Responsible for everything combat

14
The concept of prospective units, units and formations in a battalion-brigade unit
Responsible for everything combat

In recent years, we have been witnessing a succession of reforms of the structure of the Ground Forces in the brigade link (previously a regimental division – division). At the same time, almost anywhere there are no detailed substantiations of the ongoing reforms. The fact that the changes in the upper levels of the army structure practically did not affect the battalion link also looks strange. The article discusses ways to increase the capabilities of motorized rifle subunits, units and formations of the Ground Forces in the battalion-brigade level. The concept of their alternative structure and equipment is substantiated.

MISCELLANEOUS MILITARY PART

According to the experience of local wars, control should be decentralized in favor of tactical units the size of an reinforced company - an enhanced battalion consisting not only of infantry and armored forces, but also of artillery and engineering units, as well as logistics support units. In a war with a superior enemy, excessive reliance on the deep rear would cause congestion and vulnerability of communications and a practical blockade of the front, mainly the first echelon. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the support units in the battalion.

The primary factor of success in war is the secrecy of maneuver. However, in connection with the appearance on the battlefield of modern means of intelligence, the company is becoming the largest covertly maneuvering unit.

Thus, on the modern battlefield, high-autonomous company tactical groups are required, which are formed on the basis of motorized rifle companies. Following this trend, the battalion will gradually turn into a heterogeneous military unit, giving way to the main tactical division of the company. The participation of the battalion commander in battle management will decrease, so it is advisable to increase the number of motorized rifle companies in the battalion to four.

In order to preserve the maneuverability of company tactical groups and the battalion as a whole, all samples of the battalion’s armored vehicles must be developed on a single basis.

ENGINEERING AND REAR PROVIDING

Modern warfare is characterized by an increase in the volume of engineer-sapper tasks at the level of tactical units. According to the experience of local wars, subunits in the first echelon were often let down by the lack of a sufficient number of engineering equipment, especially bulldozers and earth-moving machines, for often positions were held for several days, during which it was impossible to bring up equipment from the rear, but it was during this period that the troops suffered the greatest losses. With the massive proliferation of cluster munitions, this problem is further exacerbated. The same thing happened with overcoming natural and artificial barriers, since tank There were not enough bridges in the first echelon. Assigning engineering means to units for each task requires a large investment of time, so it is advisable to include a sapper unit in the battalion. At the same time, given the complexity and variety of engineering and sapper means, their effective use and the organization of training sappers require the creation of a sufficiently large unit, consisting of several platoons: an engineering platoon, a mining platoon, a platoon for the transportation of engineering equipment and ammunition, engineering and technical platoon, road engineering platoon.

In the engineering platoon, it is advisable to include a demining unit, a department of guided mines, a general engineering and engineer unit. A platoon is needed to create guided mine-explosive barriers (in conjunction with a mining platoon), conduct engineering reconnaissance, and make passes in enemy barriers. It must be equipped with clearance equipment (including remote clearance vehicles), mine-blasting and other means. The platoon must also train the servicemen of ordinary motorized rifle units in the basics of mine explosives in relation to the installation and neutralization of all types of mine explosives.

The mining platoon must be equipped with mine-barriers and remote mining equipment based on the main equipment of the battalion. A platoon is needed to create a mine-explosive barrier, which (according to the experience of local wars) for the defending side is one of the main means of defeating the enemy.

The transport platoon must be equipped with trawls and other attachments for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, trucks and machines with lifting equipment. These machines could also be used for other transport and handling tasks, primarily for the supply of ammunition.

In the engineering technical platoon it is advisable to include a field water supply department, a field power supply department, a department of earth-moving machinery (two earth-moving machines). Providing personnel with water often becomes a significant problem in war. It is characteristic that in Chechnya, it was often the columns transporting water that often had to be ambushed, as they were forced to make regular flights to the place of extraction and purification of water. The presence of an engineering platoon will significantly increase the autonomy and capabilities of the battalion to build defensive and other structures.

It is advisable to include in the road engineering platoon a tank bridge section with two tank bridge layers or a section of light prefabricated bridges (for light wheel battalions), a separation department (equipped with a tracker and an engineering leveling machine). With such equipment, the battalion can in many cases act on difficult terrain and in conditions of barriers without additional engineering reinforcement.

Considering the close interrelation of engineering tasks and tasks for rear organization, it is advisable that the engineering units be subordinated to the battalion rear commander. The same will be subordinated platoon support, repair and evacuation and medical platoons. It is logical in this case to create a single company of engineering and logistic support. At the same time, taking into account the connection of the tasks of reconnaissance and the engineering-sapper platoon, as well as the mining platoon, it is expedient to transfer them to the reconnaissance unit of the battalion.

The medical platoon must be optimized more to evacuate the wounded and sick to the rear than to treat them. The main indicator of his work should be the time from the receipt of information about the injury of a soldier to the time of the transfer of this soldier to the field hospital.

Since the number of personnel and the number of various equipment and weapons in the battalion will increase, then the capabilities of the support platoon must be expanded. In particular, a platoon must have a double battalion food item, which will allow organizing food security when the battalion advances in two marching columns or two military echelons. Opportunities for the supply of fuel and lubricants should be significantly increased. The function of bringing ammunition should be transferred to the platoon of transportation of engineering equipment and ammunition.

RECONNAISSANCE

Characteristic of modern wars, the increase in transience and the reduction of localization of battles require the adoption of independent decisions at lower and lower levels of government. It is clear that the degree of independence of decisions should correspond to the level of awareness. It makes you think about the creation of a reconnaissance battalion in the battalion. Its composition may be as follows: sniper-reconnaissance platoon, platoon of reconnaissance vehicles, platoon of unmanned aerial vehicles, platoon of special purpose, engineering-sapper platoon, mining platoon.

The commander of the sniper-reconnaissance platoon can be the head of all the snipers of the battalion, which will allow to organize a full training snipers rifle squads. In the face of complex structures weapons and adaptations to it in the battalion, it is necessary to separate the control and maintenance of small arms, which it is advisable to introduce into the structure of the sniper platoon. A platoon could be a “base” of training and testing the knowledge of all the battalion’s servicemen in the rifle business, while selecting good snipers, as well as controlling the technical condition of the rifle armament.

A platoon of reconnaissance vehicles may include several (3 – 6) armored vehicles based on the basic equipment of the battalion, equipped with complexes of technical reconnaissance equipment: optical, thermal (infrared), seismoacoustic, radar, coordinate radio technology. The main task of the platoon will be the issuance of exact coordinates of targets for the organization of fire destruction of the enemy. Thus, these vehicles will perform the function of moving forward observation posts.

A UAV platoon must have at least four UAVs with a flight time of at least two hours and a guaranteed range of at least 15 km, with the possibility of controlling them from the control point on the march.

A special-purpose platoon is needed for reconnaissance, assault and special operations, the organization of ambushes, raids and sorties. The role of these tasks in the experience of local wars has increased many times, and a unit specialized in them in the battalion is necessary.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT

In modern war, the role of artillery fire support has increased significantly. At the same time, the provision of motorized rifle battalions with support for artillery battalions decreased during the transition to the brigade structure (due to the loss of artillery of the division level), which means that the artillery component of the motorized rifle battalion itself must be strengthened. It is advisable in the battalion instead of transported and portable mortars to have the same type of self-propelled guns of caliber 120 mm. In connection with a wide range of simultaneously performed tasks of various scales, two platoons of four self-propelled guns should be included in the artillery battery of the battalion. Such an organization will allow (if necessary) to fire with half-arches (two ACSs each). The lack of light mortars is compensated by high mobility and readiness to open fire, and the unification of the caliber will improve fire control and ammunition supply.

Taking into account the exceptionally high evaluation of the effectiveness of the use of heavy flame-throwing systems (TOC), it is advisable to include four vehicles in a artillery battery, which are grouped into a platoon. To attribute CBT to brigade artillery is impractical due to insufficient range of fire.

It is obvious that the battalion commander must have his own mobile anti-tank reserve. Such a reserve could be a platoon of self-propelled anti-tank systems (four cars). For better coordination with artillery, it is advisable to include a platoon of ATGMs in an artillery battery. The fire control system must ensure the launch of anti-tank guided missiles at targets out of sight due to the guidance of a missile on a television channel. Preliminary target data can be obtained from an advanced observer, UAV, or other intelligence. Thus, this ATGM should perform the functions of a battalion-level guided missile complex.

For effective control of firing, there may not be enough ground controllers and even UAVs, the use of which can be eliminated with a strong enemy air defense. Therefore, it is necessary to equip the battery with radar (as main) and sound (as duplicating) means of artillery reconnaissance and firing control. These means must provide reconnaissance and control of firing results at a distance of up to 15 – 20 km. Thus, an artillery reconnaissance platoon is needed, including (at least) a radar reconnaissance unit and a sound reconnaissance unit.

The big war of the future will be characterized by the broadest use by the enemy of aviation precision weapons, UAVs and helicopters. The battalion, given the increased autonomy in the brigade and the wide scope of the area of ​​operations, must have its own strong air defense systems, including both self-propelled ZRPK and MANPADS. I propose to include into the composition of the air defense company two platoons of ZRPK (four cars each) and two platoons of MANPADS (each two BMP and 6 – 8 calculations of MANPADS each). If necessary, each motorized rifle company can be given a half-platoon of MANPADS (three or four BMP calculations) and a half-deck of self-propelled air defense complexes (two ZRPK).

COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT

In wartime, in the battalion, it will be necessary to deploy several communication and control subsystems (commander, artillery commander, rear commander, air defense commander, intelligence chief). It is advisable to entrust the deployment and maintenance of these subsystems not to separate units within the respective companies, but to a single structure - a communications and control company. In addition to a control platoon and a communications platoon, a guard platoon should be included in the company of communications and control so as not to distract motorized rifle and other units from their main tasks.

One of the main tasks of the platoon control will be to ensure the operation of the means of the automated command and control system (ACCS) and the associated navigation and topographic and geodetic support system. It is advisable to include in the platoon a service control department, a topo-geodetic and navigation support department, as well as a control machinery department. The first two units, of course, should be completed not with ordinary soldiers, but with technical specialists with the appropriate education (preferably higher).

A communication platoon should be equipped with modern digital automatic telephone exchanges for a secure telephone network for several dozen subscribers, a set of portable backpack radios, sets of equipment for connecting to backbone networks via wired, satellite, radio relay and other communication channels, diagnostics and repair tools and other equipment.

In addition to the radio network at the battalion level, it may be necessary to deploy a secure communications subscriber network with the ability to integrate into higher-level communication networks. Its organization requires two compact digital mini-PBXs (main and duplicate) with a capacity of up to 64 subscribers.

A specialized guard platoon is intended primarily to guard the battalion command center. The guard platoon is not intended for maneuvering actions and may be more “heavy” than a motorized rifle. It is advisable to include heavy machine guns as well as technical means of protection in the composition of its weapons. The guard platoon may include the following sections: two-three patrol-guard, technical, machine-gun.

So, the prospective battalion will consist of:

- four motorized rifle companies (three armored and three motorized rifle platoons);

- reconnaissance company (sniper-reconnaissance platoon, reconnaissance machine platoon, unmanned aircraft platoon, special purpose platoon, engineering-sapper platoon, mining platoon);

- artillery battery (two platoons of self-propelled artillery systems, a TOC platoon, a platoon of self-propelled anti-tank systems, an artillery reconnaissance platoon);

- Air defense company (two platoon ZRPK, two platoon MANPADS);

- a company of engineering and logistical support (engineering and technical platoon, engineering and road platoon, platoon transporting engineering equipment and ammunition, providing platoon, repair and evacuation platoon, medical platoon);

- company management and communications (control platoon, communications platoon, guard platoon).

The number of such a battalion will be about 800 people. In the "heavy" battalion in service will consist of no less than 28 BMP, 24 tank, 4 self-propelled ATGM, 8 SAU caliber 120 mm and 4 TOC. For the organization of air defense in the battalion will be 8 ZRPK and 8 MANPADS, as well as more 50 automatic guns on the BMP and more 50 multi-purpose ATGM on tanks and BMP.

The battalion will be able to conduct reconnaissance in the optical, infrared, radar, sound range at a distance of at least 15 km with its own means, and the automated control system will provide automated target designation and preparation for firing. Thanks to its own engineering and logistical support, such a battalion will be able to act for a long time without any means of reinforcement in isolation from the main forces.

Perspective structure of the brigade

HOW MUCH BATTLES SHOULD BE IN THE TEAM?

The transition to the brigade structure allowed to get rid of an excessive number of managerial units, which, of course, is a progressive step. However, it is not clear why the number of motorized rifle and tank battalions in such a compound (unit) did not increase compared with the previous structure of the regiment. In a big war, the inadequate capabilities of the brigade will require the creation of an intermediate level of control between them and the operational commands, that is, the reconstitution of divisions under a new signboard.

To eliminate this drawback, the number of motorized rifle battalions in the brigade must be increased to the number intermediate between the regiment and the division. With the current battalions this, of course, would have complicated the management too much, but in a structure with promising battalions of heightened independence this problem can be solved.

To enhance the maneuverability of the brigade, all armored and unarmored vehicles in it must be unified along the track. Installations of self-propelled artillery, vehicles of rear support units and other equipment in heavy and light tracked brigades should be on a tracked base, and in light wheeled brigades on a wheel base (for example, on trucks, armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers). In my opinion, it would be optimal to include in the "heavy" brigade five "heavy" motorized rifle battalions (as a universal remedy) and one tank battalion (no longer needed, since the motorized rifle battalions would be half tank). The "light brigade" consists of six light battalions on one type of equipment. We would receive three types of brigades for operations mainly on the respective types of terrain: “heavy” - for open terrain, “light wheel” - for populated areas and “light tracked” - for difficult terrain.

In modern warfare, effective remote fire destruction of the enemy is an almost necessary basis for the active operations of combined arms groups. In a big war, the Ground Forces cannot fully count on the support of their aviationsince it will either be destroyed or will carry out missile defense and striking missions at the enemy’s operational depths. The entire burden of responsibility for the engagement of the enemy in the interests of the Ground Forces lies with artillery. Therefore, it is necessary, without making false conclusions from the experience of wars in the conditions of air supremacy, to significantly strengthen the artillery component in the brigade.

It is advisable to increase the number of self-propelled howitzers battalions to three, jet artillery battalions to two, and include a brigade-level missile complexes division (Hermes class of missile-guided missile systems) in the structure. Only with such a large number of fire units, the fire damage planning team in the brigade will turn from a bureaucratic superstructure over the divisions into a small fire destruction planning headquarters under the control of the brigade’s chief artillery. Such a headquarters should be fully responsible for organizing interaction with aviation, it should be given maximum autonomy in decision making in order to maximally relieve the main brigade headquarters from unusual tasks.

The artillery division should regularly include a motorized rifle company (for ground defense positions) and an air defense company. The artillery division also needs a company of sappers (with equipment for building shelters and for arranging roads). When in the forest one of the most necessary things in artillery is a chainsaw. The main fire assets of divisions in modern conditions that require decentralized actions, it is advisable to structure into two batteries of two platoons of four installations each. Moreover, there should be a regular semi-platoon with two installations, which will allow maximum flexibility in organizing fire support for motorized rifle subunits.

In addition, the brigade should include the following battalions (divisions): reconnaissance and electronic warfare, air defense of stationary objects, air defense of mobile objects, engineering-sapper and headquarters. By the staff battalion, I understand the communications and control subdivision with my own engineering and other means, able to independently provide for the deployment, operation, protection and defense (and partly air defense) of the main and reserve command posts and communications centers of the brigade level. In terms of its structure, such a brigade would be closer to the war-proven structures of the groupings of our troops that operated in Chechnya, but taking into account the possibility of a war with an equal or superior enemy.

It is necessary in the brigade and the division of multi-purpose helicopters. Helicopters in modern warfare are needed for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, engineering and sapper troops, can be used for the landing of motorized rifle subunits in tactical assault forces and solving many other tasks. The lack of multipurpose helicopters at the brigade level makes coordination with them extremely difficult, however, maintenance and repair of brigade helicopters must be organized at the level of the technical services of operational and operational-strategic commands.

According to the experience of local wars, engineer-sapper support for the troops should be strengthened at all structural levels. The engineer-sapper battalion, on the basis of which groups of device barriers will be formed, often leading practically independently combat operations, must consist not only of sappers, but also of infantry with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and have an all-terrain vehicle. As for the use of various incendiary and smoke agents, and to combat them, it is advisable to include the engineer battalion and the RCBZ company.

EW tasks are often inseparable from reconnaissance tasks and therefore should be concentrated in a single structure, technical intelligence battalion and EW. It is advisable to include in the battalion two or three UAV companies, a radar and sound artillery reconnaissance company, an electronic reconnaissance company and EW company, a reconnaissance company company, a combat and rear company (air defense, engineering and rear, ground defense) company. The need for several companies UAV due to the need for a large number of UAV of at least two types.

According to the experience of local wars, the main burden of fighting with saboteurs lies with brigade-level commanders. Brigades need their own reconnaissance and sabotage units, so it is at the brigade level that there must be a special battalion that combines the functions of reconnaissance and sabotage units with the functions of fighting enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The battalion also needs a counterintelligence and anti-terror department with several operational personnel.

To coordinate the actions of the technical reconnaissance battalion and the special battalion, an intelligence chief in the status of deputy brigade commander is required, who should have his own small headquarters for planning reconnaissance operations and intelligence processing.

DO NOT TURN THE COMMANDER WITH THE MANAGER

Of course, with such a structure, the brigade should not be a military unit (administrative unit). The headquarters of the brigade should be focused on the leadership of the battle, and not on the solution of administrative tasks. Thus, the brigade should be a compound, and the battalion should be a military unit.

Even the rear units in the structure at the brigade level is impractical to include. In addition, the presence of brigade rear services will lead to the placement of large stationary warehouses in the strip closer than 30 km from the front, which, when used by the enemy of modern artillery (not to mention missile systems), means their deliberate destruction. The tasks of supply must be solved directly between the battalions and the logistical services of the operational-strategic (and in wartime operational) commands. In such an organization of the rear will not be anything supernatural, if you automate and optimize the management of the rear at the upper levels, namely:

- create and introduce into the work of the rear services a single classifier of supplies;

- to automate the management of military logistics by introducing bar-coding and automated tracking of the movement of supplies and their parties, which in civil logistics has become the absolute rule;

- to exclude reverse cargo flows, in particular, to make it a rule to transfer replaceable emergency supplies to the current supply of the same part instead of meaningless delivery to a higher-level warehouse;

- introduce a unified system of automated traffic flow management for the rear services integrated with GLONASS;

- in peacetime, to prepare for deployment an extensive network of warehouses, repair bases, hospitals and other elements of the rear of operational commands; to work out their interaction directly with the rear services of battalions (divisions).

At the brigade level, there can be no full-fledged technical services. The issues of maintenance and repair should be decided by deputies for armament of the commanders of battalions (divisions) directly with the technical services of operational (operational-strategic) commands. Thus, the unnecessary transfer level of deputy commanders of weapons brigades will also be eliminated.

The brigade commander should be primarily responsible for the fighting, and not for the daily activities of the troops. Therefore, he needs deputies that are not purely functional (for educational work, for armaments), but linear-functional ones: the chief of staff, the chief of motorized rifle divisions, the chief of artillery, the chief of air defense, the chief of intelligence, the chief of engineer-sapper divisions, the chief of brigade aviation. The presence of a powerful brigade headquarters will allow each of these chiefs to select a specialized planning group (small headquarters). The small headquarters will have to take over the planning of the actions of the battalions (divisions) subordinate to the appropriate chief. Thus, in the structure of the brigade four non-standard groups (motorized rifle, artillery, reconnaissance, air defense) will be distinguished, which will actually reduce the number of control objects at the main headquarters of the brigade to seven.

14 comments
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  1. +2
    27 October 2012 07: 41
    I read this article on another site. It is difficult to say where the author is coming from, but in his view the brigade will be a kind of "ersatz division", and the battalion will be an "ersatz regiment". It seems they will be overheated.
    However, anything can be. It is better when there are new thoughts and ideas than when there are none at all.
    1. bask
      +3
      27 October 2012 08: 04
      I read the article with pleasure. It was written and analyzed superprofessionally! So much for starley Mikhailov, A.M. According to the level of thinking and presentation of the topic, This person should lead the General Staff of RA. Or at least work there))))))))), but not. these macro-silks are Serdyukov’s corruption ...... THERE ARE STILL REAL MUSIC OFFICERS IN RUSSIA ---------- BREAKTHROUGH !!!!!!!!
      1. 0
        April 29 2014 21: 09
        Breeeeeeeed !!!!!! Well and nonsense !!!
        ".. four motorized rifle companies (three armored and three motorized rifle platoons) ..." - this is actually eight companies. The author generally understands that it will be impossible to organize combat training in such a company. The company commander will simply hang himself. Why does the battalion commander need a whole reconnaissance company? It is not for him to organize reconnaissance, but to manage the battle. What kind of chief of motorized rifle units? What the hell is this ?!
        The battalion on the march moves ONE convoy, because otherwise control will be lost. TWO columns moved regiment (brigade).
        According to my estimates, there will be a total of 100-120 units of equipment in the battalion. In only the other company, there are 20 units. The column of such a battalion will stretch to 10 km, and after a couple of hundred km it will generally disperse. The shorter the column, the less time it takes to deploy in battle order. While such a battalion is deployed, they will crush him. In a word, the author carried out an imaginary optimization of the organizational structure, calling the regiment a battalion, a division a regiment, cutting control bodies to insanity and thereby making all this disgrace uncontrollable.
  2. +3
    27 October 2012 08: 12
    "Given the close relationship of engineering tasks and tasks on the rear device, it is advisable that engineering units were subordinate to the chief of the rear of the battalion."- THE MOST STUPID THOUGHT OF THE ONE WHO HAS NO CONCEPT ABOUT THE TASKS OF ENGINEERING SUPPORT OF BATTLE !!!
    What the fuck is a tight relationship? You, the author, first study for 5 years in a military engineering school, and then for five years in the rear - I hope they will explain to you about the absence of "close relationship !!!"
  3. +1
    27 October 2012 08: 48
    It turns out a very heavy team. Then the point was to abandon the divisions? The company and battalion tactical groups with almost regimental rear? The point in small tactical groups is maneuverability and flexibility ... What kind of war is the author preparing for? If the local - the current state should be enough, if the full - scale brigade reinforcement by reinforcing the battalions is not an option, they will have to return to multi-echeloned connections .... In short, the thoughts of the commander who wants to command a battalion, or the battalion commander who dreams of a former regiment ....
  4. Brother Sarych
    +1
    27 October 2012 10: 06
    Maybe I’m wrong, but the author has the wrong message, hence the rest of the pile of letters and numbers ...
  5. Gromila78
    +2
    27 October 2012 11: 34
    Yeah, the senior lieutenant was smart. Most of all I was killed by the head battalion in the brigade (what will he do in such quantity?) And how the commander of the linear battalion will manage the management of 8 companies and the battery without headquarters. Also a helicopter unit in the brigade. The result is a solid two in command training.
  6. Kaa
    0
    27 October 2012 14: 07
    As Bulgakov wrote there about the conversation between Woland and Kant: "
    After all, I then told him at breakfast: “You, professor, your will, you thought up something awkward! It may be smart, but painfully incomprehensible. "
    And where is the other link SUSHEK or MIG, TNW, (just kidding), where is the medicine, let's all to the heap ...
  7. -1
    27 October 2012 19: 01
    Shota Rustaveli (Georgian შოთა რუსთაველი, c. 1160-1166 - 1216) - Georgian statesman and poet, author of the epic poem “The Knight in the Tiger Skin”
    Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side.

    Allegorically: it’s easy to criticize other people's actions, to advise, it is much more difficult to do it yourself, that is, to realize at least your own advice (jokes.-iron.).
  8. 0
    27 October 2012 22: 36
    Well, I don’t know, either the author (senior lieutenant of the reserve) is a military genius, or a person who has never commanded a unit larger than a platoon takes too much on himself, trying to structure battalions and brigades. Yet this is a few different levels.
  9. +1
    28 October 2012 12: 55
    the article is interesting, there are controversial points: yes, it turns out to be difficult for the brigade, too cumbersome, but I agree with the size of the MSB, in today's brigades there are few of them, you need to discuss, argue, seek solutions
  10. KA
    KA
    +1
    28 October 2012 23: 55
    The article is interesting!
    I consider it inadmissible when evaluating the article to refer to the fact that the author is a senior lieutenant, the idea is important and not the author’s regalia!
    There are interesting statements, one can argue with many, but it begs some comparison that the author is from (as I understand it) MSB He wants to do something like a battalion tactical group of reinforced squad, and from the brigade just a division.
    But about unification (the creation of technology on a unified platform), I completely agree, so this is already done.
    1. 0
      19 February 2019 08: 24
      Totally agree
  11. 0
    19 February 2019 04: 04
    A very, very interesting article, you can immediately see that it was written by an officer, and not by a "couch general". How many people have so many opinions. No need to go over to insults, dear ... The article was written by an officer, based on the experience of real combat operations, and the wishes of the military officers, and not the directors of the catering departments, were taken into account ... Apparently, this is a new type of division structure under the modest name of a brigade. "The power of linear connections (based on composition is impressive)." The headquarters battalion is most likely a communications battalion. Somewhat "annoying" is the absence of the usual Rembat, the Support Battalion and the medical (at least !!!) company for reinforcing the battalion's medical platoons. You also need to think about the management of the brigade ... The presence of helicopters in the structure is an interesting idea, but how it will be in practice. In short, you have to think ... and not cut the active parts, as the "FURNITER" did !!!