Project 20386 and sanctions for Ukraine: what to do with it anyway
In the center, in uniform, is Admiral V. Korolev, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, who was acting at the time of the shooting, nearby, in a civilian suit, former Commander-in-Chief V. Chirkov, who was involved in the start of work on the project during his service, and later went to work in USC. Korolev, by the way, also went there later. Photo: TsMKB Almaz
Imminent critical problems with the construction of warships, described in the article “New ships in the post-sanctions era. What will we be able to build after the NWO?” forced to take a fresh look at the already notorious project 20386, which for a certain time became a real curse of domestic naval construction.
For those who are interested in the issue recently - a short reference.
Background question
Project 20386 is the result of the insanity of a number of figures from shipbuilding, which was superimposed by the desire of other figures to necessarily put radar systems manufactured by Zaslon JSC on all promising ships, and this desire arose in those days (2013) when there were no guarantees that " Zaslon will be able to make at least an inoperable complex (recall that according to the state contract for the corvette pr. 20385 with a fully functioning IBMK Zaslon, the ship was to be handed over to the Navy in 2015).
What was the fix idea when creating this ship?
The desire to have a replaceable load on it in containers. And without any justification from an operational-tactical point of view. Then - let's go spinning, as the Americans call it, "death spirals."
Do you need containers? They need additional internal volume for the same hoists. More volume, more displacement. But then the sediment will grow, right?
And then let's give the case "innovative" contours. What for? And for the development of ship architecture. They will also help create volumes for containers in the feed, because the project needs containers. And then choose gas turbines as energy for the afterburner so that the ship with innovative contours is fast.
With the contours there, after that, however, everything became difficult, so much so that now an additional section cannot be inserted into this building, even if it is necessary. In the bow, in order to fit the 3S97 launchers of the Redut anti-aircraft missile system and the A-100 190-mm gun mount into the “innovative” contours, the gun had to be removed behind the launchers in the direction of the ship’s movement and make it difficult to fully use it in air defense.
The same perverted logic led to the appearance on a ship with a displacement of less than 4 tons of a helicopter lift, like on an aircraft carrier or a heavy nuclear missile cruiser, and a high superstructure with a large sail area, on which the antenna canvases of an extremely problematic radar complex were supposed to stand.
In the press, you can find the following accusations (not confirmed by any official bodies, of course):
How did it happen that, to put it mildly, the crude project was approved for implementation?
Its chief designer is Rear Admiral (Ret.) Igor Zakharov, son of the outstanding communications scientist Grigory Zakharov...
In 2010, he became Deputy General Designer of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau (TsMKB). And on February 1, 2013, Igor Zakharov was elevated to the position of Vice President of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, where he oversaw the management of investments and promising projects. At the same time, the former head of the 1st Central Research Institute remained to serve in Almaz.
Having devoted most of his life to theoretical research in the field of shipbuilding, Igor Grigoryevich decided to apply them in practice - favorable conditions were created for this. Scientific work is often incompatible with design activities, but Zakharov could not cope with his own ambitions.
Igor Grigorievich himself composed the tactical and technical specifications for the project 20386 corvette, on behalf of the Almaz Central Design Bureau approved it from his successor as head of the 1st Central Research Institute (since March 1, 2012 - the Research Institute of Shipbuilding and Armament of the Navy VUNTS "Naval Academy" ), and then signed with the then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, who later became the chief adviser to the USC president.
So the incapacitated warship project was put into operation, which crashed not on the rocks, but on the vanity of its creator.
Its chief designer is Rear Admiral (Ret.) Igor Zakharov, son of the outstanding communications scientist Grigory Zakharov...
In 2010, he became Deputy General Designer of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau (TsMKB). And on February 1, 2013, Igor Zakharov was elevated to the position of Vice President of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, where he oversaw the management of investments and promising projects. At the same time, the former head of the 1st Central Research Institute remained to serve in Almaz.
Having devoted most of his life to theoretical research in the field of shipbuilding, Igor Grigoryevich decided to apply them in practice - favorable conditions were created for this. Scientific work is often incompatible with design activities, but Zakharov could not cope with his own ambitions.
Igor Grigorievich himself composed the tactical and technical specifications for the project 20386 corvette, on behalf of the Almaz Central Design Bureau approved it from his successor as head of the 1st Central Research Institute (since March 1, 2012 - the Research Institute of Shipbuilding and Armament of the Navy VUNTS "Naval Academy" ), and then signed with the then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, who later became the chief adviser to the USC president.
So the incapacitated warship project was put into operation, which crashed not on the rocks, but on the vanity of its creator.
Read more - Alexander Ivanin, "Nimble" Mercury "stumbled over vanity" (HBO)system. (Attention - "Military Review" has nothing to do with the author of the quoted text and its content, it is simply copied from a third-party source).
Initially, the need for the project was justified by lobbyists like this:
“The navy abandoned project 20385 stealth corvettes, three of which - Thundering, Agile and Capable - were going to be built at Severnaya Verf in St. Petersburg, an informed source told Izvestia. Commander-in-Chief fleet.
At a recent meeting at the Ministry of Defense with the participation of representatives of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the military decided to complete only the Thundering one according to the original plan, and develop a new project for the rest.
“The main thing that does not suit us is the too high price and excessive armament - Kalibr cruise missiles that work on sea and ground targets. Project 20385 does not meet the requirements of the fleet, ”the source said.
According to him, the estimated cost of one ship is about 14 billion rubles, but in reality it can reach 18 billion. For a corvette with a displacement of 2,2 thousand tons, although made using stealth technology, this is a lot. Equally modern frigates of project 11356R/M, which are now being built for the Black Sea Fleet, have a displacement of almost twice as much - 4 thousand tons, and cost the same.
At a recent meeting at the Ministry of Defense with the participation of representatives of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the military decided to complete only the Thundering one according to the original plan, and develop a new project for the rest.
“The main thing that does not suit us is the too high price and excessive armament - Kalibr cruise missiles that work on sea and ground targets. Project 20385 does not meet the requirements of the fleet, ”the source said.
According to him, the estimated cost of one ship is about 14 billion rubles, but in reality it can reach 18 billion. For a corvette with a displacement of 2,2 thousand tons, although made using stealth technology, this is a lot. Equally modern frigates of project 11356R/M, which are now being built for the Black Sea Fleet, have a displacement of almost twice as much - 4 thousand tons, and cost the same.
Link.
But even before the launch of the hull, the costs of 20386 exceeded 29 billion rubles.
In 2016, the ship was "laid down", but the construction stopped until the end of 2018, when the hull actually began to be built.
Since 2018, with the help of a series of articles, both his own and in co-authorship, and appeals to the command of the Navy, he managed to cause a resonance around the project, including in shipbuilding circles.
Including this (but not only and not so much this) led to certain progress around this harmful project, but it did not stop its progress.
The most important thing that this did not change is that from 2016 to 2021 we did not lay down a single ship for the near sea zone capable of solving anti-submarine missions. Project 22350 frigates can fight submarines, but these are not BMZ mass ships, and they are built in a small series.
Now that the production of marine diesel engines is in doubt due to sanctions, this five-year break will affect the country's defense capability even more.
In 2019, the corvette, which was then called "Daring", was renamed "Mercury" (temporarily!) And became a defendant in a completely shameful stories with an attempt to pass "Mercury" for some other ship, not for the "original" 20386.
In general, all those interested can familiarize themselves with the history of shame in the article "Technical descent: "corvette" project 20386 was removed from the boathouse". In it, the shortcomings of the project are disclosed in an exhaustive form, with technical details and illustrations, and the chronology of the races around the "six" is given with links. For those who are interested in the issue, but do not have enough information about the 20386 project, its study will be very interesting and informative.
At the end of the article (it was the spring of 2021), a recommendation was made - to close the project, fix the losses. At that time, it was correct, but investments in the project continued.
So, at the Zvezda-Reductor plant, the production of a 6RP gear for the power plant of this ship began.
It became known that work is underway to manufacture a composite superstructure.
And in June 2021, it was announced that the ship could be completed as an experimental one, to conduct various tests on it.
In the context of the formation of such a large backlog for this project, the question arose - is it possible to build something useful using the backlog?
This question was posed in the article “Project 20386 seems to be all. What to do with the backlog - the hull and accessories ".
The final decision on the ship has not yet been made.
Now the empty hull of the ship is docked to the wall at Severnaya Verf, as a monument to our approaches to naval construction. 6 years have already passed since its pompous "bookmarking", and 4 years since the start of the actual construction.
Project 20386 corvette, old photo, but it still looks like this. And it's right there.
In the meantime, the superstructure was manufactured and delivered to the Severnaya Verf.
And at the same time, according to some signs, the problems of the Barrier with obtaining components and subsystems for their radars turned out to be on the verge of insoluble - this is especially evident if you visit their test complex on Lake Ladoga (whoever is in the subject understands what it is about).
In theory, the project in its original form is unrealizable, and it would be possible to send it straight to hell even now, but we have a new introductory one - the sanctions will not allow to complete the construction of those project 20380 and 20385 corvettes that were recently laid down, as due to difficulties with production of diesel engines of the D49 family, and because of problems with the element base. At least, at least in some reasonable time - for sure.
So - it's still worth returning to the question posed earlier - what can be obtained from the already existing backlog by 20386? There are much more serious opponents on the way than Ukraine, with fleets, and every one will count, even this one. Since it will be impossible to build 20380 and 20385, then it is logical at least it complete in combat readiness.
It's time to answer the question posed earlier.
"Evmenov's variant" or cons of an experimental ship
A. Rakhmanov, who voiced the idea of turning 20386 into an experimental ship, could not come up with it himself, which is obvious to any understanding person. Such a "message" can only come from the fleet and nowhere else.
The situation when a ship at an unacceptably high price is completed according to a project close to the original, and then fails state tests, is fraught with a lot of trouble for the command of the Navy. Most likely, the ideas about the experimental ship have this as the root cause - as an experimental one, it can generally be handed over without part of the systems on board and not worry about the fact that it is not combat-ready. Will stand at the wall, the crew will do something on board.
What is the first disadvantage of this approach? It is obvious - the cost of the ship will be incurred, but the fleet will not receive a combat-ready unit.
But, alas, it will receive "just a unit." It will require people, money, resources, and in the event of war, this incapacitated ship will be given tasks as if it were a real one - the war in Ukraine gave many examples of this approach, with a corresponding “price”.
If the ship is completed as an “experimental” one (the quotes are quite out of place here), then there may be any composition of electronic weapons, there may not be a towed sonar station or something else.
The second drawback lies in the very attempt to finish building something similar to the original project. Recall - the windage of the superstructure, the risks that its insufficient rigidity will not allow the radar (for example, there will no longer be a "Barrier") to accurately determine the location of the target and its movement parameters, due to unpredictable deformations of the superstructure, a huge empty volume in the stern never and no containers will not be filled, and the ship will carry air there, and so on, in the articles on the links, all these shortcomings are fully disclosed.
This is also a problem, and it is also desirable to solve it.
What are the options to still get a combat unit?
Two possible approaches
There are two rational approaches to rebuilding 20386 to get a combat-ready unit.
First - conservative, when the design of the ship changes to the least possible extent.
This method implies only some expansion of electronic weapons and installation of antenna sheets in the provided composite superstructure. Perhaps it will have to be other canvases, not "Zaslonov's". Or, as an option, this radar should be abandoned by mounting "ordinary" serial radars on the top of the superstructure.
What are the benefits of this approach?
Firstly, there is no need to significantly alter the already built building.
Secondly, investments in the superstructure, which has already been delivered to Severnaya Verf, do not disappear.
Such a building is cheaper than any other option.
Before we consider it, we will voice one more question.
The ship is designed at the same time and requires electricity radar complex, and electric propulsion. The question arises - what kind of diesel generators will provide power to these systems? The question is not idle, more power will be needed.
The most likely supplier of diesel generators will be Sinara. But they don't have enough power.
Is the DM185 diesel engine, which does not yet exist in serial form, planned there?
Or should an innovative ship have a diesel generator based on the “XNUMXth” family of the Kolomna Plant?
Alas, none of this is in the series, moreover, Kolomna has no chance to bring the family of new diesel engines to the series, and Sinara, of course, can bring its engine to the series, sometime in the distant future ... probably.
For today, it is worth considering that, it seems, the project is without diesel generators, and if you rely on others, then you need to redesign part of the premises.
And now - in detail about the completion with minimal alterations.
We leave the superstructure without any serious alterations (and serious alterations on the composite structure will not turn out). On top of the superstructure, the Pozitiv-M (MK) radar and the canvases of the target detection station from the Pantsir are installed. Together they cover the required ranges and can be used to issue target designation air defense systems against any air targets, including low-flying anti-ship missiles.
The question remains of where to get target designation for their anti-ship missiles. Taking into account what is in the series, and economic realities, this should be the Mineral RLC.
To control artillery fire, you can use the 5P-10 Puma radar, which proved to be excellent on Project 20380 corvettes.
At the same time, the Barrier radar is not put on the ship, since, firstly, it is most likely not to be produced, secondly, these are huge costs, and thirdly, a large mass, without which the ship will have much better stability . Also, this solution seriously reduces the cost of REV, simplifies maintenance in the future, and makes it easier to obtain spare parts and spare parts.
At the same time, the racks with the equipment of the RLC "Mineral" will partly occupy the volumes in which the equipment from the RLC "Barrier" was, and the problem of powerful diesel generators is simplified by the fact that without the RLC from the "Barrier" the required power of diesel generators will be less.
At the same time, no containers are particularly needed on this ship, theoretically, the compartment in which they were supposed to be located could be used to accommodate one or two more boats, plus those installed along the sides. If necessary, of course.
Unfortunately, with this approach, other shortcomings remain unresolved: an overcomplicated hangar with a lift, the location of artillery pieces, and the overall irrationality of the design.
Therefore, it is worth exploring different approach - redesigning the hull and abandoning the composite superstructure, in order to build a ship with a different architecture than the currently known project 20386.
Any specialist will be against this option due to the huge amount of alterations to the original project, but, as an option, it is worth voicing it all the same.
Briefly - the helicopter lift is dismantled, the height of the aft compartments for modular weapons is reduced to the height that is left there for lifting equipment for containers, the height of the take-off deck is reduced.
Stern - you can see how much space is needed so that the hoist can move above the container. If only boats had to be moved along the compartment, it could be lower, and this is minus tens (at least) tons of metal.
The hull is being redesigned for the purpose of reconfiguration, in order to end up with a regular "classic" small frigate. With the same composition of electronic weapons, with the same composition weapons, as during completion with minimal changes, but with a superstructure similar in architecture to the project 20380 corvettes, with a conventional hangar and a mast for radar stations.
At the same time, the width of the hull 20386 makes it easy to place two helicopters on it in the hangar.
The finished superstructure with this option is sent to the scrap, bypassing the operation stage.
Thus, instead of a “dried Zumwalt”, we will get a light frigate with a more or less traditional architecture, relatively simple.
The fatal drawback of this ship will be its inadequate power plant, according to the plan, but nothing can be done here.
An estimate "on the fingers" shows that this ship can have weapons identical to project 20385, a fully operational radar and, therefore, effective air defense, a pair of helicopters instead of one, and possibly some other weapons.
The effectiveness of the contours remains in question, but here, as with the power plant, nothing can be done.
The downside of this approach is the huge amount of hull work (together with a complete revision of the project) and the rejection of the finished superstructure, which will make this ship simply “golden” in the end.
But from the point of view of combat effectiveness, this option is the best, because it allows you to get a real combat unit, just “lame” in terms of economy speed and, apparently, with increased noise on electric motors.
But this shortcoming, we repeat, cannot be eliminated. Now.
Under normal conditions, when Russia can “drive a series” of corvettes, all this would be superfluous, but in the future we will see an aggravation with the United States, and battles with countries that have a fleet, and a stop in construction or a serious slowdown in the 20380 and 20385 series due to problems with Kolomna diesels - therefore, now it has become more correct to complete the 20386 as a combat one, and the more efficient it is, the better.
The last question is legal.
The second option will meet on its way a lot of purely legal obstacles. But, in the end, we have hostilities going on, and it is possible to somehow regulate this issue in the “manual mode”. The main thing is to want to finally get rid of this undertaking. There is every reason to believe that the command of the Navy has such a desire.
As for the costs of this miracle project, no matter what its fate turns out to be, they will be monstrous in any case. Unfortunately, it is impossible in principle to adhere to such approaches to naval construction as our country adheres to and not pay for it in the end.
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