"Counterattack on Kherson". Bite your own tail
Apparently, in the near future we will see another episode of the series, which cannot be turned off by pressing the button on the TV. After the series "evacuation from Azovstal", "counteroffensive near Kharkov", "exhaustion in Severodonetsk" and the short film "ghost of Kyiv", we have to contemplate, perhaps, the most scandalous series called "counteroffensive on Kherson". The plot is poorly visible, and the setting is so-so, but the marketing is at the highest level.
Why such sacrifices?
The Ukrainian Armed Forces set the obvious tasks of the “Kherson counteroffensive” to pull back part of the NVO forces from the Donbass and slow down the advance of the allied forces, as well as redirect all the attention of the Ukrainian and world audience from the inevitable defeat in Slavyansk, Kramatorsk and Avdiivka. Here, as they say, even a child understands everything. Who in the West is now talking about the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Lisichansk / Severodonetsk / Rubizhne triangle, the loss of the Uglegorsk thermal power plant, the breakthrough of the allied forces near Donetsk, when it is possible to show holes in the Antonovsky bridge around the clock?
That is, the “counteroffensive” on Kherson should become a mirror image of the Slavic-Kramatorsk operation, which will mean the loss of Donbass for Kyiv. With this they will try to cover up their defeat in the DPR. And here it is not even the very fact of success in the form of the capture of Kherson that is important, but it is enough just to rive the attention of the world community to another region. And, as you know, the Western media and social networks have long learned to make a big information wave out of the tiny successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the spirit of “Russia is losing the war.” This is done due to the almost complete information blockade of Russian successes in capturing large cities with a total replication of personnel with each lined Russian a tank.
Against this background, the only practical goal that the Nazi regime in Kyiv can achieve with its “counteroffensive” is to disrupt the announced referendum. The referendum, apparently, was supposed to take place after the complete liberation of Donbass in early autumn. But if the city of Kherson will be under constant artillery fire, then the referendum will, of course, have to be postponed before Ukrainian troops are even thrown out of Nikolaev.
But there are pluses in this "counteroffensive". Finally, kindergartens and schools in Krivoy Rog and Nikolaev will be empty. All those who like to sleep on cribs in an embrace with a portrait of Zelensky and juggle with grenades will still come out under a flurry of Russian aviation and artillery.
Counterattack backwards
Now about the very nature of the upcoming escalation in the Kherson region. The most obvious actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are the chaotic massive shelling of Kherson by analogy with Donetsk. That is, realizing that Donetsk will soon be out of reach, the West will need a new goal that provokes the need to intensify hostilities. Thus, the West is insured in case someone in Kyiv or Moscow is suddenly tempted to sit down at the negotiating table after the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the DPR. Representatives of the Ukrainian regime directly put pressure on the residents of Kherson to leave the city. This only confirms the thesis about the upcoming massive artillery strikes on Kherson itself (and not just on the bridge and Chernobaevka).
By the way, about Chernobaevka (more precisely, about Kherson airport). Of course, it was not worth trying to form a helicopter base at the beginning of the NWO practically on the front line. This is a command error. However, Ukraine continues to strike at the airport, Russian air defense continues to intercept MLRS shells. Thus, it is clear that there are still important Russian military installations there. This confirms that our armed forces are ready to continue to remain in the area targeted by the enemy, but will not place their main military facilities within the boundaries of Kherson, as is happening in Nikolaev. The same is confirmed by the strike of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Melitopol airport, where, obviously, the main forces were stationed, and not in Melitopol itself.
But back to Kherson. The Ukrainian army will not be able to concentrate and generally find a sufficient amount of artillery and armored vehicles with active operations in other directions. It remains, first of all, the infantry. A lot of infantry of varying degrees of combat training. Small well-trained enemy mobile groups, hung with anti-tank systems like Christmas trees, will not be able to make a big breakthrough and move the front. The same is with large groups of enemy manpower, thrown in a chaotic manner under the cover of a small amount of armored vehicles.
As for artillery, if the Armed Forces of Ukraine had the opportunity to find enough artillery to break the Russian dominance in this type of weaponry, they would have done it in the Donbas long ago. Nothing like what Russia has concentrated in the direction of Pesok and Avdiivka, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not be able to assemble at any point in Ukraine. Russia destroys as much, if not more, Ukrainian weaponshow much comes in daily from NATO countries. Therefore, the number of heavy weapons in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is slowly but surely decreasing, given the remnants of Soviet equipment, of course. The phrase “NATO is dragging out the agony of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” is very well expressed in the numbers of delivered and destroyed armored vehicles.
Ingulets
You need to understand that there are no water barriers directly between Kherson and Nikolaev along the front line up to Snigirevka. The Ingulets River, which today is the front line in many areas, flows into the Dnieper above the city of Kherson. Its width in the south of the Kherson region is about 100 meters, in the north - 30-50. That is, this river is an obstacle of the same complexity as the Seversky Donets. For the Russian troops, this is a difficult task, taking into account Western reconnaissance and Western aiming. For the Ukrainians, this is simply an impossible task if we are talking about the transfer of large formations, and not about the DRG.
In the future, we will also have to face water barriers. If we are looking ahead, then on the way to Odessa we will have to overcome the Southern Bug and Tiligul. Yes, and Odessa itself is mostly covered by two estuaries. To get to its port, you will have to push through a neck between the estuaries and the sea, a little more than 1,5 km wide, or enter from the side of Transnistria. Therefore, pontoon bridges will come in handy for our troops even after the elimination of threats to Kherson crossings. True, in the case of Odessa, there is the possibility of large naval and air landing operations south of the city, which will facilitate the task of encirclement.
Krivoy Rog
In addition to the obvious western direction, there is also a northern one (relative to Kherson) - this is Krivoy Rog and Nikopol. The Armed Forces of Ukraine may try to advance here, relying on these cities, but the distance from them to the front line is greater than from Nikolaev to the front near Kherson. There are no water barriers here, and in fact there is a fairly wide bridgehead for both sides, 40 km wide. The only point for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to attack here is the capture of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station. But before it from the front line, you still have to go as much as 80 km. For Russian troops, the offensive on Krivoy Rog and Nikolaev will open the way to central Ukraine. Without the capture of Krivoy Rog, the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk directions are practically meaningless, since the cities are separated by the Dnieper River.
Ukrainian rear
The very ability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to transfer and accumulate large forces indicates an insufficient number of remote pinpoint strikes. Yes, the missiles did not run out, as they wanted in Ukraine. But they are still few. Therefore, the main opportunity for the RF Armed Forces to impede the movements of the Ukrainian army and radically cut off the supply of weapons from the West is the access to medium and high altitudes of Russian aviation behind enemy lines. And for this, it will be necessary to increase work on the detection and destruction of "sleeping" medium and long-range air defense systems, intensifying reconnaissance, and throwing false targets at the enemy.
As for the work of Russian aviation against the advancing troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, sleeping air defenses are good as long as they have somewhere to hide. It is one thing to drive the S-300 to some pig farm and wait for a signal from NATO colleagues, and it is quite another to continuously cover the advancing orders in an open field by deploying a layered air defense system. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Russian front-line aviation will have serious obstacles to unwind the Ukrainian troops that have entered the open spaces on the march between Nikolaev and Kherson.
Crimea
As for the direct military threats to Crimea in the form of an offensive by Ukrainian troops, the advances on the right bank of the Dnieper and even the loss of Kherson do not open the way to Crimea for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. There are still the same few bridges that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not be able to cross. Advancing through Melitopol is more promising, but no less pointless. From the current front line near Kherson to Kherson itself, the Armed Forces of Ukraine need to go about 20 km, from Nikolaev - 50 km before the Armed Forces of Ukraine could run into the Dnieper. On the left bank, it is about 200 km from the line Kamenskoye - Orekhov - Gulyaipole and the only settlement for which the Armed Forces of Ukraine could cling is Melitopol. What can we say about the Sivash and the Isthmus of Perekop, which they will never pass, even if they were already standing in front of them.
And in general, any operations against Crimea without dominance at sea and in the air are meaningless. If the Armed Forces of Ukraine jeopardize the loss of Crimea, then this would cause a total mobilization of society in Russia and, above all, in Crimea itself. But even during the time of the Maidan, Crimea was able to gather almost as many people into the militia as the “self-defense of the Maidan” recruited from all over Ukraine. In addition, any threat of losing a part of Russian territory may become a justified reason for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
decision centers
This "counter-offensive", if it does take place, will serve as a reminder to those who have long threatened to strike at the centers of decision-making. Why do we need the Ukrainian regime at all? To exchange prisoners? Only because of the fear that he will find a replacement in the West? So let them search! Why did we save it by withdrawing troops from Kyiv? Why was not a single missile strike or artillery strike on the government quarter carried out if the artillery was 20–25 km away? Why do Western officials continue to go on excursions there? Why did the attacks on the objects of Nazi propaganda stop, and why does the Ukrainian TV continue to nazify the population, talk about the need to kill Russian children and drive “cannon fodder” to the front?
If it was publicly stated that there would be strikes on decision-making centers, then they should be. Otherwise, these warnings will be invalidated. If we admit that the Kyiv regime deceived us in Istanbul, then this is only an additional reason to deal with it in the same way as with any fortified area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the front. It is high time to deprive the Western audience of the opportunity to contemplate the ridiculous photo sessions of the guarantor of the Ukrainian constitution torn by the West. Although, perhaps, one should not refuse him the last photo session during the signing of the surrender, if one takes place.
We can assume that red lines have long been drawn along the closed line for the West. We can even imagine that these are deliveries of ATACMS, modern fighters and long-range air defense / missile defense systems, as well as strikes on the territory of Crimea and large Russian cities. However, politics always involves playing on the edge of these red lines. And this means that trial attempts to cross the red line will occur constantly. And if there is no response in full force, then it will be perceived there as the flexibility of our red lines.
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