"In the Ring of Enemies": Soviet Society in the 1920s-1930s and Official Propaganda
Modern historiography talks a lot about the mobilization and militarization nature of Soviet society in the late 1920s-1930s. The presence of a constant external threat, the atmosphere of a "besieged fortress" served as an excuse for the difficult living conditions and an effective tool for suppressing resistance to radical measures implemented in domestic politics.
Soviet society, especially in relation to the period of 1930-1950s, is often referred to as closed. Despite the fact that the USSR actively maintained diplomatic and trade relations with many countries, there are certain grounds for this. According to the candidate historical Sciences Alexander Golubev in his book “If the world falls on our republic”: Soviet society and an external threat in 1922–1941”, the victory of the October Revolution, led to the mythologization of mass consciousness, especially in the era of the existence of a totalitarian political regime, in 1930–1950 th years.
This regime, like all regimes of this type, was distinguished by two features. First, he sought to control not only certain actions, but also the emotions and thoughts of the population. Second, such regimes have the ability to generate mass support for themselves. One of the main means of achieving this was the mobilization of society, or a significant part of it, to achieve a single goal of national importance [1].
In this paper, we will consider the following questions: how the prospects for war were seen by Soviet society in the 1920s–1930s, how society perceived the “military anxieties” of 1927–1929, and what role official propaganda played in the mythologization of public consciousness.
Picture of the outside world as part of the official mythology
As a national goal, the Stalinist regime put forward a program of qualitative renewal of the country, including industrialization, the transformation of agriculture and the cultural revolution. In essence, it was a modernization program (although the term itself was not used), leading to the transformation of Russia into an industrial society [1].
Totalitarianism could not but leave an imprint on the public consciousness. In particular, he contributed to the conservation of the mythological type of consciousness on which he relied. Unlike authoritarian regimes, the totalitarian regime did not seek to keep the masses away from politics; on the contrary, there was a general, deliberately pushed politicization of the mass consciousness. Already in the first years after the revolution, a system of institutions and mechanisms unprecedented in history was created, pursuing purely propaganda goals [1].
A certain picture of the outside world was an integral part of the official mythology. In full accordance with the mechanisms of mythological consciousness described above, she presented the world as an arena of a great struggle between the forces of progress, personified primarily by the communist and workers' movement, and the forces of reaction, and the victory of the former was inevitable, like the second coming of Christ in the view of believers [1].
The ever-expanding system of official propaganda led to the fact that the outside world, even in remote areas of the country, in the rural "outback", on the national outskirts, began to be perceived as a kind of reality that had by no means an abstract, but quite practical significance for everyday life.
At times, the not yet fully realized, almost instinctive, but already obvious understanding of the integrity of the world, of which Soviet Russia was a part, ceased to be the prerogative of only the educated sections of the population. The world acted either as a source of a very real threat (military or for the established political system), or, on the contrary, as a source of favorable changes, and not only for opponents of Soviet power, who were waiting from outside for liberation from Bolshevik power, but also in a number of cases for it. supporters, for example, could provide technical or food assistance, act as an ally in a war against a common enemy [2].
At the same time, the idea of Western-style technological progress retained its appeal. The press of the 1920s - early 30s reproduced examples of the best organization of industry or agriculture in the developed capitalist countries. However, in the mass consciousness, such agitation sometimes had an unexpected effect. Thus, after the publication in Izvestia of a series of articles on peasant farming in Denmark, a group of prosperous Siberian peasants decided to immediately move to this country [1]. After the appearance in Pravda of V. V. Osinsky’s article “On the American Automobile and the Russian Cart”, as reported from Siberia, during a collective reading of the article by the listeners
In this context, a radical transformation of the image of the West in the mass consciousness took place. The communist takeover is often interpreted as a return to isolationism, a victory for the anti-Western trend in development. There are some grounds for such an interpretation, but this is only a superficial level of understanding. At first, the Bolsheviks subjectively acted as convinced Westerners. The anti-isolationist dominant prevails at the beginning of the formation of Soviet society and reappears at the last stage of its existence. Isolationism dominates in the main spaces of the Soviet stage of Russian history, and during the culmination of the Cold War, it reaches its limit [2].
In anticipation of the inevitable war: "retrospective propaganda" in the USSR in the 1920s-1930s
Soviet Society in the 1920s–1930s lived in anticipation of the inevitable war. As the historian Svetlana Ulyanova notes, the Soviet authorities had two models of war at their disposal, the image of which could be constructed - the First World War and the Civil War.
Soviet propaganda in the 1920s–1930s actively used the "useful past", putting the country's recent history at its service. As stated in the first editorial of the Military Historical Journal, military history should, drawing on the experience of the past, illuminate the road to the future. The researchers note that the so-called "retrospective propaganda" was an integral part of the Soviet political project. The events of the past became actualized, acquired not only their own historical value, but also turned into an integral part of the model of today [3].
Historian A. Golubev, in turn, writes that the possibility of war with the "capitalist encirclement" in the 1920s was felt more acutely than in the 1930s. There were many reasons for this: there is a living memory of the World and Civil Wars with the participation of foreign powers, and Soviet propaganda, in which this topic was constantly exaggerated, and the peculiarities of perception, when, for example, reaching the village, foreign policy information was repeatedly distorted and “redrawn” according to the laws of mythological consciousness.
Despite proclaiming a policy of peace, party leaders spoke of a future war as inevitable and tried to predetermine its nature by using comparisons with the First World War. The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 29 - August 9, 1927 declared that the coming war against the USSR would create a situation that would be fundamentally different from the situation in 1914. It should no longer be a question of a war between imperialist states, but of the struggle of imperialism against the proletariat "organized as a state power" [4].
The activity in using the tools of the policy of memory was largely determined by the desire of the Bolsheviks to create a “new person”, to form a new identity among people. The latter, as A. Assman rightly notes, is most effectively constructed through the affective assimilation of one's own history through the historical myth. The grandiosity of the plans to "redefine" the past, the scale of the tasks of the Bolshevik design determined the methods of the policy of memory [5].
In general, interest in the history of the First World War increased noticeably in the anniversary years - 1924, 1934, and especially 1939. Moreover, the interpretation of the war changed from anniversary to anniversary. So, in 1924, Soviet propagandists diligently hushed up the role of Russia in the Entente and the events on the Eastern Front and presented the war, first of all, as a conflict between the Western powers. In 1934, the focus was on the class struggle in the warring countries.
Constant reminders in the press about the coming war with references to the experience of 1914-1921. caused anxiety and fear among ordinary people, forced them to seek any information about the situation in the world. In particular, the materials of the agitation and propaganda department of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks show that these questions were often asked at meetings, lectures, etc. fight? Will fraternization be allowed in a future war? Will we fight if Germany goes against France? Which of the countries preparing war is the most dangerous for us?” [1935].
For all propagandists, since 1938, the “Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks” has served as a normative text, in Chapter VI of which assessments of the First World War were given, and in Chapter VIII much attention was paid to foreign intervention during the Civil War. War 1914–1918 was presented as a struggle for the redivision of the world and spheres of influence; the imperialists of all countries were named its culprits. It was unsuccessful for Russia in military and socio-economic terms: "the tsarist army suffered defeat after defeat"; "The war destroyed the national economy of Russia."
In 1939, when the 25th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War was celebrated, its perception was determined by the acute international crisis and the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. The outbreak of a new world war was presented not as a conflict of great powers pursuing their own interests, but as an impending attack by the fascist-militarist-imperialists on the peace-loving Soviet Union. However, a few weeks later, the propaganda machine had to urgently rebuild. If before the conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, publicists wrote about "fascist predators" and emphasized the special aggressiveness of German imperialism, then after August 23 the assessments changed.
The message of V. M. Molotov at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 31, 1939 became the normative propaganda text. The change in the orientations of Soviet foreign policy also led to a reassessment of the First World War in propaganda discourse. So, in the speech of V. M. Molotov it was noted:
The British and French imperialists were declared the main warmongers.
Military alarms 1927–1929 in the mass consciousness of the population
Soviet society in the late 1920s and 1930s "was a prisoner of recent wars and continued to be in a state of "cocked the trigger", bristling all over the world." This also applied to the psychology of the political elite. Describing it, it is difficult to find a more successful formulation than that contained in one of the unpublished speeches of M. I. Kalinin in November 1934:
In 1927, a foreign policy crisis arose, which coincided with an active campaign timed to coincide with the 10th anniversary of Soviet power. Modern historians believe that the anxiety of the party and state leadership of the USSR about the new war pursued mainly propaganda goals, aggravated by psychological trauma associated with memories of foreign military intervention in 1918–1920[8]. In particular, historians A. Ya. Livshin, I. B. Orlov believe that the military phobia of those years was largely due to the provocative component associated with the intra-party struggle. At the same time, a number of Western historians believe that the danger of a military invasion in those years was real. In particular, this view was shared by the prominent Italian historian Giuseppi Boffa.
The "military alarm" in the spring of 1927 was caused by the rupture of diplomatic relations between England and the USSR, raids on the Soviet embassy in China. All this was considered in the peasant environment ambiguously. In the Voronezh district, wealthy peasants explained this as follows:
About the severance of Anglo-Russian relations in the Valuysky Uyezd they spoke as follows:
In Bobrovsky district, all this was regarded as follows:
“The Comintern is planning a world revolution, let it deal with this matter on its own” [8].
The aggravation of the international situation caused a huge number of rumors. They appeared at the beginning of 1927, in connection with the ongoing re-registration of those liable for military service. In this regard, a massive purchase of essential goods began, primarily salt, kerosene, manufactory (fabrics). In many villages of the Voronezh province, for example, peasants sold livestock and made a large supply of salt up to 15-25 pounds. The poor were afraid that they would be left without salt, as during the Civil War, and in order to create its reserves, they began to sell cattle at a low price, which was bought up by local merchants [8].
Bogucharsky noted that the initiator of the rumors was the kulaks, who announced that in a future war with England they would begin to take horses, bread, and cattle. The peasants feared a revival of the surplus-appropriation policy. In the Voronezh district, one middle peasant sold a horse, bought salt and manufactory (fabrics) and said:
Often the initiators of the rumors were merchants, since the buying rush was beneficial to them. Only in one district center - in the city of Bobrov - 12 wagons of salt were sold during the week. Previously, it was sold in the same volume for 4 months.
The Voronezh Provincial Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, after analyzing the political situation in the province, came to the conclusion that as a result of recent events, the village had split into 2 camps. The first is “the poor, the middle peasants, who stand for the Soviet power and the party” and the second is “the village kulaks and a small handful of “sub-kulakists” who are uncompromisingly disposed towards both the party and the Soviet power, hoping that “kaput will come to the communists soon.” However, it cannot be argued that the private entrepreneurial strata took a completely anti-government position and expected the fall of Soviet power. Although this is what party leaders and OGPU bodies sought to show in their reports [8].
Defeatist moods, for example, were observed in the village of Saguny, Rossoshansky district, Voronezh province, where, after hearing a report on the international situation, the middle peasant spoke and said: “We have already fought, if they drive me to war, I will lie down and lie down. A foreign warrior is the same as me, a peasant, and will not kill, we have nothing to fight with him. His speech was supported by the cries of the women present: "Down with the war, we will not fight." The second speaker said: “We have old bullets in our backs. All the people are oppressed, the best land is taken away by state farms. Who and for what will go to a new war? His speech was supported by the cries of the entire assembly: "That's right, that's right, we won't fight" [8].
According to the OGPU, in the Soviet countryside, the attitude towards a future war was determined exclusively by the social situation: “The poor and middle peasants have a negative attitude towards the possibility of war, fearing new devastation, while the kulaks are gloating” [1]. At the same time, summarizing the mood of the population, the information department of the OGPU stated:
It is worth noting that two groups stood out among potential opponents - the great powers (England, France, the USA, Japan) and the immediate neighbors of the USSR (Finland, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, China). Characteristically, Germany, an adversary in the recent Great War, is extremely rare in this series, and, as a rule, only when practically all the neighbors of the USSR and the most significant powers are listed. Moreover, unlike other Western states, Germany sometimes figured as a likely ally in the coming war. For example, in October 1926, when rumors about a war with Poland once again appeared, statements simultaneously spread that “the German delegates who had arrived in the USSR called on the Russian workers to unite with them for a joint struggle against Poland” [1].
"All-censorship": political and ideological control over the mass media
Ideas about the outside world are formed on the basis of several information blocks. One of them, historiosophical, is information about the history and culture of a particular state. Here, the opportunities for independent obtaining and development of sufficiently objective information were preserved. The classical culture of the West was not only not banned, but, although with significant exceptions, it was actively promoted; museums and libraries were preserved, literature published before the revolution and in the first post-revolutionary years was used. Fragmentary ideas about history, political traditions, worldview, characteristic of other cultures, to some extent compensated for fiction [2].
The second most important block, political and informational, is information about the political, social, cultural modern life of other countries. It is this information that should have played a decisive role in creating an adequate picture of the world. However, both main channels for obtaining information related to this bloc, namely the education system and the mass media, were under strict political and ideological control.
- writes the Russian researcher A. V. Fateev [10]. However, books or films about modern life and life in other countries were carefully selected, often translated or duplicated with significant cuts [2].
There were almost no alternative channels for obtaining information. Most Soviet citizens, including most of the political elite of the 1930s, did not have sufficient command of foreign languages and, therefore, could not use foreign press or radio messages. In the 20s, however, foreign sources were to some extent replaced by the émigré press published in Russian. However, such publications were intended only for a relatively narrow circle, primarily the party elite. In addition, in January 1927, subscription to the émigré press was banned. Until that moment, any organization and person could officially subscribe to the emigrant press [2].
Since the mid-20s, the circle of people who had access to the foreign press and other alternative sources of information has been gradually shrinking. Instead of emigre publications, it was decided to send special surveys prepared by the information department of the Central Committee to the largest party committees, and the number of party committees entitled to receive them was constantly decreasing.
At the same time, as the historian A. Golubev notes, the content of such reviews and reports “for official use” often differed little from the materials published by the official Soviet press. So, in the closed information reports of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), in particular, for May-June 1935, the main place was occupied by brief retellings of Western press reports about various manifestations of the "crisis of capitalism" and the growth of revolutionary sentiment. There were only occasional neutral reports of the news cultural life. There were no materials that significantly supplemented the reports of the Soviet press or critically assessed Soviet reality in these reports.
The Soviet intellectual elite was, in terms of access to information, in a slightly better position than other social groups, including the political elite. Knowledge of languages played a role, which allowed reading foreign press and listening to the radio. Thus, the diaries of Academician V. I. Vernadsky constantly contain references to the materials of the Western press that he read. But here, too, there was a constant tendency to closeness. Since the late 20s, budgetary funds allocated to scientific institutions for the purchase of foreign periodicals and scientific literature have been reduced [1].
- Academician V. I. Vernadsky wrote to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. M. Molotov in February 1936. He emphasized that the Soviet censorship paid attention to the scientific literature and since the summer of 1935 articles have been systematically excised.
– the academician wrote in August 1936 [1]. Vernadsky's appeal to the head of government, however, had an effect: the head of Glavlit, S.B.
Even more restrictions existed in the sphere of personal contacts. Foreign trips, regardless of their purpose, were tightly controlled. In particular, it was difficult for even world-famous scientists, such as academicians E. V. Tarle and V. I. Vernadsky, to go abroad. As a rule, this required an appeal to the top leadership of the country (i.e., Stalin or Molotov), but even such appeals did not guarantee success at all [1].
According to the American researcher M. T. Choldin, censorship in the USSR gradually became much more blurred, closed, supplemented by self-censorship, which, in particular, gave M. T. Choldin a reason to introduce a new term - “all-censorship”.
"Keep the people in a state of mobilization readiness" (as a conclusion)
In 1938, in one of his letters, I. V. Stalin wrote:
It was in this vein that Soviet propaganda worked in the 1920s and 1930s. Propaganda freely handled the "useful past", drawing from it elements of an ideal future. By the end of the 1930s. it already has a pattern of which wars and in what key Soviet citizens need to be reminded in order to contribute to the formation of mobilization moods and prepare them for a future war.
The thesis about the closeness of Soviet society in the second half of the 1920s, in the 1930s, is justified. As the historian A. Golubev notes, the trend of "closedness" of society was not only the attitude of the political leadership. In the course of the revolution, important changes took place in the mass consciousness. The stereotypes of a mass, through and through mythologized consciousness, long obsolete on the highest floors of culture, began to dominate society and official propaganda.
The stereotype of the “capitalist encirclement”, constantly threatening the USSR, reproduced the image of the outside world as a “dark zone” hostile to Soviet people. Obviously, these essentially archaic ideas had little to do with classical Marxism.
Использованная литература:
[one]. Golubev A. V. “If the world collapses on our republic”: Soviet society and an external threat in 1-1922: monograph - Moscow; Berlin: Direct Media, 1941.
[2]. Golubev A.V. "World Republic" or "Closed Society"? (USSR in the 1920s–1930s) // Russia and the modern world. 2003. No. 3. S. 123–147.
[3]. Ulyanova S. B. Recollection of the Future: The Historical Experience of World War I and the Civil War in Soviet Propaganda of the 1920–1930s. // Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series: History of Russia. 2021. V. 20. No. 2. S. 236–246.
[four]. Joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU(b). July 4 - August 29, 9. M., 1927. S. 2020.
[5]. Porshneva O. S. “Imperialist War” in the Bolshevik Politics of Memory: Institutional Aspect (1920–1930s) // Modern History of Russia. 2020.
[6]. Central State Archive of Historical and Political Documents of St. Petersburg. F. 24. Op. 10. D. 145. L. 1–2, 52–54, 82–87.
[7]. Molotov V. M. On the ratification of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact // Military History Journal. 1939. No. 2. S. 9
[eight]. Bakhtin, V.V. Military alarm of 8 and radicalization of the political consciousness of the population (on the example of the Voronezh province) // Bereginya.1927.Owl. 777. No. 2010 (3). pp. 5–74.
[9]. Soviet village through the eyes of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD. 1918–1939 Documents and materials. In 4 vols. / Vol. 2. 1923–1929 / Ed. A. Berelovich, V. Danilov. M.: ROSSPEN, 2000.
[ten]. Fateev A.V. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda. 10–1945 - M., 1954.
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