Defeat of Murat in the Battle of Tarutino

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Defeat of Murat in the Battle of Tarutino
Peter von Hess. Battle of Tarutino


General situation


During the Tarutinsky March (How the French lost the Russian army) the Russian army broke away from the enemy, won time to rest and replenish. The Russian army in Tarutino, 80 km from Moscow, where the troops arrived on September 21 (October 3), 1812, controlled the Old Kaluga, Tula and Ryazan roads. Kutuzov warned a possible enemy movement to Kaluga. Also, Russian troops put pressure on the French in Moscow.



A very convenient place south of the Nara River was chosen for the camp of the Russian army. From the front, the position was protected by the river and artillery batteries; the right flank was located on the heights and was fenced off by a ravine, and was also covered by artillery. The left flank adjoined a dense forest and was covered by the Istya River, and the rear of the army was a solid forest.

Meanwhile, the position of Napoleon's Grand Army in Moscow deteriorated rapidly and dramatically. The army was demoralized by the sacking of the old Russian capital. Parts literally before our eyes turned into gangs of robbers, hoarders, who only cared about their prey. Most of Moscow burned down in a terrible fire, it was not suitable for wintering. In addition, the city was gradually surrounded by flying cavalry detachments, partisans and Cossacks, knocking out French foragers. For the extraction of food and fodder, it was necessary to equip large detachments. That is, it was difficult to feed at the expense of the surrounding territory. For the protection of communications had to allocate significant forces. Bonaparte's hope of starting peace negotiations with Tsar Alexander quickly vanished. The Russian sovereign ignored the proposals of the French.

Napoleon realized that he needed to leave urgently, until the prerequisites for a catastrophe became a reality. The most tempting road was the southern one, through Kaluga to Volyn. There it was possible to find provisions and connect with the Austrian and Saxon troops of Schwarzenberg and Rainier. But for this it was necessary to again defeat the army of Kutuzov, also on the southern flank were the Russian armies of Tormasov and Chichagov. And the Austrians irritated with their passivity. It was still possible to go north of the Smolensk road, to the Nizhny Neman, where large reserves were prepared. Here it was possible to rely on the support of the 2nd and 6th corps of Oudinot and Saint-Cyr in Polotsk. In addition, it was possible to leave along the familiar Smolensk road, but there the area was devastated by the war.

At this time, the Russian commander-in-chief Kutuzov developed a plan to defeat the enemy. On the southern flank, the troops of Chichagov and Tormasov were to link up as quickly as possible and put pressure on the right flank of the enemy, go to the Smolensk road, intercepting French communications and going into the rear of Napoleon. On the northern flank, Wittgenstein's troops were to pin down the enemy forces on the line of the Western Dvina.

As a result, Kutuzov was preparing to defeat the main enemy forces in the area between the Dnieper, Berezina and Western Dvina. The army of Kutuzov attacked in the center, the troops of Tormasov, Chichagov and Wittgenstein - from the south and north.


Operation plan


Since September 24, Murat's vanguard has been stationed, watching the Russian army, not far from the village of Tarutino on the Chernishna River (a tributary of the Nara). The French grouping consisted of the following units: the 5th Corps of Poniatowski, all 4 cavalry corps of the Great Army (but after Borodin there were few sabers left in them). Under the command of Murat there were 20-26 thousand soldiers with 197 guns. The front and right flank of the extended disposition of the forces of the Neapolitan king were protected by the rivers Nara and Chernishnia, the left wing went into an open place where only the forest separated the French from the Russian positions.

For about two weeks, the positions of the Russian and French armies were side by side. The opposing sides coexisted for some time without clashes. A.P. Ermolov noted:

"Gg. generals and officers gathered at the front posts with an expression of courtesy, which was a reason for many to conclude that there was a truce.

Having received intelligence data that the enemy would apparently leave Moscow, the Russian command decided to attack the French avant-garde, crushing the enemy in parts. This was facilitated by the fact that the left flank of the Murat group, which abuts against the Dednevsky forest, was not actually guarded. The offensive was planned for 4–5 (16–17) October 1812. However, due to management errors (the order was not transmitted on time), the army did not act at that time. In addition, intelligence reported on the movement of the enemy along the Old and New Kaluga roads (later it turned out that this was erroneous information). Kutuzov postponed the offensive until 6 (18) October.

The Russian headquarters overestimated the enemy's forces twice (they numbered 45-50 thousand Frenchmen). Therefore, the main forces of the army were to take part in the battle. The composition of the right flank under the leadership of Bennigsen included the 2nd, 3rd, 4th infantry corps, 10 Cossack regiments, parts of the 1st cavalry corps. The left flank and center under the command of Miloradovich included the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th infantry corps and two cuirassier divisions. Kutuzov remained with the reserves in the camp and provided general leadership.

The main blow to the left wing of the enemy was to be delivered by Bennigsen's corps. The troops were divided into three columns and a reserve. The first column was made up of cavalry under the command of Orlov-Denisov: 10 Cossack regiments, one cavalry chasseur, two dragoons, one hussar, one lancer regiment. Orlov-Denisov was supposed to go around the left flank of the French troops through the Dednevsky forest and go to their rear near the village of Stremilova.

The second column, as part of the infantry units of Baggovut's 2nd Corps, attacked the enemy's left wing from the front near the village of Teterino (Teterinka). The 4th Infantry Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy entered the third column. The 4th Corps was to attack the center of the French troops, also located near the village of Teterino. In reserve was the 3rd infantry corps of Stroganov, the 1st cavalry corps of Meller-Zakomelsky. The reserve reinforced Baggovut's 2nd column.

Miloradovich's troops were to forge the right wing of the enemy in battle. In addition, the army partisan detachments of Dorokhov and Figner struck at the rear of the enemy. The plan was good, but its implementation depended on the synchronicity and successful interaction of the Russian troops.


Battle


Bennigsen and Tol were unable to launch their offensive in time. Only the Orlov-Denisov column arrived on time and launched an offensive. The other two columns got lost in the night forest and were late. At 7 o'clock in the morning, the Russian Cossacks hit Sebastiani's division and took the enemy by surprise. Orlov-Denisov noted the feat of 42 officers of the Cossack regiments, who,

“Being always in the hunters ahead, the first ones cut into the enemy cavalry columns, overturned and drove to the infantry covering their batteries; when the enemy formed up and prepared to attack, they, warning him, despising all the danger and horror of death, regardless of either shotgun or rifle volleys, rushed desperately at the enemy, cutting into the ranks, laying down many on the spot, and drove the rest in great disorder. several miles."

The French fled in panic, leaving 38 guns. The Cossack regiments went to the Ryazanov ravine, along which the road to Spas-Kuplya ran. Murat himself saved the left wing from complete defeat, he organized a counterattack, gathered the fugitives. The Cossacks were met by the cavalry of Claparede and Nansouty and pushed back.

At this time, units of the 2nd Infantry Corps began to appear opposite Teterinka. They launched an offensive without waiting for the rest of the troops to leave the forest. The French were already ready to attack and stubbornly fought back. Baggovut organized an attack on the Ryazanov defile, along which the French troops retreated. Marshal Murat, realizing the danger of the situation, gathered troops and drove the Russian rangers out of the ravine. Baggovut died in this battle.

Bennigsen did not dare to repeat the attack and waited for the approach of the third column and the reserve. This allowed Murat, under the cover of artillery, to withdraw the main forces, carts and part of the artillery to the Spas-Kupla. When units of the 2th and 4rd corps joined the regiments of the 3nd corps, it was already too late, the enemy was already leaving. The battle ended with the defeat of Murat's troops. The French retreated. Russian batteries suppressed the remaining French artillery. The retreat of the enemy quickly turned into a flight. The Russian cavalry pursued the enemy to Voronov.

The troops of the right flank did not enter the battle at all. Kutuzov, having received news of the movement of Napoleon's troops, stopped the corps of the right wing. Also, the commander-in-chief did not pursue Murat's troops.

It was not possible to completely defeat the French avant-garde due to command errors, both in planning and during the battle itself. In particular, only a small part of the Russian army participated in the battle - 12 thousand people. But on the whole, it was a victory that strengthened the morale of the Russian army.

The French lost about 4,5 thousand people killed, wounded and captured (according to other sources - 2 thousand people, including 1,5 thousand prisoners), 38 guns and part of the convoy. Russian losses amounted to about 1 people.

The news of the Battle of Tarutino forced Napoleon Bonaparte to start withdrawing from Moscow on the same day.


Portrait of Karl Fedorovich Baggovut (1761-1812) by George Dow. Military gallery of the Winter Palace
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  1. 0
    12 October 2022 19: 34
    As this battle showed, Murat is a commander, but on our part, not quite, well, there was no connection just like now
  2. +1
    13 October 2022 13: 25
    Thanks for the interesting article Alexander.

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