Fast global strike in Russian performance
“... The building of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Live.
The ceremony of awarding the fighters of the Ukrainian nationalist units was held with special pomp - the president, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, representatives of law enforcement agencies, the press and invited foreign guests. The President of Ukraine Zelensky, with a face in the style of "Harold hiding pain", fixed the highest state award of Ukraine on the chest of another neo-Nazi - what was happening did not give him much joy, since, according to available information, the recipient was guilty of raping minors, torturing and killing hundreds of civilians, organ trafficking, numerous confirmed robberies and theft. But what to do? Having sold his soul to the devil, or rather to his henchmen in the person of the CIA and MI-6, there is no turning back, he had to pull on the duty “political” smile and do what he was told, because he is a lackey, he is a lackey in independent Ukraine.
Stormy applause turning into ovations, joyful smiles on faces, flashes of cameras - all of a sudden, there was a terrible roar ...
The broadcast was interrupted for a second, but then resumed - the camera was lying on its side. Directly in front of the camera, the face of President Zelensky, distorted by pain and horror, froze, green snot stuck out of his nose, inhuman cries escaped from his mouth - he jerkily tried to crawl on the floor, but it didn’t work out well - it was clear that both his legs were torn off. In the background, there was some kind of mess of human bodies and building debris - dust, smoke, flames... There was a second, even stronger explosion, and the broadcast was interrupted completely...»
This is how the Russian special operation in Ukraine could begin, and possibly end, provided that at that moment weapon, capable of inflicting a quick, accurate and inevitable strike over thousands of kilometers, a weapon that our country is quite capable of creating. The idea of creating such a weapon has long been sitting in the heads of the highest military officials of the leading countries of the world.
The unfulfilled story of American rapid global strike
The concept of a rapid global strike (BGU), developed by the United States in the late nineties and early XNUMXs, meant providing the US armed forces (AF) with the opportunity to strike anywhere on the planet within an hour. With the help of conventional weapons, this is unattainable, therefore, the arsenal of the BGU forces should have included:
- land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in non-nuclear equipment;
- hypersonic weapons;
- orbital impact platforms.
Each of the types of promising weapons had its own advantages and disadvantages.
Of course, it is easiest to convert ICBMs and SLBMs into carriers of non-nuclear warheads, but their use can cause triggering Russian missile attack warning systems or China and provoke a retaliatory strike. Hypersonic weapons are still at the initial stage of their development., even now its number is extremely limited, let alone what it was 20 years ago. BUT orbital impact platforms and currently do not exist in reality, although a revolution in the creation of heavy, fully reusable launch vehicles can fundamentally change the situation in the next decade.
It is possible that American unmanned orbital "shuttles" can be used not only for reconnaissance and technology development ...
...and even if not, the United States may soon have a truly revolutionary ability to deliver cargo to near-Earth orbit.
Ultimately, the concept of a rapid global strike, apparently, was “shelved”, although some American officials say that already in 2010 the United States had the ability to inflict BGU - most likely, this is a lie, although who knows .. .
It's funny that Russia, which, in fact, did not develop the BSU concept, had the greatest chances to implement it first, because it was in Russia that the Avangard hypersonic glide warhead with a nuclear warhead was created. Potentially, this weapon could be created with a conventional warhead, and the scenario described at the beginning of the article could already be implemented, but the choice of the country's leadership leaned towards strategic nuclear forces.
The United States is catching up with Russia with its Hypersonic Weapons System (HWS) program, which is based on the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) guided maneuverable planning hypersonic warhead with a conventional warhead, that is, these weapons will be used, and, given the "habits" of the United States , leaders of countries unfriendly to America should think about enhanced camouflage measures or even moving to Russia.
Presentation of HWS and C-HGB
Previously, the issues of creating such weapons were considered in the article. "Planning hypersonic warheads: projects and prospects".
The Threatening Reality of a Sudden Disarming Strike
A sudden disarming strike - apart from high-level betrayal, this is the most dangerous thing that can threaten our country. Neither the United States nor NATO can defeat Russia with any other forces, because even the use of nuclear weapons in the format of delivering retaliatory strikes will not make the attacker a winner - it will be a pyrrhic victory.
Possible options for nuclear and non-nuclear conflicts were previously considered in the articles:
- “What can she be? Nuclear War Scenarios ",
- “What can she be? Scenarios of conventional war".
Our enemies know this and are actively working on the possibility of delivering a sudden disarming strike, as well as creating the necessary means for this. Among the most dangerous means of the first strike of the enemy, one can name American nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Ohio type with the Trident II SLBM, capable of striking along a flat trajectory with a short flight time.
In this case, there may not be enough time to make a decision on delivering a retaliatory strike, and then it will be too late - there will be nothing to answer with. The issues of the US destruction of the Russian nuclear shield and ways to counter this were previously considered in the material. Nuclear math: how many nuclear charges does the US need to destroy Russian strategic nuclear forces?
Potentially, the United States can strike with nuclear charges anywhere in our country in 5-7 minutes, while being outside the zone in which they can be detected by the Russian Navy
However, now we are primarily interested in the very possibility of launching ICBMs or SLBMs along a flat trajectory, which opens up significant prospects for their alternative use.
Limitless prospects
An inescapable weapon capable of destroying the enemy at a great distance in a matter of minutes. Such a weapon could be an ideal tool for destroying the leaders of hostile states..
Currently, Russia is one of the world leaders in the creation of hypersonic weapons, as an example, we can cite well-known complexes "Dagger" and Zircon. However, the mass of the warhead thrown by the "Dagger" or "Zircon" most likely does not exceed 500 kilograms. If the warhead is nuclear, this is more than enough, and if it is conventional, then it may not be enough to destroy large or buried objects. The flight range of the "Dagger" and "Zircon" is supposedly about 1 kilometers, without taking into account the range of the carrier. The cost of newly created hypersonic weapons can be quite high, and the quantity produced is limited by the capabilities of industry.
Hypersonic missile systems "Dagger" (above) and "Zirkon" (below)
At the same time, Russia has a significant fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs, the term of operation of which as part of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) is coming to an end. Isn't it a pity to throw away such a luxurious weapon?
Of course, it can be used, for example, with the refinement of the third stage be used to launch civilian satellites into orbit. But life has shown that in the current reality we need weapons. Lots of weapons. Lots of modern, highly effective weapons.
On the one hand, Russia has an aeroballistic "Dagger" and a hypersonic "Zircon", capable of accurately hitting targets with a conventional warhead, on the other hand, the Russian strategic nuclear forces have the aforementioned "Vanguard".
Taken together, this allows us to suggest that the Russian industry can create on the basis of ICBMs and SLBMs with expiration dates operational-strategic conventional weapons capable of delivering powerful and inevitable strikes against stationary enemy targets.
First of all, the question arises - how to minimize the likelihood that launching ICBMs and SLBMs with a conventional warhead will be perceived by the enemy as the beginning of a nuclear attack, as we discussed earlier?
First of all, the enemy itself, the United States, “plays along” with us, since 60% of their strategic nuclear forces are in the maritime component, and the second largest land component is located in 450 protected silo launchers. At the moment, Russia is physically incapable of inflicting a sudden disarming strike on the United States. If we talk about a sudden decapitation strike - the destruction of the country's leadership, then here the United States has everything worked out - a presidential helicopter, a presidential plane, and in general, a decapitation strike is an unreliable thing.
Do not forget about the capabilities of the US missile defense system (ABM). The American missile defense system cannot repel a massive launch of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs, but single strikes are quite.
All of the above suggests that the United States can feel more confident and not take rash steps in the event of a suspected launch of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. However, you should not rely only on the restraint of the US government, especially since Alzheimer's disease does not contribute to making informed decisions.
Taking into account the current geopolitical situation for Russia, the priority task can be considered the defeat of targets with conventional weapons at a range of about two to three thousand kilometers. The fact that this is possible is confirmed by launches of American Trident II SLBMs along a flat trajectory - the minimum range is 2 kilometers, or approximately 300 minutes of flying time.
The question remains of the warhead and its guidance. Hypersonic gliding warhead? Most likely, such weapons will be too expensive.
Perhaps the best solution would be to use a maneuvering warhead flying along a ballistic trajectory, the control system of which will be based on the solutions used in the Dagger, Zircon and Avangard. Probably, in order to obtain the necessary guidance accuracy in the final section, it will be necessary to slow down the rate of decline of the warhead in one way or another.
Thus, in the original version, we have an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering a warhead weighing one to one and a half tons to a range of about ten to twelve thousand kilometers. This range must be "exchanged" for a flight along an energetically unfavorable trajectory for a range of about two to three thousand kilometers and an increase in the mass of the warhead, which is necessary to accommodate guidance and control systems, as well as directly to the conventional warhead.
What will be its mass? It is difficult to answer, perhaps the same ton and a half will remain directly on the warhead, or maybe it will be two or three tons - after all, we are reducing the flight range by five to six times, even if we are flying along a non-optimal trajectory. The warhead of such a mass will be equivalent to the FAB-3000 aerial bomb, the destructive power of which will be supplemented by a falling speed higher than that of a conventional high-explosive aerial bomb.
The funnel, presumably from the FAB-3000 air bomb, should be the same everywhere where the military-political leadership of Ukraine may be located. Fighterbomber image
Such a conventional medium-range ICBM/SLBM would pose a limited threat to the US, although the Europeans would, of course, squeal. Of course, according to the current rules of the START-3 treaty, each such missile will be counted as one ICBM with nuclear warheads, but in the end, several dozen "converted" ICBMs or SLBMs will not affect nuclear deterrence in any way, but they can bring a lot of benefits. And it's time to say goodbye to the START-3 treaty - to classify the number, type and location of nuclear charges, leaving only the possibility of emergency communications to prevent the risks of an accidental unleashing of a nuclear war.
Media selection
What ICBMs and SLBMs can be used as carriers? There are quite a few candidates.
First of all, these are the Topol ICBMs, the Topol-M ICBMs and the Yars ICBMs of the earliest releases that have been removed or are planned to be removed from combat duty in the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN).
Mobile ground missile systems (PGRK) "Topol" (left) and "Topol-M" (right)
Of particular interest are these complexes in the mobile version - their role as a deterrent weapon, taking into account revolutionary improvement of reconnaissance satellite constellations of the enemy, will quickly decline, but the ability to change location for the first strike will be very handy - move inland in order to hit targets closer, or vice versa, advance to the borders in order to hit the target at maximum distance.
We cannot exclude the possibility of using the UR-100N UTTKh (“Stiletto”) and R-36M2 (“Satan”) complexes - their throw weight is 4 and 350 kilograms, respectively. The adaptation of these ICBMs, if it is still feasible and possible, based on their design features and service life, will allow throwing a powerful conventional warhead weighing five to ten tons for two to three thousand kilometers, for which there will be practically no invulnerable targets.
UR-100N UTTH ("Stiletto") and R-36M2 ("Satan")
And finally, we have strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) of project 667BDRM Dolphin, carrying 16 highly advanced R-29RMU2 Sineva / R-29RMU2.1 Liner SLBMs, which are gradually being replaced by SSBNs project 955A with the Bulava SLBM. In addition to those SLBMs of the R-29RMU family that are in service with strategic nuclear forces, new ones can also be produced, in an improved version of the R-29RMU3 ("Sineva-2").
Their transformation into SLBMs with a high-precision conventional warhead will allow not only to keep several of the most modern representatives of the 667BDRM "Dolphin" in service after their withdrawal from the strategic nuclear forces, but also to create a headache for the enemies of our country throughout the planet, because they do not particularly have a nuclear strike they are afraid, but they will think about the possibility of an instant strike with conventional weapons - it’s hard to sleep peacefully when you know that within five to seven minutes a gift will fly to you in the form of two or three tons of explosives, and their American curators will not be able not only to interfere, but they don't even give a warning.
SSBN project 667BDRM "Karelia" and SLBM type R-29RMU
What types of conventional warheads can be mounted on ICBMs and SLBMs?
There can be several options:
- monoblock high-explosive fragmentation warhead with the possibility of detonation at a given height or upon impact;
- a protected penetrating high-explosive warhead for the destruction of buried objects;
- warhead with cluster submunitions;
- an inert monolithic warhead made of tungsten alloy, designed to destroy buried objects with a kinetic impact;
- a cluster inert warhead that covers a ground object with a shower of thousands of tungsten pins.
Conclusions
The conversion of obsolete ICBMs and SLBMs into non-nuclear first-strike weapons will not only extend the life cycle of expensive products of the Russian (or even Soviet) industry, but will also provide the armed forces of the Russian Federation with powerful, almost inevitable first-strike weapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, ICBMs and SLBMs with conventional precision warheads can and should be used in real conflicts.
Compared to existing and developing hypersonic systems, ICBMs and SLBMs with conventional high-precision warheads can potentially carry a much more massive non-nuclear warhead, which no object can withstand.
At the very beginning of a special operation carried out by Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine, ICBMs and SLBMs with conventional high-precision warheads could decapitate the enemy, depriving him of the “power vertical”. And the American sycophants who replaced them would no longer behave so defiantly, they would rule the country either from a bunker or from abroad, which would not have the best effect on the fighting spirit of the armed forces of Ukraine (AFU). It is possible that the scenario described at the beginning of the article could well come true.
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