Formidable tandem
It was the third year of the terrible war, and both sides were preparing for one of the key battles of the Second World War - the Battle of Kursk. Opponents prepared and searched for means capable of securing victory and crushing the enemy.
For the operation, the Germans concentrated a grouping of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 battalions of assault guns, totaling, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people.
German troops received a certain amount of new equipment:
134 tank Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" (14 more - commander tanks)
190 Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" (11 also - evacuation and command)
90 assault guns Sd.Kfz. 184 Ferdinand. (There is an opinion that the indicated figures are underestimated).
The German command pinned high hopes on this new armored equipment and, without reason, tanks “Tiger” and “Panther”, self-propelled guns “Ferdinand”, despite the abundance of childhood diseases, were outstanding vehicles. Don't forget about 102 Pz.II, 809 Pz.III and 913 Pz.IV, 455 StuG III and 68 StuH (42-44% of all assault guns on the Eastern Front) plus ACS Marder III, Hummel, Nashorn, Wespe, Grille. Tanks Pz.III and Pz.IV were seriously upgraded.
For the sake of new arrivals of armored vehicles, the beginning of the “Citadel” was repeatedly postponed - the qualitative superiority of German tanks and self-propelled guns was the cornerstone on which the fateful plans for Germany were built. And for this there were all reasons - the German designers and industry have done everything possible.
The Soviet side was preparing for the battle. Intelligence played a major role in the upcoming battle, and 12 of April on the table of I. V. Stalin laid down the exact text translated from the German directive No. 6 “On the plan of Operation Citadel of the German High Command, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by A. Hitler who signed it only three days later. This allowed us to accurately predict the strength and direction of German strikes on the Kursk Bulge.
It was decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy's troops and defeat them, conducting counterattacks at the critical moment against the attackers. To this end, defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. In total, 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1500 anti-tank and 1700 anti-personnel mines for each kilometer of the front. But there was one more weapon, who made a huge contribution to the victory of the Soviet troops and turned the IL-2 into a real legend of that war.
Asymmetric response
By the 3rd year of the war, German and Soviet tankers are accustomed to the relatively low efficiency of bombing attacks aviation.
Destroying German tanks with the help of Ilov at the beginning of the war was quite problematic. First, the effectiveness of 20-mm ShVAK guns against tank armor was low (23-millimeter, and then 37-millimeter aircraft cannons appeared on Ilah only in the second half of the Great Patriotic War).
Secondly, in order to destroy a tank by a bomb, it was necessary to have truly devilish luck. The crew was not a navigator, providing aiming, and the pilot's bomber sight was ineffective. IL-2 could attack either from low altitudes, or from a very flat dive, and the long nose of the plane elementally blocked the target from the pilot.
And thirdly, rockets - an analogue of those that the Katyushas fired, were not at all as good as Soviet military leaders used to tell. Even with a direct hit, the tank did not always break down, but for a missile to hit a separate target, again, that same devilish luck was required.
But in the middle of 1942, well-known developer of fuses, Larionov I.A., proposed the design of a light anti-tank aerial bomb of cumulative action. The command of the Air Force and personally I.V. Stalin showed interest in the implementation of the proposal. TsKB-22 quickly carried out design work, and tests of the new bomb began at the end of 1942.
The action of the anti-tank bomb was as follows: when hitting the tank's armor, a fuse triggered, which, through the tetrile detonator bomb, detonated the main charge of the explosive. The main charge had a funnel-shaped notch - a cumulative notch - on the bottom side vertically. Due to the presence of a funnel, a cumulative jet with a diameter of 1-3 mm and a speed of 12-15 km / s was formed at the moment of detonation. At the site of the impact of the jet with the armor, there was pressure up to 105 MPa (1000 atm). To enhance the impact, a metal thin cone was inserted into the cumulative funnel.
Melting at the time of the explosion, the metal served as a ram, increasing the impact on armor. The cumulative jet burned through armor (therefore, the first cumulative projectiles were called armored), hitting the crew, causing an explosion of ammunition, igniting the fuel. The manpower of the air bomb struck manpower and vulnerable equipment. The maximum armor piercing effect is achieved under the condition that at the time of the explosion the charge of the bomb is at a certain distance from the armor, which is called focal. The explosion of the cumulative charge at the focal length was ensured by the appropriate dimensions of the nose of the bomb.
Tests of cumulative air bombs were conducted from December 1942 to 21 on April 1943. Field tests showed that the penetration of armor up to 60 mm in thickness was reliably ensured at the meeting angle 30 °. The minimum height that provided the bomb alignment before meeting the tank's armor and the reliability of its operation was equal to 70 m. The final version was PTAB-2,5-1,5, i.e. anti-tank aerial bomb of cumulative action of mass 1,5 kg in dimensions 2,5-kg of aerial bomb. The State short-term bonds quickly decided to adopt PTAB-2,5-1,5 and organize its mass production. The People's Commissar for Ammunition Vannikov B.L. It was entrusted to manufacture 15 1943 X thousand. PTAB-800-2,5 aerial bombs with a ground fuse ADA for 1,5 in May. The order was carried out by more than 150 enterprises of various people's commissariats and departments.
That tandem PTAB-2,5-1,5 plus IL-2 was to become a real thunderstorm of armored vehicles.
It should be noted that only thanks to I.V. Stalin, the PTAB was adopted for service. Stalin in this case, proved himself as an outstanding military-technical specialist, and not only as a "satrap".
Application on the Kursk Bulge
And in the morning of July 5, the 1943 of the year began the German offensive.
Supreme Commander Stalin I.V. to achieve the effect of tactical surprise, it categorically forbade the use of the PTAB bombs until special permission was obtained. Their existence was kept in strict confidence. But as soon as the tank battles on the Kursk Bulge began, the bombs were used in massive quantities.
The first PTAB pilots used the 2 th guards and the 299 th assault aviation divisions of the 16 th BA 5 in July 1943, in the area of Art. Malokharhangelsk-Yasnaya Polyana tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy conducted 10 attacks throughout the day, being subjected to bomb strikes using PTAB.
According to other data, for the first time new cumulative bombs PTAB-2,5-1,5 were used by pilots of the 61-th cap of the 291-th shade in the early morning of July 5. In the area of Butovo "ilam" Art. Lieutenant Dobkevich was suddenly able to hit an enemy convoy for the enemy. Decreasing after leaving the attack, the crews clearly saw a lot of burning tanks and cars. On departure from the goal, the group also strayed from the stalking "Messerschmitts", one of whom was shot down in the area of Sukho-Solotino, and the pilot was captured. The command of the compound decided to develop the emerging success: after the attack aircraft of the 61-th cap, a group of 241-th and 617-th regiments attacked, which did not allow the enemy to turn into battle formation. According to the reports of the pilots, they managed to destroy enemy tanks before 15.
The massive use of PTAB had the effect of tactical surprise and had a strong moral impact on the crews of enemy armored vehicles (besides the technology itself). In the first days of the battle, the Germans did not use dispersed marching and pre-battle formations, that is, on movement routes in columns, in concentration areas and in initial positions, for which they were punished - the PTAB expansion zone blocked the 2-3 tank remote from each other At a distance of 70-75 m and the efficiency was amazing (up to 6-8 tanks with 1-go). As a result, the losses reached significant sizes even in the absence of massive use of IL-2.
291 pilots Shad Colonel Vitruk A.N. 2-WA, using PTAB, destroyed and disabled during July 5 to German tanks 30. The 3 th and 9 th attack aircraft of the 17 VA air corps reported a defeat to the 90 units of the enemy’s armored vehicles on the battlefield and in the area of crossings across the r. North Donets.
On the Oboyan direction 7 July, the Il-2 1 th-th 2-VA attack aircraft, supporting the 3-th Mechanical Corps of the 1-TA, in the period from 4.40 to 6.40 in the morning by two groups of 46 and 33 aircraft, supported by 66 fighters, and clusters of tanks in the area of Syrtsevo-Yakovlevo, concentrated to attack in the direction of Red Dubrava (300-500 tanks) and Big Beacons (100 tanks). The strikes were crowned with success, the enemy was unable to break through the 2 th defense line of the 1 TA. The decryption of photographs of the battlefield on 13.15 showed the presence of more than 200 padded tanks and SPGs.
Probably the largest target that came under attack by the Soviet attack aircraft from 291 Shad was a column of tanks and vehicles (at least 400 units of equipment), which July 7 was moving along the Tomarovka - Cherkassky road. First eight IL-2 art. Lieutenant Baranov from a height of 200 - 300 and with two hits she dropped about 1600 anti-tank bombs, and then the attack was repeated by the other eight Il-2, slave ml. Lieutenant Golubev. On departure, our crews observed up to 20 burning tanks.
Recalling the events of July 7, S.I. Chernyshev, in those days, the commander of the 183 division, which was part of the second echelon of the Voronezh Front, noted: “A column of tanks, headed by Tigers, slowly moved in our direction, firing cannons. Projectiles with a howl swept through the air. My heart became anxious: there were already a lot of tanks. Involuntarily there was a question: do we hold the line? But our planes appeared in the air. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. On a low-level flight, attack aircraft quickly rushed to the attack. Immediately caught fire five head tanks. Aircraft continued to go again and again on the target. The entire field in front of us was covered with black smoke. For the first time at such a close distance I had to observe the remarkable skill of our pilots. ”
The command of the Voronezh Front gave a positive assessment of the use of the PTAB. In his evening report to Stalin, General Vatutin noted: “Eight sludge bombed enemy tank clusters using new bombs. The bombing efficiency is good: the enemy’s 12 tanks immediately caught fire. ”
The same positive assessment of cumulative bombs is noted in the documents of the 2 Air Army, which show: “The flight personnel of attack aircraft, accustomed to operating on tanks with previously known bombs, enthusiastically respond to PTABs, each departure of attackers with PTABs is highly effective, and the enemy lost several destroyed and burned tanks.
According to the 2 VA military readings, during 7 July, the 291 shad alone was dropped on the enemy vehicles by 10 272 PTAB, and a day later 9727 of such bombs. They began to use anti-tank bombs and aviators 1-th shack, which, unlike their colleagues, inflicted strikes with large groups numbering 40 and more attack aircraft. According to the ground troops report, July 7 80 “silt” of V.G. Ryazanov to the Yakovlevo-Syrtsevo area helped repel the attack of four enemy enemy tank divisions, who were trying to develop an offensive against Red Dubrovka, the Big Mayachki.
It is necessary, however, to note that after a few days the German tankers switched exclusively to dispersed marching and combat formations. Naturally, this greatly complicated the management of tank units and subunits, increased the time they were deployed, concentrated and redeployed, and complicated the combat interaction. The effectiveness of IL-2 strikes using PTAB decreased by about 4-4,5 times, remaining on average 2-3 times higher than when using high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation bombs.
In total, more than 500 thousand anti-tank bombs were spent in the operations of the Russian aviation on the Kursk Bulge ...
PTAB effectiveness
Enemy tanks continued to remain the main objective of the IL-2 throughout the defensive operation. Not surprisingly, on July 8, the headquarters of the 2 Air Army decided to test the effectiveness of the new cumulative bombs. The inspection was carried out by army staff officers who monitored the actions of the Il-2 unit from the 617 cap, led by the regimental commander, Major Lomovtsev. As a result of the first attack, the six attack aircraft from a height of 800 -600 m dropped PTABs to a cluster of German tanks, during the second an RSV volley was made, followed by a descent to 200 - 150m and shelling of the target with machine-gun and cannon fire. In total, our officers noted four powerful explosions and, prior to 15, burned enemy tanks.
The bomb-charging of the Il-2 attack aircraft consisted of up to 192 PTAB in 4-x cassettes for small bombs or up to 220 in bulk in 4-bomb compartments. When PTAB was dropped from an altitude of 200 m at a flight speed of 340-360 km / h, one bomb hit an average area of 15 sq. . This was enough to ensure the defeat (mostly irrevocably) of any Wehrmacht tank that had the misfortune of being in a strip of ruptures, since the area occupied by one tank is 15-190 sq.m.
With a kilogram weight of 2,5, the PTAB cumulative bomb punched in 70 mm armor. For comparison: the thickness of the roof "Tiger" - 28 mm, "Panther" - 16 mm.
A large number of bombs dropped from each attack aircraft almost simultaneously made it possible to most effectively hit armored targets at fuel filling sites, at the initial lines of attack, at ferries, while moving in columns, in general in places of concentration.
According to German data, having been subjected to several massive assault strikes in one day, the 3-I SS Panzer Division “Dead Head” in the area of Big Beacons lost a total of 270 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers. The density of PTAB was such that more than 2000 direct hits of PTAB-2,5-1,5 were recorded.
A German tanker lieutenant captured showed during interrogation: “On July 6 at 5 hours of the morning in the Belgorod area, our group of tanks — there were at least a hundred — were attacked by Russian attack aircraft. The effect of their actions was unprecedented. During the very first attack, one group of attack aircraft shot down and burned 20 tanks. At the same time, another group attacked the motorized rifle battalion, which was resting on vehicles. Small-caliber bombs and shells rained down on our heads. 90 vehicles were burned and 120 people killed. For all the time of the war on the Eastern Front, I have not seen such a result of the actions of Russian aviation. There are not enough words to express all the power of this raid. ”
According to German statistics, in the Battle of Kursk about 80 percent of the T-VI “Tiger” tanks were hit by cumulative shells, such as artillery or bombs. The same goes for the Panther T-V tank. The bulk of the "Panther" failed due to fires, and not from artillery fire. On the very first day of the battles, according to various sources, burned from 128 to 160 "Panthers" from 240 (according to other data, about 440 units were concentrated). Five days later, the Germans left only the 41 Panther in the ranks.
German tank Pz.V "Panther", destroyed by attack aircraft in 10 km from Butovo. The entry of PTAB caused the detonation of ammunition. Belgorod Direction, July 1943
A study of the effectiveness of PTAB in tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed by our attack aircraft and abandoned by the enemy during its retreat shows that as a result of a direct hit to the tank (self-propelled gun), the latter is destroyed or incapacitated. Hitting a bomb in a tower or hull causes the tank to ignite or an explosion of its ammunition, leading, as a rule, to the complete destruction of the tank. At the same time PTAB-2,5-1,5 with the same success destroys light and heavy tanks.
True, it is necessary to note one significant nuance: the main problem of defeat by cumulative ammunition was the fire in the tank that occurred after penetration of armor. But if this fire arose right on the battlefield, then the surviving crew members had no choice but to jump out of the tank and get away, otherwise our infantry would kill them. But if this fire arose after the air raid on the march or in its rear, then the surviving tankers were obliged to extinguish the fire, in case of fire the mechanic had to close the blinds of the power compartment, and the entire crew jumped out, shut the hatches and fill with foam of the fire extinguishers of the gap, that could get air into the tank. The fire went out. And in the “Panthers” in the power section there was an automatic fire extinguishing system, which, when the temperature rose above 120 °, filled the carburetors and fuel pumps with foam — places from which gasoline could flow out.
But the tank after such a fire needed repair of the engine and electrical wiring, but its chassis was intact and the tank could be easily towed to the collection sites of damaged equipment, the good thing is that in the Battle of Kursk the Germans created special engineering units for this purpose, moving behind the tank units collected and repaired padded equipment. Therefore, strictly speaking, the tanks lined with PTABs, our troops as trophies should have been taken in exceptional cases, such as the case in the First Drones.
For example, a special commission that examined military equipment in the region north of the 1 Ponyri and the height of 238,1 found that “out of 44 tanks killed and destroyed [by Soviet aviation] only five were victims of bombers (the result of a direct hit by FAB-100 or FAB-250) the rest are attack aircraft. On examination of the enemy’s tanks and assault guns, it was possible to determine that PTAB inflicted damage to the tank, after which it could not be restored. As a result of the fire, all the equipment is destroyed, the armor gets fired and loses its protective properties, and the explosion of ammunition completes the destruction of the tank ... "
There, on the battlefield in the Ponyri area, the German Ferdinand self-propelled gun destroyed by the PTAB was discovered. The bomb hit the left gas tank armor cover, burned 20-mm armor, destroyed the gas tank with a blast wave and ignited the gasoline. The fire destroyed all the equipment and exploded the ammunition.
The high effectiveness of the action of PTAB on armored vehicles received a completely unexpected confirmation. In the offensive zone of the 380 th brigade of the Bryansk Front in the area of the village of Podmaslovo, our tank company accidentally came under the blow of its attack aircraft Il-2. As a result, one T-34 tank from a direct hit by PTAB was completely destroyed: it turned out to be broken "into several parts." The special commission that worked on the spot recorded "around the tank ... seven funnels, as well as ... counter plugs from PTAB-2,5-1,5.
In general, the combat experience of the use of the PTAB showed that, on average, tank losses of up to 15% of the total number that were hit were achieved in cases where for every 10 — 20 tanks there was a detachment of forces around 3 — 5 of Il-2 groups (six machines in each group), which acted one after the other or two at a time.
Well, if we talk about efficiency, it is necessary to note the low cost and ease of production of PTAB itself, compared to the complexity and cost of its armored vehicles. The price of one tank Pz.Kpfw V "Panther" without weapons was 117 thousand Reichsmarks, PzIII cost 96 163, and "Tiger" -250 800 brands. I couldn’t find the exact cost of PTAB-2,5-1,5, but it cost ten times cheaper than the shells of the same weight. And we need to remember that, Guderian taught that a tactical novelty should be applied en masse, and this was done with the PTAB.
Unfortunately, the PTAB itself and in the use of the PTAB had disadvantages that reduce its effectiveness.
Thus, the PTAB fuse turned out to be very sensitive and worked when it hit the peaks and branches of trees and other light obstacles. At the same time, the armored vehicles standing beneath them were not surprised by what the German tankers actually began to use later, placing their tanks in dense forest or under sheds. As early as August, the use of the enemy to protect his tanks with the usual metal mesh stretched over the tank began to be noted in documents of parts and connections. When it entered the grid, PTAB was undermined, and a cumulative jet was formed at a great distance from the armor, without causing any damage to it.
The flaws in the small bombs of the Il-2 aircraft were flawed: there were cases of hanging the PTAB in the compartments and then dropping them off during landing and an explosion under the fuselage, which led to serious consequences. In addition, when loading bombs into each 78 cassette, according to the instruction manual, “the ends of the wings facing the tail of the aircraft sag from uneven positioning of cargo on them ... with a bad airfield ... separate bombs can fall out.”
Adopted laying bombs horizontally, forward stabilizer led to the fact that up to 20% bombs did not explode. Cases of airborne bombs, premature explosions due to stabilizer deformations, non-coagulation of windmills and other design defects have been reported. There were also tactical shortcomings, also "reducing the effectiveness of aircraft when operating on tanks."
The detachment of the forces of the airplanes with the PTAB for the strike against the concentration of tanks established by the reconnaissance was not always sufficient to reliably hit the target. This led to the need for repeated blows. But by this time the tanks had time to disperse - “hence a large expenditure of funds with minimal efficiency.”
Conclusion
That was the debut of the formidable tandem, it was not by chance that after the first days of the fighting, the German command ordered the Luftwaffe to concentrate all their efforts on the destruction of our attack aircraft, not paying attention to other targets. If we assume that the German tank forces were the main striking force of the Wehrmacht, it turns out that the contribution of attack aircraft to the victory on the Kursk Bulge is hard to overestimate.
And around this period of the war, the IL-2 got its nickname - "Schwarzer Tod (Black Death)".
But the real "high point" for Soviet aviation, including the IL-2, came during the operation "Bagration", when the aircraft worked with almost impunity.
In general, recalling the famous dialogue “Unfortunately, we seem to teach you how to fight! “And we will disaccustom you!”, It can be stated that our grandfathers turned out to be good students and first learned how to fight, and then wean the Germans to fight, I would like to hope that forever.
http://www.veche.tver.ru
http://krieg.wallst.ru
http://ptab1943.narod.ru/
http://www.duel.ru/200642/?42_5_1
http://810-shap.org/
http://mil-history.livejournal.com/468573.html
http://dr-guillotin.livejournal.com/82649.html
http://vadimvswar.narod.ru/ALL_OUT/TiVOut0809/FlAPz/FlAPz045.htm
http://vn-parabellum.narod.ru/article/kursk_art_critics.htm
Information