New ships in the post-sanctions era. What will we be able to build after NWO?
Project 20386 hull, then still it was Mercury, formal laying date - autumn 2016, and a small hull nearby - "Strict" project 20380, has been under construction since February 2015. The photo was taken at Severnaya Shipyard in mid-2021. Now with the filling of the buildings, everything will be much more complicated. And any mistake with the choice of components in the project will end up with such cases. Photo: Curious, forums.airbase.ru
The sanctions imposed on Russia after the start of the NWO will inevitably require a revision of the programs for the construction of surface ships. And the sooner the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and the Main Command of the Navy realize this, the less problems, financial losses, empty buildings in the "eternal parking" at shipyards and shame the country will see ahead.
Alas, until this is realized, and the industry, represented by some of its representatives, is doing everything to ensure that nothing changes (the main thing is that the gigantic and incredibly expensive "swelling" of funds into the submarine does not change, with the absence of a system for its anti-mine and anti-submarine support, not ensured the combat stability of the submarine forces themselves, the defense of bases and the near sea zone as a whole).
The proposed article contains a short overview of those possible options for building multi-purpose main classes of ships that Russia has left. This does not mean that only this can be done. But this means that all other paths will not be successful and will end in failure in one form or another.
Brief background of the issue
About what approaches in the correct version should be guided in the construction of a surface fleet, the author wrote in the article "Fundamentals of shipbuilding policy: principles and their application". All these principles are true and relevant to this day, but now we have to make a very sharp correction for the fact that the type of ships will have to be reduced to the limit.
An example of the result of the application of such principles by the United States is described in the article "The frigate" Perry "as a lesson for Russia: machine-designed, massive and cheap".
The actual technological capabilities of the country were analyzed and "sorted" in the article "Fundamentals of shipbuilding policy: a large and strong Navy inexpensively".
The time has come to clarify what is written there, taking into account the new realities.
Let's make a reservation right away - we are talking only about technical and industrial capabilities, and not about the results of the combat activities of the Navy. The way the fleet showed itself in its first major military campaign since the Great Patriotic War is a separate sad topic. The author warned for several years how any collision of our fleet with a "competent and understanding enemy" would end, and, in fact, the results are obvious, and the fact that the enemy does not have a fleet at all has not changed anything.
But this is a topic for a separate material, and now - the technical part.
As before, a certain overview will be given on various ship systems, with an approximate list of what is now technically possible and what needs to be done.
Before moving on, it must be emphasized once again that the risk of a nuclear war for the Russian Federation has not gone away, moreover, it is growing. V.V. Putin also stated this on December 7, 2022, and verbatim.
The only means of deterrence that guarantees a retaliatory strike against the United States, even in the event of a “missed” disarming strike from the Americans, are maritime strategic nuclear forces with combat stability.
Now everyone is looking at Russia’s prospects through the prism of the ongoing war, but one must understand that it will either end or turn into a low-intensity border conflict, but the threat from the United States will remain at best, and at worst will grow to the limit.
And ensuring the deployment and combat stability of NSNF is impossible either without surface forces operating in the near sea zone, or without a detachment of forces in the far one, for which, among other things, appropriate surface ships are needed.
For this reason, the need to drastically restore the capabilities of the fleet is becoming more and more acute. And this is impossible without increasing its numbers, especially in the light of the upcoming mass retirement of Soviet-built ships.
This need is also made acute by the actual level of adequacy to the tasks of the Navy shown by the Black Sea Fleet during the NWO. Recall that Ukraine has practically no fleet as such, and it is difficult to imagine the fate of the Black Sea Fleet if Ukraine had an adequate fleet, at least some.
And the sanctions, the continuous growth of economic pressure on the Russian Federation, the technological blockade and the inevitable economic recession in the near future impose a lot of restrictions on how the task of recreating the fleet can be solved, and place a lot of demands on our decision-making system.
"Sanction" and industrial production
The sanctions imposed on Russia after the NWO left a sharp imprint on the country's technological capabilities, primarily in terms of components for electronic systems. The production of radar complexes, communication systems, guided missiles, sonar equipment and other similar systems proved to be difficult.
At the same time, the situation is generally not catastrophic - most of the components can still be imported.
True, firstly, not everything that is needed, secondly, with delays in deliveries, and thirdly, at a higher price than before.
Therefore, on the one hand, it will no longer be possible to produce some expensive and complex ship complexes. On the other hand, Russia will not be left without shipboard electronic systems, but firstly, they will have to reduce their list, and secondly, to revise a number of long-term plans.
Some time ago, the author for the Army and Navy Review magazine wrote an article “Air defense of modern Russian ships”, which outlined the immediate prospects for shipborne air defense systems. The article was not laid out on resources on the Internet, but there is a pdf file with it in this message of the telegram channel "Sea power of the state"and anyone who wants to can see it.
Let us briefly list what available options the Russian Federation has left in terms of shipborne air defense systems.
As a radar complex for frigates and large ships - "Polyment" with some kind of "set" of serial radars for detecting air and surface targets and controlling artillery fire. By and large, we can say the following - no matter what ship of the 1st rank in the Russian Federation is planned, but in terms of the composition of the radar equipment, the REV will be “approximately 22350” - even if it is a ship in the dimension of a cruiser.
For ships of the size of a cruiser, it is possible to use the Podberyozovik radar for long-range detection and expanding the frequency band of the detection equipment.
The industry in its current state simply cannot master anything else, at least within a reasonable time frame.
Sanctions, of course, will complicate the production of these subsystems, but at least in relation to the specified composition of equipment, they have more or less learned how to bypass them.
Similarly, it is possible to “bypass” all restrictions for the production of radars used on RTOs of project 22800 Karakurt.
The following is a quote from the mentioned article on air defense:
“The issue of radar frequency on small ships needs to be analyzed separately. If frigates and ships of a higher class have both the Fourke decimeter radar and the Poliment radar, which together “cover” all the ranges necessary to provide air defense, then this cannot be done on small ships.
...
That is, there is an “expensive solution” - a decimeter long-range radar (including multifunctional, with mission support and firing), in addition to which the driving layer is controlled by an optimal centimetric radar, and there is a “cheap”, but also effective, albeit with a range limitation (and some restrictions on difficult weather conditions) - one centimeter radar.
...
That is, there is an “expensive solution” - a decimeter long-range radar (including multifunctional, with mission support and firing), in addition to which the driving layer is controlled by an optimal centimetric radar, and there is a “cheap”, but also effective, albeit with a range limitation (and some restrictions on difficult weather conditions) - one centimeter radar.
Well, or in a simple way - a ship without a Poliment can either have a Furke and Positive-M (MK) radars working together (or a good centimeter radar for detecting surface targets with a cosecant radiation pattern capable of working on low-flying targets - then is in the drive layer, which is problematic for the dm-radar), or only the Pozitiv-M (MK) with some kind of radar that provides detection of surface targets, of course.
As an artillery fire control radar, there is an excellent 3-centimeter "Puma", and "Bagheera". In general, there is even a choice, but the latest radar (as simpler and cheaper) must be checked against RM-24 target missiles, including their destruction by artillery fire.
The issue of creating a small-sized 8-mm range radar for installation directly on mass AK-630M installations in order to increase their effectiveness against modern targets at the required level remains relevant.
Let's estimate the approximate composition of radar systems for surface ships.
1. Destroyer, light cruiser, frigate:
Radar OVTS - 5P27 "Furke-2" (or "Podberezovik")
At the same time, it is extremely advisable to have two radars of different ranges (DM and SM) for the OTC.
Air defense radar - "Polyment"
Radar TsU PKRK - 34K1 "Monolith-B"
Radar UO artillery 5P-10 "Puma"
2. Light frigate, large ocean corvette (on the concept of "ocean corvette" - see article "Ocean corvette as an option for study"):
Radar OVTS - 5P27 "Furke-2"
RLC OVTs - "Pozitiv-MK"
Radar TsU PKRK - "Mineral-M"
Radar UO artillery 5P-10 "Puma" (or "Bagheera")
SAM radio correction equipment
3. Corvette (800-2500 tons displacement)
Air defense radar - "Positive-MK"
Radar TsU PKRK - "Mineral-M"
Radar UO artillery 5P-10 "Puma" or MP-123-02 "Bagheera"
SAM radio correction equipment or a separate SAM or SAM fire control system, including separate radar sheets or antenna posts.
Note - for the Pantsir-M ZRAK, it is possible to use a standard decimeter SOC, subject to the mandatory pairing of the ZRAK with good centimeter detection radars in the drive layer.
It is worth noting here that, taking into account some of the nuances of the operation of the Monolith radar, in many cases it is more preferable to use the reliable and proven Mineral radar.
The second one is an alternative complex for small ships.
Here it is:
Radar "Pozitiv-M (MK)"
Radar ZRAK "Pantsir-M" without the SOC "Pantsir" itself - see antenna canvases on the mast "Karakurt"
Radar TsU SCRC "Mineral"
Radar UO artillery 5P-10 "Puma" (or "Bagheera")
The important thing here is that, in terms of its parameters, such a bundle completely replaces the expensive and inoperable MF-RLK regiment from Zaslon JSC, but replaces it “without discounts”, that is, it provides those capabilities in terms of radar that were promised, but not really provided by the creators of the MF - RLC "Barrier".
And all on serial products with more than a moderate cost.
Perhaps, if the development of the Tor-MF air defense system is successfully completed, it will be possible to use it together with a standard radar.
It's all. The rest is either withdrawn into a separate R&D “for growth” to provide means of REV for some ships of the distant future, getting to the first project only after receiving a serial letter, or simply ceases to exist.
About "work for the future" was written in the already mentioned article "Fundamentals of shipbuilding policy: a large and strong Navy inexpensively", in this article, a whole section is devoted to working for the future, and there is no point in repeating it.
It is easy to see that, for example, an extremely expensive and, to put it mildly, “non-import-substituted” design from Zaslon JSC falls out of the list of radars available for the country. Even before the start of the SVO, there was a systemic breakdown with the release of this radar (with huge problems with the real ability to solve problems as intended). Now, under the conditions of sanctions and technological restrictions, the construction of ships with this complex is pure madness, fraught with empty hulls near the outbuilding wall.
At the same time, we will make a reservation - the Zaslonovites are trying to correct their mistakes, this is really true. How successful they have been will be shown by the delivery of the next corvettes, but even if the complex shows that you can shoot and hit from under it, its complexity, price and problems with serial production on corvettes have no justification.
Also, various supposedly promising “radar pagodas”, “radar towers”, and other pictures from pictures that exist only on paper and are unrealizable in the post-sanctions era are also “disappearing”.
Now all this is impossible: both due to problems with components, and because of the price appetites of "respectable people" - they will not do anything for cheap, and now there is no money.
It is important to pay attention to the fact that only three types of multi-purpose ships are proposed above. For comparison, projects 21631, 22160, 22800, 20380, 20385, 22350 are currently under construction.
At the same time, in truth, ships classified as a “light frigate / ocean-going corvette” do not exist even in the form of an idea, so in fact we can talk about two classes of ships for the fleet of the future - a certain large ship (now it is 22350) and a certain little corvette.
In an interesting way, we will see below that this is what is feasible for the country.
Alas, shipbuilding figures are trying to lobby for something completely different.
In one of the last interviews (and at Army-2020), Ak-Bars General Director R. Mistakhov announced a “new version” of project 21631 - in fact, a complete redesign of this project with the elimination of its acute shortcomings (water cannons, seaworthiness, sharp problems with air defense, etc.), link here. The question arises - why was it necessary to drive and lobby for the supply to the fleet of a series of obviously inferior ships with a "bouquet" of shortcomings (moreover, which experts spoke about right away)?
At the same time, today the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau at AkBars is fully loaded with work on the subject of UDC, and the possibility of allocating the necessary resources for a new corvette project raises serious doubts. Ak Bars had such an opportunity (a new version of the “lightweight” Gepard project, suitable for mass serial construction), however, having got involved in a scam with UDC, Ak Bars buried him himself.
But an attempt to shove the new 21631 “on steroids” into the fleet can again lead to a lost decade in shipbuilding, and objectively such a ship cannot be obtained under sanctions, that is, time and money will go nowhere. There won’t even be bad ships this time, even such terrible squalor as Project 22160.
For example, because there will be no more engines for them.
Main power plants
The most unpleasant surprise, oddly enough, is not in electronics. The most unpleasant surprise was thrown by the ship's energy.
To understand the question - a quote from article previously published on Military Review:
“Let's leave both series of RTOs for now, and focus on large ships by Russian standards - frigates, corvettes and landing ships.
First, what unites them all.
They all have something in common - diesel engines produced by the Kolomna Plant. Not the worst diesel engine, albeit inferior to Western counterparts, could be the main engine for the mass of warships, but ... turbochargers and parts of the cylinder-piston group are imported there and cannot be replaced by domestic counterparts.
And yet, according to informed comrades - forging the crankshaft and fuel equipment (mostly). Alas, like many other domestic engines, the Kolomna D49 is not entirely domestic.
What ships are they on? Project 22350 frigates use 10D49 with a maximum power of 5200 hp each. s., in the amount of two units, one for a diesel-gas turbine unit, on corvettes - four 16D49 of 6000 liters each. with., working through two reducers on two valoliny. The same "Corvette" power plant should stand on a couple of new BDKs.
But now Kolomna, apparently, will no longer be able to provide engines, at least for a while. Illusions that it is possible to replace foreign turbochargers, pistons and rings with our own must be discarded immediately - in Russia there is simply no technical ability to provide the required level of machining of products, there are no necessary alloys, automation and precision mechanics.
First, what unites them all.
They all have something in common - diesel engines produced by the Kolomna Plant. Not the worst diesel engine, albeit inferior to Western counterparts, could be the main engine for the mass of warships, but ... turbochargers and parts of the cylinder-piston group are imported there and cannot be replaced by domestic counterparts.
And yet, according to informed comrades - forging the crankshaft and fuel equipment (mostly). Alas, like many other domestic engines, the Kolomna D49 is not entirely domestic.
What ships are they on? Project 22350 frigates use 10D49 with a maximum power of 5200 hp each. s., in the amount of two units, one for a diesel-gas turbine unit, on corvettes - four 16D49 of 6000 liters each. with., working through two reducers on two valoliny. The same "Corvette" power plant should stand on a couple of new BDKs.
But now Kolomna, apparently, will no longer be able to provide engines, at least for a while. Illusions that it is possible to replace foreign turbochargers, pistons and rings with our own must be discarded immediately - in Russia there is simply no technical ability to provide the required level of machining of products, there are no necessary alloys, automation and precision mechanics.
A lot of time has passed since then, and I must say that everything has been confirmed. The assumption made earlier in the article turned out to be correct, and even somewhat optimistic.
So far, USC is receiving diesels for the ships laid down earlier. Moreover, it will receive a certain number of diesel engines in the future.
But the problems are already obvious, and with them the most unpleasant conclusion is obvious - the D49 series of diesel engines may soon lose their "non-import-substituted" representatives. In the best case, Kolomensky Zavod will be able to replace something with imports - with a loss of reliability, power, an increase in fuel consumption, and, apparently, an increase in the mass of engines (those in the subject understand why this can happen). But to remove from a 16-cylinder block of 6000 liters. with. it will apparently be impossible to run on it from the Baltic to the Red Sea and back, with reasonable fuel consumption, maximum power and without breakdowns.
And this means that projects 11711 in all iterations, 20380 and 20385, and most importantly - 22350 in the foreseeable future will have to give up.
It's inevitable whoever starts throwing a tantrum about the media leak right now.
Let's give Kolomna their due - they are trying their best and succeeded in some ways.
It is possible that in one way or another they will be able to get out, but the problem is that this is now a big question.
This means that it is no longer possible to rely on the D49, God forbid that the contracted ships be completed and equipped with diesel engines.
But then the question arises - and if our frigates and corvettes, perhaps, will soon be impossible to build, then what to build instead of them?
For the current leaders of the Armed Forces and the country, this issue cannot arise for obvious reasons.
But purely due to age factors, the country will soon be waiting for the renewal of the elites, and then the question will arise anyway, just now before other people.
Okay, corvettes, they have incapable air defense, about which a lot has been written, for example, an article by M. Klimov "Thundering" and others. Will our fleet get effective ships in the near-field? ".
But frigates are another matter. These are our "top" ships, the only ships capable of fighting more or less effectively in oceanic areas, the only ships capable of repelling massive air strikes at least by a detachment of ships, our most powerful combat units in the surface forces.
The Project 22350 frigate is so far our most powerful warship, and for all its shortcomings, it is the best. Especially if it's well built. But... Photo: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Yes, and instead of corvettes, something is needed. It is now that the Navy has fundamentally abandoned the protection of its near sea zone (this is exactly the case - it refused, and not “cannot, etc.”), and then the question will arise anyway (if a sudden and successful massive nuclear strike by the United States will not “carry out” us “in one gate” - the probability of this is now growing explodingly, and no one really wants to take countermeasures in the highest echelons of power).
And then it will be necessary to act very quickly, in a matter of years.
So what to build?
Zvezda and mobilization corvette
The above quote about the diesel industry situation is taken from an article that was the first in a series of materials about the so-called mobilization corvette - a multi-purpose ship capable of performing all the tasks of a warship: hitting surface and air targets, hitting surface targets using anti-ship cruise missiles (up to "Zircon"), attack ground targets with long-range cruise missiles, conduct artillery fire on air, surface and ground targets, and fight submarines.
At the same time, such a ship is maximally import-substituted, inexpensive, and its construction time, even in the conditions of Russian realities, is minimal.
The rejection of the use of M-507 diesel engines powered by propellers in favor of their M-504 "halves" working for a multi-shaft water jet installation (a diesel engine for a water jet) actually doubles the country's production capabilities even with a half-dead Zvezda, somehow released for 2,5-3 ship sets for "Karakurt" per year.
Engine M507. It can be seen that it consists of two identical sections-compartments working on a common gearbox. And it is true, these are two 56-cylinder engines working together. Photo: Dieselzipservice
And this is a single 56-cylinder compartment - the basis of both the M504 engine from one compartment and gearbox, and the two-compartment M507. Given the age of the structure, this is our past. And taking into account the sanctions, this is our future, and it has no alternative. No
Here it is necessary to emphasize the need for a mass series, because, taking into account real (complex) hydrology, effective control of underwater space requires a “network” of optimally distributed carriers and sensors of search facilities. That is, it is precisely the optimally distributed system with the required number of elements (carriers - ships) that is effective. Accordingly, there is an acute question of a reasonable limitation of the cost of such carriers (in combination with the necessary level of efficiency and combat stability).
There is no point in retelling this material. All technical scores (including high technical risk options) are available here and should be read by those interested in the topic.
The mobilization corvette will be slightly larger than the Karakurt RTO and will have a towed sonar, the Paket-NK complex and the Kalibr KRO
It is also recommended for familiarization, as it were, a “duplicate” article - "Near Sea Zone and Nuclear Deterrence" (originally published in the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, but then it had to be removed from the site), where the issue is discussed again, in a slightly more conservative version, and there are illustrations of the mentioned multi-shaft water-jet installations, including those actually built.
Let's pay attention to something else - how many ships Russia can build if it focuses on bringing the situation in its near sea zone (BMZ) back to normal.
For those who do not know why, in principle, to entrust part of the tasks of nuclear deterrence to the Navy, a special article with clarifications on this issue - Anti-submarine ships and nuclear deterrence, where the role and place of NSNF in the nuclear triad is revealed.
There are several scenarios for building a series of such ships. The first is conservative: first we complete the Karakurt series (Zvezda's capacities are limited, one mobile corvette diesel engine is half of one Karakurt diesel engine), then we start the mobilization corvette. These are the so-called "successive deliveries of diesel engines."
The second is when Zvezda's power is redistributed in such a way as to provide diesel engines for both series.
A summary analysis of shipbuilding capabilities is given in the summary table. In the optimistic scenario, it should be understood that some of the diesel engines built in a given year, but not used in it, are transferred to the hulls laid down in the next. With a two-year construction cycle, two years after the laying of each ship, a new ship will enter the fleet. Why such a short period? And the ship is simple, and besides, there is a precedent - the timing of the construction of the first "Karakurt". It must also be remembered that, due to their small size and draft, mobilization corvettes can be built at any of the shipyards.
It is easy to see that even our killed shipbuilding industry, with the technical and design solutions listed in the article at the link, is capable of building ships at a completely Chinese pace, and these ships are more powerful than the Chinese "056", they carry long-range cruise missiles. And they are faster (up to 28-29 knots).
Nevertheless, it is worth estimating how many ships of the near sea zone could be obtained in China if ships of Project 056A were ordered there.
Here it should be noted that the table shows the rate of delivery of ships, depending on the construction sites. For themselves, the Chinese built these corvettes at 4 shipyards. The table shows the number of ships to be handed over for 1, 2, 3 and 4 building sites, regardless of how many shipyards they are located, or, alternatively, for 1, 2, 3 and 4 shipyards, one building site each on each.
If there is a desire to simulate a larger number of building places, then you just need to multiply the data of the first column by the number of building places, for example, for 6 places by 6.
These figures are, of course, approximate, but close to reality.
You also need to take into account that crews from Russia will have to study in China, pass all the tests and coursework there, and then go on their own to their bases.
And it must be remembered that Chinese ships do not carry cruise missiles, while the maximum theoretical total salvo of 33 domestically built small corvettes will be 264 cruise missiles.
As you can see, Russia, even in its wretched state, can close the need for ships in the near sea zone faster than China can do.
Troika 056s against the background of other Chinese ships. The Chinese shipbuilding assembly line is impressive, but in this class, Russia, oddly enough, may not be inferior in quantity, still leading by head in quality. Photo taken in Ch. Dambiev's telegram channel, original copyright on the photo
The disadvantage of domestic small water-jet corvettes, in comparison with the Chinese ships of project 056 of any modifications, is the lack of a helicopter landing pad on the proposed ship.
Three things need to be said here.
First, in the near sea zone, there is always the opportunity to rely on a land-based network of landing sites from which helicopters could operate.
Secondly, there are ways to compensate for the fact that there is no helicopter on the ship, for example, to place them on a converted ship operating together with ships, or a supply ship (although we don’t build them in the right form and don’t plan to build them, well, we have anti-submarine forces do not build, this is the business of the next administrations).
Thirdly, the ways of interaction of a ship without a runway with a helicopter, up to refueling, were considered by M. Klimov in the article "A powerful efficient small multi-purpose corvette at the price of a fighter flight", in which for the first time the concept of a small ship was laid out in detail with an analysis of possible subsystems that can be used on such a ship. As you can see, everything is solved.
And we should once again “hack on the nose” - problems with the fleet in Russia are 100% organizational and rest ONLY into the human factor, and nothing else. As, however, and problems with SVO.
As soon as that extremely specific contingent (it is impossible to call a spade a spade for censorship reasons), which is now responsible for naval construction, is cleared out, the problems will be solved in a year or two, which are needed to reconfigure management structures.
If only we were ahead of the Americans ...
With large ships, the situation is slightly different.
Large cases
The only large multi-purpose ship of the far sea zone that is produced in Russia is the Project 22350 frigate. This is a good ship. True, it has serious shortcomings, both constructive and production, but nothing can be found in the open press about them, and this ship can fight with them.
Therefore, we will not talk about the shortcomings.
But what is the real problem is the 10D49 diesel engines of the Kolomna plant, which are part of the M55R diesel-gas turbine units that set the ship in motion.
So far, the Kolomna Plant is supplying diesel, but the moment when this will turn out to be impossible without a very serious deterioration in the performance characteristics of the ship is already visible on the horizon. And there is no way to quickly fix the situation.
The conclusion from this is simple - you need to switch to a fully gas turbine power plant. And with it, since it happened so, to a new ship: with a similar composition of the REV, the same or almost the same composition weapons, but larger in size - in proportion to the more powerful power plant.
What is needed for this? First, turbines. This issue is closed in Russia, marching GTU M-70FRU and afterburner M-90FR in the country are either mass-produced, or can begin to be produced at any time.
What else? There are also adder reducers, and, possibly, an inter-gear transmission, either integrated into the reducers, or as a separate mechanism.
Two important remarks. Firstly, with a certain mutual position of the propellers and rudders, you can do without an inter-gear transmission, the ship, if necessary, goes on the same shaft line. But it should be provided constructively. If it works, the task is greatly simplified. Since you only need two gearboxes.
The task will be simplified even more if it is possible to develop and start producing reverse pitch propellers (RPP) for ships with such a power (14 hp + 000 hp on each of the two shaft lines when both turbines are operating at maximum power) of the main power plants.
There are prospects here - it was the VRSh that should have been installed on the project 20386 corvette, infamous for its "drank", which, apparently, will never be completed now.
If it works out with a CPP, then the gearboxes will not need a reverse, since the reverse gear will be provided by screws.
Then the problem will be reduced to the summation of the torque from two turbines operating at the same speed.
Such a gearbox is many times simpler than the RO22350 gearbox produced for project 55, and just as cheaper, its production cycle will be significantly shorter.
In case of failure with the CPP, a reverse should appear in the gearbox, which will make it a product about as complex as the “Corvette” RRP-12000, just larger, designed for high power and speed.
Well, if you can’t do without MCI, then a third gearbox will be added, which allows you to transfer the torque from the shaft line to the shaft line.
In general, it would be worth taking the American destroyer of the Spruance type as a model - it had two shaft lines, each of which had two gas turbines through one non-reversible gearbox-adder, and the reverse was provided on the screws. There was no inter-gear transmission.
Spruance-class destroyer, not yet upgraded. The position of the gas ducts shows how the "echelons" (a pair of turbines with a gearbox) of the power plant were located
However, no matter how it turns out, but all these are solvable tasks. They will require putting things in order at the Gear Star, which is unbearable for the current government, but on the whole it is simple and can be done very quickly. A large, with about 6600 tons of standard and about 7400 tons of full displacement, high-speed (30+ full speed knots) ship is literally a little smaller than the old 1155 or 1134B, with the same RLC composition, almost the same REV as the 22350 project, with by an increased number of launchers for missiles of all types and a couple of helicopters, it is “separated” from us precisely by the gearboxes and / or propellers listed above - and nothing more.
Are there any developments in our country on the GEM described above? Yes, it even has an index, it just doesn't exist in the metal yet.
In one of the presentations of UEC-Saturn, there was a MA7 power plant with just these turbines.
Such as in the presentation, or not, but the installation can be created. Two or three gearboxes are simpler than those that are currently being produced, perhaps a CPP, but everything will work out without it - and we will be in the future.
Moreover, according to some reports, work on the MA2023 will intensify from 7, which will make it possible to return to the construction of large ships. But they must have the “correct” filling of the cases.
As a last possibility, we can mention the development of the M70FRU-R reversible turbine, but in order to build any forecasts on it, you need to know exactly at what stage the development is. In principle, a reversible economy turbine is an almost ideal solution, and technically it is possible.
In general, a large ship in the long run is much more real than 22350 in its current form. And there is almost everything for it ... Except for the slipway at the Northern Shipyard. However, perhaps, to remember the same Baltzavod? Large-block production is still impossible there, but have the icebreakers been rebuilt?
One of the not the most successful concepts of a "large" warship of the far sea zone. But it is a ship in such dimensions that will soon turn out to be the most realistic option for the Navy - we will have to say goodbye to 22350, whether we like it or not. Photo: blog.hange.jp
Then, of course, it will be necessary to develop new radars, weapons and everything else, but it is possible to urgently increase the combat strength of ships capable of effectively fighting any enemy anywhere, even without this.
"Kolomensky question"
However, the question arises of large and powerful diesel engines. Now their only supplier for the ships of the Navy is the Kolomensky Zavod (with the above problems).
But this does not mean that Kolomna will have to “go out of business” - the fleet will need diesels in the future anyway, for the same landing and auxiliary ships, at least, and no one can make them with the required power except Kolomna.
Therefore, of course, it is necessary that Kolomensky Zavod continue to work on import substitution - if they succeed with the 49th series, then it will not be left without orders.
Yes, already contracted ships will have to be built by some diesel methods. How the Kolomensky Zavod will get everything that fell under the sanctions is a separate question, perhaps it will be a really complicated scheme.
Here, in theory, the state should come into play, and not by imposing repression on the plant, which in the future may start to miss the deadlines, but by helping to circumvent sanctions. Our special services are not at all in such a state that such activities have reliable chances of success, but the issue needs to be resolved somehow.
But then...
Opportunity "Kolomensky Zavod" will be a retreat to a lower technological level.
An example from an article about a mobilization corvette is indicative - the same power that a non-import-substituted 16-cylinder 16D49 (6000 hp) produces could at one time be produced by a completely domestic 20-cylinder 20D49 with two-stage supercharging.
Yes, such a diesel engine is worse, and can only be considered as a half measure. It cannot be used on corvettes and frigates of existing projects, but, for example, on ships and vessels of the auxiliary fleet or on landing ships, such diesel engines will be quite applicable.
Naturally, the main task of Kolomna would be the launch of the 500th series. However, with the level of dependence on imports and foreign contractors that this project has, hopes for engine production must be abandoned.
Once upon a time, the author analyzed the benefits of betting on the "dieselization" of the Navy in an article "Diesel Fleet. The Navy must learn to order inexpensive but effective ships.. And all the considerations expressed in it, and the fact that the role of the "Kolomensky Zavod" in such programs will be decisive or even uncontested, have not changed today.
But the 500th series, it seems, will not be used here. It is possible that it is time for the Kolomna Plant to start developing an alternative family of diesel engines from scratch.
"Light Frigate"
If the entire burden of tasks in the BMZ falls on the mobilization corvette, and the main ship of the DMZ becomes large, capable of operating in remote areas of the oceans, then the question arises - which ship will be the mass "workhorse" in the DMZ and will strengthen the detachments of small corvettes in the BMZ ? For example, if you look at the NVO in Ukraine, what should be the ship capable of blocking the Ukrainian coast in the presence of a missile threat?
The answer is some kind of light frigate, smaller and cheaper than the large ship described earlier, but at the same time larger and more powerful than the modern corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385. The composition of the radar complex of such a ship is outlined above, the weapon systems on it should be similar to corvettes 20380 and 20385, it is desirable to have two helicopters, without which it is difficult to fight at sea (remember the American principle - if you have one, you have none - if you have one [helicopter], then you do not have them at all; this is not entirely true, of course, but the share there is a lot of truth here).
The contours of such a ship are a separate and voluminous issue, therefore, in addition to the radar, it is worth limiting to the power plant, taking into account the sanctions.
It would be ideal for such a ship to equip it with a purely diesel two-shaft power plant based on Kolomna diesel engines of the 500th series.
But they most likely won't.
However, there is an option with gas turbine power, suitable specifically for a not very large ship.
We are talking about the MA4 installation proposed at the time, built on the basis of the M-70FRU turbines, with the operation of a pair of turbines through a gearbox on one shaft line.
This power plant also needs gearboxes, according to the same logic that is described for the “large” ship with the M-70FRU and M-90FR.
Turbines UEC can start producing at any time.
That is, if there is political will and interest on the part of the authorities to ensure that the country has at least some sane fleet, the creation of such a gas turbine power plant is a matter of several years.
Yes, such a ship, both in terms of the cost of construction and in terms of the cost of the life cycle, will be more expensive than a diesel one. But there will be advantages, the same speed, and it will be possible to save on construction without overcomplicating the design of the ship (for example, due to serial electronic weapons and the rejection of the mass use of composites in the design in favor of aluminum alloys or even just steel).
And then Russia will get its "Perry" or "new 1135", "new 61st project", "Russian 054", etc. - a massive "workhorse".
Weapons and other means
Completing the contours of the possible, it is worth mentioning what was not included in the review. Basically, as outlined in the above article "Air defense of modern Russian ships". As a ship-based air defense system, the Redut with its 3S97 launchers is uncontested; as the main anti-aircraft missiles, the SAM family is 9M96 (with mandatory radio correction).
As a short-range missile, it is urgent to begin integration into 3S97 of the 9M338K missile to the Tor complex. In the air defense of the “last frontier”, artillery systems are needed, in which the line of aiming of the aiming system is combined with the barrel blocks, now it is without options “Broadsword”, standing at 22350, but it needs to be reinforced with small anti-aircraft missiles, for example, the complex “Sosna-R”.
An important point is that it is necessary to strive for the integration of "Thor" systems into the air defense circuit of large ships and for the creation of a full-fledged naval version of this air defense system.
Apparently, we will have to “work” on Pantsir-M - the limited capabilities of the radar of this complex in rainy, stormy weather, etc. are increasingly being revealed. This does not mean that Pantsir-M should be run and abandoned, especially taking into account how many buildings are being built for it, but in order for the complex to have a future, a lot of work remains to be done. And if it is not done, then the ships with it will become “good weather ships” - and this is in our climate!
On large ships, it is necessary to study the issue of returning 57-mm automatic guns and using 30 and 57-mm projectiles with programmable detonation to repel swarm attacks of future shock drones. Guns of 76, 100 and 130 mm calibers need guided projectiles, primarily anti-aircraft ones.
It is necessary to study the issue of firing supercavitating "diving" shells at torpedoes approaching ships. For a ship with a modern sonar system, such a solution is quite realistic, although it will require the integration of the HAC and artillery control.
Our hydroacoustics is quite “on the level”, and serial solutions make it possible to assemble an effective hydroacoustic complex. Another thing is that we have problems with the integration of other anti-submarine weapons and ship systems, for example, ships cannot receive information from sonar buoys placed aviation, cannot exchange "portraits" of targets with aircraft, etc. But this is no longer a question for shipbuilders.
The last issue is the replacement of the monstrous design of RTPU SM-588 missile and torpedo launchers for the Paket-NK complex. These installations greatly "cut" the combat potential of the ships and are problematic in operation. They also require specific design solutions for the ship itself, and their harmfulness is underestimated today even by professionals, unfortunately.
The problem, as well as its solution, is described in the article. “Lightweight torpedo tube. We need this weapon, but we don't have it. ".
However, some realities require clarification.
As you know, the brilliant lawmaking of the last decade, coupled with a completely wrecking approach (with a high probability, this is partly sabotage by various "sleeper" agents) to the creation and application of regulations governing the conduct and financing of developmental developments, is to blame for everything.
The ships described above require at least R&D for gearboxes for "large" hulls.
As a maximum - a gearbox, the Tor air defense system for a small corvette, from which only a rocket, shells, a modification of the Broadsword with missiles are completely ready.
This is dozens of times less than what was launched for the fleet in the 2000s, but with our current bureaucracy, this is a challenge.
The design of the mentioned new 32-cm torpedo TA will become an even greater challenge, since of all the “branches” of weapons creation, the torpedo is the most difficult and problematic.
Those who do not fully understand "the whole depth of our depths" should read the articles by M. Klimov Our Pentagon Wars. The realities of domestic military R&D " и "Our" Pentagon Wars "-2. Development chaos ", after which it partially becomes clear why “everything is like this” with us (although in reality everything is much worse, since corruption and sabotage in favor of “foreign customers” that still no one is trying to get rid of) fall like heavy stones on this indecency from above.
But there really are no options, you have to go to this.
Near future
A crisis is not only a danger, but also an opportunity. The course of the NMD in Ukraine, the real capabilities of the RF Armed Forces, so clearly demonstrated there, and the demonstrated real ability of the political leadership to respond to crisis phenomena, are more and more convincing the West that Russia is not dangerous and can be easily defeated, and its leadership will not dare to use all available means to repel aggression and protect the country.
All this dramatically increases the risks of wars with technically advanced adversaries with powerful naval forces, including the US Navy. Under such conditions, Russia, if it survives in the next ten years, will have to abruptly, literally in a matter of years, “bring the fleet to its senses”, including shipbuilding programs and their financing. Thus, such issues as the withdrawal of control over finances from the “underwater mafia”, the closure of such projects as “Poseidon / Status-6”, the refusal to lay new SSBNs until the combat services of the existing ones are provided, etc., have “overripe”.
And the proceeds will be directed to emergency needs, including surface forces.
This article shows realistic prospects for the development of this money in surface shipbuilding. The development of a sane and powerful fleet is quite possible with the money that is being spent on the fleet now - but with a different result.
The aircraft carrier theme remained outside the scope of the article, however, the theme of the aircraft carrier was disclosed in the articles "Aircraft Carrier for Russia: Faster Than You Expect" и "Our aircraft carrier is real" in the newspaper VPK-Courier (the link leads to an archived copy).
The prospects for creating new submarines instead of the incredibly expensive, but ineffective Yasenya-M with extremely dubious combat capability, remained outside the scope of the article. This issue requires a separate disclosure.
Unfortunately, the responsible leaders, who are responsible for what areas the country should focus its efforts on, are still in the "beckoning world", completely out of touch with reality.
So, at the last Maritime Board, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Viktor Evtukhov said:
“...in the Russian Federation, domestic enterprises not only produce marine diesel engines and diesel generators based on developed and mass-produced domestic machines, but also take measures to develop modifications of the D-500 and DM-185 engines.”
Link.
Meanwhile, the D-500 can simply be closed, the project has no chance with the current level of sanctions, and the DM-185 from Sinara, although somewhat more real, is just another family of diesel engines that are not completely localized, “raw”, and it will not give any radically new opportunities for shipbuilding. Sinara promises to someday create an engine with a power of up to 4500 kW in this family. Then, if it succeeds, it will be possible to return to ships similar to 20380 and 20385. If it succeeds ...
But these are years of hard work with unguaranteed results. Years, during which, with the right approaches, you can simply get a large and combat-ready fleet.
We state that the gap with reality among domestic leaders continues to be critical.
However, reality is stronger, and after February 24, 2022, it came into its own.
A very sharp wake-up call awaits all these statesmen shining with importance with smug faces.
Sorry for the wasted time.
But on the other hand, today we can say absolutely for sure - the construction of powerful and efficient multi-purpose ships on the existing industrial and technological base and under the conditions of sanctions is real. There would be someone to organize it.
And, taking into account the growing aggressiveness of the Americans who felt the blood (ours), the most important thing is that there would be enough time ...
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