Mistakes of the domestic military-industrial complex: why protect Russian soldiers
Change of concepts
In the modern world, it is impossible to imagine a truly effective army that would not be recruited on a professional (contract) basis. And there are several reasons for this - technically complex weapons systems are becoming increasingly important, the development of which requires more and more time. As a result of this approach, the army inevitably becomes smaller in number, but qualitatively better.
This increases the qualifications, the time spent on training, and hence the value of each individual soldier. This value is expressed both financially (the cost of training and equipment), and in the context of professionalism - it will be simply impossible to make up for the loss of such personnel in a short time.
These facts increase the importance of measures aimed at the survival of well-trained soldiers on the battlefield.
When forming a professional army, this aspect is also important for psychological reasons, since a contract army implies the principle of voluntariness, and as you understand, the prospect of serving on modern protected equipment is more attractive.
In order to more fully actualize the problem in question, I consider it necessary to quote one of the comments to my last article.
You just have to learn to How motorized rifles on infantry fighting vehicles develop an offensive behind line of defensive positions of the enemy with the aim of disrupting communication lines, suppressing means of support and disrupting control, after which the enemy abruptly loses the ability to control combat, that is, to maneuver and control fire, and simply tramples down to complete surrender.
Indeed, it is foolish to seek to replace miscalculations at the strategic and tactical levels with the characteristics of military equipment.
However, it is not enough just to plan a successful maneuver. The unit must have the technical means that will allow it to carry out its plan - in the case of the example, this means the ability to deliver manpower deep into enemy territory, where it can gain a foothold. And you need to bring them there, as you understand, alive in conditions where any movement on enemy territory is somehow fraught with risks of being fired upon. And here is the time to look at what equipment we have serves as an armored personnel carrier, that is, it is designed specifically for transporting personnel.
The thickness of the armor of new (!) Armored personnel carriers in the Russian army, adopted for service in 2013, is from 8 to 12 mm. This allows you to protect the sides only from small arms. That is, it can be conditionally assumed that the side is protected from a 7,62 cartridge with a muzzle energy of up to 3 kJ (approximately this level can be provided by 500 caliber light machine guns, including the Russian Pecheneg).
It's no secret that the United States has been developing sniper weapons for decades. The muzzle energy of even a 300 Winchester Magnum is 5 J. 000 Lapua Magnum - 338 J. .6 Cheyenne Tactical - 500 J. .408 BMG - 11 J.
Based on these indicators, it will be useful to re-evaluate the adequacy of the level of protection of our armored personnel carriers. We are not even talking about the use of grenade launchers - in the conditions of the city, a sniper can work from the depths of buildings (and in other conditions from any "greenery"), minimally unmasking his position, easily shoot through an armored personnel carrier and hit people inside the equipment. First, kill the driver, and then methodically shoot the entire body.
Ukrainian sniper pair with anti-materiel rifle
However, sniper rifles are the least dangerous.
Far from being the most militarily advanced countries, Soviet KPVTs are widely used, which were installed on the ancient BTR 60 (muzzle energy 31 J). Or a 000 mm charger (23 J). Both options are handicraft installed on various platforms, including "penny" civilian pickups.
Everyone has already seen the video of the execution of the Russian BMP-2 by the Ukrainian "Bucephalus". At the same time, Bucephalus is still a modern and factory model of armored vehicles. However, in order to truly appreciate the “adequacy” of the armor level of Russian armored personnel carriers, I propose to imagine what awaits the Russian troops in the “ultra-modern” BTR-82A if such a marvel of engineering rolls out on them, as in the video below.
For clarity, I also propose to evaluate the result of shelling a BMP-2 armor element from a 12,7 mm Utes machine gun, bearing in mind that the armor of an armored personnel carrier is 2 times weaker than the armor of a BMP-2, and NATO forces put the 50th caliber wherever they can ranging from tactical buggies.
Obviously, the BTR82 simply cannot ensure the safe transportation of personnel even in the face of opposition to the enemy, armed, relatively speaking, with “carts”. Its armor is also extremely vulnerable to fragments of 122-mm and 152-mm artillery shells, which is especially true for the conflict in Ukraine.
Against this background, I propose to evaluate the very vector of modernization of the BTR-80.
The Defense Ministry decided to install 30-mm guns on these vehicles and, as you might guess, this decision does not affect the issue of personnel protection in any way. While, as follows from the name of the vehicle class - "armored personnel carrier", its Home the task is precisely the safe transportation of manpower.
And, in my opinion, our "military thought" went in some very strange way, setting priorities wrong and putting the cart before the horse. Having started the development of a wide range of combat modules, one is more fantastic than the other, half of which did not go into the series, and the other half is put on frankly "cardboard" equipment.
In order for the armored personnel carrier conceptually (and not technologically) met modern requirements, super-complex and expensive solutions are not needed at all. It is enough just to start riveting "steel boxes". The Americans created the M113 on the same principle (albeit with aluminum armor) - in the dimensions of this machine, from modern Russian steel, you can create an armored personnel carrier weighing 20-25 tons, which will hold 12,7 mm on board and 30 mm in the forehead.
The concept of a "normal" armored personnel carrier can be illustrated with a single photo below.
In fact, it's just an armored box on tracks. There is enough space inside to comfortably accommodate people - they do not get tired, being in a cramped position. A large ramp, which, in addition to the convenience of landing, also protects the legs of the landing force from fire from the front.
The dimensions of the vehicle itself, coupled with armor, make it possible to use it as a truly reliable shelter during a firefight for the entire airborne squad.
Ergonomics and work with the injured
In this chapter, I would like to try to explain how the lack of a proper armored personnel carrier is an obstacle to the development of all ground forces in the complex.
In the understanding of some people, questions of comfort and convenience do not apply to military equipment. Moreover, I still meet even some bravado about the fact that NATO soldiers are pampered hipsters who will not fight without a field McDonald's, and our soldiers are tough men who ride on top of armor.
Let's take a look at specific examples of how such bravado turns out.
Leaving the armored personnel carrier through the side hatches was inconvenient from the very beginning, but how has the appearance of the soldier changed over this time?
The weight of the wearable equipment has changed, primarily due to the means of individual armor protection. Increased wearable ammunition.
There was a need to transfer the weight of the equipment worn from the back closer to the center of gravity of the soldier - this is how “warbelts” appeared, that is, combat belts on which various pouches are attached.
Modular systems have become widespread, implying the presence of a groin plate, anti-fragmentation protection of a large area (shoulders, hips, neck).
In other words, the silhouette of an infantryman over these 50 years has decently “stout”, and his mobility and ability to perform acrobatic studies when landing from uncomfortable hatches have decreased.
In addition, the role of the “tactical body kit” has increased - night vision devices and thermal imagers on the helmet of a fighter (here one recalls Miloslavsky’s sarcastic remark - “if, of course, you have them”), as well as expensive sights on weapons.
Taken together, all this significantly aggravated what A. Timokhin wrote about in the article "Heavy armor for the Russian infantry".
All this led to such a vicious phenomenon as riding over armor. Many armies suffered from this defect in different wars, but only the Soviet and Russian armies always had it, regardless of where the war was being fought and against which enemy.
However, it is worth noting that the increased weight inevitably complicates the landing directly from the "armor" - jumping from a 2-meter height onto an uneven surface is traumatic and light. How to do this in heavier equipment, holding a weapon in your hands is a mystery.
Landing of an engineering assault unit - are there options for them to land from the BTR-82? The question is, of course, rhetorical.
It turns out that the infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers that are in service, with their conceptual backwardness (in terms of habitability and ergonomics), force the fighters to abandon modern, heavier and more effective protection and thus further exacerbate the issue of maintaining personnel.
Episode analysis
This video with the participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine caused a quite expected ironic reaction in the Russian segment of YouTube.
However, in my opinion, this is not entirely appropriate for one simple reason - everything that happened is fully characteristic of the RF Armed Forces. First, let's take a look at what actually happened.
Infantry on 2 infantry fighting vehicles moved into position. For reasons already mentioned above, the soldiers were not located inside the vehicles, but “on the armor”. If the infantry were sitting inside the vehicles, then the commander could decide to retreat, the “smoke” would be fired and, firing, both vehicles would simply leave.
However, in the current situation, no coordinated actions between the infantry and their transport are simply impossible. The mechanic is not informed about the actions of the infantry - did they jump or not? Is it possible to return at all? At the same time, any active maneuvers necessary to get the vehicle out of the shelling as quickly as possible inevitably lead to “victims” among the personnel.
As a result, this video serves as a clear example of the inconsistency of the BTR / BMP concept existing in the Russian army. It also clearly shows the effect of the fall, which was mentioned above - not everyone was able to get up after they "landed" from their transport.
Falls regularly occur with us (the laws of physics, as you understand, act on all people equally).
It's pretty stupid to invest in training a soldier so that he falls out of the blue and breaks his neck.
medical transport
Another component of the “survivability” of our soldiers is the provision of effective medical care.
Golden hour is a term used in resuscitation to define the period of time after an injury, which allows the most effective first aid. It is believed that during this time the likelihood that the treatment will prevent the death of the patient is the highest.
In other words, the more qualified assistance is provided in the first minutes after the injury, the better the prognosis.
And here we can distinguish 3 components:
1. Qualification of the specialist who provides this assistance - the higher the qualification of the specialist, the higher its value. The more expensive its preparation. And the better it should be protected.
2. Transport must be able to provide assistance as quickly as possible, and for this it must be able to move as close as possible to the advancing units, which also dictates the requirements for security.
3. The issue of internal space - a spacious module allows you to place a lot of useful equipment. Oxygen allows for oxygenation, which automatically improves prognosis. The ventilator is very useful for such common injuries as pneumothorax - when a shrapnel or bullet pierces the chest and / or lung. The presence of a defibrillator and the stable position of the patient allow for full-fledged resuscitation.
4. Separately, it is necessary to address the issue of removing the victim from the armored personnel carrier and loading him into the transport for evacuation.
It is impossible to calculate the exact number of fighters who died in APCs in Afghanistan and Chechnya just because it was not possible to evacuate them in a timely manner, due to the exceptional complexity of this process. In addition, the very process of extracting from the side hatch, even if it can be done, is associated with a great risk of causing even more damage to the victim due to the fact that it is virtually impossible to manipulate the body in a controlled and accurate manner. As a possible result, bone fragments pierce an artery / broken ribs pierce a lung / a person simply develops a pain shock.
All or nothing
Another decision of our military-industrial complex, which simply cannot be explained rationally, is the complete rejection of the use of the most ordinary armored shields on turrets.
In combat conditions, when a car is being fired from small arms, getting out of the hatch to the waist and firing from a machine gun, where there is absolutely no protection, is already bordering on a feat. As a result, in practice, when shelling in half the cases, simply no one will stand behind a machine gun. And in cases where there is still a daredevil, there is a high probability that he will receive his medal either posthumously or in connection with the injury.
That is, we are talking not only about the life of a person who must directly fire, but also about the survival of a machine gun as a fire weapon in the unit. Thus, the unit, having lost the opportunity to use this weapon, will act less effectively and it is possible that it will suffer additional losses because of this.
It is traditionally believed that the United States is ready to fight to the last Ukrainian, but even they supply "independent" equipment with turrets.
One could come up with some excuses if it was about high-tech weapons, but when the solution to the issue lies on the surface and is technologically primitive, it’s already like in a joke “I don’t even know what to say.” Personally, I was finally finished off by the photo of the Russian Tigers delivered to ... Zambia.
What further conclusions can be drawn from this? If we look at the pricing of the same BMP-3, we will understand that the combat module costs a little more than the chassis itself. If, in addition to this, we take into account that our country has some difficulties in the production of electronic components, modern panoramic sights and thermal imagers, it becomes obvious that priority in equipment should be given first of all tanks, reconnaissance vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles.
Armored personnel carriers should be produced exclusively with turrets.
The photo above demonstrates the correct approach to the development of a new platform - a multi-ton vehicle with dynamic protection and gratings is armed with a manual turret with a 7,62 machine gun. The priorities of this machine are obvious.
In addition, there are reasons why equipping armored personnel carriers with heavier weapons (as our geniuses did) in the end is not only economically inexpedient, but also capable of leading to unwanted losses.
This reason is connected with the fact that an extremely harmful practice may arise on the ground - to “plow” equipment to solve those tasks for which it was not originally intended, and the main “calling” for such a “plow” will be disproportionate weapons.
For an example, refer to the article "Ukraine. Again, light vehicles replace the BMPT". It just describes the “canonical” case when an infantry fighting vehicle rolls out from around a corner and fires from a 30-mm cannon.
And what is the result? During the Chechen campaigns, the 30-mm cannon was only on the BMP. The APCs were armed with KPVT, as illustrated in the photo below.
And if in Chechnya, in order to “thirty-thirty”, it was necessary to call the BMP (more armored than the armored personnel carrier), now you can get by with the armored personnel carrier. This fact allows us to state that the situation has not just repeated itself (as the title of the article suggests) - it has become even worse! Against the backdrop of minimal technical progress, conceptual degradation occurred.
The right approach is to develop an integrated system in which the role of the armored personnel carrier is the role of a "bus" for the infantry. The tasks of engaging the enemy by fire must be accomplished by more suitable means.
It is noteworthy that this is also true for heavy infantry fighting vehicles. A. Timokhin exhaustively wrote about heavy infantry fighting vehicles.
You can only add in one place, namely:
Of course, we will have to strengthen the armor, and not only the frontal one. You will have to install some kind of serial combat module with a gun and anti-tank systems, fitting it into the hull (which is much easier than fitting it into the BMP-2 hull). Serial, because it is necessary inexpensively.
As the experience of using heavy infantry fighting vehicles shows, in the situations for which they are created, they simply do not have time to fire.
They quickly approach either a wrecked tank or a building (in any case, to a place that is known in advance), draw close to it, land infantry, take away the wounded, and just as quickly retreat.
Conclusions
1. Today, Russia simply does not have modern armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.
2. Since we are talking about modernity, not with the so-called. technical equipment, and at the concept level - there are no real technical barriers to the creation of such variants of equipment.
3. Against this background, the decision to launch the BTR-82 series is, to put it mildly, debatable.
4. The lack of modern armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles comprehensively limits the development of all ground forces and leads to unnecessary losses in manpower due to complex action sets factors (poor security, disproportionate armament, riding over armor, problems with habitability, the impossibility of creating modern medical armored vehicles, restrictions on armoring an infantryman arising from terrible habitability, ergonomics and the inconvenience of landing).
5. The use of equipment without protective shields on the turrets should be excluded. This item has the greatest impact on combat effectiveness and reduction of losses in terms of the result-cost ratio.
6. In the production of modern armored personnel carriers, at least for the first time, complex combat modules should be abandoned, focusing on the amount of equipment produced, since this will have a more significant effect on the survival of our soldiers. At least in the first "transitional" period.
Information