Monarchy and the "Milyukov theorem"
Kukryniksy. Cartoon on Milyukov
Magi are not afraid of powerful lords,
And they don’t need a princely gift;
True and Free Their Prophetic Language
And he is friendly with the will of heaven.
The coming years lurk in the gloom;
But I see your lot on a bright forehead.
A. S. Pushkin "The Song of the Prophetic Oleg"
And they don’t need a princely gift;
True and Free Their Prophetic Language
And he is friendly with the will of heaven.
The coming years lurk in the gloom;
But I see your lot on a bright forehead.
A. S. Pushkin "The Song of the Prophetic Oleg"
Stupidity or treason?
On November 1 (14), 1916, the deputy, historian and head of the Constitutional Democratic Party Pavel Nikolaevich Milyukov delivered his famous anti-government speech “Stupidity or Treason?” in the State Duma.
Some believe that his extremely radical speech was dedicated to the political crisis that hit Russia, as a result of mediocre, bordering on treasonous governance of the country, associated with paralysis of power at all levels.
Others argue that his speech was the catalyst that sharply accelerated the crisis and led to the collapse of the monarchy and the Russian state, in the "ideal form" in which it existed until February 1917.
To put it differently, despite the problems that Russia has and associated with its participation in the First World War, it was precisely such people as Milyukov, the “petrels”, and possibly the executors of the will of the “anti-Russian foreign forces”, that led to the collapse of the “autocratic” Russia.
This "historical collision” or a theorem (by analogy with mathematics) needs to be proved.
What was it, this speech for Russia? A warning of an impending catastrophe, the “Babylon” of Alexander the Great, the “Ides of March” of Julius Caesar, or the “petrel” of the second Russian revolution?
Let's try to answer three fundamental questions.
First, the could Milyukov's "stormy petrels" be the reason for the fall of Russian statehood. Or the reason for the fall of power lies in the insoluble contradictions and problems of the government itself in general and the imperial family in particular: the fundamental inability to adequately respond to historical challenges.
Second, the “stupidity and betrayal” about which Milyukov spoke - is it a metaphor, a lie or the political reality of the Russian Empire during its decline? Were there, in fact, "stupidity and betrayal"?
Third, Are the actions of “petrels” and the like in the period of complex political vicissitudes of history legitimate from the point of view of morality? Especially in the face of an exacerbated external threat?
Method
From the point of view of historical analysis, what is important is what the participant in the historical process did under specific conditions, and not how the participant in the events later assessed himself under certain conditions, retroactively trying to whitewash himself or embellish, “smearing” the original chronicle of history.
Based on what, it does not matter at all what P. N. Milyukov did after the seizure of power in Russia, or, for example, L. G. Kornilov, A. I. Denikin or M. V. Alekseev, and even more so - what they wrote (who, of course, survived the Time of Troubles) in their memoirs: their actions during the fall of the monarchy are important to us.
Thus, only the actions that occur in a particular period matter. Even if later P. N. Milyukov reproached himself for his speech:
"History will curse our leaders, the so-called proletarians, but it will also curse us, who caused the storm."
Milyukov the politician is clearly inferior to Milyukov the historian: the inevitability of change was obvious.
There were two items on the agenda.
First. Is it possible to correct the system of government during the war and thereby ensure victory in the war, thereby preventing a revolution?
Second question. If the first is no longer feasible, then who will be able to ride this revolutionary wave?
Milyukov-Dardanelsky, as the leader of the Cadets, thought that the Russian Fronde would lead only moderate forces to victory, and would not turn the flywheel of a radical political struggle.
But the fact remains that the speech was delivered and had a huge political resonance and real historical consequences.
The first question
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, in the new modern conditions, when the Second Industrial Revolution had already passed, the Russian elite and the supreme power could not find adequate answers.
The main and key issue of the irreconcilable class struggle in Russia remained the question of land: the peasants were dissatisfied with the reform carried out by the feudal lords and for the feudal lords. The reform of 1861, in addition to the conditionally personal (we emphasize - conditionally!) liberation of the peasants, at the same time economically robbed this class in favor of the state and feudal nobles.
The reform, on the one hand, opened the way for advanced capitalist economic relations, and on the other hand, sharply limited the possibility of their development, narrowing it down to state-bureaucratic ones.
It was this development of the country's economic forces that led to the military-economic catastrophe of 1916-1917.
All the rapid development of the economy and capitalist relations at a tremendous pace in the pre-war period did not eliminate the critical technological backwardness of the country, and this is taking into account the fact that the Eastern (Russian) front was not a key one for the Triple Alliance.
Russian industry in peacetime could only meet the current needs of the armed forces in the main types of weapons - artillery, rifles, shells and cartridges, and then what can we say about the war period! According to the latest types of weapons, many of which were not produced at all: machine guns, airplanes, vehicles, tanks and the latest types of warships - inferior to Germany and France from 2 to 5 times.
For fifty post-reform years, the industrial revolution in Russia did not happen.
And these are only economic problems, plus the obligatory companions of such economic development: embezzlement, bribery, inflated prices, etc.
We deliberately focus on the most important problems of systemic management, in front of which many positive actions of the government lost their meaning. Within the framework of the anti-control system, they did not play any significance, like a spoon of honey in a barrel of tar, and even a bucket of it.
During the revolution of 1905-1907. it became clear that the monarchy, which did not easily spare patrons (and checkers) against the workers of the capital, and forever had no patrons against external enemies (the Russo-Japanese War), was losing support from most classes of Russian society: from the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia to nobles and peasants.
Only the unprecedented use of force against the peasantry (the people) made it possible to bring down the intensity of this struggle. And we are not talking about the uprising of the capitals, but about the boundless peasant revolt, pacified by the famous "Stolypin ties", Cossack whips and bayonets of the guard:
"Soldiers, brave children, where is your glory?"
Even the election of a small State Duma showed that the deputies were sharply in opposition to the tsarist government, regardless of the class component.
Instead of solving pressing social and economic problems, P. Stolypin's reform began, which never set as its goal the creation of a certain "class of owners". His task was to form a social base for the support of the monarchy and the monarch, through the expropriation of the peasantry and the creation of a farmer-fist.
Stolypin's reform was adopted after the dispersal of the 1st State Duma, that is, the June 3 coup d'état carried out by Emperor Nicholas II.
And despite this, the reform completely failed, not because of "external forces", but because of its rejection by the Russian peasantry, who did not want to turn into "firewood" for the implementation of Stolypin's plans.
But the suppression of the general mass peasant uprising and the relatively calm foreign policy situation from 1907 to 1914, achieved through constant concessions - diplomatic "Tsushima", made it possible for Russia to exist without "great upheavals" for seven years, driving domestic and foreign political problems inside.
All these unresolved problems, together with historically inevitable accidents, led to the fall of the tsarist autocracy. Cadet V. Obolensky wrote:
"The feeling that Russia was run at best by lunatics and at worst by traitors was universal."
It was not the war and not the actions of the oppositionists or the secret enemies of the “Orthodox monarchy” that caused the crisis, just as it is not worth looking for it in the far reaches of history.
Thus, the speech of P. Milyukov, a relatively loyal politician - a monarchist, although a constitutional one, was the last warning to the tsar or the supreme power about the coming storm. The authorities, due to their political views and mental abilities, did not hear her.
This is the answer to the first question.
About statehood
When the term "statehood" is used, a certain constant appears, outside of time and space.
But statehood (or more precisely, the state) is a system of governing society by the ruling class: if the feudal lords rule, then the state is feudal, if the capitalists are capitalist. Of course, this is very approximate, there were many transitional moments along the historical path, when, as we know, there were remnants of one management system and another, but in general it looked like this.
Monarchy is a system of government under feudalism. It appeared with the emergence of feudalism and was abolished with the liquidation of its basis, feudal or noble land ownership, from February 1917. That's all.
The monarchy existed in Russia for about four centuries, as well as, in fact, feudalism, and as we know, Rus' appeared on the political map at the end of the XNUMXth - beginning of the XNUMXth century and remained within the pre-feudal period until the XNUMXth century, when the formation of two classes of nobles and peasants.
In February 1917, all remnants of feudalism were liquidated, and this was consolidated during the Civil War of 1918-1922.
As for Milyukov, he was not only a harbinger of the fall of "statehood", but even of the monarchy, he wanted to give a warning, about which below. Moreover, Milyukov's influence was limited to a narrow circle of the urban intelligentsia, nothing more.
Kukryniksy. The fall of the autocracy
Managerial stupidity is worse than betrayal
In his speech, the politician Milyukov noted:
“... naturally, on this basis, rumors arise about the recognition in government circles of the aimlessness of further struggle, the timeliness of the end of the war and the need to conclude a separate peace.
Gentlemen, I would not like to go towards the excessive, perhaps painful suspicion with which the excited feeling of a Russian patriot reacts to everything that happens.
But how will you refute the possibility of such suspicions when a handful of obscure personalities direct the most important state affairs for personal and base interests?
Gentlemen, I would not like to go towards the excessive, perhaps painful suspicion with which the excited feeling of a Russian patriot reacts to everything that happens.
But how will you refute the possibility of such suspicions when a handful of obscure personalities direct the most important state affairs for personal and base interests?
These facts happened. Both Rasputin and those close to him "participated" in the management of state affairs.
Firstly, it brought confusion into the system, which was not very suitable for governing the country, in the conditions of a world war.
The mystical revelations of Rasputin, supported by the same Vyrubova, would not matter if they concerned only the tsar's family, but had nothing to do with governance. Unfortunately, the interweaving of the interests of the family and the monarchy was extremely great during this period and negatively influenced the affairs of government.
Secondly, it could not do without the connection of representatives of the "dark forces" with speculators and black market bigwigs, who had a negative impact on the war economy.
The leapfrog among the appointment of the highest officials of the empire: from the Chairman of the Government to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, took place with the participation of, among other things, the "dark forces" and the "German Queen" at a time when the state strained or had to strain all its forces in the fight against the enemy.
In this case, we use the phrase “German queen” to characterize the view of the monarchy among the broad, uncultured masses of the people during the war with Germany, when any real problem was easily attributed to the tsar’s relatives, ethnically close enemies. And it was painted in rough, insulting colors for the king's family and his entourage.
The absence of the will of the tsar, as the head of state, the lack of will of the statesmen who surrounded the emperor, drove Russia into an "economic impasse" and led to a military catastrophe.
Neither the intellectual nor the managerial level of the top leadership and the generals met the requirements of the times. Although, it must be admitted, many of them were able to serve Russia with a change in the management system, after October 1917, that is, there were personnel, but in the absence of an adequate management system, they could not realize themselves.
Without removing part of the blame from Nikolai Aleksandrovich, for fairness it should be noted that this period of the development of mankind, or rather Europe, showed the inconsistency of the monarchy, as a management system, with the challenges facing countries. As a result, the monarchs of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire lost their crown.
Even trying to avoid value judgments, how can one relate to the words of the top leader, who held this post for twenty-one years, who said:
"All around treason and cowardice, and deceit"
.For twenty years, the emperor formed the system of governing the country, where during the crisis period, at the moment of the need to exert all forces, the managers turned out to be cowards, deceivers and traitors.
The Russian government was not able to carry out in time a complete "mobilization" of industry along the lines of Germany or Austria in the style of V. I. Lenin's "April theses". It was impossible to achieve effective results by half-measures. Even the confiscation of factories that could not cope with the military order was a half-measure, as in the case of the Putilov factory.
In all other respects, speculative capital, acquired on superprofits from military supplies, flourished, and fantastic corruption. Only lazy people did not talk about bribery, embezzlement in the chronic shortage of the army (the “shell” crisis began already in December 1916). And this was just a direct betrayal of the interests of the country.
In connection with the situation described, it was then difficult to talk about the unity of the rear and the front (everything for the front - everything for victory, by analogy with the Great Patriotic War).
This situation could not but irritate the masses of soldiers and the officer corps:
“In the army, loudly, not embarrassed by either place or time,” wrote A. I. Denikin, “there was talk about the empress’ insistent demand for a separate peace [with Germany - V. E.], about her betrayal of Field Marshal Kitchener, about the trip whom she allegedly told the Germans, etc.”
The tsar’s entourage, on which he relied, consisted of people who were narrow-minded, ignorant and reactionary, but clever intriguers and courtiers who did not want to bother themselves with the work of real government, which, by the way, includes reforms. The inability or ability to govern is especially pronounced in such difficult periods as the war: the reign of Nicholas II brought the country to the brink of the abyss twice during the wars.
The situation with "stupidity and betrayal" that Milyukov spoke of was real. Social forces demanded and needed a change in the state of the Russian Empire, but the supreme power did not understand and did not notice this. Another thing is that Milyukov himself, a supporter of the English system of government, where the king was a nominal figure in government, did not fully realize how much the old system could not be repaired and what the new one would be like.
Oracle or petrel?
So, we have come to the third question of the theorem: is the action of “petrels” and the like in the period of complex political vicissitudes of history legitimate from the point of view of morality? Especially in the face of an exacerbated external threat?
The leader of the monarchists, V. M. Purishkevich, speaking from the rostrum of the State Duma at the same time as P. Milyukov, in November 1916, said:
“It is necessary that from now on Rasputin’s recommendation will not be enough to appoint the most vile persons to the highest posts. Rasputin is now more dangerous than False Dmitry was once...
Lord ministers! If you are true patriots, go there, to the tsar's Headquarters, throw yourself at the feet of the tsar and ask to rid Russia of Rasputin and Rasputinists, great and small.
Lord ministers! If you are true patriots, go there, to the tsar's Headquarters, throw yourself at the feet of the tsar and ask to rid Russia of Rasputin and Rasputinists, great and small.
And the head of the right in the State Council, I. G. Shcheglovitov, described the government as follows:
“The paralytics of power are feebly, hesitantly, somehow reluctantly fighting the epileptics of the revolution.”
But no one wanted to listen to these warnings.
Throughout 1916, there was open talk that the tsar should be forced to abdicate; many of the participants in the "conspiracy" believed that the tsar should be killed. Even the assassination of Rasputin by aristocratic monarchists in December 1916 did not save either the tsar or, as it turned out, the monarchy.
Protopresbyter of the Russian Army G. I. Shavelsky wrote:
“From many hints and statements, I could guess that even such prominent generals as Alekseev, Brusilov and Ruzsky belong to the conspirators against the last tsar, or at least to people who sympathize with the conspiracy. In connection with these conspiracies, General Krymov, who commanded the cavalry corps, was also named.
It was rumored that members of the State Duma were joining the conspirators.
The conspiracy was finally made known to Palaiologos and George Buchanan, the French and British ambassadors.
It was rather vaguely reported about some two circles plotting the forced abdication of the tsar.
There was also talk of capturing a special train on the road between Headquarters and Tsarskoye Selo, in which the sovereign traveled to Mogilev.
Some of the "know-it-alls", who were always decent in the highest headquarters and in the Headquarters, argued that among the conspirators there was a dispute whether to destroy only the empress, hated by everyone, or at the same time the autocrat himself.
It was rumored that members of the State Duma were joining the conspirators.
The conspiracy was finally made known to Palaiologos and George Buchanan, the French and British ambassadors.
It was rather vaguely reported about some two circles plotting the forced abdication of the tsar.
There was also talk of capturing a special train on the road between Headquarters and Tsarskoye Selo, in which the sovereign traveled to Mogilev.
Some of the "know-it-alls", who were always decent in the highest headquarters and in the Headquarters, argued that among the conspirators there was a dispute whether to destroy only the empress, hated by everyone, or at the same time the autocrat himself.
General A. A. Brusilov in 1916, expressing the opinion of many generals, asked the Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich to influence the emperor, with the aim of political concessions and reforms in the country.
The February Revolution of 1917 began after workers' demonstrations, with a soldiers' revolt. It was the rebellion that provided the revolution with the strength that it could not have in the capital.
The soldier's mutiny of February 1917 would have had no consequences if the active army had been used against it. The governor of Petrograd, General S. S. Khabalov, did not take any effective means against the soldiers' unrest, taking a wait-and-see attitude.
Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander General of Infantry M. V. Alekseev (participant of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878 and future leader of the White movement), instead of sending loyal units to suppress the uprising and support the monarch, “asks” for an opinion on the abdication of the emperor all front commanders, accompanying the “request” with a telegram with the following content:
“The situation, apparently, does not allow a different solution. It is necessary to save the active army from collapse; continue to the end the fight against the external enemy; save the independence of Russia and the fate of the dynasty."
The commanders confirmed that they agreed with the abdication. Against were Admiral Kolchak, General Yudenich, Count Keller and Khan Ali Hussein Nakhchivan.
Now there is a version that the king was forced to abdicate by the generals, by taking the royal family hostage. But it does not answer the main question of renunciation - why? What was completely obvious to the tsarist generals at the historical moment - it was impossible to win the war with such a tsar!
And on March 8 (21), 1917, Infantry General L. G. Kornilov personally arrested Empress Alexandra Feodorovna and the emperor’s family, calling the queen a “citizen”. To the proposal in June 1917 to restore the monarchy in Russia, the future creator of the White movement replied that
"He will not go on any adventure with the Romanovs."
“Would you have listened to the Magus, nailed another shield to the gates of Tsaregrad?”
So, throughout the history of mankind, sorcerers, oracles, elders, orators and politicians, in a time of terrible trials for their country or their people and state, raised similar questions, and regardless of how the further fate of their states developed, these people warned of a storm.
Laocoön and Hannibal, Cicero, Machiavelli and Dimitrov before the Nazi court, many like them, who warned of impending troubles - were their speeches and opinions superfluous? And if their opinion had not been neglected, maybe the whole history of their countries and peoples would have gone differently?
There is an opinion that such speeches are necessary. This is what "Milyukov's theorem" is about.
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