Reform of the Airborne Forces in the light of the experience of fighting in Ukraine and previous wars. Tasks, vehicles, weapons
After a short essay on the combat path of various parachute formations, making sure that the parachute landing of troops as a means of engaging in battle is still in demand, and also that parachute landings do not lead to any such extraordinary losses if everything is planned and executed correctly and taking into account the situation, let's move on to determine the appearance of the Airborne Forces in the future Russian army.
Let's start not with the technical feasibility of the parachute landings themselves in the war, and not with whether it is possible to solve some problems with their help - these issues were discussed in the last part. In accordance with the methodology outlined earlier, let's start by answering the question:
1. Is there any point in parachute landing at all? What forces? What is the composition of the landing troops? Where, why and under what circumstances? Is it possible to abandon it in favor of landing from helicopters?
It is this question that is decisive.
Parachutes and helicopters
In the last article, it was already said why a helicopter landing is better than a parachute one, and there is no point in repeating it. Since landing from helicopters is a much more “profitable” event than landing by parachute from aircraft, then it is logical then to reduce the above question to the following: are there situations when helicopters are either inapplicable, or nevertheless, for some reason, turn out to be worse ?
The answer to it will give us a part of those boundary conditions within which it is the parachute formations that make sense.
So, in order.
1. Long range landing. IL-76 is capable of transporting troops over a distance of about 2 kilometers and disembarking, returning back to the airfield. For the Mi-000, this is a couple of hundred kilometers.
Thus, the first condition under which the presence of parachute formations makes sense is a drop at a great distance from safe landing sites on aircraft.
2. Large-scale landing. We recall the capture of airfields in Panama. The Americans threw almost 130 soldiers from S-141 and S-2 aircraft.
At the same time, in principle, they used helicopters in Panama, and they had where to take off from. But let's ask ourselves the question - how many helicopters would be needed? Suppose we are talking about a UH-60 with its 11 soldiers inside. Then, for the landing of only this group of soldiers, 263 helicopters would be needed.
In reality, of course, there is also the CH-47. The Chinook has 33 seats. At the same time, due to its carrying capacity, it is still possible to stuff soldiers into it, standing or sitting on the floor.
Let's assume that the first assault echelon in the amount of 1/3 of the forces is landed from the maneuverable and compact UH-60s, and the rest from the CH-47s, at the rate of "all seats are occupied plus one compartment on the floor (9 people), 42 people in total" .
Then we get about 88 helicopters in the first wave and 46 heavy ones next. Total 134.
Without taking into account technical breakdowns, etc. This is a lot. This is more than you can prepare for takeoff at one airfield. Moreover, take a look at the map.
Photo source: The US Military Intervention in Panama: Operation Just Cause. December 1989 – January 1990 by Lawrence A. Yates
4 points are circled with frames, in which troops had to be landed compactly. 134 helicopters for 4 such zones would be a lot.
Someone may argue that a lot of planes are needed - one battalion in those specific conditions required up to seven C-141s to drop personnel from an airborne division, and five to drop supplies and various equipment, while the rangers who fought light, they jumped in a company from four S-130s.
But the planes "skipped" the drop points very quickly, and did not land on the landing sites, of course, while trying to drop the landing force as tightly as possible. Technically, despite the dispersion of troops during landing, aircraft can drop soldiers sequentially onto the same site and fly away at top speed. Helicopters have zero random spread, but they need a place to land.
At the same time, the landing zone could be reached by helicopters, moreover, they were used there to a limited extent to help the landing force.
We look at the photo, it was taken at the exercises of the 101st Airborne Forces of the USA. You can see how many helicopters are in the air, and there are no more than 231 paratroopers on board, and this is if all the helicopters are completely crammed with troops, if a part carries a compartment with a couple of empty seats, then even less.
Now we just estimate the size of the landing zone for the battalion.
Photo: US Army
The second point is the landing time. When jumping from such a low height as 200 meters, the fighter is on the ground in 8-10 seconds after leaving the plane. The hypothetical enemy does not have much time to shoot at the fighter hanging under the dome, and there are a lot of them, they are already dispersed in the air.
We draw the final conclusion.
When the landing force reaches a certain number, it becomes "more profitable" to drop it by parachute, even with the possibility of landing by helicopter.
Here, however, a caveat is needed.
We are talking about paratroopers who land with a minimum of equipment, and not about mechanized airborne forces, like ours. For Russia, with its approaches, everything is changing - if you land with BMD and all other equipment, then you will need significantly more aircraft than the Americans, for now, just remember this.
3. Emergency landing. There are situations when it is simply not possible to transfer helicopters to a particular area. An example of such a situation was the French landing on the city of Kolwezi, in the province of Shaba, Zaire.
From the moment the decision was made to send the troops of the foreign legion to the moment the paratroopers entered the battle (the first wave was thrown onto the city hippodrome, right under enemy fire), less than three days passed.
No helicopter force could have been in place at that speed, under any circumstances.
It would have taken months to deploy field airfields near rebel-held areas and deploy helicopters there, which was unacceptable for many reasons: from the loss of French influence in Zaire, to the deaths of thousands of French citizens in Kolwezi.
4. From the examples with Panama and Kolwezi, as well as from the mass of others, another situation follows, while rather hypothetical - parachute landing from aircraft has almost no alternative when you need to achieve real surprise (not like it was near Gostomel, where helicopters went to the target under a missile shelling - if the Ukrainians knew about the level of protection of helicopters from MANPADS, they would simply place anti-aircraft guns in the right places).
Thus, we see exemplary "niches" of paratroopers. Let's repeat them for confirmation.
Long range landing.
Landing in large force.
Landing with extremely short preparation time.
Landing with the highest level of surprise.
What are the restrictions imposed on its use even in these niches?
First of all, it is air defense. If the enemy has unsuppressed air defense, the issue is closed.
Neither in Panama nor in Shaba was there any serious fire from the ground on the landing. The Americans in Panama were very afraid of MANPADS and anti-aircraft machine gun installations. Against the latter, they sent the AS-130 gunship, which, however, did not have to work on ZPU-4. Against the first, the night landing worked, before dawn.
What to do if the enemy has air defense?
If we are talking about a developed air defense system, with some unknown, but non-zero number of anti-aircraft missile systems, or even modern anti-aircraft artillery, then there is no way out - the landing will have to be canceled.
If it is known that in the landing area there is a small amount of means that can threaten aircraft in the air, then they can be “dealt with” with the help of specially trained sabotage and reconnaissance groups, whose actions should precede the landing, and success should be decisive for the final decision about the landing or its cancellation, which can be done even when the landing is in the air.
Against a low-tech enemy with only MANPADS, machine guns and the like, a night landing can help.
Another factor in the success or failure of the landing is the proximity of the attacked object to the sea - over the sea, on the side that does not have ships, there is clearly no layered air defense.
And by the way, in Panama, the landing operations were supported by SEAL fighters in fast boats.
The second factor is fighter aviation enemy. Soviet charters demanded the unequivocal achievement of air supremacy over the areas of flight, landing and airborne assault.
At the same time, in the chosen niche of the existence of parachute troops, in that part of it where we are talking about long-range operations, our aviation, due to the small combat radius of aircraft and the negligible number of tanker aircraft, will not be able to act systematically.
This requires very careful planning and precision execution of air strikes against enemy aircraft, if any, and its airfields, in order to ensure the landing of parachute troops and prevent them from being destroyed by air strikes. This also requires that the landing force have air defense systems, which will be discussed below.
Wouldn't it be easier then to refuse to disembark as well? It is simpler, but, as will be shown below, it is not always possible, precisely in our specific conditions. And that's why.
American paratroopers and our airfields
Let's digress for a second from the landing and turn to such a stage as planning operations. Troops can't basically just move around the terrain, they're more or less tied to roads. This postulate doesn't work well in deserts, but even there, maintaining roads is critical to supply, as the 2003 US invasion of Iraq showed.
But there are extreme examples. If in some locality there are only airfields, the distances between which are sometimes hundreds, and sometimes thousands of kilometers, there are no roads, and the ground is impassable, then control over airfields in such a locality means control over this entire locality.
If you have a million square kilometers of empty land with almost no roads, with one airfield in the center, then control of the airfield means control of the entire area.
It is this area that is the Russian Arctic and Chukotka. Let's look at how many airfields we have with concrete runways, plus take into account the Temp unpaved airfield, which can be landed by transport aircraft and KS-130 tankers.
Can you see how many points need to be captured in order to cut off the entire eastern part of the Arctic and the north of Eastern Siberia from us? There are really no troops there, it is impossible to transfer them there by land or sea, these are isolated points.
And now we recall what the airborne formations did mainly during their long history?
The capture of airfields and the reception of second echelons on them. This was to be done by our paratroopers in the Crimea. This was done by the fighters of the airborne brigades of the Red Army near Moscow. This was done by the Americans in New Guinea, the British in France, again the Americans in Grenada, Panama and Afghanistan.
From these points, you can then develop an air and airborne offensive into Siberia.
And - surprise - the United States has become the only country in the world that maintains an airborne formation in the Arctic, and at the same time the only country in the world that increases the number of its airborne formations, and it is in the Arctic. There was a brigade, there was a division.
Some might say that the war will still be nuclear. Well maybe though, but who said she would only nuclear?
We recall a more or less realistic scenario of a nuclear attack, in which the United States may not receive a nuclear strike on its territory, which was described in the article "World War 2030. What should we prepare for and what will be the role of the Navy". Now it is clear that she was very optimistic both about the timing and about the ability of the leadership of the RF Armed Forces to respond, but the main message has been the same since then - a significant part of the American nuclear arsenal will be spent on knocking out our nuclear forces, and after they finish, we still have something to fight for.
And to whom.
Just a few dozen points on our earth will be burned hundreds of meters deep. And radioactive dust will bring here and there. Moscow will not. Peter, perhaps, but no longer a fact. In general, Russia will not disappear anywhere.
To produce scenarios for a global war in an article is, on the whole, a thankless task, whoever wants to believe that the Americans are deploying landing troops in the Arctic just like that, let him believe, let the rest look at the map.
The question arises - what, if something happens, to knock them out of there?
Naturally, this also requires aviation support, but ensuring the regular presence of large aviation forces over the same Pevek, and not based on it itself (or simply attracting reserves from Alaska) is very difficult, there are no concrete shelters for aircraft at our airfields, parking very small, the planes on them will be vulnerable to missile attack, and so on.
There is some chance of eliminating the air threat with careful planning, at least temporarily. But troops can only be transferred by air, and they can only be landed by parachute. Then they will again need air defense systems.
Thus, in addition to a specific “niche in general”, our Airborne Forces begin to take shape in specific defensive (in this case, counter-offensive) tasks that require parachute landing. Moreover, specific tasks, with reference to the place, the enemy, along with the forces that the enemy in theory can have.
Are there any other such clear and understandable tasks? There is. Kuriles.
Japanese front
If someday Russia has a clash over the islands with Japan, and if it starts with the seizure of part of Russian territory by the Japanese, then the most competent move would be to quickly knock them out of there.
But this cannot be done by delivering troops by sea. It will be possible to deliver troops only by air and land only in a non-aerodrome way.
The distance from the South Kuriles to any absolutely place where a large military contingent can be loaded onto aircraft completely excludes any method of landing troops, except by parachuting with airplanes.
The question remains with Japanese aviation - where ours fly a little less than a thousand kilometers, the Japanese - several dozen.
After our Aerospace Forces proved themselves in Ukraine, fantasies about the struggle for air supremacy look like crazy delirium, especially due to the fact that the Japanese have a lot of missile ships that can be much more dangerous in air defense than ground systems, but We will postpone the issue of the Aerospace Forces for the time being - there is also something to work on there, and we proceed from the fact that, at least somehow, they will be able to interfere with Japanese aviation. There are resources for this, they have not gone anywhere, the problem is in the organization and in the personnel, as, indeed, everywhere else.
But in any case, in principle, there is no other way to drive the Japanese out of the islands within a reasonable time - in order to beat them back by amphibious assault, you need to defeat the Japanese fleet, and there is no land connection with the islands.
Thus, another very specific task is outlined on its territory, with reference to the place and the enemy.
In principle, this is enough. And the collapse of some of the states of Central Asia, and the sudden capture of Russian hostages somewhere in an underdeveloped state, and the need to urgently knock someone out of a poorly protected point far from the populated areas of the Russian Federation with a wide network of airfields will require the transfer of troops there by air, and the absence of nearby airfields will require their parachute landing.
And even our probable adversary gives hints about where and under what circumstances everything can happen.
And this is without taking into account the risk of some wars in underdeveloped countries, where parachute landings may be needed for the same reasons that the Americans needed them in Grenada.
Thus, the first question has an answer - there is a sense in parachute landing, it is approximately clear where. It remains only to give an answer to the part of the question "by what forces."
States and numbers - the first estimate
Having decided that, in principle, parachute formations are needed, and having understood why and where, you need to decide on their number and organization, at least approximately.
Here it is worth recalling the old claim that the entire Military Transport Aviation of the USSR could hardly land one division.
But here lies the slyness - it is not at all a fact that the division should land at the same time and all.
Let's look at history again. Often, parachute troops captured the airfield in the first echelon, the second one landed by landing from aircraft. An important point - the landing of the first and the delivery of the second echelons could be performed by the same aircraft.
The second point - the regiments of the division in those years would not necessarily have to be landed at the same time.
Thus, we make the first assumption - the very concept of optimizing paratrooper units for the size of the VTA is to some extent not correct. It cannot be called completely wrong either, in the same, for example, post-war USSR, the disproportion was simply monstrous, it is very large even now. But in general, we must determine the strength of the Airborne Forces based on tasks, and only then match it with the number of aircraft and find some kind of balanced ratio.
How many soldiers must be on the ground in order to knock out the Americans from the captured airfield? If we assume that only the 11th airborne division will operate in the Arctic, then it turns out that they have three parachute battalions, each of which can be reinforced by part of the airborne artillery regiment (as in Panama), and in the second echelon - from an infantry battalion delivered by air, plus support units.
In total, in the first parachute echelon - a reinforced infantry battalion with several guns, followed by another reinforced infantry battalion with some heavy weapons, anyone - and so on three airfields. This is what the 11th airborne division can do in a day.
It is clear that this is an estimate on the fingers, in reality everything can go differently, they landed more on the same two Panamanian airfields. Nevertheless, this is at least some kind of guideline.
Then our counterattack should begin, because the Americans with their aircraft will be able to bring a really large mass of troops through the air, and then they will not be able to do without nuclear strikes on their territory (and their cities).
To dislodge two American reinforced infantry battalions from an airfield where they did not have time to dig in and deliver heavy weapons, you need to have at least a regiment with superior firepower against them, or, alternatively, a brigade. And here we are not talking about the current states, but rather about the states of dismounted motorized riflemen with heavy weapons.
The modern parachute squad consists of 5 people and a commander, plus a driver and gunner-operator of the BMD. An attempt to drop the regiment or brigade proposed above with all standard equipment will lead to the fact that almost all military transport aviation will have to be put on the map behind some airfield. One Il-76 will not even lift a platoon on a BMD-4 to a significant distance. And without equipment, we have thin squads, platoons and companies.
Meanwhile, the IL-76 can land a reinforced company - 126 people. If she is on foot.
Or a company of 90 people, as it is now, and 36 fighters from some units of battalion subordination, for example, a fire support company - an analogue of American weapons companies.
At this point, we come to the need for some kind of "westernization" of the parachute troops - now they should become infantry, supported by heavy weapons, only in our conditions - self-propelled.
Let's think in numbers.
Three airborne (rifle) companies on foot - three Il-76s, with them 1/3 of the subdivisions of battalion subordination. Battalion command and control units - one more. In fact, this is a primitivization, and you will have to disperse control over aircraft, decide the order of taking command in the event of the death of a battalion commander, etc., but the approximate number of aircraft per battalion is clear - five ILs. Total. With a margin of six.
But the enemy has superiority in small arms, tactics focused on him, and some kind of howitzers and mortars. You need a quality amplification tool.
The answer is the old "Nonas" as artillery and mortars, BMD-4 with a 100-mm gun as a fire support vehicle (not for every squad). Quantity - based on the task, but to the maximum - 4-gun battery "Non" for each battalion and about the same number of BMD-4, instead of which you can use the Sprut-SD SPTP, just like a cannon, and not like a light tank ( he is not).
Both "Nona" and BMD-4 are thrown at the rate of 2 cars into the plane. In total, there are two aircraft for the artillery battery, and two more for the BMD-4. 9-10 aircraft per battalion.
Self-propelled artillery gun 2S9 "Nona"
More aircraft will be needed, for ammunition, it will be necessary to have at least a couple of counter-battery radars so that the Nonas can cover the enemy howitzers, leaving themselves from under counter-battery fire, and so on, these are several more aircraft. Let 2.
Total - 12.
Taking into account the fact that about 50 An-12s are still flying, ammunition and auxiliary equipment can be dropped from them, they just need more, let's take it as 4.
How many battalions will be in the regiment? Now there are three airborne battalions and an artillery battalion, in our case three battalions of 4 companies and 8 pieces of equipment.
The Americans in Panama had 5 aircraft with equipment and supplies for an infantry battalion, but there even artillery was included in the "equipment". Here the artillery is counted as part of the battalion.
It is easy to see that a regiment with heavy weapons, which is quite powerful for a parachute formation, is delivered and thrown out by about 36 aircraft, plus an aircraft to control the regiment or 31 IL-76 and up to 6 An-12.
This is a very rough estimate. It was made based on the fact that each of the battalions landed with 8 pieces of equipment, but in reality it could be different. Somewhere it will be possible not with three, but with two battalions to solve the problem, somewhere less military equipment will be needed.
The disadvantage of such a landing is that the landing site will have to be made far enough from the target to exclude the execution of the landing at the time of landing. But, again, there are different options and different situations, the order of disembarking units and dropping armored vehicles can be different. Somewhere you will need a battalion of fighters plus four BMDs plus a pair of Sprutov-SD for the main direction, a company with a pair of Non for the secondary, etc. And fewer aircraft will be needed. All figures are very approximate, but close to reality.
In any case, the appearance of the first echelon in the maximum number is determined. Strengthen it, if possible, then at the expense of a purely infantry component, which, however, may have special tasks.
Once again, no other option is possible. An attempt to land a regiment with today's states, with the amount of armored vehicles required today, is doomed a priori. There will not be enough planes, it will not be possible to ensure a landing in a compact group and quickly assemble, a little later the question of supplying this entire group with fuel (hundreds of tons per day) will arise, and this is all despite the fact that the airborne armored vehicles have zero survivability, and the purely infantry component is weak.
And the landing described above will require about a third of the IL-76 available today, which is also a very serious force, which is also dangerous to risk, but this, at least, may not completely deprive the country of the BTA in case of some kind of failure.
And then the same planes can throw out or land the second echelon by landing. What will be in it? First, transport.
The refusal to have BMD for each squad makes it possible to increase the number of BTR-Ds or trucks. Unlike the BMD, in the BTR-D (as an option, the new BTR-MD, in the future only the BTR-D will be mentioned, this is for simplicity) theoretically a full-fledged squad of 8 people can go, and there will still be room, albeit a little. The truck is even more spacious and can also be used for transporting goods. Both BTR-D and trucks can parachute to a safe area and go to the first echelon under their own power, if possible and necessary.
Landed BTR-MD. Photo: Kirill Borisenko
Secondly, doctors, fuel and ammunition, also by parachute or landing method, depending on the situation.
If the capture of the airfield and the cleaning of the area around are successful, then it will be possible to immediately proceed to the landing force, and there you can bring in Tanks, and generally anything.
To whom should tanks be subordinated? For example, the division commander. In principle, states are a debatable issue. But it is precisely the transformation of the Airborne Forces from light mechanized troops into light infantry that is necessary if we still want to have airborne capabilities - real, not fictitious.
As a result, it turns out that the staff of the parachute squad in its foot part is approximately identical to that of the motorized rifle squad, the percentage of equipment becomes less, the infantry more.
After landing and in battle, the squad moves on foot, when unloading second-echelon equipment, it receives transport (non-combat) vehicles - BTR-D or trucks, armored vehicles with weapons begin at the battalion level, but after all heavy equipment is landed or delivered to the captured airfield (deployed on the theater during operations as part of the Ground Forces groupings), then the battalion commanders will be able to transfer the same BMD or Sprut SPTP to the company level, as a means of reinforcement, if necessary, and the regimental commander will also be able to have 122-mm artillery, and tanks. Just significantly less than motorized rifles have.
2S25M "Octopus-SDM1". This vehicle can be an airborne fire support vehicle instead of the BMD-4, if necessary.
Then the offensive force of the landing on the ground turns out to be more or less sufficient, and much fewer aircraft are needed for dropping than now. Moreover, such a landing, when switching to combat operations on the ground, without any landings, turns out to be quite strong infantry, at least relatively numerous and trained to fight on foot, but with heavy weapons and equipment.
We don't have enough infantry today, do we? How many regiments should the country as a whole have?
Let's look at the map again. A maximum of seven airfields, some of which will be enough for reinforced battalions simply because the enemy will not be able to deploy large forces there, for example, Temp or Chersky with its short strip.
It turns out that if the regiment involved in the liberation of the airfield then remains there for some time for defense or other tasks, and so in each case, then from five regiments and two battalions to seven regiments for the battle for the Arctic.
If the Kuriles, then one or two more.
Nine.
At the moment, this means that in the most difficult situation for the country and at the same time the most favorable situation for the Airborne Forces (we are already at war with America, but we still have the VTA and VKS as a whole, and in considerable quantities), for all conceivable parachute scenarios landing, three airborne divisions are enough. But these are still unlikely scenarios, to put it mildly. In reality, it will be much less. At the same time, even three divisions is significantly less than it is now.
We will return to the optimal number of airborne forces later, while we just remember the upper limit.
The composition of the Airborne Forces, and the tasks of the type of troops
The current composition of the Airborne Forces looks like this:
1. Command of the Airborne Forces
2. 38th Guards Control Brigade
3. 45th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (2 OSP)
4. 7th Guards Air Assault Division (9 dshb, orb and detachment)
5. 76th Guards Air Assault Division (9 dshb, orb and detachment)
6. 98th Guards Airborne Division (6 pdb and orb)
7. 106th Guards Airborne Division (6 pdb and orb)
8. 11th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
9. 31th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
10. 83th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (2 dshb, pdb and orb)
11. 150th separate repair and restoration battalion
12. 35th separate medical detachment of the Airborne Forces
13. Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School
14. 242nd training center of the Airborne Forces
15. 309th Center for Special Parachute Training of the Airborne Forces.
Thus, if we fight simultaneously with the USA and Japan, then we now have 2 divisions and 3 brigades extra offhand, and this is if you do not touch the 45th Guards. obrspn, for which there will always be specific tasks.
The number of airborne forces is approximately 45 people.
At the same time, fantasizing about battles with American paratroopers for our polar airfields is one story, but in reality, God forbid that one regiment has enough tasks for which it is necessary to parachute.
It is worth formulating now what a typical airborne formation or unit should be (and whether we need divisions at all).
So, a typical parachute task is to capture an important object, most likely an airfield. The maximum composition of the forces of the first wave of landing (parachute) is a regiment of three foot battalions, reinforced with a certain amount of military equipment (in the example above there were 8 units, this should not be taken as a dogma). In exceptional cases - reinforced by reconnaissance units.
In the second wave of landing forces - cars, armored personnel carriers for previously landed fighters, possibly tanks, artillery, for example, a division of 122-mm howitzers D-30, if we plan to drop them with a parachute, or a division of 152-mm howitzers, if not. Tanks, at least a company. Probably more infantry.
Let's try to make a sketch of what is at war with us in the limit. In the first echelon, we have a battalion jumping as part of the command, three companies of infantry, one company with group weapons, a platoon of 4 BMD-4s, which now just shoot and do not carry anyone without urgent need, 4-gun battery SAO 2S9. About.
In the second, BTR-D and trucks are additionally delivered. Here it is necessary to think over the structure of subordination. Which unit will include the BTR-D? A separate company of armored personnel carriers, the vehicles from which are attached "on the ground" to paratroopers? Include in the departments by machine? It is better to leave this question for later, perhaps it will even need to be worked out in exercises. One way or another, in terms of people, this is about a company, in terms of cars - more.
What else? Truck driver. Tank company. Regimental artillery battery, for example, six-gun. The weakness of this artillery unit is compensated by the fact that the battalion commanders have their own "Nons".
If we slightly strengthen the rear of this formation and give it a reconnaissance battalion instead of a reconnaissance company, we will get a four-battalion brigade capable of acting both as a parachute and as a motorized infantry (in our current terminology - motorized rifle).
What does such a brigade need in order to fight from helicopters? After all, such tasks will arise more often than parachuting. At a minimum, nothing. The same battalions just get into helicopters instead of planes. But these battalions cannot be strengthened. If artillery in the form of D-30 howitzers can still theoretically be transferred on the external sling of a helicopter, having developed a slinging system, then something heavier can only be used on the Mi-26, which are few in number, and it is extremely undesirable to lose them, which together will complicate their use in landing operations.
The question arises - how to strengthen the landing? It is also logical to have 120-mm mortars as a heavy weapon of the battalion, and to tow them use the Mi-8s deployed on an external sling or even in the cargo compartment of UAZ vehicles as part of a battery.
How to combine the presence of this unit with the fact that we have 120-mm mortars in the paratroopers and there are no crews? Perhaps, in the case of a parachute landing, they should be in the second echelon.
There are a lot of questions, but all of them are, firstly, solvable, and secondly, solvable with serial equipment, and below an attempt will be made to come up with full-fledged states.
There is, however, another question to be addressed. In Russia, the Airborne Forces is a branch of the troops of central subordination. Fighting together with the Ground Forces, solving the same tasks, the Airborne Forces are not part of them.
In an interesting way, our Airborne Forces provide an example of some kind of analogy to American marines - they are also semi-independent, have their own commander (commandant) and, until recently, duplicated the tasks of the army. Their role is also similar - it is rather not amphibious, but expeditionary forces. As well as the Airborne Forces, which flew on planes to Ukraine to restore order in Kazakhstan.
On the one hand, this is very wasteful. An airborne formation may well be subordinated on all issues, except for specific airborne ones, to the district commander, and on airborne ones - to some parachute service of the Ministry of Defense, be it created.
Having a separate backup management and command structure, a university, a rear, etc. is simply expensive. On the plus side is a special fighting spirit, awareness of oneself as elite troops and a willingness to take on any task for this reason alone. Is it actually a more valuable quality than you might think? But is it so valuable as to have a whole branch of the military under it?
Rather no than yes, at least from a rational point of view. Accordingly, either the command system of the Airborne Forces and their logistic support should be simplified, or they should be “attached” to the Airborne Forces with tasks that they could solve, and this justifies their special status, and not just existence in principle.
What could be the tasks? In any structure, the Airborne Forces will be inferior in their striking power to the Ground Forces in terms of combat power, simply because of a smaller number of heavy weapons.
But they also have a plus - airmobility. This is without discounts - rapid reaction forces, they can be airlifted with all their equipment.
The events in Kazakhstan have shown how important it can be to quickly deploy troops in other countries, and in the event of an attack, in your own.
Thus, in addition to parachute landing, which some future airborne forces will be able to perform more efficiently than the current ones, they need to be charged with any airmobile tasks, emergency transfer anywhere, and so on.
Accordingly, the command structures of the Airborne Forces should be a full-fledged body of military command, and not just another "Commander-in-Chief" engaged in logistics and combat training.
What else?
Since the airborne forces of the new look in our base are light infantry, then in a war in which they do not need to land anywhere, they can be charged with tasks for light infantry - assaults on settlements (naturally, with the necessary reinforcement), actions in wooded and tank inaccessible terrain. Also, their tasks should be raids and, possibly, counter-guerrilla actions.
To some extent, this can justify their autonomy if they do all this properly. In a real war, the headquarters and command of the Airborne Forces will have to form the usual corps administration and fight together with their troops so as not to require the formation of additional headquarters from the Ground Forces.
All this will make the existence of the Airborne Forces as a separate structure, if not fully justified, then at least not burdensome for the country, while maintaining the advantages in the form of high morale.
Roughly understanding what and why the new airborne forces will be, let's pay attention to what kind of military equipment they should have. And why.
Military equipment of the Airborne Forces
In the methodology of this study, two questions were posed in the last part, we will quote them:
4. Does the Airborne Forces need non-landing equipment? What for?
The complexity of the answers to them is obvious. If the Airborne Forces perform tasks with parachutes, then all first-echelon equipment must be airborne, which imposes severe weight and size restrictions on its characteristics. If the second echelon also lands on parachutes, then the same is true with its equipment. If the second echelon lands on the airfield by landing method, then the requirements for equipment are different, it should simply be possible to transport it by plane. IL-76 allows you to transport even the T-72 tank, if there is time for unloading.
And if units or formations of the Airborne Forces go on the offensive like ordinary troops on the ground? Then you need the most powerful and well-protected military equipment, such as tanks.
And if we are talking about landing from helicopters? Then everything should be suitable for transportation by helicopters.
To understand the issue, the Mi-8 can carry a load weighing no more than 4,5 tons on an external sling, and with special modifications. This is a GAZ car. Nothing harder to carry on the Mi-8.
Transportation of artillery pieces on the external sling Mi-8
We have too few Mi-26s, and unloading armored vehicles from it is a slow process, suitable for forces in the second echelon of the landing, in a safe zone.
That is, all equipment should be light, up to 4,5 tons, and ideally less, because the greater the load, the less the range of the helicopter, the risk of accidents.
These are contradictory requirements, often mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, we will list the military equipment that the landing force needs - briefly. With the delivery method, we mean - this is not something that can be done, this is what needs to be done. If, for example, the landing party goes into battle as a regular ground unit, without any landings, then instead of the BMD-4, you can take tanks with you, and the BMD-4 is simply not needed. For the equipment that will be used not in landing operations, but in combined arms operations, one of the methods of delivery to the theater is indicated - “under its own power”.
1. SAO 2S9 "Nona". The critical unit is perhaps the most important. The ongoing hostilities in Ukraine have shown the destructive role of 120-mm mortars when used correctly. At the same time, the Nona is also self-propelled, that is, it can escape from the return artillery fire, if any. It can be used both in the first and second echelons, delivered by parachute, IL-76 - by landing method, Mi-26, as well as under its own power.
2. BMD-4. As already mentioned, now this machine will be used as a means of fire support, capable of direct fire. It is now more of a mobile gun mount than a BMD. Instead of landing, she will carry the crew's property and some stocks of materiel. Delivered by parachute, IL-76 landing method or Mi-26. In the future, the BMD may be replaced by some kind of light amphibious tank.
3. BTR-D or BTR-MD "Shell". Used as a transport vehicle. Since we are increasing the size of the squad to a motorized rifle squad, it becomes impossible to transport the entire squad on the BMD. Now it fits only in an armored personnel carrier. The only type of airborne armored personnel carrier is an armored personnel carrier on the BMD chassis.
These vehicles can be used for their intended purpose when they are delivered according to the number of fighting squads, or as transport vehicles, for transporting ammunition, separate groups of military personnel, commanders, taking out the wounded, etc. Delivered by parachute, Il-76 by landing method or Mi-26 .
4. STPT "Sprut-SD". Self-propelled airborne anti-tank gun caliber 125 mm. It is used instead of the BMD-4 or together with them for fire support of foot paratroopers. The disadvantages of the Sprut are its mass, the IL-76 will not be able to deliver and parachute two such machines, so their use will be limited. The same problem is when delivering to the Mi-26 - with such a load, its range drops. Therefore, "Octopus" is an optional tool. Delivered by parachute or Mi-26, with IL-76 by landing method only when the situation does not allow unloading tanks (this is a long time). Upon receipt of a light airborne tank by the Airborne Forces, the Octopus is removed from service, as is the BMD.
5. Main battle tanks. The main means of fire support on the battlefield, due to the small number of tank units in the landing units, are not used independently, they support infantry with fire. Delivery - with IL-76 by landing method, if the situation allows, or on its own.
6. Howitzer D-30. In conditions when we will not create our own M777 for a very long time, the only fully airmobile artillery gun is the D-30 howitzer. In the future, it may be replaced by another system, but now it has no alternative for the Airborne Forces. It is delivered by parachutes or on an external sling by Mi-8 helicopters, or under its own power in tow. When working with helicopters, helicopters provide maneuver for artillery, moving it behind the advancing troops.
7. Car KAMAZ-43501 Airborne Forces - parachute-landing truck. It is used for all transport tasks in any operations, delivered by parachute, by landing method from IL-76, to Mi-26 and under its own power.
8. Armored car "Tiger" or equivalent. It is used for the same purpose for which it is used in other branches of the military, including reconnaissance groups, but it must be possible to parachute it. Should be delivered by parachute, with IL-76 by landing method, by Mi-26 and under its own power. It must be said that the new Typhoon-VDV vehicles look quite suitable, but with them the issue of import substitution arises in a very acute form. There, even the wheels are imported, and in Ukraine all these components (on other cars) were identified. There will be problems with their supplies.
9. Car UAZ-Profi. This pickup truck should be used when landing from helicopters, along with a 120-mm mortar, as a regular means of transporting or towing it. Any other transportation in the interests of the landing force can also be carried out on it. This machine is needed, in principle, only when the troops operate from helicopters. And only because the Russian Federation has nothing more suitable. The main delivery method is on the Mi-8, on an external sling, optionally with the Il-76 landing method, if necessary. It can be used for rear transportation, as well as at the point of permanent deployment just like a small tonnage truck. And ideally - the adoption of a diesel modification for supply.
UAZ "Cargo" and 120-mm mortar in the back. Now this UAZ model is not produced ...
But "Pro" is produced. Photo: zr.ru
UAZ on the external suspension of the Mi-8, however, is different. Photo: frame from the video of the Zvezda TV channel
10. Large armored car. A large armored car with a high level of security and a combat module with a 30-mm cannon or a 14,5-mm machine gun is used as a regular means of transporting a squad and 1-2 attached people, taking out the wounded, delivering property, and in some cases as a means of fire support. Needed for actions not related to landing. Delivered with IL-76 landing method or under its own power. Again, the Typhoon would fit, but the import ... Perhaps the new Ural-Akhmat armored truck will do. But he needs to be re-armed.
11. Issues for study - the possible return of GAZ vehicles to the Airborne Forces instead of KamAZ. Cons - lower carrying capacity, the inability to tow the D-30 howitzer. Pluses - much easier landing, more cars per plane.
GAZ vehicles are in many ways better suited to the Airborne Forces, but they are not without flaws. Photo: Vitaly Kuzmin
The second question to be studied is whether it is necessary to introduce 152-mm self-propelled artillery into the airborne units. It will be useless for landing operations, but very useful if the landing goes into battle on the ground, like infantry.
However, in terms of the composition of the equipment necessary for various actions of the landing units, a large overlap is already obtained. And "Nona", and transportable / towed 120-mm mortars, and BMD, and tanks, and BTR-D, and armored vehicles ... Next, the staffing table for all this equipment will be proposed in relation to how the "new" Airborne Forces should fight in its main quality, but self-propelled guns may not fit into the structure.
This issue will be considered below, but for now it should be considered debatable. Next, consider the relationship between the strength of the Military Transport Aviation and the Airborne Forces.
Airplanes and parachutists
The network has the work of Marc de Vore "Airborne Illusion: Institutions and the post-war evolution of the airborne forces" (The Airborne Illusion: Institutions and the Evolution of Postwar Airborne Forces).
Her brief summary: the parachute as a way to enter the landing did not justify itself, those who continue to develop and have paratrooper formations are just fools. The biggest fools, of course, are Russians, and in second place are the Americans. But the Britons are great, they left themselves one parachute battalion, and good.
The arguments, so to speak, are extremist, besides, the assessment of the effectiveness and significance of airborne operations was made with distorting the facts and without disclosing the causes of losses and defeats, but one thesis is important to us, namely, that the “price” that this or that the country pays for the presence of its airborne troops, you need to include the cost of military transport aviation, capable of delivering them in the right quantities and landing them.
The thesis is correct - it is necessary. But this is if there are no other tasks for it, or if the scale of other tasks is much smaller than that of the landing ones. If not, then the logic should be different. But the question of the ratio of numbers is important nonetheless.
Let's return to the beginning of this article - to the number of aircraft that are needed for the landing of a conditional regimental landing group. Yes, it is approximate, but no matter how reasonable reinforcements we give to this landing force, it will not increase radically.
So, we need 37 Il-76s or 31 Il-76s and 6 An-12s. And how many of them does Russia have in total? Listed, approximately 110 Il-76 and 57 An-12.
That is, it is possible to successively throw out one landing after another with 37 aircraft, and there are also aircraft to compensate for losses. And two can be landed at the same time, and there is also a reserve, albeit a very small one (out of 110 Ils “on the wing”, God forbid, half, with the An-12, most likely, even worse). But even so, with the new states, there are more or less enough forces.
So what should the ratio be?
In general, it can be defined as: the number of aircraft sufficient to sequentially drop all existing regiments or brigades (which will be taken as a base in future airborne forces) one at a time, plus compensation for losses in each sortie, in accordance with acceptable standards.
It is clear that these standards need to be determined, but, generally speaking, with such a scheme, it turns out that we have at least one and a half times more military aircraft than now, and with the replacement of the An-12 with new, more efficient aircraft, we already simply playfully close the needs of the Airborne Forces if they remain within the "equivalent of three divisions in terms of numbers, working in regiments or brigades." And if there are even fewer...
And then, together, the Airborne Forces and the VTA form a structure that, in principle, can be used anywhere and against any enemy, as long as there is somewhere to take off from.
It remains only to figure out what means of air defense to equip the landing units, and you can proceed to the final definition of their appearance.
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