The conversation, as the Secretary General noted, referred to “the priorities that the Belarusian side is ready to announce for implementation during its presidency of the CSTO”. And he noted that “the attitude of the Belarusian leadership is very good, constructive.” Moreover, specific proposals were put forward not only by the head of state Alexander Lukashenko, but also by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus Sergei Martynov, Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus Leonid Maltsev, Minister of Defense of the Republic Lieutenant General Yuri Zhadobin, with whom Bordyuzha also met during his visit to the Belarusian capital.
Bordyuzha recalled during a conversation with Lukashenka that when Belarus chaired the CSTO in 2006, “quite a lot was done, a very serious impetus was given to the organization’s development,” adding: “Then many initiatives were launched that are implemented today, including in terms of the creation of collective rapid-response forces, the formation of peacekeeping potential ".
Alexander Lukashenko himself said that the Belarusian side will work actively during its upcoming CSTO chairmanship, despite today's relations with the main partner in the organization, the Russian Federation. The President of the Republic of Belarus once again confirmed: “We have been and will be for the Russian people a reliable bulwark, support, outpost, as is customary to say in Russia”. According to the Belarusian leader, speaking in favor of giving the CSTO greater dynamism in functioning, Minsk does not intend to work “coolly”: “We are very concerned about how this period of Belarus’s chairmanship will be assessed. We will do everything to ensure that the assessment was the best. ”
Belarusian initiatives to improve the organization were ready in June 2009-th. Lukashenko, intending to take over the chairmanship of the CSTO, intended to voice them at the same time at a meeting of the Collective Security Council and begin to promote it. Alas, because of the Russian-Belarusian “milk war” that broke out at that time, this did not happen. Alexander G. pointedly did not come to the CSTO summit in Moscow. In addition, by the time of the "milk problems" a series of other "food wars" had already passed between the two countries against the background of the gas and oil conflicts that had not stopped for several years. The scandal with the non-participation of the Belarusian side in the summit of the “union of seven” (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) tried to suppress the colleagues of the President of the Republic of Belarus, but Minsk nevertheless didn’t remind of its proposals.
Meanwhile, then they were reduced to the following principal aspects:
- isolating the most important problems, the solution of which would largely determine the future appearance of the CSTO;
- improvement of the current activities of the organization in the context of the global economic crisis, which has a negative impact on the security of the G7 states;
- elaboration of decisions on a number of political issues, in particular, on the events in the Caucasus (Georgian-South Ossetian “five-day war” with the participation of Russia) and the situation in Afghanistan (where NATO forces could not stop the Taliban’s terrorist activities, curb the increase in drug production, improve the socio-economic situation in this country);
- the response of the CSTO members to the West’s rejection of Moscow’s initiative to conclude a legally binding European Security Treaty;
- development of cooperation with other international organizations;
- implementation of decisions on the formation and equipping of the Collective Operational Response Forces (CRRF) of the CSTO;
- the progress of the implementation of the program of joint measures to create an information security system.
At the same time, the Belarusian Security Council intended to raise the issue of equipping the armies of the CSTO member states with modern weapons. There are also a lot of problems here (which requires a separate analysis, outside the scope of this article).
From the standpoint of the present day, it is seen that some Belarusian proposals are already outdated in some ways, others need to be adjusted and supplemented to reflect the newly emerged realities. But we must assume that by December (and even earlier) Minsk will present an updated plan for improving the work of the "seven".
In this context, it should also be noted that, according to the chairman of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus Vladimir Andreichenko, “all the 26 agreements signed by Belarus within the CSTO have passed all domestic procedures and entered into or are ready to take effect.” I remember that because of the “milk battle” Minsk slowed down its participation in the RRF, but soon this “snag” was overcome.
DABS NOT "STOP IN CONFLICTS"
Presumably, the Belarusian leadership will once again think over and present to the CSTO ways of intensifying work on the creation of a global legally binding global security system. It was literally two days after the meeting in Minsk with Alexander Lukashenko that Nikolay Bordyuzha spoke at length at a roundtable meeting held by the Association of Foreign Correspondents in cooperation with the National Information Center of the Russian Federation.
Increasing efforts in this area is necessary. For it is obvious that conflicts such as the attack of Georgia on South Ossetia (August 2008) or civil strife in Kyrgyzstan, not only undermine peace and stability in certain regions, but rather visibly exacerbate the known threats faced by many countries. In the area of responsibility of the CSTO, this is manifested quite often and visibly.
For example, as soon as they flared up in the Kyrgyz Republic, the attention to this country of extremist groups in Afghanistan immediately increased. Calculation - the south of Kyrgyzstan is quite possible to use as a springboard for the deployment of operations of radical Islamist movements. At the same time, inter-ethnic clashes in Osh almost provoked the aggravation of relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (also a member of the CSTO). Fortunately, it cost.
It is obvious that the Kyrgyz events echoed in Tajikistan, where local militants immediately got out of their cracks. Although in this case the matter would seem to be internal, but is this not a cause for concern in the CSTO? Moreover, according to Nikolai Bordyuzhi, as soon as the situation destabilizes somewhere, “new players appear who use the situation to achieve their political goals, including using such methods as terrorism and extremism”.
At the meeting in Minsk, the CSTO Secretary General and Alexander Lukashenko noted: today there is no global security system in the world, except perhaps fragments of it. Therefore, there are no other options than to create this comprehensive system, to reach a legally binding agreement, including with the participation of international organizations. Belarus, perhaps, will raise the question of developing relevant proposals in the CSTO, which will interest not only partners in the “union of seven”. For, as Bordyuzha put it at the “round table”, “otherwise we will flounder in conflicts all the time, these conflicts will lead to opposition of groups of states and the situation will only get worse”.
At the same time, the events in Kyrgyzstan showed that the Collective Security Treaty Organization did not respond promptly to the events in Bishkek and other cities of its member state. At that time, Alexander Lukashenko claimed: if the CSTO continues to keep silent, do not pay attention to the fact that blood is shed in one of the countries of the organization, a coup d'état takes place, the Union’s further activities will be unpromising.
At the same time, the President of the Republic of Belarus noted that the views of problems within the G-7 completely coincide only with Russia and Belarus, “while other CSTO member states have their own positions, views and points of view”. Based on this statement, it can be assumed that Minsk, during its chairmanship in the organization, will offer options for overcoming a number of significant disagreements in the union.
By the way, the aforementioned demarche of Minsk not only did not go unnoticed, but also found a certain understanding, which was clearly shown by the August informal CSTO summit held in Yerevan. Nikolay Bordyuzha, obviously, taking into account the criticism of Minsk, admitted: “During the events in Kyrgyzstan, it turned out that some mechanisms either stalled or didn’t produce results sufficiently quickly”. In this regard, the Secretary General noted that the improvement of the CSTO is aimed at ensuring that within the organization it is possible to take preventive measures on the “undesirable development of a crisis situation, which can lead to destabilization of the situation both in the state and in the whole region ".
But, as some experts believe, future changes in the statutory documents of the CSTO should concern not only increasing the effectiveness of the organization in crisis situations arising in a particular country that is part of the “union of seven”. The positions of the CSTO must also be strengthened in the event that, say, the troops of the international coalition led by NATO leave Afghanistan, all the more so that hints on this subject come from various European capitals and from Washington. At the same time, the objectives of the anti-Taliban operation declared in 2001 are unlikely to be achieved. And here it’s important to ask the question: Should the CSTO in the Central Asian region not conduct a certain reorientation of its Collective Rapid Deployment Forces? For the possible withdrawal of the army units of the North Atlantic Alliance and its partners could create a situation in Afghanistan that would require an immediate and appropriate response by the CSTO ...
REQUIRED MODERN WEAPONS
The concern in the CSTO executive committee over whether Lukashenka will take over the chairmanship in the organization or not is thought to be in vain. Despite all the accusations addressed to Moscow and the “union of seven” that sounded in Minsk in the last year or two, there, however, they always stressed that the CSTO is an organization “very necessary and useful” and “the role of the CSTO is special to increase the defense capability of the states participants and countering modern threats. ” Obviously, such postulates are also laid in the new edition of the Concept of National Security being developed in Belarus today (of course, in a more specific form).
And Lukashenka, who “has gone a bit hasty” last year, is unlikely to slam the door again, no matter what “intrigues” against him have been thought up in Moscow. For militarily, the CSTO is very useful to Belarus. This is mainly due to the fact that, within its framework - albeit so far not shaky or shaky - the delivery of weapons that meets modern requirements is carried out. And at the domestic prices. The Belarusian army, equipped with models of military equipment, created before the collapse of the USSR, must be re-equipped in the same way as the Russian.
In Minsk, they do not hide the fact that they are interested in acquiring from Russia primarily the Triumph C-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, Iskander operational tactical missile systems, Su-30 fighters and Su-34 front-line bombers, Yak-130 combat training aircraft and upgraded long-body aircraft IL-76, as well as attack helicopters Mi-28H "Night Hunter". These aspirations of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus are managed by the Belarusian leadership in a certain way to “promote” through the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Thus, Secretary General Bordyuzha recently remarked: "The more modern weapons are supplied to Belarus, the better for Russia, since Russia and Belarus have created a unified air defense system and a unified regional 200-thousandth group of land forces designed to protect both countries."
Of course, Russia, despite all the current political and economic differences with Belarus, is interested in ensuring that its western borders are reliably protected. The fact that they are thoroughly covered today is hardly in doubt in the Russian Ministry of Defense. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that on September 21 in Russia, the Moscow Military District was disbanded by presidential decree, including the direction of the Belarusian direction. As is known, the Moscow Military District united with the Leningrad Military District in the new Western Military District with headquarters in St. Petersburg, which also speaks about something.
At least it is clear that within the framework of a single air defense, the Belarusian and Russian military should work on the most modern equipment. And hardly ever in military partnership with the republic, which is of a strategic nature, Moscow will “fall” to some petty conflicts - dairy, sugar and other of the same kind. In any case, the Russian-Belarusian large-scale “West-2009” exercises that took place in the autumn of 2009, which became unprecedented over the years of the post-Soviet space in terms of the number of military personnel involved in them, weapons and military equipment, showed that Moscow and Minsk are at the highest level of cooperation in military sphere.
Therefore, it seems that Russia will start supplying, say, the same C-400 to Belarus not in ten years, as some experts say, but much earlier. According to the "military-industrial complex", the program of re-equipment of the Belarusian army also includes the Iskander OTRK. It is possible that he will be available to Belarusian rocket engineers after the 2015 year.