"Claw-Sword". Prospects for Turkish military operation
Turkish presidential campaign
The beginning of the week was marked not only by the start of the World Cup in Qatar, but also by the start of Turkey's military operation in Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, codenamed "Claw-sword". There are quite a lot of messages on this topic, and the events at first glance seem quite serious in terms of consequences.
For example, an air strike on an American military training base in Syrian Kurdistan (the so-called Rojava). There are no reports of casualties among the Americans, although, most likely, they simply do not exist, and the United States was warned in advance “through communication channels”. But the fact itself is loud and revealing, because, according to the Turkish intelligence service MIT, the girl who carried out the attack in Istanbul was trained at this base and was a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party.
R. Erdogan also spoke quite sharply about Russian participation in the recent Syrian events:
“Despite our repeated warnings to Russia, which is responsible for clearing terrorists from northern Iraq and Syria in accordance with our 2019 Sochi agreement, Moscow has failed and refuses to fulfill its duty.”
In general, the next campaign of the Turkish president is unfolding before our eyes, and in addition to Ankara's own "eternal enemies", the big "external" players are also to blame for this: the United States and Russia. At the same time, Europeans are also to blame as harborers of PKK activists.
But the government in Damascus did not fall under the avalanche of Turkish criticism, although along with the attack on almost nine dozen targets, Syrian military personnel also suffered. Given that the protests in Iran are closely linked to the so-called. “Kurdish factor”, and the cells of the PKK are active in the Iranian direction, this brings to mind many issues of the Syrian campaign that have been forgotten in a few years.
Node of local problems
The contradictions in that region have somewhat faded in the media field, but they have not disappeared by themselves. And, apparently, the time has come to update the information on some of the key issues related to this knot of international problems.
Many commentators immediately linked this (by the way, another in a row) military activity of Turkey with the upcoming elections next year, which the Turkish leadership approaches very carefully, realizing all the precariousness of the internal economic base, which may simply “not pull” the breadth of Ankara’s geopolitical swing. It really is. But the matter is not only and not so much in the internal "PR" of the Turkish leadership.
Ankara is well aware that the geopolitical claim will meet (and is already meeting) resistance from the "Western partners". Turkey faces a military confrontation with a literal NATO ally, and next year's elections may contain "surprises" similar to the coup attempt in 2016.
All this means that today Turkey is conducting not just an operation in the traditional style - its task is to untie or weaken the Syrian knot to the maximum, which does not let Turkey into the "operational space" of geopolitics. It seems to us from our belfry that Turkey has been doing nothing but harvesting profits from international activity, but this is not entirely true - the harvest has yet to be harvested, and it is not at all a fact that Ankara will succeed in this harsh reality.
The fact is that the Syrian campaign, in which several dozen large states were involved in one way or another, was not completed with an unequivocal result for any of the main players. The actual defeat of ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation) as a military-political force did not solve the problem of the territorial integrity of Syria, the restoration of the industrial and commercial potential of Syria and Iraq, did not end with the distribution and recognition of their interests by the players as a result of defeat or consensus.
Splinters remain in the region, which are making themselves felt and will make themselves felt until the major military-political centers decide to finally eliminate them. One such thorn is the so-called PKK. This phenomenon, even, perhaps, a regional phenomenon, which is either not appreciated in the Russian media space, or is considered from a rather strange position.
Meanwhile, this is the factor that has been exerting an extremely destructive influence on regional stability for many years. At the same time, the PKK and its structures often act as a kind of landsknecht in completely opposite games and interests of large countries, near or on the territory of which they operate. Without examining this phenomenon, we can unequivocally say that it is not possible to fully understand the features of what is happening in this Middle Eastern knot.
The big problem of our expert community is that the PKK is seen as something closely related to the concept of "Kurdish independence". Moreover, the ideologists of the PKK themselves do not prevent such a connotation, since it is trite politically beneficial, because public support, especially in the EU, is an important political factor.
The second “narrative” that confuses the media is the consideration of the PKK as a tactical counterbalance to the policy of Turkish expansion: they say, it is necessary to “negotiate with the Kurds” (that is, the PKK), persuade them to sign some kind of agreements with Damascus, give them “autonomy” and everything will be fine. And the "Kurds" will help us to upset the claims of Ankara, which today or tomorrow will cover all of Asia with a flag with a star and a crescent.
Both of these notions are not only far from reality, but cause absolutely sincere surprise in the Middle East, and often even just irritation. The real negotiating position of the parties cannot be built on this illusion, and as a result, for the layman who looks at the world through the prism of the media sphere, a natural contradiction of meanings sets in.
For example, the most popular option is: "Why is Russia allowing Turkey to bomb the Kurds in Syria." When B. Assad's campaign in Idlib was underway, Russia supported Damascus directly in a clash with Turkey, but when it comes to the region under the control of the "Kurds", everything is different? Yes exactly.
Kurdish project
The fact is that the Kurdistan Workers' Party has long been no longer a proper Kurdish party, current or movement. What began as a truly Kurdish project for the struggle for national identity gradually turned into a kind of sect, which some political scientists mistakenly call "Marxist", some (which is closer) "anarchist".
In fact, “democratic confederalism” or, as it is also called, TEV-DEM, is based on the principle of complete territorial decentralization, management based on the system of “councils” and the rejection of the state as an institution in principle. There are many materials professionally devoted to this topic, but in this case it is important for us to understand one fundamental thing - what is being built by modern adherents of this ideology (“Apoism”) is not compatible with any state entity, in any form - not in the form democracy or monarchy, neither in the form of a socialist form of production, nor capitalist, nor post-industrial.
All the negotiations that, they say, it is necessary to give the "Kurds autonomy" in Syria all the past years rested on one circumstance - for the representatives of TEV-DEM, who have been "ruling" on the territory of Syrian Kurdistan and partly Syrian Trans-Euphrates for seven years, under autonomy it implies the absence of Damascus authorities in their territories, subject to the recognition on paper of the “unity of the Syrian state”.
The icing on the cake is that, at the same time, the construction of a “system of territorial councils” in Northern Syria, although the ethnic Kurds retain the advantage in numbers there, is, in fact, against Kurdish independence proper and even real Kurdish autonomy. All political parties, one way or another connected with the real opposition to Bashar al-Assad and in fact advocating Kurdish national projects, have been systematically purged in recent years, and their paramilitary formations were squeezed out into neighboring Iraq.
It would seem that the government of B. Assad should be glad that ideological opponents are weak, but the trouble is, with ideological opponents (despite mutual rhetoric) he de facto has much more chances to agree than with representatives of the PDS / PYD, on behalf of which he rules on Northern Syria PKK.
The economic basis of this interesting enclave, which is still patronized by the United States, is quite interesting. On the ground, this is a kind of analogue of the collective farm-community with elements of a planned economy. But the question is, how do the Turkmen, Arab tribes, Assyrians and Circassians, who are not particularly accustomed to such innovations in the economy, get along with this?
At first, they really did not get along well and armed clashes periodically occurred, but the Americans managed to distribute between the top of the PKK and the Arabs the flows of illegal and semi-legal oil, which, albeit on a much smaller scale, is produced in the region, and the presence of the Americans protects the oil fields physically. The Americans continue to supply ammunition and light equipment.
On the scale of the world market, these are pennies, but within a particular region, these are quite tangible incomes. It should also be taken into account that the north-east of the province of Aleppo and the province of Hasakah are the Syrian granary, where the climate and the availability of water make it possible to grow crops and olives. That is, with all the desire to stop trade with these territories, it will not work.
Damascus is forced to buy the same oil and food (de facto from itself), Turkey buys one way or another. Having such a base, the PKK is able to ensure the recruitment and maintenance of supporters in Turkey, Iraq and even Iran, creating cells there whose ideologists advocate the denial of the role and function of the state, as well as the dismantling of official state institutions. At the same time, some of them are also armed formations that commit acts of violence (in their language - “guerrillas”).
How does it happen that such powerful and tough states as Iran and Turkey have been fighting this current for years, but have not been able to defeat it? At first glance, this looks extremely strange, because both the Turkish MIT, and the Iranian IRGC, and the Syrian Mukhabarat have a very branched structure of informants, and everyone knows the location of the top of the PKK - the Qandil mountain range on the border of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran. Yes, this is a very inconvenient place for any special operation, but with the most ardent desire, Turkey, for example, is quite capable of combing these 50–60 square kilometers, and agents can get at least part of the top.
And here we are entering on shaky ground, which at the official level, none of the parties tries not to mention. The fact is that the PKK has been used by large players for years in their combinations, and itself quite effectively uses these same players for its own purposes. After all, “you can’t erase a word from a song”: the PKK are the best smugglers in this region.
If you need to smuggle something to Iran, then you go to the PKK; if you need to take something out of Iran, you go to the PKK; if you need to smuggle something through the Turkish mountains to Syria and back, again to the PKK. If someone needs to deliver something “unusual” from Iran by land to Lebanon, then for part of the way through Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, you can be offered the services of the PKK, etc. If someone needs to support “protests”, then under structures of the PKK will emerge as the sauce of the struggle for Kurdish identity. It is necessary to "squeeze" pro-Iranian proxies in Iraq - similarly.
Accurately between central Iraqi Kurdistan and the northeastern border of Syria is the region inhabited by Yezidi Kurds (Sinjar, Yezidkhan), for which in 2015-2016. there were bloody battles with ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation). Its location is such that all the participants in the "illegal transit" periodically fight for it and try unsuccessfully to squeeze out representatives of the Workers' Party from there - on the whole, not very successfully.
The PKK has engaged with Iran against Turkey, with Turkey against Iran, with the US against everyone, with Damascus against Turkey, etc. in any combination. At the same time, the leadership of the PDS directly stated that their goal was to implement nothing more, nothing less, but a new gas project, as an alternative to Russia for supplying the EU, while agreeing with Russian representatives on “autonomy”.
If an analogue of the program “Own Game” was launched in the Middle East, then the leadership of the Workers’ Party would take the first places there permanently. But the rest of the players in the region have put both their hands and finances into this. There are many supporters of "contacts" through the PKK in Russia, since even during the Soviet era, channels of work were built there to counter Turkey in the Cold War.
Another thing is that there is no practical benefit from this interaction for Russia's effective policy in the Middle East today. How many budgets have hooted there, weapons, oil products, on these "routes" for all the years - it's just hard to imagine, while everything that happened had the most remote relation to the cause of "Kurdish independence".
Regional pin
The real project of a Kurdish state autonomy (KRG) with its capital in Erbil has always been considered by the PKK as a direct opponent, and the leadership of the Workers' Party has never been shy about threatening the official Kurdish government. And no, no, but in the region you will be asked a rhetorical question: how did it happen that for all the years of such a stubborn struggle against the PKK and large-scale agents of the special services, they could not reach anyone from the real top of this organization, which supposedly lives for decades on a mountainous nickels, spending the night in dugouts and wrapping themselves in cellophane? Over these decades, it would be possible to build an analogue of the “Great Wall of China” along the border, however, there is already a wall on the border of Syria and Turkey, which does not really prevent the particularly persistent from going back and forth.
This interplay of secret services, projects and concepts has turned the Workers' Party not only into an object, but also into a subject of big politics, which skillfully plays on regional contradictions. At the same time, this entity acquired several legal political parties in Turkey and Iran, which today, however, for the most part distanced themselves from this ideology, and also spread a wide network among leftist movements in Europe and the USA.
So, during the war with ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation), more than twenty thousand people came to Syria through various channels, who joined various military structures. Some stayed to build communes, some went home, and some of the “particularly gifted” are now fighting with us on the fields of Ukraine.
PKK-affiliated structures are openly supported by many politicians and philosophers in Europe. Some countries provide asylum and citizenship, although in some places the PKK is banned as a Workers' Party, but its subsidiaries and associations are not banned.
The format of the article simply does not technically allow giving the reader the whole palette of events that are associated with this natural regional pin, which all parties periodically shove each other in the seat of a chair, but they do not dare to agree and collectively break and throw it away. Meanwhile, without such a collegial decision, it is impossible to bring the region to a state of stability.
And to liquidate it “in a real way” means to cause a natural howl of the entire handshake, liberal and leftist public in the West. Judging by the fact that R. Erdogan is now inflicting blows on the structures associated with the PKK, the strongest after the Turkish army and Ankara-controlled formations occupied Afrin, Turkey’s mood to clean up northern Syria from this structure looks quite decisive.
However, as can be seen from the previous presentation, Ankara will not be able to achieve its goals without synergy from Damascus and Tehran. The thing is how convincing the Turkish leader will be in his assurances that after the resettlement of refugees to the north of Syria to the Kurdish territories, which today are de facto hostages of the PKK and US policies, it would not occur to him to annex them as “originally Turkish” and limited only to agreements on the supply of Syrian oil.
For Damascus and Tehran, given the quality of the “settlers”, this option looks far from ideal, and the guarantees of a future political settlement should be very, very weighty. The disadvantage for R. Erdogan today is that he started the campaign without coordination with Tehran and Moscow, the advantage is that the presence of the United States in Syria has already fed up literally all the major players, and the PKK is playing in Iran against the official government, taking part (understandably , which is unofficial) in a wave of protests and the transfer of illegal goods to Iran. But Iran also has a difficult position - after all, if there is no result, then the same Workers' Party will stand in the way of the transit of its own "delicate" cargo to Damascus and Lebanon.
Hack and predictor Aviator
In general, this is naturally a “hellish” tangle of questions that all parties in the region have been tightly twisting, not even for years, but for decades. And what should be the position of Moscow, which is present in Syria with military bases and has serious obligations, from a rational point of view?
Apparently, the most desirable option is to leave everything in the hands not even of the Syrian elite, but directly of the Syrian leader, who himself determines the balance between different interest groups. There are categorical opponents of any Turkish activity in the Syrian politicians, there are categorical opponents of the Workers' Party, but in general they are somehow tied to interaction with Iran. And Iran may have its own considerations there.
In order not to get into a very awkward situation, it may be worth simply focusing on the purely official requests of Damascus, and this is the rare case when you can simply take a wait and see attitude, because no one knows whether all interested players will agree on the Workers' Party.
If they do not agree, then Turkey, having seized some of the territories for resettlement, will declare victory without making serious sacrifices before the elections. If they come to an agreement, then it will be more convenient for Moscow to carry out humanitarian aid programs, rather than military ones.
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