Do we need helicopter carriers?
I continue my reflections on the role and place of rotorcraft in the Russian Navy, begun in the article "Helicopters for the Russian Navy". Today we will talk about helicopter carriers of a special construction.
The need to create a helicopter carrier, like any other class of military equipment, is determined by the tasks facing the armed forces of the country in general and its naval fleet in particular. Undoubtedly, the task of combating enemy submarines is of key and priority nature for our fleet. The thing is that the Russian fleet has a strategic nuclear weapons and must, if necessary, ensure its application. And one of the most terrible threats to our SSBNs are the multi-purpose nuclear and non-nuclear submarines of the United States and NATO. They need to be able to identify them in peacetime, and even in wartime - to destroy them without any pity.
Of course, the Russian Navy does not have strategic missile carriers in the Black and Baltic Seas. However, non-nuclear submarines of NATO countries can threaten our ships there, and such a threat should not be ignored. Consequently, anti-submarine warfare is relevant for all four domestic fleets. But what is the role of helicopters in countering submarines?
Against the underwater threat
In a previous article, I pointed out three fundamental drawbacks of PLO helicopters - their combat radius, search performance and payload are several times (and in the case of a combat radius, by an order of magnitude) inferior to aircraft of a similar purpose. The conclusion is obvious - it is advisable to use PLO helicopters either as a means of enhancing the anti-submarine capabilities of combat surface ships, or where PLO aircraft cannot operate for some reason, or their use is irrational. So, for example, if the frigate’s hydroacoustic complex recorded contact with an enemy submarine, which was immediately interrupted, then in order to restore it, it would be much more reasonable to raise a helicopter based on the frigate than to call and wait for a patrol aircraft aviation.
Consequently, in the fight against submarines, very important, but still secondary tasks are assigned to helicopters. And this means that the construction of specialized anti-submarine helicopter carriers clearly contradicts this logic and, in essence, is an attempt to make the helicopter the main means of anti-submarine warfare. How justified is this?
Obviously, an anti-submarine helicopter carrier makes sense if it is able to provide round-the-clock patrols for its rotorcraft "passengers". But how many helicopters should be on its deck for this? The regime in which aircraft make two sorties a day is considered very stressful. This does not mean, of course, that a helicopter cannot make three sorties or more per day; such “spurts” are possible for a short time. But long-term operation of equipment in such a mode is akin to trying to run a marathon distance at a sprint speed.
Suppose we have helicopters capable of patrolling at some distance from the ship (say, 100–150 km) for two hours. This is a very good indicator for an anti-submarine helicopter. Therefore, making two sorties a day, one helicopter will be able to provide 4 hours of patrol. But there are 24 hours in a day, and accordingly, to ensure the round-the-clock presence of a helicopter in the air, we will need six helicopters. However, for a full-fledged patrol, one helicopter is too little - due to the relatively modest payload, they should work in pairs. One carries out the search, the second - the defeat of the target. And this means that in order to ensure round-the-clock hunting for submarines, a helicopter carrier must have an air group of 12 helicopters.
But even such an air group will not be enough for a PLO helicopter carrier. After all, the detachment of forces calculated above will ensure round-the-clock duty of 2 helicopters somewhere 150–200 kilometers from the ship, and who will deal with its own ASW?
You need to understand that the task of searching for enemy submarines in a large area, which we impute to a helicopter carrier, and the task of anti-submarine defense of the helicopter carrier itself are two different tasks that an air group of 12 helicopters simply cannot solve simultaneously. In order to control the sea in the immediate vicinity of a helicopter carrier, say, within a radius of 35–50 km, at least one more helicopter is needed around the clock. In total, if we want to have a helicopter carrier capable of controlling significant water areas and at the same time providing our own anti-aircraft defense, then we need a ship for 18 helicopters. More precisely - even by 20, because, in addition to anti-submarine, it is necessary to have a couple of rescuers.
To some, my numbers may seem far-fetched, but there are facts that can hardly be ignored. The air group of the first domestic anti-submarine cruisers "Moscow" and "Leningrad" included 12 PLO helicopters (another Ka-25TsU and one Ka-25PS were attached to them), but this was not enough. Therefore, the ships of the next project 1143 in the anti-submarine version were supposed to carry up to 20 PLO helicopters. And it would not be a mistake to assume that it was precisely this number that was required to provide the PLO of the formation led by the TAVKR, and to organize "free hunting" at a considerable distance from such a formation.
Size matters!
Obviously, a helicopter carrier capable of intensively operating an air group of two dozen rotorcraft cannot, by definition, be small. Let me remind you that the domestic anti-submarine cruisers of the Condor, Moscow and Leningrad types had 12 tons of standard displacement.
At the same time, their air group consisted of only 14 rotorcraft, which weighed half the weight of a modern helicopter of a similar purpose. Yes, and the language does not turn out to be successful “heliports”: a large superstructure created fair air turbulences over the flight deck, seaworthiness and conditions for the crew were also far from desirable.
These shortcomings, apparently, are deprived of the modern Japanese helicopter carrier Hyuga.
The ship is capable of carrying 11 helicopters, but has a much more impressive standard displacement - 14 tons. But we need not 000, but 11, and even add defensive weapons, and provide for an installation for launching "Caliber" in the anti-submarine version ... Here it is already worth talking more about 20-18 thousand tons of standard displacement.
And such a ship will indeed be self-sufficient in terms of PLO, but ...
Patrol plane or helicopter carrier?
Two helicopter patrols (one of two machines, the second one single), which a helicopter carrier with an air group of 18 rotorcraft is able to constantly support in the air, would fly 500 km per hour (each 250 km), and per day - 12 km. A detachment of 000–4 aircraft of the type of our Il-5N, providing round-the-clock patrolling of one aircraft in the air at a cruising speed of 38 km / h, will cover a little less in the same time - 460 km. It seems that helicopters have a small gain, but it is imaginary, because one patrol will have to constantly “turn circles” around the helicopter carrier in order to ensure its safety.
Thus, one patrol will be involved in "tight control of a small area", which, of course, reduces the size of the surveyed area. At the same time, more modern than our Il-38N, the American Poseidons with their speed of 800 km / h during the round-the-clock patrol will already cover 19 km and will have a tangible advantage over the helicopter carrier air group.
This also adds the advantage of mobility. Let's compare the capabilities of an anti-submarine helicopter carrier with patrol aircraft somewhere in the Black Sea. It must be said that it is quite wide - from the Romanian Constanta to the Georgian Batumi is about 1 kilometers.
For example, an input was received - to search for enemy submarines in the Constanta area. Il-38N, having taken off from the airfield, say, in Simferopol, will “walk” to Constanta, which it will reach in an hour from the moment of takeoff. But with a helicopter carrier, alas, everything is much worse. If he received an order to search in the Constanta area, then in order to move out of Sevastopol, he would have to go at an economic speed of 16 knots for about 5 hours. And after that, approaching Constanta by 250 km, raise helicopters, which will take about an hour to reach the search area.
But, let's say, two hours have passed since the Il-38N took off. By this time, he has already been searching in the Constanta region for an hour, and suddenly - a new input: it is urgent to check the Batumi region. Well, no problem - having a combat radius of 2 km, the Il-200N, even having flown for 38 hours, will advance to the Batumi region without refueling and will be there in less than 2 hours, going at cruising (not maximum) speed. Or it can be recalled “for winter quarters”, and another aircraft of the same type can be sent to Batumi - then it will arrive in Batumi even faster.
Another thing is a helicopter carrier. If he receives an order to change the search area from Constanta to Batumi two hours after leaving, then by the time he receives the order, he will not have time to “look” at Constanta - he still has almost three hours to go to her only until the line of lifting helicopters into the air. And in order to advance to the same line to Batumi, the ship will have to turn around and go about 600 km to get closer to 250 km to Batumi, for which it will take more than 16 hours at an economic speed of 20 knots.
The example, of course, is exaggerated: nevertheless, I took a "run" along the widest part of the Black Sea, but it is still quite obvious that the helicopter carrier is very much inferior to patrol aircraft in terms of mobility and response speed.
Further. If such a need arises, then 4-5 patrol aircraft, lifted into the air at the same time, are able to "sift" the water area of a monstrous area in a few hours. A helicopter carrier, even if he somehow manages to lift all 18 of his PLO rotorcraft into the air, cannot cover such an area even close - simply because of the small radius of action of helicopters.
On the question of the criterion "cost / efficiency"
It is quite obvious that the search performance of a squadron of 5 patrol aircraft is, as it were, not even greater than that of a specialized PLO helicopter carrier, and at the same time, the aircraft are much more mobile. And what about the comparative cost of these solutions?
Modernization of Ka-27 helicopters into Ka-27M cost from 349 to 379 million rubles per vehicle (2017). The construction of a new helicopter, obviously, would have cost much more - no less than 550-600 million rubles, but rather even more. In those same years, a modern fighter "pulled out" about 1,5 billion rubles. Thus, it will not be a mistake to assume that a modern PLO helicopter will cost from a third to a half of a modern fighter. Let's take a third.
At the same time, the newest American Poseidon costs $115-150 million, that is, it is about a quarter more expensive than the contemporary American fighter. The proportion suggests that one modern PLO patrol aircraft will cost about the same as 4 specialized PLO helicopters.
But this means that a group of 4–5 patrol aircraft will cost only 16–20 PLO helicopters. That is, by investing in patrol aircraft, we will spend about the same amount as on the anti-submarine air group of a helicopter carrier, but at the same time we will get at least the same search performance, much better mobility and (cherry on the cake!) We will not have to build a helicopter carrier of 18 thousand .t displacement.
The benefit on the scale of "cost / effectiveness" is undeniable.
Of course, I can be reproached for not taking into account the cost of airfields for aircraft, but here is the thing - for an air group of 18–20 helicopters, a ground heliport is also needed, but 5 PLO aircraft will not require any expansion of the existing airfield network - not the size of the squad. And there are a lot of factors in favor of patrol aircraft, which I have not mentioned yet.
Here, for example, is an inter-theater maneuver: a detachment of patrol aircraft can be relocated from one fleet to another in a matter of hours, well, in a few days, if accompanying cargo is transferred by transport aircraft. It will take weeks for a helicopter carrier to do this.
In any conflict, intelligence information about the enemy is worth its weight in gold, and a patrol aircraft equipped with a much more powerful radar, an electronic intelligence station, etc., etc., which are also controlled by individual operators, will generate a much larger flow when patrolling information than PLO helicopters.
In addition, a patrol aircraft is generally more resistant to air threats than a helicopter. Simply put, more powerful electronic intelligence and a much higher speed give the patrol aircraft a better chance of noticing unwanted attention in time and avoiding impact. Typically, patrol aircraft do not have close air cover.
Ride of the Valkyries
By virtue of the foregoing, a patrol aircraft is self-sufficient to a certain extent, but a helicopter carrier is not. An aircraft carrier of about 18 thousand tons of standard displacement is a very tasty target. Yes, by increasing the air group to 18 helicopters, the helicopter carrier will be well protected from submarines. But this does not remove the need to cover it from attacks by aircraft, surface ships, and coastal missile systems. Even with its own powerful anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons, such a helicopter carrier will need an escort of at least 2-3 ships of the frigate and corvette classes, ideally one destroyer and a couple of frigates.
Such a connection is already a great force if it includes modern ships. But it is still not self-sufficient, and needs air cover. The radar station of a helicopter acting as an anti-aircraft defense system can, of course, reveal the surface situation at a distance of up to 250-300 km from the order or detect low-flying cruise missiles (if they approach from the side where the helicopter is located, and this may not be), but it is of little use for airspace control.
About the air defense / missile defense of an anti-submarine helicopter carrier
Again, we have two options. You can try to cover the connection with the helicopter carrier by land-based aviation forces, or you can try to give its air group some kind of air defense and missile defense capabilities. Which?
In my previous article, I came to the conclusion that attack helicopters are useless for air defense of naval formations. At the same time, in my opinion, AWACS helicopters may well be useful for detecting low-flying targets outside the control zone of shipborne radars. But this task, albeit with less efficiency, is capable of being performed by PLO helicopters, which today need to have a powerful radar. However, I have encountered justified criticism of these theses, for which I am sincerely grateful to the VO reader, who writes under the nickname "bayard".
My respected opponent noted that, provided that the attack helicopter is equipped with a powerful radar, similar to that planned to be installed on the MiG-29/35, and modern air-to-air missiles, then such a helicopter, in conjunction with an AWACS helicopter, will be able to effectively fight even with a massive attack by low-flying cruise missiles while they are outside the radar control zone of warships.
Without disputing the arguments of a person who is familiar with the work of anti-aircraft missile systems firsthand, I will try to imagine the implementation of such protection on the anti-submarine helicopter carrier I described above.
It is obvious that the task of a somewhat reliable air cover against cruise missile strikes can be accomplished only if at least one AWACS helicopter and one attack helicopter are on round-the-clock duty in the air. Taking into account the fact that their patrol time is approximately equal to the PLO helicopter, we get the need to base another 12 helicopters on the ship - six AWACS and six strike helicopters.
Thus, the size of the air group of our helicopter carrier increases from 18-20 to 30-32 helicopters, and the displacement will go far beyond 20 thousand tons and amount to offhand 24-26 thousand tons. By the way, the Soviet development of an auxiliary helicopter carrier (project 10200 "Khalzan") it just reached 24 tons of standard displacement with a minimum of protective equipment and an air group of 000 helicopters.
How much will such a helicopter carrier cost? The combat ship closest in size and design to the helicopter carrier designed above is the Project 23900 Avalanche amphibious assault ships (UDC). They are somewhat larger (30 thousand tons of standard displacement), but relatively slow-moving, carry few defensive weapons, and their air group is half that calculated above. At the same time, their cost, according to preliminary estimates (in the open press), exceeds 50 billion rubles per ship in 2020 prices. This, of course, is the cost without the air group, but it may not reflect all the costs of building the ship. Obviously, the helicopter carrier "designed" by us will hardly cost less.
Helicopter carriers and ... helicopter carriers
Here I would like to note one feature of the cost of helicopter carriers. The cost of these ships in the world varies greatly. The same Mistrals, for example, were traded for 600 million euros, but if you wish, you can find a helicopter carrier for $ 40 million. Why is that?
Of course, you should always keep in mind the specifics of pricing - in some cases, we are talking about the cost of building only the ship itself, without "filling" with weapons and equipment, and in some - a fully equipped product, "ready for a campaign and battle." But much more important is that this class includes ships that are very different in their capabilities.
In one case, a real warship is being built, having both a flight deck of considerable size, and the necessary systems for storing and supplying fuel and ammunition to ensure intensive flights of the air group. It accommodates the necessary equipment and personnel for inter-flight maintenance and repair of helicopters, installs all the radar systems necessary for a warship, flight control systems, electronic warfare systems, setting traps, defensive weapons, etc., etc. And this is a helicopter carrier.
In another case, they take the hull of a container ship, draw circles on its deck so that the helicopter understands where to land, and ... that's it. And this is also a helicopter carrier. It is clear that the capabilities of the second cannot be compared with the potential of the first, even with the formal equality of displacement and the number of air groups, but there is one class of ships!
Alas, for some reasons that are not clear to me, some authors of articles completely lose sight of this point. It seems to them that through cosmetic repairs it is possible to turn some tanker or ro-ro ship into a full-fledged helicopter carrier - alas, but this is not so. Of course, no one interferes with equipping a tanker with a flight deck, but this will not make it a helicopter carrier: such a ship simply cannot ensure the intensive use of its air group.
It is possible, of course, to carry out a large-scale modernization and supply the “recruit” with everything necessary: but you need to understand that in this case, at best, the hull will remain from a civilian ship, and even then it will be seriously altered, and the cost of such a ship will come close to a specially built helicopter carrier.
But efficiency is not. Simply put, a civilian ship is designed to perform certain tasks, not related to military operations, and is not optimal for war. A very good example of the above is the USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3). It was built as a supply ship, that is, not even quite like a civilian, but as an auxiliary ship of the battle fleet, although, of course, it was not a warship. And so the Americans decided to convert it into an expeditionary naval base. For this, a flight deck, a helicopter hangar, and storage facilities for ammunition, fuel, equipment, consumables and repair parts were installed on the ship.
But at the exit, the Americans received a ship with an empty displacement of 39 tons (often mentioned eighty-seven thousand tons, apparently, this is the full displacement of the ship before modernization), providing basing ... as many as four transport helicopters and the same number of unmanned anti-mine unmanned boats. It is obvious that a special-purpose amphibious assault ship, having half the displacement, is capable of carrying a multiple times larger payload. The same Mistral, with a standard displacement of 900 tons, carried up to 16 transport helicopters and 500 landing craft.
More features, more costs
Let's try to calculate the cost of equipping an ASW helicopter carrier with a dozen attack helicopters and AWACS. Suppose that a good helicopter carrier with an air group of 32 helicopters and capable of supporting 5 helicopters in the air around the clock (three PLO, one strike and one AWACS) has a standard displacement of 24-25 thousand tons and a cost of 50 billion rubles. The per ton cost is about 2 million rubles per ton.
A helicopter carrier, whose air group consists exclusively of PLO helicopters and rescuers, will, as mentioned earlier, be six to seven tons lighter, but, in my opinion, it would be wrong to reduce its price proportionally, that is, by 12–14 billion rubles. There is a lot of expensive equipment (such as a surveillance radar, an anti-torpedo system, etc.), the amount of which does not depend on the size of the ship. Let's determine the rise in the cost of a helicopter carrier - 10 billion rubles in 2020 prices.
The cost of an attack helicopter tends to be a billion, but we are talking about serial aircraft for the Air Force - adapted to the sea, and even equipped with a powerful Ka-52 Katran AFAR, which will clearly require more. Real Ka-31s were delivered for 406 million rubles back in 2008, the inflation calculator gives 960 million rubles by 2020, but we need something more modern! Thus, an additional air group of 12 helicopters will cost us at least another 12 billion rubles, but rather more. In total, the total cost of providing an “anti-missile” helicopter carrier patrol tends to 22 billion rubles.
Everything would be fine, but in 2020 the cost of the multifunctional Su-35 was about 2 billion rubles, that is, such a strengthening of the helicopter carrier will cost the price of 11 heavy fighters. Taking into account the fact that Su-35s have a very long flight range, a dozen of these machines are capable of providing round-the-clock duty of a pair of fighters almost anywhere in the Black Sea. And something tells me that two heavy fighters are much more useful for air defense / missile defense of a ship formation than a pair of attack helicopters with air-to-air missiles and an AWACS helicopter.
Conclusions
We can build a large helicopter carrier and its air group of 32 helicopters, including PLO, AWACS and attack helicopters. But we can use the same funds to create a regiment of multifunctional fighters (of the Su-35 level), five good patrol aircraft, and we still have funds to purchase four medium-sized AWACS aircraft (if we had them, of course).
In the first option, we will get a helicopter carrier that will be quite capable of fighting submarines in the theater, but subject to all the restrictions mentioned above. He will be able to provide control of the air situation only in the immediate vicinity of the ship. Thanks to the use of a “bundle” of AWACS helicopters and helicopters capable of hitting low-flying targets, this helicopter carrier will be able to provide itself and its order with an increase in the effectiveness of air defense systems by 20–30% and significantly expand the ability to combat anti-ship missiles. Also, this ship can be used to destroy enemy light surface forces operating without air support.
If PLO helicopters are completely or partially left in "winter apartments", and attack helicopters are taken on board instead of them, then the helicopter carrier will be a good help for the landing operation. But still, here the helicopter carrier will play an auxiliary role, since its air group is unable to gain air supremacy, and strike capabilities against land targets will clearly not be sufficient.
All this, of course, is not bad, but, in my opinion, investing in land-based aviation provides much more opportunities. By virtue of the previously stated arguments, I can assume that patrol aircraft will cope with the search and destruction of submarines much better than a helicopter carrier. Let's not forget that a helicopter carrier needs an escort of at least two or three ships of at least a corvette class.
This does not mean, of course, that the escort ships cannot perform any other combat missions, but still the need to protect the helicopter carrier fetters them to a certain extent. If we choose land-based aviation, these ships, having air cover, can be dispersed over a large area, thereby realizing their ASW potential much more fully.
Four AWACS aircraft are capable of providing round-the-clock control of most of the airspace of the same Black Sea, which is completely incomparable with the capabilities of a patrol of AWACS helicopters. At the same time, AWACS aircraft will not operate alone, but under the cover of a pair of heavy fighters: given that only half of the regiment will be involved in such patrols, the second half, being in full readiness for departure, will be able to very quickly strengthen the air patrol.
Striking potential? Undoubtedly, the helicopter carrier possesses it. But it is also indisputable that the regiment of heavy fighters is much higher.
A regiment of multifunctional heavy fighters, operating with the support of patrol aircraft and AWACS, is an excellent application for ensuring air supremacy or, at least, for a significant complication of enemy aviation operations over the water area, which a helicopter carrier cannot give in principle. The "patrol aircraft - AWACS - fighter" link is much more resistant to any emerging threats than the helicopter carrier air group. Naval aviation fighters are capable of assisting the Aerospace Forces in a conflict of any intensity: from nuclear Armageddon to "peace enforcement" of small, but who knows what they imagined countries (08.08.08), and in general are much more versatile than a helicopter carrier.
Of course, there are still questions about the cost of basing - more than three dozen fighters, patrol aircraft and AWACS require a separate air base for themselves. It is difficult to determine the cost of its construction, but it may well amount to 55–75 billion rubles. This is, of course, expensive, but you need to understand that:
1. Helicopter carrier rotorcraft also need their own airbase. Of course, it will cost less, since it does not require a long runway, but everything else is needed! Even if we assume that the heliport will cost a third of the air base for aircraft, it will already be 18-25 billion rubles.
2. A helicopter carrier definitely needs an escort. If we assume that the task of escorting will completely distract at least 1 frigate (simpler than 22350) from other tasks, then it will still cost at least 30 billion rubles.
3. A helicopter carrier also needs infrastructure - a berth, electricity and heat supply, and a corresponding expansion of capacities that produce these energy carriers. That's a few billion more.
That is, the construction of infrastructure for ground aviation looks more expensive, but still not fatal, but this option provides more opportunities than a helicopter carrier.
But does a helicopter carrier really have absolutely no advantages over land-based aviation? Of course, there is - it is capable of operating at a considerable distance from the coast, where aircraft from coastal airfields simply cannot reach. But where and how to use this advantage? There are simply no places on the Black Sea where aviation from the Crimea or from jump airfields on our territory cannot reach. Barents? Roughly the same. Baltic, Norwegian Sea, Far East? Alas, if our helicopter carrier, in the event of a serious conflict, dares to stick out beyond the cover of ground fighters, then it will be instantly destroyed there.
And in a frivolous conflict? And in a conflict with a frankly weak country, albeit remote from the combat radius of our ground aviation, not a specialized helicopter carrier, but a universal landing ship with a decent air group on board will bring much more benefit.
Can we give the helicopter carrier described above the ability to carry troops? Theoretically, yes, we can. But you need to understand that if we want a ship that is capable of intensively operating three dozen helicopters, and transporting a battalion of marines with equipment, for which it needs an additional cargo deck, and a dock, and landing craft, and cabins for accommodating marines, and an infirmary etc. etc., then we get something like the UDC "America", which was created for similar tasks. That's just the standard displacement of the American "America" with might and main tends to 40 thousand tons, and the construction of a series of such ships will be comparable in cost to an aircraft carrier program.
Another thing is the creation of a medium-sized UDC, like the same Mistral. Such ships really have their own niche and purpose, which they are able to realize in the best way: we are, of course, talking about landing troops. But even in a global conflict, such a ship will not be completely useless - by taking on board PLO helicopters (as many as possible), it will be able to support other anti-submarine defense forces in the theater. But still, this is an auxiliary function of the UDC, with which it will cope even worse than the PLO helicopter carrier, and its main task is precisely the landing.
Thus, I come to the conclusion that the only helicopter carrier that can really be useful to the Russian Navy is a universal landing ship. However, the tasks in which he specializes are secondary for our fleet, and building such ships at a time when the security of our strategic missile submarines is not ensured, in my opinion, is completely inappropriate.
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