Military Review

Midway. How did the turning point in the Pacific War happen?

51
Midway. How did the turning point in the Pacific War happen?

The American aircraft carrier USS Yorktown and other ships of the formation are firing barrage to repel the attack of Japanese torpedo bombers in the Battle of Midway Atoll. The Yorktown, already damaged during the first attack by Japanese carrier-based dive bombers, is in the center. Three bombs hit the ship. 4 June 1942


80 years ago, a major naval battle took place between fleets USA and Japan at Midway Atoll. There was a radical turning point in the Pacific War in favor of the United States.

The Japanese fleet lost 4 heavy aircraft carriers, 1 heavy cruiser, about 250 aircraft and the best pilots. The imperial fleet of Japan never recovered from such losses, and the empire lost its strategic initiative.

General situation


In the spring of 1942, the unfavorable military situation continued for the United States and Britain in the Asia-Pacific theater. Winter 1941–1942 The USA and England suffered heavy losses in their naval forces, lost important strategic positions and points: Hong Kong, Singapore, British Malaya, part of Burma, the Philippines, the Dutch Indies, New Britain, most of New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and a number of other islands in the Pacific Ocean . The Empire of Japan carried out a number of successful military operations, capturing the most important strategic areas and rich sources of raw materials.

The position of China, which continued to fight against the Japanese invaders, worsened. The threat of a Japanese invasion of Australia, Hawaii, Ceylon and India loomed. The situation with sea communications in the Pacific and Indian Ocean has become more complicated, and hence the situation with the transfer of troops, reinforcements and supplies.

On April 5-9, 1942, the Japanese attacked Ceylon, the British Eastern Fleet lost an aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers and a destroyer and retreated to the coast of Africa. The Japanese established dominance in the eastern Indian Ocean. The British in May began to seize the bases in Madagascar, which belonged to the French. Britain concentrated its efforts on the defense of India, concentrating ground forces there and Aviationto then launch a counteroffensive in Burma.

However, Japan was unable to inflict a decisive defeat on the US in the Pacific during the blitzkrieg. The war has entered a protracted phase. The huge military and economic superiority of the United States (not counting the British Empire and its dominions and colonies) over the limited military and economic potential of the Empire of Japan began to affect. Japan's dominance at sea, in the air and on land quickly came to an end.

The Pacific Ocean has become the main theater of war for the United States. A continuous stream of ships, aircraft, various equipment and manpower headed here. Washington saw that the German blitzkrieg had failed, the war on the Russian front was dragging on. Therefore, one could not worry about Europe and go about their business in the Pacific Ocean. The Americans sought to regain their lost positions in the Pacific Ocean, strengthen and expand them, and achieve dominance in China. The American armed forces quickly recovered from the first bitter defeats, were able to create a strong defense and even go on the counteroffensive.

In April 1942, an agreement between Washington and London regarding the division of strategic war zones came into force. Britain was responsible for the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, including Malaya and Sumatra; The United States is over the Pacific Ocean, including Australia and New Zealand.


USS Enterprise at Pearl Harbor on the eve of the Battle of Midway. March 1942


USS Yorktown at Pearl Harbor after the Battle of the Coral Sea. After completing urgent repairs, the ship sailed for Midway on 30 May.

USA: from strategic defense to private offensive operations


The Pacific Theater was divided into two main areas: the Southwest and the Pacific. The first included Australia, the western group of the Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Islands, New Guinea, the Philippines, the Dutch Indies, except for Sumatra. The commander-in-chief of the southwestern region was General D. MacArthur with headquarters in Melbourne (then Brisbane). The Pacific region was divided into three parts: northern, central and southern. The commander-in-chief of all forces in the Pacific region was the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral C. Nimitz. His headquarters was at Pearl Harbor.

At a meeting at the White House on March 5, 1942, President Roosevelt declared that Australia and New Zealand must be held and attacked in the Pacific. In April, the Naval Staff developed an offensive plan that included three successive stages of action. MacArthur and Nimitz received directives from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, which ordered: to hold key positions in the Pacific Ocean and Australia, to actively act on enemy communications and prepare for the offensive. Subsequent directives provided for offensives to capture the islands of Tulagi and Santa Cruz, then the rest of the Solomon Islands and the northern coast of New Guinea, reaching the approaches to the Philippines. However, the Japanese were ahead of the Americans and were the first to launch an offensive in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.

By the spring of 1942, there had been some changes in the views of the allies on the use and further development of forces and means of fighting at sea. The American command recognizes that the stake in the Pacific Ocean must be made on the use of aircraft carriers and naval aviation. The Americans had 7 aircraft carriers against 11 Japanese, so it was necessary to accelerate the construction of aircraft carriers. Also, an important role was still assigned to battleships, attention to submarines increased.

The accumulation of US forces and resources in the Pacific theater proceeded at an accelerated pace. Of the 8 divisions that left the country before August, 5 divisions were sent to the Pacific Ocean. By October, 5 air armies were deployed in the region: the 10th - in India, the 5th - in Australia, the 13th and 7th - in the Solomon and Hawaiian Islands, the 11th - in Alaska and the Aleuts. Most of the Navy and merchant fleet (for the transport of goods) was concentrated in the Pacific Ocean. The United States launched a forced and massive construction of warships and auxiliary vessels. Ships were raised and repaired at Pearl Harbor. Created new air and naval bases.

During strategic planning for the summer and autumn of 1942 in the Pacific Ocean, the American command gave the initiative to the enemy, intending to prevent the further advance of the Japanese. This led to battles in the Coral Sea, near Midway Atoll, to stubborn battles in the Solomon Islands, and to the activation of the Japanese in China.


The return of aircraft to the American aircraft carrier Lexington during the battle in the Coral Sea. Estimated shooting time 14:00. The picture was taken from the port side overlooking the stern. The frame shows a bomb-damaged battery of 5-inch guns. On the flight deck, the Douglas TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bomber is seen taxiing after landing. In the background, a Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighter is seen coming in to land.


USS Lexington during the Battle of the Coral Sea. Apparently, the picture was taken in the middle of the day, at about 14:30, after returning aboard the 2nd torpedo squadron and the start of damage control, but before the start of the fire that destroyed the ship. This is the last known shot of the Lexington in working condition. The picture was taken from the heavy cruiser Portland. 8 May 1942

Japan: the desire to develop an offensive


By the spring of 1942, the Japanese armed forces had achieved major successes in a short time. At the same time, the losses of the Japanese were relatively small, while the Anglo-Americans suffered serious losses. Therefore, the Japanese high command decided that large-scale operations must be continued, making new seizures and creating a favorable military-political situation for a long time. By keeping the strategic initiative, forcing the US and Britain to remain on the defensive.

Two options for further large-scale expansion were discussed:

1) the Indian direction, with the capture of Ceylon, India, access through the Red Sea to the Middle East and connection with the German-Italian allies;

2) the capture of Australia. The Australian question caused a heated discussion between the navy and army command. The army command resolutely opposed the development of an offensive to the south. It required significant efforts by the army, which weakened other areas, in particular, the Kwantung Army, where the question was about the invasion of Russia.

However, the Japanese Headquarters abandoned both options for continuing aggression. Ground forces and the Air Force were required for the war with Russia, which was planned to begin in 1942. At the first stage of the campaign, during which they were going to capture Primorye, they intended to use 30 divisions, 1 aircraft and about 500 tanks. True, the Japanese leadership did not dare to start a war with Russia. But a strong grouping on the border of the Russian Far East was preserved.

Thus, the Japanese Headquarters temporarily postponed plans for an invasion of Russia, an offensive in India and Australia. By May 1942, the Japanese had made a compromise decision to develop an offensive in the Pacific. On May 5, the Japanese Headquarters issued a directive in which the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet was ordered "in cooperation with the ground forces to carry out the occupation of about. Midway and Key Points in the Western Aleutian Islands". It was also planned to capture the islands of Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia, New Guinea, and strengthen positions in the Solomon Islands. Offensive operations in China were also planned.


Japanese carrier-based aircraft take off from the Hiryu aircraft carrier on the eve of the Battle of Midway Atoll


During the battle at Midway Atoll, the Japanese heavy cruiser Mogami, performing an anti-submarine maneuver, rammed the Mikuma, and she was seriously damaged. On the evening of June 6, 1942, American planes attacked the cruiser, and she, having received 9 hits from 227-kg and 454-kg bombs, sank.

Battle in the Coral Sea


The first objects of capture planned by the Japanese command were Tulagi Island (Solomon Islands) and Port Moresby (New Guinea). The capture of these positions made it possible to increase pressure on Australia. The operation was entrusted to the 4th fleet of Admiral S. Inoue - 1 light aircraft carrier ("Shoho"), 4 heavy and 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers. Plus transports with troops. The 4th Fleet did not have heavy aircraft carriers, so the convoy was additionally covered by the aircraft carrier formation of Admiral T. Takagi - 2 heavy aircraft carriers ("Zuikaku" and "Shokaku") with 125 aircraft on board, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 destroyers and 6 submarines. The operation was also provided by the 25th air flotilla (162 aircraft) from the 11th air fleet, which was based at the Rabaul airfield.

In April, the Americans received information about the preparation of the enemy for an attack on Port Moresby. From the Pacific Fleet, two aircraft carrier formations were sent to the Coral Sea under the command of F. Fletcher, consisting of the heavy aircraft carriers Yorktown and Lexington (143 aircraft), 5 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers. The Australian squadron of Admiral D. Kreis also obeyed the Americans - 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers. Thus, the number of aircraft on Japanese and American aircraft carriers was approximately equal. But the Allies had superiority due to coastal aircraft - 450 against 315 Japanese.

On May 3, 1942, the Japanese, without encountering resistance, landed part of the landing on Tulagi, and the other part headed for Port Moresby. Having received news of this, Fletcher sent a group led by the aircraft carrier Yorktown to Tulagi. Another group was refueling from a tanker at the time. On May 4–5, American aircraft from aircraft carriers attacked Japanese transports and cruisers, but were not successful. The Japanese realized that American aircraft carriers were operating in the battle area.


Both sides conducted active aerial reconnaissance. On May 6, the Japanese discovered an American carrier group 420 miles from Tulagi, but then lost contact. At this time, American intelligence discovered an enemy landing at the eastern tip of New Guinea. On May 7, American aircraft (more than 90 aircraft) attacked the Shoho light aircraft carrier. 15 minutes after the start of the attack, Shoho sank. It would seem that the Americans should continue and attack the enemy landing ships. However, this did not happen. For no apparent reason, the Americans were satisfied with the destruction of only the aircraft carrier.

Meanwhile, the Japanese discovered and attacked the large tanker Neosho and the destroyer Sims. The destroyer was lost, the tanker was severely damaged. Neither side has yet discovered the main carrier forces of the enemy. And the outcome of the battle was largely determined by who was the first to detect the enemy and strike. At dawn on May 8, Japanese and American reconnaissance aircraft began searching again and soon discovered the enemy. Almost simultaneously, 80 American and 72 Japanese aircraft took off. The distance between the connections was about 165 miles. The planes flew towards each other, but there was no oncoming battle, as they were flying at different heights and in difficult meteorological conditions.



Japanese aircraft carrier "Shoho" under the blows of American torpedo bombers TBD-1 "Devastator"

The first to notice the enemy was a group of 49 aircraft from the aircraft carrier Yorktown. The Americans attacked the aircraft carrier Shokaku. But before that, the Americans made an almost 20-minute pause in anticipation of torpedo bombers. As a result, the Japanese managed to raise the fighters, which inflicted heavy losses on the torpedo bombers. The American attack was unsuccessful, but it distracted enemy fighters from the wave of dive bombers. The Japanese aircraft carrier caught fire. Then it was attacked by planes from the Lexington, and the Japanese ship received more damage.

Meanwhile, Japanese aircraft launched successful strikes on the aircraft carriers Lexington and Yorktown. Thus, the Lexington was attacked by Japanese carrier-based dive bombers and torpedo bombers and was hit by two torpedoes and five bombs. The ships were on fire. But the planes were able to board their ships. Connections began to quickly leave in a southerly direction. The damage inflicted on the Lexington led to an explosion of gasoline vapors inside the ship. 216 of the 2 crew members died. Due to the impossibility of saving the aircraft carrier, the order was given to abandon the ship. After the crew members were evacuated, the Lexington was torpedoed by escort destroyers. In essence, the Americans were left with one damaged aircraft carrier, and the formation lost its combat effectiveness.

At this time, the fire continued on the Shokaku. Returning Japanese planes were forced to land on the Zuikaku. Admiral Takagi decided to temporarily abandon further attacks in order to refuel the planes. And the commander of the 4th fleet, Admiral Inoue, ordered to postpone the operation to capture Port Moresby and withdraw all forces from the battle area. This decision caused a sharp discontent of the high command. The commander of the United Fleet, Admiral I. Yamamoto, ordered the pursuit of the enemy. On May 9, the Japanese ships went south, but the enemy was no longer found. The battle is over.

In quantitative terms, the losses were approximately equal: one aircraft carrier was killed and one damaged, 77 Japanese and 66 American aircraft were destroyed. But the dead aircraft carriers were not of equal value: the Japanese lost a light aircraft carrier, and the Americans lost a heavy one. Tactically, it was a Japanese victory. But strategically, this was an unexpected blow for the Japanese fleet: in previous battles at sea, the Japanese had a minimum of losses and won serious victories. The Japanese command abandons the operation to capture Port Moresby.


The American aircraft carrier USS Lexington burns shortly after being hit by Japanese torpedoes and bombs during the Battle of the Coral Sea. The ship has a noticeable trim on the nose, but it still keeps moving, receives and launches aircraft. The picture was taken around noon, before the end of extinguishing a fire from a bomb hitting a chimney. Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter flies over the ship


An explosion on the USS Lexington during the battle in the Coral Sea. Apparently, this is an explosion in the central part of the ship, which thundered at 17:27, towards the end of the crew leaving the ship. Near the aircraft carrier, the heavy cruiser Minneapolis and the destroyers Morris, Anderson and Hammann are visible.


Explosion on USS Lexington. Due to the impossibility of saving the aircraft carrier, the order was given to abandon the ship. After the crew members were evacuated, the Lexington was torpedoed by escort destroyers.


The American aircraft carrier Lexington, abandoned by the crew, is on fire and sinking in the Coral Sea

To be continued ...
Author:
Photos used:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/, http://waralbum.ru/
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  1. Luminman
    Luminman 4 June 2022 05: 16
    +6
    Ground forces and the Air Force were required for the war with Russia, which was planned to begin in 1942

    Where did the author get this from? wink
    1. bubalik
      bubalik 4 June 2022 07: 23
      +7
      ,, they had this.
      meeting of the Imperial Conference held on July 2, 1941, the Japanese leadership took a course towards preparing a solution to the problem of the "North": "Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact (an alliance of three powers - Germany, Japan, Italy. - S. A.). However, as long as we do not interfere in this conflict. We will covertly increase our military preparations against the Soviet Union, adhering to an independent position. At that time, we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great precautions. If the German-Soviet war is develop in a direction favorable to our empire, we, by resorting to armed force, will solve the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 June 2022 14: 42
        +4
        Quote: bubalik
        they had this.

        The fact of the matter is that it IJA only had June-July 1941 g. In August, it was decided to abandon the "northern option".
        Due to the protracted German-Soviet war, the Stavka was increasingly paying attention to the areas of the South Seas. On August 9, she abandoned the plan for resolving the northern problem in 1941, regardless of how the situation on the German-Soviet front would develop, and headed for a advance in the south. Following this, the “Basic Principles of the Operations of the Imperial Army” were adopted, the content of which boiled down to the following: a) ensure the security of the Soviet Union by forces of sixteen divisions located in Manchuria and Korea; b) continue approved operations against China; c) to the south, accelerate military preparations against England and the United States with the aim of completing them by the end of November.
        © Takushiro Hattori. Japan in the War 1941–1945
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 June 2022 14: 43
        +4
        The policy of the Empire towards the USSR in the first half November 1942, XNUMX was unequivocal: despite the fact that the USSR is busy in the West, it has enough forces in the Far East, and there is also a danger of the US Air Force arriving to help. The USSR has human resources and weapons, morale is high, the war with Germany will continue.
        Action Plan of the Soviet Union:
        a) based on the protracted nature of the world war, the USSR will seek to strengthen cooperation with the United States and England; the main focus will be on the war against Germany; at present, the USSR will strive to maintain its existing position with respect to Japan; there is no danger that he will enter the war against Japan at the insistence of the USA and England; if the situation on the German-Soviet front during the spring campaign develops in favor of the USSR, and the military power of Japan is weakened as a result of military operations by the USA and England, then the possibility of the USSR entering the war against Japan is not ruled out; there is also a considerable danger that the USSR will provide the United States with military bases on its territory for delivering a surprise strike against Japan if the latter considers it inevitable to use armed force against the USSR;
        b) in the size and composition of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Far East (about 20 rifle divisions, 1000 tanks and 1000 aircraft), in spite of any expected changes on the German-Soviet front, no major changes are foreseen as long as the existing relations between Japan and USSR;

        b) The capabilities of the USSR to wage war. Under modern conditions, the USSR can conduct combat operations simultaneously on two fronts—in the West and in the East—with the forces of about 200 weakly armed divisions.
        The USSR has enormous human resources. As of the spring of 1942, the military-industrial potential of the country is about 50% compared to what it was at the beginning of the German-Soviet war. Food in the country is available in sufficient quantities. The people deeply believe in Stalin, the spirit of the army and the people is currently very high.
        The fall of the Caucasus may lead to a significant reduction in material opportunities, but at present this will not serve as an obstacle to waging war against Germany in 1942.
        If the Soviet Army holds Leningrad, Moscow and the Caucasus for a long time, then by the autumn of 1942 the military-industrial potential of the country will increase slightly (up to 70% of the pre-war), but further growth will probably be extremely slow;

        Therefore, the Empire must, of course, prepare for a war with the USSR, but at the current moment it must avoid this war with all its might and maintain even relations with the USSR without aggravating the situation.
        4. On the policy towards the USSR in modern conditions. Policy towards the USSR should be carried out on the basis of decisions approved by the council, namely:
        by all means to prevent the expansion of the war by the other side;
        make every effort to avoid war with the USSR in every possible way during operations against the regions of the South Seas;
        make efforts to maintain a calm atmosphere in Japanese-Soviet relations and at the same time hinder the strengthening of ties between the USSR and the USA and Britain, and, if possible, tear the USSR away from these countries.
        This policy, of course, does not at all mean a refusal to carry out appropriate military preparations against the USSR. It is necessary to be fully prepared for military action in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest possible time.
        © Takushiro Hattori. Japan in the War 1941–1945
      3. Starr
        Starr 5 June 2022 17: 51
        -2
        Well, that is, only if Germany will obviously finish off the USSR. The Japanese were not going to drag chestnuts from the fire for her, the lessons of Hassan and Halkin Gol were enough for the army.
        1. Negro
          Negro 5 June 2022 19: 16
          +2
          Quote from Starr.
          the army was quite satisfied with the lessons of Hasan and Halkin Gol.

          Geography lessons. The Japanese needed resources, the resources were in the south. The USSR supplied Sakhalin oil with pleasure, refueling kamikaze planes. Proletarian greetings to American allies.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. General70
      General70 4 June 2022 22: 22
      0
      Perhaps the author had concerted actions by the German Wemacht during Operation Blau in 1942, the capture of the Caucasus, the capture of Stalingrad, and the simultaneous actions of the Kwantung Imperial Army against the Soviet Primorye? smile hi
  2. dmi.pris
    dmi.pris 4 June 2022 07: 31
    +5
    The Battle of Midway can be called a radical change with a stretch. The Americans carried out their radical change gradually. Starting from the battle in the Coral Sea to the battle for the Philippines. And not everything went like clockwork for them.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 June 2022 12: 41
      +13
      Quote: dmi.pris
      The Battle of Midway is a stretch to call a turning point.

      And yet - it is possible. In our country, Stalingrad is often considered a turning point, although in reality, of course, the turning point was carried out gradually.
      1. Catfish
        Catfish 4 June 2022 14: 07
        +6
        Good day, Andrey! smile
        I have come across this comparison several times and I agree with it, it is possible to compare, and this comparison is purely symbolic in terms of moral and psychological significance for our peoples, what Midway is for the Americans, what Stalingrad is for the Russians.

        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 June 2022 17: 43
          +4
          Good day to you too, Konstantin! drinks
          Quote: Sea Cat
          one can compare, and this comparison is purely symbolic in terms of moral and psychological significance for our peoples, what Midway is for the Americans, what Stalingrad is for the Russians.

          Absolutely agree. If you look in retrospect, then the obvious turning point is the battle for Moscow, after which the enemy did not even plan operations to destroy the USSR, because the same "blau" is an attempt not to win the war, but only to improve their economic situation by worsening the situation of the enemy . But our people truly realized that this war would end in Berlin after Stalingrad.
          1. Negro
            Negro 4 June 2022 21: 00
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            If you look in retrospect, then the obvious turning point is the battle for Moscow, after which the enemy did not even plan operations to destroy the USSR, because the same "blau" is an attempt not to win the war, but only to improve their economic situation by worsening the situation of the enemy . But our people truly realized that this war would end in Berlin after Stalingrad.

            If we draw analogies with the Eastern Front, then there are three control points - Moscow, as such there was no victory, the Wehrmacht ran into logistics restrictions; Blau when by and large the Soviet side lucky; and Kursk, when the first time overpowered Luck didn't matter there.

            Then it turns out that Midway is just Stalingrad to the nth degree - there is not just luck, but cheat codes and direct divine intervention. Overpowered - on Guadalcanal.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 June 2022 22: 22
              +4
              Quote: Negro
              If we draw analogies with the Eastern Front, then there are three control points

              We discuss tipping points, not milestones
              Quote: Negro
              Moscow, as such, there was no victory

              Hmm, that is, the failure of the blitzkrieg, the failure of the fall of the capital, the rollback of the "center" hundreds of kilometers - this is not a victory. Change in German strategy, as written by Tippelskirch
              Since the Germans lost the initiative near Moscow for the first time, after the first defeats were experienced, downright pathological features have appeared in their strategy.

              it's not a win either. And the fact that the plan of the German campaign for 1942 no longer provided for the decisive defeat of the Red Army, not to mention the victory over the USSR, is also not a victory. This, it turns out,
              Quote: Negro
              The Wehrmacht ran into logistics restrictions

              Well, tell us in all the chilling details - what kind of logistical restrictions prevented the Germans from winning another brilliant victory?
              Quote: Negro
              Blau, when in general the Soviet side was lucky

              I'm even afraid to ask what the luck was. So after all, you can die from laughter, although it is easy but not on time.
              Quote: Negro
              and Kursk, when they overpowered the first time

              I don’t know what “icebreakers” you used to study history, but still you should pay attention ... okay, I won’t point to domestic historiography, but at least read German, or something.
              Quote: Negro
              Then it turns out that Midway is just Stalingrad to the nth degree - there is not just luck, but cheat codes and direct divine intervention.

              There is not "luck" and "cheat codes" but the banal inability of the Americans to fight - with adequate leadership and training of troops, the Americans would have carried all four Japanese AB forward with their feet when they were preparing the first attack ....
              1. Negro
                Negro 4 June 2022 22: 57
                -3
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                There is not "luck" and "cheat codes" but the banal inability of the Americans to fight - with adequate leadership and training of troops, the Americans would have carried all four Japanese AB forward with their feet when they were preparing the first attack ....

                Yes. Because luck - with such a performance, the loss was more than likely.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                I'm even afraid to ask, what was the luck

                Strange, it seems that the history of the Battle of Stalingrad, even in Soviet historiography, is presented relatively adequately. The performance was very thin, literally a couple of Tiger battalions in the right places could outweigh.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                what kind of logistical restrictions prevented the Germans from winning another brilliant victory?

                Some strange question. From East Prussia to Khimki 1200 km by road. No army could be supplied with vehicles on such a shoulder, this is impossible. In Europe, not like in the Soviet Union.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Change in German strategy, as written by Tippelskirch
                ... downright pathological features appeared in their strategy

                Pathological features appeared there much earlier. Namely, when Halder's "military" Barbarossa ended on the Dnieper-Dvina line, and Hitler's "political" Barbarossa ended on the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. Moreover, the exit to both these frontiers was planned simultaneously.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Hmm, that is, the failure of the blitzkrieg, the failure of the fall of the capital, the rollback of the "center" hundreds of kilometers - this is not a victory

                Of course not. It seems that by the middle of 2022, even the most stupid person knows that the failure of the blitzkrieg, the failure of the fall of the capital, the rollback of the attacking forces hundreds of kilometers is far from always a victory for the defenders. It's entirely possible that the attackers simply swapped a completely insane military plan for a slightly less insane one.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                We're discussing the tipping point

                So I actually supported your position - Midway, as the first big, albeit an accidental victory, can indeed be considered an analogue of Stalingrad - naturally, the analogy here is more like a figure of speech.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 June 2022 23: 51
                  +4
                  Quote: Negro
                  Yes. Because luck - with such a performance, the loss was more than likely.

                  OK, if you are in this sense, then yes
                  Quote: Negro
                  Strange, it seems that the history of the Battle of Stalingrad, even in Soviet historiography, is presented relatively adequately. The performance was very thin, literally a couple of Tiger battalions in the right places could outweigh.

                  Where is this? :)))
                  Quote: Negro
                  Some strange question. From East Prussia to Khimki 1200 km by road. No army could be supplied with vehicles on such a shoulder, this is impossible. In Europe, not like in the Soviet Union.

                  Firstly, it would never have occurred to anyone to supply the army at such distances with vehicles. It would be just some kind of madness, which the Germans did not suffer at all, and delivered the necessary loads by rail
                  Secondly, you never answered what kind of cargo, if delivered on time, could prevent the defeat of the Germans near Moscow
                  Quote: Negro
                  Pathological features appeared there much earlier.

                  You can, of course, consider this a pathology, but the fact is that the “stop order” and “not a step back” in the German version are precisely the consequences of the battle near Moscow. And this is a real pathology that cost the Germans many losses, unlike
                  Quote: Negro
                  Halder's "military" Barbarossa ended on the Dnieper-Dvina line, while Hitler's "political" Barbarossa ended on the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.

                  Because barbarossa, in any case, provided for the infliction of a decisive defeat on the Red Army. After the Battle of Moscow, this was never planned again.
                  Quote: Negro
                  Of course not. It seems that by the middle of 2022, even the most stupid person knows that the failure of the blitzkrieg, the failure of the fall of the capital, the rollback of the attacking forces hundreds of kilometers is far from always a victory for the defenders ..

                  Yes of course. "The French lost Borodino, and from grief they occupied Moscow."
                  Quote: Negro
                  It's entirely possible that the attackers simply swapped a completely insane military plan for a slightly less insane one.

                  Barbarossa's plan is nowhere near insane. Adventurous - as much as you like, but only such a plan, only a blitzkrieg gave Germany a chance to defeat the USSR. This plan was not on a par with the possibilities of Germany, but in Germany at that time they did not know much about the USSR. And the essence of the plan - defeating the Red Army, capturing capitals, capturing or paralyzing the main industrial areas - were completely logical, and only they gave a chance for a military victory over the USSR.
                  At the same time, all the plans that the Germans made after 1941 were just in the nature of madness. Because they, as a rule, corresponded much better to the capabilities of Germany than Barbarossa, and from this they were more realistic, but they did not give the main thing - victory in the war. And if you do not see a way to win, then the continuation of the war loses its meaning for you - the main goal of the war, peace, better than the pre-war one, you will not get that way.
                  Therefore, Barbarossa is perhaps the only reasonable plan of Germany in the war against the USSR.
                  1. Negro
                    Negro 5 June 2022 00: 38
                    +1
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Where is this? :)))

                    I didn't realize right away. For me, Stalingrad is the whole story with a Caucasian direction. There, even according to Soviet authors, the Germans were let down by a gypsy camp from the Balkan allies. If by Stalingrad you mean Stalingrad itself, drain 6A by Manstein, then yes, from a certain point it was difficult to change anything. But this is a minor episode for my taste.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    It would be just some kind of madness, which the Germans did not suffer at all, and delivered the necessary loads by rail

                    The railway was not fully restored by November.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    You never answered what kind of cargo, if delivered on time, could prevent the defeat of the Germans near Moscow

                    The whole list?
                    One advancing division requires a certain amount of supplies. It is enough to look at the transport capabilities of a German in winter - and you will find out how many divisions could theoretically storm a city of many millions.

                    Why didn’t the German take Moscow in winter 41, why Rokossovsky didn’t take Warsaw in summer 44, why Zhukov didn’t take Berlin in February 45 - this is the same question with the same answer. Because it was impossible to take the city.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    "stop order" and "not a step back" in the German version - this is precisely the consequence of the battle near Moscow. And this is a real pathology that cost the Germans many losses, unlike

                    Unlike what? You are taxiing somewhere in the wrong place, you started talking about losses on the eastern front.
                    And a stop order in a radical version is a Belarusian operation, and especially the madness of the 45th year. At the beginning of the 42nd, sanity was generally maintained, with the exception of key strategic issues.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Because barbarossa, in any case, provided for the infliction of a decisive defeat on the Red Army.

                    Yes. This was done - Barbarossa was successful beyond all expectations, the Red Army was destroyed in a series of boilers. However, it suddenly became clear that even the most impressive military success (the destruction of the Red Army in a series of border battles) may not be adequate to the political task (the collapse of the state). Life did not prepare the Fuhrer for such a turn.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Yes of course. "The French lost Borodino, and from grief they occupied Moscow."

                    Why are the French here? I'm talking about much more recent events - when we went to the suburbs of the capital, and then changed our minds, there were important urgent matters somewhere.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Barbarossa's plan is nowhere near insane.

                    The part of Barbarossa that wasn't insane ended up in the Kyiv cauldron. And then the famous turn of Guderian was an extremely risky improvisation. But then we see a cheap booth of a corporal there. A reasonable plan from a military point of view (an attack of 300-500 km - a pause of 3-6 months) was politically unacceptable for him, Hitler was NOT READY to admit that it would take at least 2 years to reach the Volga. And when the commander-in-chief refuses to recognize reality, it rarely ends up in something good.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 5 June 2022 11: 39
                      +2
                      Quote: Negro
                      There, even according to Soviet authors, the Germans were let down by a gypsy camp from the Balkan allies.

                      So there is no luck here. The Germans initially had insufficient forces to solve the task, and these forces were not enough as a result of the losses suffered near Moscow and the battles taking place in other sectors of the front (including the same defense of Sevastopol). That is, the use, as you write, of the "gypsy camp" became uncontested, and the fact that its fighting qualities did not correspond to German ones, again, does not apply to luck.
                      Quote: Negro
                      The railway was not fully restored by November.

                      At the same time, the same Tippelskirch points out
                      When no one could yet foresee the failures of the German troops in the north and south, Army Group Center launched an offensive against Moscow, which was to decide the outcome of the war. On October 2, three infantry and three tank armies were ready to attack. Tank divisions were significantly replenished, their materiel was repaired. The number of personnel of the infantry formations had already been greatly reduced, but they were fully equipped with artillery. Strong heavy artillery and numerous self-propelled guns provided the infantry divisions with a striking force that promised great success.

                      In general, Tippelskirch points out that the slush prevented the German troops from pursuing the retreating Soviet units and the exhaustion of forces, i.e. a strong overstrain of troops in battles, while he separately indicates that such an overstrain occurred when the USSR had not yet committed all its forces into battle. He also writes about the "moral and material" unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht to conduct a mobile war in winter. But he begins to mention some problems with logistics only at the height of the Soviet counteroffensive on the Center group, when there was a threat of cutting the railway lines along which it was supplied.
                      So I do not see the slightest reason to talk about logistics as a significant factor in the defeat of the German troops near Moscow.
                      Quote: Negro
                      One advancing division requires a certain amount of supplies. It is enough to look at the transport capabilities of a German in winter - and you will find out how many divisions could theoretically storm a city of many millions.

                      And what happened in winter that didn’t happen in autumn, when the German army was advancing with might and main? I'll tell you this, it's easier for cars to drive on frozen roads than on autumn thaws. The seasons do not affect the railway at all. So what's the problem?

                      Quote: Negro
                      Why didn’t the German take Moscow in winter 41, why Rokossovsky didn’t take Warsaw in summer 44, why Zhukov didn’t take Berlin in February 45 - this is the same question with the same answer.

                      To which logistics has no noticeable relation.
                      Quote: Negro
                      Unlike what? You are taxiing somewhere in the wrong place, you started talking about losses on the eastern front.

                      Now I'm not talking about losses, but about pathological changes in strategy. And I call these changes.
                      Quote: Negro
                      Yes. This was done - Barbarossa was successful beyond all expectations, the Red Army was destroyed in a series of boilers. However, it suddenly became clear that even the most impressive military success (the destruction of the Red Army in a series of border battles) may not be adequate to the political task (the collapse of the state). Life did not prepare the Fuhrer for such a turn.

                      Sorry, but you interpret Barbarossa in a strange way. The defeat of the Red Army was not the only task of the plan, which provided for the largest territorial acquisitions. Hitler was well aware that simply defeating the army was not enough, and therefore demanded to move forward

                      Quote: Negro
                      Why are the French here? I'm talking about much more recent events - when we went to the suburbs of the capital, and then changed our minds, there were important urgent matters somewhere.

                      These "important and urgent matters" Tippelskirch described as follows
                      Many representatives of the high command hoped to prevent the danger, which they had already noticed a few weeks ago, only by the immediate withdrawal of the armies and the reduction of the front line.

                      From an operational point of view, this idea was undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless, Hitler opposed her with all the energy of his indomitable character. He could not accept her for fear of losing his prestige; he also feared - and not without reason - that such a large withdrawal would cause a decline in the morale of the army. Hfinally, there was no guarantee that it would be possible to stop the retreating troops in a timely manner.

                      Simply put, Hitler seriously feared that the attempt to withdraw troops would turn into an uncontrolled and stampede flight.
                      Quote: Negro
                      The part of Barbarossa that wasn't insane ended up in the Kyiv cauldron.

                      Quite the contrary - to end the operation with the "Kyiv Cauldron" would be madness, and Hitler understood this very well.
                      Quote: Negro
                      Reasonable plan from a military point of view (offensive for 300-500 km - 3-6 months pause)

                      It would lead to the fact that the successes of the Germans in 1941 would turn out to be much more modest than real ones, and the USSR would have much more resources (both material and human), which would make the war end much faster and with fewer losses for us
                      1. Negro
                        Negro 5 June 2022 20: 03
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        So there is no luck here. The Germans initially had insufficient forces to solve the task

                        They did not have enough strength for the Citadel. In the south, the forces were relatively adequate.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        At the same time, the same Tippelskirch points out

                        )))
                        German memoirs in the genre of "Stolen Victories" is a rather peculiar source. But Tippelskirch writes quite a lot about the supply, it is unlikely that you missed it all. In particular, he writes that the supply of the GA Center along the Smolensk railway line is never Belgium at all. Russian gauge, Soviet rolling stock in poor condition.
                        Another thing is that the Germans are not Americans, they place accents differently.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And what happened in winter that didn’t happen in autumn, when the German army was advancing with might and main?

                        It happened that she was advancing 300 kilometers to the west. And every day she approached the main Soviet railway junction and moved away from her border.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Sorry, but you interpret Barbarossa in a strange way. The defeat of the Red Army was not the only task of the plan, which provided for the largest territorial acquisitions.

                        Therefore, I am writing about the "military" and "political" Barbarossa. Military Barbarossa envisaged the defeat of Soviet forces in the west, it was simply impossible to plan anything further in advance. But Hitler had to plan for victory in the East before the cold weather, so he found an elegant solution - consider the Dnieper and Volga to be the same river, so access to the Dnieper = access to the Volga. It was a brilliant idea, but as it turned out, it had its drawbacks.
                        The same trick under the working title "Home for Christmas" was then repeated by the Americans. There, the Rhine was conditionally considered the Oder. These geographical eccentricities did not cost them as much as the Germans, but in the fall of the 44th they found themselves in a stupid position.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Simply put, Hitler seriously feared that the attempt to withdraw troops would turn into an uncontrolled and stampede flight.

                        You see, I am somewhat skeptical about Hitler's statements - he was not always a sincere person. So I do not consider it necessary to discuss a possible "stamped flight" of the Germans in 41.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Quite the contrary - to end the operation with the "Kyiv Cauldron" would be madness, and Hitler understood this very well.

                        So the specific operation of the Kyiv boiler ended. Then there were other operations not envisaged by pre-war plans.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        It would lead to the fact that the successes of the Germans in 1941 would turn out to be much more modest than real ones, and the USSR would have much more resources (both material and human), which would make the war end much faster and with fewer losses for us

                        For the first time I hear that a reasonable use of the VS instead of an obviously erroneous one can bring successes "more modest than real ones." By the way, you yourself write above that the German performance of the Winter War had a catastrophic effect on their capabilities in the 42 year campaign.
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 5 June 2022 21: 07
                        +1
                        Quote: Negro
                        They did not have enough strength for the Citadel. In the south, the forces were relatively adequate.

                        Given the fact that the Germans were forced to use allies, the relativity you recommend is very relative. You yourself write about the gypsy camp, but there is only one need to use it - you lacked your own strength
                        Quote: Negro
                        German memoirs in the genre of "Stolen Victories" is a rather peculiar source.

                        Sorry, but Tippelskirch is, well, victories that have never been stolen. It just distinguishes the desire for impartiality.
                        Quote: Negro
                        But Tippelskirch writes quite a lot about the supply, it is unlikely that you missed it all. In particular, he writes that the supply of the GA Center along the Smolensk railway line is never Belgium at all.

                        Difficulties with supply are mentioned, they, of course, were. But it is impossible to speak of them as a key factor in the German problems near Moscow. The same Halder writes about the shortage of staff, infantry divisions, and the lack of replenishment in Germany. November 30 entry, for example:
                        a) The shortfall on the Eastern Front is 340 people, that is, half of the combat strength of the infantry. Now companies have an average of 000-50 people.
                        b) At present, losses and the number of convalescents returning to the front roughly balance each other. Replenishment of the shortfall is possible only by disbanding a number of formations.
                        In Germany, only 33 people are ready to be sent to the front. The bulk of the reinforcements of the personnel are not yet accustomed to front-line conditions. Hence the decrease in the fighting qualities of the troops.

                        That is, the question is not that it was impossible to deliver, the question is that there was no one to deliver.
                        Quote: Negro
                        Military Barbarossa envisaged the defeat of Soviet forces in the west, it was simply impossible to plan anything further in advance.

                        Oddly enough, Barbarossa was a completely reasonable plan, which had only one problem - an underestimation of the real size of the Red Army. But this, in essence, is not a problem of the plan, but of assessing the potential of the USSR.
                        Quote: Negro
                        You see, I am somewhat skeptical about Hitler's statements - he was not always a sincere person. So I do not consider it necessary to discuss a possible "stamped flight" of the Germans in 41.

                        The whole question is that it is not Hitler who writes about this, but Tippelskirch. But no one writes about the supply crisis near Moscow, which did not allow the Germans to defend normally. Even Halder, who, in fact, cannot be written down as a memoirist a la "stolen victories" in principle. And here you are writing.
                        Quote: Negro
                        For the first time I hear that a reasonable use of the VS instead of an obviously erroneous one can bring successes "more modest than real ones."

                        Your criteria of "reasonable" and "erroneous" are wrong here.
                        Simply put, the purpose of the use of troops is military victory. If the enemy surpasses you in resources, then you can surpass him in terms of troops. If the enemy is superior to you so much that it is impossible to neutralize the superiority due to the quality of the troops alone, then you have to compensate for his superiority with an increased risk of military plans. The stronger your opponent is, the more risky plans you have to come up with in order to achieve victory. Of course, the higher the risk - the less likely the plan will succeed, but this is the price you have to pay for the chance to win.
                        Barbarossa was a very risky plan - but, if successful, it gave the Germans a chance to win. Therefore, for all his "madness" he was perfectly reasonable. Here is what you propose
                        Quote: Negro
                        Reasonable plan from a military point of view (offensive for 300-500 km - 3-6 months pause)

                        Contained, of course, much less risk, and therefore you consider it "reasonable". But he was not such, because, in principle, he could not lead Germany to victory.
                      3. Negro
                        Negro 6 June 2022 08: 49
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Contained, of course, much less risk, and therefore you consider it "reasonable". But he was not such, because, in principle, he could not lead Germany to victory.

                        Well, it remains to note that you and I see the strategic pattern of the Second World War differently. You have a fall, a "break" in December 41 (December 11, khe-khe) and a rebound (retreat, to be more precise), I have the superiority of the Reich - a period of unstable balance, those same "Lost Victories" - a reversal of the strategic situation in the 43rd .
                      4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 June 2022 20: 23
                        0
                        Quote: Negro
                        Well, it remains to fix that you and I see the strategic pattern of the Second World War differently

                        Undoubtedly. And you are absolutely right that the discussion should end here - we are unlikely to convince each other.
          2. Starr
            Starr 5 June 2022 17: 53
            -2
            Is it? Blau was an attempt to destroy the USSR economically, because in the event of the capture of Baku, he would have lost 80% of all oil, and this is certain death.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 5 June 2022 22: 02
              0
              Quote from Starr.
              Blau was an attempt to destroy the USSR economically, because in the event of the capture of Baku, he would have lost 80% of all oil, and this is certain death.

              You are wrong. The Volga-Ural region has become a new raw material base of the country
              1. Starr
                Starr 6 June 2022 14: 03
                -2
                And what was the percentage of oil production there? It is impossible to quickly increase it many times.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 June 2022 21: 01
                  +1
                  Quote from Starr.
                  And what was the percentage of oil production there?

                  Everything is complicated there, and taking a certain percentage is pointless. The Caucasus and Baku, before the German troops approached them, really gave up to 70% of oil, but all this fell heavily - some of the wells went to the Germans (most of them were destroyed), some - although they didn’t get to the Germans, were bombed by them. In other words, there was a sharp drop in oil production and supplies from the percentages you indicated, but they survived at the expense of the new region.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 June 2022 14: 29
      +6
      Quote: dmi.pris
      The Battle of Midway is a stretch to call a turning point.

      It is possible without tension. We just got used to the fact that a radical change is necessarily a grandiose battle with millions of losses (General Slashchev, remember, walked well on this occasion). And it is difficult for us to understand what a war at sea is when in one battle, with insignificant human losses from the point of view of the army, the enemy loses 2/3 of the ships that determine the course of the war - and can no longer recover from this loss.
      Midway is primarily the death of four of the six large aircraft carriers. The IJN never received a replacement for them. And after the aircraft carriers, the deck elite that survived at Midway also died - having lost its decks, it was forced to work in the role of a base one, regularly flying over the Solomons from coastal airfields - where it was ground on the American middle peasants.
      Quote: dmi.pris
      And the change was carried out mostly in the factories and shipyards of the United States.

      But this is yes. It is much easier to plan operations, knowing that in the summer of 1943 a new fleet will begin to come to you. smile
      Although at the beginning of 1943 the US Pacific Fleet was hanging by a thread. The Solomons cost Nimitz very dearly - the fleet had the only combat-ready AB left, so the Yankees even rented their "Victories" from the limes, which became a pair of "Lady Sarah" (for this, in the spring of 1944, "Lady Sarah" repaid the debt as part of the RN in Indian Ocean).
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 June 2022 17: 45
        +2
        Quote: Alexey RA
        It is possible without tension.

        Certainly.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        We just got used to the fact that a radical change is necessarily a grandiose battle with millions of losses

        Here, rather, something else was meant - after all, the Japanese were actively fighting at sea after Midway, and for some time the forces at Guadalcanal were approximately equal, and the Americans were on the verge of defeat.
        Well, at least that's how I understood our opponent's remark :)
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 4 June 2022 18: 49
          +1
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Here, rather, something else was meant - after all, the Japanese were actively fighting at sea after Midway, and for some time the forces at Guadalcanal were approximately equal, and the Americans were on the verge of defeat.

          It was. But the situation before and after Midway are two big differences. Before Midway, the navy was really afraid even of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After Midway, the war went to the far periphery of the Solomons, and the area for future battles was already determined by the Americans. Yes, the Solomons cost the Yankees dearly - the USN had only three ABs left, of which one worked in the Atlantic, and the second was breathing its last. Yes, the Japanese, even after Midway, were formally able to put up impressive forces. But "Junyo" and even more so "Ryujo" with "Zuiho" are not "Akagi", "Kaga" and "Dragons".
          And "on the verge of defeat on the Solomons" is still different from "on the verge of defeat on the threshold of the main fleet base" - because in the latter case the enemy has 6 first-class AB, and he does not need to understaff the 1st and 2nd DAV with converted passenger liners and floating base submarines.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 June 2022 20: 37
            +2
            Quote: Alexey RA
            But the situation before and after Midway are two big differences.

            Certainly, why I am not inclined to deny Midway the title of turning point. And yes, it was the destruction of 4 ABs at Midway that led to the loss of the Nihon Kaigun's ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Thus, the hope for a "quick victorious war" among the Japanese died, and the Americans felt the joy of victory over the strongest enemy.
            That is, after Midway, the Japanese did not even have the specter of a winning strategy. This, of course, is a fact. On the other hand, a break is usually understood as a certain point, after which the opponent is weaker. Midway, on the other hand, rather equalized forces - and given the fact that America could strengthen the fleet at a pace that was an order of magnitude higher than the Japanese, it was guaranteed to lead them to win the war. But - later, and so they still had to flounder with approximately equal forces
            1. Starr
              Starr 6 June 2022 14: 06
              -2
              So a victorious war was impossible from the very beginning. Pearl Harbor excluded any peace agreements, and in an all-out war, Japanese admirals were guaranteed to lose to American industry. The United States launched ships faster than Japan sank them. Defeating an enemy at sea capable of building an aircraft carrier every 3 days is simply unrealistic...
    3. Negro
      Negro 4 June 2022 16: 39
      0
      Quote: dmi.pris
      From the Battle of the Coral Sea to the Battle of the Philippines.

      Well, about the Philippines too much. Already at the Marianas, the game was one-sided.
  3. Looking for
    Looking for 4 June 2022 10: 19
    -12
    Or maybe it’s enough for the authors to advertise the military "genius" of America.?? Especially at such a time !!!
    1. Region-25.rus
      Region-25.rus 4 June 2022 11: 06
      +8
      Maybe it's enough for the authors to advertise America's military "genius"
      where is the advertisement of someone's genius? Did it seem that way to you? It is simply history and its lessons to be remembered. And it doesn’t matter on which theater of operations and between whom.
      Especially at this time!!!
      what is the connection between WW2 and today? Parallels maybe? Or if about "Americans" that's all?! Taboo? Or like schoolchildren -
      "Maryivanna! Did you hear that Kennedy answered Khrushchev about the missiles in Cuba? Well, did you hear what? - Well, what about it! Let's cancel the lessons! It's such a time!"
      Are you a schoolboy by any chance?
    2. dmi.pris
      dmi.pris 4 June 2022 12: 40
      +4
      Then we fought together. And they had their own heroes. The author does not talk about "victories" and brilliant Yankees in Yugoslavia or in Afghanistan and Syria?
      1. Region-25.rus
        Region-25.rus 5 June 2022 03: 28
        +2
        The author does not talk about "victories" and brilliant Yankees in Yugoslavia or in Afghanistan and Syria?
        like an article for the anniversary of the described battle. 80 years!. AND...
        yes, we were on the same side then. And to happiness The US won that battle. If it were the other way around, it would be much worse (for us, first of all). The Americans, yes, having lost the initiative at sea, would have taken refuge on the mainland to lick their wounds. But the samurai ... from here they would have turned around in full. Considering the Kwantung Army near our practically borders and our position in 1942 ..... here, most likely, the Japanese would not give a damn about the "Non-Aggression Pact". Do you understand what I mean? hi
        1. dmi.pris
          dmi.pris 5 June 2022 08: 13
          +1
          I understand perfectly. They were still scratching their heads in the fall of 41, but they didn’t stop there.
    3. Negro
      Negro 4 June 2022 16: 48
      +3
      Quote: Seeker
      Or maybe it’s enough for the authors to advertise the military "genius" of America. ??

      No problem.

      The only possibly brilliant American naval commander of that time, Yarnell, was retired before the war, by the end of the 42nd, the best, perhaps, current naval commander, the winner at Midway Fletcher, was actually removed, and two mediocrities, Halsey and Spruance, commanded the American fleet until the end of the war . Both missed the general battle, one at the Philippines, the second at the Marian.

      That's better?
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 June 2022 18: 54
        +4
        Quote: Negro
        That's better?

        Not good enough. It would not hurt to mention MacArthur, who destroyed his army and fled from the Philippines, in order to satisfy the ambitions of which the fleet had to lay people down and waste time in a senseless operation to liberate the Philippines. wink
        1. Negro
          Negro 4 June 2022 21: 16
          -1
          Quote: Alexey RA
          it would also be inconvenient to mention MacArthur, who destroyed his army and fled from the Philippines, in order to satisfy the ambitions of which the fleet had to lay people down and waste time in a senseless operation to liberate the Philippines.

          Well, you know. You are stepping on thin ice. Of course, the field marshal is a juicy figure for criticism. But it is difficult to avoid such expressions as "American October" - for the heroic evacuation, "American Tukhachevsky" - for the army bonus, etc. And in general, talking about army losses has never been beneficial to supporters of Soviet military thought.

          So it’s better to focus on the naval ones - the USSR didn’t have a fleet, then the answer will not arrive. And the characters are better than each other. Here you have a journalist Rogozin Knox, secretary of the Navy, and King, a model eccentric, and Kimmel, who had little authority to change the time for breakfast at the air defense center, are one better than the other.

          Nevertheless, Nimitz and Lockwood somehow had enough for them.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 4 June 2022 23: 41
            +2
            Quote: Negro
            And the characters are better than each other. Here you have journalist Rogozin Knox - Minister of the Navy, and King, an exemplary eccentric, and Kimmel, who had little authority to change the time for breakfast at the air defense center - one is better than the other.

            No, no, no, Kimmel had nothing to do with breakfast at the air defense center. You remember that the Air Force and coastal defense is an army diocese. So this is the work of Short, touching which is also fraught - because it immediately pops up "do not succumb to provocations", "at peacefully sleeping airfields", etc. smile
            Kimmel had enough of his jambs - with the same lower degree of combat readiness, the lack of an air patrol around the GVMB, at least in the near zone, or docking an EM with full ammo (including torpedo warheads) and fuel, which is why they almost ruined it during a fire " Pennsylvania".
            1. Negro
              Negro 5 June 2022 00: 44
              +2
              Quote: Alexey RA
              So this is the work of Short, touching which is also fraught - because it immediately pops up "do not succumb to provocations", "at peacefully sleeping airfields", etc.

              American General Pavlov.
              Quote: Alexey RA
              Kimmel had enough of his joints

              The truth was lucky that it was not possible to give a general battle of linear forces somewhere near Wake. That would be the number, given all the circumstances now known. Thank you Yamamoto with Nagumo from American mothers.
      2. Starr
        Starr 6 June 2022 14: 06
        -2
        That is, they filled up the corpses of the Japanese?)
        1. Negro
          Negro 6 June 2022 15: 34
          0
          Anything happened. But mostly money.
  4. TermNachTer
    TermNachTer 4 June 2022 11: 01
    +2
    I do not want to offend the author, but an attempt to consider the battles in the Coral Sea, Midway and the attack on Dutch Harbor, in the size of a magazine article, looks naive. In the United States, dozens of books are devoted to each of these topics. Moreover, these events are considered both as a whole, by senior officers, and in detail by individual participants - commanders of destroyers, submarines, pilots and even rear-guards - repairmen, supplies. In general - much more informative, with a lot of details. Google translator does not work very correctly, but for someone who is in the subject, it is acceptable.
    1. dmi.pris
      dmi.pris 4 June 2022 12: 59
      0
      I read several books in translation. It is written interestingly, they refer to documents ..
      1. TermNachTer
        TermNachTer 4 June 2022 13: 24
        +3
        So from there. I have already collected pcs in my laptop. 30 for this period alone. And there is also Singapore, And the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands. Reading is not rereading.
  5. Vladislav 73
    Vladislav 73 4 June 2022 11: 59
    +2
    It required significant efforts by the army, which weakened other areas, in particular, the Kwantung Army, where the question of the invasion of Russia was raised.
    True, the Japanese leadership did not dare to start a war with Russia. But a strong grouping on the border of the Russian Far East was preserved.
    Is it so difficult for the author to write that the war was waged not by Russia but by the Soviet Union? And that the object of further plans was the Soviet Primorye and the Soviet Far East? Or is the name of the bygone country secretly banned? I don’t know how anyone, for me, such a substitution of concepts has the same meaning as, for example, plywood on the Mausoleum on May 9, the St. which have been promoted for a long time. But on the other hand, we are not rewriting history, it is somewhere out there, in the West!
    1. Negro
      Negro 4 June 2022 16: 43
      +5
      This is the artel of the Samsonovs, they have this all the time. Form style. Stalin is a Russian leader, etc.
      1. Vladislav 73
        Vladislav 73 4 June 2022 16: 59
        +1
        Exactly! Let me refresh my memory...
        “... The matter is, therefore, about the life and death of the Soviet state, about the life and death of the peoples of the USSR, about whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement”
        From a speech on the radio on July 3, 1941 by I.V. Stalin. Where is Russia, Russia ?? Who does not believe, find and read!
  6. RVAPatriot
    RVAPatriot 4 June 2022 12: 39
    0
    The smoke is white....
  7. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 4 June 2022 14: 14
    +5
    The damage inflicted on the Lexington led to an explosion of gasoline vapors inside the ship. 216 of the 2 crew members died. Due to the impossibility of saving the aircraft carrier, the order was given to abandon the ship.

    As it turned out later, "Lady Lex" was destroyed by her own team, who did everything possible to cause maximum damage during a torpedo hit and the subsequent explosion of fuel vapors.
    Have you read WDR Lexington? This is just a song - in 1940, for these two AB, BuShip issued a prescription - before adopting the system for filling empty containers and their CO2 fittings, keep the rooms around the jet fuel tanks empty, under no circumstances filling them with liquids. Jet fuel was stored there in tanks in the bow of the hull, approximately in the area of ​​the bow of the aircraft.
    On May 7, 1942, the ballast and fresh tanks around the starboard fuel tanks were empty, as prescribed, outside of the port side tanks, they were filled with fresh water. The torpedoes also hit the port side ... in fact, in the area of ​​\uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbthe tanks - only one of them. The PTZ was not inspected in this district, they came to the conclusion that it withstood the blow, but the exhaust ventilation systems in the area of ​​the well of the first elevator were damaged - therefore, the watch was removed from there. This is the aggregate compartment of the hydraulic motors of the elevator itself, a filtration cofferdam and ... an emergency DGR, which (and what will be done with it) was left in operation! In a room with poor ventilation. Under conditions of full operability of the ship's GTG and their being under load.
    Of course, fuel vapors from the driven tank penetrated through the rubber dam into the generator room, accumulated there, and then, of course, rushed.
    © maxez