The defeat of the Third Reich in World War II meant the collapse of the idea of a German empire in Europe and had a strong impact on the entire German society. As historian Oleg Plenkov notes, история Germany in the recent history of modernity occupies an exceptional place for the reason that it is the only country in the history of modernity that has experienced a total defeat in the war, that is, such a defeat, behind which the possibility of the revival of the national state was not even initially visible. As many Germans thought then,
“zero hour has come” [1].
The terms of surrender were harsh and meant not only territorial losses, the occupation and division of Germany, but also a revision of its political culture. The process of formation of the modern historical memory of German society about the Second World War, expressed in a sense of repentance, has been developing continuously throughout the history of the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany [2]. Regarding the reasons for German repentance, the historian Viktor Kondrashin expressed the following opinion:
“In recent history, only one country has repented for the actions of the previous authorities. This is Germany. But the repentance of the Germans was not voluntary, but forced. It was imposed on them by the victors [3].”
The first stage in the formation of historical memory should include the denazification processes, first in the occupation zones, and then in the FRG and the GDR. The denazification of Germany, like the Nuremberg Trials that initiated it, are widely publicized components of post-war reconstruction.
However, it can be stated that these processes have become mythologized. In this material, we will try to answer the questions - how did the Germans feel about the Nuremberg trials, how did they feel about the Third Reich in the 1950s and 1960s, and how Germany eventually came to condemnation of Nazism and national repentance.
The Nuremberg trials through the eyes of the Germans
As Oleg Plenkov notes, the Nuremberg Tribunal in the eyes of the Germans was not a court that was perceived as fair and legal. He is perceived as such today, and immediately after the war there were quite controversial issues related to his work. The Germans were inclined to perceive the Nuremberg trials as the revenge of the victors.
The German historian S. Haffner noted that the major mistake of the Allies during the Nuremberg Tribunal was that they did not separate from each other, firstly, military aggression, secondly, war crimes, and thirdly, genocide. The first was committed by all powers without exception at all times, the second was done during the war not only by the Germans, but mass murder in a factory way - this is what really separated Nazism from the civilized world. Simply put, the prosecutors at Nuremberg blurred the difference between the crimes of the Nazis and ordinary imperial politics [5].
The trial of another state, in principle, had no precedents and was a legal nonsense. Moreover, during the war, all participants committed crimes, but only the defeated were judged. French historian Marc Ferro rightly notes:
“At the same time, other regimes – singers of democracy and champions of freedom – have also resorted to war of annihilation without hesitation. Even if such a war was not justified theoretically and was not programmed, it, nevertheless, provided, following the example of the enemy, erasing cities to the ground - up to the use of the atomic bomb [6]."
The chief American prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson, said that
"War is a crime"
must be understood that any war. The most piquant thing was that Enola Gay with an atomic bomb on board was already on its way to Hiroshima, when in London the thesis of the main US prosecutor Jackson that “war is a crime [5]” was lively discussed.
It must also be remembered that the Nuremberg Trials were a typically American undertaking, since Americans have always been inclined to transfer the principles of their domestic policy to foreign policy throughout the world. President Woodrow Wilson tried to do the same after the end of the First World War, trying to replace the former principle of the balance of power in international politics [5].
In 1918, a situation similar to 1945 already took place: at the end of the war, an attempt was made to compile a list of 4 war criminals, including the Kaiser (the Dutch, however, refused to extradite him), Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Bethmann Gollweg, but in the end, the Entente countries abandoned all of this. In Nuremberg, on the other hand, the emotional component was very strong: the scale of the murders was terrible, it was especially difficult to comprehend what was happening in the concentration camps [900].
The status of the international tribunal, which was agreed and signed on August 8, 1945, included three points:
1. Planning and conducting an aggressive war.
2. Violation of the laws of war and the customs of war - that is, war crimes.
3. Crimes against humanity, to the extent that these violations are related to war crimes.
However, an important remark should be made never after Nuremberg was the crime of waging a war of aggression recognized in international law.
With regard to war crimes, the question related to the "execution of criminal orders" was of particular interest. Wehrmacht General Alfred Jodl at the Nuremberg trials said that decisions to start a war are made by politicians, not soldiers,
"soldiers do not wage aggressive wars, this is a political concept" [7].
Jodl's words about a soldier's duty to obey an order were later repeated many times in different versions. In fact, if you choose orders that you need to obey, and which you don’t, such a path will lead to a dead end, since the army is built on the relationship of order-subordination. Refusal to obey has always resulted in punishment.
For example, English officer William Douglas Home landed in prison for a year for refusing to obey the order of his command to continue the bombardment of French Le Havre in September 1944, when the head of the German garrison, Colonel Eberhard Wildermuth, after the first bombing war, asked for permission to evacuate the civilian population. Home command forbade Home to accept the offer of a German officer, but Home did not obey the order, for which he was suspended and arrested. The new commander continued the shelling, as a result, more than three thousand Frenchmen died in the besieged city [5].
In this regard, Home expressed surprise at the court-martial's finding of von Manstein "guilty of allowing the execution of the orders of the highest leadership." Home advised two amendments to the British army regulations: first, to specify which orders were to be carried out and which were not; secondly, to determine what entails a greater criminal punishment - obedience or disobedience to orders [5].
In 1954, in Germany, it was legally established that all decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal are binding and do not require any additional evidence. This decision opened windows and doors for the subjectivism of the winners. History textbooks, not to mention scientific research, had to follow this court order dictated by politicians [5].
As a result, it should be stated that the Nuremberg Tribunal was, of course, necessary, but it did not become a prologue to the establishment of a real legal order in the assessment of war crimes as such and did not create any corresponding precedent.
The real realization by the Germans of what had happened happened much later, according to the German historian Edgar Wolfram:
“in Germany, the understanding that defeat in the war and liberation from Nazism are interconnected came much later than 1945”
and by no means due to the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal [8].
Denazification - myths and reality
Aerial view of the Justice Buildings on Fürterstraße in Nuremberg in November 1945
The basic principles of denazification were considered at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
Denazification meant the destruction of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) and all structures controlled by it, the cleansing of all spheres of society from Nazi leaders and National Socialist ideas. The main goal of denazification can be considered the desire to convince the German people that
"that he had suffered a total military defeat, and that he could not escape the responsibility for what he had brought upon himself, since his own ruthless warfare and fanatical resistance had destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable" [9].
It should be noted that the denazification carried out by the occupation authorities was aimed at forming a new historical memory of the German people about the Second World War. Recall that the NSDAP in Germany had a high popularity rating. In July 1932, the NSDAP received 37,36% in the elections to the Reichstag, and in November - 33,09%, which demonstrated its popularity. This success was one of the reasons why Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933 as Chancellor of the Reich.
Denazification was based on the legal norms of the Nuremberg trials. It was initiated by the military administrations of the occupation zones, but after the emergence of two states, the FRG and the GDR, it was assigned to their competence. In the 1950s, a shortage of personnel and the Cold War led to a partial "renazification" of the FRG, as a result of which some former Nazis ended up in government bodies. In 1951, amendments were made to the fundamental law of the Federal Republic of Germany, which allowed former members of the NSDAP to return to service in a number of government agencies [10]. In fact, the new system has successfully integrated many people with a brown background.
The myths that in 1945, after the total defeat, the Germans suddenly became democratic and unequivocally condemned their past, are quite common, but have very little relation to reality. As historian Nikolai Vlasov notes, in the 1950s and 1960s there were many people in Germany who still sympathized with the Third Reich.
“There was no “zero hour” in 1945 for German society. Hitler continued to enjoy posthumous popularity, a significant part of society, and a few years after the defeat, considered the pre-war Third Reich the best time in German history.
In the 1950s and 1960s, there were quite a lot of people in Germany who did not want to know anything about any guilt, responsibility, and the list goes on. These people sincerely believed that the Wehrmacht was carrying out a noble mission to protect Germany from Bolshevism, and the death camps were a fake invented by the winners.
The West Germans began to really deal with their past towards the end of the 1960s, when a new generation matured, many tarnished figures left the stage, and the FRG was already a fairly successful and stable system that was not threatened by the fate of Weimar [12]”,
In the 1950s and 1960s, there were quite a lot of people in Germany who did not want to know anything about any guilt, responsibility, and the list goes on. These people sincerely believed that the Wehrmacht was carrying out a noble mission to protect Germany from Bolshevism, and the death camps were a fake invented by the winners.
The West Germans began to really deal with their past towards the end of the 1960s, when a new generation matured, many tarnished figures left the stage, and the FRG was already a fairly successful and stable system that was not threatened by the fate of Weimar [12]”,
the historian notes.
In his opinion, the main factor in the stability of the early FRG was the "German economic miracle."
“The main factor in the stability of the early FRG was the famous “German economic miracle”.
Citizens began to wholeheartedly support the new system when they felt real improvements in their own lives. It is often said that the victors acted very wisely, not by punishing the West Germans financially, but by helping them recover as soon as possible. In fact, this strategy was dictated primarily not by historical wisdom, but by the development of the Cold War in Europe.
In a situation of acute confrontation with the social bloc, the Western powers needed a strong and successful Germany as the eastern bastion of the Western world, they needed a West German army and industrial potential.
The issue of punishing the Germans for the same reason quickly became irrelevant [12].”
Citizens began to wholeheartedly support the new system when they felt real improvements in their own lives. It is often said that the victors acted very wisely, not by punishing the West Germans financially, but by helping them recover as soon as possible. In fact, this strategy was dictated primarily not by historical wisdom, but by the development of the Cold War in Europe.
In a situation of acute confrontation with the social bloc, the Western powers needed a strong and successful Germany as the eastern bastion of the Western world, they needed a West German army and industrial potential.
The issue of punishing the Germans for the same reason quickly became irrelevant [12].”
It is difficult to disagree with this opinion. However, it is difficult to agree with another thesis of the historian.
In the same text, Nikolai Vlasov emphasizes that the occupation administrations first took part in the formation of the new German elite, and then delegated powers to it, while he also notes that
"if a significant number of West Germans rejected the new regime, the victors could do little about it",
thus giving two mutually exclusive theses.
German society was clearly not ready for new upheavals and resistance to the new German political elites formed by the victorious countries (primarily the United States), so the thesis that they could be rejected seems to the author unreasonable.
The Holocaust and the Politics of "National Repentance"
As Oleg Plenkov notes, the German historiography of the social history of Nazi Germany is concerned with only one thing - the process of national re-education, repentance, overcoming the temptation of the German people by Nazism. In Germany, political correctness and the tasks of political education are still at the center of attention during the debate about collective guilt and involvement in Nazism.
The turning point in the history of Germany was the student uprisings of 1968, when a new generation, in an inquisitorial manner, demanded from the previous generation an account of what happened to their fathers and mothers. Despite the fact that the students protested against the "American imperialists", they adopted the "sit-in" and "go-in" forms of protest from the Americans, thus Americanizing their own country [1].
The Holocaust was dealt with especially radically in 1968 - it was made the main crime of the Germans. It was in connection with the Holocaust that Nazism in the minds of the Germans became the personification of absolute evil, and the usual need for a critical rethinking of the past gradually turned into repentance on an unprecedented scale, accompanied by the absolutization of evil. In this regard, Erich Nolte wittily noted that if we are talking about "absolute evil", then this implies that there is an "absolute good" and that in some historical interpretations that Jewish researchers offer,
“The Holocaust is perceived as an attack on a God-fearing people and thus on God himself” [11].
The Nazi past seems to have left a perpetual wound on Germany. Germany lives with this wound, and so that it does not fester, the wound is opened from time to time. The magic number - six million victims of the Holocaust - is not negotiable, it is expressly prohibited by law [1]. The Holocaust has become a creed and a criterion for the moral, political and even aesthetic evaluation of discourses of any kind in Germany.
In the 1960s, the Germans gradually turned from victims of Nazism into villains and criminals for their own compatriots. In left-wing circles, the ethnic cleansing of the Germans, their brutal eviction after the victory in 1945, began to be seen as just retribution for the genocide of the Jews. The one who recalled the suffering of the Germans fell under suspicion that he sought to cast doubt on the suffering of the victims of Nazi aggression [1].
In 1993, Steven Spielberg's "Schindler's List" once again addressed the topic of the extermination of the Jews. The scale of evil was shown in this film especially clearly, thanks to the skill of the Hollywood director.
Three years after Schindler's List, the American historian Daniel Goldhagen published Hitler's Willing Executioners. The author sought to show that the murder of Jews in the Third Reich is a national political goal of the Germans during the war. In Germany, the book was received with great attention, and there was even a broad public discussion on this subject, despite the absurdity of the question. The issue of erecting a monument to the victims of the Holocaust in the center of Berlin was also widely discussed; as a result, it was built, despite its obvious architectural absurdity [1].
In shaping this approach to the issue of the Holocaust, the state of Israel played an important role, whose politicians sought to “instrumentalize” this tragedy and adapt it to their own political needs. It is clear to historians that Israel is greatly affected by the concept of the Holocaust, yet the Nuremberg trials did not mention the Holocaust at all. It is very important that influential American Jews also constantly exploit the theme of the Holocaust, using it for their own political purposes.
Foreigners look with mixed feelings of disbelief and surprise at this German secular self-flagellation, which other Western countries have increasingly come to perceive as exemplary and worthy of emulation [1].
Conclusion
Thus, it should be stated that the key role in the process of denazification of Germany was played not so much by denazification itself (which did not come down to punishing criminals, but included a revision of educational programs, limiting the influence of National Socialist ideas on culture, literature, art, the abolition of Nazi laws etc.), how much democratization and the "German economic miracle". And, of course, all this was supported by anti-Nazi propaganda.
The sharp rise in the German economy was due to large financial support from the United States, which established control over the industrialized regions of West Germany and de facto made the FRG its protectorate. After the Second World War, Germany found itself in a fundamentally different situation than after the First World War, the Germans were not severely punished economically (this became possible due to the Cold War), but on the contrary, they gave their economy an incentive.
True, you have to pay for everything, and the Germans paid for this with their political independence.
German political scientist Philip Manow in his book In the Shadow of Kings. The Political Anatomy of Democratic Representation" wrote:
“Modern democracy is not post-metaphysical, but, so to speak, neo-metaphysical. Every political power, including democracy, needs political mythology and produces it:
"A completely disenchanted world is a completely depoliticized world."
Any form of political government operates in the context of a symbolic series that legitimizes it [4].”
"A completely disenchanted world is a completely depoliticized world."
Any form of political government operates in the context of a symbolic series that legitimizes it [4].”
German repentance for Nazism and a conscious rejection of claims to a leading political role in Europe and in the process of its integration (and in everything else), as well as a politically correct interpretation of the Holocaust, which, as Oleg Plenkov notes, is the initial myth of the formation of national identity in Germany, have become conditions for Germany's integration into the Western world.
Paradoxically, the negative myth has become the cornerstone of the historical identity of the whole nation.
Использованная литература:
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[2]. Historical memory of the Second World War in Germany: stages of formation / D. I. Kolesov [et al.] // Izv. higher textbook head Povolzhsk. region. Humanite. Sciences. - 2018. - No. 1 (45). – P. 89–104; The same [Electronic resource]. – URL: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/v/istoricheskaya-pamyat-o-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyne-v-germanii-etapy-formirovaniya.
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[6]. Ferro, Mark. Seven main faces of the war, 1918-1945 [Text]: parallel history / Mark Ferro; [per. from fr. S. I. Shemet]. - Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2014.
[7]. Darnstadt T. Das Weltgericht. // Der Spiegel. - 2006, No. 42.
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[nine]. Berlin conference. July 9 - August 17, 2 Protocol of the Berlin Conference of the Three Great Powers August 1945, 1 - URL: http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/War_Conf/berlin_main.htm.
[10]. Kolesov, Denis. Holocaust memory culture in Germany's denazification policy [Text] / D. Kolesov, O. Shimanskaya // Modern Europe. - Moscow, 2019. - No. 4. - P. 164–173.
[eleven]. Winkler HA Der lange Weg nach Westen. Zweiter Band. Deutsche Geschichte vom "Dritten Reich" bis zur Wiedervereinigung. Munich: Beck, 11. 2002 s.
[12]. Six theses about the early Germany (published on the blog of the historian Nikolai Vlasov) URL: https://navlasov.livejournal.com/237726.html.