Military Review

Implications of military reform for the Navy

Fleet today, virtually no one commands - the sailors themselves think

Implications of military reform for the Navy

The weekly "Military Industrial Complex" has repeatedly addressed the topic of organizational and staff events held in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In particular, the 32 – 35 number for the 2012 year gives an expert assessment of the military construction phase of the Russian Armed Forces, which began after the 2008 year. In № 36, 37, the priorities of military construction and a number of doctrinal issues were touched upon. In issue number 27 – 30 “MIC” addressed some of the problems of the shipbuilding program. In this issue, readers are offered an opinion on the new structure of the Russian Navy.

The large-scale organizational and staff measures carried out in recent years in the Armed Forces set (according to their authors) the destruction of complex bureaucratic administrative structures that had become rigid in the past decades. But in some areas of military construction, the final result turned out, according to representatives of the domestic expert community, is not entirely unambiguous.

By and large, the initial plan of the reform of the Armed Forces is correct and timely. It was necessary to reduce the excessively swollen command and control apparatus, increase the army mobility and efficiency of executing directives and orders of the General Staff and the Supreme Commander, and adapt the control system of the Armed Forces to the realities of modern warfare.

It was understood that future military conflicts would be exclusively regional in scope. The threat of a large-scale war at this stage was considered unlikely. In 8 wars of August 2008, the ability of formations and units of branches of the Armed Forces (combat arms) to act effectively and quickly by relatively small tactical groups was considered the most important.

As a model for a new type of command and control system (for commanding troops and forces) in such conflicts, similar Western models were taken as a model. It would seem that in numerous local wars and conflicts of recent times, they have proven their high efficiency. However, the copying of foreign samples and models, as well as their mechanical transfer to domestic soil, rarely gives positive results. And there are many historical examples.

In this particular case, a complete and authentic copy, of course, failed. Much had to be redone according to local conditions. As a result, the organization of command and control of troops (forces), which turned out at the exit, turned out to be, as most experts believe, quite controversial in its effectiveness. There are also more radical assessments - it is completely unable to manage the troops and the Navy in particular at all in any effective way. In the fleet will dwell.

What, in the opinion of a number of experts, were the most significant errors in the creation of a fundamentally new control system for our army and navy?

For a complete understanding of the current situation in the fleet in the field of management, let us consider, first, the American original. The pinnacle of the office is the president of the United States, directly giving orders to the Secretary of Defense. The administrative branch of management begins in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is divided into four main types of armed forces: the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps. The chief of staff of the Navy, subordinate to the Minister of the Navy, is responsible for the organization and training of subordinates, as well as determining the needs of the Navy. The command of the fleet forces is an administrative-strategic unit that unites the US Pacific and Atlantic fleets and partially duplicates the functions of the chief of staff.

The operational unit is a single command, subordinate directly to the US Secretary of Defense. Under his command there are several types of armed forces operating jointly in a certain area of ​​responsibility and assigned by order of the minister of the corresponding type of armed forces.

Currently, there are six commands in the US: African, Central, European, Pacific, North and South. In the described system, as you can see, the main focus is on a clear separation of administrative and operational management verticals, as well as the maximum concentration of commands of different types of armed forces (combat arms) in one joint headquarters.

Exactly the same capabilities were required from the Russian command and control system (forces) before the reform. Before turning to the analysis of what was done in the course of the reform, it is necessary to look back - from which management system did modern reformers refuse?

Previously, she looked like that. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, he is the President of Russia, the Minister of Defense submitted to him. Further, the now rejected principle of the “commander - chief of staff” pair was implemented, which, starting from the minister of defense (as chief commander) and chief of the general staff (as chief staff officer), ran vertically down to the battalion level.

The General Staff was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. He was in charge of the operational management of the Navy - a body that plans to use the forces and means of the fleet, as well as their interaction with other branches of the Armed Forces (combat arms), and a body that implements operational management solutions - the Central Command Post of the Navy. Further, orders and orders went down to specific combat units.

This system, inherited from the Soviet Union, has been working for many years. The need for some modernization to bring this management scheme into a modern look was obvious.

Now let's look at the new device of the Russian Armed Forces.

Today, the chain of command begins with the president in the role of commander-in-chief, who gives commands directly to the minister of defense. The Minister, in turn, reports to the Chief of the General Staff, responsible for the system of high command, including the Navy. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy performs only administrative functions: organization of combat training, fleet development activities, material support, training of specialists, development of statutory documents.

The operational command of the fleet is now carried out by the naval department of the Joint Strategic Command (USC), which reports to the General Staff and has a certain area of ​​responsibility. In the course of the reform, four USKs were created: the Western, in charge of the Northern and Baltic fleets, the Southern fleet, which leads the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla, the Central and Eastern Fleet, which is responsible for the Pacific Fleet.

As you can see, the domestic scheme, largely repeating the transatlantic, is considerably simplified. Firstly, the American chiefs of staffs represent all types of armed forces, in contrast to one land general in the Armed Forces. Secondly, there are no operational controls at the Main Command of the Navy.

In other words, the direct control of the fleet is in the hands of the USC, unlike the command of the forces of the US fleet, which has the authority to enforce combat orders from the national command.

These simplifications, apparently, were carried out in order to further optimize the management apparatus. It was intended to further shorten the time for passing an order directly to the executive ship. It seems to be formally all right and at first glance the goal is achieved. But how close is this paper organization to the realities of our Armed Forces?

Probably, it’s worth starting with the fundamentals of the foundation - the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, more precisely, the formulation of external threats to our country. And it turns out that there is simply no clearly marked adversary in the doctrine. And if so, what should the troops (forces) reflect and what should they be prepared for? Correspondingly difficult is the formulation of tactical and technical tasks for defense-industrial complex enterprises in the development and serial production of weapons and military equipment. It is completely unclear what the “sharpened” equipment is specifically needed by the army and the fleet.

But this is the smallest of the problems facing the fleet today. Sailors are happy at least some ships. But who and how will these ships manage?

From the old memory I want to say - the commander in chief of the Navy. However, today this statement is more than far from the truth. Glavkomat now lost all available controls. Until recently, the General Staff of the Navy was subordinated to such a body as the Central Command Post of the Navy, responsible for the management of all available fleet forces both in peacetime and in wartime. However, from December 1 2011, the PCU was abolished. Together with him went the last opportunity to lead the fleet at the operational level.

However, the Main Committee (apparently, as a consolation prize) remained only administrative functions. Meanwhile, the command of the fleet was not only curtailed by the possibilities, but also seriously reduced the number of personnel. Of the 850 officers, only 90 retained their posts in the Main Committee. Naturally, such a modest composition is simply impossible to solve any serious problems. For example, the same development of TTZ for defense enterprises. As a result, no matter how tragicomic it may sound, many employees themselves do not fully understand what they should do.

Who is now entrusted with the operational management of the Navy?

This function was entirely assumed by the united headquarters of the joint strategic commands. The solution, we repeat, is correct in theory (and proven in the West in practice) - various types of the Armed Forces (combat arms) should effectively coordinate their actions. However, as mentioned above, today naval officers do not take the slightest participation in fleet command.

Instead, they are engaged in a purely land commanders and with quite predictable results. Moreover, the number of the naval department, for example, the Western District, which is immediately responsible for two full-fledged fleets, is just 14 people. From any point of view it is difficult to explain such a system. It is not surprising that sailors often complain about absurd and inadequate directions from district headquarters.

The next minus of USC is the insufficiently clearly defined area of ​​responsibility outside the borders of the Russian Federation. Formally, each district has its own region, but there are still no clearly defined boundaries, like those of the United Combat Command. Imagine a situation in which the ship, for example, Eastern USC makes the transition to the Mediterranean Sea, located in the zone of responsibility of the Southern USC. It is difficult to say who this unit will submit to in this case.

Meanwhile, at the early stage of the reform, the idea of ​​creating a command of a distant sea zone was considered. Unfortunately, this project still remains unfulfilled. And this is not the only organizational flaw in the new system. Over the years, a sophisticated system of communication and information exchange between the command and individual units, including strategic submarine missile carriers, has also been violated.

If earlier the “atomic” signal could reach each submarine personally from the commander-in-chief, then with the liquidation of the Naval Communications Directorate, most of the channels were cut off. An additional element of confusion, and a very considerable one, in the activity of the fleet is the recent redeployment of the commander-in-chief of the Navy from Moscow to St. Petersburg. But more about that below.

The third flaw, which can be fatal, was the actual separation of the naval nuclear deterrence forces from the forces of the Northern Fleet, which ensured their actions. Recall, according to the draft reform of the command of the strategic nuclear forces is independent of the USC. This means additional difficulties in the interaction. Orders will have to be coordinated sequentially on several levels. In the case of force majeure, it takes a lot of precious time.

Reorganization, which is more appropriately called collapse, has undergone and the system of military education in the fleet. Borrowed from the United States, it was also largely incapable in the Russian context. About 75 percent of graduates are dismissed immediately after graduation, receiving a diploma of higher vocational education. Meanwhile, an unprecedented concentration of higher education institutions destroyed many of the best military schools of its kind in the navy, forcing them to merge with major centers. As a result, further radical changes are needed, otherwise the number of officers in the fleet may drop to a critical level.

Probably no one will be surprised by the fact that almost all sailors - from fleet commanders (chiefs of staff at various levels) to ship / submarine commanders - were from the very beginning opposed to such transformations. However, they did not reckon with their opinion. Moreover, according to the long-established Russian tradition, the plan and even the course of the reform were kept secret until the very last moment.

Perhaps the most complete and capacious description of what is happening with the fleet is the epic with the relocation of the Navy Main Command to St. Petersburg. Absolutely unnecessary for strategic reasons, protracted for a long time, which caused frank chaos in fleet management, disrupted the organizational structure of command centers, communications centers, fleet management bodies, and most importantly, incredibly, simply prohibitively expensive.

According to the most preliminary estimates, it cost up to 50 billion rubles. For comparison: a very expensive even by world standards PKK CH "Yuri Dolgoruky" cost the Ministry of Defense two times cheaper. Is this not the best illustration of the senselessness of the redeployment of the General Staff of the Navy, undertaken solely for voluntaristic considerations, very far from the issues of genuinely strengthening the country's defense.

As a result, the situation with the operational management of the Navy cannot be called anything other than catastrophic today. In fact, what we have now is a direct opposite of the old Soviet system, which, according to fleet veterans, was distinguished by sufficient speed, reliability, management efficiency and high professionalism of the personnel.

Again - and this system was not perfect, especially in the mid-2000-s. The need for modernization is long overdue, including radical cuts in the number of government bodies. For example, the size of the General Staff in the USSR was one and a half times less than the pre-reform "brain of the army." However, they decided to chop up the stairs from above. This ultimately led to many errors, which, naturally, could have been avoided.
What should be done in order for the fleet to regain the meaning of life and be able to fulfill its original purpose? It is absolutely clear that we cannot do without another thorough restructuring of the entire control system. Experts propose to return the old system (of course, with elements of the necessary modernization), the main structural units of which were previously the Central Command Point of the Navy, the Central Computing Center of the Navy, the Central Communications Center of the Navy, and the operational management of the Navy.

In other words, the fleet must remain independent from the command of the district structure with its own control system. The benefit will be the unified command itself, which will be able to direct the vacated command resources to the more familiar Ground Forces and Air Force. It remains only for the very top to realize the need for urgent correction of errors. Otherwise, they will have to pay for them at very high rates.

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  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 October 2012 15: 38
    A definite plus, and it is a pity that you can put only one plus. Very competent article. Nothing to add - except that the Air Force was in a similar situation.
    1. nagual
      nagual 24 October 2012 19: 18
      The article made a fundamental mistake. When describing control systems, operational command is confused with administrative. So, the Minister of Defense and all the MoD is an administrative governing body that is responsible for the issues of vital activity of the Armed Forces. Similarly, according to the chain - the functions of the high command, including the naval, now belong to the administrative, in connection with which the powers and staff are cut. Now even the supply and logistics of fleets are transferred to the jurisdiction operational strategic commands (not unitedas in wikipedia article lol ) They already have operational functions, that is, functions of command and control of forces in strategic directions during the hostilities. Moreover, the management of all forces on a given theater - both land, and air, and sea. To do this, in the USC relevant departments. So the salary transfer scheme is one, the payback scheme of combat orders is another. They should not be confused. So, the furniture maker, beloved here, has nothing to do with operational management, he is more of the quartermaster.
      As for the subordination of the forces of the fleet beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, there is also no confusion. For example, the campaign of Kuznetsov to the Syrian coast was controlled from the USC West, and, by the way, the first deputy and the beginning. the headquarters of the "West" - just Admiral Maximov. This is because the BF and SF are subordinate to the western USC.
      As for the separate naval command of the far sea zone - I do not know how expedient it is again to create a separate naval command structure that will operate separately from the East Kazakhstan region and other forces? All the same, she will have to temporarily give control to the fleet involved in the operation, which are constantly subordinate to their headquarters in their waters. This is when there will be a separate Mediterranean or Caribbean-Cuban squadron bully may be appropriate. In the meantime, it will turn out - command without subordinates and supply bases.
      Further. Strategic nuclear forces, including naval forces, are directly subordinated, and not through the districts, not in vain. Need to explain why?
      There are no difficulties in the interaction of naval strategic forces with “non-strategic” forces. They have a single operational management, and a separate management for the use of nuclear weapons directly from the "nuclear case" in the case of the mentioned "force majeure". In my opinion, this is the only way.
      The general conclusion that the fleet should remain independent of other forces may warm my proud naval soul, but it contributes little to management efficiency. Now the means of the fleet, aviation, air defense / aerospace defense and air defense - can not be controlled separately. All these are only instruments of forces acting in a given direction. Otherwise, we will come to just long coordination and actions of units separately from each other. This is just plain stupid.
      Well and more. The reform was conceived by Marshal Ogarkov. It was he who wanted to divide operational management into strategic areas, with a common command of all available forces, and with a separate subordination of strategic nuclear forces. So no need for "stools" - not that scale.
      1. Nick
        Nick 24 October 2012 20: 14
        Thank you Alexander, very helpful comment. Feels like you are "in the subject".
        1. nagual
          nagual 24 October 2012 20: 20
          I am naval hi (sorry, there is no smiley with a madness) I can't say that everything is fine in the fleets, but what is being done now just for the revival of the Navy is worth more attention than ranting about "collapse" and "stool".
          1. Nick
            Nick 24 October 2012 21: 02
            Quote: nagual
            I am naval

            According to your professionalism, the comment is felt sea hardening.
      2. nagual
        nagual 24 October 2012 21: 06
        Yes, and more about the military doctrine. The author of the article read it inattentively. It predicts military conflicts as sprouting from low intensity (including in its territory), to middle (with the involvement of neighboring countries in the conflict) with a constant nuclear confrontation in the event of NATO participation, which is implied as the main enemy, although no one pokes a finger at him. Looking at the development of recent wars, it should be recognized as true. At the same time, the scale of the growing conflict depends on the speed of stopping the conflict in the initial stage (such as a counterinsurgency operation in the North Caucasus). This is also true. And given the methods of warfare of NATO, when military force is connected only as support for forces operating within the country, our doctrine should be defined as quite adequate. Under it, and military construction is underway.
        1. Nickname
          Nickname 25 October 2012 00: 10
          Reform conceived by Marshal Ogarkov
          He promised to marry ...
          But Vysotsky promised this summer to withdraw the strategists on a permanent duty.
          And they removed it according to rumors, because it was against the transfer of the commander in chief from Moscow to St. Petersburg. What has already been worked out and justified for years to steal.
          P / S I really want to know the Old from different points.
          1. nagual
            nagual 25 October 2012 00: 30
            Quote: Nickname
            Reform conceived by Marshal Ogarkov
            He promised to marry ...

            Ogarkov promised only the Americans an adequate response to the doctrine of "limited nuclear war".
            Vysotsky, not young, and first wanted to technically ensure the management of the fleet from St. Petersburg, and only then, the apartments for officers and so on.
            And the strategists are on duty.
      3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 October 2012 07: 41
        Dear nagual, thanks for the most interesting comment and let me ask you some questions.
        Quote: nagual
        Similarly, according to the chain - the functions of the high command, including the naval, now belong to the administrative, in connection with which the powers and staff are cut

        But it wasn't always like that, was it? And I have some suspicion that the cutback in one place was not accompanied by the addition in another.
        I will explain my. the idea is that during the 08.08.08 war the command of the Air Force on the ground showed a very low level of control. There were both objective ones (lack of command of the operational radio and radio intelligence forces at the disposal of the command, because it was transferred to the GRU) and, alas, subjective reasons. An analysis of the combat use of aviation during this period showed insufficient training of the military command and control bodies in planning combat operations in a difficult situation, with active opposition to Georgian air defense. The experience of Chechnya, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia was either not sufficiently studied or completely forgotten.

        • xnumx & wversion = staging
        So, the situation was corrected only after interference in the leadership of aviation by representatives of the Air Force High Command. And now, as I understand it, no one will immediately help. What am I wrong about?
        Quote: nagual
        Now even the supply and logistics of fleets are transferred to the operational and strategic commands

        It is obvious to me that the COMPETENT Operational Strategic Command (USC) is the best way to manage the armed forces. I agree that in modern conditions there should be a single command of all forces in the theater. But I have big doubts that the leadership of the operational-strategic commands is able to competently lead the forces entrusted to him. As far as I understand, in the USSR Armed Forces there was a specialization, and, for example, an Air Force officer (even of a high level) very vaguely imagined what the land, for example, forces are at war. In the Russian Federation, nothing has changed. And then, suddenly, abruptly, there is a transition to USC.
        So, I absolutely do not understand how, for example, a general general will "steer" the Air Force and the fleet in his direction. I just do not really understand how, without the necessary personnel, to knit a horse and a quivering doe in one team.
        If we already decided to grow a new generation of military leaders capable of effectively commanding the Air Force, naval detachments and the Navy, then as I think it was necessary to do this before the reform, while maintaining the main battalions, and only having worked out such interaction in a series of large-scale exercises (and not what we are now we read - 10 MiG-29 aircraft will work out ...) having understood the necessary control staffs, switch to USC. We, apparently, were guided mainly by the number of officers who could be reduced. What am I wrong about?
        I really hope that you will answer - it is very interesting to me.
        Yours faithfully,
        1. nagual
          nagual 25 October 2012 11: 57
          Good afternoon! In a nutshell you can not say. The functions of the commanders in the past included administrative functions, including scientific work, issues of organization, combat training, armament and the development of forces subordinate to them. At the same time, headquarters and command posts were subordinate. That is, they combined both operational and administrative management. They were fully responsible for the state of affairs in the troops during the peace period, and for the mobilization without which the late Soviet (and then early Russian) Armed forces could not be called a full-fledged structure. But further (during and after mobilization) the headquarters and command posts themselves assumed control functions.
          For example, the division, with the outbreak of war, had to operate as one regiment under the command of the headquarters. There were simply no other regiments; they were partially filled with officers and almost zero privates. They had to be understaffed, re-formed and prepared for military operations in the process of mobilization. In this organization, the role of the commander in chief was indeed significant, since direct operational control (command of the troops) began after the army was put on alert. In the meantime, it is not - it is necessary to support the vital activity of what will become a full-fledged structure later.
          Back in the late 70s, it became clear that the nature of the threats hardly implies the invasion of multimillion-strong armies a la the Great Patriotic War. And if such an invasion does occur, it will surely turn into an exchange of nuclear strikes. Plus, the Americans have the concept of limited nuclear war - this is when hostilities begin in Europe with limited ones, develop into the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited theater, and the Americans themselves are eliminated from the use of strategic nuclear weapons and thereby avoid a retaliatory strike. Then it does not matter who wins, and how much Europe will be destroyed. The main thing is that the USSR will be weakened or just badly hurt. But to finish off or invade is simply not necessary. It turned out that we are preparing for the war of past centuries, and we are offered a new war.
          Actually, then the NGS Ogarkov took up the matter. It was he who back in the 80s proposed to increase the share of units of constant readiness (as in the Western Group of Forces), to eliminate the cropped parts, to reduce the share of draftees by increasing the number of professionals, to transfer control functions from the high command, to new commands. Then he was not given. Although he demonstrated to the whole world the effectiveness of such a structure with the West-81 and Shield-82 exercises. He did not have time to create a new command system of combat control (KBSU), which was supposed to replace the old system of headquarters and command posts not connected with each other and subordinate to the commander in chief - in fact, the rear structures of peacetime. Then it seemed that his ideas were too revolutionary. But when it became clear (after Chechnya and especially after 080808) that something needed to be done, it turned out that there was simply no other model adequate to the threats. Therefore, the thesis of the article that we supposedly copy the Western structure is simply from ignorance of our own history of the Armed Forces.
          Say, Baluevsky, generally proposed to liquidate the commander in chief, and transfer their functions to departments and administrations of the Moscow Region. This is logical, since the MO is already an administrative structure and it is correct to concentrate all administrative functions in it. But this would affect the fate of a huge number of officers who honestly served the motherland and are not to blame for the fact that the situation has changed. And these officers had their weight, voice and authority. As a result, Baluevsky left, and decided to cut the tail of the cat into pieces, request so as not to scream at once and all who it touches. However, they cut him. And you won’t get anywhere from this - you need to do this.
        2. nagual
          nagual 25 October 2012 12: 41
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          So, the situation was corrected only after interference in the leadership of aviation by representatives of the Air Force High Command. And now, as I understand it, no one will immediately help. What am I wrong about?

          Yes, about the Air Force. Now the management of the Air Force bases has already been transferred from the high command to the USC. Actually, from here comes the number of the commander in chief. He no longer manages military schools (they are run by the Air Force Research Center), he does not manage the headquarters and command posts (they are run by the USC), he does not manage the supply and support (also under the responsibility of the relevant departments of the rear of districts), he is not engaged in scientific activities (she is in various Research institutes subordinate to the Ministry of Defense). Only engaged in some calculations. This earlier, the intervention of the commander in chief, meant the connection of a central control center. Now it is a structure of the General Staff that coordinates control points in strategic areas in the districts. So there is someone to manage and help.
  2. vic011
    vic011 24 October 2012 15: 45
    Yeah, the fleet must be restored! And at a fast pace, Iraq, Libya, Iran and Syria, who could be next? You need to prepare for everything. After all, "If you want peace, prepare for war."
    1. Armata
      Armata 24 October 2012 18: 41
      Answer which enterprises? Who is ready for the release of ships of large displacement? Submarines do not count. And then our shipyards from 1993 of the year are experiencing the only multi-purpose. Borey horseradish knows when it comes down. RUSSIA DOES NOT HAVE A FLEET,
      1. olegyurjewitch
        olegyurjewitch 24 October 2012 20: 08
        Quote: Mechanic

        I specifically read this material last, because I knew that he would not bring anything good except chagrin. But the article is true. I knew that everything was bad, but it turned out to be even worse than I expected. It turns out that all the talk and statements about the revival of the Fleet are just for avert eyes, a screen to cover up the miscalculations of our defense?
      2. Nick
        Nick 24 October 2012 20: 20
        Quote: Mechanic

        But you, my friend, do not go too far ... What does Russia mean by the fleet? No such as the Americans? - I agree. Not at all! - a statement contrary to the facts.
      3. toguns
        toguns 24 October 2012 22: 13
        Quote: Mechanic
        Answer which enterprises? Who is ready for the release of ships of large displacement? Submarines do not count. And then our shipyards from 1993 of the year are experiencing the only multi-purpose. Borey horseradish knows when it comes down. RUSSIA DOES NOT HAVE A FLEET,

        the Baltic plant and admiralty shipyards will definitely be able :)
      4. lelikas
        lelikas 24 October 2012 23: 49
        Quote: Mechanic
        at which enterprises?
        - So at the French shipyard in Saint-Nazaire and will be .... lol
      5. vic011
        vic011 25 October 2012 10: 54
        Not everything is as bad as you think. Russia has a fleet, or rather, the remnants of the great Soviet fleet ... But now, thank God, the construction of new ships has begun, already many of the drawings are slowly turning into reality! Yes, I agree our fleet is far behind the American. But what did you want, in the 90s, few people thought about the fleet, and generally about the armed forces in general, only recently we recovered from the crisis of the 90s
  3. crambol
    crambol 24 October 2012 15: 54
    ... according to a long-established Russian tradition, the plan and even the course of the reform were kept secret until the very last moment.

    The bureaucrats on the ground, apparently, are going to command the Yauz flotilla, sitting in soft chairs on Arbat Square. Northern and Pacific Fleet for them is something like a Marquise puddle. And these people were entrusted with the security of Russia! One gets the impression that the command of the fleets is being transferred to the shores of the Potomac. Shame!
  4. Alexander Romanov
    Alexander Romanov 24 October 2012 15: 55
    Okay, there’s a common command there, they’ll sort it out over time, but why was the headquarters moving closer to the border? In Moscow, even though the air defense system is good, it’s Peter that, if desired, they will strike and the headquarters will be in ruins. It’s not clear who is guided by what.
    1. strannik595
      strannik595 24 October 2012 16: 10
      if Peter is in ruins, then the capital of well-aimed missiles along with the General Staff will also be in ruins after a very short time 100%
    2. AleksUkr
      AleksUkr 24 October 2012 16: 49
      The command of the Eastern Military District is located in Khabarovsk. It turns out - from Lake Baikal to Chukotka, troops are controlled from the border by "friends of the Chinese." It is also interesting - who is the smart guy who suggested bringing the control centers to the border? And where are our beloved presidential administration, ruling party and government looking? Is this thoughtlessness or ....
      1. Brother Sarych
        Brother Sarych 24 October 2012 18: 04
        It has not yet been possible to place headquarters on the territory of a probable enemy ...
        1. AleksUkr
          AleksUkr 24 October 2012 18: 35
          Or is it already posted? All signs come from there ... Otherwise, how to understand the deeds of our military-political leadership? All normal generals and officers with combat experience are practically expelled from the army ... This year, not those who need the army, but who need the army, entered military schools
      2. Ruswolf
        Ruswolf 24 October 2012 18: 38
        And where does our beloved presidential administration, ruling party and government look? Is it frivolity or ....

        Naturally - to each other below the waist!
        But in front or behind .....- this is who has what inclinations and "fighting skills"
      3. v53993
        v53993 24 October 2012 18: 53
        This is thoughtlessness and the same or ...
    3. leon-iv
      leon-iv 24 October 2012 18: 20
      Peter, if you wish, they will strike him and the headquarters will be in ruins.
      Do you think that during the war everyone will be in their offices? LOL
      In the bunker, everyone will hang around. And those who can strike at Peter already at this moment will pick up a butut from the Strategic Rocket Forces.
      1. Armata
        Armata 24 October 2012 18: 50
        leon-iv But I'm sure what exactly is according to Peter? I really respect and love this city, but unfortunately it has lost the title of supporting city. Too many in the west of Russia are taking over. Especially 2 city. Guess what.
    4. Nick
      Nick 24 October 2012 20: 35
      Quote: Alexander Romanov
      In Moscow, even though the air defense system is good, it’s Peter that, if desired, they’ll strike him and the headquarters will be in ruins

      IMHO also includes Peter, not only Moscow, but technical capabilities allow. Range of air defense MVO Kolo 600 km. if my memory serves me right.
  5. Ross
    Ross 24 October 2012 15: 57
    It is necessary to restore the entire control system .... The Navy is only part of the picture ...
  6. Ser_ega
    Ser_ega 24 October 2012 16: 02
    Do they really not see in the leadership of the country what is now doing the stools with our army ?? This is either blatant incompetence or worse - betrayal !!!
    1. dimanf
      dimanf 24 October 2012 17: 37
      [quote = Ser_ega] Really in the leadership of the country they do not see what is now tabouretkin doing with our army ??

      many on this site are asking this question.
      like that. why Putin reassigned the furniture maker.

      at the end of your sentence you yourself answered your question.
    2. Volozhanin
      Volozhanin 24 October 2012 17: 53
      and who the fuck ..... on appointed minister and continues to hold on to this post despite criticism? Everyone knows who.
  7. Per se.
    Per se. 24 October 2012 16: 19
    The article is current. All of this is sad, the consequences of the cause are terrible - military affairs are not the lot of salesmen-managers. Who will calculate the damage from their momentary "economy", the harm from mediocre, amateurish logic? Question...
  8. IRBIS
    IRBIS 24 October 2012 16: 39
    Yesterday there was an article about the beginning of "reorganization" in the Air Force High Command. Where are you, guardians of reforms? Read and think about it. Lost control, and what could be more fatal? The coastal parts "slashed" outright. The Marine Corps was reduced to a state of obscurity. The coastal artillery was abolished, the coastal missile regiments were "reformed". The naval aviation was "stung". Is this optimization? We have to watch with bitterness the ongoing "reform" of the Armed Forces. To personal happiness - from the bench, because those who stayed often do not even know what they are doing. There is no specifics, everyone is waiting for the next steps of the Ministry of Defense to give a new look.
    I do not catch up with pessimism, but facts are a persistent thing.
    During its first launch to the sea, the new BF ship, Yaroslav the Wise, "slightly" burned down. It's a shame that everything happened at the international exercises, in front of the NATO squadron.
  9. sq
    sq 24 October 2012 16: 41
    so everywhere AND ALWAYS WHEN there is no OWNER !!
  10. vlbelugin
    vlbelugin 24 October 2012 16: 58
    Even during World War I, Admiral Essen, commander of the Baltic Fleet, did everything to ensure that the fleet was not commanded by infantrymen. He predicted the death of the fleet at their command.
    Never the Russian, Soviet fleet was not subordinate to the infantry. For the tasks of the infantry and fleet are different.
    This is another rusty nail in the lid of the tomb of Serdyukov and K.
    1. lelikas
      lelikas 24 October 2012 23: 51
      I think that he will then find out who will be the Minister of Defense today — he was completely hit.
  11. taseka
    taseka 24 October 2012 17: 09
    As it was said there - "remains the minister to complete the reforms"
    Once again, the bread and rolls are full, under the slogans of the super !! Managers are their mother !!
  12. d.gksueyjd
    d.gksueyjd 24 October 2012 17: 13
    We are now like in Krylov's fable "The Cat and the Cook", "and Vaska listens and eats."
    It is necessary to take REAL opportunities to change the situation in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and to demand the resignation of Serdyukov until it is too late.
    In 1991, 3 alcoholics endowed with power drank the USSR, now the same option is repeated with Russia enough time to act at least within the framework of the law of the Russian Federation.
    1. dimanf
      dimanf 24 October 2012 17: 40
      special thanks to visitors to this site. who voted for the sun of the nation!
      how much controversy was here.
      Putin's supporters argued with foam at the mouth that the stool would fly out right away.
      1. d.gksueyjd
        d.gksueyjd 24 October 2012 22: 22
        Personally, I thought that the mind would win, I was mistaken, I apologize (only the one who does nothing is not mistaken) they are all big shit ** s!
  13. Volozhanin
    Volozhanin 24 October 2012 17: 56
    oh, I smell, they pile on us a full armful ... and then we pile on as always. And as always, we will wash ourselves with blood. And the divisions will have to be formed hastily from brigades, and much more.
  14. Brother Sarych
    Brother Sarych 24 October 2012 18: 03
    If the ship commanders were taken away even the right to put a seal, then what can we say more!
    It seems to me that in reality no one has been commanding anything for a long time - somehow everything itself goes where it will be taken out ...
  15. bubla5
    bubla5 24 October 2012 18: 08
    Well, someone has to build a new furniture factory in Magadan for Serdyukov
    1. d.gksueyjd
      d.gksueyjd 24 October 2012 22: 25
      Quote: bubla5
      to build a new furniture factory in Magadan for Serdyukov
      It is necessary to send Serdyukov, put on a pea jacket and a cap with earflaps, give out a friendship jigsaw - 2 years and so for at least 5
  16. Waroc
    Waroc 24 October 2012 18: 15
    Strange, while no ardent defender of such reforms has been heard, is it interesting they will appear soon? For only from them do we learn with certainty that in fact - everything is fine, the marquise is fine, everything is fine, everything is good-ro-sho ...
    1. bubla5
      bubla5 24 October 2012 21: 29
      While the salaries of the military block the process of resentment by reform
      1. d.gksueyjd
        d.gksueyjd 24 October 2012 22: 33
        Nonsense, it's not about salaries, really, the salaries of the junior commanders increased by 25-30%, just in 1991 the army was against the collapse of the USSR. Well, sho: there were no commands for action, first of all, the combat-ready guards units were reduced, they even dispersed the "alpha", now you will only vyakni - you will fly out for violation of the contract or they will not sign the next one.
  17. leon-iv
    leon-iv 24 October 2012 18: 25
    And will the OSB be before and after, or take a word?
    And do not confuse the US Fleet and the Russian Fleet with different goals and objectives. Power us land? The colonial warrior is not going to lead. Will the applicant will change.

    Threat Hey cursors bring OSH or current fart in a puddle fashionable?
  18. Ruswolf
    Ruswolf 24 October 2012 18: 33
    This is not the first blow to the Russian Navy!
    The first was inflicted by the Bolsheviks, destroying almost a third of the personnel crew (here we must pay tribute to the sailors - the crews of those ships that were directly involved in the fighting, hid their officers from representatives of the Military Revolutionary Councils and ignored their directives on the extradition of officers)
    The second was in 12.05.1956. - Zhukov sent Khrushchev a directive in which he indicated that there was no need to contain the Marine Corps in the conditions of nuclear missile wars. Airborne operations (in his opinion) may well be performed by rifle and tank divisions of the districts.
    As a result:
    1. Navy Coast Troops Commander Abolished
    2. all Marine Corps units disbanded
    3. textbooks and teaching materials for the preparation of MP destroyed
    4. the only Vyborg Naval School in the country was closed that day.
    5. programs on aircraft carrier fleet and submarine were minimized
    6. the construction of landing ships was completely closed, since landing operations, according to Zhukov, are coastal activities that can be carried out by any craft with minimal draft (including combat boats)
    All this had dire consequences, including the tragedy in the Caspian Sea, where during the storm two landing ships sank and there were irreparable losses.
    This opal of the Navy lasted almost until 1965.

    So the sailors are not the first time to swell.
    A Russian sailor is not a bunch of rags that you can wipe your feet on.
    A article "+!"
    1. CARBON
      CARBON 24 October 2012 19: 05
      But Stalin is not afraid of sailors, he loved it, built cruisers, destroyers, submarines. I can also say about Brezhnev and Andropov. For some reason, the Russian fleet in its history is like on a swing, then it is cherished and then crap. By the way, under the kings it was also like that. Probably as a very expensive type of armed forces, it suffers the most from the political confusion and economic state of the state.
      I am a land man, but I love the fleet, since childhood I have been fond of its history and present. At the same time, despite my remoteness from Neptune’s possessions, I understand that moving from Moscow to St. Petersburg is more than just moving officials with desks, computers and secretaries. After all, there is still communication, bunkers, airfields, garages, archives, security units, even trivial apartments for admirals and officers with kindergartens, schools, summer cottages.
      Just the question arises, why the hell are you up to it now?
    2. d.gksueyjd
      d.gksueyjd 24 October 2012 22: 38
      A little later we got to the Air Force, all of these reformers, past and present, DO NOT KNOW, DO NOT WANT, and cannot know the specifics of the activity of the combat arms. These mediocrity consider themselves the most intelligent! am
  19. v53993
    v53993 24 October 2012 19: 05
    The unique insurmountability of the stools can be explained only by very big money, for which the leadership does not see the problems of the military security of the state.
  20. Ruswolf
    Ruswolf 24 October 2012 19: 50
    I don’t know who and what he thinks about all this der, but this reform needs to end with yards and galleys, LACE AND KILEVA.
    And the country will benefit and the marine flora will also benefit - everyone will win
  21. dmitrich
    dmitrich 24 October 2012 20: 15
    nonsense, these are the opponents of the relocation of the headquarters of the Navy and Peter, are frightened by cataclysms.
    1. sazhka0
      sazhka0 24 October 2012 22: 42
      Dmitry you are wrong ..
      Glorifying Solntselikogo "frighten" the same .. And in the Country who is the VGK? Why doesn't HE know WHAT his subordinates are doing?
      for the "fool" mows?
      I DO NOT SEE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER COURT !!! Where is esaul and the like ??? Screaming a little more and we’ll tear them up .. You just need to tolerate it ... It was .. We tried it. For us, these calls always end in blood .. Article PLUS WITH PLUS ..
  22. sazhka0
    sazhka0 24 October 2012 23: 14
    VAF. .k I appeal to you. There is nothing to do here .. There is NO fish here .. (Jumble) .. Except for slogans and calls. Stupidly to surprise ..
    Regards Alecazhka ..
  23. sazhka0
    sazhka0 24 October 2012 23: 29
    Once a minus appeared means right. esaul is you ?? Not going to talk .. Not interesting. Already all is said unfortunately not by me ..
  24. Brother Sarych
    Brother Sarych 25 October 2012 00: 08
    The main adversary will soon put into operation a new landing ship America - against its background, wind-troughs look generally sad! And this should also be taken into account that they will not be ready tomorrow ...
    All this is sad, citizens, very sad ...
  25. nagual
    nagual 25 October 2012 00: 20
    Quote: Nickname
    Reform conceived by Marshal Ogarkov
    He promised to marry ...

    If Ogarkov promised anything, it was only an answer to the doctrine of "limited nuclear war."
    Vysotsky, not young, and first wanted to technically ensure the management of the fleet from St. Petersburg, and only then, the apartments for officers and so on.
    And the strategists are on duty.
  26. Cat
    Cat 25 October 2012 04: 26
    Interesting all such, naive ... wonder what Serdyukov is doing and why?
    And everything is simple, as in most budget organizations. Got government money - what's the first thing? That's right, renovation of the office, ideally - moving to a new building larger and more beautiful. Well, all kinds of production buildings - why bother with them? The gates were painted with fresh meerk, the broken windows were closed with plywood - so let them rejoice that it doesn’t penetrate. And in general, it is desirable to compact and reduce all obscure and malozhnyh, in order to optimize costs. And the vacated space to lease to some business people is a living penny at the box office, and no hemorrhoids.

    In general, the standard "managerial" approach. It would be strange if it were different =)))
  27. smel
    smel 25 October 2012 06: 58
    Yes ... No esaula. Today he is replaced by the nagual optimist. Although I gave him a plus for owning the material, I still don’t agree fundamentally with the ongoing reformist events in the army and navy. All these monkey copies from other models can sad end. Smart people, especially those in high positions, preliminarily carry out calculations and experimental measures. Then, an expert evaluation of the results and comparison with the existing system or model is carried out. The costs and the expected effect are compared and only after that I’d like to know if at least once an experiment was conducted on the possibility of managing subordinates of the existing management system? Just don’t lie ... I’m in the subject ... I’m familiar with many people mentioned in the comments. Yes, and the sad results of famous experimental I know the exercises with the 74 Omsbr even before the destruction of