Khasavyurt guillotine for Russia
More than 16 years have passed since the signing of the so-called Khasavyurt Agreement. Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed signed the document on behalf of the presidents of the Republic of Ichkeria and the Russian Federation. Officially it is believed that Khasavyurt'96 put an end to the bloody war in Chechnya and confirmed the complete and final victory of the Chechen army, supported by international separatists of various stripes, over federal troops; the victory of the then Chechen leadership over Yeltsin and his political circle. Naturally, such a version for a long time served as a life-giving balm for supporters of the rejection of the North Caucasus from Russia, followed by the creation of the so-called Caucasian caliphate, able to stretch from the Black Sea to the Caspian.
However, both the agreements themselves between Moscow and Grozny, and their background even after years continue to remain extremely contradictory and give reason to doubt that the victory of Chechnya over the federal center was solely due to the military superiority of the first over the second. And there is a whole range of evidence, many of which have a verified documentary form.
So, once again, dryly and officially: the Khasavyurt agreements of the 31 model on August 1996 of the year were signed by the Chief of Staff of the Republic of Ichkeria Maskhadov and Secretary of the Russian Security Council, General Lebed. Here are the points defining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow according to the Khasavyurt paper:
Moscow undertakes to withdraw military units from Chechnya, to direct funds for the restoration of the destroyed republic, to provide Ichkeria with food, money and medicines. A kind of indemnity that Moscow must pay ...
However, this is not the main thing. After all, Moscow and today is financially helping Chechnya ... The main thing here is to take the phrase that is contained in the first paragraph of the principles for determining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow. It is a question of such a thing as “in accordance with the norms of international law”. In other words, the Chechen Republic de jure should have been recognized as a subject of international law, leaving Russia for the next five years. Journalist Andrei Karaulov speaks of three years of “waiting” for complete independence for Ichkeria. Three years or five years - by and large does not matter. And what matters is that on behalf of the President of Russia a document was signed in which Russia not only acknowledges its defeat in the North Caucasus, but also creates a precedent for the North Caucasian republics to leave the federation. After all, it is hardly possible today that someone has doubts that the separation of Chechnya from Russia would not have entailed the so-called domino effect, when the whole country, already without economic and political problems, began to crumble.
Let's not forget that in August 1996 of the year and five years did not pass after the signing of the notorious Belovezhsk agreements that put an end to a big country. It turns out that in the 1996 year, Yeltsin, who recently celebrated an extremely dubious election victory, in fact received the status of a state leader who managed to take part in the collapse of two states (first the USSR and then the Russian Federation) for less than five years.
But was the hand of Boris Yeltsin traced in the Khasavyurt agreements, or was he not the most important figure in someone's big game?
Answering this question, it is worth considering the background of the Khasavyurt agreements themselves, under which Ichkeria could become an independent state in a few years and become the “first sign” of the total destruction of the Russian Federation. The rationale is that the Khasavyurt agreements were signed on August 31 after Chechen militant units occupied Grozny, knocking out federal troops, but according to reports of Chechen Republic Council secretary Ruslan Tsakayev, the agreements were prepared by General Lebed at least a month before the Chechen attack separatists. According to him, the attack on the Chechen administrative center itself was an event that should have justified the signing of the paper in Dagestan’s Khasavyurt.
It turns out that the Russian authorities at that time needed a reason to end the war on the territory of Chechnya, but the withdrawal of troops without an obvious reason would have looked completely ridiculous. The fact that many people knew about the 6 attack of August 1996 on Grozny was confirmed today by politicians and journalists who were working in Chechnya at that time. In particular, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic, Yuri Plugin, says that he unexpectedly received an order to remove the Ministry of Internal Affairs officers from several checkpoints at the entrance to Grozny and for obscure reasons send them to the villages of the district to exercise passport control and control the situation on rural roads. Moreover, just before the militants attacked Grozny, General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, the commander of the Russian forces in Chechnya, went on vacation, and General Vladimir Shamanov (at that time the commander of the Ministry of Defense forces in the Chechen Republic) was unexpectedly summoned to study at the Academy of the Russian General Staff in Moscow . In essence, the army group was decapitated, and it was clear that someone was very stubbornly and methodically clearing the way for international terrorists in order for them to calmly seize the Chechen capital. Only in Grozny, according to information published by the separatist information agency head Mayrbek Vachagayev, the 887 people entered almost unhindered, and after several days of confrontation with representatives of the Chechen militia loyal to Moscow, as well as units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops that remained in the city, took Grozny under their control.
It was after this that Moscow, or, more precisely, those who stood behind it, and there was a motive to withdraw the troops from Ichkeria, in effect declaring the defeat of the federal troops. The motive, as mentioned above, in the scenario version was painted before the so-called storming of Grozny by the militants.
After signing the paper in Khasavyurt under the controlling eye of OSCE diplomats, General Lebed in Russia was accused almost of high treason. But if, say so, to wind back time, it becomes clear that he was not the person who played a serious role in this big game. The fact is that Alexander Lebed, as you know, in 1996, ran for president from the “Congress of Russian Communities”. At the same time, in the first round of the presidential campaign, Lebed managed to take the third place, gaining more than 14% of votes. It is obvious that Boris Yeltsin needed the votes cast for the general, and he made an offer to Lebed, which he could not refuse. Yeltsin put General Lebed on the post of presidential aide for national security and secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, who was popular among the troops.
Apparently, immediately after the appointment of Lebed, he was told how it is necessary to complete the Chechen campaign. At first glance, it is surprising that the general, who managed to distinguish himself in Afghanistan and Transnistria, went to the shameful proposal to conclude agreements with the separatists, in effect pandering to the fact that Russian servicemen were left in Grozny for an obvious death. Betrayal? .. Ignorance of the situation? .. Vanity? ..
The answer to this question may be the words spoken by Lebed in an interview with the German edition of Der Spiegel. In particular, in 1996, General Lebed stated that he was ready to assume the presidency and did not see any potentials in the sick and aging Boris Yeltsin.
In other words, Lebed could have signed the Khasavyurt agreements, including in order to show the world who actually stopped the war in Chechnya. Probably, the idea that it would give him some political trumps, and especially trumps will appear in his head, when the West supports him in the event that Yeltsin retires in connection with the state of his health. It turns out that it was vanity that could push the military general to such a very dubious move as a handshake with Maskhadov and other representatives of the separatists. Obviously, Lebed knew well who really was behind the militants in Chechnya, and therefore he wished them to enjoy as a general peacemaker.
But the aspirations of General Lebed did not come true: the West, led by the United States, supported Boris Yeltsin, who already in the middle of October 1996 (since the Khasavyurt agreements) sent Alexander Lebed to resign. The situation resembles the one in which General Lebed, who relied on someone's help in pushing his candidacy for the highest state post, skillfully used and then simply merged ... Yeltsin took advantage of the moment, received votes from Cygnus, gave him an extremely unpopular case in Russia and then gently pulled the drain rope ...
Thus, for many, Lebed is now associated with a man who was ready to have a hand in the collapse of Russia, but in fact he only participated in a rather short period of a large geopolitical party. At the same time, President Yeltsin himself acted as a statistician, who, obviously, was not going to become a two-time destroyer of the country, because this could completely bury his chances of continuing his political career, which by that time was under considerable doubt. Yeltsin, who, according to his associates, received active funding from abroad for his election campaign, had to pursue a policy that was interesting to the West. At the same time, the Khasavyurt Agreement is one of the stages of such a policy.
In simple terms, President Yeltsin himself became a hostage of those forces that at one time asked to support themselves in the elections. These forces supported him, but under conditions capable of putting an end to such a state as Russia. For obvious reasons, Yeltsin was addicted to this addiction, and he wanted to let his character show itself, once and for all, cutting the western Gordian knot with which his hands were tied. At the same time, Yeltsin delivered his main blow to those who decided to finally tear Russia to pieces in 1999, when, without coordination with Western "partners", he decided to make the second and then the first person in the state of Vladimir Putin first. It is clear that Putin did not fit into the Western concept of the Russian leader, if only because it was thanks to Putin that the very Khasavyurt agreements, apparently dictated in 1996 by a certain group of foreign “specialists” and which became a pass for Yeltsin for the second presidential term, were buried , and the Caucasian people are consolidated against the separatist movement in the Caucasus. The events of 1999 of the year in Dagestan, when Chechen fighters decided to consolidate their positions, and the people of Dagestan gave them a serious rebuff, vividly illustrate this.
The big political game, in which Russia was given the role of a quilt, each part of which was supposed to snap at neighboring parts, turned out to be completely different from what those interested in the disintegration of the country had expected.
This can be judged by the Western and Russian excessively liberal newspapers of that time, which peacefully narrate the victory of law and democracy in Chechnya, the joyful day of the possible independence of this North Caucasian republic from Russia at first suddenly became somewhat taken aback, and then began to pour mud on the new leadership of Russia, accusing the "oppression" of the Caucasian peoples and the new "imperial ambitions". And this mournful record is already turning 13 for a year in a row, confirming the thesis that in 1999 year, Yeltsin, having signed the document on Putin’s appointment, confused the cards to someone in the most serious way ...
Materials used:
The program “The Moment of Truth” 5 channel from 01.10.2012
Documentary film “On the Other Side of the War - Hasavyurt”, NTV
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/12737/print
http://www.peoples.ru/military/general/lebed/index.html
http://mn.ru/blog_caucasus/20110901/304590216.html
http://www.litmir.net/br/?b=91245&p=39
However, both the agreements themselves between Moscow and Grozny, and their background even after years continue to remain extremely contradictory and give reason to doubt that the victory of Chechnya over the federal center was solely due to the military superiority of the first over the second. And there is a whole range of evidence, many of which have a verified documentary form.
So, once again, dryly and officially: the Khasavyurt agreements of the 31 model on August 1996 of the year were signed by the Chief of Staff of the Republic of Ichkeria Maskhadov and Secretary of the Russian Security Council, General Lebed. Here are the points defining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow according to the Khasavyurt paper:
1. An agreement on the basis of the relationship between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, defined in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law, must be reached before December 31, 2001.
2. Not later than October 1 of 1996, the Joint Commission is formed of representatives of state authorities of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, whose tasks are:
monitoring the implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 25 June 1996 of 985 and the preparation of proposals for the completion of the withdrawal of troops;
preparation of concerted measures to combat crime, terrorism and manifestations of national and religious hatred and control over their implementation;
preparation of proposals for the restoration of monetary and budgetary relations;
preparation and submission to the Government of the Russian Federation of programs for the restoration of the socio-economic complex of the Chechen Republic;
control over the coordinated interaction of public authorities and other interested organizations in providing the population with food and medicine.
3. The legislation of the Chechen Republic is based on the observance of the rights of a person and citizen, the right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equal rights of peoples, ensuring civil peace, interethnic harmony and security of citizens living in the territory of the Chechen Republic, regardless of nationality, religion or other differences.
4. The joint commission completes its work by mutual agreement.
2. Not later than October 1 of 1996, the Joint Commission is formed of representatives of state authorities of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, whose tasks are:
monitoring the implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 25 June 1996 of 985 and the preparation of proposals for the completion of the withdrawal of troops;
preparation of concerted measures to combat crime, terrorism and manifestations of national and religious hatred and control over their implementation;
preparation of proposals for the restoration of monetary and budgetary relations;
preparation and submission to the Government of the Russian Federation of programs for the restoration of the socio-economic complex of the Chechen Republic;
control over the coordinated interaction of public authorities and other interested organizations in providing the population with food and medicine.
3. The legislation of the Chechen Republic is based on the observance of the rights of a person and citizen, the right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equal rights of peoples, ensuring civil peace, interethnic harmony and security of citizens living in the territory of the Chechen Republic, regardless of nationality, religion or other differences.
4. The joint commission completes its work by mutual agreement.
Moscow undertakes to withdraw military units from Chechnya, to direct funds for the restoration of the destroyed republic, to provide Ichkeria with food, money and medicines. A kind of indemnity that Moscow must pay ...
However, this is not the main thing. After all, Moscow and today is financially helping Chechnya ... The main thing here is to take the phrase that is contained in the first paragraph of the principles for determining the relationship between Grozny and Moscow. It is a question of such a thing as “in accordance with the norms of international law”. In other words, the Chechen Republic de jure should have been recognized as a subject of international law, leaving Russia for the next five years. Journalist Andrei Karaulov speaks of three years of “waiting” for complete independence for Ichkeria. Three years or five years - by and large does not matter. And what matters is that on behalf of the President of Russia a document was signed in which Russia not only acknowledges its defeat in the North Caucasus, but also creates a precedent for the North Caucasian republics to leave the federation. After all, it is hardly possible today that someone has doubts that the separation of Chechnya from Russia would not have entailed the so-called domino effect, when the whole country, already without economic and political problems, began to crumble.
Let's not forget that in August 1996 of the year and five years did not pass after the signing of the notorious Belovezhsk agreements that put an end to a big country. It turns out that in the 1996 year, Yeltsin, who recently celebrated an extremely dubious election victory, in fact received the status of a state leader who managed to take part in the collapse of two states (first the USSR and then the Russian Federation) for less than five years.
But was the hand of Boris Yeltsin traced in the Khasavyurt agreements, or was he not the most important figure in someone's big game?
Answering this question, it is worth considering the background of the Khasavyurt agreements themselves, under which Ichkeria could become an independent state in a few years and become the “first sign” of the total destruction of the Russian Federation. The rationale is that the Khasavyurt agreements were signed on August 31 after Chechen militant units occupied Grozny, knocking out federal troops, but according to reports of Chechen Republic Council secretary Ruslan Tsakayev, the agreements were prepared by General Lebed at least a month before the Chechen attack separatists. According to him, the attack on the Chechen administrative center itself was an event that should have justified the signing of the paper in Dagestan’s Khasavyurt.
It turns out that the Russian authorities at that time needed a reason to end the war on the territory of Chechnya, but the withdrawal of troops without an obvious reason would have looked completely ridiculous. The fact that many people knew about the 6 attack of August 1996 on Grozny was confirmed today by politicians and journalists who were working in Chechnya at that time. In particular, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic, Yuri Plugin, says that he unexpectedly received an order to remove the Ministry of Internal Affairs officers from several checkpoints at the entrance to Grozny and for obscure reasons send them to the villages of the district to exercise passport control and control the situation on rural roads. Moreover, just before the militants attacked Grozny, General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, the commander of the Russian forces in Chechnya, went on vacation, and General Vladimir Shamanov (at that time the commander of the Ministry of Defense forces in the Chechen Republic) was unexpectedly summoned to study at the Academy of the Russian General Staff in Moscow . In essence, the army group was decapitated, and it was clear that someone was very stubbornly and methodically clearing the way for international terrorists in order for them to calmly seize the Chechen capital. Only in Grozny, according to information published by the separatist information agency head Mayrbek Vachagayev, the 887 people entered almost unhindered, and after several days of confrontation with representatives of the Chechen militia loyal to Moscow, as well as units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops that remained in the city, took Grozny under their control.
It was after this that Moscow, or, more precisely, those who stood behind it, and there was a motive to withdraw the troops from Ichkeria, in effect declaring the defeat of the federal troops. The motive, as mentioned above, in the scenario version was painted before the so-called storming of Grozny by the militants.
After signing the paper in Khasavyurt under the controlling eye of OSCE diplomats, General Lebed in Russia was accused almost of high treason. But if, say so, to wind back time, it becomes clear that he was not the person who played a serious role in this big game. The fact is that Alexander Lebed, as you know, in 1996, ran for president from the “Congress of Russian Communities”. At the same time, in the first round of the presidential campaign, Lebed managed to take the third place, gaining more than 14% of votes. It is obvious that Boris Yeltsin needed the votes cast for the general, and he made an offer to Lebed, which he could not refuse. Yeltsin put General Lebed on the post of presidential aide for national security and secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, who was popular among the troops.
Apparently, immediately after the appointment of Lebed, he was told how it is necessary to complete the Chechen campaign. At first glance, it is surprising that the general, who managed to distinguish himself in Afghanistan and Transnistria, went to the shameful proposal to conclude agreements with the separatists, in effect pandering to the fact that Russian servicemen were left in Grozny for an obvious death. Betrayal? .. Ignorance of the situation? .. Vanity? ..
The answer to this question may be the words spoken by Lebed in an interview with the German edition of Der Spiegel. In particular, in 1996, General Lebed stated that he was ready to assume the presidency and did not see any potentials in the sick and aging Boris Yeltsin.
In other words, Lebed could have signed the Khasavyurt agreements, including in order to show the world who actually stopped the war in Chechnya. Probably, the idea that it would give him some political trumps, and especially trumps will appear in his head, when the West supports him in the event that Yeltsin retires in connection with the state of his health. It turns out that it was vanity that could push the military general to such a very dubious move as a handshake with Maskhadov and other representatives of the separatists. Obviously, Lebed knew well who really was behind the militants in Chechnya, and therefore he wished them to enjoy as a general peacemaker.
But the aspirations of General Lebed did not come true: the West, led by the United States, supported Boris Yeltsin, who already in the middle of October 1996 (since the Khasavyurt agreements) sent Alexander Lebed to resign. The situation resembles the one in which General Lebed, who relied on someone's help in pushing his candidacy for the highest state post, skillfully used and then simply merged ... Yeltsin took advantage of the moment, received votes from Cygnus, gave him an extremely unpopular case in Russia and then gently pulled the drain rope ...
Thus, for many, Lebed is now associated with a man who was ready to have a hand in the collapse of Russia, but in fact he only participated in a rather short period of a large geopolitical party. At the same time, President Yeltsin himself acted as a statistician, who, obviously, was not going to become a two-time destroyer of the country, because this could completely bury his chances of continuing his political career, which by that time was under considerable doubt. Yeltsin, who, according to his associates, received active funding from abroad for his election campaign, had to pursue a policy that was interesting to the West. At the same time, the Khasavyurt Agreement is one of the stages of such a policy.
In simple terms, President Yeltsin himself became a hostage of those forces that at one time asked to support themselves in the elections. These forces supported him, but under conditions capable of putting an end to such a state as Russia. For obvious reasons, Yeltsin was addicted to this addiction, and he wanted to let his character show itself, once and for all, cutting the western Gordian knot with which his hands were tied. At the same time, Yeltsin delivered his main blow to those who decided to finally tear Russia to pieces in 1999, when, without coordination with Western "partners", he decided to make the second and then the first person in the state of Vladimir Putin first. It is clear that Putin did not fit into the Western concept of the Russian leader, if only because it was thanks to Putin that the very Khasavyurt agreements, apparently dictated in 1996 by a certain group of foreign “specialists” and which became a pass for Yeltsin for the second presidential term, were buried , and the Caucasian people are consolidated against the separatist movement in the Caucasus. The events of 1999 of the year in Dagestan, when Chechen fighters decided to consolidate their positions, and the people of Dagestan gave them a serious rebuff, vividly illustrate this.
The big political game, in which Russia was given the role of a quilt, each part of which was supposed to snap at neighboring parts, turned out to be completely different from what those interested in the disintegration of the country had expected.
This can be judged by the Western and Russian excessively liberal newspapers of that time, which peacefully narrate the victory of law and democracy in Chechnya, the joyful day of the possible independence of this North Caucasian republic from Russia at first suddenly became somewhat taken aback, and then began to pour mud on the new leadership of Russia, accusing the "oppression" of the Caucasian peoples and the new "imperial ambitions". And this mournful record is already turning 13 for a year in a row, confirming the thesis that in 1999 year, Yeltsin, having signed the document on Putin’s appointment, confused the cards to someone in the most serious way ...
Materials used:
The program “The Moment of Truth” 5 channel from 01.10.2012
Documentary film “On the Other Side of the War - Hasavyurt”, NTV
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/12737/print
http://www.peoples.ru/military/general/lebed/index.html
http://mn.ru/blog_caucasus/20110901/304590216.html
http://www.litmir.net/br/?b=91245&p=39
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