Nobody pulled the tongue
The recently announced official refusal of Iran to recognize Crimea, Donbass, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions as Russian territory is due to several reasons at once. But first of all, the fact that Tehran, in anticipation of the resumption of the notorious “nuclear deal”, does not want to provoke further anti-Iranian sanctions pressure from the West.
Countries that are unfriendly to Russia are currently engaged in an unprincipled cleansing of the political and economic space for those who, in one area or another, show at least relative loyalty or tolerance towards Moscow.
With countries such as the BRICS members, this does not work, it is also difficult with Turkey or Hungary. But it turns out that it is very possible to put pressure on Tehran. And after all, no one in Iran was particularly drawn to the language, and Moscow did not set the recognition of the Crimea and four new regions of the Russian Federation as a condition for Tehran in terms of economic integration.
This process, as you know, has been rapidly gaining momentum over the past few years, and not only in Iran’s relations with Russia, but also with its partners in the EAEU and other integration structures. Nevertheless, pressure on Iran turned out to be possible - it is possible that precisely because of Tehran's active interaction with Moscow.
Memory problems
Although the Iranians apparently forgot that the USSR in 1971 cold-bloodedly recognized the inclusion of Iran in the same year in its composition of the three former British islands at the junction of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. That still allows Tehran to control almost the entire water area of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz - these sea gates to the Indian Ocean...
In connection with the Iranian demarche, we note that the North-South Eurasian transit corridor (RF-Azerbaijan-Iran-India) is not yet subject to Western anti-Iranian sanctions. But although this project is being implemented, it is getting slower every year. Thus, the subproject of the connecting northern Iranian railway line Rasht - the port of Astara - only 165 km - has not yet been implemented.
Interestingly, construction here began back in the early 2010s, when the pressure of sanctions against Iran, and even more so against Russia, was much weaker. Only in mid-January 2023, the parties agreed to speed up the construction of this section.
However, there is no financial support under the project - the sources of its financing (approximately 800 million euros in current prices) have not yet been officially announced. The fact is that this line is focused on the growth of international freight transit in the direction of Azerbaijan - the Russian Federation (and in the opposite direction).
Sanctions against the Russian Federation and Iran, as Tehran believes, may extend to the entire North-South corridor if the mentioned Rasht-Astara line is built. Moreover, since 1997, US sanctions have been in effect against the long-standing project of the Caspian-Persian Gulf shipping channel (RF-Iran).
Therefore, an extremely promising and obviously integration project is not being implemented. Since the mid 2010s There are also US sanctions against Iranian oil exports. Obviously, these factors directly or indirectly impede more active Iranian-Russian cooperation.
In this regard, since 2022, Iran has been speeding up the formation of an adjacent, moreover, non-sanctioned, railway corridor of China - Pakistan - Iran - Turkey, with branches from southern Turkey to the ports of Syria (Tartus, Baniyas) and through Syria to the ports of Lebanon (Saida, Tripoli).
To date, about 70% of the total length of such a large-scale corridor is in operation, and at least 60% of the financing here is provided by the PRC - in the form of state and commercial loans on favorable terms. Plus, Iran, together with Iraq, forms its part of the railway and parallel oil pipeline corridor to the ports of Syria.
More precisely, two Iranian-Iraqi railway border crossings are still operating, but at the beginning of 2022, the parties agreed on the construction in 2023 of a 30 km steel line between the port of Basra (the largest Iraqi port in the Persian Gulf) and the Iranian border checkpoint Shalamche, connected by a railway (20 km) with the Iranian port of Khorramshahr.
They will go the other way
The significance of the new Iran-Iraq railway goes beyond the bilateral framework, as it will become an integral part of the East-West route: China-Pakistan-Iran-Iraq-Syria/Lebanon. Accordingly, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation, the new Iran-Iraq line "will eliminate the gap in the East-West railway corridors, providing Iraq with a new outlet, through Iran, to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India." In addition to this, the same line will create "a new connection of Iran's railways with the ports of Syria and Lebanon" through Iraq.
This is not the end of large-scale regional projects - in addition, it is planned to create in 2023-2024. new railway lines between Iran and Pakistan, where so far only one steel line is in operation.
In the more distant future, the establishment of a direct rail link between Iran and Afghanistan. There is also information that the Iranian side is increasingly proposing to Pakistan and India to develop border transit infrastructure so that all of South Asia is included in the East-West corridor system.
It seems that in the current geopolitical conditions, Tehran is more interested in this Eurasian corridor, in which Russia, which has fallen under sanctions, does not participate. Therefore, the activation of the work of the North-South corridor is already a second priority.
Indirect, if not direct, confirmation of this is, we repeat, the official refusal of Iran, announced the other day, to recognize the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the Crimea, Donbass, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions.
Among other things, this also sends a signal to the West about Tehran's readiness to take into account anti-Russian sanctions. And thereby achieve the weakening (or even lifting) of sanctions against Iran - at least the oil ones.