Military Review

Fifth Panjsher. May 1982

12 June1982, when the 177-th separate special purpose detachment of GRU GSH entered the village of Ruh in the Panjshir Valley, ended a large-scale operation against the detachments of the famous field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. The operation, which was carried out by the forces of the Soviet 40 Army and AF DRA, according to experts, and the Mujahideen themselves, became one of the most successful in the Afghan war for the Soviet troops, receiving the name of the “Fifth Panjshir”.

Fifth Panjsher. May 1982

Despite the fact that by the beginning of 1982 the number of OKSVA reached more than 85 thousand people and at its disposal was about 600 tanks, 1500 infantry fighting vehicles, 2900 armored personnel carriers, about 400 planes and helicopters, 500 guns, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, only 3 thousand people were killed. At the same time, OKSVA controlled practically all large cities, airfields and highways, 862 outposts were created, on which more than 40 thousand contingent troops served.

It became increasingly obvious for the Soviet command that it would not be possible for the 40 army to defeat the Mujahideen in a short time. A new approach was needed, new forms of fighting the enemy in the high mountains. First of all, it was necessary to destroy the basic areas of the opposition. According to the method of organization and implementation of such operations were the most complex and not always effective. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership, who had no opportunity to influence the military-strategic situation in the country in a different way, placed emphasis on their conduct. The fact is that in Afghanistan, the struggle was conducted by scattered Islamist parties, groups and detachments, which led to the emergence of a special category of field commanders on the ground who controlled certain zones and gained considerable weight and influence among the local population.

One of these field commanders was Ahmad Shah, nicknamed Masood, which means “happy”. Subsequently, he became a national hero of Afghanistan. Having managed to strengthen in the valley of the Panjsher River with the support of local Tajiks, Masud created practically his own mountain republic. From the very beginning of the entry of the Soviet troops, its detachments committed sabotage and bombarded the strategic highway Termez-Kabul and the Salang Pass, which are important for the 40 Army. In 1980 – 1981 Four military operations were carried out against Ahmad Shah, but they did not achieve their goals.

Order: Hack Panjshir

The Panjsher Valley (about 250 km in length) was the connecting link of northeastern Afghanistan with Pakistan. The defense of the Mujahideen in the valley was made up of individual strongholds on the dominant heights, in the gorges, in the fortresses. As a rule, the stronghold had up to 20 fighters and several firing points. The whole valley was prepared in engineering. There was practically no free space through which troops could move freely. The whole area was sweeping, and from different levels and directions. Especially skillfully was organized by the air defense system - 120 machine guns DShK throughout the depth of Panjshir. Carefully disguised air defense weapons were located near crevices, caves. Highly located caves were used to shelter the population and outgoing militant groups. There were also warehouses weapons, ammunition, food. All this allowed the rebels to fully control the valley area.

Preparations for the operation began at the end of April 1982, with a scrupulous study of the area of ​​upcoming actions. Within ten days, aerial photography was taken about 2 thousand square meters. km of the Panjshera valley, the Shahran region and adjacent parts of the terrain. As a result, 95 detachments and groups of Mujahideen numbering up to 3 thousand people, 16 Islamic committees, about 100 air defense guns, two centers for the preparation of reserves and many warehouses were found.

Major-General N. G. Ter-Grigoryants, Chief of Staff of the 40 Army, was appointed head of the operation. The army commander, Major-General V. F. Ermakov, had just arrived in Afghanistan and had not yet had any combat experience. General leadership was entrusted to the commander of the Turkestan Military District, Colonel-General Yu. P. Maksimov, and the task force of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan assumed the coordination of the actions of the Soviet and government forces.

Main strike with support aviation and artillery was supposed to inflict in the direction of Rukh, Pasi Shahi-Mardan along the Panjshir river valley, and the second, distracting blow, on the Gorband valley in the direction of Jabal-us-Siraj, Bamyan.

To dismember the Mujahideen defense system, it was planned to land tactical airborne assault forces on the 20 Soviet and Afghan battalions in three zones in the Panjsher valley in order to tear the defense apart, deprive it of solidity and crush the enemy alternately, with simultaneous actions of 108 units along the river valley. By the third or fourth day of the operation, with the support of aviation, it was planned to complete the destruction of the identified insurgent formations in the three zones of the Panjshir valley.

To participate in the operation from OXVA, units of the 108, 201 of the motorized rifle divisions and 103 of the airborne divisions, 66 of the separate motorized rifle brigade, 191 and 860 of the individual motorized rifle and 345 of the separate parachute regiment were involved. . The Afghan army allocated units of three infantry divisions, the Commandos brigade, a separate regiment, and Tsaranda and Hud units.

In total, about 12 thousand people were to be involved in the operation, of which 4 thousand 200 were involved in tactical airborne assault forces. A total of 36 battalions (20 Afghan and 16 Soviet) were involved, more than 320 units of armored vehicles: tanks (BMP, BTR), 155 guns and mortars, 137 helicopters, 26 aircraft. For purposes of secrecy and secrecy, the plan of the operation was developed only by people from the headquarters of the 40 Army.

In order to mislead the enemy, a plan was discussed, according to which hostilities were envisaged in the direction of the Gorband Gorge (in the opposite direction from Panjshir). The name “Panjsher” was forbidden to be used even in conversations, and on all plans and documents Panjshir was replaced by Bamian.

In order to disorient the enemy, demonstrative distracting actions were carried out: concentration of troops at the entrance to the Gorband valley, powerful air strikes and artillery in the direction of Bamiyan. The rebels began to transfer additional forces to Gorband from adjacent areas, including from Panjshir.

Meanwhile, at the headquarters of the 40 Army, the commanders of the armed forces, the chiefs of services, the commanders of the formations, units and divisions, the officers of the operational groups, the participants in the upcoming actions were preparing for the operation, studying the plan for the upcoming military operations, the combat missions, the order of operations of the troops in the operation. On a large-scale model of the terrain, interaction between the formations, units of the armed forces, special forces and the air force of the army was worked out.

Depending on the height of the landing sites above sea level, they were divided into four categories. Eighth Mi-1500 helicopters could deliver eight people onboard to the first category up to 8 m, seven more onboard the second (over 1500 and up to 1800 m), five on the third platform (over 1800 and up to 2000 m) - on the fourth ( over 2000 m) - only four people. Especially carefully prepared servicemen belonging to the landed groups. They were equipped in accordance with the “Instructions for equipping paratroopers” prepared in advance by the army headquarters. According to the plan of training, tactical tactical exercises, combat shooting exercises, helicopter landing and disembarkation exercises, and integrated staff radio training in the army-division-regiment-battalion division were conducted in units.

From 5 to 10, aerial reconnaissance was organized in May with the participation of key officials of the formations and units involved in the operation.
By the end of May NUMX, the airborne units from Kabul, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Kunduz focused on the Bagram airfield, and the command post of the operational group of the 15 Army was also located there. Part of the 40-th MSD took positions at the entrance to the gorge in the area of ​​Jabal, Ussarj and Charikar.
15 – 16 In May, parts of the 350 paradigm 103 VDD began to carry out distracting activities in the valley of the Gorband River.

Lead May. Storming Panjshira

On the night of May 16, eleven reconnaissance companies almost without a fight captured all the main dominant heights at the entrance to the Panjsher Valley. The next night, the 3 battalion of the 177-th MRP, together with the reconnaissance units, captured important heights to a depth of 10 km from the entrance to the valley and entrenched themselves on them, forming the forward bridgehead.

On May 2, 17, two hours before dawn, the formation commanders brought the task of fighting in Panjshir to the Afghan forces. From 4 hours of the morning according to the combat plan, after powerful air strikes and artillery fire of the part of the 108 division, they launched an offensive. The 180 and 181 battalion battalions advanced on foot in altitude to the left and right of Panjshir at a distance of 5 km from the center of the valley under cover of armored vehicles.

In 5, one battalion from the 191-th Omsp and 14-th PD were landed as assault forces in the areas of Ruhi and Marishtany. Part of the troops were fixed on the heights captured from the enemy, and the main forces blocked the settlements. Taken aback the enemy sought to slip out of the encirclement, even engaging in melee fights. In the Ruhi area, there was considerable resistance to the landing. In the first minutes of the landing, two Mi-8 mt helicopters, Major Yu. Grudinkin and Captain A. Sadokhin, were shot down, five helicopters were damaged. 14 pilots and paratroopers were killed, 13 was injured, among them the chief air officer of the 40 Army, Lieutenant Colonel K. Shevelev was killed.

Part of 108-th MSD, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the rebels, continued to move forward. The fighters with fire of all available means suppressed the firing points and ensured the actions of the detachment to ensure movement of the division. The speed of advance of the Ltd. on mined areas with debris and destruction was low and did not exceed 2 km / h. Because of this, the speed of the advance of the avant-garde and the column of the main forces on the first day averaged 1 – 2 km / h.

The reinforced 2 battalion of the 180 squadron (commander — Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain R. S. Aushev), acting as an advance detachment of the division, began to move forward rapidly in the direction of Ruhi, Bazarak under the cover of 177 battalions, 180 th and 181 th mas, operating on the flanks. He was able, with the support of aviation and artillery, to capture all the dominant heights and for three days to repel the attacks of the Mujahideen, ensuring the landing of assault forces. With the onset of darkness, the Mujahideen repeatedly tried to storm the heights, turning into counterattacks in large groups, shouting at the same time Islamic spells.

After the firing of the landing sites, six more battalions landed during the first day of operation in four zones to a depth of 40 to 100 (two MSNs of 191, OMSB, 66, IIB, two 14 units, 11, XB front, a total of over 1200 people). On the second day - four more, on the third - two, on the fourth - two. Successful operations of the paratroopers contributed to the advance of ground forces on Anavu in three directions: along the only road along the riverbed and along the mountain gorges from the north and south.

The troops seized the gorges, as a rule, on foot, after which an armored group was introduced there, moving along the bed of a shallow river or along a roadside. The resistance of the enemy was suppressed by helicopters, artillery and mortar fire. At the same time, the subunits created a fire bag by traversing the crests of heights.

To increase efforts in the morning 18 in May in the area of ​​Mata were landed on one battalion from the Soviet and Afghan troops, who, having captured landing sites, rapidly moving to the heights, knocked the enemy down from the dominant heights and occupied them. By the evening of the same day, after four flights, army aviation landed four battalions in the third and then in the second zone, two of them Soviet and two Afghan, in total up to 1000 people. The troops captured a significant area by area, forming a wedge between the third and first zones, and thus prevented the enemy’s maneuver, which was already largely dismembered and began to lose control.

19 May landed two battalions of Soviet and Afghan troops in the area of ​​Astana and the same forces in the area of ​​Mata.

The next day, two Soviet and two Afghan battalions were landed at a depth of about 100 km from the entrance to the Panjshir Gorge. In total, thus, within four days, eighteen battalions were deployed to the enemy rear with the help of helicopters. But the enemy continued stubborn resistance and moved to a positional defense, focusing on maintaining the dominant heights. As the defense system was destroyed, the mojahedin also changed the tactics of the struggle, moving from defense to maneuvering actions and back. The Soviet and Afghan troops had to slowly drive out the enemy, while suffering heavy losses in manpower and especially in technology.

Only by May 21 did Soviet and Afghan troops reach the settlements of Mata and Pasi-Shahi-Mardan and join up with paratroopers. After the capture of the main road to the entire depth of the Panjsher Valley, armored groups could be entered on armored personnel carriers.

22 in May in the area of ​​Evim in 220 km from Bagram, a landing party (about 600 people) consisting of two battalions of Soviet and Afghan troops was landed on the site of the main junction of caravan roads from Pakistan, which supplied Panjshir with everything necessary. This landing was made possible by the flight of 32 helicopters commanded by Colonel V. Ye. Pavlov through the Hindu Kush ranges at an altitude of 4600 – 4700 m at the border of the extreme capabilities of the Mi-8 MT helicopter.

The landing of the battalions took place in extremely difficult conditions, under enemy fire.

The paratroopers, carrying with them three ammunition sets, within a day of the battle requested additional ammunition. Within three days, 30 helicopters, making three flights a day, sent about 180 tons of ammunition and 30 tons of food to the Evim area. With this intensity of flight, the pilots had to make up to 7 sorties per day, with a total 9 flight time for army and 4 hours for front-line aviation.

By May 24, Soviet troops managed to gain a foothold in the captured area and cut off the most important communications of the Mujahideen in the area of ​​Evim and Shahran.
As a result of the fighting in May 1982, the whole Panjsher valley was under the control of the Soviet and Afghan troops. In early June, the Soviet command began to withdraw troops to the points of permanent deployment. At some points of Panjshir, Afghan garrisons were abandoned.

For the fifth time conquered Panjshir

In 1982, the Soviet and Afghan forces succeeded in capturing the territory of the Panjshir Gorge with the involvement of great forces and at the cost of tremendous efforts.
The main control center and the base of Ahmad Shah Masud in the Parandekh gorge, the main Islamic committee of the Panjsher gorge, the provinces of Parwan and Kapisa, the combined headquarters of the zonal Islamic committees in Astana, the 10 headquarters of the zonal Islamic committees, a large number of ammunition, various weapons, equipment were destroyed. , warehouses, radio communications.

Many valuable documents fell into the hands of the winners: the program of the Mujahideen’s struggle against the Afghan and Soviet troops in the coming years; structural diagram of the leadership of the rebel movement; documents of combat groups operating on the Salang – Kabul route in the green zone of Parwan province; lists of persons subject to physical destruction in the “Center” zone; the 113 list of active members of the counter-revolutionary underground in Kabul; 5200 lists of members of the IOA party with photographs and questionnaires; diary of Ahmad Shah.

About 200 prisoners were also captured, and they were interrogated at the place of capture. Of these, more than 120 was interrogated, and 95 gave evidence that confirmed the presence of more than 200 objects.

To achieve success, Soviet troops relied on the sudden and massive use of assault forces, the rapid advance of troops along the valley, active operations of aviation and continuous support of artillery.

Thus, the aircraft carried out 5210 sorties with a total 5579 flight hours. In total, 10 549 aerial bombs and 61 297 NAR, 415 226 ammunition of all calibres, 559 missiles "Sturm B" were used during the operation. All the combat work of aviation took place with the powerful countering of the air defense of the Mujahideen, and in already liberated areas. May 27 during a strike on the target near the village of Avund was shot down by Captain A. Sribnoy's MiG-21 bis, May Captain V. Voitekhovich’s Mi-28 in the Ruhi area - May. A total of 24 aircraft and helicopters were damaged, i.e. more than 108%. Three helicopters and one aircraft were lost forever, and 80 helicopters and two aircraft suffered heavy damage.

During the operation, the 50 pilots of Colonel V.E. Pavlov and 27 Colonel V.S. Kota distinguished themselves especially by pilots.

The success of the entire operation was largely dependent on artillery. Each day of the fighting began with artillery preparation, which usually lasted 30 min. Each battalion was supported by fire from one or two artillery battalions. The ammunition consumption during the artillery preparation period was 200 – 600 projectiles per gun or mortar.

But the main burden of the operation was carried on their shoulders by units of motorized infantry and paratroopers. It was they who, under the most difficult conditions of the highlands, under constant enemy fire, often in the absence of water and food, acted decisively and effectively in the forward detachments and airborne assault forces.

Since the roads and the main directions were mined and covered with rebel fire, the unit commanders successfully used on foot along the ridges of heights and mountain slopes of motorized riflemen who imperceptibly advanced to the positions of the Mujahideen, used natural shelters, causing sudden blows. The 180 fighter squadron 108 MSD, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel E.V. Vysotsky, and 191 Omsp, commanded by the deputy commander for political affairs Major A.Ya. Oparin, distinguished here.

During the operation, landings were used as never before. Their total number was about 4200 people. The landing of the battalions took place in extremely difficult conditions, under enemy fire. The battalions landed in the mountains engaged in bloody battles with the Mujahideen, who often ended in melee. In these battles, the fighters of the 345 gv.opdp commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. V. Kuznetsov and 103 gv.vdd commanded by Major-General A. E. Slusar distinguished themselves.

But the rebels fought with bitterness. As the troops moved, the nature of their actions changed. The detachments successfully counterattacked in the most uncomfortable moments for the Soviet troops and in the most vulnerable areas. With the support of local residents, Ahmad Shah skillfully led the actions of his troops, timely maneuvering and removing them from the blows of the Soviet troops. Masterfully Ahmad Shah built a system of fire and engineering barriers at Panjshir. He knew the terrain well and made the most of the advantages of the mountains in building defense. Overcoming this defense, the Soviet troops lost 93 man killed and 343 wounded.

After the operation in Panjshir, Masood faced a great shortage of food, ammunition and equipment. He praised the actions of the Soviet troops. The following words belong to him: “If Allah wanted me to surrender to the vanquished, I would surrender only to the Russians.”

Immediately after the operation, the government of Karmal began to establish a new government in Panjshir, appointing its representatives to the so-called organdry of people's power in key posts. But over time, the rebels began to return to the Panjshir Valley, intending to continue their resistance. The garrisons of the Afghan troops and the new-power org. Of the new power stationed in the settlements in the north-east of the valley began to be attacked. Soon they were forced to leave the valley. In response, the Soviet command took an unprecedented step by deploying a separate special forces detachment of the GRU command in Panjshir under the command of Lieutenant Colonel B. Kerimbayev - Kara Major or the Black Major, as the Afghans called it. The 177 squad of June 12 of the year, which was introduced just six months ago, entered Afghanistan and started fighting immediately, seizing all the dominant heights ...

Punjsher after surgery

The Panjshir operation 1982 of the year was the quintessence of combat experience gained during two years of fighting in Afghanistan. It became clear that only a careful organization of the operation carried out over a large area and for a long time using a large number of forces and means can guarantee success. The experience of this operation was summarized and influenced the planning and combat use of the Soviet troops in further operations of the Afghan war. In the course of this operation, commanders, soldiers and sergeants, officers and generals of the 40 Army showed courage and bravery, heroism and self-sacrifice. Several thousand of them were awarded orders and medals, and to Colonel-General Yu. P. Maksimov, Colonels V. E. Pavlov, V. S. Kot, Lieutenant-Colonels E. V. Vysotsky, Yu. V. Kuznetsov, Major A. Ya. Oparin (posthumously) was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Major-Generals N. G. Ter-Grigoriants and A. E. Slyusar were honored with the Order of Lenin.

Ahmad Shah Masoud was forced in January 1983 to go to an armistice with the Soviet troops, which lasted until April 1984.

The Soviet command after this operation, on the one hand, focused on strengthening the firepower. So, already in the seventh 1984 operation of the year, 200 aircraft were used in Panjshir, including heavy bombers, 190 helicopters and 39 batteries. On the other hand, serious doubts arose about the effectiveness of large-scale operations in a territory with a hostile population.

Ahmad Shah concentrated all his efforts on combating the Karmal regime, on intensifying intelligence and introducing agents not only in the government and military Afghan structures, but also among Soviet military personnel. And although at least four major operations were still carried out against him, Ahmad Shah never again allowed himself to be taken by surprise and incur such losses as in May 1982.

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  1. mar.tira
    mar.tira 29 October 2012 09: 37
    Well, what did Masoud achieve? It was necessary to surrender. Although he would have been alive. And so they finished their own! So Allah needed it! We must answer for our blood!
  2. borisst64
    borisst64 29 October 2012 10: 23
    Amer weakly carry out such an operation!
  3. 8 company
    8 company 29 October 2012 10: 49
    It is interesting that during the Afghan war, attempts were repeatedly made to lure Ahmad Shah to our side, to make an ally, but he did not go for it. Only temporary truces were sought. And after our departure and the emergence of the Taliban, Ahmad Shah began to look like the only more or less sane political force capable of resisting the Taliban. And all the Pajjer operations of the Soviet Army did not lead to anything - as the Panjshir was under the control of the Akhmadshahists, it remained.
    1. Oles
      Oles 8 November 2012 20: 43
      that's right .. totally agree ...
  4. aksakal
    aksakal 29 October 2012 11: 01
    He praised the actions of the Soviet troops. Such words belong to him: “If Allah wanted me to surrender to the vanquished, I would surrender only to Russians.” - from the lips of a worthy adversary this is the highest praise. Those who came after the amer were not honored. Glory to the Soviet warriors.
    And in Afghanistan we did not lose. Just a treacherous solution to humpbacks. Sorry, the political vector of the USSR has changed. He began to move away from confrontation with the West, and if you move away from confrontation, go away to the end. That is, also withdraw troops from Afghanistan. That is, if Afghanistan was the defeat of the USSR, then this is nothing more than part of its more global defeat in the socio-political and economic confrontation, but not in the military. The military generally did not fail the USSR in any way, anyone, but not the military.
  5. Samovar
    Samovar 29 October 2012 11: 12
    This landing was made possible thanks to the flight of 32 helicopters under the command of Colonel V. E. Pavlov through the Hindu Kush ridges at an altitude of 4600–4700 m at the border of the maximum capabilities of the Mi-8 MT helicopter.

    I once read that Mi-8 in the highlands could take on board only 5-10 fighters. This is how many flights did you have to do to transfer so much strength? After that, army pilots can not be called supermen.
    1. ikar2006
      ikar2006 29 October 2012 12: 45
      I confirm. Examination groups were no more than 10 people. In any case, in Ghazni (1986-1988). The airfield was located at an altitude of 2200 m. When fully fueled with fuel and weapons, the Mi-24 could not fly upright at all, only from acceleration on an airplane.
    2. aleshka
      aleshka 24 October 2014 12: 06
      from personal experience-MI8mt take-mortar "cornflower" 600kg, calculation of four people-350kg, well, 150-200min, total 1,2-1,3 tons, heights from 3000 to 3500 !!!
  6. omsbon
    omsbon 29 October 2012 11: 35
    Remember how in one of the episodes about Rambo, he famously smashes Russian special forces consisting of blind, deaf and crooked-handed. For 10 years, amers have similar operations NO
    1. Karlsonn
      Karlsonn 29 October 2012 21: 00
      Quote: omsbon
      he famously smashes Russian special forces consisting of blind, deaf and crooked-handed.

      "Rambo 3"
  7. sapulid
    sapulid 29 October 2012 13: 07
    The war unleashed by our feeble-minded leadership has shown the heroism of our people in military operations. The Afghans, on the other hand, defended their homeland, fighting against us, as, incidentally, against the British, etc. morally. In the absence of clear reasons for the start of the war, our society was not ready to bury their relatives and friends for the notorious "internationalism" ...

    At present, the Russian Federation, encouraging the West to conduct military operations in Afghanistan, has exhausted it both materially and morally, predetermining the onset of the financial crisis and the collapse of the kaolitsi. Having stuck in the Middle East and Afghanistan, forced to spend millions of dollars daily, the West is decrepit and bursting at the seams. Add hundreds of thousands of refugees who preach an alien religion, often of a radical sense and not glowing with gratitude to countries destroying their near and dear ones ...

    Well, thank God, we also learned not to engage in forgiveness, but to lure the offender into his own trap. It's good when our "sworn friends and allies" know that we are not vindictive, just that we are evil and we have a good memory ...
    1. strannik595
      strannik595 29 October 2012 13: 25
      everything is back ....
    2. Karlsonn
      Karlsonn 29 October 2012 21: 04
      Quote: sapulid
      The war unleashed by our weak-minded leadership showed the heroism of our people in hostilities. The Afghans, however, defended their homeland, fighting against us,

      Do you know how much now in the territory of the former USSR dies a year from Afghan heroin?
      for 10 years more than 1 in Russia alone, because of the notorious "internationalism", as you put it in the 000s, this was not.
      1. sapulid
        sapulid 29 October 2012 23: 18
        Are you aware that before the entry of our troops, there was order in Afghanistan and there was no heroin? You taste that the supply of drugs, the Mujahideen began to pay for the supply of weapons, the glory of the CIA ...

        What to do now, a separate question .. Don’t load me, I, a living witness of those events ...

        How did you get incompetent ....
        1. Karlsonn
          Karlsonn 30 October 2012 01: 45
          Quote: sapulid
          was there order and no heroin in Afghanistan?

          order? Do you call it that?

          Quote: sapulid
          You taste that the supply of drugs, the Mujahideen began to pay for the supply of weapons, the glory of the CIA ...

          lies. Amers stingers delivered to spirits for heroin? why so frankly frown?

          Quote: sapulid
          Don’t load me, I, a living witness of those events ...

          yeah, and I write from the afterlife hi

          Quote: sapulid
          How did you get incompetent ....

          what exactly are you competent in, can only guess.
          1. sapulid
            sapulid 30 October 2012 11: 22
            Will you say that before the entry of our troops into Afghanistan there were military operations? Or maybe some kind of turmoil? As a living witness, you are worthless. Look for information on the Internet, if not in the know.
            In addition to the United States, the players were Pakistan and China and Iran. If a living witness, then you should know what caravans went to Pakistan with.

            The States worked out the supply of weapons in exchange for drug money back in Nicaragua. Or, do you believe in the US "silly attitude"?
  8. Raptor75
    Raptor75 29 October 2012 21: 25
    Quote: sapulid
    The war unleashed by our weak-minded leadership showed the heroism of our people in hostilities.

    This should be judged on the basis of the realities of that time. And the realities were such that input was necessary. And in the government there was no unity on this issue.
    1. sapulid
      sapulid 29 October 2012 23: 36
      Need for what? Afraid of entering amricos? Do not make me laugh...
      1. Gren9
        Gren9 30 October 2012 00: 35
        I understand that you are not familiar with the concept of "geopolitics"
        1. Karlsonn
          Karlsonn 30 October 2012 01: 46
          Quote: Gren9
          I understand that you are not familiar with the concept of "geopolitics"

          it seems to us they are writing from parallel reality.
  9. hommer
    hommer 29 October 2012 21: 59
    The legendary "Kara - major", the first commander of the legendary Muslim battalion B. Kerimbayev lives in a dacha near Almaty.
    1. sapulid
      sapulid 29 October 2012 23: 25
      May God grant HIM 1000 years of life. He passed all the circles of Hell and was alive ... I did not know that he was Kazakh ... In any case, bow to him, to the ground, if you are not lying. Unfortunately, I was not personally acquainted with "Kara-Major". I didn't even know the last name.
      1. Karlsonn
        Karlsonn 30 October 2012 01: 48
        Quote: sapulid
        In any case, bow to him, to the ground, if you are not lying.

        wonderful remark from a living witness of those events.
        1. sapulid
          sapulid 30 October 2012 11: 39
          I didn't know him, but I heard a lot. I had no photographs. Or do you think that every soldier knew the data of "Kara-Maor"?
          Is this dumbness or did you decide to troll?
          1. hommer
            hommer 30 October 2012 15: 07
            Now the photo can be published. And there are enough materials about Boris Tukenovich on the net.
            Photo "military unit 71170 Kapchagay 85-87g" Kerimbaev BT - in the center, on the right - Yurchuk ON (author - Sergey Sokov)
      2. Karlsonn
        Karlsonn 30 October 2012 02: 44
        but how did it happen that you finished school in 1983, and in the Soviet Army you served from 1982 to 1984? Pskov. Airborne. 234 RAP. 5 company.? I'm interested in wink as it turned out that you both studied in Ryazan and were a living witness of the actions of our limited contingent in Afghanistan, I will recognize the degree of reliability of your testimony without your participation, so is the testimony of a Russian German who graduated from an officer school as a sergeant, and also time along the way having served from 82 to 84 in Pskov and visited?!? !!! in Afghanistan, it will not be difficult to verify.
        I’m like a guy who knows whom and what to ask, I’m talking about.
        1. sapulid
          sapulid 30 October 2012 11: 30
          I studied, but did not finish. Entered in 1982, dropped out in 1983. You know, sometimes it happens, "the knowledgeable guy." He served in Pskov. By order of the Commander of the Airborne Forces, the period of study at the RKPU was included in the service life in the SA. Guess what.
          Also, ask around where you went to Afghan. I think that the "knowledgeable guy" will be surprised to learn that after having fought in Afghanistan for 1,5 years, many went to their native regiments for demobilization documents, some to Pskov, some to Ryazan.

          Don't tell me, "living witness" ...

          It's disgusting ....
          1. Karlsonn
            Karlsonn 30 October 2012 15: 51
            Quote: sapulid
            Entered 1982, expelled to 1983.

            entered Ryazan in 16 years? were born in December? in xnumx in afghan?
            Quote: sapulid
            ask around

            Quote: sapulid
            I think the "knowledgeable guy" will be surprised

            of course I ask wink
            Quote: sapulid
            Don't tell me, "living witness" ...

            and it wasn’t in your thoughts that you ...
            1. sapulid
              sapulid 31 October 2012 17: 17
              At six, he went to school, for he already knew how to read and write (he studied together with his older brother).
              At 16 he entered the RCPU. After a year, he was expelled (self-willed and a fight with combatants in the women's dorm).
              A year and a half in the troops, for he was enrolled in August at the school. Accordingly, the spring call did not fit.
              He went on a demobilization at the age of 19, having served, until December 1984. 2,5 years in the Airborne Forces.
              Let me remind you that at that time, the term of study could be protected by the ex-cadet only by order of the Commander of the Airborne Forces. In practice, such a reading occurred in exceptional cases.
              By the way, he was born in November, and if it were not for the "ball" with a booze (they stole the company officer's alcohol and noted the "Dembelsky order"), he could have been at home at 18.
              I recommend that you read about those times "living witness", damn it.
              Apparently, either a schoolboy, or a "mama's son" who has turned away from the army .....
      3. hommer
        hommer 30 October 2012 14: 55
        sapulid[Quote: I did not know that he was Kazakh ... In any case, bow to him, to the ground, if you are not lying.

        Lying is not accustomed.
        An excerpt from an article about "Kara-Major".

        He does not like to return to the past. Now retired colonel Boris Kerimbaev lives in a summer house near Almaty. I really want him to listen to the silence in retirement. Yes, and plenty of freedom, clean air - in contrast to the noisy city bustle. In addition, here he will add his memoirs, and we hope that someday they will come out as a separate book, the reader’s success of which should not be doubted. “This book is an attempt to tell how Soviet soldiers and officers courageously and selflessly performed an international duty in Afghanistan. They primarily performed military duty. They now convince me that the sick generation has returned, perhaps I do not argue. Yes, the boys died. All the boys who died in the war are heroes. And what difference does it make under what circumstances a soldier or officer died. He is a hero, and that’s it. Before becoming a story, they still have someone's pain. We did not just fight. We served the interests of the motherland, no matter what orders it gave. We lived the best years in this war. And it is true. I decided that I would answer only to her. You know, I’m for my friend ... I carried my truth in a plastic bag from a combat mission. I carried the body of a friend who had a splinter in the cervical artery. Before his death, he barely managed to tell me that he really wants to live. And this must happen - exactly before February 23. So this day is doubly dear to me, ”says Boris Tukenovich. For three years, Boris Kerimbaev commanded military unit 56712 (the 177th separate detachment of special forces of the 15th separate brigade of special forces of the GRU of the USSR General Staff), which was later called the Muslim battalion. He is a skilled personnel officer with experience in intelligence, formed this battalion of special forces units in Kapchagai and was his first commander. And the colonel carried out his international duty in Afghanistan from 1981 to 1984. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree. It was he, the legendary Kara-Major Boris Tukenovich, who advised certain engineer-sapper units of the Kazakhstan battalion that carried out the peacekeeping mission in the Republic of Iraq. So is it possible to encroach on the right of Boris Tukenovich with such an impressive track record to tell the truth about the war, no matter how tragic and cruel it may be?
        1. Karlsonn
          Karlsonn 30 October 2012 16: 04
          Quote: hommer
          We did not just fight. We served the interests of the motherland, no matter what orders it gave. We lived the best years in this war.


          Muslim battalion. 1980.
          1. sapulid
            sapulid 31 October 2012 22: 36
            Alla, "zhivchik", tongue in the ass? Before pouring mud, it's worth finding out ..

            However, acne is not worth worrying. Mow on, but the problem is you. When talking in real life, they can bang ..

            Without respect for the NIT ...
  10. fatalist
    fatalist 1 November 2012 19: 07
    Under Stalin, the entire "hostile population" would have been sent to cut forests in Siberia, and as a result they would have won the war.

    And his followers did not have the willpower for such decisions - in the end they dragged the country.