Reform of the Airborne Forces in the light of the experience of fighting in Ukraine and previous wars. staff structure

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Reform of the Airborne Forces in the light of the experience of fighting in Ukraine and previous wars. staff structure

Having briefly reviewed the previous experience of using parachute troops in wars, including modern ones (first part of essay), as well as roughly estimating the tasks that may require parachute landing in modern times, making the first approach to the states of the troops and the ratio of their numbers to the strength of the military transport aviation (second part of essay), let's take a quick look at how the air defense of the airborne units should be provided, and then more or less finally decide on the states and structure.

But first, a fundamental question must be answered.



Are airborne divisions needed?


Why should the issue of the divisional link be resolved first of all? Because it is fundamental for the states of future troops, since the integration of the military branches there is implemented to a large extent at the divisional level.

Recall from last part composition of the Airborne Forces, where it is listed in full.

1. Command of the Airborne Forces
2. 38th Guards Control Brigade
3. 45th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (2 OSP)
4. 7th Guards Air Assault Division (9 dshb, orb and detachment)
5. 76th Guards Air Assault Division (9 dshb, orb and detachment)
6. 98th Guards Airborne Division (6 pdb and orb)
7. 106th Guards Airborne Division (6 pdb and orb)
8. 11th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
9. 31th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
10. 83th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
11. 150th separate repair and restoration battalion
12. 35th separate medical detachment of the Airborne Forces
13. Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School
14. 242nd training center of the Airborne Forces
15. 309th Center for Special Parachute Training of the Airborne Forces.

In the last part, it was indicated that the Airborne Forces can be left as expeditionary troops under separate command, so as not to lose the morale they have, which, of course, is worth a lot.

It was also justified there that under no circumstances could Russia need more than nine landing regiments of the Airborne Forces.

At the same time, nine is in some way “adjusting a task to an answer”: the maximum theoretically possible number in the presence of both tasks (also limiting), and the ability of the BTA to parachute them all in turn with acceptable losses in aircraft.

Nine regiments is about three divisions. If we deploy regiments into brigades, adding certain units there, then in any case no more than three divisions. We have 4 of them, and in addition to them 3 air assault brigades and a special forces brigade.

And now what does air defense have to do with it?

For example, consider the composition of the 76th Guards Airborne Division.

Management (headquarters)
104th Guards Airborne Assault Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Regiment
234th Guards Airborne Assault Black Sea Order of Kutuzov Regiment named after the Holy Prince Alexander Nevsky
237th Guards Air Assault Torun Red Banner Regiment
1140th Guards Artillery twice Red Banner Regiment
4th Guards (since July 22, 2015) Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (former 165th Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion)
656th separate engineer-sapper order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky battalion
124 st separate tank battalion
728th Separate Communications Battalion
3996th military hospital (airmobile). All personnel have parachute training, from 3 jumps
1682th Separate Logistics Battalion
175th separate reconnaissance battalion
separate airborne support company
separate company of radiation, chemical and biological protection
commandant's company
separate repair company of the division
201st courier-postal communication station.


It can be seen that our anti-aircraft gunners are in a separate regiment, while the personnel of the air assault regiments, especially the first echelons of the landing (remember that with the current saturation of the Airborne Forces, armored vehicles of aircraft need an prohibitively large amount, you cannot land everyone in one wave), will be content with MANPADS, memory -23 and machine guns, and in small quantities.

How with this to fight off a pair of "Apache" shooting troops from five kilometers away? Hiding from a thermal sight? The answer is no way, there is no way, even a single helicopter will be a deadly threat. There is no mention of airplanes. Again, foot troops can still disperse, crawl into basements, pits, they can be given camouflage masking in the thermal range ... But we have equipment everywhere.

We repeat - in the planned reform, a bet was made on the fact that we will not have tasks that require throwing more than a regiment into one wave (excluding MTR and intelligence, which may be there earlier). That is, air defense should be part of a regiment, well, or a brigade. Not in division.

This means that there is no option to reduce air defense systems to a separate regiment. The question of how to include them in the airborne forces is a separate topic, for now we will focus on the fact that the divisional organization and the presence of air defense as a separate regiment prevent us from organically including it in the airborne groups, at least in the second echelons. To do this, you will have to tailor temporary tactical groups, and the existence of the regiment as a separate structure loses its meaning.

But most importantly, the division does not have tasks commensurate with its scale.

We look at the Americans - no matter how intensively they used their parachute troops, the maximum number of airborne troops after World War II never reached 4 people per object. Almost reached two neighboring airfields in Panama.

Their divisional administrations actually acted as administrative units. They were used precisely for command and control of troops for the last time in Iraq in 2003, but there were no parachute landings, the 101st division, as part of its unique structure, operated on a wide front in helicopters, and the 82nd part of the forces helped it, partly kept communications torn to Baghdad 3rd Infantry Division. Only one brigade jumped on parachutes in Iraq, and then unnecessarily.

Divisional controls have not been used in paratroopers since the Second World War.

Now the 11th airborne division is also an administrative structure that should ensure the readiness of troops to conduct landing and airborne operations in the Arctic (in Russia for those who have not yet woken up), as well as the formation and dispatch of expeditionary contingents of a limited number where ordered. For the headquarters of the 11th airborne division, there are simply no tasks in which he would have to manage a divisional-scale landing operation, rather, during the invasion of the Russian Federation, it will be a quasi-corps commanding several brigade or battalion landing forces in different, very remote places from each other.

And, if you look at the previously described landing tasks for our aircraft, then we do not have such tasks either. On the other hand, there is a need to “bring closer” those units that are now subordinate to the command of divisions to landing groups based on regiments. With the expansion of the rear, because with the current Airborne Forces they will have disproportionately large non-combat losses in equipment and "out of the blue" supply problems.
Which, in fact, already exists, under the same Kherson.

Thus, it is rational to abandon the divisional structure, introducing into regiments or brigades units from those units that are now under divisional subordination.

Suppose that, having the need to parachute about a regiment, we, having also the need to saturate it with intelligence units, air defense, a developed rear, and the like, will be forced to focus on a brigade organization in which the equivalent of a regiment in terms of numbers is ready for immediate landing.

Then it will turn out that instead of nine regiments (the limit on the number of line units of the Airborne Forces dropped with a parachute, justified earlier), we will have nine brigades, plus the 45th brigade for special tasks.


In terms of personnel, it will look like this - regiments of airborne and airborne assault divisions are deployed into brigades, the current units of divisional subordination and separate airborne brigades are used to replenish them, or rather, apparently, one brigade is enough for such an analysis.

Then the structure of the Airborne Forces will become like this:

1. Command of the Airborne Forces
2. 38th Guards Control Brigade
3. 45th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (2 OSP)
4–13. 9 airborne brigades
14. 150th separate repair and restoration battalion
15. 35th separate medical detachment of the Airborne Forces
16. Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School
17. 242nd training center of the Airborne Forces
18. 309th Center for Special Parachute Training of the Airborne Forces.


Additional personnel in nine brigades are taken due to the “cannibalization” of one, and 4 divisional directorates, one brigade directorate, units of the disbanded brigade and two full air assault brigades are transferred to the ground forces, where the directorates are converted into the directorates of the SV formations, and the airborne infantry brigade into motorized rifle brigades with conventional heavy equipment.

The divisional link in the Airborne Forces does not make any sense and should be eliminated. And the integration of units from different branches of the military should take place at the brigade level, including air defense.

air defense landing


Immediately you need to understand that the first wave of landing forces will not take a lot of air defense systems with them, there is nowhere, but the planes are back to back. Therefore, first of all, technical solutions are needed, the option "to throw out an anti-aircraft battery on a landing vehicle in the first wave" does not exist even in theory. At least for the first wave - for sure. Either at the expense of BMD or "Non".

Let us recall once again that we are flying along with foot soldiers and wearable weapons in the same 31 aircraft on which we land troops in the size of the regiment. This is in the first approximation (see the previous part) 4 BMD-4 per battalion and the same number of SAO "Nona". Under such conditions, we will, willy-nilly, have to equip this particular armored vehicle with means of detecting and destroying air targets.

Today, it is technically possible to create non-radiating optoelectronic sighting systems that are compact enough to be placed on a small armored vehicle. It is also technically possible to create a missile with a laser-beam guidance system that can hit an air target. An example of an air defense system operating with such a guidance system is the British Starstreak MANPADS.

Such a missile can be placed either in a transport and launch container on the BMD turret from above or on the side, or it can be developed in a format that allows it to be fired from a 100-mm gun. Moreover, it is logical to have both for different ranges, and the crews of armored vehicles must be real masters in hitting air targets.

The sighting system should also be mounted on the tower and be integrated with the Bakhcha-U module (with the help of which there are some possibilities for hitting air targets even now). In parallel, the missiles in the TPK should be installed on the Nons. The first wave of landing forces should also include fighters with MANPADS, and at an extremely fast pace they must take up positions that are optimal for protecting the main forces of the landing force from air targets.

But the most important thing is the control system.

The experience of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with their ACS "Virage-Planshet", which actually completely paralyzed the actions of our aviation behind the line of contact, shows that even a small number of simple air defense systems when creating a system for collecting information about the air situation from all possible sources of information and automated distribution of targets according to "shooting" tactical units (up to the calculations of MANPADS), the effectiveness of even a small number of air defense systems rises "by several orders of magnitude."

A banal quadrocopter with a rangefinder becomes a reliable source of target data for calculating MANPADS several kilometers away. Such automated control systems are the most powerful air defense tool.


The Airborne Forces already have the Andromeda-D automated control system, on the basis of which it is possible to create a target distribution system for air defense systems as part of the landing force, up to machine-gun crews.
Combining an air and / or missile attack before landing, the actions of the MTR to prevent the timely use of aviation by the enemy, the presence of MANPADS in the landing force, the release of MANPADS calculations not in the total mass of the landing force, but on the flanks of the main group, the presence of anti-aircraft capabilities in armored vehicles thrown in the first wave , a fighter escort, possible in some cases, will make it possible to create a more or less effective air defense of the first echelon of the landing force, capable of preventing enemy aircraft from disrupting its actions during the time critical to ensure the landing of the second echelon.

But in the second echelon, “heavier things” should already appear. Up to this point, it was only about military equipment, adjusted for the retrofitting of the BMD and Non (and, possibly, Octopuses) with surface-to-air missiles and their means of targeting. Now it must be said that the landing party lacks an airborne self-propelled air defense system. We look at what the Airborne Forces have now.

We look here to register:. None of this is suitable for the new structure. The Verba, according to rumors, did not perform well enough in Syria, the Strela-10M is not airborne, and the system itself is outdated.
The paratroopers took the same systems with them to Ukraine - there are no others.

Photo of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

We do not know in advance whether it will be possible to land the second echelon by the landing method. Perhaps not. At least, we had situations when the capture of the airfield by the first wave of landing did not work out during the Great Patriotic War, only then it was possible to land the second echelon within a few days on an improvised runway in the snow, but now not.

This means that the airborne air defense system should be airborne. And its base should be the BMD-4 chassis. Does Russia have a ready-made air defense system, on the basis of which it is necessary to make a landing version? Yes, this is "Ptitselov" based on the "Pine" system.


SAM "Ptitselov". Photo: russiandefence.com

Unfortunately, the system is not yet ready to enter service. But in any case, it needs to be finalized, and it is necessary to immediately create an option that can withstand all the loads during a parachute drop and “splice” it with a landing gear.

Theoretically, it is possible to ensure that an airborne air defense system could be dropped at the rate of 2 vehicles on an IL-76 or a battery of four vehicles from two aircraft. Again, in some specific situation, this technique may be thrown out in the first echelon, or may not be used at all. In any case, such an airborne air defense system is needed, and what will be the base for it is said above.

But, in addition to protecting the landing force from strike aircraft, you also need a means of combating drones, including small quadcopter drones. Here again, it will be necessary to slightly improve the BMD-4, namely to equip the 30-mm cannon with a programmer and provide the machine with the issuance of a control center for such targets.

A gun with a programmer is an ideal means of combating small-sized UAVs, and this issue has already been raised in the article. "How Not to Prepare for the Last War Instead of the Future". There it is revealed. As for programmers, since 2022 our country also has them, and, in principle, work on equipping armored vehicles with 30-mm guns with them can begin right now.

And in the second tier? There it would be logical to recreate such a type of machine as a ZSU - an anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. Now such a vehicle is being created for the Ground Forces as part of the Air Defense Derivation development project, but the fact is that it will be quite difficult for the Airborne Forces to create a landing gun - it will have weight and size characteristics approximately at the level of the Sprut anti-tank gun, that is, it will be needed one aircraft per gun. We should be talking about an "anti-aircraft gun" with a 30-mm gun or guns, a programmer, a large ammunition load and a BMD-4 chassis.

How should the air defense of an airborne brigade be organized organizationally?

The simplest option is an anti-aircraft missile division of two or three batteries of four vehicles each. How many batteries will be armed with SAMs, and how many ZSUs, and whether they should be mixed, must be determined during experimental exercises. Having decided on how the air defense of the airborne brigade should be organized, let's move on to its regular structure.

States, approx.


So let's summarize what we have. Let's start with the battalion.

We agreed that we were jumping as part of a battalion: 3 companies, as well as some, as yet incomprehensible reinforcement units, either a fire support platoon as part of a company, or a separate fire support company distributed among aircraft. We'll come back to this later.

Initially, companies jump without equipment and fight on foot, but they are given reinforcements - 4 infantry fighting vehicles as a battalion armored group and a battery of four 120-mm Nona SAO instead of battalion artillery. We will assume that without rears our battalion is what it is, and all this is part of it, and fights together.

Now we need to decide with the fire support unit - is it in the company or in the battalion? The answer is in the mouth. The reason is simple.

How many management units does the commander of our battalion have in the first echelon of the landing force? The answer is three companies of foot soldiers, an armored group, a mortar battery (“Nony”). If we also add a fire support company here, then we get, firstly, duplication of functions with a battalion armored group, and secondly, another command and control unit that needs to be thought about and that needs to be assigned tasks in an extremely tense and stressful environment of an airborne operation .

It is ideal that the commander has three units at his disposal (three lower commanders in fact), four is normal, more is already undesirable. Thus, instead of a fire support company in a battalion, it is logical to have a fire support platoon in companies. Then in the battalion: command, three parachute companies (actually rifle companies), a BMD platoon, a mortar battery on the Nonah.

We calculated that the equivalent of a regiment in terms of strength, that is, three such battalions, would go to the first echelon of a paratrooper as much as possible. These three battalions form the backbone of our brigade.

What else should be in the team?

Let's start with the second tier.

Artillery. In the last part, we decided that a howitzer battery for the D-30 would be enough as part of the parachute assault, and this is probably true, the idea of ​​\uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbthrowing paratroopers to where dozens of howitzers are needed to solve the problem is initially strange. This does not mean, however, that more artillery is not needed. in general, this means that it is no longer needed in the landing. We will return to the number of artillery.

To tow the guns, you need 6 trucks, this is without the KAMAZ 4350 VDV options, nothing else can tow the D-30 and be dropped by parachute. These vehicles should be part of the brigade artillery. Another brigade auto company will need a certain number of trucks, including tankers, also landing. We also need BTR-D or MD, at least a certain amount, to transport part of the landing force and its ammunition.

But organizationally, BTR-Ds should not be part of companies or battalions, if only because they are not needed in a situation where the brigade is not fighting as a parachute brigade, and this was mentioned earlier. The personnel of the brigade use the BTR-D for movement when acting as a paratrooper, and when fighting on the ground - other armored vehicles, such as armored cars.

Since parachute companies should simply receive the necessary armored vehicles, we will need some kind of service as part of a brigade that will be responsible for maintaining a fleet of various armored vehicles (BTR-D, armored vehicles or armored personnel carriers, etc.) and issuing them to companies together with the driver-mechanics according to the task at hand. There is no equivalent to that in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation today, let's call it the armored service of the brigade, even if, in addition to the fleet of armored vehicles, the remrota is subordinate to it. Earlier it was said that in the case of operations from helicopters, mortar batteries instead of "Non" take UAZ vehicles and transported or towed 120-mm mortars with them.

Also remember tanks.

In the last part of the article, it was proposed to confine ourselves to a tank company as part of an airborne landing unit. This is quite logical, since it takes a long time to unload a tank from an aircraft, and it cannot transport more than one Il-76 tank. A battalion means that only 31 air flights are needed to transport tanks, so a tank company is the limit for amphibious and airmobile operations with a landing landing, it simply does not make sense to transport by air anymore, and a company will be rare. When operating from helicopters, tanks are not applicable, there is no way to deliver them by air.

Intelligence deserves special mention.

It is logical that the brigade should not have a reconnaissance company, but a reconnaissance battalion capable of conducting various types of reconnaissance - on foot, motorized, using unmanned aerial vehicles. The number of reconnaissance battalions should be large, because its responsibility will be to control the situation not only in the offensive zone of the brigade, as if it were a motorized rifle brigade, but also in its rear - after all, the brigade is an airborne one. And various measures to ensure the success of the landing, up to sabotage at enemy targets (air defense forces, airfields) will also be on the reconnaissance battalion. Therefore, he needs a large number of personnel - there will be a lot of work.

In fact, all of the above outlines the limits of the number of airborne troops, even parachute, even helicopter.

On our brigades and how ordinary army ones should “be able” to fight. As mentioned in the last part, in order to justify its existence, the Airborne Forces will need to take on some more tasks inherent in light infantry. For example, the conduct of hostilities in the forest, in the mountains, in the city. But for this, against a strong and numerous enemy, the new look will be rather weak. How to strengthen it?

Two simple ways - to bring the number of heavy weapons of the brigade to a certain minimum sufficient value. In the course of airborne operations, the full use of all these forces will be impossible, but in a war "on the ground", where the Airborne Forces will operate together with the Ground Forces, they will be able to solve the assigned tasks. And here we will have to start increasing the number of non-landing units.

Firstly, it looks logical that there should still be a battalion of tanks in the brigade. They will never be used in airborne operations all together, but more often they will have to fight not as a landing force, but as an infantry.

Secondly, it is possible to do the same with artillery and equip the brigade with a full-fledged three-battery division, in which one battery will consist of towed D-30s, and two of normal self-propelled ones. Perhaps even with a 152-mm caliber, if the logistics capabilities allow supplying one division with two types of shells. If not, then the other two batteries will be on the Gvozdika self-propelled guns. However, such nuances can be settled already in the process of working out the structure in research exercises.

An important point - "Carnations" in size and weight can be transported inside the Il-76 aircraft, which makes them applicable both in airmobile operations and in the landing echelon of an airborne assault.

The last question is anti-tank defense.

During a parachute assault, fire support platoons may have man-portable anti-tank missile systems (ATGMs), and battalion commanders will have 100-mm BMD-4 guns with guided shots and guided 120-mm mines at Non. Somewhere in the same place there may be compact loitering ammunition with a cumulative warhead.

And the brigade should have a battery of self-propelled anti-tank systems based on the BMD-4M. Such vehicles can be dropped in the first or second wave of landings or delivered by landing, and in ordinary battles on the ground they can be used like any other self-propelled anti-tank systems.


Self-propelled ATGM based on BMD-4M. Photo: Anna-news.

And, of course, the brigade should be able to use the Sprut-SDM SPTP 2S25M, including those parachuted. Together with a tank battalion and powerful artillery, this should give the brigade sufficient anti-tank capabilities. And do not think that anti-tank defense is not the task of the Airborne Forces: at the time of writing, the 45th Special Forces Brigade is fighting Ukrainian tanks near Kherson. Defensive.

Airborne brigade of a new look in the war


Closing the issue with the appearance of the new brigade, you need to see what composition it will fight in various scenarios of combat use. To do this, we will finally freeze its appearance and make a diagram of the units that make up the brigade.
Here is the diagram.


Some auxiliary and rear units are not here, but this is not important. Other points are also not fundamental, for example, someone may consider that the Sprut-SDM guns should be in an anti-tank company, the company itself should turn into a battalion, and the crews on the Spruts should be their own, not tankers. The rears of the mouths are not shown, but they are needed. Units with drones are not shown, and they should start from the platoon level, however, we will show the UAV service after all.

In principle, all this is discussed, the purpose of the article is not to close all questions, but to outline approximate goals. Correction is quite possible.

First of all, let's clarify an important issue - the first wave of landing should have its own command body, and therefore the diagram contains the so-called. "Regimental tact. group" - this is the first echelon of the landing force, numbering "about a regiment" and with its own command in battle.

Such a scheme, when under the headquarters of the brigade there is another one, “about a regimental one,” was already in our army in 1941, in the tank troops, when the divisions were disbanded. There she showed herself ineffective, and soon the regimental link from the brigades was removed. But here, part of our forces are thrown at a great distance, they act in isolation from the rest of the forces, and a separate command body is needed. Here he is.

Now we look at what composition the brigade is introduced into battle.

If we talk about the maximum possible attire of forces, then as part of the same “regimental group”, three battalions with BMD-4 and Nonami can be thrown out. If the availability of aircraft and the situation allow, then they can be reinforced either by individual units from the anti-aircraft division, or a battery of D-30 howitzers, or self-propelled anti-tank systems - all this can be dropped from the air, and due to the fact that the basis of the landing force is infantry without equipment, then everything this heavy weapon operates in conjunction with numerous fighters on the ground, there can be 320-330 people in the airborne part of the battalion, three battalions - almost a thousand infantrymen alone.

In some other conditions, the adopted organization allows you to get by with only infantry and Nonami, or to form a mechanized battalion group in the image and likeness of the current Airborne Forces, only with large squads, platoons and companies.

Let's estimate the second echelon, which is landing by parachute, following the three battalions and part of the reconnaissance battalion forces, which cleared the landing zone and prepared to receive reinforcements. In the second wave, the same planes can throw out a D-30 artillery battery, six KamAZ trucks for towing it, a couple of trucks from the auto company, a platoon of anti-tank systems or Spruts, etc.


Reset KAMAZ with IL-76

Where will the foot assault get transport for themselves, so that they can maneuver, throw up ammunition and take out the wounded?

And the armored service will allocate both BTR-MD, and driver mechanics, and machine gunners from its composition, and they will be included in the second echelon (and under other circumstances, in the first).

Further, for example, according to the plan, the main landing force should be delivered to the captured airfield.

We look - six Il-76s will land all the self-propelled guns of the artillery division, four more - eight KamAZ trucks for transporting shells and fuel.

Or the same number of sides 20 BTR-MD, so that at least one landed company gets on the tracks. And if there were old BTR-Ds, then 30 vehicles, 30 squads that became mechanized, more than two companies of the state that we chose (with the fourth fire support platoon). Or alternatively, there may be two self-propelled guns (1 side), a couple of KamAZ trucks (another one), shells on parachute platforms as needed, and the rest of the sides with armored personnel carriers.

In principle, starting from the operation plan and the situation, you can arrange everything as you like. And all this within the framework of the original three and a half dozen Il-76s, without the fantastic outfit of the forces of the Military Transport Aviation.

That is, the organization of the brigade allows you to form any combat groups without "cutting" the paratrooper battalions into parts and without reducing their strike force.

For comparison, let's look at the photo:


31 BMD, sort of like BMD-3. This is 16 Il-76 and only 155 foot soldiers.

In the brigade of the new state, 16 Ils are, for example: one reconnaissance battalion company of 120 people, a battalion combat group of three infantry companies of 120 people each, four BMD-4s, a Non battery, two D-30 howitzers with KamAZ trucks and a reserve shells and a pair of self-propelled air defense systems. Plus a headquarters capable of managing it all. With drones. Normal difference?

Now suppose that the brigade must operate in helicopters. What is the maximum power of the proposed organization?

Again we have three battalions, only now purely on foot, without the BMD-4M - the last Mi-8 will not lift. Battalion batteries leave their Nonas in position, instead of them, helicopters deliver UAZ pickups with 120-mm mortars in their bodies and a certain number of vehicles to deliver shells from the landing point to mortar positions.

It turns out that now we have a battalion of three rifle companies of 120 people each fighting, having 6 120-mm UAV-guided mortars as their heavy weapons.

In the second echelon, several landed battalions receive a D-30 battery, only without mechanical traction - howitzers will have to be dragged from place to place by helicopters, which, in principle, can easily be done - foot troops move slowly, and often it will not be necessary to maneuver artillery.

Who and how neutralizes enemy artillery?

The reconnaissance battalion with drones should be in place in advance and give a tip to attack helicopters supporting the landing. If Mi-26s are used in the landing operation, then KamAZ trucks can fly on them for maneuvering artillery, a certain number of armored personnel carriers for evacuating the wounded and delivering ammunition, for emergency infantry maneuvers, BMD-4, SPTRK, tanker trucks with fuel.

However, the numbers will be small, the main thing that the landing force will have to rely on is attack helicopters, mortars and surprise, like a “trump card”: rare but accurate artillery fire.

And if you need to go into battle on the ground?

Again, the armored service provides personnel with armored vehicles for movement, for example, Akhmat armored vehicles, paratrooper battalions become motorized, the entire artillery division of the brigade is fighting in full force, the tank battalion and the anti-aircraft division are fighting.

Moreover, the new structure of the brigade gives it the opportunity to act as a combination of air assault and mechanized, when the first echelon occupies objects critical for the offensive from helicopters or parachutes, and the second - with all heavy weapons and equipment (tanks, self-propelled guns) goes on the ground , and all this under a single command. Here the "regimental" headquarters will come in handy.

Since we agreed that the Airborne Forces will specialize in difficult conditions (mountains, forests, swamps, cities), they will not particularly need infantry fighting vehicles or conventional armored personnel carriers, however, a scheme with an armored service and a unit capable of providing battalions with any armored vehicles and its crews "For the task" - universal. There you can include armored personnel carriers with infantry fighting vehicles, and work out any interaction schemes.

And, of course, she will take care of installing additional armor from ready-made and pre-stored kits on the BMD-4M (the battalion's standard fire support weapon) and Nona (the same).

With airmobile deployment, as it was in 2021 in Kazakhstan, everything is also very simple - all equipment of the brigade, even tanks and self-propelled guns, is transported on the Il-76. At the same time, equipment can be delivered in any order, depending on the urgency of the tasks and the situation. There will be exceptions only if the brigade self-propelled artillery (two batteries in the artillery battalion) is decided to be re-equipped with 152-mm self-propelled artillery from the systems currently in service, and not some new ones suitable for transportation on the Il-76.

It is also worth paying attention to the presence of a reserve training battalion in the brigade. Before the start of hostilities, it must be filled with personnel, which will then be used to make up for combat losses and maintain their regular strength with the warring units of the brigade.

Conclusion


The war in Ukraine showed that the current appearance of the Airborne Forces is inadequate to modern threats. For airborne assault operations such as Gostomelskaya, they have an excess of equipment, for combined arms combat they have too few heavy weapons, few infantry per unit of armored vehicles, and weak artillery.


BMD in combat, photo of the RF Ministry of Defense. According to the proposed states, they could be T-90M instead

Now in Ukraine, the landing force is being reinforced with 152-mm artillery and tanks, but what will happen if it has to act in line with the profile?

In recent years, points of view have spread that parachute landing does not justify itself at all anymore, but the problem is that this is not so, moreover, even discarding all combat use scenarios from the last part, let's say that in some cases paratroopers will have to be thrown out even on their own territory, simply because an emergency maneuver of the troops will be needed, and there will be no airfields nearby.

Therefore, it is important, on the one hand, to finally begin to solve the conceptual problems of the Airborne Forces, which have not been resolved for many years (the last attempt was in the 90s), but, on the other hand, not to lose a number of unique and potentially necessary capabilities that the Airborne Forces have with their specific technique is now.

The proposed reform primarily preserves the life of these formations as parachute ones, moreover, a certain operational niche is clearly traced for them in this capacity. And this is now, when the collapse of the world order is just beginning.

In the future, when the world collapses into chaos, the tasks of instant landing can increase dramatically.

But such a reform removes the weak points of the Airborne Forces. In combat, a brigade of a new look is three infantry battalions with powerful fire support, plus not the weakest air defense, a tank battalion and serious anti-tank capabilities: and all this is organically included in the landing doctrine.

Without insisting that everything should be done exactly as suggested, the author nevertheless invites everyone who is not indifferent to think about this topic.

The Airborne Forces in their form are too expensive and do not give the return that they could. Their conversion into motorized rifles or some kind of quasi-special forces on buggies can be even more expensive, since it is undesirable to lose their useful competencies and capabilities. A measured reform is needed, and it is quite possible.
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  1. +4
    24 October 2022 06: 10
    It is necessary to parachute robots and not people. And put people in the factory to make robots. This is what reform will be.
    1. +4
      24 October 2022 11: 03
      I agree. Throw out the robotic dog with machine guns on its back (there are already such in metal), quadrocopters with two RPG-18s (Belarusians also have metal in metal) cover them from above, they clean the territory, then you can already throw people out or enter by infantry. This is reform and preparation for the war of the future, and not for the past!
      In total, it is necessary to introduce a company of robotic dogs and a squadron of combat quadrocopters into the staff of the airborne brigade. And we are all discussing people to parachute with Kalash or with a couple of BMDesheks into the crowd.
  2. +4
    24 October 2022 06: 53
    I thought that Timokhin was "special" only in the Navy, but it turns out also in the Airborne Forces!
    But ...
  3. +10
    24 October 2022 07: 00
    In recent years, points of view have spread that parachute landing does not justify itself at all anymore, but the problem is that this is not so, moreover, even discarding all combat use scenarios from the last part, let's say that in some cases paratroopers will have to be thrown out even on their own territory, simply because an emergency maneuver of the troops will be needed, and there will be no airfields nearby.
    The question is what will be the losses. Yes, it sounds great, but completely suppressing enemy air defenses is very problematic, and transport aircraft are a very good target.
    1. 0
      24 October 2022 10: 59
      if you throw it into your territory, what kind of air defense to press there?
      1. 0
        24 October 2022 11: 08
        Quote: glory1974
        if you throw out on your territory

        Why throw it on your territory?
        1. +1
          24 October 2022 11: 27
          The article says why. For emergency manoeuvres.
          1. -5
            24 October 2022 12: 27
            Quote: glory1974
            For emergency manoeuvres.

            AND? What maneuver? In the event of hostilities? Then the enemy will have at least MANPADS.
            1. +5
              24 October 2022 12: 56
              To your own territory.
              For example, the Yaps take out airfields on Sakhalin, cross the La Perouse Strait and go north, ours block the island across with available troops, they throw an airborne brigade into the near rear, which goes to the front from there.
              1. -6
                24 October 2022 13: 46
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                For example, the Yaps take out airfields on Sakhalin, force the La Perouse Strait and go north, ours block the island across with available troops, they throw airborne troops into the reinforcement in the near rear of ours

                All the same, the probability of falling under the fire of their air defense is too great, it is more reliable by trains, and then on their own.
                1. +10
                  24 October 2022 14: 44
                  On your own to Sakhalin? Well, you give.

                  Is it drawn to the earth? )))) But Russia has islands and roads are not everywhere to put it mildly.
                  And there may not be enough time.
                  In total - non-aerodrome landing - is needed!
                  1. -1
                    24 October 2022 15: 19
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    Is it drawn to the earth? )))) But Russia has islands and roads are not everywhere to put it mildly.

                    Not everywhere. But the problem is that the alternative is worse. Using the example of the NMD, we were able to verify the well-established NATO satellite reconnaissance - there is no need to talk about any covert transfer of the VTA with the landing force, and substituting planes full of paratroopers for enemy air defense systems is not an idea.
                    1. +1
                      24 October 2022 23: 50
                      Using the example of the NMD, we were able to verify the well-established satellite intelligence of NATO - there is no need to talk about any covert transfer of the BTA with the landing


                      Well, what kind of air defense do the Japanese have on Sakhalin?
                      1. +2
                        25 October 2022 18: 59
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Well, what kind of air defense do the Japanese have on Sakhalin?

                        And what kind of troops do they have there? If we consider the possibility of a database, then it is obvious that the enemy army will have air defense systems.
                    2. 0
                      25 October 2022 22: 03
                      Quote: Dart2027
                      were able to verify the well-established NATO satellite reconnaissance

                      Well, that's solely because we're leaving US satellites chaste for the time being. Therefore, the CBO example is at least incorrect.
                      1. -1
                        25 October 2022 22: 23
                        Quote: Clone
                        solely for the reason that for the time being we leave the US satellites in chaste integrity

                        Shooting down US satellites is already a war with the United States, and this is already the third world war.
                  2. 0
                    24 October 2022 15: 45
                    For the islands, there is a marine corps, which is not so limited in terms of the weight and size characteristics of equipment. In general, Mr. Mokrenko discussed this issue about the "Airborne Forces a wonderful future" in some detail, if sclerosis does not change, you were also present there hi
                    1. +1
                      24 October 2022 23: 50
                      Only it is necessary to establish dominance at sea, for the MP. And we look at the distance, for example, to the Kuriles - bypassing Sakhalin, trudge to the BDK under 2000 km.
                      And the Japanese are 70.
                      By air without options.
              2. -1
                24 October 2022 21: 04
                In this case, we need either teleports, or just a nuclear strike on Tokyo.

                The airborne paratroopers will not be able to provide much help and will again be used as weak motorized rifles.
                1. +1
                  25 October 2022 12: 32
                  The airborne paratroopers will not be able to provide much help and will again be used as weak motorized rifles.

                  The exercises were carried out. People are transferred by planes, and equipment is used locally stored at the bases. A few hours of flying and a motorized rifle brigade with equipment in the right place. What's wrong?
                  1. +1
                    26 October 2022 00: 10
                    Well, what's the point then of having a separate type of troops, with special equipment, if again they are supposed to be used as ordinary motorized riflemen. And the base on which the equipment, equipment, ammunition for the whole brigade is stored is deserted and there is no railway or any other ways to it?
                    Maybe it's a question of the proper organization of border protection and the location of military units, if there is a threat of a Japanese landing on Sakhalin, well, if the nuclear doctrine has stopped working?
                    1. 0
                      26 October 2022 11: 07
                      so the Airborne Forces are essentially motorized rifles. Due to the possibility of landing, they have higher mobility. This is their plus. But also a minus. If they are used correctly, everything will be fine. But if they are not, then there will be problems that cannot be solved.
                      And yes, ordinary motorized riflemen are also used for landing on airplanes. But if the need arises to jump with a parachute, you can’t do without the Airborne Forces.
        2. -2
          24 October 2022 16: 48
          Why throw it on your territory?

          For example, for the urgent transfer of troops. Thus, it would be possible to stabilize the situation near Balakleya and Izyum, but it did not happen. Why?
          Maybe the question is different; and how to throw out such a landing?
          1. +3
            24 October 2022 17: 19
            Quote: Cympak
            Thus, it would be possible to stabilize the situation near Balakleya and Izyum

            During the time that we had, the paratroopers could walk.
  4. +6
    24 October 2022 08: 33
    Great article! Thanks to the author! You and Klimov turned out to be right, in almost everything.
    1. +10
      24 October 2022 08: 38
      The Airborne Forces have a very strong lobby in the Ministry of Defense ...
      1. +7
        24 October 2022 19: 34
        Quote: agond
        The Airborne Forces have a very strong lobby
        Lobby? This is because at least from a great country the Airborne Forces were not allowed to be destroyed, like the fleet and ground forces ... Let's break up the Airborne Forces to their level, so that there was nothing to envy. I would swear, but I’ll just say, stop optimizing and reforming already, everything in the country has already been optimized and reformed to such an extent that there is nothing more to cut, the economy will become disabled.

        It is not the Airborne Forces that should be lowered to the level of the rest, but, first of all, the ground forces should be raised to a decent level so that the Airborne Forces do not plug all the holes, after which they are blamed for not being on heavy equipment. We have the best landing equipment in the world, it doesn’t take much to destroy the mind created by Margelov, it’s better to find such an uncle Vasya for other branches of the military, let him create a new doctrine for tanks and motorized infantry, make them the best in the world.
        1. 0
          25 October 2022 11: 26
          I fully support you! You can hammer nails with a microscope, or you can use a hammer. The Airborne Forces are a "plug" from all the troubles and mistakes in actions ... You yourself know who. The Airborne Forces have their own task, and not what the "experts" are voicing here. And why then, tell me dear sirs, this branch of the army was created ??? It's clear. Were there few Serdyukovs? Timokhin to the commander-in-chief! Wow optimize! We will immediately defeat all adversaries.
          1. +1
            25 October 2022 14: 22
            And what is the "task" of the Airborne Forces and how often did the Airborne Forces solve this "task", and not something from the ground forces? Right now, as far as I understand the Airborne Forces in the Kherson direction on the defense line. Is this their job? It so happened that the Airborne Forces are the most trained troops, which is why they are thrown into the most responsible tasks. But these tasks are not a "task".
            1. +2
              25 October 2022 18: 09
              Quote from ZuekRek
              And what is the "task" of the Airborne Forces and how often did the Airborne Forces solve this "task"
              And what is the task of the Strategic Missile Forces and how often do they solve their task? You still calculate how much it costs to maintain nuclear weapons, which have been "useless" for decades, and translate how much this money could buy in-demand shells and cartridges ...

              "It so happened that the Airborne Forces are the most trained troops", - I already said, why didn’t it happen with the same motorized riflemen that the paratroopers were forced to carry out their tasks? Where among the fat-bellied generals is at least one who is rooting for his troops, like Vasily Margelov? From him in the Airborne Forces there was an idea, fighting spirit, a sense of pride in the landing, why was it not brought up in the same infantry, at least in the guard?
              Who put on this show with "blitzkrieg", which "genius" did everything to make it happen the way it did? It remains to send sailors to the trenches, to the slogan why "land" Russia needs a fleet.
              1. 0
                25 October 2022 19: 38
                And what is the task of the Strategic Missile Forces and how often do they solve their task?

                Are you a politician that you answer a question with a question? The task of the Strategic Missile Forces is the strategic deterrence of opponents, and if used, turn half the globe into ashes. And the fact that we can correspond in the comments shows that they cope with the task. Do you think that the Airborne Forces should prevent war by one of their FACT OF PRESENCE? Then it's a failure. The example is extremely unfortunate.
                “It so happened that the Airborne Forces are the most trained troops,” I already said, but why didn’t it happen with the same motorized riflemen that the paratroopers were forced to carry out their tasks?

                Because they are actually outside the general army system. That's the way it should be. But the task - as I understand it - in view of the technical development of the air defense of our potential adversary will never be fulfilled in the way it was formulated back in the USSR.
                1. The comment was deleted.
                  1. +4
                    26 October 2022 00: 16
                    About the popular topic of lack of money, it is better to tell Elvira Sakhipzadovna, the actual agent of the IMF in the Central Bank, who somehow showed himself very weakly for the Russian economy,] to put it mildly.


                    Does Putin know that she is an agent of the IMF, or is it only you who is the bearer of this unique information? And then after all, not so long ago, after the freezing of assets, he again nominated her for the post of head of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
                  2. The comment was deleted.
              2. +1
                26 October 2022 00: 14
                already said, why didn’t it happen with the same motorized riflemen that the paratroopers were forced to carry out their tasks?

                Who told you it didn't work out? That the Airborne Forces, that the motorized rifles are trained plus / minus the same within their competencies, then that the Airborne Forces are thrown into tasks that are uncharacteristic for them, in my opinion, there are two reasons, the first is the impossibility now, in principle, of any airborne operations due to the development of air defense systems, the second most the main thing is not the lack of troops, motorized riflemen in particular.
              3. 0
                4 November 2022 15: 52
                If I could put 1000 likes - I would! But alas, one! Respect from the paratrooper in reserve.
          2. +1
            25 October 2022 21: 55
            The Airborne Forces have their own task, and not what the "experts" are voicing here.


            Only Seryozha the crow doesn't know her, but that doesn't stop him from crowing.
            1. 0
              26 October 2022 16: 01
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              but that doesn't stop him from crowing

              I don’t know for Kozhugetovich, I’ll explain for my opinion if it’s about cock songs to my comment. This is not about resisting, not accepting, useful and necessary reforms in the troops. The problem is complex, it cannot be solved by discussions of the Airborne Forces alone, which are part of our army, in which it was the Airborne Forces that remained the most combat-ready troops. Many generally believe that since parachute landing is not used now, the airborne forces are not needed, the similarity of what is in NATO is enough.

              It must be understood that not everyone writes articles, wanting to keep our airborne units in an improved form, the ideological war, ideological sabotage has not gone away. In the 90s, the media fanned the orgy about Russia's uselessness of the ocean fleet, and the aircraft carrier in the first place. Who rocked it, and with whose money was our fleet slaughtered?
              The “partners” are also hindered by our airborne forces, whose power miraculously survived after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It’s a pity, Alexander (or Sasha), if this turned out to be incomprehensible to me.
              1. +1
                27 October 2022 21: 07
                I didn’t write this to you at all, it was an answer to another person
                1. 0
                  28 October 2022 07: 02
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  it was a response to another person

                  Please excuse me.
            2. 0
              4 November 2022 15: 57
              There are no words. How low. Listen, comrade! Ali lord, according to you! He served in the 317th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division. 1st SAB SADN. ZKVO-KO of the 1st firing platoon. Castle platoon. If that means something to people like you. So, "rooster", I invite you to Vitebsk (Belarus) on August 2. See you. Let's talk.
        2. 0
          25 October 2022 22: 27
          Quote: Per se.
          It is not the Airborne Forces that should be lowered to the level of the rest, but, first of all, the ground forces should be raised to a decent level so that the Airborne Forces do not plug all the holes

          An exceptionally wise idea! As soon as a verbal tie about "reforms" sounds from the lips of "specialists in all matters", you involuntarily begin to prepare for the worst, because at the end of all the "transformations and optimizations" we get a loud "cheers" in the central office and the truncation of the states of linear parts. And when they encroach on the divisional structure in a veiled and scientific manner, then the sinister phantom of "Serdyukovism" with all its references to "foreign experience" unconsciously arises ...
      2. +4
        24 October 2022 21: 02
        That's right, that's why a large number of resources will be spent on the Airborne Forces for a long time, but they will be used as motorized riflemen. If attack aircraft cannot fly beyond the front line, then there is no point in talking about transport workers at all.
  5. +5
    24 October 2022 09: 15
    It is not entirely clear how the brigade will be reinforced if necessary. With the current structure, the Division can strengthen the regiment to a brigade by transferring an artillery battalion and an air defense battalion, as well as an engineer battalion. If necessary, the division commander can reinforce one regiment by transferring a battalion from another regiment. With a brigade organization, who will make the decision to strengthen the brigade and at the expense of what? If the brigade is subordinate to the corps, then what forces will be subordinate to the corps, and if not the corps, then the army? How quickly will the command of the corps or army respond to the needs of the airborne brigade?
  6. +4
    24 October 2022 09: 58
    Explanatory. But every war we reinvent the wheel. In reality, they always fight in brigades - units numbering from 4 to 6 thousand people. In which they single out directly a combat core of 1000. And not paper divisions, or vice versa, battalions (even reinforced BTg).

    For those interested - the composition of the "divisions" during the assault on Koenigsberg (a company is the code name for the combat group itself).



    Vasilevsky could well group 27 pseudo-divisions into 9 full-fledged, 12 thousandths, or vice versa, break it into 50 BTg.
    But he was already an experienced Commander... wink

    PS By the way, the average strength of a real "division" of the Red Army in the Second World War was 5 people. And not because there were not enough people, they would like to - they combined 200 into 2.
    1. +4
      24 October 2022 10: 57
      In reality, they always fight in brigades - units numbering from 4 to 6 thousand people. In which they single out directly a combat core of 1000. And not paper divisions, or vice versa, battalions (even reinforced BTg).

      For one fighter on the front line, at least one is needed in the rear. During the Second World War, the supply was centralized across the armies, separate units of logistic support in divisions were not created. Multiply the number you gave by 2, you get the number of regular divisions.
      After the war, all required units were formed in the divisions. A fully equipped division can conduct combat operations on its own.
      When, under Serdyukov, the divisions were reduced to brigades, the set of rear units was reduced, the combat support units were left. But the brigades could not act independently. Therefore, everyone was returned back.
      In the United States, the number of divisions can reach 20.
      Therefore, the problem is not only that there were not enough people. Equipment, controls, etc. are needed. Therefore, combining two divisions into one would not give anything.
      1. +2
        24 October 2022 11: 25
        For one fighter on the front line, you need at least one in the rear.

        And so it was. 1000 fights, 3000 provides. See table.

        After the war, all required units were formed in the divisions. A fully equipped division can conduct combat operations on its own.

        Everything turned out great on the headquarters paper and in the PPD. In real life, a combined regiment was sent to Chechnya from the Taman division. Because a full-fledged division is an uncontrollable horde, think if they tried to raise it all. At one mooring of equipment, 50 people would be crushed. Yes
        Now the same song, 3 MSD did not even fit in the PPD in one place.

        When, under Serdyukov, the divisions were reduced to brigades, the set of rear units was reduced, the combat support units were left. But the brigades could not act independently. Therefore, everyone was returned back.

        Rear yes, he almost finished. Turns out outsourcing doesn't work on the battlefield. laughing

        In the United States, the number of divisions can reach 20.

        Yes, but it consists of brigades.
        1. +2
          24 October 2022 11: 32
          And so it was. 1000 fights, 3000 provides. See table.

          what companies are in the table? Shooting? And where are the companies of the 2nd echelons? And where is the combat support, communications, reconnaissance, sappers, gunners?
          Everything turned out great on the headquarters paper and in the PPD. In real life, a combined regiment was sent to Chechnya from the Taman division.

          I don’t know, regular divisions and regiments were included in Afghanistan and everything was fine. And in the 90s they gathered all over the country those who could even hold a machine gun. An unsuccessful example.
          Yes, but it consists of brigades.

          And we have from the regiments. What is the difference?
          1. +2
            24 October 2022 11: 47
            And we have from the regiments. What is the difference?

            In the number of structural units of the division. 4000 is the minimum.
            Why do you think there were from 4 to 6 thousand in the Roman legion? Despite the fact that they were with swords, and now with AK.
            It has to do with the anatomy of the human body. Height, stride width, visibility range, etc.
            If we were hobits, we would fight in units of 12 thousand. laughing
            1. +2
              25 October 2022 12: 40
              In the number of structural units of the division. 4000 is the minimum.

              The main tactical unit is a battalion, 500 people. Even though he is in a brigade, even in a regiment, even somewhere else, it’s still 500 people.
              And then, what weapons do you have, what staff, means of control and communications, reconnaissance and target designation.
              A brigade consists of battalions, a regiment consists of battalions. Where is the difference that some fight badly, others do well?
              It has to do with the anatomy of the human body. Height, stride width, visibility range, etc.
              If we were hobits, we would fight in units of 12 thousand.

              This is if only the anatomy is considered.
              And if you take into account the technique? They walked shoulder to shoulder with swords. Now with weapons, the distance between the fighters is 10 meters. Here is your answer. As soon as the equipment allows you to attack, support fire, and most importantly control at other distances, there will be other states.
          2. +2
            24 October 2022 11: 50
            what companies are in the table? Shooting? And where are the companies of the 2nd echelons? And where is the combat support, communications, reconnaissance, sappers, gunners?


            To break through the Königsberg fortified area of ​​the Wehrmacht and storm the city of Königsberg[6], 26 assault detachments and 104 assault groups were created - both from rifle units and from engineering troops (consisting of ten engineering and sapper brigades, three assault engineering and sapper brigades, two motorized engineering teams and one pontoon team).

            In addition, Soviet chemical troops participated in the assault - 7 separate flamethrower battalions, 3 chemical defense battalions, a company of high-explosive flamethrowers and 5 separate companies of knapsack flamethrowers. In addition, three more separate battalions of knapsack flamethrowers participated in the operation as part of the assault engineer-sapper brigades of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. These units were divided into assault squads and assault groups. During the assault on the fortress, their role was huge, it is no coincidence that, following the results of the operation, almost all flamethrower battalions and companies were awarded orders or honorary titles "Königsberg".

            The assault on Königsberg began at 9 o'clock in the morning with powerful artillery preparation, then, at 12 o'clock, under the cover of a barrage, infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive. According to the plan, the main forces bypassed the forts, which were blocked by rifle battalions or companies, supported by self-propelled guns that suppressed enemy fire, sappers using demolition charges, and flamethrowers.

            Storm troops played an important role in the assault on the city and the Königsberg fortress. They consisted of rifle companies, several artillery pieces with a caliber of 45 to 122 mm, one or two tanks or self-propelled guns, a platoon of heavy machine guns, a mortar platoon, a platoon of sappers and a squad of flamethrowers.
            1. +1
              25 October 2022 12: 42
              Until now, it is written in the combat regulations, based on combat experience, that it is not regular units that are going to assault, but assault groups assembled and equipped for the task.
        2. +1
          25 October 2022 22: 43
          Quote: Arzt
          Because a full-fledged division is an uncontrollable horde, think if they tried to raise it all.

          I can, of course, be wrong, but only those subjects who were unlucky enough to serve in units and formations of full combat readiness can reason in this way ... in particular, in the GSVG-ZGV, where not only "going out into the field" of divisions in full strength was practiced, but also "opposing" armies. And right up to the "peace initiatives" of the marked ghoul, it was there that the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division with the staff of the so-called "breakthrough division" existed ... when the motorized rifle regiments included reconnaissance, engineer-sapper, anti-aircraft missile divisions ... in motorized rifle battalions - tank companies, artillery and anti-aircraft batteries and other specialists. Yes, there was overkill in some part, but there was no point-blank "uncontrollable horde" ... because everything depends on commanders and chiefs, their experience and strict observance of existing traditions.
          1. 0
            26 October 2022 16: 46
            I can, of course, be wrong, but only those subjects who were unlucky enough to serve in units and formations of full combat readiness can reason in this way ... in particular, in the GSVG-ZGV, where not only "going out into the field" of divisions in full strength was practiced, but also "opposing" armies. And right up to the "peace initiatives" of the marked ghoul, it was there that the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division with the staff of the so-called "breakthrough division" existed ... when the motorized rifle regiments included reconnaissance, engineer-sapper, anti-aircraft missile divisions ... in motorized rifle battalions - tank companies, artillery and anti-aircraft batteries and other specialists. Yes, there was overkill in some part, but there was no point-blank "uncontrollable horde" ... because everything depends on commanders and chiefs, their experience and strict observance of existing traditions.

            Yes, the divisions went into the field. At the exercises... wink
    2. The comment was deleted.
  7. NKT
    +4
    24 October 2022 10: 12
    Thanks to the author for the article.
    The reform of the Airborne Forces, in my opinion, is a complex task, where it is also necessary to consider both the Special Forces of the GRU and conventional motorized rifle units together. As shown by the SVO, neither the Airborne Forces nor the Special Forces of the GRU are used for their intended purpose, but carry out their tasks shoulder to shoulder with conventional motorized rifles.
    1. -1
      24 October 2022 10: 17
      Thanks to the author for the article.
      The reform of the Airborne Forces, in my opinion, is a complex task, where it is also necessary to consider both the Special Forces of the GRU and conventional motorized rifle units together. As shown by the SVO, neither the Airborne Forces nor the Special Forces of the GRU are used for their intended purpose, but carry out their tasks shoulder to shoulder with conventional motorized rifles.

      And not only NWO, but even WWII. No wonder all these special forces were disbanded following its results.
      For the projectile in a drum how many times you pull yourself up ...
      1. +3
        24 October 2022 10: 41
        No wonder all these special forces were disbanded following its results.

        And after 5 years they were re-formed. Because special troops are needed to perform special tasks.
      2. +2
        24 October 2022 16: 55
        Rather, on the contrary, the role and number of special forces have increased. That's just according to the doctrine of the Airborne Forces - this is not special forces.
    2. +6
      24 October 2022 10: 40
      As shown by the SVO, neither the Airborne Forces nor the Special Forces of the GRU are used for their intended purpose, but carry out their tasks shoulder to shoulder with conventional motorized rifles.

      The reason is the lack of infantry. Therefore, special forces are fighting instead of infantry.
      1. +1
        24 October 2022 17: 04
        The problem is the lack of trained and motivated infantry. And it goes from tying infantry to infantry fighting vehicles. You can’t put a lot of infantry on an infantry fighting vehicle. You need a lot of infantry fighting vehicles. But a lot of BMPs are expensive. A motorized rifleman without an infantry fighting vehicle is not trained to act. The motorized rifle squad is small and relies not on itself, but on infantry fighting vehicles as fire support. Until now, they cannot solve the problem of where the squad leader is after he dismounts: in the BMP or outside it with the troops.
        It is necessary to turn motorized riflemen into elite units of heavy divisions, and form the bulk of the infantry (to control territories and clean up the area) from motorized infantry units on armored personnel carriers (10-12 airborne troops) with the support of armored vehicles: tanks, BMPT
        1. 0
          25 October 2022 22: 52
          Quote: Cympak
          the bulk of the infantry (to control territories and clean up the area) to form from motorized infantry units on armored personnel carriers

          What a charm ... and the former internal troops, in their current form - the Russian guard - what will they do?
          1. 0
            26 October 2022 10: 26
            Then the National Guard needs to change its goal setting and re-equip for combined arms combat, saturate with artillery, MANPADS, ATGMs, heavy armored vehicles to support
      2. 0
        25 October 2022 14: 28
        I would specify - qualified infantry. You can catch up with a lot, but what's the point of it?
  8. -1
    24 October 2022 11: 59
    To begin with, it is necessary to increase the physical load on the landing force, based on the principle of the Airborne Forces: 5 minutes an eagle, the rest a horse .. Moving 40 km with 30 kg of personal load is the norm for any airmobile part of the troops. Mortarmen add to this two more 120 mm mines of another 32 kg with carrying for 5 km .. Personal shooting training without taking into account the amount of ammunition and jump training are MANDATORY! When this minimum is, then you can continue to dream ...
    1. -1
      24 October 2022 12: 17
      Quote: AlexFly
      To begin with, it is necessary to increase the physical load on the landing, based on the principle of the Airborne Forces: 5 minutes an eagle, the rest a horse .. Moving 40 km with 30 kg of personal load is the norm for any airmobile part of the troops.
      Well, you will be left without personnel, it’s just that you won’t be able to recruit so many of these bullies suitable for landing.
    2. +1
      24 October 2022 17: 09
      To begin with, it is necessary to increase the physical load on the landing force, based on the principle of the Airborne Forces: 5 minutes for an eagle, the rest for a horse

      War needs fighters, not athletes.
      40 km with 30 kg = failure in solving the logistical problem. What will the fighters be like after such a race, but they still need to fight. Recall the 9th company, which carried stoves into the mountains on itself, and when it arrived, it could not prepare a position.
      1. 0
        24 October 2022 17: 37
        CAC wears 40 kg for 54 km and nothing .. Why take girls to the Airborne Forces? If you want to serve there, pull the strap, I carry everything with me. and equipment .. Do not forget that Russia is huge and the transfer of forces over thousands of distances is necessary, quite possibly by amphibious assault on its own territory .. And you will have to carry potbelly stoves anyway, it’s nowhere .. So it’s easier to look for mullahs than to take in the Airborne Forces Arlov
    3. +2
      24 October 2022 23: 48
      Even the Americans will not take it out with their average build and athletic culture.
      Moreover, we won’t take them out - the smaller people we have and strong. And it doesn't rock wildly.
      1. 0
        25 October 2022 22: 57
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Even the Americans will not take it out with their average build and athletic culture.

        I’ll take an interest ... have you personally ever had “meetings” with army ... uh ... Americans? Met. Was disappointed. winked
      2. 0
        27 October 2022 16: 32
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Moreover, we won’t take them out - the smaller people we have and strong.

        We must already discard prejudices and start supplying the troops with anabolics. At least the elite ones. Yes
  9. -1
    24 October 2022 12: 20
    How with this to fight off a pair of "Apache" shooting troops from five kilometers away?
    The air defense of the landing should be provided by aviation. The use of an air defense system by an air defense system is already the end, which means that the fighters have missed everything.
    Again we have three battalions, only now purely on foot, without the BMD-4M - the last Mi-8 will not lift.
    Mi-26 will raise, so we need Mi-26.
    Who and how neutralizes enemy artillery?
    Aviation again. She is first and foremost. If aviation cannot provide landing forces, then there is nothing to throw people away.
  10. +4
    24 October 2022 12: 55
    The concept of Airborne Forces must be abandoned, alas, but there is no such situation where they can be used, even as part of a regiment by landing from aircraft, or rather, the enemy will not give us such an opportunity. But here the main thing is not to throw out the child with "dirty water", namely, it is necessary to create an expeditionary, mobile, Jaeger corps on their basis, the name is not the point. The bottom line is that it should be troops fully staffed by contract soldiers, consisting of divisions created according to the American model. That is, allowing on their basis to form expeditionary brigades with all the means of armed struggle, from machine guns, to tanks, artillery, barrel and jet, missile systems, air defense systems, electronic warfare, reconnaissance and everything else. And they must be highly mobile, able to quickly rise in alarm and leave for the specified areas, to perform their tasks, by all means of transport and on their own.
  11. The comment was deleted.
  12. +3
    24 October 2022 13: 24
    And when was the last time the Airborne Forces were used for their intended purpose?
    The Airborne Forces in all conflicts over the past 40 years have been used as ordinary motorized rifles.
    Not counting the helicopter landing in Gostomel ...
  13. exo
    -1
    24 October 2022 13: 37
    And what is this legendary "11th Airborne Division"? If the American 101, then it is an air assault.
    1. +2
      24 October 2022 23: 46
      What's the problem:

      1. Google,

      or

      2. Open the last part?
      1. exo
        +2
        25 October 2022 11: 41
        Criticism is fair. I missed it in the first part. I'm sorry.
  14. +2
    24 October 2022 14: 03
    With all due respect, you don’t consider it fundamentally as a reserve of the Civil Code capable of quickly deploying in the right direction, but it’s just here that divisions may be needed?
    Comparison with the states, in my opinion, is not entirely correct, they have an ILC and they do not reduce it, even though the MP division is inferior to the TD.
    Thanks in advance for the answer
    P.S. the lack of landing craft is not the fault of the Airborne Forces and is solved by other means.
  15. +1
    24 October 2022 14: 32
    Everything is written correctly - save the branch of the armed forces, leave a few units for the paratroopers, transfer the rest to the air assault units on the BMP-3, attach tanks and self-propelled artillery with air defense.
  16. +4
    24 October 2022 16: 34
    I will share my vision too.
    briefly.
    1. The territory of the Russian Federation should be divided into 6 military districts.

    2. each district should have its own airborne division.
    (for example, Ivanovskaya should be given to the Northern District and, accordingly, her combat training should be tailored to the conditions of the Arctic, Norway, Finns and Canada.) "own" in the sense of the direction of combat training and not subordination.

    3. The division of the Airborne Forces should consist of three regiments.
    a) RAP; b) DSHP; c) DSHP (mountain). There are mountains in almost every region of the planet, including along the borders of the Russian Federation.

    4. The regiment of the Airborne Forces should consist of three BTG, one RB, auxiliary units.

    5. The BTG should be equipped with equipment and weapons, depending on the type of regiment, and should include all the reinforcements that were previously included in separate units.

    6. Disband the Special Forces brigade consisting of 2 battalions. At its base, deploy six special forces battalions, one for each military unit.

    7. The total composition of the Airborne Forces assumes in its composition (in my understanding):
    6 divisions, school, training center, special forces units.
    forget all sorts of brigades and give this name to plumbers and builders.

    8. I agree with the author that the Airborne Forces need to be re-equipped. But it's expensive. Therefore, it is possible not to abandon something, but to modernize. For example. BMD-1, it is necessary to replace the tower with "Berezhok", add booking to the maximum. And give them into service with mountain units. You won't have to swim and parachute there.
    you also need to understand that the task of the DShBat is a helicopter landing in the near rear of the enemy (tactical level). This means that the problem of air defense is being solved by the air defense forces of the SV, Air Force. And even support with artillery to some extent (Iskanders, Daggers, etc.)
    1. +4
      24 October 2022 21: 44
      9. A component of the Airborne Forces - the special forces of the Airborne Forces does not need to solve the problems voiced by the author ...... Because their mission is to land deep behind enemy lines in small groups. These groups absolutely do not need tanks, air defense, or artillery. And they will take a small UAV with them.
      10. Part of the RAP, yes. Needs air defense and good art support. Therefore, these units should have the best and most advanced weapons. Although I am sure that in a modern war they will also operate in small groups.

      In any case, sending parts of the PD regiments and special forces into the trenches into the trenches is incredible stupidity, and also extremely expensive.
      In the NWO, I would attract the Airborne Forces as a DRG, but into the trenches .........

      throw slippers))
      Regarding additional tasks for the Airborne Forces - peacekeeping operations from the Russian Federation.
  17. +3
    24 October 2022 20: 14
    Seven large hats from one sheep will never be sewn. But idiots are still trying to do it. To dump almost all the functions and duties of the armed forces on the landing is cretinism. Let's give them more atomic bombs and missiles. fool
  18. +1
    24 October 2022 22: 08
    Communication companies for such tasks will not be enough. If such, say, a brigade, allocates something near the regiment with its own command to solve some problem, at least the command posts of this "regiment" must be provided with at least a company of communications down and up (one step above direct command is mandatory), with neighbors on the left on the right, satellite, zas, maybe with aviation and artillery. Cables, switches, data transmission.
    So, rather, either divisions should be smaller, say, up to six thousand, but with a full set of divisional support units, or let them be brigades, but again with a divisional set of support units.
    Apparently, the truth for modernity is somewhere between a division and a brigade in terms of numbers, but here we are stuck in the dogmas of the past - either a division up to 14000, or a brigade of 3-4, and we are trying to squeeze modernity into these parameters, but under the number 5- 8 thousand names were not invented before, but now we are rushing about, and this way and that, back and forth. Yes, name at least a third, at least a legion - if it is so expedient, then you need to do it.
    Although, there is another factor here, which will seem like sheer nonsense to civilians, but it is very important for military personnel, and it is impossible not to take it into account: our brigade commander is a colonel (and deputies, by the way, too), and the division commander is a major general, and this is for ambitious campaigner (and others are not needed) - two big differences. And that is why we copy everything from the West, but, however, they did not fork out either before the revolution or after the title of "brigadier general". As a result, our populist struggle with the number of generals may, in response, cause lobbying for divisions where they are inappropriate. And where can paratroopers get generals, only at the headquarters of the Airborne Forces? After all, "that soldier is bad ...". and even more so - an officer who does not dream ...
    1. +2
      24 October 2022 23: 44
      Well, let's inflate the connection to a reinforced company, to a five-platoon company. What number is needed, this will be.

      Apparently, the truth for modernity is somewhere between a division and a brigade in terms of numbers, but here we are stuck in the dogmas of the past - either a division up to 14000, or a brigade of 3-4, and we are trying to squeeze modernity into these parameters, but under the number 5- 8 thousand names were not invented before, but now we are rushing about, and this way and that, back and forth. Yes, name at least a third, at least a legion - if it is so expedient, then you need to do it.


      We need to fit on planes.

      Although, there is another factor here, which will seem like sheer nonsense to civilians, but it is very important for regular military personnel, and it is impossible not to take it into account: our brigade commander is a colonel (and deputies, by the way, too), and the division commander is a major general


      Let's make the brigade commander a major general, and his deputy commander of a regimental airborne detachment, a colonel.
      And that's all.
    2. NKT
      -1
      25 October 2022 17: 40
      And that is why we copy everything from the West, but, however, they did not fork out either before the revolution or after the title of "brigadier general".

      Until May 1940, after all, we had the ranks: brigade commander, division commander, commander, army commander 2r, army commander 1r. in total, there are 5 steps to the marshal, and after the re-certification, only 4 remained.
  19. 0
    25 October 2022 00: 24
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Let's make the brigade commander a major general, and his deputy commander of a regimental airborne detachment, a colonel.
    And that's all.

    Yep, do it.
    There is some kind of directly ideological ambush - it is impossible! At least in the last 200 years. Yes, and this step is still a divisional commander. Is it weak for a brigadier general to do the same? In order not to introduce a new form - a shoulder strap with a golden zigzag without a star, and stripes for trousers, oak leaves for buttonholes, and sewing for a cap. Delov...
    So the liberals will raise a cry: the generals are inflated! Where? Wherever, wherever, if you want to become a general - go to Ryazan, study, jump, run, shoot, you won’t see children, but why shout?
    Also with the conscripts, some kind of ideological terrorism of the NGO "Committee of Soldiers' Mothers", as a result of which we have that the conscript, like, is not a warrior, but a retired conscript is not a mobile reserve.
    1. 0
      25 October 2022 14: 40
      It seems that inventing a new title is still more expensive than changing the rules for assigning current ones. Well, and at the expense of urgent service. Why does everyone serve in Israel and there is no such "glow" of passions? I know a couple of people who "ran" from our service and eventually "ran away" straight to the Israel Defense Forces, as repatriates laughing . An army for a conscript should be an army, and not a place of "departure" and wasted time. Then the attitude towards her will be different.
    2. 0
      25 October 2022 18: 27
      Yes, it’s not weak for me to make a brigadier general, why only ...
      I would stupidly solve the issue in the Airborne Forces like this and that's it. Since this is a separate shop with us.
  20. 0
    25 October 2022 11: 10
    Reform again. after all, this was all already and they changed the divisions to brigades and returned them again. maybe all these reforms are not necessary, but simply the coherence of the divisions. and it doesn’t matter the division. or brigade
  21. 0
    25 October 2022 12: 55
    “The war of engines, mechanization, aviation and chemistry were invented by military experts. For now, the main thing is the horse. The decisive role in the future war will be played by the cavalry.” Shchadenko E.A., assistant to the head of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze for political affairs, 1936.
  22. 0
    25 October 2022 13: 57
    The author Sasha Timokhin continues to carry nonsense against the background of a complete lack of knowledge and understanding of the process, so to speak, hype on the chaff ...
    Sasha sees the air defense of the Airborne Forces only in separate regiments ... you don’t have to read further .... before you disgrace yourself on the Internet, you need to find out the OShS.
    And where did the air defense in the RAP and DSHP, where did they go in the battalions?
    1. 0
      25 October 2022 18: 25
      Not the author Oleg continues his blah blah blah without specifics.

      Let's be specific. Why is there a divisional link in the Airborne Forces, but a miracle?

      Sasha sees the air defense of the Airborne Forces only in separate regiments


      The regimental anti-aircraft missile battery is strong, yes. To the regiment
      1. 0
        26 October 2022 08: 13
        The divisional link in the Airborne Forces is not a miracle, it is the main operational-tactical formation))) .. what does "why" mean? Then, why in the RF Armed Forces tank brigades and motorized rifle divisions, to solve the assigned tasks, and, in general, then, why in the USA 101 and 82 divisions))))
        A regimental anti-aircraft missile battery is not strong, nothing happens "strongly" in a war, there is always little, and there are few batteries in a motorized rifle regiment, just like there is not enough anti-aircraft missile platoon in a battalion, moreover, this platoon is not enough, which in the airborne battalion / airborne assault, and in the motorized rifle battalion ....
        If we continue this topic, that the military air defense in our Armed Forces, in general, has been rather weak for centuries, as such, covering the troops from the air is not really carried out, and the SVO has been exposed to indecent.
        Once again, before trying to teach something, you need to learn the topic of the lesson yourself, a good teacher should always know a little better than the average student, and when a student comes across with a level higher than the teacher, the teacher will always be ashamed of illiteracy)) )
        1. 0
          26 October 2022 14: 29
          and, in general, then, why in the USA 101 and 82 divisions))))


          The level is clear, thanks.
          1. 0
            26 October 2022 15: 02
            The level of people who, without understanding anything in the topic, are trying to discuss, moreover, to build some kind of projectors)))) ... and when you pin them, so to speak, to the wall, with facts, they "gurgle" and go to the bottom ...)))
            There, over there, stupid people from NATO, especially from the USA, 101 divisions began the transfer ... they are probably completely stupid, they keep so many divisions, and also brigades ...
            1. 0
              27 October 2022 21: 05
              so to speak, to the wall, with facts, they "bulk" and to the bottom ...)))


              So bulk to the bottom then you have.
              The author does not understand anything, but I will not say how it should be, and in a mink with a smart expression on his face.
              In fact, in essence, you simply have nothing to object to.
              1. 0
                28 October 2022 09: 23
                The most basic thing to do is to create modern weapons and equipment, what is needed today and already tomorrow in the war!!! Nothing prevents engineers and designers from turning on their heads and placing modern air defense systems on a landing platform, on the basis of Rakushka, an air defense system detection and control station has already been placed, which prevents the weapon itself from being planted there .. or making a prototype ?? Svo introduced us to the excellent 777 howitzer, which, oddly enough, was created in the USA for the Airborne Forces and the Marine Corps, because, as the lightest, air-transported, and for us, it means air-landed sample, the performance characteristics of our old lady D30 in terms of firing range and opportunities to use VTB are not comparable. The most important thing is that the problems are exposed not of the Airborne Forces, but of the Armed Forces as a whole, even the Ground Forces have no analogues 777, Khaimars, etc. Therefore, the problem is not that we are following the utopian scenario of creating airborne equipment and weapons, but because for many years we have not created these weapons, as such, at all. It is necessary to work on this, and not on endless reforms of the OShS, it is necessary not to reshape the caftan, but to saturate the units with fire capabilities, increase their quantity and quality.
          2. 0
            26 October 2022 15: 12
            in 1997, if I didn’t forget, I had the good fortune to observe the joint exercises "Centrazbat" (Russia, USA, Turkey, Kazakhstan), from Carolina (Fort Brag) the Americans transferred to C17 and parachuted a battalion and several Hummers, we reconnaissance 119 RAP ( Naro-Fominsk) in full force with standard equipment (BMD2), the Turks, near the battalion, landed from the Hercules ... the results of the landing of hp. and technology, the results of the implementation of the immediate task in the area of ​​​​the landing site, a separate topic, there will be a desire, I will lead, and the very fact that far from the last countries of the world are engaged in this nonsense suggests that it is necessary (like stars that light up). By the way, the Americans flew with 2 or 3 refuelings in the air, that is, the development of another most complex element, not to mention the escort of the battle formation and the creation of the VTA flyway and all the other turbidity that accompanies this.
  23. 0
    25 October 2022 14: 03
    Enough about all these parachute landings! ?? What landings??? For the European theater of operations, it will be just suicide, ask any BTA pilot ... everyone will die before they reach it! All that remains is Africa, the Middle East .. well, or some Asian regions. I think that after this war a serious reform of the Airborne Forces is coming. I myself pulled urgent 83-85 to 119gvdp, and then 15 more around the world ....
    1. 0
      25 October 2022 17: 40
      Or you can read the first two articles from the series to learn about the Arctic theater.
      1. 0
        25 October 2022 18: 18
        At the beginning of the link text, look
    2. +1
      25 October 2022 18: 19
      All that remains is Africa, the Middle East .. well, or some Asian regions.


      Well, yes. Plus Russia. What is it about
  24. +1
    25 October 2022 17: 41
    Excellent article, all on the shelves. It remains to get through to the authorities. Let's hope this year clears their minds.
  25. 0
    25 October 2022 20: 34
    The article is unprincipled.
    A task. It is necessary to set the TASK. And under it to create (not to reform, namely to create!) Troops.
    And not to create troops, and then scratch their turnips, wherever they are, so beautiful, and so that the order is fulfilled, and so that not everyone lies down.
    1. +1
      25 October 2022 21: 52
      The second part about tasks, link in the text
  26. 0
    25 October 2022 21: 41
    Reform what is not left, not bad
  27. 0
    25 October 2022 23: 02
    Good evening Alexander. Thanks for the interesting articles. Late, but still I consider it necessary to pay attention to the fact that the entire trilogy about the Airborne Forces does not take into account the need to land, together with the Nona SAO, their mobile control posts 1V119. Of which, in the states of the 1980s, for example, there were 10 units in the regiment, with 18 Nona SAOs. That is, one 1V119 machine for two guns. Which somewhat increases the need for aircraft.
    1. 0
      26 October 2022 13: 13
      In the last article, the reserve for the controls of 2 aircraft is indicated.
  28. 0
    29 October 2022 15: 12
    I think that the idea that we won’t need to land anywhere more than one airborne regiment at a time (in the first wave of landing) is deeply erroneous ... We have already replicated the postulates that they say the modern Russian army, if conflicts are coming, then this there will be conflicts of low intensity, mainly the fight against various kinds of militants ... And in larger-scale hostilities, we will use nuclear weapons ... In reality, we are already participating in a conflict of far from low intensity and there were not enough troops for it, I had to call on the storekeepers and it’s not yet known: will there be enough of those called up, will they have to be called up again ... Therefore, disfiguring the airborne troops in the hope that they won’t have to seriously fight with anyone is a gamble ... By the way, about the fact that there are not enough troops says the decree of President V.V. Putin to increase the size of the army by 137 thousand people ...
  29. 0
    30 October 2022 17: 45
    If the Mi-26 will be used in the landing operation


    Further, even reading is not interesting.
  30. 0
    30 October 2022 19: 00
    Excuse me. I read the comments. With the current level of air defense systems, landing is theoretically possible only if somewhere in Africa or Asia (theoretically), as well as on the territory of Russia, if an urgent transfer of troops is necessary ...
    Contain the Airborne Forces for this purpose ... Well, so-so thought.
    I think landing should be left to the special forces of the Airborne Forces, the rest should turn into a mobile elite of motorized riflemen with a complete support structure for the possibility of autonomous operations.
  31. 0
    30 October 2022 19: 16
    Strong essay. The topic is deeply worked out. Next, you need to discuss the General Staff with the headquarters of the Airborne Forces.
    It is necessary to strengthen air defense and anti-tank systems + drones (from personal at the squad level to strategic ones) + communications + automated control system + high-quality combat training + tactical medicine. The introduction of heavy units into the composition is mandatory for the possibility of conducting combined arms combat, what the Airborne Forces have to do and will have to do. From the 152 mm airmobile artillery, self-propelled guns 2S36 with a range of over 20 km are possible. (the project is frozen, but the next iteration of Non is much more promising, because when the enemy spuds from 30-40 km, and you can only answer max from 12...).
    It may be advisable to introduce training in combat tactics in the conditions of the city, forest, desert, tundra, mountains, and the Arctic into the RDP.
  32. 0
    April 15 2023 00: 05
    and how did Verba prove ineffective in Syria? against what?)))) against copters that one?))
  33. 0
    10 February 2024 19: 12
    Since 2005:
    98th Guards airborne division (composition: 2 regiments)
    106th Guards airborne division (composition: 2 regiments)
    76th Guards air assault division (composition: 2 regiments)
    31st Guards separate air assault brigade (composition: 3 battalions)
    7th Guards air assault mountain division (composition: 2 regiments)
    If we consider the brigade as a reinforced regiment, we get a total of 9 regiments.

    The non-stop, non-parachute method is quite specific (from helicopters on cables) for small special units (squad - platoon) and can be used not only in the Airborne Forces, but also in the Marine Corps (MP).
    Air (parachute)-landing formations - landing by non-stop parachute method (4 regiments).
    Air assault formations - landing by landing method (4 regiments + 1 brigade, of which 2 regiments are for military operations in the mountains). By application airmobile motorized rifle units!

    1. For actions from the front (offensive, capture, defense), the OSS corresponds to combined arms, and should not be considered as for autonomous actions. Same for MP. Without combined arms support it makes no sense.
    2. For operations behind enemy lines, the organizational and staffing structure (OSS) plays a secondary role; the composition depends on the goals and objectives.
    3. The acquisition of equipment is due to the possibility of transportation by military transport aviation of the military transport aviation and the possibility of parachute landing (rather a possibility). Basic actions (drop-in, capture for landing of air transport, build-up of forces, defense and attack). Also, without combined arms support it makes no sense, except if there is absolutely no opposition.

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