Why was the modernization of the Russian army slowed down?
Modernization of the Russian army remains the subject of heated debate. On the one hand, there are people who are convinced that the unprecedented funding allocated for the renewal of the country's military-technical potential and a sharp increase in the monetary allowance of military personnel is an unbearable burden for the Russian budget. On the other hand, there are people who directly link the degree of quality of the country's defense with material investments in this industry.
One of the most active supporters of the idea that today has not yet come to modernize the Russian army on a serious scale was and continues to be former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, who is confident that reform plans for the Armed Forces should be supported by sustainable economic growth. Kudrin himself at one time repeatedly expressed the idea that a trillion-dollar investment in the modernization of the Russian army could literally bury the Russian economy. It is this position and the rather open criticism of the actions of top Russian leaders that served as the reasons for dismissing Mr. Kudrin from his post.
Yesterday, the “Military Review” started talking about the activities of Alexei Kudrin at the present time, about ordering some strange sociological study of revolutionary sentiments in Russian society, and some readers said they did not see a reason to consider the activities of Mr. Kudrin’s personality. The opinion, of course, is interesting, but it is difficult to call it constructive. Why? Because recently there has been noticeable activity on the part of the former Minister of Finance, who outwardly occupies a political niche, thanks to which he is seen by many as a possible “returnee” to one or another segment of the Russian government. In other words, in one form or another, Aleksey Leonidovich, who in certain circles was called, almost, not a financial guru, could return to the slopes of the political Olympus.
If so, then what can such a “comeback” turn out to be for Russia as a whole and the modernization aspirations of the authorities in terms of the development of the Russian army in particular. The fact is that Kudrin is not just an economist who is separately pulled from some political context. By the word "Kudrin" one should understand the collective image of an economic specialist, who for a long time held in his hands the levers of regulation of the financial system. For several years, this “collective image” led the Russian economy according to one scenario: no matter what positive tectonic shifts were observed in the Russian financial crust, the Kudrinsky economists called for budget funds to be received in tangible amounts in a stabilization fund. It would seem that a good thing: the economic safety cushion should certainly play a positive role for Russia in the case of new waves of acute financial crises. However, the problem is that these same economists, by some strange coincidence, formed the very “safety cushion” for an overwhelmingly large percentage of foreign currencies (dollar and euro). At the same time, in the pre-crisis period (2006-2007), when replenishments to the state treasury reached truly impressive values, Kudrinsky economists continued to fill the Stabilization Fund with banknotes, which in large quantities in unsubstantiated form, issued printing presses in the European Union and the USA.
Advisor to the President of Russia Sergey Glazyev says that when the Minister of Finance Kudrin himself was asked why the Stabilization Fund is, in fact, an investment in the American economy, he replied about the following: expert consultants are convinced that the dollar is a reliable investment. In this answer, at least two positions are surprising: what kind of consultants are we talking about, and how could you trust investments in the American financial system when the famous epic of cracks in the US banking and insurance sectors began, when mortgage lending in the States began to fall on its side. It turns out that either Kudrin did not take any decisions himself, but listened to instructions from some external experts, or, if he did, then, for some reason, it was in the direction of the greatest losses for the Russian economy. By the way, the same Sergey Glazyev answers this question. In his opinion, Kudrin at that time was the best finance minister in Russia from the point of view of the United States of America.
Still would! It turns out that those funds that could be used for the pre-crisis ruble strengthening were used for dubious operations to invest in the American economy. It is obvious that in the United States they applauded the actions of Kudrin economists, who by all means tried to slow down the military modernization of the country. Let's not forget that such activity of the “best finance minister” was observed at the very moment when the steel democratic skating rink began its “triumphal” asphalt paving in the expanses of North Africa and the Middle East.
By the way, the words of the ex-minister himself in terms of financing the modernization of the army:
The choice of the tactical direction of modernization of the armed forces is advisable only if there are obvious military threats in the short term (we get a quick, but relatively short-term effect). In this case, the reform of the army should be directly focused on preparing for confrontation with a specific adversary, in a particular theater of military operations.
It is obvious that the former minister by all means made it clear that Russia at this stage has no enemies. Agree that it is very much like the theses of the early Yeltsin era, when nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, small weapon, and enriched uranium straight distilled in the United States, since "there were only friends around". At the same time, the Chechen campaign showed that with the complete dismantling of the army, they were clearly in a hurry ... So why attack the same rake again? Economy and security are not always one field of berries. The situation in the once stable Libya confirms this.
The thought arises that the “Kudrintsev” case was an artificial inhibition of the declared army modernization, so that suddenly the Russian army would not stand in the way of total democratization in an American way. In general, Mr. Minister really did everything that the "consultants" demanded from him, but only, obviously, neither he nor the "consultants" could have imagined that the "best minister" would soon be unemployed ...
For obvious reasons, for the same West, Kudrin in the role of an oppositionist is not as interesting as in the role of a person in whose hands are the financial levers of a huge country. That is why Alexey Leonidovich, only briefly appeared among such zealots of opposition views as Messrs. Navalny, Nemtsov, Kasparov, Udaltsov and others. That is why recently Kudrin himself makes it clear that he is ready to return to power, but if this power does not have his main offender, Dmitry Medvedev ...
And if it comes back, then we can expect the final transformation of the economy exclusively into the petrodollar field, from which any, even the most urgent state project, if financed, will be only in the amount that will suit the western “consultants”. And if today there is a certain reform reform slip in terms of financing the modernization of the army, then when you return to the “Kudrinsky” model of the economy, you will have to put a cross on the reform in general.
Materials used:
http://moment-istini.ru/program_archiv/?vid=377&start=5
http://www.slideshare.net/gaidar_fund/ss-13074387
One of the most active supporters of the idea that today has not yet come to modernize the Russian army on a serious scale was and continues to be former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, who is confident that reform plans for the Armed Forces should be supported by sustainable economic growth. Kudrin himself at one time repeatedly expressed the idea that a trillion-dollar investment in the modernization of the Russian army could literally bury the Russian economy. It is this position and the rather open criticism of the actions of top Russian leaders that served as the reasons for dismissing Mr. Kudrin from his post.
Yesterday, the “Military Review” started talking about the activities of Alexei Kudrin at the present time, about ordering some strange sociological study of revolutionary sentiments in Russian society, and some readers said they did not see a reason to consider the activities of Mr. Kudrin’s personality. The opinion, of course, is interesting, but it is difficult to call it constructive. Why? Because recently there has been noticeable activity on the part of the former Minister of Finance, who outwardly occupies a political niche, thanks to which he is seen by many as a possible “returnee” to one or another segment of the Russian government. In other words, in one form or another, Aleksey Leonidovich, who in certain circles was called, almost, not a financial guru, could return to the slopes of the political Olympus.
If so, then what can such a “comeback” turn out to be for Russia as a whole and the modernization aspirations of the authorities in terms of the development of the Russian army in particular. The fact is that Kudrin is not just an economist who is separately pulled from some political context. By the word "Kudrin" one should understand the collective image of an economic specialist, who for a long time held in his hands the levers of regulation of the financial system. For several years, this “collective image” led the Russian economy according to one scenario: no matter what positive tectonic shifts were observed in the Russian financial crust, the Kudrinsky economists called for budget funds to be received in tangible amounts in a stabilization fund. It would seem that a good thing: the economic safety cushion should certainly play a positive role for Russia in the case of new waves of acute financial crises. However, the problem is that these same economists, by some strange coincidence, formed the very “safety cushion” for an overwhelmingly large percentage of foreign currencies (dollar and euro). At the same time, in the pre-crisis period (2006-2007), when replenishments to the state treasury reached truly impressive values, Kudrinsky economists continued to fill the Stabilization Fund with banknotes, which in large quantities in unsubstantiated form, issued printing presses in the European Union and the USA.
Advisor to the President of Russia Sergey Glazyev says that when the Minister of Finance Kudrin himself was asked why the Stabilization Fund is, in fact, an investment in the American economy, he replied about the following: expert consultants are convinced that the dollar is a reliable investment. In this answer, at least two positions are surprising: what kind of consultants are we talking about, and how could you trust investments in the American financial system when the famous epic of cracks in the US banking and insurance sectors began, when mortgage lending in the States began to fall on its side. It turns out that either Kudrin did not take any decisions himself, but listened to instructions from some external experts, or, if he did, then, for some reason, it was in the direction of the greatest losses for the Russian economy. By the way, the same Sergey Glazyev answers this question. In his opinion, Kudrin at that time was the best finance minister in Russia from the point of view of the United States of America.
Still would! It turns out that those funds that could be used for the pre-crisis ruble strengthening were used for dubious operations to invest in the American economy. It is obvious that in the United States they applauded the actions of Kudrin economists, who by all means tried to slow down the military modernization of the country. Let's not forget that such activity of the “best finance minister” was observed at the very moment when the steel democratic skating rink began its “triumphal” asphalt paving in the expanses of North Africa and the Middle East.
By the way, the words of the ex-minister himself in terms of financing the modernization of the army:
The choice of the tactical direction of modernization of the armed forces is advisable only if there are obvious military threats in the short term (we get a quick, but relatively short-term effect). In this case, the reform of the army should be directly focused on preparing for confrontation with a specific adversary, in a particular theater of military operations.
It is obvious that the former minister by all means made it clear that Russia at this stage has no enemies. Agree that it is very much like the theses of the early Yeltsin era, when nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, small weapon, and enriched uranium straight distilled in the United States, since "there were only friends around". At the same time, the Chechen campaign showed that with the complete dismantling of the army, they were clearly in a hurry ... So why attack the same rake again? Economy and security are not always one field of berries. The situation in the once stable Libya confirms this.
The thought arises that the “Kudrintsev” case was an artificial inhibition of the declared army modernization, so that suddenly the Russian army would not stand in the way of total democratization in an American way. In general, Mr. Minister really did everything that the "consultants" demanded from him, but only, obviously, neither he nor the "consultants" could have imagined that the "best minister" would soon be unemployed ...
For obvious reasons, for the same West, Kudrin in the role of an oppositionist is not as interesting as in the role of a person in whose hands are the financial levers of a huge country. That is why Alexey Leonidovich, only briefly appeared among such zealots of opposition views as Messrs. Navalny, Nemtsov, Kasparov, Udaltsov and others. That is why recently Kudrin himself makes it clear that he is ready to return to power, but if this power does not have his main offender, Dmitry Medvedev ...
And if it comes back, then we can expect the final transformation of the economy exclusively into the petrodollar field, from which any, even the most urgent state project, if financed, will be only in the amount that will suit the western “consultants”. And if today there is a certain reform reform slip in terms of financing the modernization of the army, then when you return to the “Kudrinsky” model of the economy, you will have to put a cross on the reform in general.
Materials used:
http://moment-istini.ru/program_archiv/?vid=377&start=5
http://www.slideshare.net/gaidar_fund/ss-13074387
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