Summary May 4th. Kharkiv, Lyman, Popasnaya, Nikolaev

Yuri Podolyaka

Traditional evening summary from the fronts of the war in Ukraine

Comments

[Saboteur_Navy]

Artillery is all right, something needs to be done with it .. their 155 self-propelled guns should not appear. But I’m more worried, to be honest, the supply of counter-battery radars ...

[dmi.pris1]

What to do? Methodically destroy. Although I believe that we will be grinding groups with a mobilization potential of ten million and a constant supply of weapons for a very long time.

[nnm]

The only counterargument is the conduct of its own partial mobilization.

[Bad_gr]

Quote: nnm

The only counterargument is the conduct of its own partial mobilization.

If you believe the Internet, then the regular number of military personnel in the Russian Army is
(1) 013 628 Human. Fighting in Ukraine ± 200 people. If they deem it necessary, they will add from the rest.

[Saboteur_Navy]

Purely my opinion on artillery
1.we need to increase the UAV and urgently
2.immediately increase the air force
3. methodically and totally burn their railway and auto transport, so that the machinists and drivers would twitch and be afraid
4.remember the experience of partisan detachments in western Ukraine

[Odysseus]

Alas, your suggestions are wonderful, but difficult to implement.
1) There is nothing to increase. If only to buy in China.
2) Similarly. Moreover, if drones can be purchased in China, then there is simply nowhere to get aviation.
3) We would eliminate the bridges on the Dnieper - that would be great. Railway transport can only be attacked with complete air supremacy. He is not.
4) Probably in the east? But there is some merit in this proposal. This can be done if you fight in a normal way.

[Saboteur_Navy]

I do not agree with you, but I know from the media
1.there is already a firm Kronshtad
2. I appreciate the performance characteristics of the SU-34, it is ours
3.it is the SU-34 that can successfully burn both railway and auto transport
4. Precisely in the western one, because there, when crossing the border, it is necessary to violate and destroy their supply. For this, everything you need is there, mountains, forests.
I don’t believe that everything is bad with us, on the second day the British scoundrels said that we had run out of cruise missiles. No, they didn’t run out, they fly successfully, we apparently have more of them than in the USA, it’s in the USA that they ran out during the operation in Yugoslavia. It's good that the USA and all other villains underestimate us... We'll wash them with blood!

[Vadmir]

1.there is already a firm Kronshtad

There is a firm, but the plant, according to the latest data, they are only building.

2. I appreciate the performance characteristics of the SU-34, it is ours

I also like Su-34s, but there are only 124 of them in the Aerospace Forces (according to Military balance 2022) minus those in Syria, minus those preparing for parades. We were not going to fight with anyone, because there were only partners around. My opinion is that the size of our army, air force and navy does not correspond in any way to the length of our borders and the number of enemies.

[Vadmir]

1.we need to increase the UAV and urgently

Well said, but where do you get them? The production of strike UAVs in our country is just unfolding, as long as it is a piece goods.

urgently increase the air force

I would like to, but the headquarters do not yet take this war seriously, if more than 400 aircraft are involved in parades across the country, with a total number of 1172 aircraft, according to Military balance 2022. That is, more than a third of all aviation was preparing for the parade within a month and it's during the war (madness).
...

4.remember the experience of partisan detachments in western Ukraine

Partisan detachments relied on a loyal population, in 2014 there were plenty of such a population, but now this is not the case.

[donavi49]

Well, against the background of standing still instead of a mega-offensive, Kharkiv seriously buffs morale and recruits.

By the way, in Kharkov, in general, the change of tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is in the media. Complete silence, zero materials. As a result, the Americans and RIA Novosti reported on the success of the Ukrainians at Stary Saltov. And this is already an opportunity to place artillery and tightly cover the rear bases in Vovchansk-Kolodyaz with a correction for Maviks.

Only after everyone had already reported, the Ukrainians let the journalists into the north of Kharkov. In my opinion, there was even a note about the T-90M near Kharkov on Topvar.

Well, he couldn't back down. And about minor miscalculations in technology.

[Odysseus]

Quote: donavi49

By the way, in Kharkov, in general, the change of tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is in the media. Complete silence, zero materials. As a result, the Americans and RIA Novosti reported on the success of the Ukrainians at Stary Saltov. And this is already an opportunity to place artillery and tightly cover the rear bases in Vovchansk-Kolodyaz with a correction for Maviks.

Formally, everything is correct. But something when reading your messages, the question arises, actually, whose side are you on? I'm not saying that initially you performed under the Ukrainian flag.
Tell the public please.

[Arian]

Well, a little different analytics from Strelkov I.I. also does not hurt, pluralism of opinions, so to speak:
I have no information about active hostilities from the Belgorod and Bryansk fronts.

In the Kharkov area - fighting to the northeast and southwest of the city. The attacks of the Ukrainian troops in these areas were stopped without significant (for the Armed Forces) results. Our troops, however, also have nothing to "boast" about. In general, the front remains on the line reached by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during a slight advance a week ago.

In the area south of Izyum, over the past two days, Russian troops have not been able to make significant progress and capture any settlements. There is no talk yet about a breakthrough to the Barvenkovo-Slavyansk highway.
Fighting continued around Krasny Liman (apparently considered by the command of the RF Armed Forces as a "consolation prize" for the expected (by me) failure to cover the entire enemy Donetsk grouping). The estuary is covered by Russian troops and units of the LDNR Armed Forces from the east and southeast, but now (when the threat of a breakthrough to Barvenkovo ​​has weakened) the Armed Forces of Ukraine are clearly not going to surrender it without a fight. The wooded area around the city and the fully blossomed foliage on the vegetation contribute to the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The advance of Russian troops is slow. Both sides are suffering significant losses.

In the area of ​​Severodonetsk - no changes: again, because they do not intend to leave this heavily fortified outpost without a real threat to the rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and it is not possible to take it by storm from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the LPR. Fighting continues in the industrial zone on the southern outskirts of Rubizhne. There are heavy losses on both sides.

Popasnaya - no change. Fierce street fighting with a very slow advance of Russian and allied forces.

Donetsk region. Avdiivka and Maryinka - no changes. District Ugledar - similarly. The only difference is that the DPR Armed Forces have not yet entered the city itself and the key settlements around it.

In the Zaporozhye region, units of the DPR Armed Forces deployed there failed in preparing an offensive in the area of ​​​​the village of Lyubimovka (North of Melitopol along the highway to Zaporozhye, west of Tokmak). Positional battles continue.

Transnistria - there was no information about an additional aggravation of the situation. The threat of invasion remains relevant and will remain so until the Russian troops break through to the region.

Finally, systemic (aimed not at one-time "acts of intimidation", but at a real violation of the railway network) missile strikes on the so-called communications began. "Ukraine". At the same time, I cannot fail to note that key objects - bridges and bridge aqueducts - are still bypassed with blows. The main emphasis is on the destruction of electrical substations that feed the lines. However, I have the honor to remind you (if suddenly the General Staff does not know) that Kyiv has a not so small fleet of diesel locomotives at its disposal (part of the railway lines in western Ukraine were not electrified even in Soviet times). And for them, damage to electricity supply systems is unpleasant, but not critical.

In general, the situation at the front continues to develop according to my (a week ago) forecast. Strategically, it plays into the hands of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which managed to prevent the widely advertised breakthrough of the front in the Donbass at almost the same positions from which the attempted breakthrough began (for now, at least).
The Armed Forces of Ukraine won another week to replenish troops, regroup and prepare reserves. And also for planning probable offensive operations where they are expected (Transnistria, for example) and the Russian command is not expected, for some reason still confident (despite all the "lessons" of the previous two months) that the enemy will fight in such a way that how convenient the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

[Carlos Hall]

Comrade Andrei, having carefully read your analysis, I would like to hear your suggestions. What do you think should be done?

[Arian]

Well, he’s still not mine, but Strelkov’s, but now I’ll state my thoughts: 1. The announcement of partial mobilization - in our country there are over two million people with combat experience in Chechnya, Afghanistan - call them. Without a sharp increase in the order of forces, a turning point will not come. 2. The maximum build-up of unmanned aircraft, primarily strike aircraft - do not hesitate to purchase abroad. 3. Causing maximum damage to the infrastructure of the enemy, using CR and aviation, not one-time actions, but constant strikes every day. 4. Urgent and massive introduction in the troops of advanced models of communications, as well as counter-battery combat stations, about protective equipment, sights, thermal imagers and night vision systems, I am silent - this should be the default

[Arian]

If briefly and without going into particular, as a first approximation, so to speak, then so

[Arian]

It is also necessary to seriously improve the protection of all armored vehicles - tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored vehicles. Setting kaz for the first and second should become mandatory

[Carlos Hall]

I would do this: From my point of view, this is an existential war for Russia. This is not a strategic positioning war, like in Afghanistan or Syria, this is a war that decides the fate of Russia. We will no longer go into what was done right or what was done wrong.1 General mobilization, because although it is not obligatory, partial mobilization would be worth it, but it will have a psychological effect on opponents. 2 I would make a solemn statement about the use of tactical nuclear weapons if the supply of weapons to Ukraine continues, which is de facto participation in the war. Once the West fully understands that Russia will not give up on this issue, it will enter into a dynamic solution that will satisfy Russia.
3 In the meantime, the above points are being fulfilled, the entire communication infrastructure, industry, objects of national economic importance, etc. will be fired upon. Nobody wants to pay for the content of more than 40 million people. Be smart, it completely stifles the economy of Ukraine, which cannot export anything. And they will get tired of paying Zelensky's bills

[Arian]

As for the tiao, I don’t agree with you, this will not affect the supplies, but they can take it weakly, conducting them defiantly, they say, decide or not, any "partners" do not lose anything, and the consequences of using nuclear weapons are not predictable

[Odysseus]

Quote from Carlos Sala

Comrade Andrei, having carefully read your analysis, I would like to hear your suggestions

This is not his, but Strelkov. Andrey will answer for himself, and what Strelkov offers is known
1) Withdraw from negotiations with Zelensky
2) Change the ideological platform of the special operation and start fighting, and not try to reach a constructive agreement with Western partners.
3) Start partial mobilization
4) Actively recruit volunteers.

[Vadmir]

And also for planning probable offensive operations where they are expected (Transnistria, for example) and the Russian command is not expected, for some reason still confident (despite all the "lessons" of the previous two months) that the enemy will fight in such a way that how convenient the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The Russian command is still conducting a special military operation, whatever that means, and the enemy is fully fighting in earnest and with everything he has. With this approach, you can lose.

[Knell wardenheart]

Am I the only one who is aesthetically annoyed by this transparent button for launching a video in RuTube? Couldn't the design have been more intuitive, couldn't the commercial have been cut longer instead of running another one abruptly just before the end? Why all this stupid Khokhloma, when there is many years of YouTube experience, trial and error experience, so to speak.

[steelmaker]

The next day did not bring joyful news. There is no forward movement. And since the Russian army is not moving forward, it means that the Poles will soon begin to grapple with NATO. And how would they not make a "surprise" for us on May 9?

[jktu66]

Positional warfare, or the red army in anticipation of the people