Soviet naval art: a discussion about "dominance at sea"

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Soviet naval art: a discussion about "dominance at sea"

One of the most important components of the naval fleet is naval strategy and tactics. The path of Soviet naval science in the second half of the XNUMXth century was difficult. The political leadership of the country, as well as the army, had a very low opinion of the capabilities of the fleet in a future war. At the same time, the command of the fleet could not effectively participate in political games and defend the interests of the fleet in them.

This was the result of a confrontation within the naval command itself, between supporters of the independence of the fleet and supporters of a unified military strategy and science, which led to a weakening of the overall position of the fleet on key issues.



Turning to the analysis of the discussion itself, it should be noted that the first post-war decade was the time of the most active comprehension of the experience of the Second World War. The existing "Combat Charter of the Navy of the USSR of 1945" (BU-45), written in the last months of the war, was only a reaction to the already largely receded problems of the war at sea of ​​the Second World War. A new theory was needed to meet the needs of rapidly developing technologies (such as jet propulsion and rocket weapons).


"On the essence of maritime operations"


The publication of Admiral V. A. Alafuzov “On the essence of naval operations” in 1946 should be considered the beginning of the post-war discussion about the further development of the Navy. In this article, he analyzes and summarizes the experience of naval operations during the war and displays the main features of their conduct. However, one of the main issues, which was subsequently widely discussed, was the question of "domination of the sea." V. A. Alafuzov in an article of 1946 formulates it as follows:

"an area of ​​the sea in which, in the course of performing a mission, the enemy can only provide partial interference or not provide them at all."

Dominance at sea, according to V. A. Alafuzov, is divided into permanent and temporary. Temporary dominance was to be achieved in a certain area for the duration of the operation.

In the operation itself, the admiral identifies three areas: the main, decisive and auxiliary. On the decisive axis "the enemy's main obstacle to the solution of the problem is overcome," and in the main direction "the goal of the operation is directly achieved."

In addition, the operation, according to V. A. Alafuzov, should not be an isolated act, but an integral part of the war. Thus, the author notes that any operation must be based on dominance in the permanent zone, and this dominance must be achieved by the previous operation. From this it follows that when planning an operation, the achievements of the previous and the prospects for future operations should be taken into account.

Thus, V. A. Alafuzov’s article raised the question of the existence of a naval strategy independent of land and introduced the for some time forgotten term “dominance at sea”, and also set the main task of the fleet to expand its zone of dominance for successful operations in a given theater military operations.


The researches of Admiral V. A. Alafuzov at the time of publication did not become the object of a wide discussion. Active attention to the problem raised by V. A. Alafuzov was attracted only by the opponent of the separation of the fleet, the head of the department of the Higher Political Courses of the Navy, Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev. In his article “On the Question of the Fundamentals of Warfare at Sea,” he notes that

“The expansion of the zone of its dominance to the limits of the entire theater, mistaken for the essence of war, becomes an end in itself. It breaks away from the general strategic tasks ... and leads to dispersal and waste of forces ... "

The independence of maritime missions from combined arms missions is also criticized, in particular, according to I. D. Eliseev:

“the independence of the operation of the naval forces should be considered from the point of view of the operational and strategic assistance to their land army ...”

Thus, he believed that the tasks of the fleet were just appendages to the tasks of the land army, whose goals were more extensive - operational. Nevertheless, it was recognized that in some operations the role of the fleet, as a means of delivering the army to the place of the operation, would be decisive.

Also, I. D. Eliseev did not deny the concept of "dominance at sea", however, he gave his definition of this term a little later in his next work, which was a response to the ongoing discussion.

It should be noted that although Eliseev's first article was declared critical, in many respects, some of which are presented above, it was similar to the article by V. A. Alafuzov. Probably, the article itself with an attempt at criticism was written under the influence of the "Admirals' Case", during which V. A. Alafuzov was convicted and deprived of his rank.

Nevertheless, it was precisely the article by Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev that evoked an active response from the naval community. During the period 1948–1949. a number of articles were published that supplemented the research of V. A. Alafuzov and I. D. Eliseev and formed the basis of NMO-51.

Let's take a look at some of these publications.

Discussion


One of the first to respond was Captain First Rank D. G. Rechister. He repeated the thesis of I. D. Eliseev about the impossibility of separating the actions of the fleet from the actions of the land army (i.e., assistance to the army on coastal fronts), while expanding the activities of the fleet also with active economic pressure (operations on enemy communications).

D. G. Rechister also introduces the concept of “fleet operating zone”, which is understood as “part of the sea or ocean theater of operations, in which the fleet, by one force or another, solves the tasks assigned to it.” The concept itself generalizes the other term "task area", bringing it to a strategic meaning. At the same time, D. G. Rechister notes that

"The fleet itself cannot solve the problem of expanding its operational zone."

In his opinion, this task is available only to coastal ground forces.

Thus, D. G. Rechister sees the main task of the fleet in ensuring the security of the coastal fronts, in turn, one of the important goals of the coastal front is to expand the operational zone of the fleet. Dominance at sea in this case, in the overwhelming majority of cases, should be ensured for the duration of a separate operation (for example, on the route of a convoy in the case of a landing or supply operation), it should be reinforced in the operating zone of the fleet by capturing bases and ports by ground forces, which will turn a temporary dominance is permanent. D. G. Rechister paid special attention to the problems of interaction as the basis for conducting operations and warfare at sea.

K. K. Zotov, in addition to other authors, put forward the theory of methods for conducting operations at sea. He identified three such categories: the method of force, the method of speed, and the method of stealth.

A. A. Alekseev was more specific and formulated several important questions (for example, the question of the meaning of the term "strategic permanent dominance at sea"), which were subsequently widely discussed.

Separately, P. V. Chernyshev stands out, who, unlike other authors, questioned the very concept of dominance at sea, noting that “with modern development aviation fleet and other means of attack "the question of establishing dominance at sea" is problematic and may turn out to be only a desire, not a reality. P. V. Chernyshev also criticized the thesis about the auxiliary role of the fleet in maritime combat operations, highlighting here such operations as landing or repulsing landings, in which the fleet plays the main role, and the ground forces play an auxiliary one.

One of the last articles in this discussion was the second publication of Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev, in which he clarified and deepened the topic of his previous work. So, he once again confirmed his opinion that

"The decisive role in achieving ... the goals of the war, undoubtedly, belongs to the ground forces ... The fleet and aviation assist the ground forces in every possible way in solving the main task."

In many ways, Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev bases this point of view on the fact of counterbalancing the theory of the countries of the NATO bloc (primarily the United States and Great Britain), in which naval dominance over the enemy was put forward.

In general, I. D. Eliseev formulated the main task of the fleet as

"all-round operational-strategic and operational-tactical assistance to the Soviet Army (as a decisive force in achieving strategic goals in modern warfare ... carried out through purposeful independent and joint operations in the coastal and maritime directions."

From the position of such a formulation, he criticizes the idea of ​​captain 1st rank D. G. Rechister about independent auxiliary operations of the fleet not in the interests of the land army, but in the interests of the armed forces as a whole.

Regarding the problems of the concept of the term "dominance at sea", I. D. Eliseev did not support the authors who consider it necessary to abandon this term. However, in his opinion, "dominance at sea" itself cannot be considered as the main goal of war at sea. This term is completely identical to the term "favorable operational regime" and reflects the totality of favorable conditions for achieving the main tasks set for the fleet.

One of the first I. D. Eliseev raises the question of a qualitative revision of the composition of the fleet. In particular, I. D. Eliseev touched upon the topic of the security of a battleship (battleship) in modern warfare. He notes:

“At a time when a cannon with armor competed mainly in a war at sea, the battleship was considered the personification of sea power ... when mines, torpedoes and bombs appeared and began to be widely used, against which the battleship has weak protection ... its place in the fleet changed.”

Here he notes the new location of the battleship:

"on the high seas ... as part of an operational or tactical formation with appropriate support against submarines and aircraft."

In general, the work of Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev "On the question of the conduct of hostilities at sea" was the most comprehensive and elaborated in the discussion on the development of the Soviet Navy. In addition to the topics described above, questions were also raised about maritime theaters and morale, and about the concentration of forces in the operation. Many of the ideas of Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev were included in the provisions of NMO-51. In general, the instruction of 1951 was written under the influence of the theory held by Rear Admiral.

At the same time, the discussion on the development of the navy itself was not over.

Repression


As mentioned above, in 1948, Admiral V. A. Alafuzov, one of the main initiators of the discussion, was arrested and sentenced to 10 years, and in April 1949, the editorial “Against the reactionary ideology of cosmopolitanism” was published in the Marine Collection, which was directed against independent naval science. Articles devoted to naval strategy ceased to be printed, and revealing materials began to appear.

In one of these articles, the editor-in-chief of the Marine Collection, Major General of the Coastal Service S. F. Naida, attacked the Naval Academy, whose teachers used in the educational process, according to S. F. Naida, the books "History wars at sea" by A. N. Shcheglov and "History of war at sea" by A. Shtentsel. These works were declared harmful. In the future, a whole concept of struggle in the Navy against "crawling and servility to Western culture and science", "rootless cosmopolitanism", since "nothing new can be learned from the decaying bourgeoisie and its modern military theorists" was formed.

The works of the Russian “noble-bourgeois historians” A. V. Viskovaty, F. F. Veselago, P. I. Belavenets, A. N. Shcheglov and others were unconditionally rejected. N. L. Klado, M. A. Petrov, B. B. Gervais was accused of "engaging in counter-revolutionary work under the guise of scientific activity after the revolution." "The most harmful manifestation of bourgeois influence" were the scientific works of all those who created the foundations of Soviet naval theory - V. A. Alafuzov, G. A. Stepanov, A. V. Shtal and others. The works of naval historians deserve a similar assessment. S. P. Moiseeva and N. V. Novikova.

It should be noted that such a sharp curtailment of the discussion and the axiomatization of one course with the exclusion of carriers of alternative views had a negative impact on naval art. Thus, the problem of developing a theory of the strategic use of the fleet in the new conditions was pushed aside, and they could return to it only in the 70s with the creation of operational squadrons. The question of the content of the basic concepts of naval art (for example, "dominance at sea") was not resolved. The navy itself, as a result of repressions, suffered significant losses in its senior command staff, which could not but affect the general state of affairs in the navy.

NMO-51


Nevertheless, in 1951, the "Manual on the Conduct of Marine Operations" was published, in which naval theorists managed to collect the main achievements in the development of marine theory over the first post-war decade. In particular, in this manual, "for the first time, Soviet naval science defined maritime strategy as an organic part of the unified military strategy of the state and the most important branch of naval art." The naval strategy itself should be based on the provisions of the unified military strategy of the state, and war at sea is an integral part of the armed struggle as a whole.

The concept of "dominance at sea" was also partially introduced in the form of "strategic dominance at sea", which was not the main goal of war at sea, but was seen as a desirable condition for conducting maritime operations. The main tasks of the fleet were proclaimed: the destruction of the forces of the enemy fleet, undermining the economic power of the enemy by disrupting its sea communications, ensuring the invasion of the Soviet army into enemy territory by landing.

At the same time, due to the active persecution mentioned above, the experience of foreign fleets in World War II was ignored, which led to an incorrect assessment of the significance of individual types of ships. Also, NMO-51 had a serious drawback: the instruction was designed for a fleet still under construction, and most of the provisions could not be implemented in the short term.

HMO-51 was a landmark event for naval theory. After its publication, the study of naval strategy entered the curriculum of the Military Academy of the General Staff. Textbooks and teaching aids were written on the maritime strategy, which developed and supplemented the provisions of the manual. However, the green light for maritime science did not last long - already in 1953, at a military scientific conference, the existence of the category “naval strategy” was declared illegal, “since its recognition allegedly contradicted the principle of the unity of military strategy.”

In 1953, the political leadership of the country is replaced, the new leaders are more categorically disposed towards the fleet. Its significant reduction begins. 240 ships and vessels were cut into scrap metal, and 375 warships were mothballed. In addition, in May 1956, units of the Marine Corps were liquidated.

As mentioned earlier, the instruction of NMO-51 was focused on the future, on the fleet, which had yet to be built. In this regard, the political leadership was at odds with the views of the naval command. The military-political leadership considered the fleet and its use in a probable conflict, based on the available forces, which were significantly reduced and focused on the submarine fleet.
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64 comments
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  1. +4
    15 November 2022 08: 50
    How many stupid, mean people are in the leadership of such a great country
    1. -4
      15 November 2022 12: 02
      And why then the country is "great"? The greatness of a country is determined by the greatness of its leaders. At least one first person.
      1. +8
        15 November 2022 14: 39
        The greatness of a country is determined by the greatness of its leaders. At least one first person.

        A very strange definition.
        1. 0
          2 February 2023 14: 44
          Filthy skeptic. The greatness of the country is its independence and ability to stand up for itself. The main people of the country, which is the master of the country and is able to choose smart politicians from their country to manage the country and manage international relations. This is security.
  2. +9
    15 November 2022 09: 08
    Thank you for the article.
    Much has already been written on this topic, contradictory works. Some argued about the "continentality" of Russia, others about the implementation of the strategy of maritime domination. Both of them gave many arguments in favor of their theory. The truth, as always, is somewhere in the middle. A country that occupies a gigantic area on the mainland really should devote a lot of time, effort and money to the development of these vast territories. However, it cannot be denied that at all times it was economically more profitable to trade with other states, because the larger the market, the greater the profit. This means that an increasing part of this superprofit could be directed to the development of their own territories. Here the circle is closed. Comprehensive development of their industries - international trade - the contribution of profits to the further development of their own science and industry. As we can see from the above, maritime trade is one of the links that cannot be removed. But there are other merchant fleets at sea that are unlikely to calmly contemplate a competitor. Therefore, at some stage, combat fleets will come into play. And this struggle will not be for pieces of land, not for goods, but for complete maritime dominance, for saddling trade routes, for ensuring unhindered trade. The one who ensures dominance at sea with the help of the navy will become the world trade leader, and therefore the richest, and therefore the most developed state. So it turns out that ensuring "dominance at sea" is not someone's whim, not a utopia, not a whim of admirals or politicians, but a cornerstone in the development strategy of any large state. And Carthage, and Rome, and Byzantium, and Holland, and Britain, and now the United States became powerful states only after ensuring freedom of trade. And one of the reasons for the collapse of the first socialist experience was that at some stage they abandoned the strategy of maritime domination, concentrating on affairs within the continent.
    Can it be said that it is necessary to devote all forces and means to the construction of the fleet, to the detriment of everything else? Of course not. The development of the state must be approached comprehensively, but the idea of ​​gaining "complete superiority at sea" (starting small - bays, separate seas ...) cannot be abandoned, because the rejection of this strategy will inevitably lead to collapse.
    1. -3
      15 November 2022 12: 04
      The truth, as always, is somewhere in the middle.
      "In the middle" is a swamp, not the truth. We seem to be heading towards our ultimate national disaster. Not at sea though.
  3. -3
    15 November 2022 09: 21
    Each new Russian war repeatedly shows what kind of naval strategy and what kind of fleet we need.

    And every time after another war, Russia begins to build a mighty ocean fleet. laughing
    1. +2
      15 November 2022 20: 38
      Probably, these events have some kind of causal relationship. Think about it
      1. +1
        15 November 2022 21: 58
        Probably, these events have some kind of causal relationship. Think about it

        No connection. This is the tragedy.
        In 1943, the Americans were our allies, so they sold the boats to us, even though they had to drive them across the ocean.
        Now we are opponents, so Ukraine will receive boats for the Dnieper flotilla, and we will continue to repair the "non-aircraft carrier". fool
        1. 0
          16 November 2022 08: 37
          Quote: Arzt
          No connection. This is the tragedy

          More precisely, you do not want to see it and ignore it.
          Quote: Arzt
          Now we are opponents, so Ukraine will receive boats for the Dnieper flotilla, and we will continue to repair the "non-aircraft carrier".

          I'm afraid to even ask why it was said. But so, for the sake of interest, take a look at the archships, artillery, landing and other boats that are part of the RF Armed Forces (not only the fleet)
  4. Hey
    -5
    15 November 2022 09: 21
    I looked at the photo of the ship at its main caliber, and for some reason I come to the conclusion that if he approached Odessa at the beginning of the operation, it would be more sense than from the entire Black Sea Fleet. And it would be possible to carry out a landing operation under his cover.
    1. +10
      15 November 2022 09: 50
      Quote: MUD
      there would be more sense than from the entire Black Sea Fleet

      Comrade Admiral, the cruiser Kutuzov is under steam and is looking forward to seeing you in Novorossiysk!
    2. +7
      15 November 2022 11: 09
      Quote: MUD
      I looked at the photo of the ship at its main caliber, and for some reason I come to the conclusion that if he approached Odessa at the beginning of the operation, it would be more sense than from the entire Black Sea Fleet.

      As I understand it, the case with Slava is not enough for you. Let's also substitute KRL pr. 68-bis with its air defense level of the late 30s (MZA) - early 50s (SZA).
      Quote: MUD
      And it would be possible to carry out a landing operation under his cover.

      What to carry out? What forces to land and how to transport them?
      810 obrmp is tightly occupied on land. Alas, the main scourge of our army is the wild shortage of active bayonets that are allowed to be thrown into battle. And it can be overcome only by mobilization and the declaration of official war. So they put everyone in the first line - both the marines and the landing force.
      And the large landing craft are ushatany by the Syrian Express.
      Or again arrange a landing a-la Feodosiya - with the transportation of l / s and weapons on a cruiser and frigates and landing right in the harbor? wink
      I'm not talking about the fact that it is necessary to land no less than a brigade - for the enemy has been waiting for this landing for all eight years and has concentrated almost all of its coastal defenses in this direction.
      1. +3
        15 November 2022 12: 01
        Quote: Alexey RA
        I'm not talking about the fact that it is necessary to land at least a brigade

        Plant where? Going nowhere! What will OBRMP do in Odessa? Walk along Potemkinskaya and drink beer in Gambrinus?
        1. +3
          15 November 2022 14: 53
          Demonstrate presence and generate content for bravura reports.
          And then, due to the lack of active bayonets and rears on the theater of operations, the victory would have turned into a disaster - and we would have received a new Boryspil or Serpentine. sad
    3. +2
      15 November 2022 12: 20
      There is some truth in your words.
      Indeed, there is nothing for our fleet to work along the coast.
      1. -7
        15 November 2022 14: 22
        There is some truth in your words.
        Indeed, there is nothing for our fleet to work along the coast.

        Given that 10 Karakurts would be able to exhale 80 missiles at once.
        And 10 Bison under their cover, land 2 MP brigades.

        This is the question of strategies for the Black Sea Fleet - every war is the same.
        1. +4
          15 November 2022 20: 37
          Quote: Arzt
          Given that 10 Karakurts would be able to exhale 80 missiles at once.

          Which are not needed to ensure the landing
          Quote: Arzt
          And 10 Bison under their cover

          I’m even afraid to ask how Karakurt in your imagination with his 30 knots at best should keep up with the 60 knots of the Bison. Moreover, I won’t ask how Karakurt, with his Shell at best, will be able to cover another ship from an air attack
          Quote: Arzt
          land 2 MP brigades.

          Taking into account the fact that the regular load of the Bison is 140 troops with 10 armored personnel carriers, then 10 Bisons will land at most 1400 people with 100 armored personnel carriers. Without artillery, tanks, reinforcements, etc.
          This, in your opinion, 2 brigades of marines?
          1. -1
            15 November 2022 21: 24
            Which are not needed to ensure the landing

            And what you need? Cruisers 68 bis? wink
            1. +4
              16 November 2022 08: 46
              Quote: Arzt
              And what you need

              First of all, reconnaissance means that make it possible to identify the positions of the defending troops. Next is an operation to suppress enemy air defense and control, where, by a combination of balanced air groups (strike + electronic warfare), together with cruise missiles, they take out radars, air defense systems, nearby airfields, command posts, etc., and AWACS + fighters extinguish everything that tries to resist in the air. Then it is already possible with ordinary cast iron on equipped positions of troops + MLRS and art of ships to a state of complete non-survivability. And only then - the landing.
              1. 0
                16 November 2022 10: 43
                First of all, reconnaissance means that make it possible to identify the positions of the defending troops. Next is an operation to suppress enemy air defense and control, where, by a combination of balanced air groups (strike + electronic warfare), together with cruise missiles, they take out radars, air defense systems, nearby airfields, command posts, etc., and AWACS + fighters extinguish everything that tries to resist in the air. Then it is already possible with ordinary cast iron on equipped positions of troops + MLRS and art of ships to a state of complete non-survivability. And only then - the landing.

                Handsomely. I agree almost completely. Only not balanced air groups together with cruise missiles, but rather a massive strike of cruise missiles, and then a landing with the support of air groups. They will deal with helicopters.

                But these missiles must be launched by someone, right? winked
                1. +1
                  16 November 2022 11: 50
                  Quote: Arzt
                  Only not balanced air groups together with cruise missiles, but rather a massive strike of cruise missiles

                  Not properly. It is the combination of one with the other that makes it possible to significantly improve the quality of hitting targets - trite, jamming + using PRR will minimize enemy opposition. Calibers can't do that.
                  Quote: Arzt
                  But these rockets must be launched by someone

                  At least someone. At least start with sushi. At least with stratobombers. From tactical aircraft. From warships. Small carriers are useless here.
          2. -2
            15 November 2022 21: 26
            I’m even afraid to ask how Karakurt in your imagination with his 30 knots at best should keep up with the 60 knots of the Bison. Moreover, I won’t ask how Karakurt, with his Shell at best, will be able to cover another ship from an air attack

            He doesn't have to chase. To do this, he has a "Caliber". wink
            1. +5
              16 November 2022 08: 48
              Quote: Arzt
              . To do this, he has a "Caliber".

              I’m even afraid to ask how you intend to repel an attack by, say, conventional helicopters with Caliber.
          3. -2
            15 November 2022 21: 31
            Taking into account the fact that the regular load of the Bison is 140 troops with 10 armored personnel carriers, then 10 Bisons will land at most 1400 people with 100 armored personnel carriers. Without artillery, tanks, reinforcements, etc.
            This, in your opinion, 2 brigades of marines?

            And why are armored personnel carriers on the beach of Odessa? Land the vanguard with light weapons, take the foothold, and the rest to catch up. soldier
            1. +6
              16 November 2022 08: 50
              Quote: Arzt
              And why are armored personnel carriers on the beach of Odessa?

              That is, do you propose to land with machine guns at all?
              M-dya ... And these people talk about the strategy of war at sea wassat
              1. -1
                16 November 2022 10: 47
                That is, do you propose to land with machine guns at all?
                M-dya ... And these people talk about the strategy of war at sea wassat

                With light weapons. Machine guns, machine guns, mortars, ATGMs, MANPADS ...

                Further more.
                1. +2
                  16 November 2022 12: 01
                  Quote: Arzt
                  With light weapons

                  No way. Since you are going to be limited only to light forces, the guys will not even have a turntable over their heads. And if the enemy has a couple of howitzers survived? It’s only beautiful in the movies, how the marines with machine guns ran out of bison, in reality they urgently need the support of heavy weapons in the first wave of landing
                  1. -1
                    16 November 2022 13: 48
                    And if the enemy has a couple of howitzers survived?

                    And how will armored personnel carriers help?
                    In principle, of course, there are no objections to disembarkation with equipment. We are talking about the maritime strategy of the Russian Federation. I will clarify - on the Black Sea.

                    What do we need here?
                    The practice of wars shows - amphibious assaults in the first place. And fight them.

                    Large enemy ships - aviation, diesel-electric submarines.
                    Enemy submarines - aviation, anti-submarine corvettes.
                    Developed boat fleets.
                    UAV.

                    And for the rest - 3 brigades of marines with the necessary number of high-speed landing craft and support for RTOs.

                    From warships. Small carriers are useless here.

                    Exactly RTOs, you don't need to put all your eggs in one basket. They are warships too.

                    Here is the approximate composition of the Black Sea Fleet.
                    1. +2
                      16 November 2022 19: 53
                      Quote: Arzt
                      And how will armored personnel carriers help?

                      I pointed out to you one of the options for regular loading that is as "loyal" as possible to the size of the landing force. And then two brigades did not come close. And so, for example, you can shove three MBTs into the Bison. But without landing.
                      Quote: Arzt
                      I’ll clarify - on the Black Sea. What do we need here?
                      The practice of wars shows - amphibious assaults in the first place. And fight them.

                      Let's say.
                      Quote: Arzt
                      Large enemy ships - aviation, diesel-electric submarines.
                      Enemy submarines - aviation, anti-submarine corvettes.

                      Okay, let's say you want to land troops. We already need BDKs at a minimum, because the same Bisons are only for landing something very tactical and local, or they are suitable for the first wave of a large landing there. And the BDK must be covered at the crossing, for which at least frigate-class ships are already needed. The landing of a decent landing force is always a very intimate and long matter (combat means are not so bad, but supplies and other support ...), all this time it is very useful to have the same frigate with its air defense systems nearby.
                      Quote: Arzt
                      Exactly RTOs, you don't need to put all your eggs in one basket. They are warships too.

                      They are exactly what "too" - it was not in vain that they were not included in the first shipbuilding program at all. Pampering is one thing, a very expensive thing with a minimum of combat capability
                      1. 0
                        17 November 2022 11: 46
                        I pointed out to you one of the options for regular loading that is as "loyal" as possible to the size of the landing force. And then two brigades did not come close. And so, for example, you can shove three MBTs into the Bison. But without landing.

                        Rough:
                        1 Zubr - 1,5 billion rubles.
                        The senseless repair of Kuznetsov - 40 billion rubles.

                        What prevented the construction of 25 MDK?
                        I will answer.
                        Soviet naval art. laughing
                      2. +1
                        17 November 2022 12: 10
                        Quote: Arzt
                        Rough:
                        1 Zubr - 1,5 billion rubles.

                        Considering that China bought for $ 80 million ... You are very accurate in numbers :))))
                        If we assume that for the Navy, the Russian Federation, the ship will get one and a half times cheaper and at the rate of 60 rubles dollars - and then 3,2 billion comes out.

                        Quote: Arzt
                        The senseless repair of Kuznetsov - 40 billion rubles.

                        We limited ourselves to the World Cup, didn't we? Well, without Kuznetsov, you can immediately write off the submarine of the Northern Fleet.
                      3. 0
                        17 November 2022 11: 52
                        Okay, let's say you want to land troops. We already need BDKs at a minimum, because the same Bisons are only for landing something very tactical and local, or they are suitable for the first wave of a large landing there. And the BDK must be covered at the crossing, for which at least frigate-class ships are already needed. The landing of a decent landing force is always a very intimate and long matter (combat means are not so bad, but supplies and other support ...), all this time it is very useful to have the same frigate with its air defense systems nearby.

                        I repeat: BDK - eggs in one basket. Why is this at the World Cup?
                        "Zubrs" reach out to Turkey. A swarm of small ones has a much higher chance of landing.

                        And everyone needs to be covered.
                      4. +2
                        17 November 2022 12: 12
                        Quote: Arzt
                        I repeat: BDK - eggs in one basket.

                        And without them, you will not land the MP brigade. That's all.
                        Quote: Arzt
                        "Zubrs" reach out to Turkey. A swarm of small ones has a much higher chance of landing.

                        Without cover, neither one nor the other have a chance.
                      5. 0
                        17 November 2022 12: 03
                        They are exactly what "too" - it was not in vain that they were not included in the first shipbuilding program at all. Pampering is one thing, a very expensive thing with a minimum of combat capability

                        A high-speed, maneuverable, capable of "sailing" over a mined coast deep into the territory of a ship - pampering?

                        What then is needed? Shed UDC? This is a mass grave. Yes
                      6. +2
                        17 November 2022 13: 17
                        Quote: Arzt
                        Fast, agile

                        It is detected long before the approach by means of AWACS, after which it is destroyed by aircraft.
                        Quote: Arzt
                        a ship capable of "sailing" over a mined coast deep into the territory - pampering?

                        About pampering, I wrote about RTOs.
                        Quote: Arzt
                        What then is needed? Shed UDC? This is a mass grave.

                        If landing ships are hit, the whole difference between bison and udk is that instead of one large mass grave there will be several, but smaller ones. If we take the landing force, then with the UDC the landing force will receive much fewer losses, fewer dead and wounded due to the delivery of more equipment, supplies, the presence of combat and transport turntables in the landing zone, operational transportation to the hospital on board the ship.
                        The bison is a useful thing, but it solves only a part of the tasks of landing ships and cannot solve the entire spectrum of these tasks on its own.
                        If you want to limit yourself to tactical landings, including a reinforced company, bet on the Zubrs. If you want to land in brigades, then if you please, build much larger ships for this
  5. -1
    15 November 2022 09: 39
    I wonder what kind of reward Eliseev has with a block to the right of the Red Star?
    1. +6
      15 November 2022 09: 53
      Quote from solar
      I wonder what kind of reward Eliseev has with a block to the right of the Red Star?

      Jubilee medal 20 years of the Red Army!
    2. +2
      15 November 2022 09: 55
      Jubilee medal "20 years of the Red Army"
  6. +2
    15 November 2022 09: 55
    The most interesting thing is that Khrushchev laid the foundation for the development of the Soviet ocean fleet ... after his visit to Egypt on the ship Armenia!
    1. 0
      15 November 2022 10: 21
      Earlier, after the Caribbean crisis, when it turned out that there was practically nothing to get Americans at home.
      1. +3
        15 November 2022 10: 41
        Quote: strannik1985
        Before, after the Caribbean Crisis

        The Caribbean crisis gave rise to the development of land- and sea-based missile submarines and ICBMs.
        And the brazen photographing of the Soviet leader by the sailors of Turkey, Greece and what kind of Portugal played a decisive role in the revival of the Soviet surface fleet!
        1. +4
          15 November 2022 11: 18
          Quote: Serg65
          The Caribbean crisis gave rise to the development of land- and sea-based missile submarines and ICBMs.

          In fact, the launch was given earlier - when the Navy convinced the leadership that it could deliver the SBC to a potential enemy.
          By the time of the Caribbean crisis, the Navy already had 22 diesel and 4 nuclear SSBNs. Well, how was it... was included in. wink
          And the Crisis was, rather, a cold shower for naval missile optimists - when it suddenly became clear that the NATO ASW, after being deployed according to military standards, simply would not allow the SSBNs to reach the launch area, much less complete the cycle ". And of the four ARPKSNs, only one turned out to be combat-ready at the time of the crisis. And of the other three, one got up for repairs, the other just got out of repair, and the third ... the third fonil in the harbor - because it was Hiroshima.
          1. +4
            15 November 2022 11: 56
            hi Hello buddy! How is your health?
            Quote: Alexey RA
            By the time of the Caribbean Crisis, the Navy already had 22 diesel

            Those. 66 R-13 missiles with a range of 600 km...
            The crisis influenced the birth of the R-27 missiles, and subsequently the R-29.
            Well, the foxtrot in the Caribbean, it's just a show off with the task of strengthening Mikoyan's position in the negotiations in Washington! In the 61st, a pair of the same boats of the 641 project calmly sailed both in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean Sea!
            1. +1
              15 November 2022 14: 47
              Quote: Serg65
              Well, a foxtrot in the Caribbean, it's just a show off with the task of strengthening Mikoyan's position in the negotiations in Washington!

              Worse. This is all that the Navy could do in response to the order to demonstrate force - four torpedo diesel-electric submarines.
              Quote: Serg65
              In the 61st, a pair of the same boats of the 641 project calmly sailed both in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean Sea!

              That's why I write
              Quote: Alexey RA
              PLO NATO after military deployment

              And one thing - the 641st project. And the other is the 629th. SSBNs at launch range must be constantly monitored.
        2. 0
          15 November 2022 11: 29
          The Cuban Missile Crisis kicked off

          Modernization of project 611 under R-11FM - 1954-1955, TTZ for the development of project 629 - 1954 (the first adopted by the fleet in 1959, but the first combat service was in 1963).
          A cheeky photo

          There were many factors, but the most important one was that the Americans considered Europe as the future battlefield in the Third World War, in order to influence their policy, it was necessary to get the continent, hit the means of nuclear attack, etc.
          1. +4
            15 November 2022 12: 06
            Quote: strannik1985
            There were many factors

            Sergei Georgievich, why can't I see our ship?
            So, Nikita Sergeevich, you yourself ordered to cut them!
            Verbatim dialogue between Khrushchev and Admiral Gorshkov, on board the ship "Armenia" in the Aegean Sea!
            1. 0
              15 November 2022 13: 43
              Sergey Georgievich

              De jure, by the beginning of the crisis, the Navy had 17 cruisers, including a pair of pr.26 and training 68K and 68bis (missile), plus 6 EM 57bis and 27 pr.56. Of course, not all of them were ready, but one squadron would be enough.
      2. -1
        16 November 2022 15: 49
        Earlier, after the Caribbean crisis, when it turned out that there was practically nothing to get Americans at home.

        Even earlier, after a trip to China, when the Moremans tried to hang noodles on his ears. laughing

        We went to Nakhodka Bay, from there we moved on. We are told that military exercises will begin now. Submarines, torpedoes placed.

        I think that during military exercises, especially when the Chairman of the Council of Ministers on the ship and other members of the Presidium, and the military are not without sin, they will always whisper what course we will follow in order to place submarines closer to the planned route. We seem to have been attacked by five submarines. And only one torpedo hit the target. They knew that a cruiser with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers was coming and they would not shoot at it, but what if during the war?

        Then they say: look, look! Now there will be an attack by torpedo boats. Indeed, noise, crackling, smoke. They threw torpedoes, but not a single torpedo came close to our cruiser. And all this, apparently, at a distance of artillery fire from a cruiser. And if there had been artillery fire, there would have been shooting, then it would have been even worse.

        And they are triumphant, happy, that's what they say. And I was taken by fear. If we have such weapons, how can we protect our shores. After all, this is only a fool, sorry for being rude, can present joy over such an ineffective weapon, but rather expensive.


        And the crackers asked for a company atomic bomb !!! laughing laughing

        The military say: give me a company atomic bomb. No. Go to the store and find. No. Neither a company nor a battalion can have an atomic bomb. The atomic bomb is a strategic weapon. We need to rewire our brains. Not only does he not understand the new technology, he does not understand the future war and thinks the way our grandfathers fought, as we already fought during two world wars.

        All transcript. Carve in stone.
        https://paul-atrydes.livejournal.com/301168.html

        Nikita Sergeevich was a smart man. Yes
    2. -5
      15 November 2022 14: 27
      The most interesting thing is that Khrushchev laid the foundation for the development of the Soviet ocean fleet ... after his visit to Egypt on the ship Armenia!

      Classic double standards.
      Khrushchev is bad because he cut 240 ships, mostly boats.
      All large - cannon.

      What was built from 1956 to 1960 1863 modern, missile and nuclear submarines - no one is interested. wink
      1. +3
        15 November 2022 17: 10
        Khrushchev is bad because he cut 240 ships, mostly boats.

        Yes, but repression and naval defeat (from NMO-51 to NMO-57) led the fleet to an approximate state of the times of the "young school", except that it was better in the Baltic and the Black Sea, the experience of the Second World War somehow influenced.
        The fact that 1956 modern, missile and nuclear submarines were built from 1960 to 1863 is of no interest to anyone.

        In the USSR, as is often the case with us, they perceived the appearance of nuclear submarines as another "wunderwaffe", with the help of which it is possible to take away the adversary in a "perpendicular" way and devalue his advantage at sea. Therefore, unlike the Americans, who very carefully developed the construction of the 1st generation submarines, having built 9 single or small-scale boats of 6 different types, very different in many structural elements, and only after finding the optimal type of design, they switched to the construction of serial 2nd generation boats (types "Skipjack" and "Thresher", and then the massive "Sturgeon" and SSBNs), in the USSR they immediately embarked on the mass construction of submarines, without even having time to really think about the need to work out such a complex and fundamentally innovative system as a nuclear boat . K-3 was laid down in 1955, and before it was launched, already in 1956-1957 they began mass construction of serial submarines pr.627A and preparations for the start of serial construction of missile boats pr.658 and 659. When the acceptance certificate was signed K-3, mass construction of submarines was already underway according to 4 projects. And not having time to get any full-fledged experience in operating the boats of these projects, they started the construction of a grand series of pr.675. As a result, if the Americans stuffed bumps on several essentially experimental boats with specially selected crews, the Soviets had to stuff these bumps in SERIES and MASSIVELY on hastily built serial boats with "combat" crews. The result was on the face. On the same K-3 in the late 50s and early 60s, accidents due to the general lack of development of new equipment followed in almost EVERY exit to the sea. And all this was massively repeated on serial boats of the 1st generation. As a result, until the second half of the 60s, the armada of the 1st generation submarines built in the USSR was practically uncompetitive, and from the second half of the 60s, boats of this generation began to rapidly lose their combat value due to obsolescence and "uncompetitiveness" compared to massively built in the US submarines of their 2nd generation.
        In other words, the main mistake was the mass construction of first-generation submarines in the USSR, with their design completely undeveloped.
      2. +3
        15 November 2022 20: 41
        Quote: Arzt
        The fact that from 1956 to 1960 1863 modern, missile and nuclear submarines were built

        cut the sturgeon please
      3. +2
        16 November 2022 14: 15
        Quote: Arzt
        The fact that 1956 modern, missile and nuclear submarines were built from 1960 to 1863 is of no interest to anyone.

        I tell you about Yeryoma, and you tell me about Foma! wink
        Submarines are surface ships in your opinion?
  7. 0
    15 November 2022 11: 28
    In the photo, the cruiser pr. 68 bis "Sverdlov" I had the honor to serve on the first cruiser from pr. 68 bis "Sverdlov". The happiest time in youth, from training in Mamonovo to the end of the service. The fate of "Sverdlov" is sad. Under Gorbachev, the decommissioned rusty Sverdlov was dragged somewhere outside the USSR, sold to the Indians for recycling. But the Murmansk, when towed somewhere in the Norwegian Sea for disposal, was sold to the same Indians either flooded or thrown onto the rocks, and it rusted there as a symbol of the once powerful fleet of the USSR and the entire Soviet state that was destroyed.
    As for the construction of the post-war fleet, Khrushchev, who I did not like, completed a dozen cruisers, Project 68 bis, and before Brezhnev came to power, they did not know what to do with these ships. Either in fact, the new ships were put into conservation, or they were considered the main surface ships of the USSR Navy.
    Yes, and the Brezhnev admirals did not know what to do with these ships. With Brezhnev coming to power, the ten-year-old Sverdlov was mothballed in Kronstadt, ten years later it was re-mothballed and appointed the flagship of the DCBF.
    I would like to note the special aesthetics of the external architecture and design of cruisers, destroyers and BOD of the USSR Navy. These are some of the most beautiful ships in the world and this aesthetic did not interfere with either driving performance or performance characteristics. The same applies to all Soviet post-war surface ships.
    By the way, I recommend watching the video on youtube, "Destroyer Admiral Ushakov in a stormy sea", especially the video under the Rammstein song "Mutter"
    1. +3
      15 November 2022 12: 07
      Quote: north 2
      I had the honor to serve on the first cruiser from Project 68 bis "Sverdlov"

      what What was Sverdlov's political officer famous for in the Navy?
  8. Eug
    +1
    15 November 2022 12: 05
    When theoretical DISCUSSIONS end in repression against one of the parties, this is very sad and does not lead to anything good.
  9. +2
    15 November 2022 17: 57
    The publication of Admiral V. A. Alafuzov “On the essence of naval operations” in 1946 should be considered the beginning of the post-war discussion about the further development of the Navy.

    The beginning of the post-war discussion about the further development of the Navy should be considered an article by Captain 1st Rank Zotov K.K. "On some features of modern warfare at sea", published in the journal "Sea Collection", 1946. No. 1. Alafuzov's article was the next on this topic.
  10. 0
    15 November 2022 18: 09
    At one time, the Soviet fleet was able to ensure the defense of Leningrad through Ladoga and the defense of Stalingrad through the Volga. And the Russian fleet today could not supply the defense of Kherson through the Dnieper. On etim it is necessary to argue.
    1. -1
      15 November 2022 19: 50
      At one time, the Soviet fleet was able to ensure the defense of Leningrad through Ladoga and the defense of Stalingrad through the Volga. And the Russian fleet today could not supply the defense of Kherson through the Dnieper. On etim it is necessary to argue.
      In the USSR and the Russian Federation, a different state system, that's all.
  11. 0
    16 November 2022 16: 04
    As I understand it, the case with Slava is not enough for you. Let's also substitute KRL pr. 68-bis with its air defense level of the late 30s (MZA) - early 50s (SZA).

    1. Glory / Moscow, as far as I know, burned down due to an accident. KRL 68-bis did not burn themselves, at least there was no such incident.
    2. Armor still matters today. It well complements the short-range air defense and KAZ. Protects against fragments and shells up to 155 mm caliber. For a serious impact on the cruiser from the side armor (100 mm), you need full-fledged armor-piercing shells of 155 mm and a distance of less than 10-12 km. 155 mm cumulative and sub-caliber ammunition is ineffective against large ships due to insignificant armor impact.
    3. Why should the 68-bis cruiser keep air defense from the 50s? You can install both modern air defense and KAZ and modern SLA for the main caliber and modern ammunition.
    4. The only real threat to these cruisers will be anti-ship missiles and 220-300 mm MLRS.
  12. 0
    17 November 2022 19: 34
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Arzt
    Rough:
    1 Zubr - 1,5 billion rubles.

    Considering that China bought for $ 80 million ... You are very accurate in numbers :))))
    If we assume that for the Navy, the Russian Federation, the ship will get one and a half times cheaper and at the rate of 60 rubles dollars - and then 3,2 billion comes out.

    Quote: Arzt
    The senseless repair of Kuznetsov - 40 billion rubles.

    We limited ourselves to the World Cup, didn't we? Well, without Kuznetsov, you can immediately write off the submarine of the Northern Fleet.

    That is, until at least the middle of 2024, we no longer have a subfloor of the Northern Fleet? And it hasn’t been since 2017. So maybe it’s not needed at all, since we can’t even provide a way out, transfer everything to the PGRK.
  13. 0
    27 December 2022 21: 44
    The theory of the post-war RKKF was based on the experience of our Second World War, when the fleet rolled back and forth, returned after the Red Army. Hence the total attachment to the actions of the army, and the emphasis on the defense of naval bases, and the focus on temporary local dominance in the coastal areas of the sea, the emphasis on supporting land flanks, the emphasis on tactical landings, the actions of boats and mine-sweeping forces, on evacuation / army transportation. Even the relatively independent strike actions of naval aviation, torpedo boats and submarines were still tied to the actions of the army in coastal areas. And in matters of the actual naval war, for some reason, they took beaten Nazis as an example, and after the Second World War they began to invest in raider cruisers and a huge submarine fleet.
    1. 0
      28 December 2022 07: 26
      What was left?
      The US Navy is the most powerful and experienced at the end of WWII
      The fleet of the USSR has only experience in coastal operations, and is not ready for war at sea (ocean).
      So it turns out that since the main (3rd century) war will be for Europe, then the USSR does not need an ocean fleet until the mid-50s.
  14. 0
    4 January 2023 11: 39
    Only a superpower, which was Great Britain in the XNUMXth century and the United States in the XNUMXth century, can dominate the sea.
    "Rule Britannia, rule the waves!"
    Russia has never had a tradition of dominance at sea.
    In addition, since the twentieth century, dominance at sea is impossible without dominance in the air.

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