"Shaheds" over Russia: how to deal with them
To begin with, the authors had no doubt that sooner or later (but rather sooner) “greetings” from Ukraine would fly towards Russia. And what happened in Sevastopol confirmed this, so now it is worth working out this issue even deeper.
Now, when materials have surfaced that Iranian developments in the field of UAVs are based on Ukrainian materials transferred in circumvention of all the sanctions imposed on Iran, which is also not in doubt, since Ukrainians will sell anything for the appropriate money, somehow one has to doubt that Ukrainian engineers will be able to use their Shaheda, which in the last article ( link) we called it "Periwinkle".
Ukrainians will be able to, and Europe will help them once again. The Germans will no doubt give the engines from which the Chinese and Iranians copied their engines for UAVs. Air defense systems and howitzers give, and such a trifle ...
So it will fly to us, there is no doubt. And it will obviously fly further than the cities of the Kursk and Belgorod regions, fortunately, there are targets and fatter. We here at home understand that a drone bomb capable of flying along the coordinates of 400 km - and we have it with a guarantee, because there are about 300 km from the border to the center of Voronezh.
And here a question that is essentially difficult arises: how to detect this muck, given that the only thing that can give at least some clue is an engine 30x30x40 cm in size with a corresponding thermal image?
In the photo you can understand the dimensions of the same Limbach L550E, the ancestor of Iranian and Chinese engines for drones.
Radar station. Very difficult. Plastic and a minimum of metal in the design of the UAV make it virtually invisible in the radio range. Of course, with a clear beam hit, the engine will give an answer, but here is the question of the selective sensitivity of the radar, which can easily take such a weak signal for interference. Moreover, there is more than enough interference during the operation of the radar.
visual observation. It is good only in the final phase of the flight of the strike UAV, when it descends when approaching the target. As the practice of Ukraine shows, it is useless to shoot at a drone at this moment, since even if it is shot down, it causes decent damage to civilian infrastructure located in the vicinity of the target.
And for almost the entire flight, the UAV goes at a height inaccessible to visual detection. Of course, if you use strong optics and great luck, you will be able to detect it, in much the same way you can detect a flying device from a helicopter and an airplane. But the probability is extremely small.
Thermal imager. It is more interesting here, because the air at an altitude of 2-4 thousand meters is colder than near the ground and the thermal imaging picture can be quite clear. The issue of sensitivity and range of the thermal imager.
The ones that stand on tanks and helicopters, in principle, can illuminate UAVs, the question is probably at what distance they can confidently do this. We think about a kilometer, no more. Everything will really depend on the temperature and humidity of the air.
Naturally, we are talking about stationary systems placed on mobile platforms (car, helicopter, armored base) with forced cooling of the matrix. But even such a system cannot work continuously, it requires a shutdown for 1 hour for every 6 hours of operation. In addition, such a thermal imager cannot be brought into combat mode instantly, it takes 8-10 minutes to “warm up”.
It turns out that the thermal imager is good as an accurate guidance system at close range. But we have a question about how to detect drones not at close range, when you can only shoot from a personal weapons, but on the way.
And here in our heads (three at once, which excludes the option of clouding our minds), a plan was born, according to which it is worth looking back into the experience of the Second World War.
Yes, VNOS. The same system of air surveillance, warning and communications, which worked quite successfully in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War in terms of combating Luftwaffe raids.
Go to history, without it in any way.
The main element of the VNOS service, regardless of its combat use, was the NP, an observation post, the calculation of which consisted of seven people: a commander, a deputy and several observers. Before the advent of the radar, binoculars served as technical means of observation and ... yes, we hinted about this. Sound pickups.
After all, judge for yourself, the design of the UAV has reached the point that it is really difficult to detect it with either a radar or a thermal imager. But no one canceled the sound of a running engine! Yes, this is not the same engine as those on the Junkers, but when it works, it makes a sound that, by the way, is easy to identify. "Moped".
And modern means of capturing sound, as it were, slightly completely, but ahead of the technique of almost a century ago. There is something to push off.
The modern VNOS post will definitely differ from the one a century ago. Then all the armament of the post consisted of a sound detector and a semi-electronic corrector, which made it possible to process the received sound signal and issue some settings based on the received data.
In general, with the help of these mouthpieces and boxes with indicators, the fighters of the VNOS post could perform miracles, which were called combat duties:
- detection of aircraft in the sky by sound;
- identification (an experienced fighter could even determine the brand of the aircraft by sound);
- determination of the number of aircraft (very approximately 1-2-10, but could);
- determination of the flight direction;
- determination of flight altitude.
By sound, with the help of all this primitive that we see in old photos. Direction and height were determined using the same electronic devices that simply measured the sound strength.
VNOS posts were effective not only conditionally, but approximately effective. An observer by the sound of the engines could detect the aircraft in good weather and in the absence of additional sources of noise at a distance of up to 10 km. It is clear that in the event of bad weather and the noise of the same rain, the detection distance dropped sharply.
If we talk about optical detection methods (binoculars or a stereo tube), they could at best provide a detection distance of up to 5 km.
So when we are talking about the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, then yes, until more or less decent radars appeared, it was possible to detect enemy aircraft at night or in low clouds and fog only by sound.
But even with the most thorough training and training of the personnel of the NP VNOS, he (the personnel) needed, under favorable conditions, a relatively low flight speed (up to 450 km / h) and an average altitude (less than 7000 meters) about 2-3 minutes to to define all target parameters. And at night, in fog or low cloud cover, in the case of aircraft flying at high altitude, the calculation of the OP, at best, could only approximately indicate that at such and such a time several aircraft were flying over the NP VNOS.
In our time, the technical means that can be used for listening are significantly superior to those that were at the disposal of the VNOS fighters 80 years ago. This is clear and understandable, it remains only to put the engineers behind the topic and give them the opportunity to solve it. Sound pickup equipment on a mobile base is not so difficult.
Moreover, here you can even give a hint from the present.
One of the units of the NM of the LPR implemented a very interesting project with the help of volunteers: communication between all units of the regiment using repeaters. What's new, you say? What is new is that the repeaters were made “from dung and sticks,” as they say, that is, from improvised materials that could be obtained. The highlight of the placement was that the repeaters themselves were raised to a height of 200-300 meters above the ground with the help of balloons from weather balloons.
One of the authors also participated a little in the development of this project, in fact, it turned out pretty well. Even better than expected. The ball, by the way, at such a height is almost invisible from a distance of a couple of kilometers, so the system works without loss. We omit the rest of the details, because they are redundant here.
But the very principle of raising sensitive equipment up, away from the earth with its noise, there is something reasonable in it. Moreover, the existing wireless data transmission systems make it possible to do without bulky coils of wires.
Sound detection systems connected to modern computers, with programs that can "remember" the sound of the UAV and distinguish it from the general sound background - this is actually not so difficult. All this is already there and you won’t have to invent a tank.
The task of creating such wiretapping complexes is not a super task for normal modern engineers, if we still have such. It's just a task, nothing more.
We'll have to think about what to shoot down.
Here, the main problem is that along the route, any strike UAV does not go at low level, but at a comfortable and safe height of 2-3 km, where it is not visible and not really heard. And it descends to a lower height just before the attack of the target.
When it comes to the final part of the UAV flight, when the height allows the use of MZA (small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery), then everything is clear. Ukrainians shot down drones with the help of ZSU-23-2, and with the help of small arms.
In our case, the good old "Shilki" are simply beautiful with their ability to sow space with 23 mm cucumbers. Naval AK-630s can look pretty good. The essence is the same - sowing with shells the area where the UAV was spotted.
However, the 20-30 mm projectile has a number of disadvantages, such as the fact that it does not have a remote fuse once and explodes on contact with the target once and twice - such a projectile is clearly too big for such a small target.
And then it makes direct sense to recall how, in general, the air defense of different countries fought against aviation enemy. This, of course, is not about the United States, but in the USSR, Germany and Great Britain, air defense had to work from the heart.
How to shoot down a WWII bomber? Of course, a fighter or an anti-aircraft gun. How did the anti-aircraft guns of the air defense system of the same Germany work when armadas of allied bombers in the amount of 500 to 1000 units flew into the country? Yes, and at an altitude of 8 km and above?
Naturally, guided by the radar data, the German anti-aircraft gunners put up a barrier in the way of the bombers. Hundreds of barrels fired thousands of shells where the planes were flying. That's right, not by planes, but to where they flew. Approximately to the point that was calculated and approximately at that height.
No one talked about the fact that an anti-aircraft projectile can hit an aircraft flying at an altitude of 8 meters at a speed of 000 km / h. It happened, but rarely. Basically, the crews suffered losses, and the equipment of the aircraft failed due to fragments that pierced the skin, tore wires and pipelines with fuel, disabled hydraulic systems, and so on.
So really, fragments and striking elements such as arrows or shrapnel. Arrows have not proven themselves so well, today it is a method of dealing with modern aircraft, but the old proven shrapnel is a topic, in our opinion.
Let's look at the 76,2x558R shrapnel projectile for the anti-aircraft gun of the 1931/38 model, which is "3-K".
A projectile weighing 6,3-6,5 kg rose to a height of 1 to 9 km and exploded there, forming about a hundred steel or cast-iron fragments from the shell weighing more than 5 grams and throwing out 260 steel shrapnel bullets, weighing 10,7 grams each, along with fragments . 458 grams of explosive ensured the spread of fragments and shrapnel within a radius of up to 100 meters or more.
The fact that the height of the shell burst could be set, albeit approximately, everyone knows. The same "tube ...", which ensured the detonation of the projectile at a given height.
Antiquity? Quite yes. But a radio fuse that received a signal reflected from the target being attacked and explodes as close as possible to it is not suitable here. Nothing to reflect.
But a primitive projectile from the period of the beginning of the Second World War will look quite interesting here.
What is known? Approximate height and speed of the target. The initial speed of the projectile is known, there are tables according to which the delay time of the projectile fuse is set. By turning a special key on the body of the projectile, the height of the gap (the adjusting ring was twisted) of the warhead was set. At the bottom of the projectile there was something like a groove filled with a combustible composition, which, in fact, slowed down the burst of the projectile by its burning.
The turn of the ring set the place of ignition of the fire mixture after the shot, that is, how long this track would burn, from a second to ten, roughly speaking.
Why so detailed? Just for understanding: a very simple and dumb system. No locators, no radar or barometric sensors. But this simplicity will make it possible to fill up with fragments a certain sector of space, to which aircraft or UAVs are approaching in our particular case.
Considering that one 3-K 76-mm gun fired up to 20 (actually 14-15) rounds per minute, a battery of four guns in barrage mode could fire 60 rounds. This is 6000 fragments and 15600 shrapnel bullets. The only question is which sector in length and height these guns will cover. That is, it is a question of training and training of calculations.
Moreover, the old projectile doesn’t really care about electronic warfare and other tricks of our time. It flies while the retarder in the bottom burns. Then everything, the gap and the striking elements flew. The sector in the sky is simply covered with small metal balls and fragments, making it very difficult for these drones to fly through it.
Quite a viable option.
If someone (and there will certainly be such) says that this is unscientific fantastic nonsense, well, we will object.
Some six months ago, we were all sure that the latest equipment would work on the battlefield for Ukraine. All these “analogues” of ours that were shown to us at parades and told how cool and fancy they were.
But in fact, moreover, on both sides, we are seeing frank junk half a century ago. We have the T-62, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have the T-55M (Macedonia supplied), the BMP-1, the S-57 60-mm artillery system both here and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the same ancient Gepards sent to the Ukrainians ...
All according to the canons. The cheaper the better.
But in our case, cheapness does not play such a role. In our case, the very possibility of setting barrage fire when enemy drones approach is just interesting.
Another question is where to get guns and shells? Even if the principle is quite self-explanatory, it must be supported precisely by the presence of barrels and shells for them. And also to train people in all anti-aircraft artillery kitchen.
For starters, it would be nice to delve into long-term storage warehouses. There are a lot of things there for a long time, and anti-aircraft guns can be found. S-60s and shells for them were found.
The idea seems to be a good one.
However, if someone else has opinions on how to defeat shahid-like devices, then you have the floor.
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