Military Review

The myth of the "faithful dog" of Stalin Lev Zakharovich Mehlis

67
Our foreword


Dear friends, a letter was sent to the site http://delostalina.ru, in which there was the following wish: “... I would like to know the truth about the role of L. Mehlis in the Crimean tragedy 1942 of the year ...”. We asked to answer the question of the famous historian Arsen Martirosyan

The myth of the "faithful dog" of Stalin Lev Zakharovich Mehlis


From the tragedy of the Crimean front they concocted one of the most convoluted and most complex myths in all the mythology about the Great Patriotic War - the myth that the Supreme Commander Stalin specifically sent his dull dog in military affairs, but “faithful dog” L. Mehlis, to he held command in fear, as a result of which the Crimean catastrophe eventually occurred. The fact is that due to both objective and subjective circumstances, including not without insidious malicious intent, lies and truth, courage and meanness, heroism and cowardice, hopeless stupidity and exact prediction of the development of the situation are closely interwoven, non-fulfillment military duty and elements of betrayal, and even hidden, but not too hidden anti-Semitism. In short, mixed up such that the devil break his leg. And it is necessary to understand. Oh, as it should be - one cannot be content with a single lie or a little proof of truth.

Oddly enough, but you will have to start with anti-Semitism. Yes, from him, because the center of attraction for all the lies of this myth is the figure of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the deputy people's commissar of defense, that is, Stalin himself, the chief commissar of the Red Army Lev Zakharovich Mehlis, a Jew by nationality. It is on his figure that all those extreme opposites that are so characteristic of the analyzed myth are tightly intertwined, or rather deliberately intertwined. The man who wrote the book “Mekhlis. The Leader's Shadow "(M., 2007) - Doctor historical Sci. Yuri Rubtsov, - right on the cover of his printed work he made the following summary about the hero of his work: “The mere mention of the name of Lev Mehlis caused horror in many brave and honored generals. For many years this man was a real shadow of Stalin, his “second self” and in fact the master of the Red Army. He was so fanatically devoted to his leader and country that he didn’t stop at anything in order to accomplish the task. On the one hand, Mehlis is accused of having the blood of hundreds of innocent commanders on his hands, some of which he personally shot. On the other hand, he was respected by ordinary soldiers, whom he always cared about. On the one hand, Mehlis was one of the main perpetrators of the defeat of the first months of World War II and the collapse of the Crimean Front in the spring of 1942. On the other hand, his inflexibility and hardness more than once saved the troops in the most desperate situations. Was Mehlis the embodiment of evil? Or did he simply personify his controversial time? These questions are answered by a new book by the Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Rubtsov, created on the basis of archival documents that were only recently kept under the “Top Secret” label.

So what gives such an application about the content of the book? Why pre-tune readers into the fact that Mehlis is the fiend of hell, which is to blame for the Crimean catastrophe ?! Does this help to establish the truth? Do all the documents and facts cited by the distinguished colleague on the pages of the book unequivocally indicate the guilt of Mehlis alone and only ?! Yes, it is well known that in our historiography about war there is absolute dislike, if not worse, for the personality of Mehlis. Who is the only one who does not drift him ?! What are the only stones and clumps of dirt do not throw in his address? And what, is it all fair ?! Yes, the mere fact that absolute dislike for Mehlis reigns should already be alarming. Because fundamentally similar phenomena of universal insanity or hatred for one particular person mean only one thing - behind all this lies a skillfully directed from behind the scenes, supposedly a general, but not just righteous desire to blind from one, quite possibly, truly ambiguous person responsible for all tragedies . In general, all the facts testify to this.

Yes, indeed, Lev Zakharovich was not a very simple person. He was harsh, sometimes even very, often straightforward in assessments and requirements. To put it mildly, he did not like diplomacy. Almond - too. It was tough, including on the verge of cruelty, and sometimes, during the war years, and overtook this boundary, if that, of course, required the situation. And at the same time he was principled, brave, really possessed an unbending will, a strong character. Unfortunately, he did not have a military education at the academy level and did not have leadership talents, like the great Rokossovsky, whom, by the way, he highly valued and shortly before the disastrous spring of the Crimean Front, which had become obvious to him in the near future, asked Stalin to appoint him the commander of the Crimean front, in order to save the front. Alas, due to a severe injury, Rokossovsky was then in the hospital. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that during the Civil War, Mehlis gained a unique experience in forming formations and commanders in offensive and defensive battles with an exceptionally strong adversary — the most talented general of the White Army, Lieutenant-General Ya.A. Slashchev. Of course, the experience of the Civil War is one thing, and the Great Patriotic War is completely different. Nevertheless, to call Mekhlis a complete oak in military affairs, neither tongue nor arm is turned. He understood and even very well understood Lev Zakharovich what war is. But the commander was still not.

On top of that, Mehlis never hesitated to talk in the forehead, including writing, about the worst mistakes (by the way, also about his own) of the command with which he had served, his miscalculations, bashfulness, sloppiness, negligence, disdain for simple soldiers and officers, cowardice on the verge of treason and betrayal, etc. Mehlis mastered the various propaganda techniques characteristic of his time. He had a developed intuition for meanness, cowardice, negligence and other shortcomings, which he had seen enough while he was People's Commissar of State Control. For that, by the way, he was pretty hated even before the war. Was educated and erudite. He always spoke with pathos, but I must give him his due, sincerely. He always sincerely believed in what he was talking about. No matter how many critical arrows were let in his address, Lev Zakharovich was able to quickly grasp the end of the “Ariadne thread” and quickly unwind even the most complicated ball of acute problems. Of course, he didn’t do without his usual manner of seeing everything either in white or black, but the fact remains that he quickly picked up the essence of the problem he was sent to solve. By the way, when I realized that I was wrong, I never hesitated to admit it. Including before subordinates (once he made such a confession to General Gorbatov).

It is impossible not to admit that if he were not a Jew, but as a stubborn Russian peasant, then, quite possibly, he would have been forgiven much. In a pinch, they simply would not have remembered him. And, of course, many of the “brave and honored generals” would not have recalled Mehlis with horror. However, unfortunately, even in the post-war memoirs, barely concealed anti-Semitism in some parts of our generals of the wartime will not put it anywhere. In addition to all this, to his misfortune Mehlis was also the chief commissar of the Red Army. But I must honestly say that they could not bear commissioners in the army. About a year before the war, believing that after the purging of a new generation of generals could be trusted, Stalin once again eliminated the institution of commissars introduced even after the defeat of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy. However, already in July, 1941, seeing that the generals were brazenly doing, how they were destroying the army and the country, Stalin was forced to restore this institution, because at that time the command really needed to be watched. And one Special Department was not enough. This is the cruel truth of war, which must be a priori recognized.

This is to the fact that, not trying to make Lev Zakharovich a kind of cherub or an angel with wings, I can not agree at the same time that all the “dogs” are undeservedly hanged on him, including for the disaster of the Crimean Front. And they present the matter in such a way that it is he, Lev Zakharovich Mehlis, who is the main guilty party in this disaster. This, as they say, is the general background that you need to know before embarking on an attempt to understand what is happening in the history of the Crimean Front. And for this we will have to briefly go over its main milestones.

Mehlis arrived on the Crimean Front (until January 28, 1942 - the Caucasian Front) on January 20. On the eve of his arrival on this front in the status of plenipotentiary representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the front troops successfully carried out the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation (25.12.41-02.01.42) and seized an important bridgehead. In connection with this front commander, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov was instructed by the Supreme Command to speed up the concentration of forces in every way, for which it was allowed to transfer additional forces (47th Army) and no later than January 12 to go on a general offensive with the support of the Black Sea fleet. The offensive failed. Usually this failure is described in such a way that the Soviet command underestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy. By the way, this insanely inadequate to the realities of war Zhukov's wording appears in the description of almost every failed operation. Inevitably, here you will recall the famous saying about what prevented the dancer ... In fact, the offensive was frustrated due to the lack of a well-thought-out plan, as well as clear material and technical and combat support for troops landed in Crimea. What is primarily expressed in the lack of transport vessels for the transfer of manpower from the "mainland", artillery, special units. And with the provision of troops with ammunition and fuel, the situation was generally disastrous. There is no reason not to believe the conclusions just quoted by the former commander of the 44th Army, who participated in this operation, Major General A.N. Pervushina. Further, weather conditions intervened - the onset of the thaw made field airfields completely unusable. Affected and the favorite mess of our generals of that time - the lack of normal communications, air defense equipment. All this led to the fact that after the Germans took possession of Theodosius, the front commander General Kozlov decided to withdraw troops to Ak-Monai positions - a defensive line about 80 km from Kerch. In such a situation, Mehlis arrived at the front. He was sent to strengthen the leadership of the front. As many researchers note, here for the first time he received almost the highest degree of independence as a representative of the Headquarters.

Two days after the arrival, Mehlis sent Stalin a telegram of the following content: “The 20.01.42 flew to Kerch. The most unattractive picture of the organization of command and control of the troops was caught ... No divisions have data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a confused and uncertain commander. None of the leaders of the front since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula in the army was not ... "1

1 TsA MO f. 32, op. 11309, d. 139, l. 17.

Usually, this telegram is described as follows: the self-confident Mehlis “had enough” of two days to get an idea of ​​the state of affairs at the front. And where does the arrogance of Mehlis? Even if what he wrote to Stalin corresponded to the real situation by at least one percent — I specifically reduce it a hundred times — then all the same, his conclusion is objective and alarming. The command of the front does not fulfill its duties. In fact, Mehlis was right for one hundred percent. Because the main provisions of this telegram were recorded in the order of the front troops No. 12 from 23 in January 1942, the order was signed by Kozlov himself, a member of the Military Council of the front, F.A. Shamanin and Mehlis. That is, if for some simple reason, Kozlov himself confirmed that all this is true truth.

Why was Mehlis completely right ?! Yes, because the front command was in ... Tbilisi. And from there, sitting in the warm offices of the district headquarters, led the fighting! From a thousand kilometers away! But is it possible to lead the fighting of the whole front? If the commander does not see and does not know what exactly is going on at the front, where the enemy is, what is the condition of our troops, how is defense being built on the ground, etc. etc., then, I'm sorry, this is not the front command, but just a mess, fraught with the most negative consequences. Mehlis quickly figured out what was wrong. And immediately put before Stavka the question of separating the front from the Caucasus into an independent Crimean one. Moreover, he raised the question of shifting the control of the troops of the Crimean Front to the Kerch Peninsula. At the same time, Mehlis immediately requested replenishment in manpower (three rifle divisions), began to demand urgent restoration of order in artillery, air defense, and logistic support. The order number 12 from 23 January 1942 and said: “1. The command of armies, divisions, regiments to take into account the experience of fighting 15-18.01.42, immediately restore order in the units ... Regimental artillery and artillery of anti-tank guns (anti-tank. - AM) have infantry in combat formations ...

2. Panicked and deserters shot on the spot as traitors. Caught in the deliberate wound of left-handed gunmen, shoot in front of the line.

3. In three days to restore full order in the rear ... "1.

1 APRF, f. 5, op. 50, d. 441, l. 32-36.

It should be added to this that Mehlis carefully checked the condition of the air force and the artillery of the front, on which its combat capability depended to a decisive degree. It turned out that due to poor material and technical support on the Kerch Peninsula, 110 had accumulated inoperable aircraft, as a result of which less than one departure was made a day. Artillery readiness was low. Lev Zakharovich was not lazy and checked the status of military intelligence - it turned out that she was poorly placed. And commanders of all levels are responsible for this, starting with the front commander. For if intelligence does not work well, then the consequences are always catastrophic.

Mehlis quickly got additional arms from the General Headquarters and the General Staff - the front received 450 light machine guns, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 120 mm caliber mortars and 50 82 mm caliber guns, as well as two M-8 rocket divisions. The issue of allocating an additional amount to the front was resolved. tanks, including HF, anti-tank rifles and their ammunition, other weapons and equipment. Moreover. Mehlis immediately set about strengthening the front command with experienced personnel. Already on January 24, a new front air force commander was appointed - Major General aviation EAT. Nikolaenko. A little later, the new deputy front commander, Major General A.F. Khrenov, the new head of the political department - Brigadier Commissar S.S. Emelyanov. In addition, in anticipation of the planned offensive, Mehlis also managed to send a large number of political workers at various levels to the front. Two divisional commissars, 15 regiment commissars, 45 battalion level officers, 23 military divisions of artillery divisions and batteries, 15 propaganda instructors, 7 political workers to work in divisions formed from immigrants from the Transcaucasian republics, 4 propaganda specialists among the Germans. Then, also at the request of the Mehlis, another 1030 political fighters and 225 deputy political officers were sent to the front. Strengthening the forces of the front, Mehlis nevertheless, to the displeasure of Stalin, when meeting 15 in person with him in February 1942, required additional time to prepare the front for the offensive. That is, he did not at all strive to fulfill the orders of the Stake at any cost. And Stalin agreed with him, although, I emphasize this, I was very unhappy with the forced postponement of the already planned offensive. But the arguments of Mehlis worked. So, if we summarize all this, then is it not obvious that the representative of the Stake has thoroughly understood the essence of the problems that literally crushed the front?! As regards clause No. 2 of the above order, it should not be considered as a manifestation of Mehlis’s particular bloodthirstiness. In this case, he only carried out the Stalinist order No. 270 from 16.08.1941. Not to mention that, to my deep regret, there was still an urgent need for that.

And what happened next ?! Is Mehlis guilty of the tragedy repeatedly played out at the front ?! If objectively, then far less than front command. Because the commander and chief of staff of the front are personally responsible for the hostilities, and especially for their organization. However, when the planned offensive began on February 9, 27, the “valiant” command of the Crimean Front — Commander General Kozlov and Chief of Staff General Tolbukhin — instead of allowing the German Defense Forces to break through the German defense of the Kerch Peninsula, The T-1942 was brought to the front in large numbers, and the infantry was sent forward, which the Germans threw mercilessly, as there was nowhere to hide. Thus, if we proceed from the descriptions of the writer K. Simonov who was present on the Crimean front in those days, did they check the tank accessibility of the area ?! They checked them for three days, driving them ... chasing the infantry into senseless attacks without any cover, putting thousands of people for nothing! The 34 Soviet divisions were advancing against three German and one Romanian. And the irretrievable losses are simply fantastic (by April, already 13 thousands of people!). Mehlis literally howled from such a command, and already on March 225 sent Stalin a request to immediately remove Kozlov and Tolbukhin and appoint normal generals. They took only Tolbukhin. Mehlis doesn’t calm down, and 9 in March again insists in writing to Stalin on the removal of Kozlov, and already gives a summary summary to him - in two months I’ve seen enough. The summary is not in the eyebrow, but directly in the general's eye: unintelligent, lazy, “the man who has devoured the master” is not interested in operational issues, regards trips to the troops as “punishment”, is not known in the troops of the front, does not enjoy prestige, painstaking, daily work is not loves.

Stalin did not change Kozlov. Why? Maybe then Stalin is to blame ?! Firstly, Mehlis asked to remove Kozlov and appoint one of the following generals to the position of commander: N.K. Klykova, but he commanded the 2 th shock army that had broken through to Leningrad. At that moment it was impossible to change it. K.K. Rokossovsky, who, as noted above, at that moment was treated in a hospital after being seriously wounded. N.K. Lviv, commander of 51-th army, whom he met on the Kerch Peninsula. For some reason, this candidacy did not attract the attention of Stalin. Secondly, not in justification, but only in explanation of Stalin’s position, I consider it correct to point out the following. Stalin was forced to reckon with the fact that the war had not yet forged enough talented and strong commanders to appoint them to the most difficult sections. And from the realization of this damned compulsion, he himself was forced to be content with the human material that was available. What can you do, and Stalin, too, is far from all under the force, it all took time ...

By the beginning of May 1942, the situation at the front was close to critical. As a result of Kozlov's “gallant” command, a situation arose in which the grouping of front forces, while retaining all the offensive signs, could not go on the offensive - it was constantly postponed. Moreover. The defense is not strengthened. And in this case there is every reason to say that the defense was not strengthened in the most criminal way. Why?! Yes, because the Supreme Commander Stalin back in October - November 1941 gave orders on the construction of fortifications in the North Caucasus Military District three times. Including in the area of ​​the future of the Crimean Front (in order to avoid repetition, the content of these orders is given below in connection with the preparations for the Battle of Stalingrad, since they also deal with the defense of Stalingrad). But after all, no shit was done. And this in wartime conditions is called only by one term - a crime.

* * *

Comment. It so happened - a crime. 6 May 1942. The Stavka issued an order to go over the front to defense. But the defense must rely on something. And this support was not. Already during the May breakthrough of our defenses by the Germans, the Headquarters gave Kozlov an indication of the following content: “1) The entire 47 army should immediately begin to withdraw behind the Turkish shaft, organizing a rear guard and covering the withdrawal by aircraft. Without this, there will be a risk of being taken prisoner ... 3) You can organize a strike by the forces of the 51 army so that this army can be gradually withdrawn beyond the Turkish wall. 4) The remnants of the army 44 also need to take over the Turkish shaft. 5) Mehlis and Kozlov must immediately start organizing defense on the line of the Turkish Wall. 6) We do not object to the transfer of headquarters to the place you specified. 7) We strongly oppose the departure of Kozlov and Mehlis to the Lvov group. Take all measures to ensure that the artillery, especially large, was concentrated behind the Turkish shaft, as well as a number of anti-tank regiments. 9) If you can and will have time to hold the enemy in front of the Turkish shaft, we will consider this an achievement ... "1. But after all neither the Turkish shaft, nor Kerch contours were not equipped in the engineering relation and did not represent a serious obstacle for Germans. But the orders for the construction of fortifications on the Kerch Peninsula, I emphasize this again, were given as early as October - November 1941! So how do you order it to evaluate?

1 TsAMO RF, f. 32, op. 11309, d. 140, l. 341-345.

* * *

Worse. All three armies of the front were deployed in one echelon, which sharply reduced the depth of defense and even more sharply limited the ability to repel enemy strikes in the event of a breakthrough.. I do not think that a special explanation is needed for the fact that the commander and the chief of staff of the front are responsible for the deployment and the correct formation of troops for solving various tasks, and not the representative of the Headquarters, whoever he is. But when, in May, the Germans launched a decisive offensive, their main attack came precisely in the most unfortunate, rather insanely criminal, construction of the troops of General S.I.'s 44 army. Chernyak. Insanely criminal construction of the troops of this army - because the second echelon of this army was only in 3-4 km from the front edge, which allowed the Nazis even without changing their artillery positions to smash down even the operational defense of the army, and not just tactical. What they did. They crushed the entire 44 nd army.

* * *

By the way, be curious what kind of opinion Mehlis had about General Chernyak: “Chernyak. Illiterate man, unable to lead the army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not a troop organizer. You can marvel, whose hand introduced Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general. "

* * *

Further. For some reason, almost all researchers angrily mock about the fact that on the eve of the German offensive a Croatian pilot flew over to our side, who warned about the offensive, but, they say, Mehlis did not believe it. And in connection with which such an attitude ?! After all, in reality, the front command is to blame, not Mehlis. Even Yu. Rubtsov himself even points out that firstly, the pilot’s information was confirmed by other data, and secondly, on the night of May 7, the military council of the Crimean Front sent the necessary orders to the troops, but this was done so slowly that by the morning they did not even reach all the commanders armies! Worse. 8 May 1942 Mr. Mehlis sent a telegram to Stalin in which he wrote: “Now is not the time to complain, but I have to report that General Headquarters know the front commander. 7 on May, that is, on the eve of the enemy offensive, Kozlov convened a military council to discuss the draft of a future operation to capture Koy Aksan. I recommended to postpone this project and immediately give instructions to the armies in connection with the expected offensive of the enemy. In the signed order of the commander in several places, he pointed out that the offensive is expected to be 10-15 in May, and suggested that we work out an army defense plan with all the commanders, commanders and staffs. This was done when the whole situation of the past day showed that in the morning the enemy would advance. At my insistence, the orientation was erroneous in terms. Kozlov also resisted the advancement of additional forces to the 10 Army. ”

* * *

Comment. Doesn't this remind you anything ?! That's right, Tymoshenko and Zhukov behaved exactly the same way, failing with the most important directive No. 1 until late at night, as a result of which, even according to Zhukov, she left for the districts only in 00.30 June 22 minutes, because of which she was deciphered locally already under the roar of barbaric bombing and Nazi artillery raids. Worse. Similarly, in the orders to camouflage the district air forces on the eve of the war, both of the cool star completely disoriented the command of the districts in terms of the forthcoming attack! And despite the fact that 18 of June 1941 was passed to the border districts of Stalin's directive on bringing their troops into full combat readiness in connection with the expected attack of the Nazis !? After that - disguising orders for disguise ?! You can’t think up anything deliberately! .. And the commander of the Crimean front behaves in the same way: all data hits right in the eye - tomorrow the Germans will launch an offensive, and he specifies the 10-15 deadline in May on the front order, and everyone can work out a defense plan before 10, which long ago was supposed to be ready. He should always be ready and only be adjusted in the course of the action depending on the situation.

* * *

In response to his telegram, in which he once again asked to change Kozlov, Mehlis received a very irritated message from Stalin: “You hold the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimea Front. This position is very convenient, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the Stake responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct command errors on the spot. Together with the command you are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be very weak. If “the whole situation showed that in the morning the enemy would attack,” and you did not take all measures to organize repulse, confining yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. So, you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimea front not as a State Control, but as a responsible representative of the Headquarters.

You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you can not know that we do not have in reserve Hindenburg ... If you used attack aircraft not for side effects, but against tanks and enemy manpower, the enemy would not break through the front and the tanks would not pass. You do not need to be Hindenburg to understand this simple thing, sitting for two months on the Crimea Front »1.


1 Quote by: Rubtsov Y. Mehlis. Shadow of the leader. M., 2007, p. 364.

Formally, it appears that Mehlis seems to have deservedly received "nuts." Especially when you consider that Stalin then withdrew him from the front and demoted him. In fact, the opposite happened. Stalin became angry that at the most crucial moment, Mehlis, who saw perfectly well that Kozlov simply could not cope with his duties of the com-front, did not switch command of himself. Understanding Mehlis is also possible and necessary. After all, formally, the representative of the Stavka had no right to completely substitute the front commander. He was obliged to help him. But Kozlov, meanwhile, is very cleverly settled - once Mehlis takes care of everything, well, so let him be responsible for everything. Kozlov got his from Stalin. Yes, as received! But he is not remembered as the primary culprit for the failure of the Crimea Front. All the bumps are falling on the head of Mehlis. And not for the fact that he, unlike the commander, was desperately trying to change the situation of the wild mess that led to the tragedy. And only for the fact that he openly demanded to change General Kozlov for his frank professional unsuitability. That is, because he simply attacked the holy of holies of the generals - the general may be free to use an oak tree in military affairs, but no one has the right to raise his hand to the status of a general. That is why Mehlis in the post-war period was blamed for all the responsibility. With his demands for a change of commander, he raised the gigantic problem of the professional unsuitability of a significant part of the generals. For what he was slandered. Especially since he was a commissar, and the generals of commissars hated. Such is the hard truth about the affairs of Mehlis on the Crimean front.
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  1. andrei332809
    andrei332809 18 October 2012 08: 07
    +25
    How did the commissars of 20x differ from the political officers of 50x? first said, do as I do. second- do as I said
    1. Vadivak
      Vadivak 18 October 2012 15: 20
      +18
      Leo Zakharovich desperate courage commander,

      “Comrade Mehlis found the Chongar River, which flows into Sivash. The river was frozen, through it he crossed part of the 137th brigade. Part went behind enemy lines, captured the headquarters of the white with the generals, 18 guns, several dozen machine guns, a huge number of rifles and ammunition ... "

      Why didn’t those who wrote memoirs love him?
      “Perhaps, in that war no one dared to shoot the general before the ranks without trial. And the head of the Main Political Administration did not hesitate to go for it. Here is the text of the order to the troops of the front No. 057 of September 12, 1941, drawn up personally by Mehlis: “... For cowardice and personal departure from the battlefield to the rear, for violation of military discipline, expressed in direct failure [308] to order the front to leave assistance to the units advancing from the west, for failure to take measures to save the artillery's material part, for the loss of military appearance and two days of drunkenness during the fighting of the army of Major General of the artillery Goncharov, on the basis of the order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 270, to shoot publicly in front of the formation of the commanders of the 34th Army headquarters ".
      1. S_mirnov
        S_mirnov 18 October 2012 15: 39
        +9
        Article SUPER! Urgently include in the history books of elementary grades! And if you don’t have enough time to study, you can cancel classes on tolerance and the study of priestly tales!
        1. strannik595
          strannik595 18 October 2012 15: 44
          +1
          don’t need to touch Russian priests Sasha, do you have enough skulls for epaulettes?
        2. strannik595
          strannik595 18 October 2012 15: 48
          +7
          don’t need to touch Russian priests Sasha, do you have enough skulls for epaulettes? angry
          1. S_mirnov
            S_mirnov 19 October 2012 00: 18
            +6
            Not in the stars on uniform, happiness, Wanderer. But traders from the church must be driven!
            http://demotivation.me/lbxla0vg698jpic.html
            And from schools, by the way, too, a secular state seems to be constitutionally. And then after the priests there and the rabbis will stretch, with all kinds of mullahs. Arranged a mess out of education!
            And we have already seen beautiful pictures with priests, but as it comes to business, you will not find a single priest!
            http://www.nr2.ru/moskow/408221.html
            By the way, if someone didn’t understand something, I’ll explain. I have nothing against Orthodoxy, a good religion in general. But the corrupt priests got it, they teach us humility, they made us out of faith - business and others live on it, that's all disgusting.
      2. Poppy
        Poppy 18 October 2012 17: 43
        +6
        yes, generals don’t forgive such
      3. postman
        postman 18 October 2012 18: 10
        +6
        Quote: Vadivak
        no one else decided to shoot without a court before the formation of the general. And the head of the Main Political Administration did not hesitate

        And who appointed this "drunkard, coward, who lost his appearance" to the post? And when (From what time? Have you ever thought?
        Chief of Artillery of the 34th Army Major General Goncharov Vasily Safronovich, born in 1894 = member of the CPSU (b) with 1939 years (after all purges, mopping-ups and destruction of all those who mumble)
        A folder with materials on the case of General-6 (!) Sheets
        There is no verdict, no extract from the decision of the Special Meeting, nor protocols of investigative actions. NOTHING.
        Mehlis: “Where are the guns?” Goncharov waved his hand vaguely in the direction where our units were surrounded. “Where, am I asking you?” - Mehlis shouted again and, after a short pause, began the standard phrase: “In accordance with the order of the USSR people's commissar of defense No. 270 ...” To execute the “sentence,” he called the right-winged, tall major. He, risking, but not able to overcome the emotional excitement, refused. I had to call the separation of soldiers ... ".
        NOTICE not yourself, but with the wrong hands.

        and it’s not for nothing that the military do not like him, the dog never got drunk to the full of Russian blood.
        All of them (Mehlises, Trotsky, Sverdlovs, and others) of the same Berry field.
        Oprichniki of the 20th century.
        1. Alikos
          Alikos 16 June 2017 11: 12
          0
          Quote: Postman
          Quote: Vadivak
          no one else decided to shoot without a court before the formation of the general. And the head of the Main Political Administration did not hesitate

          And who appointed this "drunkard, coward, who lost his appearance" to the post? And when (From what time? Have you ever thought?
          Chief of Artillery of the 34th Army Major General Goncharov Vasily Safronovich, born in 1894 = member of the CPSU (b) with 1939 years (after all purges, mopping-ups and destruction of all those who mumble)
          A folder with materials on the case of General-6 (!) Sheets
          There is no verdict, no extract from the decision of the Special Meeting, nor protocols of investigative actions. NOTHING.
          Mehlis: “Where are the guns?” Goncharov waved his hand vaguely in the direction where our units were surrounded. “Where, am I asking you?” - Mehlis shouted again and, after a short pause, began the standard phrase: “In accordance with the order of the USSR people's commissar of defense No. 270 ...” To execute the “sentence,” he called the right-winged, tall major. He, risking, but not able to overcome the emotional excitement, refused. I had to call the separation of soldiers ... ".
          NOTICE not yourself, but with the wrong hands.
          and it’s not for nothing that the military do not like him, the dog never got drunk to the full of Russian blood.
          All of them (Mehlises, Trotsky, Sverdlovs, and others) of the same Berry field.
          Oprichniki of the 20th century.

          I agree with you 100% !! Scum worthy gallows. And their Zionists praise without conscience and honor
          1. Pancir026
            Pancir026 16 June 2017 11: 25
            +2
            Quote: Alikos
            I agree with you 100% !! Scum worthy gallows.

            This is you ..... however, judging by the fact that you are not reading the article, rested on nationality. He talks about you and your way of thinking not in the best way.
            That’s the way of thinking .. "waved his hand languidly ... in the direction .. where the surrounded units were fighting" "" And then the same ones ... ... who sat in the rear, dishonored those who fought.
      4. Arxangel nemcov
        Arxangel nemcov 20 October 2016 23: 35
        +1
        Actually, he was a political worker, not a commander.
    2. Arxangel nemcov
      Arxangel nemcov 20 October 2016 23: 37
      0
      They practically did not differ in anything, because in the 50s the participants of the Second World War still served. And in the 60 years there were military-political schools.
  2. strannik595
    strannik595 18 October 2012 15: 42
    0
    stick your mustache - get Stalin, maybe the great helmsman went to the people? what
  3. dmb
    dmb 18 October 2012 15: 44
    +9
    Old anecdote: "Armenians, take care of the Jews. They will finish off for you." God kill, I don’t remember what the historian Martirosyan is so famous for. Speaking about the massive anti-Semitism of Russian generals, we must at least somehow confirm this. Their negative attitude towards Mehlis is caused rather not by his nationality, but by his activities. Stalin's telegram speaks for itself. And in the assessment of Mehlis, I somehow trust Simonov more than Martirosyan. Maybe for some people Simonov is less known than Martirosyan, but unlike the latter, he was there, and in his works he was not caught in a lie. And the last, the site from which this "opus" was copied, is called the "Stalin case". Why do you "continue the work" do not love him so much. After all, otherwise, nothing other than the stupidity of the leader can explain the direction of "talentless Zhukov" to the most difficult sectors of the front.
    1. postman
      postman 18 October 2012 18: 14
      0
      Quote: dmb
      I somehow trust Simonov more,

      So do I .
      ======================
      Martirosyan, Arsen Benikovich was born January 10 1950 years in Moscow.
      In the past, a KGB officer.
  4. str73
    str73 18 October 2012 15: 46
    +19
    Yes, it was not an ordinary person. He sincerely served his homeland - the USSR. Somewhere I lamented that he wrote in a letter to his son: "Love your son, your Motherland, love more than anything, more than father and mother." Do you think many current officials and generals are happy to write this to their children?
    1. garnag
      garnag 18 October 2012 19: 53
      +4
      They are robbing their homeland.
      1. Alikos
        Alikos 16 June 2017 11: 17
        0
        Quote: garnag
        They are robbing their homeland.


        No doubt yes!
    2. Alikos
      Alikos 16 June 2017 11: 15
      0
      Quote: str73
      Yes, it was not an ordinary person. He sincerely served his homeland - the USSR. Somewhere I lamented that he wrote in a letter to his son: "Love your son, your Motherland, love more than anything, more than father and mother." Do you think many current officials and generals are happy to write this to their children?



      "Love your Motherland" ...
      The keyword is "mine." Where is his homeland?
      1. Pancir026
        Pancir026 16 June 2017 11: 25
        +1
        Quote: Alikos
        The keyword is "mine." Where is his homeland?

        His motherland is the USSR. What is not clear?
        1. The comment was deleted.
          1. The comment was deleted.
  5. gosha1970
    gosha1970 18 October 2012 16: 03
    +3
    An article such that the right word, a monument must be put to him in his homeland
    1. Poppy
      Poppy 18 October 2012 17: 43
      +10
      it is, it is necessary to put
  6. 8 company
    8 company 18 October 2012 16: 12
    +5
    "Stalin got angry that at the most crucial moment, Mehlis, who saw perfectly that Kozlov was simply not coping with his duties as a front, did not switch his command to himself"

    Indescribable nonsense. Mehlis was never a talented commander, he was just a chain dog, without hesitation, following any orders of his master - Stalin. And Stalin knew this, so he got angry with the Mehlis precisely because he, having the right to be shot, intimidated and removed Kozlov, and tried to command himself. But commanding the troops is not to shoot the defenseless military before the war, it needs a head, not loyalty. And Kalin Stalin then said that it was necessary not to concede to the Mehlis - which of you is the commander? And further Mehlis commissar, and not commanded, was a PMC on different fronts. Actually, it was Stalin who was to blame for the Crimean catastrophe, who at the beginning of the war often sent dogs not to military leaders, namely dogs, and stopped this practice only in the autumn of 1942, when normal representatives began to travel from the General Staff and Headquarters: Vasilevsky, Zhukov and others. Then things went uphill on the fronts.
    1. Siberian46
      Siberian46 18 October 2012 18: 34
      +2
      people like lion mehlis always stir up water.
      1. Insurgent
        Insurgent 18 October 2012 20: 55
        +2
        Yes, this Mehlis is alive for a long time no muddy water, the laces were also sent to Stalingrad, but all failed, they didn’t shoot it
        1. Alikos
          Alikos 16 June 2017 19: 31
          0
          Quote: Insurgent
          Yes, this Mehlis is alive for a long time no muddy water, the laces were also sent to Stalingrad, but all failed, they didn’t shoot it

          These are the "Insurgents" and muddied the water in the world, since the Pharaonic times
    2. Uncle
      Uncle 18 October 2012 21: 03
      -2
      Quote: 8 company
      he was just a chain dog, without hesitation carrying out any orders of his master - Stalin.
      Stalin generally did not tolerate being surrounded by outstanding people, it does not matter "bad" or "good". He uprooted everyone in order to shine himself against the background of mediocrity. It is simply amazing how persistently someone is trying to revive the image of Stalin as a genius of all times and peoples, a fighter for ordinary happiness. It seemed cast in bronze that Stalinism, with communism in the compartment, is evil, but no, there are still plenty of Stalinists. In "17 Moments" there is a beautiful phrase, in the words of a German general, that the more freedom we are given, the more we want SS. Here in Russia the same shnyaga, they threw off the communist yoke, now we want the GULAGs and the NKVD again.
      1. str73
        str73 19 October 2012 09: 17
        +7
        The main Stalinist is the Soviet people (it does not matter that they are fragmented today). And the people - you can’t deceive him, he feels inside that those who caressing their ears with sweet speeches are slowly killing and those who are doing real things without too much chatter so that people can live easier!
      2. Lantau
        Lantau 19 October 2012 09: 17
        +8
        When Konstantin Rokossovsky (in the years of Khrushchev), was asked to write articles about Stalin who poured mud on him, he refused. And he said at the same time - Comrade Stalin is a saint for me. Why don't you know? But Rokossovsky was also subjected to repression. And why, after his release (Rokossovsky), was he reinstated in his position and rank? And at the same time he was paid monetary allowance for the whole time. Answer if you know.
        1. str73
          str73 19 October 2012 09: 32
          +4
          Yes, because he (Rokossovsky) understood everything that and why it happened to him and many more honest people and really saw the correction of this error (the shooting of Yezhov and his team). He understood what kind of person I.V. Stalin.
      3. 8 company
        8 company 19 October 2012 12: 41
        0
        Quote: Uncle
        So in Russia, the same shnyaga, dropped the communist yoke, now again we want the Gulag and the NKVD.


        It looks like it.
      4. Witness 45
        Witness 45 16 February 2017 23: 07
        +4
        Quote: Uncle
        Stalin did not tolerate surrounded by prominent people,

        What, Svanidze read? Stalin was just trying to promote talented people who were saved from the GPU by the jealous guardians of the socialist laws, who saved Sholokhov and Bulgakov from the GPU, who first, long before the war in 35, first defended the Orthodox Church and turned to patriotic traditions and moral laws of the past of Russia? The only misfortune is that there are always more mediocrity than talented ones, but they know how to get ahead, “show themselves” without stopping by any means, they hold on to corporate ones and overwrite the talented ones. So leave your attempts to denigrate Stalin, you’ve been working hard for sixty years now, since the time when Trotsky’s Khrushchev was not enough, but you won’t succeed and you won’t succeed, go against the truth, it’s the same as against the wind ... you just splatter yourself.
    3. Pancir026
      Pancir026 16 June 2017 11: 32
      0
      Quote: Company 8
      Actually, it was Stalin who was to blame for the Crimean disaster, who at the beginning of the war often sent not military leaders, namely dogs,

      You know ... I read your pompous .... woof and understand ... a country is defeated, if and only if the number of all kinds of different woofs goes over a certain line, beyond which - collapse. Split, catastrophe. 91 years ago indicative ..
      We look at today ... we see the bulk and the public of the woof-gavs of his retinue .... if we allow the increment of the mass, we will again get a disaster.
      Mehlis didn’t coward, didn’t eat vodka like that shot general, didn’t surrender as a Vlasov, didn’t hide behind the others. for the Stalingrad and for the unsuccessful Kharkov .. however, you are not a single reproach to him. Probably because you are essentially his spiritual heir, he lied to you too ..
  7. erased
    erased 18 October 2012 16: 43
    +4
    The article has an attack on Zhukov, I do not share it. As for the Mehlis, I am not familiar with all the documents on it, and I can not count literary works as a document. But one thing is clear - to blame all the bumps on him is stupid. Like making an angel.
    The truth is somewhere in between, but it still needs to be studied.
  8. Nechai
    Nechai 18 October 2012 17: 04
    +4
    Read ... November 1939
    1. Mikado
      Mikado 18 October 2012 17: 42
      +2
      Stalin did not say that. This is a famous fake. Vissarionitch had a completely different manner of presentation, you can verify this by reading his compositions and listening to speeches.
    2. besser best
      besser best 18 October 2012 18: 03
      +2
      Nechai! THANKS sensibly!
    3. Uncle
      Uncle 18 October 2012 21: 05
      -5
      As in the water looked. Even a broken watch shows the exact time twice a day.
  9. MAX
    MAX 18 October 2012 17: 05
    +1
    we read Mukhin's book "If not for our generals".
    and Soviet propaganda and the horniness of people who do not accept new knowledge (rested like a ram say in the people) did and are doing their dirty work.
  10. Brother Sarych
    Brother Sarych 18 October 2012 17: 21
    +10
    The fact that Mehlis was honest and brave is known to almost everyone who is interested, but the article is rubbish, and was taken from a garbage site that contains some kind of holy fool ...
    It was necessary to manage to suffer defeat in the Crimea! Mekhlis clearly intimidated all the generals there, but he himself did not command, so the "laurels" of the defeat belong to him by full right ...
    1. Siberian46
      Siberian46 18 October 2012 18: 30
      0
      opinion is welcome
  11. predator.2
    predator.2 18 October 2012 17: 24
    +4
    Mekhlis is one of those about whom they say: "make the fool pray to God ...." a sea of ​​excesses, incompetence, interference in the operational work of headquarters, etc. he is the main culprit in the defeat of the Crimean Front!
  12. Volkh
    Volkh 18 October 2012 17: 27
    +3
    As for the personality of the scribbler Martirosyan, he is an extremely vile historian.
    1. Alikos
      Alikos 16 June 2017 11: 24
      0
      Quote: WOLF
      As for the personality of the scribbler Martirosyan, he is an extremely vile historian.


      I would like to see his rye sorry photo. From the face you can often understand what kind of
    2. Pancir026
      Pancir026 16 June 2017 11: 34
      0
      Quote: WOLF
      As for personality

      And yours?
  13. AIR ZNAK
    AIR ZNAK 18 October 2012 17: 33
    +3
    Yes, you can collect something on all geniuses of the Second World War. And Zhukov wasn’t quite an angel. But the fact that by the beginning of the war divisions and armies were mostly commanded by yesterday’s company and battalion forces, without experience, this also explains the flaws (and not miscalculations, only a znachka can miscalculate, only flaws are characteristic of a dunno), and negligence, and a misunderstanding of the tactical situation (we will keep silent about the strategy) And the organization of troop construction, the work of the rear units. This remained at their former (company-battalion) level. But either it is impossible to change without the Supreme’s approval, it is fraught with the VMN. And this also implicitly affected the actions (inactions) of the command. At one time there was a saying ** HUMAN RESOURCES DECIDE EVERYTHING. ** (Stalin) And it seems to me that it is relevant today.
    1. predator.2
      predator.2 18 October 2012 17: 58
      +3
      According to the stories of the former Minister of Health of the USSR, E. I. Smirnov, in 1949, he proposed to Stalin to put Mehlis (Minister of State Control) at the head of one of the government commissions. To this, Stalin “began to laugh, clutching his stomach and wiping his tears”:

      Is it possible to appoint Mehlis to creative affairs. Here is something to destroy, defeat, destroy - for this it is suitable.
      1. TRex
        TRex 18 October 2012 18: 27
        +7
        No matter how many read memoirs, memoirs, and of different categories - commanders, gunsmiths, just officers - I did not see a good word about this Jew. And then, suddenly, - a hero, clever, etc.
        Do not bend the stick, retromancers.
        By the way, I myself am a former member of the CPSU, I graduated from two academies, listened to smart people for many years, but did not hear such stupid things about Mehlis.
        No need to rewrite history, distort the cards and so on.
        1. Grenz
          Grenz 18 October 2012 22: 52
          +4
          TRex
          I agree with you completely.
          I will add. As a state figure, Stalin needed him. Why?
          From the point of view of psychology: Schizoid personality type with pronounced associal disorder (intolerance of someone else’s opinion, aggression based on gendeon and ethnic characteristics, beyond conceit, hysteria attacks when resolving disputes and defending one’s point of view, impulsive uncontrolled reactions, etc. Apparently, impotence is close (there was no candle)).
          With all this, mentally painful insights - he was able to intuitively sometimes find the right solution to a complex problem.
          When the task is everything, and the man is nothing, then the Mehlis was and is needed!
  14. iulai
    iulai 18 October 2012 18: 35
    +6
    For some reason I don’t trust the generals, what’s current, what’s there. with such soldiers, with such technology, almost lose the war. and how many men they put, not generals, but idiots, everyone had hari like suitcases, all the brains on their cheeks! Yes, just take the Chechen war that you lost, no words, just a mate!
    1. vovan1949
      vovan1949 18 October 2012 19: 40
      +1
      @ For some reason, I don’t trust the generals, what is current, what is there. with such soldiers, with such technology, almost lose the war. and how many men they put, not generals, but idiots, everyone has hari like suitcases, all the brains on their cheeks @
      iulai, these generals won the war, not "nearly lost". And in June 1941 they were attacked by the best army in the world at that time, armed to the teeth, with combat experience in modern warfare. Industry all over Europe worked for them. This must be taken into account. This can explain the failure of the start of the war.
    2. mamba
      mamba 18 October 2012 22: 22
      +4
      Quote: iulai
      For some reason I don’t trust the generals, what’s current, what’s there. with such soldiers, with such technology, almost lose the war. and how many men they put, not generals, but idiots, everyone had hari like suitcases, all the brains on their cheeks!

      Erich von Manstein, who commanded the 11th Army, conquered the Crimea, defeated our three armies on the Kerch Peninsula and took Sevastopol, spoke extremely negatively about the Soviet generals opposing him. To read about it was unpleasant and somehow did not believe in it. But this article shows a picture of egregious sloppiness, criminal irresponsibility and the dense gagging of our generals on the Crimean front. It is worthwhile to imagine yourself in the place of those unfortunate fighters who were poorly killed by these freak generals and it becomes bitter and nasty. And you look differently at those who surrendered not by their own free will, but in a hopeless environment situation.
      And what are the current generals, engaged exclusively in profit, who believe that a general is not a position, but a gift from God! When will it end? Is another big war really needed to clear their ranks? So while they are "clearing", how many hundreds of thousands or millions of men will they put? If the army is a mirror of society, as these generals mold to us, then why at all times were there so many goats among them? I also remember Napoleon did not like our generals.
    3. Basil50
      Basil50 22 October 2016 13: 07
      0
      iulai
      I completely agree with your opinion about the generals; I had cases to be sure. Betrayal is always from the staff and those who * cover them *. Then the clerk will beautifully describe the * exploits * and * genius * of the staff, and failures only from negligent subordinates who * strive to die just not to fulfill the brilliant plan *.
  15. omsbon
    omsbon 18 October 2012 19: 14
    +4
    Article minus, somehow it is not correct.
    Many contemporaries left their negative opinion about the Mehlis. It turns out that people who knew him are lying, and Martirosyan is in all white. I understood everything, figured it all out.
    I am surprised that the mongoose is not on the site, it seems to be its theme.
  16. Goldmitro
    Goldmitro 18 October 2012 19: 36
    +3
    Another important, if not decisive cause of the disaster of our army in Crimea in 1942 was the fact that divisions formed there (in the order of experiment) on a national basis (from the Caucasus) took part in the battles. And at the very first strike of the Germans in early May 1942, the landing of German troops behind the front line, because the depth of our front, as indicated, was not designed for defense, these divisions abandoned their positions in panic and fled, mixing all the defenses. After that, they refused to form such divisions (on a national basis). No offense to others will be said, I do not want to offend anyone, war heroes of many nationalities of the Soviet Union became the heroes of the war, but commanders on all fronts asked me most to send a replenishment from the Russians, this is the harsh truth of that life!
    1. Sivasa
      Sivasa 26 January 2017 18: 32
      0
      Can you tell what kind of division it is?
  17. andreitk20
    andreitk20 18 October 2012 20: 17
    +2
    Mekhlis is not an unambiguous figure, so one can only judge by documents. Many are to blame for the disaster on the Crimean front, but the main ones are Mekhlis (who drove the troops into the offensive without preparing him), Kozlov (as the front commander, who had withdrawn himself from his leadership). A small example "occupying a strip of 80 km, the troops did not even equip trenches in full profile." Therefore, the degree of guilt must be determined by historians. And also to the author about the Jewish question, I remind you that there were many Jews in the Red Army and at that time they were treated like everyone else, the time was not right, people were fighting. And you, as always, are again trying to pull everything by the ears, so that you become yellow.
  18. Colonel
    Colonel 18 October 2012 22: 03
    +2
    An unexpected twist in the plot, Mehlis in heroes. Who's next? Lavrenty Palych? Trotsky? Or maybe Kaganovich? And we are chasing amerikosov for rewriting history. What for? There are enough of their own "historians".
    1. Nick
      Nick 18 October 2012 23: 08
      +3
      Quote: colonel
      An unexpected plot twist, Mehlis into heroes. Who is next in line? Lavrenty Palych? Trotsky?

      Well, at the expense of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, there was already more than one article on the VO site ... In all he came out a great organizer and manager ... His last great achievement was the Atomic Project of the USSR. So in Heroes, social labor, at least ..., quite ... Without fools!
    2. bakhshiyan rachik
      bakhshiyan rachik 28 December 2016 15: 15
      0
      yes mehlis is an ambiguous person, but for some reason in alternative stories the second person after mehlis is mehlis and this
  19. Nechai
    Nechai 18 October 2012 22: 39
    +1
    Quote: Mikado
    you can verify this by reading his writings and listening to speeches.

    And you there are records and prints of TOTAL what did the one you call "Vissarionych" so familiarly? Then don't screw up, share with people, and cut down the dough, she-she ... You are our expert, such and such a Japanese mother.
    Seriously, this is the appeal of I.V. Stalin, for the first time I saw on the website of the writer Artyom Rybakov.
  20. Galleon
    Galleon 9 October 2016 16: 43
    +5
    Yes, the rubbish was your Mehlis, trash.
    In the spring of the 42nd, he arrived with a platoon of machine gunners at a sluggish airfield and ordered all the machines to take off with full load. At the end of a dirt take-off, they turned over and exploded. When the last crew died, he spat spitefully, turned around and left.
    That's it!
    You can say anything about him after that! All his "desperate courage" and "courage" is to torment and tear his own people in the rear, and not in the front line of the fascists.
    1. Alexander Greene
      Alexander Greene 15 October 2016 22: 46
      +2
      And do you believe in this nonsense?
  21. Pilat2009
    Pilat2009 9 October 2016 21: 42
    +1
    Quote: garnag
    They rob the motherland

    Who are they?
    Jews? Oligarchs? Communists? Democrats? Liberals?
    Rob, because the Duma has created laws to rob.
    Some old woman who stole a bun in a store will be planted, and Vasilyeva will be amnestied
  22. geologist
    geologist 12 October 2016 11: 13
    +1
    Unfortunately, there were many such creepy performers in our country at that time. Here, in my opinion, nationality does not matter because everyone always has executioners. This massive desire for murder, as a dangerous disease, was officially noted by the chief psychologist of the Red Army at the end of the Civil War. The Chief Prosecutor of the Red Army banned mass executions of commanders without trial after the Finnish one. Mekhlis turned to Stalin with a complaint about the prosecutor, but the leader said, "calm down."
    The mediocre, intimidated and incompetent leadership of the Crimean Front itself was, in addition to all the troubles, “strengthened” by this figure.
    ++++++++++++++++++++
    First, they destroyed all their tanks and equipment, sending them to advance in rainy February - the only month in the Crimea when it is impossible to drive along the steppe at all, only on concrete roads. In any other month, the entire Kerch Peninsula is a tank-dangerous direction, but in February the tanks get stuck in muddy clay, lose their maneuver and are easily shot by artillery. Having lost their mobile connections, they still did not lose faith in success and counted on multiple superiority in the infantry, but in the summer, Manstein had several dozen tanks and a handful of dive bombers to disperse 100 thousand infantry. This is despite the fact that in Kerch there is a Totleben fortress, which could be relied on, but the fortress was not even prepared for the corresponding defense, moreover, the tsarist large-caliber guns did not explode, warehouses with unique ammunition were left to the enemy and the Germans transported the most powerful guns of the fortress heroically fought Sevastopol. And here the direct fault of the Mehlis was that the leadership pushed for them to drive tanks for slaughter. Moscow gave the order for a general offensive, but there was winter and the land froze and how did Muscovites know the peculiarities of the Crimean climate. A fortress to cook is a defeatist mood, for which execution on the spot.
    1. Alexander Greene
      Alexander Greene 15 October 2016 22: 49
      +3
      [quote] [/ quote] The chief prosecutor of the Red Army banned the mass executions of commanders without trial after the Finnish one.
      What kind of nonsense? Tell me where and when such executions were carried out?
  23. Ustinov 055 055
    Ustinov 055 055 27 October 2016 16: 23
    0
    It’s a pity that now there are a lot of such bosses out of hand. I encounter such service every day
  24. taseka
    taseka 15 November 2016 14: 04
    0
    Mehlis personally liked to shoot young soldiers and commanders - he is a "very bad man" and he does not need to be rehabilitated!
    1. Witness 45
      Witness 45 16 February 2017 23: 13
      +2
      Quote: taseka
      Mehlis personally liked to shoot young soldiers and commanders - he is a "very bad man" and he does not need to be rehabilitated!

      Nonsense is complete!
    2. Alikos
      Alikos 16 June 2017 19: 39
      0
      Quote: taseka
      MehlisMehlis personally loved to shoot young soldiers and commanders - he is a "very bad man" and no need to rehabilitate him!

      Burn it in Hell your Executioner Mehlis with his descendants !!
  25. iouris
    iouris 21 December 2016 00: 58
    0
    I have a question for the author: if Mehlis did not have strategic talents, then why the heck was he needed at all? With or without the Mehlis, what would happen would still happen.
    It turns out that the article is about "anti-Semitism in the history of the Second World War." However, there were many Jewish officers who, at all levels, were highly professional soldiers. So they are the winners. And the ebullient activities of Mehlis, in general, are not interesting and worthy of analysis. Especially now.
  26. Burdock
    Burdock 22 December 2016 20: 25
    +1
    Railway butcher. Judge Nodo by deeds, but by deeds he is also a sadist.
  27. vladimirvn
    vladimirvn 28 December 2016 15: 55
    +1
    .. "With his demands to change the commander, he raised the gigantic problem of the professional unsuitability of a significant part of the generals. For this he was slandered to smithereens. Moreover, he was a commissar, and the generals of commissars could not stand."
    good
  28. RoTTor
    RoTTor 11 January 2017 21: 35
    +2
    Thank you for the honest, professional, interestingly written and courageous material about the unfairly slandered. like many real heroes, LZ Mehlis.
    All the dirt and slander poured on him by official propaganda in the presence of the villain maize is Khrushchev's revenge for the truth about his stupid and harmful activities as a PMC, for which both he and the front commander should have had a minimum. removed from office. Likewise, L.P. Beria was slandered and accused of everything. to which the repressions in the Ukrainian SSR were also written off, initiated personally by Khrushchev, who was forced to rudely besiege JV STALIN personally. who telegraphed the Khrushchev: "... Calm down!" For half a century there was not a word, not a half word about L.P. Beria's great merits in the creation of missile and nuclear weapons, etc. The same thing happened with Mehlis.
    Even in his youth, he managed to communicate with real front-line commissars. who served in our university - they spoke very highly of LZ Mehlis. And with those who were under his command in the narutom of national control. No corruption with such a commissar was absolutely impossible.
    It is worth recalling. that he was an intelligent editor of the Pravda newspaper ..
    It is not for nothing that the ashes of L.Z. Mehlis rest in the Kremlin wall.
    Thanks to the author.
    A huge plus.
    There is a lot of bullshit in our history slandered and undeservedly blackened.
    1. Sivasa
      Sivasa 26 January 2017 18: 20
      +2
      My university professor of national history served with Mehlis in the People’s Commissariat of National Control. His opinion - Mehlis was an honest, very responsible person. Deeply devoted personally to Stalin and the communist idea in his presentation. He was distinguished by personal courage. Could raise fighters to attack. At the same time, he possessed a completely narrow-minded and somewhere primitive mentality. Obviously did not match the positions held.
      1. Sanny
        Sanny 18 May 2017 16: 49
        +1
        Can I give a historical fact of Mehlis’s participation in the attack?
        1. The comment was deleted.
  29. Sanny
    Sanny 18 May 2017 16: 48
    0
    Why did not the author write who Mehlis is? Where he was born, where he studied. Who are grandparents, parents? How did you make a career? How did you get into the zone of influence of Stalin? Raw, pathos article!
  30. Krasnoyarsk
    Krasnoyarsk 25 July 2017 13: 16
    0
    Quote: S_mirnov
    Article SUPER! Urgently include in the history books of elementary grades! And if you don’t have enough time to study, you can cancel classes on tolerance and the study of priestly tales!

    Let me ask myself - and what is the "article super"? Yes, I do not argue, Kozlov’s guilt is undeniable. But in what? Most likely that he allowed Mehlis to “crush himself”. Here the author writes: - = ... After all, formally, the representative of the Headquarters did not have the right to completely replace himself with the front commander. = With this phrase, the author agrees that Kozlov was pushed to the background by the Mehlis, that Mehlis took the lead operation. Further, the author writes: - = ... - since the Mehlis takes care of everything, well, let it be responsible for everything. = These words that the "Mehlis takes care of everything" say that the Mehlis took full responsibility and pushed aside Kozlov from the command. I believe that the article is one-sided and tendentious, and therefore ambiguous.
  31. Krasnoyarsk
    Krasnoyarsk 25 July 2017 13: 35
    0
    Quote: dmb
    ... Indeed, otherwise, you cannot explain the stupidity of the leader by sending them the “mediocre Zhukov” to the most difficult sectors of the front.

    Let me ask - what are these "most difficult"? To Leningrad? Where did Voroshilov stop Leeb completely and irrevocably and leave for the wound? The Western Front, where, having numerical superiority, has not achieved any success? Or in Germany, having received from Rokosovsky a front ready for victories?
  32. Boris Mityashin
    Boris Mityashin 7 November 2017 14: 35
    0
    I read and I can’t believe my eyes! Such a panegyric to one of the most disgusting people surrounded by Stalin. Rosalia Zemlyachka in a masculine guise! And the hater. He knew nothing but to frighten and personally kill.
    How could such a publication be placed in a reputable publication?
  33. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 17 December 2017 15: 56
    0
    Quote from the article:
    By the way, inquire, what was the opinion of Mehlis about General Chernyak: “Chernyak. Illiterate man, unable to lead the army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. It’s possible to be amazed whose hand introduced Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general. ”

    And was Mehlis not right about Lieutenant General Chernyak?
    Although Chernyak studied quite a bit, he graduated from the Moscow infantry command courses, then the 8th Leningrad Infantry School command staff Red Army, then studied at refresher courses command staff The Red Army "Shot" named after the Comintern and later in refresher courses top commanding staff at the Academy of the General Staff named after KE Voroshilov. A total of four military schools graduated.
    However, studies did not go for the future. He remained professionally illiterate.
    In peacetime he commanded both corps and armies, and the war began, so he ditched the entrusted 44th army. After being removed from the commanders above the division, they no longer trusted the Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General Chernyak. And the division was commanded either poorly or satisfactorily. So for the poor command of the 32nd Infantry Division, its commander was already dismissed by the Commander Yeremenko.
    After the war, he led the regional military registration and enlistment offices.
    So Mehlis was right about Lieutenant General Chernyak.