Reform of the Airborne Forces in the light of the experience of fighting in Ukraine and previous wars. staff structure
Having briefly reviewed the previous experience of using parachute troops in wars, including modern ones (first part of essay), as well as roughly estimating the tasks that may require parachute landing in modern times, making the first approach to the states of the troops and the ratio of their numbers to the strength of the military transport aviation (second part of essay), let's take a quick look at how the air defense of the airborne units should be provided, and then more or less finally decide on the states and structure.
But first, a fundamental question must be answered.
Are airborne divisions needed?
Why should the issue of the divisional link be resolved first of all? Because it is fundamental for the states of future troops, since the integration of the military branches there is implemented to a large extent at the divisional level.
Recall from last part composition of the Airborne Forces, where it is listed in full.
2. 38th Guards Control Brigade
3. 45th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (2 OSP)
4. 7th Guards Air Assault Division (9 dshb, orb and detachment)
5. 76th Guards Air Assault Division (9 dshb, orb and detachment)
6. 98th Guards Airborne Division (6 pdb and orb)
7. 106th Guards Airborne Division (6 pdb and orb)
8. 11th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
9. 31th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
10. 83th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
11. 150th separate repair and restoration battalion
12. 35th separate medical detachment of the Airborne Forces
13. Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School
14. 242nd training center of the Airborne Forces
15. 309th Center for Special Parachute Training of the Airborne Forces.
In the last part, it was indicated that the Airborne Forces can be left as expeditionary troops under separate command, so as not to lose the morale they have, which, of course, is worth a lot.
It was also justified there that under no circumstances could Russia need more than nine landing regiments of the Airborne Forces.
At the same time, nine is in some way “adjusting a task to an answer”: the maximum theoretically possible number in the presence of both tasks (also limiting), and the ability of the BTA to parachute them all in turn with acceptable losses in aircraft.
Nine regiments is about three divisions. If we deploy regiments into brigades, adding certain units there, then in any case no more than three divisions. We have 4 of them, and in addition to them 3 air assault brigades and a special forces brigade.
And now what does air defense have to do with it?
For example, consider the composition of the 76th Guards Airborne Division.
Management (headquarters)
104th Guards Airborne Assault Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Regiment
234th Guards Airborne Assault Black Sea Order of Kutuzov Regiment named after the Holy Prince Alexander Nevsky
237th Guards Air Assault Torun Red Banner Regiment
1140th Guards Artillery twice Red Banner Regiment
4th Guards (since July 22, 2015) Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (former 165th Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion)
656th separate engineer-sapper order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky battalion
124 st separate tank battalion
728th Separate Communications Battalion
3996th military hospital (airmobile). All personnel have parachute training, from 3 jumps
1682th Separate Logistics Battalion
175th separate reconnaissance battalion
separate airborne support company
separate company of radiation, chemical and biological protection
commandant's company
separate repair company of the division
201st courier-postal communication station.
It can be seen that our anti-aircraft gunners are in a separate regiment, while the personnel of the air assault regiments, especially the first echelons of the landing (remember that with the current saturation of the Airborne Forces, armored vehicles of aircraft need an prohibitively large amount, you cannot land everyone in one wave), will be content with MANPADS, memory -23 and machine guns, and in small quantities.
How with this to fight off a pair of "Apache" shooting troops from five kilometers away? Hiding from a thermal sight? The answer is no way, there is no way, even a single helicopter will be a deadly threat. There is no mention of airplanes. Again, foot troops can still disperse, crawl into basements, pits, they can be given camouflage masking in the thermal range ... But we have equipment everywhere.
We repeat - in the planned reform, a bet was made on the fact that we will not have tasks that require throwing more than a regiment into one wave (excluding MTR and intelligence, which may be there earlier). That is, air defense should be part of a regiment, well, or a brigade. Not in division.
This means that there is no option to reduce air defense systems to a separate regiment. The question of how to include them in the airborne forces is a separate topic, for now we will focus on the fact that the divisional organization and the presence of air defense as a separate regiment prevent us from organically including it in the airborne groups, at least in the second echelons. To do this, you will have to tailor temporary tactical groups, and the existence of the regiment as a separate structure loses its meaning.
But most importantly, the division does not have tasks commensurate with its scale.
We look at the Americans - no matter how intensively they used their parachute troops, the maximum number of airborne troops after World War II never reached 4 people per object. Almost reached two neighboring airfields in Panama.
Their divisional administrations actually acted as administrative units. They were used precisely for command and control of troops for the last time in Iraq in 2003, but there were no parachute landings, the 101st division, as part of its unique structure, operated on a wide front in helicopters, and the 82nd part of the forces helped it, partly kept communications torn to Baghdad 3rd Infantry Division. Only one brigade jumped on parachutes in Iraq, and then unnecessarily.
Divisional controls have not been used in paratroopers since the Second World War.
Now the 11th airborne division is also an administrative structure that should ensure the readiness of troops to conduct landing and airborne operations in the Arctic (in Russia for those who have not yet woken up), as well as the formation and dispatch of expeditionary contingents of a limited number where ordered. For the headquarters of the 11th airborne division, there are simply no tasks in which he would have to manage a divisional-scale landing operation, rather, during the invasion of the Russian Federation, it will be a quasi-corps commanding several brigade or battalion landing forces in different, very remote places from each other.
And, if you look at the previously described landing tasks for our aircraft, then we do not have such tasks either. On the other hand, there is a need to “bring closer” those units that are now subordinate to the command of divisions to landing groups based on regiments. With the expansion of the rear, because with the current Airborne Forces they will have disproportionately large non-combat losses in equipment and "out of the blue" supply problems.
Which, in fact, already exists, under the same Kherson.
Thus, it is rational to abandon the divisional structure, introducing into regiments or brigades units from those units that are now under divisional subordination.
Suppose that, having the need to parachute about a regiment, we, having also the need to saturate it with intelligence units, air defense, a developed rear, and the like, will be forced to focus on a brigade organization in which the equivalent of a regiment in terms of numbers is ready for immediate landing.
Then it will turn out that instead of nine regiments (the limit on the number of line units of the Airborne Forces dropped with a parachute, justified earlier), we will have nine brigades, plus the 45th brigade for special tasks.
In terms of personnel, it will look like this - regiments of airborne and airborne assault divisions are deployed into brigades, the current units of divisional subordination and separate airborne brigades are used to replenish them, or rather, apparently, one brigade is enough for such an analysis.
Then the structure of the Airborne Forces will become like this:
1. Command of the Airborne Forces
2. 38th Guards Control Brigade
3. 45th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (2 OSP)
4–13. 9 airborne brigades
14. 150th separate repair and restoration battalion
15. 35th separate medical detachment of the Airborne Forces
16. Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School
17. 242nd training center of the Airborne Forces
18. 309th Center for Special Parachute Training of the Airborne Forces.
Additional personnel in nine brigades are taken due to the “cannibalization” of one, and 4 divisional directorates, one brigade directorate, units of the disbanded brigade and two full air assault brigades are transferred to the ground forces, where the directorates are converted into the directorates of the SV formations, and the airborne infantry brigade into motorized rifle brigades with conventional heavy equipment.
The divisional link in the Airborne Forces does not make any sense and should be eliminated. And the integration of units from different branches of the military should take place at the brigade level, including air defense.
air defense landing
Immediately you need to understand that the first wave of landing forces will not take a lot of air defense systems with them, there is nowhere, but the planes are back to back. Therefore, first of all, technical solutions are needed, the option "to throw out an anti-aircraft battery on a landing vehicle in the first wave" does not exist even in theory. At least for the first wave - for sure. Either at the expense of BMD or "Non".
Let us recall once again that we are flying along with foot soldiers and wearable weapons in the same 31 aircraft on which we land troops in the size of the regiment. This is in the first approximation (see the previous part) 4 BMD-4 per battalion and the same number of SAO "Nona". Under such conditions, we will, willy-nilly, have to equip this particular armored vehicle with means of detecting and destroying air targets.
Today, it is technically possible to create non-radiating optoelectronic sighting systems that are compact enough to be placed on a small armored vehicle. It is also technically possible to create a missile with a laser-beam guidance system that can hit an air target. An example of an air defense system operating with such a guidance system is the British Starstreak MANPADS.
Such a missile can be placed either in a transport and launch container on the BMD turret from above or on the side, or it can be developed in a format that allows it to be fired from a 100-mm gun. Moreover, it is logical to have both for different ranges, and the crews of armored vehicles must be real masters in hitting air targets.
The sighting system should also be mounted on the tower and be integrated with the Bakhcha-U module (with the help of which there are some possibilities for hitting air targets even now). In parallel, the missiles in the TPK should be installed on the Nons. The first wave of landing forces should also include fighters with MANPADS, and at an extremely fast pace they must take up positions that are optimal for protecting the main forces of the landing force from air targets.
But the most important thing is the control system.
The experience of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with their ACS "Virage-Planshet", which actually completely paralyzed the actions of our aviation behind the line of contact, shows that even a small number of simple air defense systems when creating a system for collecting information about the air situation from all possible sources of information and automated distribution of targets according to "shooting" tactical units (up to the calculations of MANPADS), the effectiveness of even a small number of air defense systems rises "by several orders of magnitude."
A banal quadrocopter with a rangefinder becomes a reliable source of target data for calculating MANPADS several kilometers away. Such automated control systems are the most powerful air defense tool.
The Airborne Forces already have the Andromeda-D automated control system, on the basis of which it is possible to create a target distribution system for air defense systems as part of the landing force, up to machine-gun crews.
Combining an air and / or missile attack before landing, the actions of the MTR to prevent the timely use of aviation by the enemy, the presence of MANPADS in the landing force, the release of MANPADS calculations not in the total mass of the landing force, but on the flanks of the main group, the presence of anti-aircraft capabilities in armored vehicles thrown in the first wave , a fighter escort, possible in some cases, will make it possible to create a more or less effective air defense of the first echelon of the landing force, capable of preventing enemy aircraft from disrupting its actions during the time critical to ensure the landing of the second echelon.
But in the second echelon, “heavier things” should already appear. Up to this point, it was only about military equipment, adjusted for the retrofitting of the BMD and Non (and, possibly, Octopuses) with surface-to-air missiles and their means of targeting. Now it must be said that the landing party lacks an airborne self-propelled air defense system. We look at what the Airborne Forces have now.
We look here to register:. None of this is suitable for the new structure. The Verba, according to rumors, did not perform well enough in Syria, the Strela-10M is not airborne, and the system itself is outdated.
The paratroopers took the same systems with them to Ukraine - there are no others.
We do not know in advance whether it will be possible to land the second echelon by the landing method. Perhaps not. At least, we had situations when the capture of the airfield by the first wave of landing did not work out during the Great Patriotic War, only then it was possible to land the second echelon within a few days on an improvised runway in the snow, but now not.
This means that the airborne air defense system should be airborne. And its base should be the BMD-4 chassis. Does Russia have a ready-made air defense system, on the basis of which it is necessary to make a landing version? Yes, this is "Ptitselov" based on the "Pine" system.
SAM "Ptitselov". Photo: russiandefence.com
Unfortunately, the system is not yet ready to enter service. But in any case, it needs to be finalized, and it is necessary to immediately create an option that can withstand all the loads during a parachute drop and “splice” it with a landing gear.
Theoretically, it is possible to ensure that an airborne air defense system could be dropped at the rate of 2 vehicles on an IL-76 or a battery of four vehicles from two aircraft. Again, in some specific situation, this technique may be thrown out in the first echelon, or may not be used at all. In any case, such an airborne air defense system is needed, and what will be the base for it is said above.
But, in addition to protecting the landing force from strike aircraft, you also need a means of combating drones, including small quadcopter drones. Here again, it will be necessary to slightly improve the BMD-4, namely to equip the 30-mm cannon with a programmer and provide the machine with the issuance of a control center for such targets.
A gun with a programmer is an ideal means of combating small-sized UAVs, and this issue has already been raised in the article. "How Not to Prepare for the Last War Instead of the Future". There it is revealed. As for programmers, since 2022 our country also has them, and, in principle, work on equipping armored vehicles with 30-mm guns with them can begin right now.
And in the second tier? There it would be logical to recreate such a type of machine as a ZSU - an anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. Now such a vehicle is being created for the Ground Forces as part of the Air Defense Derivation development project, but the fact is that it will be quite difficult for the Airborne Forces to create a landing gun - it will have weight and size characteristics approximately at the level of the Sprut anti-tank gun, that is, it will be needed one aircraft per gun. We should be talking about an "anti-aircraft gun" with a 30-mm gun or guns, a programmer, a large ammunition load and a BMD-4 chassis.
How should the air defense of an airborne brigade be organized organizationally?
The simplest option is an anti-aircraft missile division of two or three batteries of four vehicles each. How many batteries will be armed with SAMs, and how many ZSUs, and whether they should be mixed, must be determined during experimental exercises. Having decided on how the air defense of the airborne brigade should be organized, let's move on to its regular structure.
States, approx.
So let's summarize what we have. Let's start with the battalion.
We agreed that we were jumping as part of a battalion: 3 companies, as well as some, as yet incomprehensible reinforcement units, either a fire support platoon as part of a company, or a separate fire support company distributed among aircraft. We'll come back to this later.
Initially, companies jump without equipment and fight on foot, but they are given reinforcements - 4 infantry fighting vehicles as a battalion armored group and a battery of four 120-mm Nona SAO instead of battalion artillery. We will assume that without rears our battalion is what it is, and all this is part of it, and fights together.
Now we need to decide with the fire support unit - is it in the company or in the battalion? The answer is in the mouth. The reason is simple.
How many management units does the commander of our battalion have in the first echelon of the landing force? The answer is three companies of foot soldiers, an armored group, a mortar battery (“Nony”). If we also add a fire support company here, then we get, firstly, duplication of functions with a battalion armored group, and secondly, another command and control unit that needs to be thought about and that needs to be assigned tasks in an extremely tense and stressful environment of an airborne operation .
It is ideal that the commander has three units at his disposal (three lower commanders in fact), four is normal, more is already undesirable. Thus, instead of a fire support company in a battalion, it is logical to have a fire support platoon in companies. Then in the battalion: command, three parachute companies (actually rifle companies), a BMD platoon, a mortar battery on the Nonah.
We calculated that the equivalent of a regiment in terms of strength, that is, three such battalions, would go to the first echelon of a paratrooper as much as possible. These three battalions form the backbone of our brigade.
What else should be in the team?
Let's start with the second tier.
Artillery. In the last part, we decided that a howitzer battery for the D-30 would be enough as part of the parachute assault, and this is probably true, the idea of \uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbthrowing paratroopers to where dozens of howitzers are needed to solve the problem is initially strange. This does not mean, however, that more artillery is not needed. in general, this means that it is no longer needed in the landing. We will return to the number of artillery.
To tow the guns, you need 6 trucks, this is without the KAMAZ 4350 VDV options, nothing else can tow the D-30 and be dropped by parachute. These vehicles should be part of the brigade artillery. Another brigade auto company will need a certain number of trucks, including tankers, also landing. We also need BTR-D or MD, at least a certain amount, to transport part of the landing force and its ammunition.
But organizationally, BTR-Ds should not be part of companies or battalions, if only because they are not needed in a situation where the brigade is not fighting as a parachute brigade, and this was mentioned earlier. The personnel of the brigade use the BTR-D for movement when acting as a paratrooper, and when fighting on the ground - other armored vehicles, such as armored cars.
Since parachute companies should simply receive the necessary armored vehicles, we will need some kind of service as part of a brigade that will be responsible for maintaining a fleet of various armored vehicles (BTR-D, armored vehicles or armored personnel carriers, etc.) and issuing them to companies together with the driver-mechanics according to the task at hand. There is no equivalent to that in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation today, let's call it the armored service of the brigade, even if, in addition to the fleet of armored vehicles, the remrota is subordinate to it. Earlier it was said that in the case of operations from helicopters, mortar batteries instead of "Non" take UAZ vehicles and transported or towed 120-mm mortars with them.
Also remember tanks.
In the last part of the article, it was proposed to confine ourselves to a tank company as part of an airborne landing unit. This is quite logical, since it takes a long time to unload a tank from an aircraft, and it cannot transport more than one Il-76 tank. A battalion means that only 31 air flights are needed to transport tanks, so a tank company is the limit for amphibious and airmobile operations with a landing landing, it simply does not make sense to transport by air anymore, and a company will be rare. When operating from helicopters, tanks are not applicable, there is no way to deliver them by air.
Intelligence deserves special mention.
It is logical that the brigade should not have a reconnaissance company, but a reconnaissance battalion capable of conducting various types of reconnaissance - on foot, motorized, using unmanned aerial vehicles. The number of reconnaissance battalions should be large, because its responsibility will be to control the situation not only in the offensive zone of the brigade, as if it were a motorized rifle brigade, but also in its rear - after all, the brigade is an airborne one. And various measures to ensure the success of the landing, up to sabotage at enemy targets (air defense forces, airfields) will also be on the reconnaissance battalion. Therefore, he needs a large number of personnel - there will be a lot of work.
In fact, all of the above outlines the limits of the number of airborne troops, even parachute, even helicopter.
On our brigades and how ordinary army ones should “be able” to fight. As mentioned in the last part, in order to justify its existence, the Airborne Forces will need to take on some more tasks inherent in light infantry. For example, the conduct of hostilities in the forest, in the mountains, in the city. But for this, against a strong and numerous enemy, the new look will be rather weak. How to strengthen it?
Two simple ways - to bring the number of heavy weapons of the brigade to a certain minimum sufficient value. In the course of airborne operations, the full use of all these forces will be impossible, but in a war "on the ground", where the Airborne Forces will operate together with the Ground Forces, they will be able to solve the assigned tasks. And here we will have to start increasing the number of non-landing units.
Firstly, it looks logical that there should still be a battalion of tanks in the brigade. They will never be used in airborne operations all together, but more often they will have to fight not as a landing force, but as an infantry.
Secondly, it is possible to do the same with artillery and equip the brigade with a full-fledged three-battery division, in which one battery will consist of towed D-30s, and two of normal self-propelled ones. Perhaps even with a 152-mm caliber, if the logistics capabilities allow supplying one division with two types of shells. If not, then the other two batteries will be on the Gvozdika self-propelled guns. However, such nuances can be settled already in the process of working out the structure in research exercises.
An important point - "Carnations" in size and weight can be transported inside the Il-76 aircraft, which makes them applicable both in airmobile operations and in the landing echelon of an airborne assault.
The last question is anti-tank defense.
During a parachute assault, fire support platoons may have man-portable anti-tank missile systems (ATGMs), and battalion commanders will have 100-mm BMD-4 guns with guided shots and guided 120-mm mines at Non. Somewhere in the same place there may be compact loitering ammunition with a cumulative warhead.
And the brigade should have a battery of self-propelled anti-tank systems based on the BMD-4M. Such vehicles can be dropped in the first or second wave of landings or delivered by landing, and in ordinary battles on the ground they can be used like any other self-propelled anti-tank systems.
Self-propelled ATGM based on BMD-4M. Photo: Anna-news.
And, of course, the brigade should be able to use the Sprut-SDM SPTP 2S25M, including those parachuted. Together with a tank battalion and powerful artillery, this should give the brigade sufficient anti-tank capabilities. And do not think that anti-tank defense is not the task of the Airborne Forces: at the time of writing, the 45th Special Forces Brigade is fighting Ukrainian tanks near Kherson. Defensive.
Airborne brigade of a new look in the war
Closing the issue with the appearance of the new brigade, you need to see what composition it will fight in various scenarios of combat use. To do this, we will finally freeze its appearance and make a diagram of the units that make up the brigade.
Here is the diagram.
Some auxiliary and rear units are not here, but this is not important. Other points are also not fundamental, for example, someone may consider that the Sprut-SDM guns should be in an anti-tank company, the company itself should turn into a battalion, and the crews on the Spruts should be their own, not tankers. The rears of the mouths are not shown, but they are needed. Units with drones are not shown, and they should start from the platoon level, however, we will show the UAV service after all.
In principle, all this is discussed, the purpose of the article is not to close all questions, but to outline approximate goals. Correction is quite possible.
First of all, let's clarify an important issue - the first wave of landing should have its own command body, and therefore the diagram contains the so-called. "Regimental tact. group" - this is the first echelon of the landing force, numbering "about a regiment" and with its own command in battle.
Such a scheme, when under the headquarters of the brigade there is another one, “about a regimental one,” was already in our army in 1941, in the tank troops, when the divisions were disbanded. There she showed herself ineffective, and soon the regimental link from the brigades was removed. But here, part of our forces are thrown at a great distance, they act in isolation from the rest of the forces, and a separate command body is needed. Here he is.
Now we look at what composition the brigade is introduced into battle.
If we talk about the maximum possible attire of forces, then as part of the same “regimental group”, three battalions with BMD-4 and Nonami can be thrown out. If the availability of aircraft and the situation allow, then they can be reinforced either by individual units from the anti-aircraft division, or a battery of D-30 howitzers, or self-propelled anti-tank systems - all this can be dropped from the air, and due to the fact that the basis of the landing force is infantry without equipment, then everything this heavy weapon operates in conjunction with numerous fighters on the ground, there can be 320-330 people in the airborne part of the battalion, three battalions - almost a thousand infantrymen alone.
In some other conditions, the adopted organization allows you to get by with only infantry and Nonami, or to form a mechanized battalion group in the image and likeness of the current Airborne Forces, only with large squads, platoons and companies.
Let's estimate the second echelon, which is landing by parachute, following the three battalions and part of the reconnaissance battalion forces, which cleared the landing zone and prepared to receive reinforcements. In the second wave, the same planes can throw out a D-30 artillery battery, six KamAZ trucks for towing it, a couple of trucks from the auto company, a platoon of anti-tank systems or Spruts, etc.
Reset KAMAZ with IL-76
Where will the foot assault get transport for themselves, so that they can maneuver, throw up ammunition and take out the wounded?
And the armored service will allocate both BTR-MD, and driver mechanics, and machine gunners from its composition, and they will be included in the second echelon (and under other circumstances, in the first).
Further, for example, according to the plan, the main landing force should be delivered to the captured airfield.
We look - six Il-76s will land all the self-propelled guns of the artillery division, four more - eight KamAZ trucks for transporting shells and fuel.
Or the same number of sides 20 BTR-MD, so that at least one landed company gets on the tracks. And if there were old BTR-Ds, then 30 vehicles, 30 squads that became mechanized, more than two companies of the state that we chose (with the fourth fire support platoon). Or alternatively, there may be two self-propelled guns (1 side), a couple of KamAZ trucks (another one), shells on parachute platforms as needed, and the rest of the sides with armored personnel carriers.
In principle, starting from the operation plan and the situation, you can arrange everything as you like. And all this within the framework of the original three and a half dozen Il-76s, without the fantastic outfit of the forces of the Military Transport Aviation.
That is, the organization of the brigade allows you to form any combat groups without "cutting" the paratrooper battalions into parts and without reducing their strike force.
For comparison, let's look at the photo:
31 BMD, sort of like BMD-3. This is 16 Il-76 and only 155 foot soldiers.
In the brigade of the new state, 16 Ils are, for example: one reconnaissance battalion company of 120 people, a battalion combat group of three infantry companies of 120 people each, four BMD-4s, a Non battery, two D-30 howitzers with KamAZ trucks and a reserve shells and a pair of self-propelled air defense systems. Plus a headquarters capable of managing it all. With drones. Normal difference?
Now suppose that the brigade must operate in helicopters. What is the maximum power of the proposed organization?
Again we have three battalions, only now purely on foot, without the BMD-4M - the last Mi-8 will not lift. Battalion batteries leave their Nonas in position, instead of them, helicopters deliver UAZ pickups with 120-mm mortars in their bodies and a certain number of vehicles to deliver shells from the landing point to mortar positions.
It turns out that now we have a battalion of three rifle companies of 120 people each fighting, having 6 120-mm UAV-guided mortars as their heavy weapons.
In the second echelon, several landed battalions receive a D-30 battery, only without mechanical traction - howitzers will have to be dragged from place to place by helicopters, which, in principle, can easily be done - foot troops move slowly, and often it will not be necessary to maneuver artillery.
Who and how neutralizes enemy artillery?
The reconnaissance battalion with drones should be in place in advance and give a tip to attack helicopters supporting the landing. If Mi-26s are used in the landing operation, then KamAZ trucks can fly on them for maneuvering artillery, a certain number of armored personnel carriers for evacuating the wounded and delivering ammunition, for emergency infantry maneuvers, BMD-4, SPTRK, tanker trucks with fuel.
However, the numbers will be small, the main thing that the landing force will have to rely on is attack helicopters, mortars and surprise, like a “trump card”: rare but accurate artillery fire.
And if you need to go into battle on the ground?
Again, the armored service provides personnel with armored vehicles for movement, for example, Akhmat armored vehicles, paratrooper battalions become motorized, the entire artillery division of the brigade is fighting in full force, the tank battalion and the anti-aircraft division are fighting.
Moreover, the new structure of the brigade gives it the opportunity to act as a combination of air assault and mechanized, when the first echelon occupies objects critical for the offensive from helicopters or parachutes, and the second - with all heavy weapons and equipment (tanks, self-propelled guns) goes on the ground , and all this under a single command. Here the "regimental" headquarters will come in handy.
Since we agreed that the Airborne Forces will specialize in difficult conditions (mountains, forests, swamps, cities), they will not particularly need infantry fighting vehicles or conventional armored personnel carriers, however, a scheme with an armored service and a unit capable of providing battalions with any armored vehicles and its crews "For the task" - universal. There you can include armored personnel carriers with infantry fighting vehicles, and work out any interaction schemes.
And, of course, she will take care of installing additional armor from ready-made and pre-stored kits on the BMD-4M (the battalion's standard fire support weapon) and Nona (the same).
With airmobile deployment, as it was in 2021 in Kazakhstan, everything is also very simple - all equipment of the brigade, even tanks and self-propelled guns, is transported on the Il-76. At the same time, equipment can be delivered in any order, depending on the urgency of the tasks and the situation. There will be exceptions only if the brigade self-propelled artillery (two batteries in the artillery battalion) is decided to be re-equipped with 152-mm self-propelled artillery from the systems currently in service, and not some new ones suitable for transportation on the Il-76.
It is also worth paying attention to the presence of a reserve training battalion in the brigade. Before the start of hostilities, it must be filled with personnel, which will then be used to make up for combat losses and maintain their regular strength with the warring units of the brigade.
Conclusion
The war in Ukraine showed that the current appearance of the Airborne Forces is inadequate to modern threats. For airborne assault operations such as Gostomelskaya, they have an excess of equipment, for combined arms combat they have too few heavy weapons, few infantry per unit of armored vehicles, and weak artillery.
BMD in combat, photo of the RF Ministry of Defense. According to the proposed states, they could be T-90M instead
Now in Ukraine, the landing force is being reinforced with 152-mm artillery and tanks, but what will happen if it has to act in line with the profile?
In recent years, points of view have spread that parachute landing does not justify itself at all anymore, but the problem is that this is not so, moreover, even discarding all combat use scenarios from the last part, let's say that in some cases paratroopers will have to be thrown out even on their own territory, simply because an emergency maneuver of the troops will be needed, and there will be no airfields nearby.
Therefore, it is important, on the one hand, to finally begin to solve the conceptual problems of the Airborne Forces, which have not been resolved for many years (the last attempt was in the 90s), but, on the other hand, not to lose a number of unique and potentially necessary capabilities that the Airborne Forces have with their specific technique is now.
The proposed reform primarily preserves the life of these formations as parachute ones, moreover, a certain operational niche is clearly traced for them in this capacity. And this is now, when the collapse of the world order is just beginning.
In the future, when the world collapses into chaos, the tasks of instant landing can increase dramatically.
But such a reform removes the weak points of the Airborne Forces. In combat, a brigade of a new look is three infantry battalions with powerful fire support, plus not the weakest air defense, a tank battalion and serious anti-tank capabilities: and all this is organically included in the landing doctrine.
Without insisting that everything should be done exactly as suggested, the author nevertheless invites everyone who is not indifferent to think about this topic.
The Airborne Forces in their form are too expensive and do not give the return that they could. Their conversion into motorized rifles or some kind of quasi-special forces on buggies can be even more expensive, since it is undesirable to lose their useful competencies and capabilities. A measured reform is needed, and it is quite possible.
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