Military Review

"Claw-Sword". Prospects for Turkish military operation

"Claw-Sword". Prospects for Turkish military operation

Turkish presidential campaign

The beginning of the week was marked not only by the start of the World Cup in Qatar, but also by the start of Turkey's military operation in Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, codenamed "Claw-sword". There are quite a lot of messages on this topic, and the events at first glance seem quite serious in terms of consequences.

For example, an air strike on an American military training base in Syrian Kurdistan (the so-called Rojava). There are no reports of casualties among the Americans, although, most likely, they simply do not exist, and the United States was warned in advance “through communication channels”. But the fact itself is loud and revealing, because, according to the Turkish intelligence service MIT, the girl who carried out the attack in Istanbul was trained at this base and was a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party.

R. Erdogan also spoke quite sharply about Russian participation in the recent Syrian events:

“Despite our repeated warnings to Russia, which is responsible for clearing terrorists from northern Iraq and Syria in accordance with our 2019 Sochi agreement, Moscow has failed and refuses to fulfill its duty.”

In general, the next campaign of the Turkish president is unfolding before our eyes, and in addition to Ankara's own "eternal enemies", the big "external" players are also to blame for this: the United States and Russia. At the same time, Europeans are also to blame as harborers of PKK activists.

But the government in Damascus did not fall under the avalanche of Turkish criticism, although along with the attack on almost nine dozen targets, Syrian military personnel also suffered. Given that the protests in Iran are closely linked to the so-called. “Kurdish factor”, and the cells of the PKK are active in the Iranian direction, this brings to mind many issues of the Syrian campaign that have been forgotten in a few years.

Node of local problems

The contradictions in that region have somewhat faded in the media field, but they have not disappeared by themselves. And, apparently, the time has come to update the information on some of the key issues related to this knot of international problems.

Many commentators immediately linked this (by the way, another in a row) military activity of Turkey with the upcoming elections next year, which the Turkish leadership approaches very carefully, realizing all the precariousness of the internal economic base, which may simply “not pull” the breadth of Ankara’s geopolitical swing. It really is. But the matter is not only and not so much in the internal "PR" of the Turkish leadership.

Ankara is well aware that the geopolitical claim will meet (and is already meeting) resistance from the "Western partners". Turkey faces a military confrontation with a literal NATO ally, and next year's elections may contain "surprises" similar to the coup attempt in 2016.

All this means that today Turkey is conducting not just an operation in the traditional style - its task is to untie or weaken the Syrian knot to the maximum, which does not let Turkey into the "operational space" of geopolitics. It seems to us from our belfry that Turkey has been doing nothing but harvesting profits from international activity, but this is not entirely true - the harvest has yet to be harvested, and it is not at all a fact that Ankara will succeed in this harsh reality.

The fact is that the Syrian campaign, in which several dozen large states were involved in one way or another, was not completed with an unequivocal result for any of the main players. The actual defeat of ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation) as a military-political force did not solve the problem of the territorial integrity of Syria, the restoration of the industrial and commercial potential of Syria and Iraq, did not end with the distribution and recognition of their interests by the players as a result of defeat or consensus.

Splinters remain in the region, which are making themselves felt and will make themselves felt until the major military-political centers decide to finally eliminate them. One such thorn is the so-called PKK. This phenomenon, even, perhaps, a regional phenomenon, which is either not appreciated in the Russian media space, or is considered from a rather strange position.

Meanwhile, this is the factor that has been exerting an extremely destructive influence on regional stability for many years. At the same time, the PKK and its structures often act as a kind of landsknecht in completely opposite games and interests of large countries, near or on the territory of which they operate. Without examining this phenomenon, we can unequivocally say that it is not possible to fully understand the features of what is happening in this Middle Eastern knot.

The big problem of our expert community is that the PKK is seen as something closely related to the concept of "Kurdish independence". Moreover, the ideologists of the PKK themselves do not prevent such a connotation, since it is trite politically beneficial, because public support, especially in the EU, is an important political factor.

The second “narrative” that confuses the media is the consideration of the PKK as a tactical counterbalance to the policy of Turkish expansion: they say, it is necessary to “negotiate with the Kurds” (that is, the PKK), persuade them to sign some kind of agreements with Damascus, give them “autonomy” and everything will be fine. And the "Kurds" will help us to upset the claims of Ankara, which today or tomorrow will cover all of Asia with a flag with a star and a crescent.

Both of these notions are not only far from reality, but cause absolutely sincere surprise in the Middle East, and often even just irritation. The real negotiating position of the parties cannot be built on this illusion, and as a result, for the layman who looks at the world through the prism of the media sphere, a natural contradiction of meanings sets in.

For example, the most popular option is: "Why is Russia allowing Turkey to bomb the Kurds in Syria." When B. Assad's campaign in Idlib was underway, Russia supported Damascus directly in a clash with Turkey, but when it comes to the region under the control of the "Kurds", everything is different? Yes exactly.

Kurdish project

The fact is that the Kurdistan Workers' Party has long been no longer a proper Kurdish party, current or movement. What began as a truly Kurdish project for the struggle for national identity gradually turned into a kind of sect, which some political scientists mistakenly call "Marxist", some (which is closer) "anarchist".

In fact, “democratic confederalism” or, as it is also called, TEV-DEM, is based on the principle of complete territorial decentralization, management based on the system of “councils” and the rejection of the state as an institution in principle. There are many materials professionally devoted to this topic, but in this case it is important for us to understand one fundamental thing - what is being built by modern adherents of this ideology (“Apoism”) is not compatible with any state entity, in any form - not in the form democracy or monarchy, neither in the form of a socialist form of production, nor capitalist, nor post-industrial.

All the negotiations that, they say, it is necessary to give the "Kurds autonomy" in Syria all the past years rested on one circumstance - for the representatives of TEV-DEM, who have been "ruling" on the territory of Syrian Kurdistan and partly Syrian Trans-Euphrates for seven years, under autonomy it implies the absence of Damascus authorities in their territories, subject to the recognition on paper of the “unity of the Syrian state”.

The icing on the cake is that, at the same time, the construction of a “system of territorial councils” in Northern Syria, although the ethnic Kurds retain the advantage in numbers there, is, in fact, against Kurdish independence proper and even real Kurdish autonomy. All political parties, one way or another connected with the real opposition to Bashar al-Assad and in fact advocating Kurdish national projects, have been systematically purged in recent years, and their paramilitary formations were squeezed out into neighboring Iraq.

It would seem that the government of B. Assad should be glad that ideological opponents are weak, but the trouble is, with ideological opponents (despite mutual rhetoric) he de facto has much more chances to agree than with representatives of the PDS / PYD, on behalf of which he rules on Northern Syria PKK.

The economic basis of this interesting enclave, which is still patronized by the United States, is quite interesting. On the ground, this is a kind of analogue of the collective farm-community with elements of a planned economy. But the question is, how do the Turkmen, Arab tribes, Assyrians and Circassians, who are not particularly accustomed to such innovations in the economy, get along with this?

At first, they really did not get along well and armed clashes periodically occurred, but the Americans managed to distribute between the top of the PKK and the Arabs the flows of illegal and semi-legal oil, which, albeit on a much smaller scale, is produced in the region, and the presence of the Americans protects the oil fields physically. The Americans continue to supply ammunition and light equipment.

On the scale of the world market, these are pennies, but within a particular region, these are quite tangible incomes. It should also be taken into account that the north-east of the province of Aleppo and the province of Hasakah are the Syrian granary, where the climate and the availability of water make it possible to grow crops and olives. That is, with all the desire to stop trade with these territories, it will not work.

Damascus is forced to buy the same oil and food (de facto from itself), Turkey buys one way or another. Having such a base, the PKK is able to ensure the recruitment and maintenance of supporters in Turkey, Iraq and even Iran, creating cells there whose ideologists advocate the denial of the role and function of the state, as well as the dismantling of official state institutions. At the same time, some of them are also armed formations that commit acts of violence (in their language - “guerrillas”).

How does it happen that such powerful and tough states as Iran and Turkey have been fighting this current for years, but have not been able to defeat it? At first glance, this looks extremely strange, because both the Turkish MIT, and the Iranian IRGC, and the Syrian Mukhabarat have a very branched structure of informants, and everyone knows the location of the top of the PKK - the Qandil mountain range on the border of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran. Yes, this is a very inconvenient place for any special operation, but with the most ardent desire, Turkey, for example, is quite capable of combing these 50–60 square kilometers, and agents can get at least part of the top.

And here we are entering on shaky ground, which at the official level, none of the parties tries not to mention. The fact is that the PKK has been used by large players for years in their combinations, and itself quite effectively uses these same players for its own purposes. After all, “you can’t erase a word from a song”: the PKK are the best smugglers in this region.

If you need to smuggle something to Iran, then you go to the PKK; if you need to take something out of Iran, you go to the PKK; if you need to smuggle something through the Turkish mountains to Syria and back, again to the PKK. If someone needs to deliver something “unusual” from Iran by land to Lebanon, then for part of the way through Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, you can be offered the services of the PKK, etc. If someone needs to support “protests”, then under structures of the PKK will emerge as the sauce of the struggle for Kurdish identity. It is necessary to "squeeze" pro-Iranian proxies in Iraq - similarly.

Accurately between central Iraqi Kurdistan and the northeastern border of Syria is the region inhabited by Yezidi Kurds (Sinjar, Yezidkhan), for which in 2015-2016. there were bloody battles with ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation). Its location is such that all the participants in the "illegal transit" periodically fight for it and try unsuccessfully to squeeze out representatives of the Workers' Party from there - on the whole, not very successfully.

The PKK has engaged with Iran against Turkey, with Turkey against Iran, with the US against everyone, with Damascus against Turkey, etc. in any combination. At the same time, the leadership of the PDS directly stated that their goal was to implement nothing more, nothing less, but a new gas project, as an alternative to Russia for supplying the EU, while agreeing with Russian representatives on “autonomy”.

If an analogue of the program “Own Game” was launched in the Middle East, then the leadership of the Workers’ Party would take the first places there permanently. But the rest of the players in the region have put both their hands and finances into this. There are many supporters of "contacts" through the PKK in Russia, since even during the Soviet era, channels of work were built there to counter Turkey in the Cold War.

Another thing is that there is no practical benefit from this interaction for Russia's effective policy in the Middle East today. How many budgets have hooted there, weapons, oil products, on these "routes" for all the years - it's just hard to imagine, while everything that happened had the most remote relation to the cause of "Kurdish independence".

Regional pin

The real project of a Kurdish state autonomy (KRG) with its capital in Erbil has always been considered by the PKK as a direct opponent, and the leadership of the Workers' Party has never been shy about threatening the official Kurdish government. And no, no, but in the region you will be asked a rhetorical question: how did it happen that for all the years of such a stubborn struggle against the PKK and large-scale agents of the special services, they could not reach anyone from the real top of this organization, which supposedly lives for decades on a mountainous nickels, spending the night in dugouts and wrapping themselves in cellophane? Over these decades, it would be possible to build an analogue of the “Great Wall of China” along the border, however, there is already a wall on the border of Syria and Turkey, which does not really prevent the particularly persistent from going back and forth.

This interplay of secret services, projects and concepts has turned the Workers' Party not only into an object, but also into a subject of big politics, which skillfully plays on regional contradictions. At the same time, this entity acquired several legal political parties in Turkey and Iran, which today, however, for the most part distanced themselves from this ideology, and also spread a wide network among leftist movements in Europe and the USA.

So, during the war with ISIS (banned in the Russian Federation), more than twenty thousand people came to Syria through various channels, who joined various military structures. Some stayed to build communes, some went home, and some of the “particularly gifted” are now fighting with us on the fields of Ukraine.

PKK-affiliated structures are openly supported by many politicians and philosophers in Europe. Some countries provide asylum and citizenship, although in some places the PKK is banned as a Workers' Party, but its subsidiaries and associations are not banned.

The format of the article simply does not technically allow giving the reader the whole palette of events that are associated with this natural regional pin, which all parties periodically shove each other in the seat of a chair, but they do not dare to agree and collectively break and throw it away. Meanwhile, without such a collegial decision, it is impossible to bring the region to a state of stability.

And to liquidate it “in a real way” means to cause a natural howl of the entire handshake, liberal and leftist public in the West. Judging by the fact that R. Erdogan is now inflicting blows on the structures associated with the PKK, the strongest after the Turkish army and Ankara-controlled formations occupied Afrin, Turkey’s mood to clean up northern Syria from this structure looks quite decisive.

However, as can be seen from the previous presentation, Ankara will not be able to achieve its goals without synergy from Damascus and Tehran. The thing is how convincing the Turkish leader will be in his assurances that after the resettlement of refugees to the north of Syria to the Kurdish territories, which today are de facto hostages of the PKK and US policies, it would not occur to him to annex them as “originally Turkish” and limited only to agreements on the supply of Syrian oil.

For Damascus and Tehran, given the quality of the “settlers”, this option looks far from ideal, and the guarantees of a future political settlement should be very, very weighty. The disadvantage for R. Erdogan today is that he started the campaign without coordination with Tehran and Moscow, the advantage is that the presence of the United States in Syria has already fed up literally all the major players, and the PKK is playing in Iran against the official government, taking part (understandably , which is unofficial) in a wave of protests and the transfer of illegal goods to Iran. But Iran also has a difficult position - after all, if there is no result, then the same Workers' Party will stand in the way of the transit of its own "delicate" cargo to Damascus and Lebanon.


In general, this is naturally a “hellish” tangle of questions that all parties in the region have been tightly twisting, not even for years, but for decades. And what should be the position of Moscow, which is present in Syria with military bases and has serious obligations, from a rational point of view?

Apparently, the most desirable option is to leave everything in the hands not even of the Syrian elite, but directly of the Syrian leader, who himself determines the balance between different interest groups. There are categorical opponents of any Turkish activity in the Syrian politicians, there are categorical opponents of the Workers' Party, but in general they are somehow tied to interaction with Iran. And Iran may have its own considerations there.

In order not to get into a very awkward situation, it may be worth simply focusing on the purely official requests of Damascus, and this is the rare case when you can simply take a wait and see attitude, because no one knows whether all interested players will agree on the Workers' Party.

If they do not agree, then Turkey, having seized some of the territories for resettlement, will declare victory without making serious sacrifices before the elections. If they come to an agreement, then it will be more convenient for Moscow to carry out humanitarian aid programs, rather than military ones.

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  1. YOUR
    YOUR 23 November 2022 11: 17
    In the photo there are some demobilizations, sewing troops. Decorated with all sorts of gimmicks.
    1. raki-uzo
      raki-uzo 23 November 2022 12: 18

      This is the case in Qatar. Turkish soldiers, like soldiers of other countries, wear different uniforms in different regions.
    2. The comment was deleted.
  2. kor1vet1974
    kor1vet1974 23 November 2022 11: 20
    The PKK can be finished if Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran join forces, but the world players are not interested in this.
    1. nikolaevskiy78
      23 November 2022 12: 07
      It turned out to be a tool that everyone uses in one way or another. Including Syria, Turkey and Iran. Until the three of them agree, nothing good will happen. After all, the history of the PKK in Syria is quite interesting in itself. This is the father of B. Assad - H. Assad patronized them for a long time. It allowed the creation of almost enclaves in a number of regions - for confrontation with Turkey. Then he will squeeze Ocalan out of Syria.
      1. kor1vet1974
        kor1vet1974 23 November 2022 12: 14
        Until the three of them agree, nothing good will happen.
        The PKK can be finished if Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran join forces
        What did you write wrong? In addition, I remember in the 70s it seems that joint operations were carried out by Syria, Iraq and Iran against the Kurds, if I'm not mistaken
        1. nikolaevskiy78
          23 November 2022 12: 19
          And here it is necessary to separate the period when these anarchists fought, among other things, for the Kurdish identity, then the period when they collaborated with the Assad government, and the period that came after the arrest of Ocalan.
          1. kor1vet1974
            kor1vet1974 23 November 2022 12: 41
            laughing You never explained what was wrong in my first comment. hi
            1. nikolaevskiy78
              23 November 2022 13: 06
              In essence, it turns out that the unification of the efforts of the three regional players in this direction is hindered by the world players. I think that after all, it is the reluctance of Iran, Turkey and Syria that is primary here, and the efforts of the "world" ones are already coming second. Well I understand hi
      2. Albay
        Albay 25 November 2022 00: 03
        Then he will squeeze Ocalan out of Syria.

        Not quite so. Turkey will present an ultimatum to Syria that within 48 hours either the PKK fighters with Ocalan leave Syria or Turkey itself will enter the territory of Syria and defeat the PKK. Therefore, Assad got rid of Ocalan Ocalan fled to Maskva, but he could not hide there for a long time. Turkish Intelligence found out about the whereabouts of Ocalan and began to put pressure on Maskva, and Moscow had to expel Apo.
    2. Doccor18
      Doccor18 23 November 2022 13: 59
      Quote: kor1vet1974
      The PKK can be finished if Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Iran join forces, but the world players are not interested in this.

      The problem is that it will not be possible to agree, since everyone pursues exclusively their own interests, and some are also momentary ...
      The survivability of the PKK is explained by the fact that such groups are always needed, because they are able to solve all sorts of "subtle" issues without casting a big shadow on customers ...
  3. Asad
    Asad 23 November 2022 11: 38
    Thanks for a very interesting article! At the moment, of course, due to events in Ukraine, events in Syria have faded into the background. Probably all these contradictions will not go away for decades. The question is, can the United States generally dump from Syria as from Afghanistan? Thanks again.
    1. nikolaevskiy78
      23 November 2022 12: 15
      Thanks for the rating. US forces in Syria now number no more than 1 thousand people. But some of their bases are located exactly on the oil fields. They can fall off quickly. But after all (which is usually not mentioned), Turkey itself, although it waters these bases from all information buckets, is against the complete withdrawal of the United States (for now), because Iran and Syria will immediately occupy these territories. This means that the road from Sinjar will be completely controlled by Tehran and Assad. The Turks do not want the option that the United States will leave, Syria will occupy the territories, and they will agree with the PKK in the old fashioned way to spite Ankara and leave them in the buffer zone in the North. No one trusts each other and the PKK uses this very well. The Americans do not incur significant costs here, neither financial, nor human, nor image, so they simply watch this serpentine tangle of interests, feeding the PKK and the Arabs, who are selling oil with them with weapons and some money. They will leave if the three parties come to an agreement.
      1. Asad
        Asad 23 November 2022 12: 38
        Thanks for the info! We are waiting for the next publications.
      2. springrain
        springrain 23 November 2022 16: 18
        Michael, in your article you confuse cause and effect. The statement that the PKK is a key regional problem is wrong - it is the existence of irresolvable contradictions between Turkey and Iran that allows the PKK to exist.
        If Northeast Syria is occupied by Iran, Turkey will lose the ability to creep "squeeze" territories from Damascus. If Turkey itself - Iran will receive tangible obstacles to the construction of the "Shiite Crescent".
        As a result, the problem remains unresolved, and few people are interested in the opinion of Damascus.
        The ultimate message about the need to leave the decision to the Syrian leader is doubtful, especially after the "wonderful" example of the province of Deraa.
        At the same time, I agree with the opinion that the actions of external actors impede normalization. But here it is necessary to take into account the opinion of all parties: Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the United States. As long as there is no working mechanism for resolving contradictions, as long as there are alternative negotiating formats, there will be no peace.
        1. nikolaevskiy78
          23 November 2022 16: 58
          Thanks for the detailed comment. Still, in this particular period of time, of the other "key" problems, this problem is still the most "key" request Oh, sorry, for such a choice of "terms".
          You will pay attention to the fact that since 2015 this structure has received a real opportunity to work in certain territories as a political project. What did they have before? Local communities, areas in Syria and Turkey, where they were engaged in "communal services" in their own way. And here is still a full-fledged format for work. They have any resources, support from the United States and the EU politically, involvement in various negotiating formats on Syria, international platforms. They had nothing of the kind in the past and could not have had it. They do not hesitate to purge political opponents in the region, and they remove their renegades, who sometimes appear, without much reflection. Those. before us, after all, is no longer just a "stream", but a military-political force, which, thanks to the efforts of Western "partners", has become today, as it is customary to say, an "actor". This subjectivity is based on the United States, but it cannot be said that it is exclusively based on the position of the United States. For example, oil bonuses and complete independence are also appealing to local Arabs (at the top, that's for sure).
          If the three parties (Syria, Iran and Turkey) come to an agreement, then the United States will not have the potential to work there - there will simply be no economy if the transit channels are blocked by all three parties. Moscow's position has already run into the simplest question many times - the PDS does not give any obligations. A few years ago, no one understood what they actually wanted to talk about. What kind of model "autonomy". And the model is simple - there is no Damascus in these territories at all, in any form, Moscow covers it with an umbrella from Turkey, and the guys in Kobani write a paper that they recognize themselves as part of Syria. For six months Manbij was discussed. Like, at first, just let the Russian patrols be there, but there will be no Assad’s forces and his organs. Then we agreed that the forces of Damascus would still be there and the organs would be. As a result, they didn’t let me in, then they let me in, without flags, etc. And this is all in a sluggish mode everywhere in the region, for years. Not a single firm and understandable scheme and agreement. The Turks, on the other hand, see all this very well, although they themselves cannot fulfill all the obligations under Idlib. But on the other hand, it’s convenient for them to say, they say, what you require from us in Idlib, you can’t cope with yourself - an endless vinaigrette. fellow
          As a result, Moscow simply got bogged down in this particular issue. The Syrians are not happy, the Turks are blaming, the PKK is making fun of us. However, over all too. So I would still consider this particular case from the position that all three parties should be allowed to resolve the issue on their own. Erdogan is ripe for a direct conversation with Assad. Well, let's talk.
          As for Deraa, there is still a difference. But this is probably a long conversation with a deep retrospective.
          1. springrain
            springrain 23 November 2022 18: 10
            Thank you for your reply!
            Yet the solution to the "Kurdish question" is much broader than the fight against the PKK and its influence.
            First you need to remember how Rojava appeared. In many ways, the PKK got the opportunity to operate not even in 2015, but 2 years earlier - when government troops left the northeast of the country. That is, Assad purposefully concentrated all combat-ready units around large cities (Damascus, Aleppo, Raqqa), leaving part of the population to their fate. This is supported by the fact that the YPG had practically no heavy weapons - there were many times fewer tanks and artillery than the "green" opposition. Further, neither Russia nor Iran interfered with the PKK and its structures, since they were busy destroying ISIS, which the United States took advantage of. The result is a practically formed state, which also has oil resources. The forceful elimination of such an enclave will certainly affect the security situation in the region due to the resulting chaos.
            Next, you need to understand why the PKK is perceived by many as a Kurdish project. Here we can recall the Ba'ath Party's policy towards the Kurdish minority - a ban on the use of the language, obstacles to education, the inaccessibility of civil service, and finally, the banal lack of passports due to the Syrian government's refusal to recognize Kurds as citizens. Naturally, the policy for the Kurds was overwhelmingly out of reach as well. Accordingly, in the chaos of the civil war, the PKK managed to take power as the most organized structure with a military wing.
            In addition, one cannot agree with the statement that the Kurds and their representatives are included in the negotiation process. Rojava representatives have been expelled from the Geneva venue since 2017, and they were not even invited to Sochi and Astana. Those Kurdish parties that are part of the pro-Turkish structures were also not allowed to negotiate.
            Another moment concerning the negotiations - the official Damascus refused to assume any obligations (we can recall the statements of Walid Muallem).
            Plus, the calculation that with the departure of the RPK-PDS it will get better looks overly optimistic. The questions of the existence of the Al-Khol camp and the fight against the remnants of ISIS will immediately arise. At the moment, the official government is not eager to deal with these issues. And if we imagine that overnight they will need several tens of thousands more soldiers, at least for conditional control of the returned territories?
            The Iranians, as pragmatic people, will do what can bring profit - oil fields, and forces will be thrown at them. The rest of the territory will be a "gray zone" almost to a greater extent than now. The Turks will simply release the inhabitants of Al-Khol - they benefit from the chaos of their neighbors, which will undermine the possibilities of the same Damascus.
            Thus, the negative consequences of the liquidation of Rojava are much greater than it seems at first glance. At the moment, the Kurds are a profitable "lightning rod", but their defeat will not solve the region's problems at all.
            Therefore, in order to overcome the "Kurdish problem" it is necessary to solve its key element - to find those representatives of the Kurdish minority with whom Damascus will speak. But this will require a complete restructuring of the political system in Syria, with which Mr. Assad strongly disagrees.
            Therefore, one can understand Erdogan's displeasure (who, by the way, is in no hurry to fulfill his obligations, but believes that everyone owes him) and his desire to "cut the Gordian knot." For which, by the way, he now has quite good opportunities.
            1. nikolaevskiy78
              23 November 2022 19: 28
              It is quite easy to find representatives of the Kurds from the Kurdish Rojava, and the "Northern Syria" federation - in Erbil or through Erbil, and everyone knows the phones in Damascus. wink Another thing is that the representatives of the KDP (s) are actually opponents of Damascus, and the Baath and advocate the unification of the Kurdish cantons with the KRG into a single structure under international patronage. They had a small Peshmerga-Rozh armed forces that pushed the PDS into Iraq. Activists in Syria have been thinned out and pressed down by the Assaishi.
              And so it turns out that the Kurdish representatives themselves, who act precisely from the Kurdish positions, are in words more consistent opponents of Assad. And the PDS / PKK, which in words do not act as antagonists to Assad, in fact they are not going to cooperate with him, and all this freemen suits them.
              Judging by my feeling and communication, Assad was not going to, is not going to and most likely will not be going to grant political autonomy to the region. And the KDPs do not want to move away from the position of complete rejection of Damascus. We want independence with the KRG, period. But this completely closes the way to a political dialogue. And ours didn’t invite them anywhere either. If there were many contacts with the PDS, then with the Kurdish structures themselves, well, maybe once a year. There are also business groups in Damascus that could take over the actual Kurdish dialogue, but the PYD is categorically against them. That is why I think that Assad and Erdogan will eventually come to an agreement, and the Syrian Kurds will continue to be squeezed out. The PKK is not a Kurdish project, the KDP(s) are against Damascus, and the Kurdish groups in Damascus are not strong.
              The question of how the current Rojava began is raised by you quite rightly. But here you need to see how the transformation No. 1 into Rojava and the transformation No. 2 into the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria took place. After the second stage, it is already difficult to talk about "Kurdish autonomy". It's more of a facade for the outside world.
              1. springrain
                springrain 24 November 2022 13: 19
                KDP (s) are generally very interesting guys. Their Peshmerga-Rozh was lit up in small numbers during the battle for Kobani, after which for several years they did not show themselves in any way either in Syria or in Iraq. In 2019, the KDP(s) abruptly materialized in Syria and demanded (just like that) their share of power. At the same time, the support of the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan does not help them much, due to the strained relations between the PKK and the leadership of the IK.
                At the same time, you correctly noted that Rojava has de facto transformed into the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. Indeed, in the occupied territories, it is the Kurdish population, at best, half. The rest are Arabs, with small inclusions of Armenians and Assyrians. That is, a purely national project is hardly possible.
                The role of the United States must also be taken into account here - they have never been ready to support a purely Kurdish autonomy in Syria. It was because of their demands to include the Arab component that Rojava turned into DFSS.
                At the same time, it should be noted that Iraqi Kurdistan cannot be an exclusively positive example of Kurdish autonomy. The key problem of the region is the continuing dual power between the KDP and the PUK, which are trying to make the actions of their opponents as difficult as possible. The authorities of the region were unable to create combat-ready armed forces - with a payroll of 200, they were unable to defend the territories after the referendum in 2017. The reform of the Peshmerga government has been going on for 5 years and has not led to tangible results. There are regular attacks on the offices of political parties (for example, Gorran) in the region. The fight against corruption is conducted with varying degrees of success. Therefore, it is not surprising that the PDS do not want to reproduce this model at home.
                Therefore, at this stage, Kurdish autonomy in Syria can only be realized through the federalization of the country. But this is impossible due to the sharp rejection by Damascus of any Kurdish organizations as participants in the political process and the unclear position of Russia, which at this stage does not seem to have any long-term strategy on the issue of the Syrian settlement.
                That is, in order to resolve the "Kurdish question", it is necessary to recognize the Kurds as full participants in the political process. Neither Syria, nor Iran, nor Turkey categorically want this. It turns out a vicious circle.
                Another problem is the deliberate incitement of hatred towards the Kurds as a nation in the Russian media segment. I have repeatedly observed openly chauvinistic posts in major authors (for example, colonelcassad) (for example, support for the actions of the Shiite militia after the 2017 referendum) or in Telegram (quite a few groups expressed genuine joy about the events in As-Sina prison).
                1. nikolaevskiy78
                  24 November 2022 20: 57
                  Thank you for the comment! It's very nice to read.
                  To answer it, you need to make a big post. With your permission, I will write it tomorrow. I don’t agree with you on everything, but it’s extremely interesting to discuss and you can talk about a lot.
                  And Kassad is an observer who can do purely military reviews, but not military-political ones. Well, many commentators simply left him, because he doesn’t even do military reviews anymore - reposts.
                  I agree about the narrative "against the Kurds". All raked under the same brush, they say, "Kurds under the Americans", so let them suffer. And the fact that the policy of Bashar, that of his father, in relation to the Kurds, did not differ in complimentary, to put it mildly, and it was not for nothing that all these revolutions did not start in Damascus, this is already, as usual - in all this we see only the tentacles of the United States. But what to do. Our TV or mainstream media is impossible to watch. The level of expertise is slipping lower and lower.
                  1. springrain
                    springrain 25 November 2022 15: 06
                    I'm looking forward to new material! I have been reading your articles on LiveJournal since 2018, and now I found that they are on VO)
  4. raki-uzo
    raki-uzo 23 November 2022 13: 17
    3 years ago, on October 22, 2019, Turkey prematurely suspended the operation "Source of Peace". The United States and Russia promised Turkey that within 150 hours (and the United States 130 hours), all military structures would withdraw to a depth of 30 km from the Turkish border. Read again points 5, 6 and 7 in the memorandum signed between Russia and Turkey in Sochi.
    5. Starting from 12.00 23 on October 2019, units of the Russian military police and the Syrian border service are being deployed outside the zone of Operation Source of Peace on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Turkish border. They will facilitate the withdrawal of KOS units and their armaments at 30 km from the Syrian-Turkish border, which should end within 150 hours after 12.00 23 October 2019. From this moment, joint Russian-Turkish patrols will begin to a depth of 10 km from the border to the west and east of the operation area "Source of Peace", except for the city of Kamyshly.

    6. All CBS units and their weapons will be withdrawn from Manbij and Tal Rifat.

    7. Both sides will take the necessary measures to prevent the infiltration of terrorist elements.
    1. nikolaevskiy78
      23 November 2022 13: 26
      Do you mean that these points were not fulfilled in the end?
      1. iouris
        iouris 23 November 2022 13: 38
        It means that Erdogan chose a moment that seems to him very good. And the operation itself was being prepared and its beginning was expected for a relatively long time. It's called "real politics". It remains to be seen how this all ends.
        And there are "too many points" in Erdogan's manifesto. You may not even read.
        1. nikolaevskiy78
          23 November 2022 13: 51
          Well, there one operation smoothly flowed into another. There was "Claw-Castle", became "Claw-Sword". The question is not the operation - they are permanent there, but in the depths of it - the ground component
      2. raki-uzo
        raki-uzo 23 November 2022 13: 50
        Me not! There are few who think that the US and Russia have fulfilled the clauses of the treaties. Since that time, Turkish soldiers and Turkish border areas have been attacked many times by terrorists. The last case in Istanbul proved that terrorists are protected, trained, trained and sent to carry out a terrorist act.
        And at the expense of the United States - they handed over Menbich not to the Turks, but to Russia in those days ... Paper is more expensive, as they say :)
        1. nikolaevskiy78
          23 November 2022 13: 53
          Why not enough, I'm here. I have been writing since 2017 that the hopes in Russia in general to agree on something with the Workers' Party are zero, and the result of all negotiations will be that the PKK will not do anything and Turkey will again and again activate the armed forces.
          1. raki-uzo
            raki-uzo 23 November 2022 14: 07
            "... There are few who think..."
            The word "here" means "in Turkey", where I live, and not "on our website".
            1. nikolaevskiy78
              23 November 2022 14: 13
              Understood. Well, we have a very one-sided information in the media. For example, at one time we wrote a lot that Turkey could not unblock the M4 highway in Idlib. They actually had a lot of friction with the HTS there, but practically nothing was said about it, and we (Russia) did not, in fact, limit the structures of the PDS / YPG in the border area.
  5. HattinGokbori88
    HattinGokbori88 23 November 2022 19: 06
    Quote: Red_Graphic
    In fact, Edrogan did not blame the Russian Federation, but the United States. Direct text. Yes, he said that there were Sochi agreements, but they were not only with the Russian Federation and the United States. And the non-fulfillment of these agreements comes from the United States. And here is the truth from the original source cited by the journalists:
    Asked if the Gerkie had discussed this operation with Russia and the United States, Erdotan said: “We have not had any conversations with (US President Joe) Biden or (Russian President Vladimir) Putin about this operation. However, both Biden and Putin already know that in this region we can do these things anyway."

    "252 fought; "rkye" is with the United States in NATO, Erdotan said, noting that, unfortunately, Washington sent thousands of pieces of equipment, ammunition and weapons to terrorist zones in Syria."