American analysts: Russian defensive line in the Kherson region contains tactical vulnerabilities

36
American analysts: Russian defensive line in the Kherson region contains tactical vulnerabilities

Russian troops, after withdrawing from Kherson, create a new defensive line on the left bank of the Dnieper. At the same time, American analysts doubt its ability to hold back the onslaught of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including because of the shortcomings made during the construction of the protective "wall".

As noted in a study by the Institute for the Study of War (USA), work on defense equipment in the eastern part of the Kherson region, in the Crimea, on the Kinburn Spit and near it has been carried out by the RF Armed Forces since early October. As follows from satellite images, the troops are digging trenches, erecting strongholds, placing anti-tank hedgehogs along roads, making earthen ramparts, creating a layered defense network. A spare defensive line was created behind the front positions.



Russian defensive positions indicate that the military leadership sees the prospect of a Ukrainian offensive across the Dnieper River as a serious threat.

- says the study.

As stated, most of the field fortifications are located along the roads and look more like separate powerful checkpoints than extended fortified areas. The placement of strongholds near the highways indicates that the APU is expected to advance along highways, and not over rough terrain. Only a few defensive positions have been set up in the fields. The authors of the study suggest that this is a weak point of Russian defense:

Previously, Ukrainian forces had previously carried out deep cross-country raids in the Kharkiv region, surrounding Russian strongholds such as Kupyansk and Izyum and pushing Russian forces away from the Seversky Donets River from the environment].



As a result, according to American analysts, units of the RF Armed Forces, who have settled in defense along the highways, may be surrounded. This is facilitated by the open flanks of the strongholds, many of them scattered from each other, not allowing for mutual support. Anti-tank hedgehogs are installed directly on the roads, but do not extend into the fields, which makes it possible to bypass them.

Russian forces have put in considerable effort to create a new defensive system, but it has many tactical vulnerabilities that the Armed Forces of Ukraine can use in organizing a breakthrough.

- the conclusion is made by American analysts.
  • Institute for the Study of War
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

36 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. -7
    28 November 2022 14: 28
    Well, let's go to the new frontier. Or vice versa, they are lured into a trap.
    1. +1
      28 November 2022 14: 48
      Quote: Melziar
      Well, let's go to the new frontier. Or vice versa, they are lured into a trap.

      It seems that American "analysts" write articles for only one purpose - so that some military NWO in anger writes a rebuke to them that everything they wrote is a lie and that in this place we have minefields, but in in this place are hidden caponiers, underground passages, shelters for fighters and storage for food and weapons. wink
      1. 0
        28 November 2022 14: 59
        all these lines also have a moral side - they support the enemy's confidence, we are waiting for them!
        1. +4
          28 November 2022 19: 32
          No one doubts that the most detailed satellite images are promptly received by the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
          As no one doubts that the Americans are trying as much as possible to force the xoxls to go on the attack. This article is just one of those efforts.
          I don’t know what those who planned the fortifications were thinking, but after reading the article, the film “Seven Samurai” immediately comes to mind, where an experienced samurai instructs a young one:
          - Every fortress should have an obvious weak spot. It is there that they meet the enemy.
  2. -1
    28 November 2022 14: 31
    American analysts: Russian defensive line in the Kherson region contains tactical vulnerabilities

    There are two vulnerabilities there: the lack of an adequate number of armed personnel / s of the RF Armed Forces with a proper control system and communications equipment, and US intelligence-transmitting satellites.
    1. -6
      28 November 2022 14: 40
      As a result, according to American analysts, units of the RF Armed Forces, who have settled in defense along the highways, may be surrounded. This is facilitated by the open flanks of the strongholds, many of them scattered from each other, not allowing for mutual support. Anti-tank hedgehogs are installed directly on the roads, but do not extend into the fields, which makes it possible to bypass them.
      until the muddy road, who the hell will bypass, and then we will go forward.
  3. +6
    28 November 2022 14: 34
    Neither the Maginot defense line, nor the Mannerheim defense line, nor the Stalin defense line during WWII played any special role ... hi
    This is so, for your information, if suddenly someone did not know feel
    1. +6
      28 November 2022 14: 40
      didn't play any role...

      understaffed URs Stalin's line on average held back the Germans for up to 11 days
      Polotsk UR - 20 days, Kyiv UR - more than 2 months
      1. +6
        28 November 2022 15: 01
        Quote: Romario_Argo
        didn't play any role...

        understaffed URs Stalin's line on average held back the Germans for up to 11 days
        Polotsk UR - 20 days, Kyiv UR - more than 2 months

        You yourself confirm my words about the "special" role of defense lines drinks
        We had at least 8 months to "dig into the concrete" for the defense of Kherson - not only did we not lift a finger, we also surrendered Kherson without a fight am
        And if you take a calculator in your hands and stupidly calculate how many missiles we put into transformer booths - with such a number of missiles we would hold back the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine almost indefinitely without any defense, especially if we violated all the bridges of cars and railways to an operational depth of 500 km from the front line ...
        1. 0
          29 November 2022 00: 40
          Quote: Corona without virus
          And if you take a calculator in your hands and stupidly calculate how many missiles we put into transformer booths - with such a number of missiles we would hold back the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine almost indefinitely without any defense

          Strikes on transformers stopped industry for a day in cities with a total population of 5 million people. That is, 5 million people did nothing for the defense of the country all day. This is equivalent to the death of 2400 people at the rate of 365 days a year * 70 years of human life. In addition, because of these strikes, NATO should supply air defense systems instead of offensive weapons. Soldiers from the air defense calculations near Kyiv, Rovno, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk will not be able to attack the Crimea. That is, about 8000 more people were sent for retraining as anti-aircraft gunners and withdrawn from the infantry. I doubt that geraniums and Caliber fired at transformers could kill at least 1000 soldiers.
    2. 0
      28 November 2022 14: 40
      But Miuss - the front played very well.
  4. +1
    28 November 2022 14: 38
    The defensive line, along the way, is not a big secret for the Armed Forces of Ukraine ..
  5. +1
    28 November 2022 14: 39
    Do they see minefields from space too?
    Well, then WELCOME!
    1. 0
      28 November 2022 14: 56
      Well, why are you talking about the Americans like that, they just got attached to the roads. He doesn’t even know that the earth is not flat, but what the terrain is, they study from the photo in Playboy! bully hiMines, what kind of mines?
    2. -2
      28 November 2022 16: 26
      Quote: Novik225
      Do they see minefields from space too?
      Well, then WELCOME!

      And at least one mine exploded under the feet of the ukrovermacht when they entered Kherson? Why would it be otherwise...
  6. -4
    28 November 2022 14: 43
    The schemes of fortified areas are born, executed and carried out, probably by the same amazing knights who started the victorious plan. soldier Was the construction of plywood fortifications!? It was! Done!? And then! And they will deal with it! Where it is necessary to correct, where it is necessary to file. fellow
  7. Two
    +2
    28 November 2022 14: 46
    hi How easy it is to distribute satellite imagery recommendations!
  8. +5
    28 November 2022 15: 17
    I would prefer that our generals listen to the advice of the Yankees and once again check the quality of the fortifications being prepared.
    It certainly won’t be worse.
  9. -3
    28 November 2022 15: 20
    They are strange ... striped ears. Will a Ukrainian cross the Dnieper, with full connivance on our part? Let's send 40-60 thousand, accumulate, and attack? Will it be difficult to wash away these crossings to this mother?
    1. -3
      28 November 2022 16: 24
      Quote: Mountain Shooter
      Will a Ukrainian cross the Dnieper, with full connivance on our part? Let's send 40-60 thousand, accumulate, and attack?

      Well, there were several attempts to take the ZNPP. Sometimes 300 people were transported. And ours caught them already in the reeds on this side. And 300 people is not 60 thousand, 300 chewbaccs are much easier to sink ... but they somehow got there!
  10. 0
    28 November 2022 15: 29
    Let's see if I understand it. Will Surovikin really let them through the Dnieper now?
    1. 0
      28 November 2022 16: 21
      Quote from Carlos Sala
      Will Surovikin really let them through the Dnieper now?

      Well, he let them into Kherson ... although even in the Duma they said: "Kherson is now more important than Stalingrad!"
      1. The comment was deleted.
  11. 0
    28 November 2022 16: 20
    Russian defensive positions indicate that the military leadership sees the prospect of a Ukrainian offensive across the Dnieper River as a serious threat.

    In fact, it is strange that for them the crossing of a huge amount of troops and resources across the Dnieper is not at all a difficult task. For some reason, it is unsolvable only for us! Even taking into account the fact that, on the other hand, we had a warm, well-fortified territory, far beyond the scope of a simple bridgehead, with a 20-strong group, with a huge number of armored vehicles ... and all the same: we need to transport reinforcements and BP across the Dnieper - why - something was impossible. For some reason, they don’t have any problems to cross to our shore, where they don’t even have a foothold (which they regularly proved near Energodar)!
  12. 0
    28 November 2022 16: 31
    Have you noticed that there are a lot of satellite images in the West, but in the Russian Federation they publish little?
  13. 0
    28 November 2022 16: 44
    History repeats itself, in 1941 our command liked to organize defense along the highways, and the Nazis covered entire armies across the fields in pincers, as a result, entire armies ended up in boilers.
    P.S. Another thing: a) If it is a hopeless situation associated with a shortage of personnel. B) ..... No one is going to stay in these positions for a long time, so the defense was built on a network of strongholds.
  14. +1
    28 November 2022 16: 57
    Those American and not very specialists who write such analytical articles, like the Decembrists, who were terribly far from the people))). The construction of certain fortifications, especially of a long-term type, does not imply that solid walls are being made along the entire line of contact. Firstly, it is very expensive, and secondly, it is simply not necessary. The conditional Maginot Line and the Great Wall of China were not a continuous line of fortifications for a thousand kilometers. Structures and barriers of this type are usually installed in the directions and places where the main efforts are supposed to be concentrated, just these are roads, bridges, and large road junctions. During the transition to the defense in these places, additional positions will also be equipped, based on the situation, a fire system will be organized., Joints / flanks will be covered by minefields, terrain will be determined for the sectors of fire and fire lanes of units and fire weapons.
  15. -2
    28 November 2022 17: 01
    I think that the creation of fortified areas is standard and should be done according to some kind of unified method .. such as a battalion OP or company or battery ...... Does our army make them independently? Who and how wants.
  16. +1
    28 November 2022 17: 45
    Quote: Romario_Argo
    Polotsk UR - 20 days, Kyiv UR - more than 2 months

    So what? URs bypassed and deepened hundreds of kilometers until they surrendered. Not a single line that has been built for YEARS and spent billions is all broken through or surrounded. hi hi
  17. +1
    28 November 2022 19: 34
    I would like to see how mattress analysts will ride through the Ukrainian mud))) but how they ride, then you can talk about what is right and what is not.
  18. +1
    28 November 2022 21: 48
    No one says that they will stop there, perhaps at first they strengthened the key nodes, and then they will strengthen them with a solid line, today I literally saw how the pyramids were being transported in the Krasnodar Territory, which means they continue to strengthen further. And the situation with the personnel at the front is not the same as it was 2 months ago. And by the way, the convoys with the equipment continue to go towards the Crimea.
  19. 0
    28 November 2022 21: 51
    And this is on purpose: there are traps - a cunning plan.
  20. -1
    29 November 2022 00: 13
    [in fact, the RF Armed Forces left these cities, retreating to the rear, and not breaking out of the encirclement]

    They left under the threat of complete encirclement.
    units of the RF Armed Forces that have settled in defense along the highways may be surrounded. This is facilitated by the open flanks of the strongholds, many of them scattered from each other, not allowing for mutual support.

    In addition to the main paved trails, there is a very developed network of paved and unpaved roads. During rains, they are not very convenient for the passage of columns, except for small groups of cars, such as DRGs.
    But with a slight frost, they will become passable for vehicles no worse than trails. The situation in the Kharkiv region may repeat itself, when the cities were not stormed head-on, as Artemovsk is being tried now, but bypassed by relatively small groups of DRGs, after which the garrison was urgently evacuated under the threat of encirclement, abandoning equipment, ammunition and property.
  21. 0
    29 November 2022 00: 55
    It is better to have such a defense than none! But communication and visibility and fire support are needed between strong points ...
  22. 0
    29 November 2022 01: 26
    Fields are easier to mine than Maginot to build
  23. 0
    29 November 2022 11: 16
    I think the issue here is not the quality of defensive lines, but the understanding of what goals the leadership of our country sets.
  24. 0
    29 November 2022 15: 13
    We don't have enough people there to build lines along all lines. We can build them, but there will be 2 people per 1 km, but there is no sense in this. Everything is the opposite here, these half-empty trenches will quickly occupy the Armed Forces of Ukraine and hide in them from our artillery. And so our art will break them in an open field, the whole bet is made on this.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned), Kirill Budanov (included to the Rosfinmonitoring list of terrorists and extremists)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev Lev; Ponomarev Ilya; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; Mikhail Kasyanov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"