The real unification of military equipment is an important consequence of the special operation "Z"
RZSO "Hurricane" is perhaps the most unique vehicle of the ground forces. Source: smolgazeta.ru
Unification is more important than innovation
The experience of combat operations for any army is invaluable. At times, it can radically change views on the tactics and strategy of warfare, as well as on the military-industrial complex. So it was with the Second World War, which launched irreversible changes. For example, the unification of military equipment in the Soviet Union reached its climax by the end of the war.
By the way, this process moved in antiphase with the German approach. The technical vinaigrette that the Germans introduced on the fronts of the World War, although it was quite perfect, seriously complicated logistics, maintenance and repair.
In the Red Army, until the end of the war, there were only two main models on the assembly line tanks - T-34 and IS (KV). And one tank engine - V-2 in two versions for medium and heavy tanks. On the basis of these platforms, self-propelled artillery guns were built - tank destroyers and howitzers. During the war years, the T-44 with a transverse engine was ready for production, but due to low unification with existing tank models, it never became a replacement for the T-34-85. It was necessary to maintain significant production rates, and with the introduction of the T-44 on the conveyor, this would have caused serious problems. Therefore, they left the old car, which, most likely, brought Victory closer.
Self-propelled guns "Acacia" and "Msta-S". Source: sdelanounas.ru vladimirkrym.livejournal.com
Surprisingly, after the war, the experience of unifying armored vehicles and other weapons was rethought. And that's putting it mildly. We will not go into details, we will only note that during the special operation in Ukraine, all this story requires a special organization of rear services. It complicates the work, which means - efficiency is reduced. Just imagine what a wide range of artillery calibers are used by the allied forces and what difficulties arise with logistics.
So, artillery shells and mines with a caliber of 23 mm, 30 mm, 73 mm, 82 mm, 100 mm, 115 mm, 120 mm, 122 mm, 125 mm, 152 mm, 203 mm and 240 mm, as well as three RZSO calibers - 122 mm, 220 mm and 300 mm. Occasionally, 57-mm ammunition for dumbbells with an S-60 anti-aircraft gun can be used. Rifle calibers weapons - 5,45mm, 7,62mm, 9mm, 12,7mm and 14,5mm. At the same time, some of the ammunition of the same caliber is not interchangeable for different systems. For example, part of the 152-mm ammunition of the Msta-S gun does not fit the Akatsiya.
With a 152-mm caliber in the allied forces, perhaps the most important incident is that three self-propelled systems 2S19 Msta-S, 2S5 Hyacinth-S and 2S3 Akatsiya use the same projectile size at once. Of course, the Hyacinth-S self-propelled gun is knocked out of this row, but the specifics of using guns and howitzers are so fundamentally different that it requires two platforms at once - tank and self-propelled "Object-123"? Each platform has its own set of nodes, assemblies and service specifics.
In this regard, the words of Viktor Ivanovich Murakhovsky, a retired colonel, editor-in-chief of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, published in his Telegram channel of the same name, are indicative:
“Unification is more important than innovation.
Single platforms (bases / chassis) are more important than the completeness of the nomenclature.
Seriality is more important than uniqueness.
The presence in the ranks is more important than prospects.
New ammunition is more important than new calibers.
The resource is more important than the limiting parameters.
Not breaking is more important than fixing.
Ergonomics is more important than tight packaging.
Crew qualification is more important than performance characteristics.
Organization is more important than qualifications.
Maintaining skills is more important than records.
The quality of command and control is more important than the quality of armored vehicles.
Interaction in combat is more important than anything else.
The preservation of the crew / landing force is more important than the preservation of equipment.
Courage is more important than dementia, but professionalism is more important than courage.”
Single platforms (bases / chassis) are more important than the completeness of the nomenclature.
Seriality is more important than uniqueness.
The presence in the ranks is more important than prospects.
New ammunition is more important than new calibers.
The resource is more important than the limiting parameters.
Not breaking is more important than fixing.
Ergonomics is more important than tight packaging.
Crew qualification is more important than performance characteristics.
Organization is more important than qualifications.
Maintaining skills is more important than records.
The quality of command and control is more important than the quality of armored vehicles.
Interaction in combat is more important than anything else.
The preservation of the crew / landing force is more important than the preservation of equipment.
Courage is more important than dementia, but professionalism is more important than courage.”
You can talk about most of the theses for a long time, but in this case we are interested in the problem of a wide range of weapons in Ukraine and what to do about it.
The heavy legacy of the USSR
The situation in the Russian army has developed under the influence of a huge stockpile of weapons of the late Soviet era. Saving on defense spending in the USSR was not accepted, which caused the "misappropriation" of funds. For example, the Akatsiya self-propelled gun was built on the Object 123 tracked base, which is also used for the Krug air defense system and the Giacint-S self-propelled gun. But in 1983, a more advanced Msta-S was added, already on a dearmored T-80 platform with MTO from the T-72.
As the developers write, "howitzer armor provides protection for the crew, weapons, mechanisms and ammunition carried from armor-piercing bullets and shrapnel." The realization of the benefits of using a single tank base for artillery guns came already at the end of the Soviet Union. Although it has been clear since the Second World War. Following Msta-S, the Pinocchio / Solntsepek heavy flamethrower system was also built on a tank base. The platform of the tank is also stronger, and the range of spare parts does not need to be expanded. But thousands of Acacias and Hyacinths have already been built and are widely used in Ukraine.
Our tanks in Ukraine. All the legendary trinity in the collection. Source: theconversation.com
It may seem that everything is in order with domestic tanks in this story. But it's not. In the special operation, the allied forces are now using three lines of armored vehicles with modifications at once - T-72, T-80 and T-64. Three crowns of the design school of Kharkov, Leningrad and Nizhny Tagil. The interchangeability of tanks ends at the stage of ammunition: engines, transmissions and chassis are completely different.
All tanks are good in their own way and for some time they were in service with the Soviet army at the same time. The armored “troika” even in peacetime gave a lot of headaches to deputy troopers, and in the realities of an armed conflict, the difficulties increase manifold. Now in Ukraine, this assortment has been supplemented by decommissioned T-62s, which also have a 115-mm cannon caliber. In this case, all tanks are used, with a few exceptions, to solve similar problems. Unless they try not to let the T-62 into dangerous areas.
Is such diversity justified in terms of logistics and logistics? The question is rhetorical and once again confirms the severity of the technical heritage of the Soviet army. More precisely - a rash waste of funds.
RZSO "Hurricane" based on ZIL-135LM is technically the most controversial vehicle of the "Z" special operation. Source: pinterest
В news gallant Russian gunners on the Uragan MLRS often appear on the ribbons. Many talk about the indisputable advantages of the machine, but completely forget what platform the machine is based on. This is the ZIL-135LM, the last serial brainchild of the legendary designer of the SKB ZIL, Vitaly Grachev.
The machine, adopted back in 1963, is completely unique - two gasoline carburetor engines are located between the 1st and 2nd pairs of wheels and drive the wheels of the left and right sides, respectively. The machine does not have axles as such - final drives are used to transmit torque. For full-fledged work, full synchronization of the operation of the motors is required, which is very difficult to achieve. There were attempts to replace two motors with a single power unit, but then it was necessary to completely reshape the transmission, which is comparable to building a new car.
Grachev laid another mine in the design of the 135th ZIL - he appointed the first and last pairs of wheels as turning. On the one hand, the car turns on one track and goes easier on virgin snow, and on the other hand, it is equipped with a complex steering system. We remember that according to Murakhovsky - "unification is more important than innovation." The question is why the Zilovsky dinosaur has not yet been replaced by the products of the Belarusian MZKT and the domestic BAZ?
In fairness, there is such a machine - "Hurricane-1M" on the MZKT-7930 chassis, but there are no more than a dozen such RZSOs in the army. Not only does the Hurricane RZSO require a separate delivery of gasoline, while the rest of the equipment “drinks” diesel fuel, it also needs its own range of spare parts. And driving the machine is not so easy - the turning kinematics are different from traditional four-axle vehicles.
If you go lower from heavy armored vehicles and RZSO, then it turns out that there is no unity in the class of trucks. The actual twins for the purpose of KamAZ and Ural use different engines. On products from Naberezhnye Chelny there are numerous modifications of KamAZ-740, and Miass trucks come to the army with diesel engines from Yaroslavl. Does it add convenience in maintenance and repair? It's good that at least the gearboxes of both are "KAMAZ".
In the class of light armored vehicles with unification in the Russian army, a couple is fighting - the Gazovsky "Tiger" and the Italian "Lynx" (nee Iveco LMV).
If you look up from the ground forces to the sky, it turns out that everything is not rosy here either. In the army aviation three models of helicopters are fighting the nationalists at once - Mi-24, Mi-28 and Ka-52. At the same time, they take out up to 60-80% of all combat work in the sky - for example, expensive Su-34s simply cannot operate at full strength due to the enemy’s live air defense.
A weak excuse in this situation is that the nationalists of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have an even greater variety of equipment. They only have three rifle calibers - NATO 5,56 mm and Soviet 5,45 mm and 7,62 mm. In the cannon cluster, the 155-mm caliber was also added to the legacy of the USSR. With tanks in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation is similar to the Russian one - only there are much fewer gas turbine T-80s. With armored vehicles that have not yet been knocked out, it becomes more difficult day by day. All and sundry strive to install light equipment, forming a real technical zoo.
And now let's imagine what difficulties would be added by the latest Russian Armata tanks, Kurganets and Boomerang armored vehicles with Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled guns. There are a lot of commentators on the net waiting for this armored vehicle in Ukraine. All this innovative brethren would not only have to be protected from captivity with subsequent analysis in the West, but also to be supplied through a separate line. Even if the cars got to the front in trace amounts.
We will not know soon how unification at the current level affects events on the fronts. Analytical reports will first go through all the stages in the highest echelons of the military departments and only then will they reach the concerned citizens. One can only hope that the lessons of the special operation "Z" will be learned, unification will become real, and the work of repair teams with rear units will be greatly facilitated. And with this, the combat effectiveness of the army in the field will also increase.
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