Special Operations: Raid on Pebble Island
This year marks the 30-th anniversary of one of the most iconic armed conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century - the Argentine-British war for the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). During the Falkland War, the British command actively used special operations aviation service (SAS) and its, so to speak, naval counterpart - special boat service (SBS). Operation Prelim, conducted by SAS on Pebble Island and listed as a classic combat operation of the special aviation service, is dedicated to this material.
Operation Prelim (Operation Prelim, which can be translated from English as the “Entrance Exam”) was part of a larger Operation Sutton. It was planned by the British command to conduct an amphibious operation in the area of San Carlos and Ajax Bays and a town called Port of San Carlos on the west coast of East Falkland from 16 to 25 in May 1982.
Operation Prelim was the first since the Second World War, the combat operation of British special forces with the task of attacking the enemy’s airfield and the first large-scale operation of a special aviation service, after an operation in Omani Jebel Akbar in 1956.
The idea of Operation Prelim belongs to the commander of an aircraft carrier group led by the Hermes aircraft carrier (317.8 task force), Rear Admiral John Forster Sandy Woodward. The commander of the operation was the Commodore Michael Clapp, the commander of the amphibious forces of the 317 OS (317.0 Task Force), and the brigadier Julian Thompson, the commander of the Royal Commandant of the Royal Marine Corps of the United Kingdom. The plan of operation was approved directly by the commander of 3's operational compound, Admiral Sir John David Eliot Fieldhouse, and SAS director and brigadier Peter de la Bille.
The main objective of Operation Prelim was the destruction of enemy aircraft deployed at a small aerodrome created by Argentines on Pebble Island. More to the point, an advanced operational base was created on the island as part of an airfield, a small fortified point and a marines garrison. It consisted of units of the 3 Battalion of the Marine Corps named after Ilizar Videla, numbering about 100 men, armed with large-caliber machine guns and 75-mm recoilless guns.
The Argentine base wore the designation “Elephant naval aviation base” or also “Calderon” air base (Estacion Aero Calderon) or it was called “Calderon naval aviation base” according to the Argentine variant of the name of the village on Pebble island - Puerto Calderon. Often, the designation “La Payanca” (La Payanca) was used in the call signs, and the command of the Argentine marines designated the base as “the airfield of naval aviation of Bourbon Island”. Bourbon Island is the Argentinean version of the name of the island in honor of the famous Bourbon dynasty, which should not be confused with the same name used - Bourbon Island - in relation to the island of Reunion.
Aviation Hunt
In the book "Ghost troops: secret story SAS, published in 1998, former SAS soldier Ken Connor pointed out that the most important task of the SAS reconnaissance and sabotage groups in the Falkland Islands was to closely monitor any movements of Argentine planes and helicopters. “One of the reasons for this was that the Argentinean command largely based its defensive strategy on the use of large reserves of troops and military equipment concentrated in the Port Stanley area. Quickly the same personnel to the most threatened areas should have been helicopters, including those of the Chinook type. Such a tactic, in the opinion of the Argentine military command, was to ensure the successful and effective repulse of any enemy attacks and the disruption of its airborne and amphibious assault operations.
However, the Argentinean command understood that to concentrate the main forces of aviation on one aerodrome is to subject them to a very real and deadly threat. One massive enemy air raid and active resistance of the garrisons on the Falkland Islands would be impossible. As a result, every night, Argentine helicopters and, if possible, airplanes were scattered around Port Stanley in order to reduce the possibility of their detection and destruction. Temporary locations were kept in the strictest secrecy and changed every day.
One of the reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the company “G” of the special aviation service monitored the movement of helicopters in the areas west of Port Stanley, making many kilometers of throws. Twice British scouts managed to find temporary bases for Argentine helicopters. They called their aircraft, but in both cases, the British expected failure - the Argentines had time to relocate helicopters. And only the third time the British waited for luck - the helicopters were discovered and subjected to air strikes. As a result, four Argentine dragonflies, including two Chinooks, were destroyed. This caused a very significant damage to the grouping of Argentine troops: the mobile reserve was actually left without its “horses”.
However, the British command was interested not only in helicopters. On the eve of the landing operation in the Gulf of San Carlos, on the agenda was the question of the need to neutralize the strike aircraft of the enemy stationed at the nearest airfields. In addition to the main airfield in the Port Stanley area, there were many backup landing sites on other islands, most of which were ordinary fields or meadows. In addition, there was intelligence information about the presence of a radar station on the island.
“No one knew how big the threat posed to our ships or to the troops who were supposed to land in the Bay of San Carlos on East Falkland, the airfield on Pebble Island. But when it was suggested that there was a radar on the island, the danger of this place became, of course, very serious. Admiral Woodward believed that the radar could detect the main forces of the British fleet while they’ll be out of range of the radar on the mainland or East Falkland, while the airfield was only a few minutes away, even for piston attack aircraft, from the planned landing site of the main landing forces, ”writes Peter Ratcliffe, a direct participant in the operation “Preliminaries” in the book “Eye of the storm. Twenty-five years of service at SAS. ”
The British commanders and the IA-58 “Pukar” light attack aircraft and T-34 C “turbo mentor” training aircraft, which, as British intelligence suggested, could be stationed at Pebble island, were worried about. Of course, the Pukars, and there were five or six of them on Pebble Island, could not withstand the British "harriers" in air combat, but they had enough weaponry to carry out powerful strikes on the airborne troops: bombs, NAR, napalm containers, two 20-mm guns and four 7,62-mm machine guns. Yes, and "turbo mentors" also represented a good "counterguise machine." Four Pebble-based vehicles had a range of at least 1200 km and could carry NAR LAU-6 / 68 units for 70-mm NAR and two 7,62-mm machine guns. Therefore, the aircraft needed to be destroyed, and the airfield - to disable.
It was decided to entrust this task to the company “D” of the 22 S regiment. The forces assigned to Operation Prelim included the aircraft carrier Hermes, the aircraft carrier escort ship — the frigate of the Brodsward URO of the same type, and also the fire support ship of the special forces group — the destroyer of the Glamorgan-type URO. To coordinate artillery support, special forces were given to Captain Christopher Charles Brown from the 148 artillery battery of the 29 artillery regiment of the commando.
It is noteworthy that, as recognized by the British themselves, a raid on the airfield on Pebble Island was a risky event, and for several reasons at once. First, most of the transport helicopters of the British group in the South Atlantic were involved in the operation. Secondly, in fact, a third of all British special forces, located in the Falklands area, took part in the raid. Thirdly, a member of the forces assigned to the operation was assigned a senior naval artillery fire control officer and one of only five forward observers to adjust the naval artillery fire at that time "throughout the South Atlantic". Finally, fourthly, among the combat ships assigned to the operational group there was also a “diamond in the crown” of the operational formation of the British fleet directed to the Falkland Islands, the aircraft carrier Hermes. The ship had to enter the coastal zone, where there was a high probability of its attack by Argentine planes and, which the British admirals were especially afraid of, by the Argentine navy submarines.
Pebble Island
Pebble Island (Pebble Island - English geographic name) is part of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas - for Argentines) islands and lies just north of West Falkland Island - one of the two main islands of this South Atlantic archipelago. The first permanent residents appeared on the island in 1846 year. Its main attraction was a large sheep farm. "World famous" the island became, by and large, only during the Falklands war 1982 of the year. At first - May 15 - it became the venue for one of the classic operations of the British SAS. And on May 25, in 10 miles to the north of it, the destroyer of the Coventry-type anti-missile system Sheffield was sunk. On that day, the Argentinean "skyhawks" with two bombs sent to the bottom of the not served and for ten years the ship worth 37,9 million pounds.
Pebble Island is a small, only 103,36 square. km: in the direction from west to east, it stretches for about 30 km, and in its widest part it has just 7 km. First Mountain’s highest point on the island is 277 meters above sea level, there are also two other dominant heights on the island - Middle Mountain, 214 meters above sea level, and Marble Mountain, 237 meters above sea level. In the east, the Pebbles from the West Falkland are separated by the Tamar and Inner Straits, and in the south by the Pebble and Keppel Straits. The shape of the island - two large parts, as if connected by a narrow isthmus. On the latter there is actually the only settlement on the island, called Pebble Island Settlement - literally “Pebble Island Settlement”. As of April 1982, the 22 resident lived there.
Argentines call this settlement Calderon, and next to it they built an airfield from a dirt runway. More precisely, the airfield was there before the occupation of the island by Argentine troops, the latter simply expanded its capabilities and built defensive positions. There were a total of four serviceable runways with a length of 533,4 meters, 381 meters and two 228,6 meters. The western part of the island is hilly, and the eastern part is replete with swamps and small lakes. To the north of the settlement and the isthmus there is a large Elephant Bay, on the coast of which stretches the largest “white sandy beach” of the same name on the islands, about 5 km. The latter was chosen by the Argentines for the landing of troops and the delivery of weapons, ammunition and equipment for the expansion of the airfield.
Prepare
Initially, a reconnaissance group landed on Pebble Island, on which it was supposed to base a group of Argentine planes and helicopters. On the night from 11 to 12 in May, a reconnaissance group from Company D, commander of the group Captain Timothy William Burles, was landed on Keppel Island, south of the eastern tip of Pebble Island. The next day, the group with the help of “special forces” kayaks overcame a small strait and found themselves in the area of the object of interest.
It should be noted that the size of the group of Captain Burles in different sources is given in different ways. For example, in the book by Francis McKay and John Cooksey “Pebble Island: Operation Prelim” indicates that the group included 17 fighters, whereas in Peter Ratcliff’s book “The Eye of a Storm. Twenty-five years of service in the SAS "author, a direct participant in the event (was part of the Mobility Troop group), indicates that the group of captain Burles was 8 people - two combat groups of four fighters. The fighters of the group were part of the so-called “boat group”, Boat Troop, company D of the 22 SAS regiment and were specialists specially trained in maritime affairs, the main way of disembarking ashore is by water. Why fighters undergo advanced training on the use of diving equipment and various watercraft - such as Klepper kayaks.
The group managed to organize several observation points, including in the immediate vicinity of the airfield. During the observation, British special forces reconnoitered the objects of the airfield, and also determined the coordinates of the defensive positions of the Argentine garrison. Moreover, during the reconnaissance of the Philips Cove district, the British discovered that a sufficiently large “pond” located at some distance from the coastline was not marked on their maps. In the case of the planned special operations, this could be a very unpleasant surprise, since it was on this beach that the SAS squadron was planned to land.
On the night of 13 on 14 in May, reconnaissance group commander Captain Burles radioed to headquarters: “Eleven, I repeat, eleven aircraft. I consider it real (that is, not layouts. - Note of the author). Attack company - the next night.
After receiving the 14 radiogram in May, the entire operation was developed in detail within literally an hour. The future general and commander of the special operations forces of Great Britain, and then the commander of the 22 regiment of SAS and the head of the operations of all special operations forces during the Falklands war Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Michael Rose, the commander of the S company “D” major Cedric Norman George Delves, and a representative of the command in Hereford, where the headquarters of the special aviation service was located, quickly discussed the details of the operation and approved the proposed plan. After that, Michael Rose began to organize the necessary support from the fleet.
The main task was to destroy the enemy aircraft, as well as pilots and guards on the airfield. At the same time, it was believed that the Argentine garrison was more numerous than the attackers at least twice. Naturally, the admirals after the terrible lesson of "Sheffield" did not seek to once again bring their ships close to the islands, putting them at risk. Therefore, helicopters assigned to disembark and evacuate reconnaissance and sabotage groups, had to operate almost at the limit of their range.
The plan was originally developed as follows:
- the first group, the Mobility Troop, was to directly destroy the aircraft, fuel tanks, equipment of the airfield, as well as the vehicles and other equipment there;
- The second group, Air Troop, was supposed to take control of the village;
- the third group, Mountain Troop (commander - captain John Hamilton, who died 10 on June 1982 of the year, during a special operation on West Falkland Island - he was only 29 years old), made up a support and rapid response team, included one mortar crew;
- Major Delves and Captain Brown, a ship artillery spotting officer, were to be located at a point between the village and the eastern end of the airfield, maintaining contact with all the special forces, headquarters and fire support ship, the destroyer of the Glamorgan URO.
The second group, Air Troop, was given the commander of the landing from the British fleet, Lieutenant Commander Roger Edwards, who had previously been in these places and was well versed in the terrain. From Edwards's memoirs: “I was here in 1973, arrived on the Endurance patrol boat, and traveled a lot with my wife, a native of the Falkland Islands. In particular, they visited Pebble Island and other islands in the north, where my wife’s family farm was. I helped SAS with the terrain assessment. According to intelligence data, the island was 300 – 400 Argentine military. It turned out that SAS will be less than ten to one in number. ” In fact, of course, there were fewer Argentines - only 144 people, including marines, pilots and support staff.
Special Forces officers were to disembark with the help of special Sea King’s HC4 helicopters from the 846 squadron reconfigured to support the actions of the special operations forces. Each such helicopter could take on board 27 fighters and deliver them over a distance of about 150 miles (about 240 km). And in the spetsnaz version the crew of the helicopter included two pilots, and not one, as usual. This made it possible to more effectively solve problems during the landing / evacuation of the reconnaissance group, as well as in flight at ultra-low altitudes and at night.
As a result, for the operation "Prelim" identified three helicopters that were to deliver to the island 42 special forces, Major Delves, Captain Brown and Lieutenant Commander Edwards, with a personal weapons, one 81-mm mortar L16 (weight 40 kg) and more than 30 plastic containers with mortar mines - two mines in each container, one high-explosive fragmentation, the other - with white phosphorus filling. The weight of the container - 8 kg, each member of the special forces carried one such container. Special Forces officers were sent on mission with the following weapons: 5,56-mm automatic M16 rifle (some with the 40-mm M203 submachine-gun grenade launcher) or 7,62-mm machine gun, 9-mm Browning-High Power pistol, one 66-mm manual grenade-guns XMXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX-XXXX hand grenades, explosive charges, three spare magazines for the M72 and numerous machine gun belts. The latter were all special forces, not just machine gunners, - for 16 – 200 cartridges per person. All had individual first-aid kits.
Operation begins
The first phase of the active part of the Prelim operation began on the 20 00 hours of 14 May minutes. The destroyer URO "Glamorgan" left the operative connection order and headed for Pebble Island. Half an hour later, the aircraft carrier Hermes and the frigate ERO Brodswold followed. The destroyer armed with the Sea Dart air defense system played the role of an anti-aircraft defense ship, and a frigate armed with the near-range air defense system Sy-Wolfe played the role of an anti-submarine patrol ship and a near-air defense ship. The British were lucky - by that time the Argentines did not have a single Neptune combat aircraft used for long-distance reconnaissance. The maneuver of the three ships went unnoticed.
Then the situation became complicated. Due to the stormy weather and a number of technical breakdowns (for example, the Broadsworth crew had to throw off the course in order to repair the failed Sea Wolk air defense missile system, and one of the Sea King helicopters failed, they had to prepare the replacement urgently) arrive at the designated point. Argentine radars, located on East Falkland Island, found a group of three ships separated from the main forces. Lieutenant Marege was sent a radiogram of relevant content.
The commanders of Hermes and Glamorgan did not accurately calculate the time they would need to occupy the assigned positions. As a result, the ships had to take positions at an “accelerated pace”, but they did not manage to properly prepare helicopters for departure. All this ultimately led to a delay in the start of the operation by an hour and a half, bringing the departure time closely to dawn. The plan of operation had to be corrected. Now its goal was only the destruction of enemy aircraft. “The Argentine garrison didn’t even know how lucky they were and how dangerous they escaped,” Ken Connor wrote in his memoirs. The Air Troop group, which originally had to attack the settlement, now had to take a position between the airfield and the village and, if necessary, repel the attacks of the Argentine marines. ”
As a result, in 2 hours 00 minutes 15 in May, the aircraft carrier Hermes slowed down, and after 25 minutes, three helicopters headed for the island. After that, the aircraft carrier and the frigate retreated, and Glamorgan took up a position in 6 miles north-west of the airfield in readiness to open artillery fire on reconnoitered targets and positions of the enemy. The helicopter pilots who landed the special forces were at an extremely low altitude. Moreover, the helicopters were not equipped with radar stations following the terrain. Pilots helped new night vision goggles. The strike team landed in 3 hours of 50 minutes about five miles from the destination, in the Philips Cove area, and later joined up with the island’s reconnaissance group. The fighters of the latter picked up and equipped the position for the 81-mm mortar, with which it was planned to “highlight” the area with lighting mines, and then - to provide fire support. In addition, the fire support of the reconnaissance group during the operation was provided by the destroyer URO "Glamorgan". Exactly at 4 hours 00 minutes, Captain Brown received from the destroyer radio that the ship was in position and ready to provide artillery support. The helicopters, taking the special forces to the island, returned to the Hermes for refueling and were ready to take off for the evacuation of the detachment.
Aircraft destroyed
After connecting with the group of Captain Burles, the detachment moved to the goal of the operation. The first was Captain Burles, who played the role of "guide", along with him - Major Delves and Captain Brown, then - mortar crew, the Air Troop group, the fighters of the Captain Burles group, the Mountain Troop group and, finally, the Mobility Troop group.
6 hours 10 minutes - the squad reached the position where they had to install an 81-mm mortar. The mortar crew was ready to open fire in 6 hours 15 minutes. A bit later, Air Troop and Mountain Troop took their positions, but the third group ... was lost. She left the landing zone last, and she did not have enough "guide". In the end, in the dark, she deviated from the course. However, this did not affect the course of the operation. The Mountain Troop group was a backup, so it changed positions and began preparing for a new task.
On the destroyer URO "Glamorgan" command was beginning to get nervous. In order not to fall under a possible bombardment from the coast or an attack by Argentine aviation, the ship needed to leave the occupied position maximum with the first rays of the sun - no later than 7 hours 30 minutes. This was reported from the ship to Major Delves and Captain Brown, who replied that the groups had not yet taken up positions to attack. At the same time, the ship was radioed that first of all it would be necessary to “hang up” lighting shells over the ZJ5007 target — that is, the location of the supposedly located positions of the Argentine marines, and not to hit high-explosive fragmentation shells at the observation post on First Mountain Top (ZJ5004 target), as planned initially
Captain Brown requested the radio from the “Glamorgan” at 7 hours 19 minutes on a walkie-talkie - after three minutes, lighting shells burst out of the island, flying out of the destroyer’s gun barrel at intervals of 15. At the very first shells, British special forces clearly discerned that there were 11 airplanes on the airfield: four “turbo mentors” from the 4 th assault squadron of the Argentine Navy (A-401, A-408, A-411 and A-412), six "Pukar "(A-502, A-520, A-523, A-526, A-529 and A-552) from the 3 th assault squadron of the Argentine Air Forces that were relocated from the Gus Green airfield as part of the operation to disperse aviation forces , and one Skyvan from Coast Guard aviation (RA-50, arrived on Pebble Island on April 30).
Corporal Armstrong and Captain Hamilton engaged in "Pukar", setting them plastic explosives. Airplanes "turbo mentor" also undermined the charges of plastic explosives. Two charges were put on each car: one under the left stabilizer, the second under the engine, in the niche of the nose landing gear.
Interesting is the description of one of the plots given in the book by Francis MacKay and John Kuksi “Pebble Island: Operation Prelim” and relating to the actions of Argentines: “A corporal and two marines moved to the airfield, climbed the slope and saw a picture - numerous dark figures were rapidly rushing between airplanes, stopping for a moment just to give a turn or throw a grenade. The marines quietly moved to the fire station, were noticed by two sentries (the latter were at the fire station and didn’t take any action from the beginning of the attack. - Approx. Ed.), Who let them in. All quickly fell on the floor, because bullets were whistling around.
Within a few minutes, the light from the burning aircraft became brighter than from the lighting mines - a man-made day arrived. Soon, all 11 aircraft were destroyed, as well as fuel barrels and ammunition boxes. The enemy made a "shy" attempt to resist, but at the very first shots Major Delves asked the Glamorgan radio to open fire with high-explosive fragmentation shells at the ZJ5007 target, and to highlight its mortar gunners.
"Combat assault"
Losses among the British "commandos" were minimal - three wounded:
- Corporal Davie from the Mountain Troop group got a shard of 40-mm grenades in the leg (he was immediately tied up by a colleague - Staff Sergeant Philip Karras, a medical orderly on the combat schedule);
- Corporal Armstrong wounded by shrapnel from a radio-controlled mine that exploded too closely - Commander of the Argentine garrison, Lieutenant Marega, who arrived on the scene and failed to organize repulse with his demoralized subordinates, ordered an explosion of self-destructing self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, to blow up the prepared self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, to blow up the prepared self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the bomb, ordered the detonation to blow up the prepared self-destruction charges, and Corporal Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destructing charges, and Corporal Armstrong, fought back the blast of self-destruction, and ordered Armstrong. “Pukaru”, A-523, turned out to be “at the wrong time in the wrong place.” British historians suggest that Lieutenant Marega could have imagined that the British were capturing the airfield and military transport aircraft with the main landing forces would land on it at dawn, which, by the way, destroyed Skyvenn;
- Finally, with the explosion of Argentinean mines, Corporal Bunker (Corporal Bunker) received a concussion, and he was unlucky for the second time, since he received his first wound during an operation in South Georgia, when he was in a fallen Wessex helicopter.
Anyway, the problem was solved. The detachment began to retreat to the evacuation zone, and the Hermes was reported on the full completion of the operation and helicopters were called.
From the memoirs of Captain Christopher Charles Brown: “We destroyed all the planes, began to retreat, while the planes exploded and burned. The enemy did not attempt to counterattack from the village or to take control of the airfield. If we had more time, we would try to eliminate them, but there was a real danger of damaging the property of local residents or even killing some of the settlers. But in reality, we simply did not have time, so a signal was given for retreat, because we decided to set the task. The destruction of these aircraft eliminated the threat of a future landing operation. We retreated to a safe place, were picked up by Sea King helicopters and delivered to Hermes for breakfast. ”
According to British sources, in 7 hours 45 minutes the destroyer “Glamorgan” sent the last projectile to the target. The last volleys the gunners "put", putting a wall of fire between the retreating special forces and the village, where the Argentine garrison. Commander Ian Inskip from the crew of the EM URO Glamorgan recalled later in this connection: “We needed to leave the firing position - the danger grew the more, the longer we were here. However, Captain Barrow (commander of the destroyer. - Comm. Aut.) Decided that we are here to support SAS, and therefore we stayed in position. " Finally, the ship left the coastal waters at full speed - and so it lingered there 15 minutes longer than planned. At that time, the special forces were already boarding four "Sea King", who picked them up 2 miles (about 3,5 km) from the airfield.
From the memoirs of Peter Ratcliff: “Two and a half hours after the first shot, we were again on board the Sea King and headed back to the sea. Behind us on the runway lay the remains of six Pukar, a Short Skyven light transport aircraft and four Mentor training aircraft. The ship's artillery processed all the other positions of the enemy, but so effectively that it seemed as if the whole Pebble Island was on fire. It must have been hotter here than it has been for several million years. ”
In general, the raid on Pebble Island was included in the collection of classic operations of the British Special Aviation Service. Along with those who were subordinated to David Stirling during World War II, who created SAS in 1941 during the year and commanded the "long-range group in the desert" during an operation against Italian troops in North Africa. The mission was carried out with delicate precision, and as a result, the risk for the entire British group was significantly reduced before the landing operation in San Carlos Bay. It remains to add that one of the broken attack aircraft “Pukar”, A-529, was taken out after the war to Port Stanley, where it is exhibited in the local museum. And one of the "turbo mentors", sir. Number 0729, was literally saved from "parsing for souvenirs" by local boys and transferred to the Aviation Museum of the British Navy in Yeovilton.
Operation Prelim (Operation Prelim, which can be translated from English as the “Entrance Exam”) was part of a larger Operation Sutton. It was planned by the British command to conduct an amphibious operation in the area of San Carlos and Ajax Bays and a town called Port of San Carlos on the west coast of East Falkland from 16 to 25 in May 1982.Operation Prelim was the first since the Second World War, the combat operation of British special forces with the task of attacking the enemy’s airfield and the first large-scale operation of a special aviation service, after an operation in Omani Jebel Akbar in 1956.
The idea of Operation Prelim belongs to the commander of an aircraft carrier group led by the Hermes aircraft carrier (317.8 task force), Rear Admiral John Forster Sandy Woodward. The commander of the operation was the Commodore Michael Clapp, the commander of the amphibious forces of the 317 OS (317.0 Task Force), and the brigadier Julian Thompson, the commander of the Royal Commandant of the Royal Marine Corps of the United Kingdom. The plan of operation was approved directly by the commander of 3's operational compound, Admiral Sir John David Eliot Fieldhouse, and SAS director and brigadier Peter de la Bille.
The main objective of Operation Prelim was the destruction of enemy aircraft deployed at a small aerodrome created by Argentines on Pebble Island. More to the point, an advanced operational base was created on the island as part of an airfield, a small fortified point and a marines garrison. It consisted of units of the 3 Battalion of the Marine Corps named after Ilizar Videla, numbering about 100 men, armed with large-caliber machine guns and 75-mm recoilless guns.
The Argentine base wore the designation “Elephant naval aviation base” or also “Calderon” air base (Estacion Aero Calderon) or it was called “Calderon naval aviation base” according to the Argentine variant of the name of the village on Pebble island - Puerto Calderon. Often, the designation “La Payanca” (La Payanca) was used in the call signs, and the command of the Argentine marines designated the base as “the airfield of naval aviation of Bourbon Island”. Bourbon Island is the Argentinean version of the name of the island in honor of the famous Bourbon dynasty, which should not be confused with the same name used - Bourbon Island - in relation to the island of Reunion.
Aviation Hunt
In the book "Ghost troops: secret story SAS, published in 1998, former SAS soldier Ken Connor pointed out that the most important task of the SAS reconnaissance and sabotage groups in the Falkland Islands was to closely monitor any movements of Argentine planes and helicopters. “One of the reasons for this was that the Argentinean command largely based its defensive strategy on the use of large reserves of troops and military equipment concentrated in the Port Stanley area. Quickly the same personnel to the most threatened areas should have been helicopters, including those of the Chinook type. Such a tactic, in the opinion of the Argentine military command, was to ensure the successful and effective repulse of any enemy attacks and the disruption of its airborne and amphibious assault operations.
However, the Argentinean command understood that to concentrate the main forces of aviation on one aerodrome is to subject them to a very real and deadly threat. One massive enemy air raid and active resistance of the garrisons on the Falkland Islands would be impossible. As a result, every night, Argentine helicopters and, if possible, airplanes were scattered around Port Stanley in order to reduce the possibility of their detection and destruction. Temporary locations were kept in the strictest secrecy and changed every day.
One of the reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the company “G” of the special aviation service monitored the movement of helicopters in the areas west of Port Stanley, making many kilometers of throws. Twice British scouts managed to find temporary bases for Argentine helicopters. They called their aircraft, but in both cases, the British expected failure - the Argentines had time to relocate helicopters. And only the third time the British waited for luck - the helicopters were discovered and subjected to air strikes. As a result, four Argentine dragonflies, including two Chinooks, were destroyed. This caused a very significant damage to the grouping of Argentine troops: the mobile reserve was actually left without its “horses”.
However, the British command was interested not only in helicopters. On the eve of the landing operation in the Gulf of San Carlos, on the agenda was the question of the need to neutralize the strike aircraft of the enemy stationed at the nearest airfields. In addition to the main airfield in the Port Stanley area, there were many backup landing sites on other islands, most of which were ordinary fields or meadows. In addition, there was intelligence information about the presence of a radar station on the island.
“No one knew how big the threat posed to our ships or to the troops who were supposed to land in the Bay of San Carlos on East Falkland, the airfield on Pebble Island. But when it was suggested that there was a radar on the island, the danger of this place became, of course, very serious. Admiral Woodward believed that the radar could detect the main forces of the British fleet while they’ll be out of range of the radar on the mainland or East Falkland, while the airfield was only a few minutes away, even for piston attack aircraft, from the planned landing site of the main landing forces, ”writes Peter Ratcliffe, a direct participant in the operation “Preliminaries” in the book “Eye of the storm. Twenty-five years of service at SAS. ”
The British commanders and the IA-58 “Pukar” light attack aircraft and T-34 C “turbo mentor” training aircraft, which, as British intelligence suggested, could be stationed at Pebble island, were worried about. Of course, the Pukars, and there were five or six of them on Pebble Island, could not withstand the British "harriers" in air combat, but they had enough weaponry to carry out powerful strikes on the airborne troops: bombs, NAR, napalm containers, two 20-mm guns and four 7,62-mm machine guns. Yes, and "turbo mentors" also represented a good "counterguise machine." Four Pebble-based vehicles had a range of at least 1200 km and could carry NAR LAU-6 / 68 units for 70-mm NAR and two 7,62-mm machine guns. Therefore, the aircraft needed to be destroyed, and the airfield - to disable.
It was decided to entrust this task to the company “D” of the 22 S regiment. The forces assigned to Operation Prelim included the aircraft carrier Hermes, the aircraft carrier escort ship — the frigate of the Brodsward URO of the same type, and also the fire support ship of the special forces group — the destroyer of the Glamorgan-type URO. To coordinate artillery support, special forces were given to Captain Christopher Charles Brown from the 148 artillery battery of the 29 artillery regiment of the commando.
It is noteworthy that, as recognized by the British themselves, a raid on the airfield on Pebble Island was a risky event, and for several reasons at once. First, most of the transport helicopters of the British group in the South Atlantic were involved in the operation. Secondly, in fact, a third of all British special forces, located in the Falklands area, took part in the raid. Thirdly, a member of the forces assigned to the operation was assigned a senior naval artillery fire control officer and one of only five forward observers to adjust the naval artillery fire at that time "throughout the South Atlantic". Finally, fourthly, among the combat ships assigned to the operational group there was also a “diamond in the crown” of the operational formation of the British fleet directed to the Falkland Islands, the aircraft carrier Hermes. The ship had to enter the coastal zone, where there was a high probability of its attack by Argentine planes and, which the British admirals were especially afraid of, by the Argentine navy submarines.Pebble Island
Pebble Island (Pebble Island - English geographic name) is part of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas - for Argentines) islands and lies just north of West Falkland Island - one of the two main islands of this South Atlantic archipelago. The first permanent residents appeared on the island in 1846 year. Its main attraction was a large sheep farm. "World famous" the island became, by and large, only during the Falklands war 1982 of the year. At first - May 15 - it became the venue for one of the classic operations of the British SAS. And on May 25, in 10 miles to the north of it, the destroyer of the Coventry-type anti-missile system Sheffield was sunk. On that day, the Argentinean "skyhawks" with two bombs sent to the bottom of the not served and for ten years the ship worth 37,9 million pounds.
Pebble Island is a small, only 103,36 square. km: in the direction from west to east, it stretches for about 30 km, and in its widest part it has just 7 km. First Mountain’s highest point on the island is 277 meters above sea level, there are also two other dominant heights on the island - Middle Mountain, 214 meters above sea level, and Marble Mountain, 237 meters above sea level. In the east, the Pebbles from the West Falkland are separated by the Tamar and Inner Straits, and in the south by the Pebble and Keppel Straits. The shape of the island - two large parts, as if connected by a narrow isthmus. On the latter there is actually the only settlement on the island, called Pebble Island Settlement - literally “Pebble Island Settlement”. As of April 1982, the 22 resident lived there.
Argentines call this settlement Calderon, and next to it they built an airfield from a dirt runway. More precisely, the airfield was there before the occupation of the island by Argentine troops, the latter simply expanded its capabilities and built defensive positions. There were a total of four serviceable runways with a length of 533,4 meters, 381 meters and two 228,6 meters. The western part of the island is hilly, and the eastern part is replete with swamps and small lakes. To the north of the settlement and the isthmus there is a large Elephant Bay, on the coast of which stretches the largest “white sandy beach” of the same name on the islands, about 5 km. The latter was chosen by the Argentines for the landing of troops and the delivery of weapons, ammunition and equipment for the expansion of the airfield.
Prepare
Initially, a reconnaissance group landed on Pebble Island, on which it was supposed to base a group of Argentine planes and helicopters. On the night from 11 to 12 in May, a reconnaissance group from Company D, commander of the group Captain Timothy William Burles, was landed on Keppel Island, south of the eastern tip of Pebble Island. The next day, the group with the help of “special forces” kayaks overcame a small strait and found themselves in the area of the object of interest.
It should be noted that the size of the group of Captain Burles in different sources is given in different ways. For example, in the book by Francis McKay and John Cooksey “Pebble Island: Operation Prelim” indicates that the group included 17 fighters, whereas in Peter Ratcliff’s book “The Eye of a Storm. Twenty-five years of service in the SAS "author, a direct participant in the event (was part of the Mobility Troop group), indicates that the group of captain Burles was 8 people - two combat groups of four fighters. The fighters of the group were part of the so-called “boat group”, Boat Troop, company D of the 22 SAS regiment and were specialists specially trained in maritime affairs, the main way of disembarking ashore is by water. Why fighters undergo advanced training on the use of diving equipment and various watercraft - such as Klepper kayaks.
The group managed to organize several observation points, including in the immediate vicinity of the airfield. During the observation, British special forces reconnoitered the objects of the airfield, and also determined the coordinates of the defensive positions of the Argentine garrison. Moreover, during the reconnaissance of the Philips Cove district, the British discovered that a sufficiently large “pond” located at some distance from the coastline was not marked on their maps. In the case of the planned special operations, this could be a very unpleasant surprise, since it was on this beach that the SAS squadron was planned to land.
On the night of 13 on 14 in May, reconnaissance group commander Captain Burles radioed to headquarters: “Eleven, I repeat, eleven aircraft. I consider it real (that is, not layouts. - Note of the author). Attack company - the next night.
After receiving the 14 radiogram in May, the entire operation was developed in detail within literally an hour. The future general and commander of the special operations forces of Great Britain, and then the commander of the 22 regiment of SAS and the head of the operations of all special operations forces during the Falklands war Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Michael Rose, the commander of the S company “D” major Cedric Norman George Delves, and a representative of the command in Hereford, where the headquarters of the special aviation service was located, quickly discussed the details of the operation and approved the proposed plan. After that, Michael Rose began to organize the necessary support from the fleet.
The main task was to destroy the enemy aircraft, as well as pilots and guards on the airfield. At the same time, it was believed that the Argentine garrison was more numerous than the attackers at least twice. Naturally, the admirals after the terrible lesson of "Sheffield" did not seek to once again bring their ships close to the islands, putting them at risk. Therefore, helicopters assigned to disembark and evacuate reconnaissance and sabotage groups, had to operate almost at the limit of their range.
The plan was originally developed as follows:
- the first group, the Mobility Troop, was to directly destroy the aircraft, fuel tanks, equipment of the airfield, as well as the vehicles and other equipment there;
- The second group, Air Troop, was supposed to take control of the village;
- the third group, Mountain Troop (commander - captain John Hamilton, who died 10 on June 1982 of the year, during a special operation on West Falkland Island - he was only 29 years old), made up a support and rapid response team, included one mortar crew;
- Major Delves and Captain Brown, a ship artillery spotting officer, were to be located at a point between the village and the eastern end of the airfield, maintaining contact with all the special forces, headquarters and fire support ship, the destroyer of the Glamorgan URO.
The second group, Air Troop, was given the commander of the landing from the British fleet, Lieutenant Commander Roger Edwards, who had previously been in these places and was well versed in the terrain. From Edwards's memoirs: “I was here in 1973, arrived on the Endurance patrol boat, and traveled a lot with my wife, a native of the Falkland Islands. In particular, they visited Pebble Island and other islands in the north, where my wife’s family farm was. I helped SAS with the terrain assessment. According to intelligence data, the island was 300 – 400 Argentine military. It turned out that SAS will be less than ten to one in number. ” In fact, of course, there were fewer Argentines - only 144 people, including marines, pilots and support staff.
Special Forces officers were to disembark with the help of special Sea King’s HC4 helicopters from the 846 squadron reconfigured to support the actions of the special operations forces. Each such helicopter could take on board 27 fighters and deliver them over a distance of about 150 miles (about 240 km). And in the spetsnaz version the crew of the helicopter included two pilots, and not one, as usual. This made it possible to more effectively solve problems during the landing / evacuation of the reconnaissance group, as well as in flight at ultra-low altitudes and at night.
As a result, for the operation "Prelim" identified three helicopters that were to deliver to the island 42 special forces, Major Delves, Captain Brown and Lieutenant Commander Edwards, with a personal weapons, one 81-mm mortar L16 (weight 40 kg) and more than 30 plastic containers with mortar mines - two mines in each container, one high-explosive fragmentation, the other - with white phosphorus filling. The weight of the container - 8 kg, each member of the special forces carried one such container. Special Forces officers were sent on mission with the following weapons: 5,56-mm automatic M16 rifle (some with the 40-mm M203 submachine-gun grenade launcher) or 7,62-mm machine gun, 9-mm Browning-High Power pistol, one 66-mm manual grenade-guns XMXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX-XXXX hand grenades, explosive charges, three spare magazines for the M72 and numerous machine gun belts. The latter were all special forces, not just machine gunners, - for 16 – 200 cartridges per person. All had individual first-aid kits.Operation begins
The first phase of the active part of the Prelim operation began on the 20 00 hours of 14 May minutes. The destroyer URO "Glamorgan" left the operative connection order and headed for Pebble Island. Half an hour later, the aircraft carrier Hermes and the frigate ERO Brodswold followed. The destroyer armed with the Sea Dart air defense system played the role of an anti-aircraft defense ship, and a frigate armed with the near-range air defense system Sy-Wolfe played the role of an anti-submarine patrol ship and a near-air defense ship. The British were lucky - by that time the Argentines did not have a single Neptune combat aircraft used for long-distance reconnaissance. The maneuver of the three ships went unnoticed.
Then the situation became complicated. Due to the stormy weather and a number of technical breakdowns (for example, the Broadsworth crew had to throw off the course in order to repair the failed Sea Wolk air defense missile system, and one of the Sea King helicopters failed, they had to prepare the replacement urgently) arrive at the designated point. Argentine radars, located on East Falkland Island, found a group of three ships separated from the main forces. Lieutenant Marege was sent a radiogram of relevant content.
The commanders of Hermes and Glamorgan did not accurately calculate the time they would need to occupy the assigned positions. As a result, the ships had to take positions at an “accelerated pace”, but they did not manage to properly prepare helicopters for departure. All this ultimately led to a delay in the start of the operation by an hour and a half, bringing the departure time closely to dawn. The plan of operation had to be corrected. Now its goal was only the destruction of enemy aircraft. “The Argentine garrison didn’t even know how lucky they were and how dangerous they escaped,” Ken Connor wrote in his memoirs. The Air Troop group, which originally had to attack the settlement, now had to take a position between the airfield and the village and, if necessary, repel the attacks of the Argentine marines. ”
As a result, in 2 hours 00 minutes 15 in May, the aircraft carrier Hermes slowed down, and after 25 minutes, three helicopters headed for the island. After that, the aircraft carrier and the frigate retreated, and Glamorgan took up a position in 6 miles north-west of the airfield in readiness to open artillery fire on reconnoitered targets and positions of the enemy. The helicopter pilots who landed the special forces were at an extremely low altitude. Moreover, the helicopters were not equipped with radar stations following the terrain. Pilots helped new night vision goggles. The strike team landed in 3 hours of 50 minutes about five miles from the destination, in the Philips Cove area, and later joined up with the island’s reconnaissance group. The fighters of the latter picked up and equipped the position for the 81-mm mortar, with which it was planned to “highlight” the area with lighting mines, and then - to provide fire support. In addition, the fire support of the reconnaissance group during the operation was provided by the destroyer URO "Glamorgan". Exactly at 4 hours 00 minutes, Captain Brown received from the destroyer radio that the ship was in position and ready to provide artillery support. The helicopters, taking the special forces to the island, returned to the Hermes for refueling and were ready to take off for the evacuation of the detachment.
Aircraft destroyed
After connecting with the group of Captain Burles, the detachment moved to the goal of the operation. The first was Captain Burles, who played the role of "guide", along with him - Major Delves and Captain Brown, then - mortar crew, the Air Troop group, the fighters of the Captain Burles group, the Mountain Troop group and, finally, the Mobility Troop group.
6 hours 10 minutes - the squad reached the position where they had to install an 81-mm mortar. The mortar crew was ready to open fire in 6 hours 15 minutes. A bit later, Air Troop and Mountain Troop took their positions, but the third group ... was lost. She left the landing zone last, and she did not have enough "guide". In the end, in the dark, she deviated from the course. However, this did not affect the course of the operation. The Mountain Troop group was a backup, so it changed positions and began preparing for a new task.
On the destroyer URO "Glamorgan" command was beginning to get nervous. In order not to fall under a possible bombardment from the coast or an attack by Argentine aviation, the ship needed to leave the occupied position maximum with the first rays of the sun - no later than 7 hours 30 minutes. This was reported from the ship to Major Delves and Captain Brown, who replied that the groups had not yet taken up positions to attack. At the same time, the ship was radioed that first of all it would be necessary to “hang up” lighting shells over the ZJ5007 target — that is, the location of the supposedly located positions of the Argentine marines, and not to hit high-explosive fragmentation shells at the observation post on First Mountain Top (ZJ5004 target), as planned initially
Captain Brown requested the radio from the “Glamorgan” at 7 hours 19 minutes on a walkie-talkie - after three minutes, lighting shells burst out of the island, flying out of the destroyer’s gun barrel at intervals of 15. At the very first shells, British special forces clearly discerned that there were 11 airplanes on the airfield: four “turbo mentors” from the 4 th assault squadron of the Argentine Navy (A-401, A-408, A-411 and A-412), six "Pukar "(A-502, A-520, A-523, A-526, A-529 and A-552) from the 3 th assault squadron of the Argentine Air Forces that were relocated from the Gus Green airfield as part of the operation to disperse aviation forces , and one Skyvan from Coast Guard aviation (RA-50, arrived on Pebble Island on April 30).
Corporal Armstrong and Captain Hamilton engaged in "Pukar", setting them plastic explosives. Airplanes "turbo mentor" also undermined the charges of plastic explosives. Two charges were put on each car: one under the left stabilizer, the second under the engine, in the niche of the nose landing gear.
Interesting is the description of one of the plots given in the book by Francis MacKay and John Kuksi “Pebble Island: Operation Prelim” and relating to the actions of Argentines: “A corporal and two marines moved to the airfield, climbed the slope and saw a picture - numerous dark figures were rapidly rushing between airplanes, stopping for a moment just to give a turn or throw a grenade. The marines quietly moved to the fire station, were noticed by two sentries (the latter were at the fire station and didn’t take any action from the beginning of the attack. - Approx. Ed.), Who let them in. All quickly fell on the floor, because bullets were whistling around.
Within a few minutes, the light from the burning aircraft became brighter than from the lighting mines - a man-made day arrived. Soon, all 11 aircraft were destroyed, as well as fuel barrels and ammunition boxes. The enemy made a "shy" attempt to resist, but at the very first shots Major Delves asked the Glamorgan radio to open fire with high-explosive fragmentation shells at the ZJ5007 target, and to highlight its mortar gunners."Combat assault"
Losses among the British "commandos" were minimal - three wounded:
- Corporal Davie from the Mountain Troop group got a shard of 40-mm grenades in the leg (he was immediately tied up by a colleague - Staff Sergeant Philip Karras, a medical orderly on the combat schedule);
- Corporal Armstrong wounded by shrapnel from a radio-controlled mine that exploded too closely - Commander of the Argentine garrison, Lieutenant Marega, who arrived on the scene and failed to organize repulse with his demoralized subordinates, ordered an explosion of self-destructing self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, to blow up the prepared self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, to blow up the prepared self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the bomb, ordered the detonation to blow up the prepared self-destruction charges, and Corporal Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destruction charges, and Armstrong, who installed the blast, detonated self-destructing charges, and Corporal Armstrong, fought back the blast of self-destruction, and ordered Armstrong. “Pukaru”, A-523, turned out to be “at the wrong time in the wrong place.” British historians suggest that Lieutenant Marega could have imagined that the British were capturing the airfield and military transport aircraft with the main landing forces would land on it at dawn, which, by the way, destroyed Skyvenn;
- Finally, with the explosion of Argentinean mines, Corporal Bunker (Corporal Bunker) received a concussion, and he was unlucky for the second time, since he received his first wound during an operation in South Georgia, when he was in a fallen Wessex helicopter.
Anyway, the problem was solved. The detachment began to retreat to the evacuation zone, and the Hermes was reported on the full completion of the operation and helicopters were called.
From the memoirs of Captain Christopher Charles Brown: “We destroyed all the planes, began to retreat, while the planes exploded and burned. The enemy did not attempt to counterattack from the village or to take control of the airfield. If we had more time, we would try to eliminate them, but there was a real danger of damaging the property of local residents or even killing some of the settlers. But in reality, we simply did not have time, so a signal was given for retreat, because we decided to set the task. The destruction of these aircraft eliminated the threat of a future landing operation. We retreated to a safe place, were picked up by Sea King helicopters and delivered to Hermes for breakfast. ”
According to British sources, in 7 hours 45 minutes the destroyer “Glamorgan” sent the last projectile to the target. The last volleys the gunners "put", putting a wall of fire between the retreating special forces and the village, where the Argentine garrison. Commander Ian Inskip from the crew of the EM URO Glamorgan recalled later in this connection: “We needed to leave the firing position - the danger grew the more, the longer we were here. However, Captain Barrow (commander of the destroyer. - Comm. Aut.) Decided that we are here to support SAS, and therefore we stayed in position. " Finally, the ship left the coastal waters at full speed - and so it lingered there 15 minutes longer than planned. At that time, the special forces were already boarding four "Sea King", who picked them up 2 miles (about 3,5 km) from the airfield.
From the memoirs of Peter Ratcliff: “Two and a half hours after the first shot, we were again on board the Sea King and headed back to the sea. Behind us on the runway lay the remains of six Pukar, a Short Skyven light transport aircraft and four Mentor training aircraft. The ship's artillery processed all the other positions of the enemy, but so effectively that it seemed as if the whole Pebble Island was on fire. It must have been hotter here than it has been for several million years. ”
In general, the raid on Pebble Island was included in the collection of classic operations of the British Special Aviation Service. Along with those who were subordinated to David Stirling during World War II, who created SAS in 1941 during the year and commanded the "long-range group in the desert" during an operation against Italian troops in North Africa. The mission was carried out with delicate precision, and as a result, the risk for the entire British group was significantly reduced before the landing operation in San Carlos Bay. It remains to add that one of the broken attack aircraft “Pukar”, A-529, was taken out after the war to Port Stanley, where it is exhibited in the local museum. And one of the "turbo mentors", sir. Number 0729, was literally saved from "parsing for souvenirs" by local boys and transferred to the Aviation Museum of the British Navy in Yeovilton.
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