Military Review

Secrets of the oil balance of the Japanese Empire during the war

43
Secrets of the oil balance of the Japanese Empire during the war

The topic of the oil economy of the Japanese Empire during the Second World War attracted my attention a few years ago. Then, as part of the search for more specific information on the state and dynamics of the economy of the warring powers, I got acquainted with several survey works on the Japanese war economy, where there was some information about oil. The works were both Soviet and American.


How does interest and desire to consider the issue in detail arise? First of all, the absurdities in the presentation are of interest. For example, Japan was said to be dependent on oil imports, primarily from the US, but adopted a policy that led to an oil embargo. It was this oil embargo that caused Japan to enter the war. Despite the instructive tone with which all this is presented in the literature, I have always had doubts about this thesis. If you don't have oil, don't go to war.

The Japanese political leadership and military command could not fail to understand the military and economic significance of oil and could not help but think about what they would fill ships, planes, cars, Tanks. To attack the main source of oil is recklessness. To take such a thesis seriously means to take the Japanese for some fools who are incapable of assessing the situation. But then it turns out nonsense: these fools gave a surprise to Great Britain and the United States at once, seized vast territories, from which they then had to be knocked out with difficulty. Experience has taught me that if a historian perceives the participants in events as fools, then he clearly misunderstands the course of events and their causes.

Okay, Japan has entered the war. Then how did she manage her own and captured oil resources during the war, how did she spend them and how did this affect the course of the war? There were no answers to these questions in the literature; it is the war years that researchers somehow ignore. If there are still works about the pre-war Japanese economy, then there is silence about the war years. This is partly due to the fact that the Japanese stopped publishing any data, and there are very few open sources during the war years.

However, after the war, the Americans could shake up all the captured archives and printed materials in order to figure it all out. But they didn't do it.

Literature does not answer questions, but rather poses them. And in general, I got the impression that there are a lot of hushed up moments in this topic, which is why the whole war, and especially its economic background, looks extremely distorted and presented upside down.

There was an interest in this topic, and I began to study history the military economy of the Empire of Japan, deciding to stay closer to the primary sources, that is, first of all, to study Japanese literature. Indeed, not every American, European, or our historian will begin to study the complex Japanese language in order to sort out the issue in detail.

The studies in English are mainly based on American intelligence data, which are very interesting in themselves, but hardly accurate and hardly cover the situation in the Empire of Japan with sufficient completeness. The Japanese in this case know better.

How long is short, but I was lucky. I found a fundamental work on the history of the Japanese oil industry, published in Tokyo in 1963. It was called briefly and expressively: "Sekiyu" (Oil). It's such a thick volume with a lot of all sorts of data collected from very hard-to-reach sources, and there was a large section about the pre-war and war years.

Statistical puzzles


I will say right away that more questions have arisen from these numbers than have been answered. Japanese information turned out to be a statistical puzzle.

For example, there is information about the production of different types of petroleum products for the army, fleet and civil needs. In Showa 18 (1943), 113 kiloliters of aviation gasoline were produced for civilian needs, 412 kiloliters for military needs, a total of 218 kiloliters. The Japanese preferred volumetric measures for measuring oil and petroleum products, rather than weight. But they are easily calculated. The total production of aviation gasoline in 000 corresponded to 331 thousand tons. There is information about stocks located outside of Japan.

In the same year of Showa, the army had 18 thousand kiloliters of aviation gasoline, the fleet - 238 thousand kiloliters, in total - 323 thousand kiloliters or 561 thousand tons.

But at the same time, in this fundamental work, almost no information is given about how much oil products were consumed. Whether this was due to the fact that the compilers of the work so censored the figures used, or whether during the war years, Japanese statistics did not take into account the actual consumption of oil and oil products - it is still difficult to say, for this you need to look even deeper.

And without consumption figures, we cannot say for sure whether Japan had enough oil and oil products, or there was a shortage, and how the situation changed during the war. All these wonderful statistics are largely useless. Well, or she will speak only when information about the consumption of oil and oil products is discovered.

Thrifty Japanese


By the way, about consumption. In this remarkable work, among other things, there was a large table with information about the production, import and stocks of oil, production, import and stocks of petroleum products from 1937 to 1945. Moreover, the data for 1944 and 1945 were given broken down by quarters, while for 1945 they are given only for the first and second quarters, that is, until the beginning of July.

For some reason, it was compiled in barrels, although the Japanese usually preferred kiloliters. However, this table is attractive in that it gives a continuous series of numbers that you can try to analyze. Barrels, on the other hand, can be converted even into kiloliters (especially since the authors have applied a conversion factor from barrels to kiloliters), even into tons.

There is also no consumption in this table, but it can be calculated by having data on receipts (production and purchases), as well as calculating the change in stocks. In the figures considered below, information is only for Japan proper, with the exception of the governors-general of Korea and Formosa (Taiwan), as well as Manchukuo, for which statistics were also given, but in a separate line and without the occupied territories.

First, I made this calculation for petroleum products (the term used was seiseihin - a refined or refined product; it includes everything from gasoline to asphalt, bitumen, lubricating oils, etc.). The result is shown in the following table.


Balance of receipts, stocks and estimated consumption of petroleum products in Japan

Already in this table, the situation in the Japanese oil industry turns out to be noticeably more difficult than they say.

First, Japan, in addition to oil, acquired a large volume of finished petroleum products. For example, in 1937 - 16,6 million barrels or 2,1 million tons. In the table, I did not single out purchases separately, summing them up with domestic production of petroleum products in the receipts column. In other words, the Japanese, dependent on imports, tried to buy, although more expensive, but already ready-to-use product, thereby rationalizing their oil economy.

Secondly, it is clear that Japan created huge reserves of petroleum products. For example, 32,5 million barrels of reserves in 1937 is 4,1 million tons. This reserve, as can be seen from the table, they spent carefully, and only with the outbreak of war in 1942 did they begin to draw it more actively. From which it follows that Japan approached the war not at random, but by preparing a significant supply of petroleum products.

Thirdly, the annual consumption of petroleum products in Japan fluctuated around the average of 27,5 million barrels or 3,5 million tons. This level of consumption lasted throughout the first half of the war, and only in 1944 did consumption fall by 30% compared to the previous year.

Thus, before the war, Japan had stocks of petroleum products in excess of annual consumption. This is a very good reserve in case of war.

By the way, the navy possessed huge reserves of oil products. In the 12th year of Showa (1937), the fleet had the largest fuel oil reserves - 4 thousand kiloliters or 708 million tons. Data on the stocks of the fleet and the army were secret and concerned only those stocks that were located outside of Japan.

How could this even be?

Apparently, it was fuel oil, formally owned by numerous private Japanese companies and firms, stored in warehouses or tankers of these companies, but in reality was at the disposal of the fleet. In imperial Japan, such merging of private business with military structures was the most common thing.

Subsequently, fuel oil reserves were continuously declining, and in 1945 the navy had only 129 thousand kiloliters or 103,2 thousand tons.

Then the impudence of the Japanese government before the attack on the United States, at least in part, becomes understandable. In fact, the Japanese were not particularly afraid of the threats of an oil embargo, since they had a supply of petroleum products alone in the amount of more than annual consumption.

Unknown oil source


An attempt to balance oil from the same table gave an even more interesting result. In principle, the numbers should have converged. On the one hand - own production and import, that is, receipt; on the other hand, the cost of processing and shipping to the warehouse, that is, spending. The amounts received and spent must match. In a detailed balance, which takes into account everything, up to technological losses, with an accuracy of up to a ton.

But in Japanese statistics, they do not match. The calculation results are given in the following table:


Balance of receipts, processing and reserves of oil in Japan

This table reveals two interesting facts.

First, before 1940, Japan received much more oil than it processed and sent to replenish its reserves. It turned out an unaccounted balance from spending, which disappeared to no one knows where. In 1939 - 9,5 million barrels or 1,3 million tons. A very significant amount. It is even difficult to imagine where so much oil could “dissolve”. Perhaps we are dealing with shadow stocks that the Japanese government was unwilling to report.

Secondly, in 1941, when the oil embargo was actually introduced, Japan suddenly began to process oil much more than it was supplied. Moreover, we see how in 1941, before the attack on Pearl Harbor, oil refining in Japan suddenly increased by 1,5 times. At the same time, borrowing from reserves began.

In 1941, 8,5 million barrels or 1,1 million tons were taken from the reserves. But the receipt and reduction of recorded reserves did not at all cover the entire volume of oil refining. This does not happen - a distillation column cannot make gasoline from air. Oil is needed. So, in 1941, there was an unrecorded flow of 2,4 million barrels or 332 tons.

It is quite possible that this is a consequence of the consumption of those shadow oil reserves that were accumulated before the war. In 1937–1940 29,9 million barrels or 4,1 million tons could be collected. This is despite the fact that in the shown reserves at the beginning of 1941 there were 20,8 million barrels or 2,8 million tons of oil.

As can be seen from the table, 7,9 million barrels or 1,08 million tons of oil were used up from these shadow reserves, especially in 1944, when oil imports dropped sharply, and from the fourth quarter of 1944 it stopped completely. If so, then in 1945 these shadow reserves should have contained another 22 million barrels, or 3 million tons of oil. What happened to this oil later is still impossible to say for sure.

Japan could wait


So the Japanese military economy, it turns out, was much more complicated than one might think at first glance. Just one attempt to figure out how much oil the Empire of Japan received and spent during the war led to the fact that the statistics are very confusing, and there are traces of at least double bookkeeping and double oil reserves - open and shadow.

In total, in 1941, these reserves can be estimated at 6,9 million tons, which would be enough for the consumption of petroleum products during the war years for more than two years.

That's not all. It's only Japan.

In early 1942, the Japanese captured Malaya and the Dutch East Indies with their large oil fields and oil refining. From 1942 to 1945, 11,6 million kiloliters or 10 million tons of oil were processed in this region, producing approximately 5,2 million tons of light oil products. Their import to Japan was small, less than in pre-war 1941; these oil products were most likely used to supply the army and navy operating in China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.


Bombing of an oil refinery in Palembang, in the Dutch East Indies in January 1945

Plus, there was the production of synthetic fuel; the Japanese also used the addition of ethyl alcohol to gasoline, and Taiwan, with its sugar cane plantations, played a special role in the production of alcohol. So you will have to read a lot more publications and materials before a decent clarity appears in all this economy, at least in the basic details.

But one of the theses has already fallen - the oil embargo was not the reason for Japan's entry into the war. And there is nothing to argue with this conclusion.

If Japan accumulated reserves of about 6,9 million tons of oil and 3,5 million tons of oil products (for oil products - for more than a year, for oil - for more than two years of consumption; Japan could live for three years without imports at all), then - the factor The oil embargo was considered by the Japanese leadership to be surmountable.

In 1941, the Japanese government had a choice: strike now or wait for the outcome of the war in Europe and which side the victory would tend to. At that time, Japan was on good terms with two opposing sides at once: both Germany and the USSR. After waiting, they could join the winning side.

The fact that the Japanese government decided to strike at the United States and enter the war on the side of the "Axis" is, it turns out, their own, deliberate choice, and not a decision dictated by an acute shortage of oil.
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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 29 November 2022 05: 48
    +3
    The fact that the Japanese government decided to strike at the United States and enter the war on the side of the "Axis" is, it turns out, their own, deliberate choice, and not a decision dictated by an acute shortage of oil.
    Bravo! Amazing conclusion! Pulls for a prize! All my life I thought that Japan attacked the United States because of the embargo .. And now, the author, has opened my eyes.
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 29 November 2022 08: 08
      +1
      Lesh, good morning. The author is happy to enlighten you.
      But seriously, it's a no brainer that it was: "own, deliberate choice"
      1. insafufa
        insafufa 29 November 2022 10: 36
        +1
        Well, the author forgot about China's oil fields in Machzhuriya
        In 1941, 1 tons were produced in Fushun. In Jehol, some oil was produced in conjunction with coal deposits. Oil refineries also operated in Manchukuo.

        This is quite enough for the fleet
        Military review Engineering troops and transport
        Synthetic fuel and shale oil
        15 2015 June

        Germany and Japan made extensive use of this alternative fuel during the war years. In Germany, the annual production of synthetic fuels in 1944 reached about 6,5 million tons, or 124 barrels per day.

        https://topwar.ru/76973-sinteticheskoe-toplivo-i-slancevaya-neft.html
        1. vladcub
          vladcub 30 November 2022 09: 22
          0
          "oil fields" he casually mentioned: "also Manchu Guo", and then forgot.
          It seemed to me that the author himself got lost in the topic and could not decide what to say
    2. Viktor Sergeev
      Viktor Sergeev 29 November 2022 19: 26
      +1
      Yeah, they attacked because they attacked for no reason at all. It’s just that, unlike the author, the Japanese were not fools and understood what the embargo would lead to in the future, they would gradually crush them like bedbugs, besides, the Japanese were going to take China and half of Asia, and gasoline was needed for conquest.
  2. ycuce234-san
    ycuce234-san 29 November 2022 07: 49
    +1
    But at the same time, in this fundamental work, almost no information is given about how much oil products were consumed.


    Oil and oil products cannot be stored in warehouses for years and decades, as, for example, rolled metal or gas in underground storage facilities - they evaporate and lose their properties. Look at natural oil and bitumen lakes. Because about how much they consumed so much and mined and processed.
    It is more logical to look for delivery routes in the data of third-party companies and countries and their merchant fleets.
    1. Chief Officer Lom
      Chief Officer Lom 29 November 2022 20: 23
      0
      Oil and oil products cannot be stored in warehouses for years and decades

      But what about the US oil reserve? Of course, they can update it, well, so could the Japanese, but the very fact of accumulating a stock of physical, not paper oil, which Ivan Baidenyuk is now spending, seems to be beyond doubt?
      1. ycuce234-san
        ycuce234-san 30 November 2022 07: 47
        0
        And updated and stocks are not so big. In general, it is more profitable to conduct additional exploration of deposits - these reserves in rocks can really be stored for centuries. The US reserve is the consequences of their fuel shock of the 70s - no one stores oil in the Middle East, since society did not have this shock there and societies live there in the era before fuel crises, until now.
  3. kor1vet1974
    kor1vet1974 29 November 2022 07: 50
    +3
    Secrets, black and white magic and its exposure.
  4. vladcub
    vladcub 29 November 2022 08: 20
    +3
    The author, in fact, there is nothing surprising in: "the merging of private business and military structures" is not. Business was interested in military orders. And they gave away their oil reserves not "for beautiful eyes."
    And the question is out of harm: in pre-war Japan, how much gasoline did it go to the needs of the population?
    I doubt that the population had many private cars
    It was not difficult for them to create a reserve of oil
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 30 November 2022 11: 51
      0
      Quote: vladcub
      The author, in fact, there is nothing surprising in: "the merging of private business and military structures" is not.

      Actually, the merging of zaibatsu and army groups was the norm in Japan. In the same Manchuria, the army and industrialists acted shoulder to shoulder. smile
  5. Illanatol
    Illanatol 29 November 2022 08: 37
    +3
    The fact that the Japanese government decided to strike at the United States and enter the war on the side of the "Axis" is, it turns out, their own, deliberate choice, and not a decision dictated by an acute shortage of oil.


    And Japan only lacked oil? Maybe there were other shortages that were taken into account when choosing the direction of aggression? Well, there, non-ferrous metal or rubber or chemical industry products? Or maybe the financial area is worth digging into.
    I agree only with the fact that not only the lack of oil forced Japan into direct conflict with such a strong enemy. But that the Japanese had complete freedom of choice, that they could do without this aggression, is doubtful, it seems to me.
    I myself am sure that the Japanese were very diligently provoked into a conflict, using them as an "icebreaker" against the European colonial powers. The oil embargo would not have worked - the overseas puppeteers would have used other methods of provoking the samurai.
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 29 November 2022 11: 59
      +1
      There was also an embargo on the sale of scrap metal to the Japanese!
      They had a very bad situation with iron ore. And the main supplier of scrap metal for the Japanese was the YANKS ...
  6. Fat
    Fat 29 November 2022 08: 47
    +3
    hi Hello Dmitry. I read another article of yours (DID JAPAN LOST THE WORLD WAR OVER OIL? DMITRY VERKHOTUROV
    27.05.2022/XNUMX/XNUMX) Your calculations look decent. Thank you.
    Is it possible to take the data seriously =http&_x_tr_sl=ja&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en
    What do you think?
  7. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 29 November 2022 10: 59
    +5
    The Japanese political leadership and military command could not fail to understand the military and economic significance of oil and could not help but wonder what they would fill ships, planes, cars, tanks with. To attack the main source of oil is recklessness.

    Nah, this is a calculation for a quick victorious war with the pampered and cowardly Yankees and other British and Dutch, the result of which will be the transfer of these same oil sources under Japanese control.
    When determining the moment for the start of hostilities, the following two circumstances were taken into account: the need to provide the armed forces with fuel and satisfaction of the requirements of the high command for the leadership of hostilities.
    The delay in resolving the question of the start of hostilities led to a decrease in the prepared stocks of fuel, which was scarce for Japan in the total volume of its material resources. The deadline for the start of hostilities, taking into account the available fuel reserves, could be March 1942. However, by this time, the country's oil reserves could run out. Japan, on the other hand, hoped that at the beginning of 1942 the war would end and a truce would be concluded ..
    © Japan in the war 1941-1945.
    Moreover, the economic aspects of a future war directly influenced the planning of operations.
    On November 10, 1941, the council discussed the economic prospects for ensuring the war. There, in particular, it was said that it was important for Japan to ensure the conduct of military operations with strategic raw materials, and primarily oil. It was decided to drop a parachute landing on about. Sumatra to capture the oil fields in the Palembang region.

    15 A and 16 A, the seizure of oil fields was directly prescribed by command directives and operational plans.
  8. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 29 November 2022 11: 02
    +5
    And without consumption figures, we cannot say for sure whether Japan had enough oil and oil products, or there was a shortage, and how the situation changed during the war. All these wonderful statistics are largely useless. Well, or she will speak only when information about the consumption of oil and oil products is discovered.

    For consumption, there is separate data from the same Takushiro Hattori. He, in particular, describes the beginning of the fuel crisis of 1942, when, due to the growth in fuel consumption by the fleet, he had to get into civilian reserves + it turned out that not only was it impossible to return some of the previously mobilized tankers to supply the Metropolis (as was planned before the war ), and additional mobilization of tankers is required. The prolongation of the war was slowly beginning to stifle Japan's economy.
    Fuel (oil) is also an important factor that largely affects the potential of the country. Before the war, it was assumed that the amount of oil delivered to Japan from the southern regions would be 600 in the first year, 2 million in the second, and 4,5 million cells in the third. If we add to this the 8,4 million cells available in storage, and the subsequent production of natural and synthetic oil in the country, then the total would hardly be enough for three years. It was assumed that aviation would experience the greatest difficulties in gasoline around the end of the second year of the war.
    The initial period of hostilities in the southern regions was more than successful, the extraction and processing of oil on the spot went on as usual, and there was a hope of getting in the first year not 600 thousand, as it was originally supposed, but 1,7 million cells. However, even here the issue rested on tankers. By the beginning of the war, Japan had tankers with a total tonnage of 380 tons, but of this amount, about 270 tons were transferred to the navy. Consequently, oil from the southern regions could be transported by the remaining tankers (100 thousand tons) and newly built ones. At that time, domestic oil production was pushed to the limit; Replenishment of oil reserves was a matter of paramount importance. Providing the army with fuel, primarily aviation fuel, began to cause concern. Everything depended on the tanker fleet; the hopes were that the navy would release the tankers at the end of the initial period of the war.

    According to the plan for the use of fuel in the second half of 1942, the navy was set to spend 256 thousand cells per month. During August, September and October, in connection with the conduct of hostilities, fuel consumption actually amounted to 300-340 thousand cells, therefore, at the end of 1942, the fleet almost exhausted the reserves allocated to it and is now forced to take from reserves for civilian needs.
    In order to replenish the national strategic fuel reserves, from now on the ships of the Navy will be supplied with fuel directly in the area of ​​the South Seas, and, in addition, at least 350 cubic meters of oil must be delivered to the country every month. To transport this amount, already at the beginning of next year, a tanker fleet of 200 tons will be required, so it is necessary to select suitable vessels from the merchant fleet - 120 tons in operation and 70 tons under construction - and rebuild them into tankers.

    Need more Gold tankers, my lord... smile
  9. Baker
    Baker 29 November 2022 11: 11
    +8
    The author skillfully pulled the bird onto a three-dimensional model of the globe, inventing the secret himself and immediately exposing it.
    Particularly impressive is the fundamental conclusion of the author that
    "The oil embargo was not the reason for Japan's entry into the war. And there is nothing to argue with this conclusion."

    True, it is not clear from the article who is arguing with this conclusion, since it has long been known that the reason for Japan's entry into the war is the desire of the country's ruling elite to gain access to new markets and resource markets. And in accordance with this aspiration, Japan has been building its foreign policy since 1931, when Manchuria was "cut off" from China. Over the next ten years, the Empire of Japan "increased" the territory from 147 to 000 square miles. Naturally, such a rapid growth could not but disturb the competing parties. Accordingly, the United States tried to provide economic resistance to such a rapid expansion, including through various embargoes. That is, Japan had to either abandon its foreign policy, or go to war with the United States. There are many interesting points around the decision on Japan's entry into the war with the United States. After all, the Japanese understood that militarily they were weaker. And this was directly stated in the special report of the group headed by Lieutenant Colonel Jiro Akimaru. This report can still be viewed today in the library of the University of Tokyo. But the Japanese leadership decided that, given the whole course of events, they had a chance. As history has shown, the calculations turned out to be erroneous.
    Well, about the study of the Japanese language by the author - a test joke!
    1. parma
      parma 29 November 2022 15: 12
      +4
      Quote from Baker
      The author skillfully pulled the bird onto a three-dimensional model of the globe, inventing the secret himself and immediately exposing it.
      Particularly impressive is the fundamental conclusion of the author that
      "The oil embargo was not the reason for Japan's entry into the war. And there is nothing to argue with this conclusion."

      True, it is not clear from the article who is arguing with this conclusion, since it has long been known that the reason for Japan's entry into the war is the desire of the country's ruling elite to gain access to new markets and resource markets. And in accordance with this aspiration, Japan has been building its foreign policy since 1931, when Manchuria was "cut off" from China. Over the next ten years, the Empire of Japan "increased" the territory from 147 to 000 square miles. Naturally, such a rapid growth could not but disturb the competing parties. Accordingly, the United States tried to provide economic resistance to such a rapid expansion, including through various embargoes. That is, Japan had to either abandon its foreign policy, or go to war with the United States. There are many interesting points around the decision on Japan's entry into the war with the United States. After all, the Japanese understood that militarily they were weaker. And this was directly stated in the special report of the group headed by Lieutenant Colonel Jiro Akimaru. This report can still be viewed today in the library of the University of Tokyo. But the Japanese leadership decided that, given the whole course of events, they had a chance. As history has shown, the calculations turned out to be erroneous.
      Well, about the study of the Japanese language by the author - a test joke!

      Were the Japanese really weaker militarily? A moot point ... at the time of the start of the war with the United States, it’s more likely no than yes (taking into account the original plan to destroy US aircraft carriers right in the base), it’s easy to talk about the whole story, but what Japan’s leaders saw at that time:
      1) the lightning fall of France and the almost bloodless transition of the colonies under the control of Japan
      2) a fairly massive transition of Chinese leaders to the side of Japan (the number of military units of pro-Japanese Chinese at a peak of under 1,5 million people)
      2) great successes of the German-Italian units in Africa
      3) the huge successes of the Wehrmacht in the USSR (at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was a battle for Moscow, and at the time of planning, there was almost a parade procession across the territory of the union with tens of kilometers a day, and Germany did not even begin a full mobilization of the economy, the question of victory seemed to be resolved)
      4) the almost complete absence of the ground army and air force in the United States, the industry was just switching to a military footing
      What follows from this - when the US aircraft carrier fleet is destroyed, the enemy, at best, will go on the defensive, or even not combat-ready for several years at all (the minimum period for building and commissioning an aircraft carrier is 1,5-2 years), Great Britain and other allies of forces for defense they didn’t have in Asia, taking into account the possible loss of northern Africa in battles with Italy, their problems are generally collapsing, the fall of Moscow and the defeat of the USSR will lead to the cessation of support for China by anyone at all ... it was also impossible to pull, the embargo rather became a trigger (without oil supplies and new conquests, the reserves were melting, complicating the beginning of expansion every minute, and after the fall of Egypt and the USSR, Britain could go to peace negotiations, which left Japan without part of the pie in the form of colonies), so the Japanese broke into the war ...
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 30 November 2022 12: 18
        +2
        Quote: parma
        3) the huge successes of the Wehrmacht in the USSR (at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was a battle for Moscow, and at the time of planning, there was almost a parade procession across the territory of the union with tens of kilometers a day, and Germany did not even begin a full mobilization of the economy, the question of victory seemed to be resolved)

        Nope. The fact of the matter is that Japan did not believe in a quick victory for the Reich. Otherwise, Japan would have attacked the USSR - in accordance with the "Program of the national policy of the empire in accordance with a change in the situation" dated 24.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
        3. Although our attitude towards the German-Soviet war is based on the principles of strengthening the power of the Axis Powers, we will not intervene at this time and maintain an independent policy, while covertly completing military preparations against the Soviet Union. During this period, diplomatic negotiations, of course, should be conducted with great caution.
        If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to the empire, the empire, having resorted to armed force, will solve the northern problem and ensure stability in the North.

        But already in August, the leadership of Japan realized that the German blitzkrieg had failed and the war was dragging on.
        Due to the fact that the German-Soviet war was taking on a protracted character, the Headquarters paid more and more attention to the regions of the South Seas. On August 9, she abandoned the plan for resolving the northern problem in 1941, regardless of how the situation on the German-Soviet front developed, and set a course for an advance in a southerly direction.

        And by November, there were already doubts about the victory of the Reich.
        At the end of November 1941, the Headquarters and the government already had a firm conviction that it was necessary to enter the war. Both the Stavka and the government believed that Germany would not be defeated in Europe, but there was also no firm certainty that Germany would win a final victory.
        © Japan in the war 1941-1945.
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 30 November 2022 12: 42
        +2
        Quote: parma
        What follows from this - when the US aircraft carrier fleet is destroyed, the enemy, at best, will go on the defensive, or even not combat-ready for several years at all (the minimum period for building and commissioning an aircraft carrier is 1,5-2 years), Great Britain and other allies of forces for defense they didn’t have in Asia, taking into account the possible loss of northern Africa in battles with Italy, their problems are generally collapsing, the fall of Moscow and the defeat of the USSR will lead to the cessation of support for China by anyone at all ...

        The fact of the matter is that the calculation was for a quick crushing defeat of the enemy forces in the theater of operations, after which he had to sue for peace. No transitions to the defense - Japan merged 100% of the long war. The same IJN command was well aware that in a year and a half the US industry would be mobilized and would begin to overwhelm the Japanese forces with iron. And the US Navy during this time will launch a war on communications, which the IJN did not plan to counteract at all. For the budget and capabilities of Japan's industry were limited, so the emphasis was placed on squadron forces (to quickly defeat the enemy fleet), and not on convoys. So if it came to guarding convoys, then the war could no longer be won.
  10. Knell wardenheart
    Knell wardenheart 29 November 2022 12: 58
    +7
    The choice was marked long enough - Japan began laying down large participating ships in the late 20s and early 30s. Apparently, they were preparing not so much to knock out the United States as to knock out the decrepit colonial appendages of Europeans - the Russian-Japanese and the First World War showed the Japanese that they could to do this and that it is profitable (I mean how they scammed the possessions of the Germans, among other things). Having made quite logical conclusions that the fundamental causes of BB1 are not closed with its end, the Japanese understand that the war after the interbellum will inevitably repeat itself (probably on a more serious scale), according to the development of technology in the same interbellum, they understand that technically this will be a development the concept of a more flexible and faster war than BB1. Given the nature of their "claim zone", they rely on the mobile forces of the fleet, amphibious assault forces, and aviation. Developing all this, they are simply waiting for the mess in Europe, and they essentially have one interest - to knock out the European colonies from Asia (to India) and gain a foothold there so that their return by the Europeans would not be considered.

    This line of action is extremely logical. What is not logical is their activities in China and the attack on the United States. China could well wait for a greater focus of attention, especially since the Japanese themselves should have understood that 2 large-scale fronts of action are too much. And an attack on the United States in general is also illogical - the United States is in the very juice of isolationism and its focus is gradually shifting to the European direction. The inevitability of this is quite logical - the Japanese should have understood that the time is right here on their side, and there will be a more successful configuration for action ahead. But apparently they didn't understand.

    I believe that in the attack on the United States, the main role was played not by the objective, but by the subjective. Psychology eclipsed the calculation - America was for Japan "the main boar" which they had not yet tried on the tooth and were unable to evaluate empirically as they did with the European colonialists. Having got involved in this, they ran far ahead of the locomotive, clearly underestimating the current involvement of the United States in European affairs, the potential of American industry, and their ability to act on 2-3 fronts of influence.
    I would write it all off as a nationalist cheer-waste, a la the wind of luck that demolished the tower of Adolf Aloizovich in front of Poland. It's definitely hard to resist the prospect of having "God is on your side," especially when you're stewing in an environment that's been thoroughly saturated with it by now.

    The Japanese at that time were very good. a selfish nation - which has made a colossal leap in 80 years, and therefore perceived the overtaken nations as "brakes". Gradually, this was extrapolated to all "non-Japanese" and they began to indulge in excessive assumptions beyond the rational.
    1. Doctor
      Doctor 29 November 2022 15: 56
      +2
      This line of action is extremely logical. What is not logical is their activities in China and the attack on the United States.

      Japanese logic:

      As a result of the Meiji Restoration, Japan emerged from the isolation in which it had been for three hundred years, and went from a feudal state to a modern capitalist one. She closely followed the development of the material culture of the more civilized countries of Europe and America, as well as their rapid advance into East Asia. From a backward country, Japan has become a major power with powerful armed forces.

      Under these conditions, Japan could not turn a blind eye to the aggressive plans of China or Russia towards Korea. The Korean Peninsula is like a dagger aimed at the heart of Japan. This circumstance dictated the need to ensure Japan's security by establishing close political and military relations with Korea.

      Both in the First and in the Second World War, the United States, while providing assistance to England, could not help but fight against Germany. Similarly, Japan, while helping Korea, was forced to fight against China and Russia. The result was the Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Russian wars.
      During the latter, the United States and England provided assistance to Japan, which contributed to its victory. As a result of the war, Japan achieved a number of privileges in Manchuria. It acquired the concessions that Russia had had in Manchuria since 1898: the right to lease the Kwantung region, the ownership of the South Manchurian Railway (SMZhD), the right to keep troops in the areas adjacent to the SMWR, etc.

      To survive, Japan, with its small territory, poor natural resources and growing population, needed to establish close relations with the Asian mainland.

      In 1910, Korea became part of Japan, and ties between Japan and Manchuria were becoming stronger and stronger. In 1917, an agreement was reached with the United States recognizing Japan's special interests in China. Japan invested heavily in various enterprises in Manchuria, primarily in the Southern Moscow Railway. The amount of these investments by the beginning of the Manchurian Incident reached about 1680 million yen. The economic development of Manchuria proceeded at a much higher rate than the economic development of China proper. Every year, more than 1 million people moved from Korea and China proper to Manchuria. From 1907 until the beginning of the Manchurian Incident, its population increased from 17 to 33 million people.

      In World War I, Japan sided with the Entente and fought against Germany. But after the war, the European powers and the United States began to pursue a policy of diktat towards Japan. As a result of the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the limitation of the main forces of the Japanese fleet at the Washington Conference, the annulment of the agreement on China, the elimination of Japan's special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia established by the Nine-Power Treaty, the adoption by the United States of the law on the restriction of Japanese immigration and other measures, Japan was in for a hopeless future. All these measures were ultimately aimed at hindering the development of Japan, especially its strengthening on the mainland.

      After the First World War, the struggle for foreign markets intensified. As countermeasures against dumping, the European powers and the United States set high customs barriers. Japan began to be gradually ousted from world markets, and above all from India and the countries of the South Seas. The global economic crisis that began in 1929 dealt a severe blow to the Japanese economy as well.


      Takushiro Hattori
      Japan in the war 1941–1945
      1. Knell wardenheart
        Knell wardenheart 29 November 2022 18: 46
        0
        I think that this reason is not entirely true. No, of course, the Asia-Pacific markets were important for Japan, but by that time they had already learned to trade where it was traded. Like the Germans, Japan could deal with the Soviet state - while maintaining "clean hands", but preferred a deliberately cool and confrontational line. Japan could trade with the OSI countries, Turkey, which kept relative sovereignty by China, to do business with European "neutrals" who did not have colonies in the Asia-Pacific region, with Shah's Iran (at least until 1941) - to trade with the LAS who had sovereignty during the interbellum period. The geographical position quite allowed them to do this. and be content with what we have during major international economic crises , but no, these guys definitely didn’t yearn for money - they needed courage, big stakes, Kuz’kin’s mother and so on.
        Yes, their interest was "yellow asia", "asia for asians" and they are at the head of their "co-prosperity sphere" as they called it, but even beyond this - no, it was not all because of the markets. Who really needs to dig under the markets, painstakingly and methodically, like the Weimar Republic, through agents of influence, diplomatic contacts. And he gets his bite in conditions and heavier.
        And the Japanese needed to "show themselves" by correcting others - this was their interest, they cheated themselves great in their own eyes at the beginning of the 20th century. Self-conceit there broke through any ceiling, it was pride and the desire to project their own exclusivity that pushed them to the USA. Knowing perfectly well what kind of meat grinder would be in BB2, Japan could extract gesheft from this like the same Sweden or Turkey, but on a much larger scale - they would even be allowed to chop off something again, on the sly and sewn with white thread. But this categorically did not suit them - pride permeates their entire culture.

        Japan's gesheft from Korea is 100% understandable, but I can't understand Chinese. They COULD occupy and control Korea with minimal effort and extensive use of the fleet - huge China, even in itself (in isolation from much larger plans for number of possessions) was already a challenge for exerting their forces and organization. They should have understood that the nationalist currents in China had already developed enough that it was not a cakewalk - but nevertheless they got into it "to the very ears." Whereas they could well trade with China - even clandestinely, if necessary, postponing it as a goal for a later period.
        However, they climbed, mostly because of pride, rather than because of the direct benefit of a short-range order.
        1. Doctor
          Doctor 29 November 2022 23: 18
          0
          Japan's gesheft from Korea is 100% understandable, but I can't understand Chinese. They COULD occupy and control Korea with minimal effort and extensive use of the fleet - huge China, even in itself (in isolation from much larger plans for number of possessions) was already a challenge for exerting their forces and organization. They should have understood that the nationalist currents in China had already developed enough that it was not a cakewalk - but nevertheless they got into it "to the very ears." Whereas they could well trade with China - even clandestinely, if necessary, postponing it as a goal for a later period.
          However, they climbed, mostly because of pride, rather than because of the direct benefit of a short-range order.

          This is now China - this is CHINA.
          Then China is a herd. The Japanese considered it their fiefdom in accordance with the "Program of the national policy of the empire", approved by their emperor.

          1. Regardless of changes in the international situation, the empire will firmly adhere to the policy of building a Greater East Asia common prosperity sphere, thereby contributing to the preservation of world peace.
          2. The Empire will continue to make efforts to resolve the conflict in China; will continue to move south to ensure the foundations of independence and self-defense.
          The solution of the northern problem will depend on changes in the situation.
          3. To achieve these goals, the empire will overcome any obstacles.


          Well, then oil:

          After facing the prospect of a long war in China, Japan turned its eyes to the regions of the South Seas, rich in various types of raw materials. In the Dutch Indies, for example, about 8 million tons of oil were produced annually, which was about 20 times the oil production in Japan. At that time, Japan's annual oil demand was about 5 million tons, of which it was able to obtain only 10% from its own production.

          Progressive humanity (including the USSR) supported the Chinese morally and materially.

          The US reacted in the usual way:
          While indicating the reasons for the entry of Japanese troops, the government simultaneously emphasized Japan's desire to normalize relations with the United States. However, on July 26, the US announced a freeze on Japanese capital. laughing
      2. ycuce234-san
        ycuce234-san 29 November 2022 19: 39
        0
        [quote = Arzt] [quote]
        In World War I, Japan sided with the Entente and fought against Germany. But after the war, the European powers and the United States began to pursue a policy of diktat towards Japan. As a result of the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the limitation of the main forces of the Japanese fleet at the Washington Conference, the annulment of the agreement on China, the elimination of Japan's special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia established by the Nine-Power Treaty, the adoption by the United States of the law on the restriction of Japanese immigration and other measures, Japan was in for a hopeless future. All these measures were ultimately aimed at hindering the development of Japan, especially its strengthening on the mainland.
        Takushiro Hattori
        Japan in the war 1941–1945
        [/ Quote]

        In those days, the science of demography was still poorly developed, so the then Japanese did not understand that the explosive growth of the population was actually finite, and therefore they should not have been so worried about resources. They thought that there were no limits to growth, and we, living in the era of the global demographic crisis, did not understand their fears.
      3. Chief Officer Lom
        Chief Officer Lom 29 November 2022 21: 04
        +1
        In the same way, Japan, while helping Korea, was forced to fight ... Takushiro Hattori

        Well, it's a masterpiece! That is still in both Koreas, the Japanese are hated no less than in China. It's as if Scholz wrote now: "In 1941, Germany, providing assistance to Poland, was forced to fight ..."
        1. Doctor
          Doctor 29 November 2022 22: 39
          +3
          Well, it's a masterpiece! That is still in both Koreas, the Japanese are hated no less than in China. It's as if Scholz wrote now: "In 1941, Germany, providing assistance to Poland, was forced to fight ..."

          The whole book is a masterpiece.

          How they squeezed out Manjuria (Mukden incident).

          The colonel, two subfields and a major of the Kwantung Army TYPA, on their own initiative, blew up the railway, and then persuaded the commander-in-chief to raise the army. He TYPE was not in the know at all. laughing
          A general was sent from Tokyo to sort things out, but it was too late...

          On the night of September 18, 1931, an explosion occurred on the South Manchurian Railway north of Mukden, which led to an armed clash. The Kwantung Army, on its own initiative, went on the offensive against Chang Hsueh-liang's Chinese army. This is how the Manchurian incident arose....

          The Japanese side tried to settle the incident through direct negotiations with the Chinese side, but the latter did not agree to this and turned to the League of Nations for mediation, which further complicated the situation and made it difficult to resolve the incident as soon as possible ....

          The moment for resolving the conflict through direct negotiations between the governments of Japan and China was lost ...

          Japan was forced to withdraw from the League of Nations...


          Then he has a "Chinese incident."
          They also did not capture Indochina, they simply "placed" part of the forces there. wink

          On September 5, the military department of the Stavka sent an order to the commander of the South China Front: "In order to fulfill the task, place part of the army's forces in the northern part of French Indochina."

          Etc.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 30 November 2022 14: 32
            +1
            Quote: Arzt
            The colonel, two subfields and a major of the Kwantung Army TYPA, on their own initiative, blew up the railway, and then persuaded the commander-in-chief to raise the army. He TYPE was not in the know at all.

            The funny thing is that if the commander-in-chief, most likely, was aware, then the Metropolis could be neither sleep nor spirit. Examples of independent policy of IJA field commanders are a dime a dozen, from the dispersal and arrest of local authorities officially approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the creative execution of orders from the Center and even immediate superiors, up to refusal to comply. A clinical case - Imphal, when during the operation, EMNIP, all division commanders were removed for insubordination.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 30 November 2022 14: 28
      0
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      The choice was marked long enough - Japan began laying large participating vessels in the late 20s and early 30s.

      So they were all laid at about the same time. For the economy + the Washington and London treaties with their "battleship holidays". So the participants until the mid-30s chose the tonnage for KR and AB and looked closely at the LK.
  11. Doctor
    Doctor 29 November 2022 13: 29
    +2
    Very interesting. yes

    Oil is particulars. Globally - everything is decided by the individual. Specifically, in this case, Fumimaro Konoe, the repeated prime minister of Japan since 1937. Japanese "hawk", a supporter of the territorial expansion of Japan and an alliance with fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, aimed at redistributing the world.

  12. Illanatol
    Illanatol 29 November 2022 14: 06
    +2
    Quote: Knell Wardenheart
    What is not logical is their activities in China and the attack on the United States. China could well wait for a greater focus of attention, especially since the Japanese themselves should have understood that 2 large-scale fronts of action are too much. And an attack on the United States in general is also illogical - the United States is in the very juice of isolationism and its focus is gradually shifting to the European direction.


    Why is it illogical? China is a very logical choice. After the economic crisis ("Great Depression"), China was in deep decline. Army - at the level of the First World War. Unlike the neighboring USSR, which was able to firmly break into the samurai. Those. China is a very convenient and easy opponent. At the same time - rich in resources (metals, coal).
    A war on two fronts - maybe too much. Only the conflicts are very different. Ground forces are involved in the war against China (China's fleet is so-so). And the war on the islands is just the fleet and carrier-based aviation, you don’t need much ground forces. Japan has a rather large mob potential, the population is in abundance and the aging of the nation was not even heard of at that time.
    As for the focus of attention - debatable. Let's not forget that American "volunteer" pilots have already fought against the Japanese in China. I doubt that they bought their airplanes with their own savings, so the attention to the Island Empire among the Yankees was quite close.
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 29 November 2022 22: 16
      0
      The Emperor had enough people.
      But with what to arm these people, the Japanese generals themselves "puzzled their heads."
      Almost half of the infantry division did not have small arms. Only one bayonet.
      And before the American "winged tiger cubs" there were other pilots - volunteers and mercenaries. At that moment, the owners of the White House "kept their mouths shut" and did not prevent the Japanese from seizing the coastal provinces of China.
  13. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 29 November 2022 16: 03
    +3
    In 1941, the Japanese government had a choice: strike now or wait for the outcome of the war in Europe and which side the victory would tend to.

    It was impossible to beat the victory of the British Empire, France and their allies in Europe. From their victory, the position of Japan could only worsen.
    At that time, Japan was on good terms with two opposing sides at once: both Germany and the USSR. After waiting, they could join the winning side.

    Japan was already on good terms with Germany and the USSR until 1945. She remained neutral in their conflict and could give her contribution to a diplomatic solution. For Japan and its interests, the alliance between Germany and the USSR beat the best thing in the war. By the way, this was the best solution for both Germany and the USSR. It is not Japan's fault that the best solution for the three countries failed. There is no wine and the USSR - he also did everything that could be done to avoid a war with Germany. All the blame for this geopolitical catastrophe falls entirely on the tops of the Third Reich and personally on Hitler.
  14. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 29 November 2022 16: 37
    +3
    This does not happen - a distillation column cannot make gasoline from air.

    Gasoline cannot be made from air, but synthetic fuel will be added to gasoline, or alcohol, or ordinary water, or octane-enhancing additives from coal distillates, or fuel from turpentine, all this was done by the Japanese in the war.
    In addition, a large part of the oil and fuel did not reach Japan. They were used on the spot not only for the Japanese army, but for its allies and for the population of these countries. Among the allies, such states as Manzhou-go with a population of 50 million in 1945, or the "Republic of China" in Nanjing, also several tens of millions, were beaten.
  15. Grossvater
    Grossvater 29 November 2022 18: 09
    +1
    Just their own choice due to the catastrophic shortage of oil. Or does the author think that the war should have been started with supplies for a month? A two-three-year supply is the necessary minimum for the start of hostilities.
    Information about the availability of Japan's two-year fuel supply is mentioned in any Murzilka dedicated to the beginning of the war in the Pacific.
  16. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 29 November 2022 19: 01
    +5
    The research conducted by the author inspires great respect. A painstaking search for information, a search of sources ... I take off my hat.
    However, I did not understand at all either the reasons that prompted the respected Dmitry to undertake this study, or the conclusions that he draws.
    To attack the main source of oil is recklessness. To take such a thesis seriously means to take the Japanese for some fools who are incapable of assessing the situation.

    Why? After all, one of the goals of the attack was precisely to seize and put under its control the oil-bearing regions of Asia. "I have no oil, but my enemy has it, I will take the oil from him" - what's illogical?
    But one of the theses has already fallen - the oil embargo was not the reason for Japan's entry into the war. And there is nothing to argue with this conclusion.

    I do not see anything in the article that could refute this thesis. Well, yes,
    In total, in 1941, these reserves can be estimated at 6,9 million tons, which would be enough for the consumption of petroleum products during the war years for more than two years.

    And what is, sorry, two years?
    Japan lands and starts a war in China, seizes significant territories, but until the complete enslavement of China, she ... as before China on all fours. And then - a cry from Washington: "Either turn back and return to your islands, or - get an embargo!" To surrender means a loss of face and the return of the pre-war status, which is unacceptable for Japan - it is focused on aggression, it is cramped on its islands. Let it be as it is? So in a year there will not be enough oil for the war against the United States, even theoretically. That is, the oil embargo itself did not bring Japan to its knees immediately, but did not give it any chance in the medium term. And the attack, while the fleet is strong, and the Americans' shipbuilding programs have not yet been completed, is the sweetest thing.
  17. Illanatol
    Illanatol 30 November 2022 09: 02
    0
    Quote: Knell Wardenheart
    No, of course, the Asia-Pacific markets were important for Japan, but by that time they had already learned to trade where it was traded.


    Before you can trade, you need to produce goods for sale. And for production you need raw materials. Did Japan have it? Yes, and the industry of Japan was heavily militarized. The quality of industrial goods for peaceful purposes among the Japanese was then disgusting, they were not competitive. The production of the agricultural sector had a higher cost than that of its neighbors. What to trade? Weapons? Strengthen your neighbors, who are not very friendly to the Japanese? The Chinese and Koreans even then did not like the Japanese.
    So free trade is not an option for the Empire. It was necessary to create our own "sphere of mutual prosperity", fenced off from the rest of the world by measures of protectionism, high duties, and so on.
  18. Illanatol
    Illanatol 30 November 2022 09: 10
    +1
    Quote: Kostadinov
    Japan was already on good terms with Germany and the USSR until 1945. She remained neutral in their conflict and could give her contribution to a diplomatic solution. For Japan and its interests, the alliance between Germany and the USSR beat the best thing in the war.


    With the USSR, Japan began to have "good relations" only after the Red Army gave the samurai a good deal for cabbage soup at Khalkhin Gol.
    However, one should not forget that Japan agreed to sign a peace treaty with the USSR also because the USSR signed the Pact with Germany, just during this conflict. The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was perceived by the Japanese as a betrayal of their interests by Hitler (even the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan, which had previously signed a military alliance with the Reich, resigned). Therefore, relations between the Reich and Japan became cooler.
    There was no union between the Reich and the USSR, there was only a respite before the war. A lasting alliance was basically impossible, given the cardinal differences in state ideologies.
  19. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 30 November 2022 11: 21
    0
    However, one should not forget that Japan agreed to sign a peace treaty with the USSR also because the USSR signed the Pact with Germany, just during this conflict.

    The difference is insignificant - Japan complied with the agreement with the USSR, and Germany trampled it.
    Quote: Illanatol
    There was no union between the Reich and the USSR, there was only a respite before the war. A lasting alliance was basically impossible, given the cardinal differences in state ideologies.

    All this fully applies to the union of the USSR with the USA and Britain. Between them, too, there were cardinal differences in ideology. At the same time, there was no need not only for a "strong alliance", but for any alliance with Germany. It was only necessary to beat the observance of the non-aggression pact and the neutrality of the USSR in the already ongoing war between Germany and Britain. Just like the USSR remained neutral in the war between Japan and the United States.
    At the same time, the USSR acted as an intermediary without any casualties, and Germany and Japan were maintained as buffer zones against the US and Britain. The Japanese understood this already in April 1941. In the end, Hitler also understood this, but only in April 1945.
    1. Illanatol
      Illanatol 30 November 2022 14: 05
      0
      Quote: Kostadinov
      The difference is insignificant - Japan complied with the agreement with the USSR, and Germany trampled it.


      The difference is insignificant: Japan has already tried to open its mouth against the USSR and rake. Reich - not yet.
      Japan observed the treaty very poorly: border skirmishes, the sinking of several Soviet ships. So the USSR had a formal reason for early termination of the peace treaty.

      It was only necessary to beat the observance of the non-aggression pact and the neutrality of the USSR in the already ongoing war between Germany and Britain.


      The USSR maintained neutrality. And the Pact was violated by the Reich led by Hitler. He is to blame for this violation.
      Such a scenario would be impossible. The USSR and the Reich had to fight. No lasting alliance of strong European countries in any configuration (England-Germany, France-USSR) was possible, because it contradicted the plans of the US elite to establish its own hegemony over Europe. The United States would simply be superfluous in this part of the world. But it was precisely for the sake of establishing such hegemony that the United States prepared and provoked the Second World War.
  20. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 1 December 2022 11: 23
    0
    The USSR maintained neutrality. And the Pact was violated by the Reich led by Hitler. He is to blame for this violation.

    I wrote this. All the fault of Hitler and he himself ruined his Reich.
    Quote: Illanatol
    Such a scenario would be impossible. The USSR and the Reich had to fight. ...because it contradicted the plans of the US elite to establish their own hegemony over Europe. The United States would simply be superfluous in this part of the world. But it was precisely for the sake of establishing such hegemony that the United States prepared and provoked the Second World War.

    And why should the Reich beat the US plan to establish American hegemony in the world and, at the same time, die itself?
  21. Illanatol
    Illanatol 2 December 2022 09: 37
    0
    Quote: Kostadinov

    And why should the Reich beat the US plan to establish American hegemony in the world and, at the same time, die itself?


    Because that's what it was created for, with American help. The prerequisites were laid back at Versailles in 1918. The conditions of the then capitulation of Germany laid the objective prerequisites for revanchism.
    The Germans once again showed that they are not particularly smart and can be used "in the dark."
    They were used to weaken (and subsequently tame by the States) Britain, to weaken and collapse other European colonial powers.
    Reich played his role diligently. "The Moor has done his job, the Moor can cut down the forest ..."
    1. wehr
      2 December 2022 16: 48
      0
      This is pure conspiracy theories.
      In addition, this theory has no actual evidence.