Do Iveco need in Russia?
Italian armored vehicles may be useless toy
From the very beginning, the unexpected and rapidly developing “romance” of the Russian Ministry of Defense with wheeled armored vehicles of the Italian association Iveco was surprising to many. Apparently, the true "spring" of the action, which led to the unprecedented hitherto penetration of the western company into the Russian defense market and even immediately on a significant scale, will become public much later.
Today, it makes sense to try to assess the practical value of wheeled armored vehicles manufactured by Iveco for the needs of Russia, leaving aside questions about the very feasibility of importing Western-made armored vehicles.
Iveco armor goes to us
As is known, the first appearance of Iveco armored vehicles in Russia dates back to 2009, when KamAZ Inc., with the assistance of Rostekhnologii (co-owner of KamAZ), at its own expense purchased and imported into the country for testing two light Iveco M65E19WMM armored vehicles , also known as LMV (Light Multirole Vehicle - lightweight multi-purpose machine), and in the Italian army referred to as Lince (“Lynx”, the English name Lynx is used in a number of countries).
““ Lynx ”is unsuitable for use in a light armored personnel carrier and off-road vehicle assigned to it in Russia”
It is unlikely that the initiative of KamAZ and Russian Technologies was inconsistent with the Russian top military-political circles, as there were immediately reports of plans to adopt the Iveco LMV into service with the Russian army. In the 2010 year, two more LMVs were bought, and at the end of 2010, 10 machines that were assembled at the beginning of the next year at KamAZ and also received the official name “Lynx” in Russia with the corresponding Russian inscription on the radiator. These 10 machines were used for military trials.
However, later KamAZ in relation to the “Lynx” was out of work - the initiative was taken over by the recently established Oboronprom under the Ministry of Defense of Russia, which united the joint-stock military repair plants. At the end of 2010, the Ministry of Defense signed with Iveco an agreement on the creation of a joint venture for the assembly of LMV machines in Russia, the assembly capacity was created at the part of Oboronservis OJSC 173 Automotive Repair Plant in Voronezh. According to the agreement, starting from 2011, it is planned to assemble 1775 vehicles for the Russian army under the “Lynx” brand for five years in Voronezh. The first 57 will be released this year. Further planned: 194 armored car - in 2013-m, 248 machines - in 2014-m and 285 units - in 2015-m. Localization of production in Voronezh in 2012 is 10 percent, and by 2014 should be supposedly reduced to 50 percent.
At the same time, the cost of the “Lynx” collected in Voronezh is more than 20 million rubles, and the whole program of purchasing 1775 units was estimated at more than 30 billions. However, earlier the Ministry of Defense called the number of needs for "Lynx" called up to 3700 units. In July of this year, it became known that the Minister of Defense sent an application to the government to increase the volume of LMV purchases from 2013 to 2015 in the year from 727 to 3000 units worth 50 billion rubles. Thus, the receipt of machines of this type is expected in volumes unprecedented for the post-Soviet period, and Russia will turn into the largest LMV operator in the world, surpassing even Italy itself (where these machines have so far been purchased by 1260).
Having got a taste, the Russian military department drew attention to the heavier armored vehicles Iveco, produced by the latter within the framework of the CIO consortium with another well-known Italian company - Oto Melara. We are talking about a family of vehicles with an 8x8 wheel arrangement, led by an armored vehicle Centauro B1 (``) with 105-mm tank the gun. Oto Melara in the consortium is responsible for the creation and production of weapons systems for military vehicles.
In December 2010, the ministers of defense of the Russian Federation and Italy signed a protocol regarding the receipt by Russia of two Centauro armored vehicles and two Freccia (“Strela”) armored personnel carriers developed for their development. In May, two standard-made vehicles arrived in Novorossiysk from the presence of the Italian army - Centauro with the 2012-mm cannon and the Freccia BTR with the tower with the 105-mm cannon, and in August new modified export samples were delivered to Centauro with the 25 -mm cannon and Freccia with turret with 120-mm cannon.
A spokesman for Oto Melara in May 2012 of the year said that Russia could acquire in Italy a license to manufacture Centauro wheeled tanks. Following the results of the tests, which will fail at the end of 2012, conclusions will be made about the prospect of creating a joint venture for the licensed release of Centauro at one of the Russian defense plants. A high-ranking representative of Rosoboronexport OJSC (which is part of Russian Technologies and now also deals with the import of military property) confirmed that the Centauro tests are being carried out for possible future purchase of a license for its production. One of the possible sites for the production of this technology, he called KamAZ.
Thus, as can be judged, the project of organizing the assembly in Russia of the Centauro and Freccia family machines is being lobbied by Russian Technologies, in peak, carried out in the military industrial complex by the promising domestic medium-sized family of wheeled armored vehicles with the code Boomerang.
Glitter and poverty "Lynx"
All the above data provoked heated discussions in the media and near-war circles, although for the most part they were emotional in nature, especially since the Russian Ministry of Defense was not in a hurry to clarify the nature of their needs for the purchase of these machines are certainly specific types and specific Italian manufacturer.
It is already known that the mass purchase of the same lightweight armored vehicles "Lynx" is caused by the plans of the military department to create in the Russian army several so-called light brigades that will be completely moved on light armored vehicles. Existing air assault brigades are planned to be used as the basis for these brigades. In this regard, with the 2010 of the year, the staff and methods of applying such an light brigade based on the 56-th separate air assault brigade deployed in Kamyshin in the Volgograd region are being developed. In the absence of so far, the LMV 56-I brigade was temporarily armed with conventional off-road vehicles, the UAZ-315108 and the UAZ-3152 "Gusar". In addition, the armored vehicles "Lynx" are supposed to be put into the created reconnaissance brigades (which are planned to form as many as ten), special brigades, and also units of the Airborne Forces.
Thus, in the Russian army, “Lynx” has a slightly strange role in the essence of the “linear” armored vehicle and a de facto kind of light armored personnel carrier (apparently, two vehicles must carry the detachment). This is despite the fact that initially the LMV was created by Iveco as a reconnaissance and patrol, patrol, communications and command-staff (commander) machine, a kind of niche armored jeep. It is in this capacity that LMVs are mainly used in the armies of Italy, Great Britain and nine other countries that have acquired them. It is significant that in the British army these armored vehicles, called Panther, are officially designated as CLV (Command and Liaison Vehicle - vehicle control and communication).
In Russian sources, the main advantage of LMV is a good minozaschischennost. Indeed, the machine is specially designed to provide a very high for its mass (up to 6,5 t) level of protection according to the NATO standard STANAG 4569 - the level of 2 (crew survival when undermining under the bottom or wheel of the charge with the TNT equivalent of TNT kg). Thus, the LMV is essentially a lightweight version of an MRAP-class machine with enhanced anti-mine and anti-explosive protection. This was the innovation of the Iveco product at the time of its birth a decade ago. However, the other side of the minzaprotection is significant for a machine of such a small capacity (maximum five people) weight, which limits the mobility and maneuverability of the LMV outside roads.
For those tasks and applications for which LMV was originally created, this restriction of permeability is not so significant - like all similar MRAP machines, it is intended for use mainly on highways. After all, the threat from mines and, moreover, to pre-laid land mines exists mainly on constantly used roads, outside of such roads this danger is minimal. LMV is essentially a lightweight and inexpensive version of the patrol and patrol and convoy type MRAP vehicles for use as part of road convoys and is purchased as a “cheap MRAP” by small European countries for its Afghan and peacekeeping contingents.
And then the question arises about the feasibility of using this machine as the main means of transporting personnel of the light and reconnaissance brigades of the Russian army. Do these teams have to move exclusively on the highway? No, as can be judged, domestic military planners intend to use the same light brigades as high-mobility formations capable of conducting combat operations on a broad front, acting in small groups, making flanks and seeps, using raid tactics, being involved as advanced and reconnaissance units. .
It is obvious that all of these actions provide for precisely good mobility outside the highways and in open areas. At the same time, the threat from mines and land mines for such actions is minimal. So why do light crews need “Lynx” type vehicles whose mobility and throughput is limited in favor of mine protection? If light brigades are supposed to be used on highways and for regular counterinsurgency actions, then why do we need an inferior lightweight MRAP: then these brigades can be put on full-fledged MRAP vehicles with good capacity and even higher security - types are being conducted in Russia on a broad front.
It is absolutely clear that for armament of light and reconnaissance brigades within the framework of their chosen concept of use, it is more expedient to use vehicles with good mobility, even to the detriment of mine protection, that is, cars like the GAZ-2330 family “Tigr”, “Scorpion” developed by Corporation "Protection" and the like.
It is noteworthy that the Western special forces, even in Afghanistan, use mainly special light unarmored open "assault vehicles", for which high mobility, good visibility and ease of use of weapons are considered the best defense. Similarly, improvised, unprotected commercial vehicle types form the basis of military equipment in the notorious “Toyotas” wars, another example of which we recently saw in Libya. In flat-desert terrain, light bezbronnaya technology due to its high mobility is very often more efficient armored.
Here, however, it is appropriate to ask the question of the validity of the very concept of light brigades for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, all the more due to the transfer to jeeps and light armored vehicles of assault landing brigades. Where is our military department supposed to wage “Toyotas wars” in Russian conditions? With which opponent? By and large, in Russia neither the terrain, nor the climate, nor the character and level of potential adversaries contribute to the effective use of such forces.
In the light of the above, it is not surprising that the first reviews of the brief experience in operating the Lynx vehicles in the army, according to leaking information, turned out to be quite disappointing. Iveco is criticized for insufficient capacity (the inconvenience of placing five people transported, a small amount of space for equipment and ammunition), insufficient off-road traffic, etc. Thus, the criticism demonstrates precisely the inability of the “Lynx” to be used in the light armored personnel carrier assigned to it in Russia and an off-road vehicle - which clearly shows that the Russian military has made a large, costly mistake by choosing LMV for this role.
It’s time to finally admit that LMV is essentially a highway armored jeep, but, paradoxically, in this capacity it is not particularly needed in Russia, the same domestic Tiger is already successfully taking root in this role in our army. Purchases of Iveco LMV armored vehicles and the contract with Iveco obviously do not correspond to the real needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and in the conditions of our limited resources they look useless luxury. For the Russian army, LMV is a low-value toy with a limited scope.
This circumstance is a logical outcome of the hasty purchase of Italian machines without a serious analysis of the needs for this type of equipment, without a thorough analysis of their characteristics and without making serious and qualified comparison with other samples (including foreign ones). That is, to put it simply, this is the result of ignoring the procurement of elementary competitive procedures, which are used in the procurement practice of even the most underdeveloped countries. A wide international tender could save huge taxpayers' money and, perhaps, give our army a much better and more suitable machine than Iveco LMV, not to mention the possibility of putting tough demands on participating foreign companies in partnership with Russian manufacturers, localization, offset and so on. Further. In the current state of affairs, the Iveco group can calmly ignore all such requirements, approaching Russia as an underdeveloped third world country who honors for the happiness of getting a screwdriver assembly of machinery from vehicle sets.
Trail "Centaur"
Even more bizarre than the addiction to Iveco LMV, the heightened interest of a certain part of the Russian leadership in the Italian Centauro and Freccia cars looks like. It is not clear why these very samples of modern wheeled armored vehicles with the formula 8х8 - Italy (represented by Iveco and CIO) have never been an authoritative leader in the production of such machines as a priority, and these Italian samples, unlike the LMV, have not at all accompanied broad export successes. Centauro was, in addition to the Italian army, purchased only by Spain and a small party Oman (the latter acquired the version with the 120-mm gun), and Freccia did not receive any foreign orders at all, despite participating in a number of tenders. The design of the chassis of these machines (especially Freccia) is of particular interest to domestic developers, but in general does not contain anything outstanding.
The thesis of the "political" inaccessibility of similar machines with the 8x8 formula of other Western developers is clearly unreliable, especially in the light of the not so long ago known interest of the Russian Defense Ministry in the AMV BTR of the Finnish Patria group. It is obvious that, as in the case of the LMV machine, the cooperation agreement on Centauro and Freccia was accepted with complete disregard for any possible competitive procedures.
Initially, the Centauro 23-ton wheeled combat vehicle was developed in 80 as a mobile tank destroyer for the Italian army, but ultimately became one of the types of medium armored vehicles gaining popularity in the world in recent years (intermediate in mass between tanks and tracked infantry fighting vehicles on the one hand, and light wheeled armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles - on the other). The most significant adherents of medium armored vehicles since the late nineties are the US Armed Forces, which have adopted the Stryker armored personnel carrier with the 8X8 wheel formula and a whole range of vehicles based on it (including MGS with an 105-mm cannon) and medium-sized “Striker” brigades equipped with this technique, protruding expeditionary multifunctional compounds of increased mobility.
Similar trends have come to Russia, where the Ministry of Defense also plans to create medium-sized brigades equipped with wheeled armored personnel carriers and other armored vehicles with the wheel formula 8х8. The main candidate for equipping these brigades is the multipurpose Boomerang wheeled platform developed by GAZ Group in the weight class up to 25 tons, which is expected to be ready no earlier than 2015 of the year. So far, in the absence of anything else, the concept of an average brigade is driven around the 23-th separate motorized rifle brigade in Samara, which received the equipment of the conventional BTR-80.
On the whole, the concept of the medium brigade of the “strayer” type, that is, fully equipped with machines on the chassis of the wheeled armored personnel carrier, including wheeled vehicles with heavy cannon armament, with regard to the Russian army looks even more controversial than the concept of light brigades.
In fact, Centauro and other similar medium wheeled vehicles were created for countries and theaters of war, where the main method of operational transfer is to move on the highway (rather than transfer by rail) or where the nature of the terrain allows extensive use of wheeled vehicles off-road. Thus, the most suitable areas for the use of an average brigade are terrain with either a well-developed network of highways, or, conversely, with a relatively poorly developed network of highways, but with a complete absence of railways and a flat-desert or steppe landscape. In the second case, we are talking about the Middle East region (and specifically, Iraq), where the American “strayker” brigades had a successful combat debut.
In Russia, we see the opposite picture - the main method of operational troop transfer is railways, which are the main means of communication in the country (and do not require special restrictions on the transport of vehicles, either by mass or by type of running gear). The density of highways is relatively small, and at the same time the distances are too great for transporting equipment on them under their own power. Finally, off-road reigns pretty often near the desperate roads, and winter, spring and autumn thaws last a total of up to eight months a year, even in the middle lane. It is difficult to understand how it is possible to effectively use the compounds, built entirely on a fairly heavy wheeled armored vehicles and even with the "wheeled tanks." The patency of wheeled armored vehicles inevitably inferior to that of tanks and tracked vehicles. The aero-transport ability of combined-arms equipment also does not find a place in the practice of troop transportation and redeployment within Russia. But the expeditionary tasks of deployment in overseas desert theaters to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation do not seem to stand.
It was not by chance that, at an unofficial level, the only possible scenario for the use of Russian counterparts of the “Striker” brigades was the fighting in the steppes of Kazakhstan against the Taliban from Afghanistan who were rushing through. Not to mention the complete fictitiousness of such a picture: obviously, there is no way to smash the Taliban in the Kazakh steppes in simpler ways. Simple tanks probably won't do. And apparently, combat vehicles armed with anti-tank guns with a caliber 105 – 125 of millimeters are the most necessary in the fight against the Taliban beggars.
Thus, the need for an urgent adoption by the Russian Land Forces of a wheeled armored vehicle with heavy armament is apparently not a priority, and in the light of this interest in Centauro (and even less so that it can be assembled in Russia) does not have a deep rationale and is very artificial and far-fetched. As a potential interest for the developers to study (first of all, the undercarriage) - maybe, but here, it seems, the task of familiarizing them with these machines by the military department is not set. Yes, and Italians are unlikely to allow such a serious study without more or less firm guarantees of purchasing lots of cars, as well as their licensed production or any serious localization of industrial assembly.
Centauro vehicles themselves, developed by 30 years ago, do not look like the last word of technology, having a very conservative design with a habitable two-seat turret - in fact, the stage for advanced tank design has already been passed. The characteristics of the 105-mm and 120-mm guns of the lowered ballistics of the Oto Melara are very ordinary, and the fire control system, as can be judged, does not contain anything fundamentally new.
Attempts to promote the Centauro vehicles into service with the army of the Russian Federation, therefore, appear to have little response to Russian interests and needs. The whole concept of using medium armored vehicles in some separate units in our Armed Forces seems far-fetched and uncritically borrowed in the West, so it’s not surprising that looking for equipment for imitative "mock regiments of increased mobility" turned to the same.
It is difficult to find a combat vehicle less adapted to domestic realities than the “wheeled tank” Centauro. It remains to hope that the practical acquaintance of the Russian military with this system will confirm the obvious and will not lead to new large senseless waste of public money for the benefit of Iveco and other Italian manufacturers.
From the very beginning, the unexpected and rapidly developing “romance” of the Russian Ministry of Defense with wheeled armored vehicles of the Italian association Iveco was surprising to many. Apparently, the true "spring" of the action, which led to the unprecedented hitherto penetration of the western company into the Russian defense market and even immediately on a significant scale, will become public much later.
Today, it makes sense to try to assess the practical value of wheeled armored vehicles manufactured by Iveco for the needs of Russia, leaving aside questions about the very feasibility of importing Western-made armored vehicles.
Iveco armor goes to us
As is known, the first appearance of Iveco armored vehicles in Russia dates back to 2009, when KamAZ Inc., with the assistance of Rostekhnologii (co-owner of KamAZ), at its own expense purchased and imported into the country for testing two light Iveco M65E19WMM armored vehicles , also known as LMV (Light Multirole Vehicle - lightweight multi-purpose machine), and in the Italian army referred to as Lince (“Lynx”, the English name Lynx is used in a number of countries).
““ Lynx ”is unsuitable for use in a light armored personnel carrier and off-road vehicle assigned to it in Russia”
It is unlikely that the initiative of KamAZ and Russian Technologies was inconsistent with the Russian top military-political circles, as there were immediately reports of plans to adopt the Iveco LMV into service with the Russian army. In the 2010 year, two more LMVs were bought, and at the end of 2010, 10 machines that were assembled at the beginning of the next year at KamAZ and also received the official name “Lynx” in Russia with the corresponding Russian inscription on the radiator. These 10 machines were used for military trials.
However, later KamAZ in relation to the “Lynx” was out of work - the initiative was taken over by the recently established Oboronprom under the Ministry of Defense of Russia, which united the joint-stock military repair plants. At the end of 2010, the Ministry of Defense signed with Iveco an agreement on the creation of a joint venture for the assembly of LMV machines in Russia, the assembly capacity was created at the part of Oboronservis OJSC 173 Automotive Repair Plant in Voronezh. According to the agreement, starting from 2011, it is planned to assemble 1775 vehicles for the Russian army under the “Lynx” brand for five years in Voronezh. The first 57 will be released this year. Further planned: 194 armored car - in 2013-m, 248 machines - in 2014-m and 285 units - in 2015-m. Localization of production in Voronezh in 2012 is 10 percent, and by 2014 should be supposedly reduced to 50 percent.
At the same time, the cost of the “Lynx” collected in Voronezh is more than 20 million rubles, and the whole program of purchasing 1775 units was estimated at more than 30 billions. However, earlier the Ministry of Defense called the number of needs for "Lynx" called up to 3700 units. In July of this year, it became known that the Minister of Defense sent an application to the government to increase the volume of LMV purchases from 2013 to 2015 in the year from 727 to 3000 units worth 50 billion rubles. Thus, the receipt of machines of this type is expected in volumes unprecedented for the post-Soviet period, and Russia will turn into the largest LMV operator in the world, surpassing even Italy itself (where these machines have so far been purchased by 1260).
Having got a taste, the Russian military department drew attention to the heavier armored vehicles Iveco, produced by the latter within the framework of the CIO consortium with another well-known Italian company - Oto Melara. We are talking about a family of vehicles with an 8x8 wheel arrangement, led by an armored vehicle Centauro B1 (``) with 105-mm tank the gun. Oto Melara in the consortium is responsible for the creation and production of weapons systems for military vehicles.
In December 2010, the ministers of defense of the Russian Federation and Italy signed a protocol regarding the receipt by Russia of two Centauro armored vehicles and two Freccia (“Strela”) armored personnel carriers developed for their development. In May, two standard-made vehicles arrived in Novorossiysk from the presence of the Italian army - Centauro with the 2012-mm cannon and the Freccia BTR with the tower with the 105-mm cannon, and in August new modified export samples were delivered to Centauro with the 25 -mm cannon and Freccia with turret with 120-mm cannon.
A spokesman for Oto Melara in May 2012 of the year said that Russia could acquire in Italy a license to manufacture Centauro wheeled tanks. Following the results of the tests, which will fail at the end of 2012, conclusions will be made about the prospect of creating a joint venture for the licensed release of Centauro at one of the Russian defense plants. A high-ranking representative of Rosoboronexport OJSC (which is part of Russian Technologies and now also deals with the import of military property) confirmed that the Centauro tests are being carried out for possible future purchase of a license for its production. One of the possible sites for the production of this technology, he called KamAZ.
Thus, as can be judged, the project of organizing the assembly in Russia of the Centauro and Freccia family machines is being lobbied by Russian Technologies, in peak, carried out in the military industrial complex by the promising domestic medium-sized family of wheeled armored vehicles with the code Boomerang.
Glitter and poverty "Lynx"
All the above data provoked heated discussions in the media and near-war circles, although for the most part they were emotional in nature, especially since the Russian Ministry of Defense was not in a hurry to clarify the nature of their needs for the purchase of these machines are certainly specific types and specific Italian manufacturer.
It is already known that the mass purchase of the same lightweight armored vehicles "Lynx" is caused by the plans of the military department to create in the Russian army several so-called light brigades that will be completely moved on light armored vehicles. Existing air assault brigades are planned to be used as the basis for these brigades. In this regard, with the 2010 of the year, the staff and methods of applying such an light brigade based on the 56-th separate air assault brigade deployed in Kamyshin in the Volgograd region are being developed. In the absence of so far, the LMV 56-I brigade was temporarily armed with conventional off-road vehicles, the UAZ-315108 and the UAZ-3152 "Gusar". In addition, the armored vehicles "Lynx" are supposed to be put into the created reconnaissance brigades (which are planned to form as many as ten), special brigades, and also units of the Airborne Forces.
Thus, in the Russian army, “Lynx” has a slightly strange role in the essence of the “linear” armored vehicle and a de facto kind of light armored personnel carrier (apparently, two vehicles must carry the detachment). This is despite the fact that initially the LMV was created by Iveco as a reconnaissance and patrol, patrol, communications and command-staff (commander) machine, a kind of niche armored jeep. It is in this capacity that LMVs are mainly used in the armies of Italy, Great Britain and nine other countries that have acquired them. It is significant that in the British army these armored vehicles, called Panther, are officially designated as CLV (Command and Liaison Vehicle - vehicle control and communication).
In Russian sources, the main advantage of LMV is a good minozaschischennost. Indeed, the machine is specially designed to provide a very high for its mass (up to 6,5 t) level of protection according to the NATO standard STANAG 4569 - the level of 2 (crew survival when undermining under the bottom or wheel of the charge with the TNT equivalent of TNT kg). Thus, the LMV is essentially a lightweight version of an MRAP-class machine with enhanced anti-mine and anti-explosive protection. This was the innovation of the Iveco product at the time of its birth a decade ago. However, the other side of the minzaprotection is significant for a machine of such a small capacity (maximum five people) weight, which limits the mobility and maneuverability of the LMV outside roads.
For those tasks and applications for which LMV was originally created, this restriction of permeability is not so significant - like all similar MRAP machines, it is intended for use mainly on highways. After all, the threat from mines and, moreover, to pre-laid land mines exists mainly on constantly used roads, outside of such roads this danger is minimal. LMV is essentially a lightweight and inexpensive version of the patrol and patrol and convoy type MRAP vehicles for use as part of road convoys and is purchased as a “cheap MRAP” by small European countries for its Afghan and peacekeeping contingents.
And then the question arises about the feasibility of using this machine as the main means of transporting personnel of the light and reconnaissance brigades of the Russian army. Do these teams have to move exclusively on the highway? No, as can be judged, domestic military planners intend to use the same light brigades as high-mobility formations capable of conducting combat operations on a broad front, acting in small groups, making flanks and seeps, using raid tactics, being involved as advanced and reconnaissance units. .
It is obvious that all of these actions provide for precisely good mobility outside the highways and in open areas. At the same time, the threat from mines and land mines for such actions is minimal. So why do light crews need “Lynx” type vehicles whose mobility and throughput is limited in favor of mine protection? If light brigades are supposed to be used on highways and for regular counterinsurgency actions, then why do we need an inferior lightweight MRAP: then these brigades can be put on full-fledged MRAP vehicles with good capacity and even higher security - types are being conducted in Russia on a broad front.
It is absolutely clear that for armament of light and reconnaissance brigades within the framework of their chosen concept of use, it is more expedient to use vehicles with good mobility, even to the detriment of mine protection, that is, cars like the GAZ-2330 family “Tigr”, “Scorpion” developed by Corporation "Protection" and the like.
It is noteworthy that the Western special forces, even in Afghanistan, use mainly special light unarmored open "assault vehicles", for which high mobility, good visibility and ease of use of weapons are considered the best defense. Similarly, improvised, unprotected commercial vehicle types form the basis of military equipment in the notorious “Toyotas” wars, another example of which we recently saw in Libya. In flat-desert terrain, light bezbronnaya technology due to its high mobility is very often more efficient armored.
Here, however, it is appropriate to ask the question of the validity of the very concept of light brigades for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, all the more due to the transfer to jeeps and light armored vehicles of assault landing brigades. Where is our military department supposed to wage “Toyotas wars” in Russian conditions? With which opponent? By and large, in Russia neither the terrain, nor the climate, nor the character and level of potential adversaries contribute to the effective use of such forces.
In the light of the above, it is not surprising that the first reviews of the brief experience in operating the Lynx vehicles in the army, according to leaking information, turned out to be quite disappointing. Iveco is criticized for insufficient capacity (the inconvenience of placing five people transported, a small amount of space for equipment and ammunition), insufficient off-road traffic, etc. Thus, the criticism demonstrates precisely the inability of the “Lynx” to be used in the light armored personnel carrier assigned to it in Russia and an off-road vehicle - which clearly shows that the Russian military has made a large, costly mistake by choosing LMV for this role.
It’s time to finally admit that LMV is essentially a highway armored jeep, but, paradoxically, in this capacity it is not particularly needed in Russia, the same domestic Tiger is already successfully taking root in this role in our army. Purchases of Iveco LMV armored vehicles and the contract with Iveco obviously do not correspond to the real needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and in the conditions of our limited resources they look useless luxury. For the Russian army, LMV is a low-value toy with a limited scope.
This circumstance is a logical outcome of the hasty purchase of Italian machines without a serious analysis of the needs for this type of equipment, without a thorough analysis of their characteristics and without making serious and qualified comparison with other samples (including foreign ones). That is, to put it simply, this is the result of ignoring the procurement of elementary competitive procedures, which are used in the procurement practice of even the most underdeveloped countries. A wide international tender could save huge taxpayers' money and, perhaps, give our army a much better and more suitable machine than Iveco LMV, not to mention the possibility of putting tough demands on participating foreign companies in partnership with Russian manufacturers, localization, offset and so on. Further. In the current state of affairs, the Iveco group can calmly ignore all such requirements, approaching Russia as an underdeveloped third world country who honors for the happiness of getting a screwdriver assembly of machinery from vehicle sets.
Trail "Centaur"
Even more bizarre than the addiction to Iveco LMV, the heightened interest of a certain part of the Russian leadership in the Italian Centauro and Freccia cars looks like. It is not clear why these very samples of modern wheeled armored vehicles with the formula 8х8 - Italy (represented by Iveco and CIO) have never been an authoritative leader in the production of such machines as a priority, and these Italian samples, unlike the LMV, have not at all accompanied broad export successes. Centauro was, in addition to the Italian army, purchased only by Spain and a small party Oman (the latter acquired the version with the 120-mm gun), and Freccia did not receive any foreign orders at all, despite participating in a number of tenders. The design of the chassis of these machines (especially Freccia) is of particular interest to domestic developers, but in general does not contain anything outstanding.
The thesis of the "political" inaccessibility of similar machines with the 8x8 formula of other Western developers is clearly unreliable, especially in the light of the not so long ago known interest of the Russian Defense Ministry in the AMV BTR of the Finnish Patria group. It is obvious that, as in the case of the LMV machine, the cooperation agreement on Centauro and Freccia was accepted with complete disregard for any possible competitive procedures.
Initially, the Centauro 23-ton wheeled combat vehicle was developed in 80 as a mobile tank destroyer for the Italian army, but ultimately became one of the types of medium armored vehicles gaining popularity in the world in recent years (intermediate in mass between tanks and tracked infantry fighting vehicles on the one hand, and light wheeled armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles - on the other). The most significant adherents of medium armored vehicles since the late nineties are the US Armed Forces, which have adopted the Stryker armored personnel carrier with the 8X8 wheel formula and a whole range of vehicles based on it (including MGS with an 105-mm cannon) and medium-sized “Striker” brigades equipped with this technique, protruding expeditionary multifunctional compounds of increased mobility.
Similar trends have come to Russia, where the Ministry of Defense also plans to create medium-sized brigades equipped with wheeled armored personnel carriers and other armored vehicles with the wheel formula 8х8. The main candidate for equipping these brigades is the multipurpose Boomerang wheeled platform developed by GAZ Group in the weight class up to 25 tons, which is expected to be ready no earlier than 2015 of the year. So far, in the absence of anything else, the concept of an average brigade is driven around the 23-th separate motorized rifle brigade in Samara, which received the equipment of the conventional BTR-80.
On the whole, the concept of the medium brigade of the “strayer” type, that is, fully equipped with machines on the chassis of the wheeled armored personnel carrier, including wheeled vehicles with heavy cannon armament, with regard to the Russian army looks even more controversial than the concept of light brigades.
In fact, Centauro and other similar medium wheeled vehicles were created for countries and theaters of war, where the main method of operational transfer is to move on the highway (rather than transfer by rail) or where the nature of the terrain allows extensive use of wheeled vehicles off-road. Thus, the most suitable areas for the use of an average brigade are terrain with either a well-developed network of highways, or, conversely, with a relatively poorly developed network of highways, but with a complete absence of railways and a flat-desert or steppe landscape. In the second case, we are talking about the Middle East region (and specifically, Iraq), where the American “strayker” brigades had a successful combat debut.
In Russia, we see the opposite picture - the main method of operational troop transfer is railways, which are the main means of communication in the country (and do not require special restrictions on the transport of vehicles, either by mass or by type of running gear). The density of highways is relatively small, and at the same time the distances are too great for transporting equipment on them under their own power. Finally, off-road reigns pretty often near the desperate roads, and winter, spring and autumn thaws last a total of up to eight months a year, even in the middle lane. It is difficult to understand how it is possible to effectively use the compounds, built entirely on a fairly heavy wheeled armored vehicles and even with the "wheeled tanks." The patency of wheeled armored vehicles inevitably inferior to that of tanks and tracked vehicles. The aero-transport ability of combined-arms equipment also does not find a place in the practice of troop transportation and redeployment within Russia. But the expeditionary tasks of deployment in overseas desert theaters to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation do not seem to stand.
It was not by chance that, at an unofficial level, the only possible scenario for the use of Russian counterparts of the “Striker” brigades was the fighting in the steppes of Kazakhstan against the Taliban from Afghanistan who were rushing through. Not to mention the complete fictitiousness of such a picture: obviously, there is no way to smash the Taliban in the Kazakh steppes in simpler ways. Simple tanks probably won't do. And apparently, combat vehicles armed with anti-tank guns with a caliber 105 – 125 of millimeters are the most necessary in the fight against the Taliban beggars.
Thus, the need for an urgent adoption by the Russian Land Forces of a wheeled armored vehicle with heavy armament is apparently not a priority, and in the light of this interest in Centauro (and even less so that it can be assembled in Russia) does not have a deep rationale and is very artificial and far-fetched. As a potential interest for the developers to study (first of all, the undercarriage) - maybe, but here, it seems, the task of familiarizing them with these machines by the military department is not set. Yes, and Italians are unlikely to allow such a serious study without more or less firm guarantees of purchasing lots of cars, as well as their licensed production or any serious localization of industrial assembly.
Centauro vehicles themselves, developed by 30 years ago, do not look like the last word of technology, having a very conservative design with a habitable two-seat turret - in fact, the stage for advanced tank design has already been passed. The characteristics of the 105-mm and 120-mm guns of the lowered ballistics of the Oto Melara are very ordinary, and the fire control system, as can be judged, does not contain anything fundamentally new.
Attempts to promote the Centauro vehicles into service with the army of the Russian Federation, therefore, appear to have little response to Russian interests and needs. The whole concept of using medium armored vehicles in some separate units in our Armed Forces seems far-fetched and uncritically borrowed in the West, so it’s not surprising that looking for equipment for imitative "mock regiments of increased mobility" turned to the same.
It is difficult to find a combat vehicle less adapted to domestic realities than the “wheeled tank” Centauro. It remains to hope that the practical acquaintance of the Russian military with this system will confirm the obvious and will not lead to new large senseless waste of public money for the benefit of Iveco and other Italian manufacturers.
- Mikhail Barabanov
- Andrey Sedykh
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