Why do Ukrainian Tochka-U missiles hit targets in Russia and the liberated part of Ukraine
During the special operation conducted by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, there were several incidents with the missiles of the Tochka-U operational-tactical missile systems (OTRK) hitting Russian targets, including the hit on the airfield in the city of Millerovo, Rostov Region, as a result of which the at least one aircraft, as well as a hit with a fairly high probability on the large landing ship (BDK) "Orsk", unloading in the port of Berdyansk, which led to the flooding of the BDK.
Why do Tochka-U missiles hit targets on the territory of Ukraine and even on the territory of Russia?
Invulnerable "Points"
Firstly, where did the enemy still have the Tochka-U OTRK, why haven’t the Russian Armed Forces destroyed them all yet?
After the collapse of the USSR, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had 90 launchers (PU) of the Tochka-U OTRK and God knows how many missiles for them (presumably, about 800 missiles). It is extremely difficult to destroy them all, since this complex does not emit anything, it is quite easy to disguise it. The targets that needed to be hit by the RF Armed Forces, and the problems related to this issue, were mentioned in the article. Survival of military aviation on airfields under the influence of long-range precision weapons. Even if the RF Armed Forces have already destroyed 90% of the Ukrainian Tochka-U OTRKs, the remaining nine OTRKs can cause a lot of problems if used correctly by the enemy.
“The number of mobile Scud OTRK launchers involved from the Iraqi side during the American operation Desert Storm was only 14 pieces, another 78 launchers were either dummies or decommissioned Luna missiles. The coalition pilots claimed that during the war they destroyed about 100 Scud OTRKs, but in reality, not a single installation was hit.
It is worth recalling once again that at the beginning of the special operation, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had 90 units of real Tochka-U OTRK.
Secondly, target designation - how do Ukrainian OTRK crews find targets, are they really “invulnerable Bayraktars”?
No, the Ukrainian crews of the Tochka-U OTRK receive target designation from the United States and its allies. It is the information transmitted by our real enemies that gives them an understanding of what targets can be attacked in the reach zone. If it were not for the United States and its allies, the Ukrainian OTRK would not have hit anywhere, except for stationary civilian or military targets with coordinates known in advance.
And thirdly, why do Ukrainian missiles reach their targets, why are they not destroyed by anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) S-400, S-300V4 and others?
This issue is worth considering in more detail.
Types of missiles of the Tochka-U complex in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Apart from missiles with nuclear and chemical warheads (BC), OTRK "Tochka-U" can use missiles 9M79F (9M79-1F), 9M79K (9M79-1K) and 9M79R (9M79FR, 9M79-1FR), respectively, with high-explosive, cluster and anti-radar warheads. The height of the trajectory of the Tochka-U missiles, depending on the distance to the target, is from 6 to 26 kilometers, the firing range is from 15 to 120 kilometers.
It is not known with what warheads the Ukrainian Armed Forces have missiles, they definitely have 9N123F high-explosive fragmentation warhead missiles, most likely, there are missiles with 9N123N cluster warheads, the presence of anti-radar missiles with 9N123F-R warheads, with passive guidance on radar radiation sources (radar), as well as their effectiveness against modern radars is in question.
Judging by the fact that so far there has been no information about the attack on the radar stations of Russian anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) by Tochka-U missiles, the Ukrainian Armed Forces most likely do not have 9M79R (9M79FR, 9M79-1FR) missiles. Either they really are not capable of working against modern radars, or Ukrainian specialists do not know how to use them correctly. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that a certain number of 9M79R (9M79FR, 9M79-1FR) missiles are still available in the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and they are saved for some kind of action, to inflict maximum reputational damage on the RF Armed Forces.
9M79K (9M79-1K) missiles with cluster warheads could potentially be available in Ukraine. Undermining such a warhead occurs at an altitude of 2 meters to increase the affected area. Accordingly, at this height and below this missile no longer makes sense to shoot down, more precisely, there is nothing to shoot down. When detonated, a cluster warhead scatters 250 fragmentation submunitions, each of which contains 50 kilograms of explosives (BB) and 1,45 fragments - a total of 316 fragments, the affected area is up to seven hectares.
And finally, 9M79F (9M79-1F) missiles with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead, which most likely form the basis of the ammunition load of the Ukrainian Tochka-U OTRK, are blown up by a radio fuse at a height of 20 meters and contain 162,5 kilograms of explosives 14 fragments, hitting everything on an area of up to three hectares.
The flight time to the maximum range for the Tochka-U missile is 136 seconds, that is, in real combat conditions, depending on the firing range, it will most likely be about 90-120 seconds.
It can be assumed that even with the timely detection of launching missiles of the Tochka-U OTRK, their defeat occurs already at the final stage of the flight, when the missile moves towards the target on a descending section of the trajectory. And here a problem may arise.
The fact is that Russian anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs) hit the target with a fragmentation field, and the energy of the fragments could potentially be insufficient to ensure the detonation of the warhead of the Tochka-U missile.
Thus, even a missile hit by missiles reaches the target, albeit with a loss of accuracy, is undermined and causes significant damage due to the rather high power of the warhead. Moreover, most often Ukrainian OTRK try to hit areal targets, the accuracy of hitting which is not critical when hitting - airfields, cities with civilians, and so on.
Is it possible to destroy the warheads of the Tochka-U OTRK missiles with guarantee? Yes, but this requires missiles with a direct hit on the target, that is, the so-called hit-to-kill. It is believed that in order to implement the method of hitting a target using the hit-to-kill method, missiles must be equipped with an active radar homing head (ARLGSN) and a gas-dynamic control belt, which makes it possible to ensure the highest maneuverability of missiles in the final guidance area. It is stated that the latest 9M96E and 9M96E2 missiles, which can be used by the S-350 Vityaz air defense system and the S-400 air defense system, have this capability, but are they available in the ammunition load of the air defense systems used during the special operation conducted in Ukraine?
On the other hand, it is assumed that other Russian missiles of the S-300V and S-400 air defense systems, which do not have the ability to hit targets with a direct hit, have quite powerful high-explosive fragmentation warheads that are capable of destroying the warhead of an OTRK missile or even a ballistic missile with a high probability medium range.
However, even if the powerful missiles of Russian long-range air defense systems are capable of destroying the warheads of Tochka-U missiles, it is necessary that these missiles still be in the coverage area of Russian long-range air defense systems.
Distances and probabilities
The thing is that working at a maximum range, for example, 400 kilometers (for the S-400 air defense system), is possible only for certain types of aerodynamic targets. To hit ballistic targets, the range is limited to 40–60 km.
Thus, in order to completely close the Russian border from attacks by the Ukrainian Tochka-U OTRK, it will take at least a dozen S-400 air defense systems, or even more.
Can Russia deploy such a number of air defense systems on the border with Ukraine? Most likely, yes - the number of purchased S-400 air defense systems allows this.
Will it be implemented? Possibly given recent events.
Why hasn't this been done before? It was probably assumed that most of the Tochka-U OTRK would be destroyed at the very beginning of the war, or maybe it was thought that the entire special operation would last one or two weeks, as mentioned above. And it is possible that the required number of air defense systems was deployed, but, according to the theory of probability, there has never been and never will be a one hundred percent probability of intercepting all attacking enemy ammunition.
OTRK missiles miss not only Russian air defense systems, but also the American Patriot air defense systems, the Israeli Iron Dome and others. Many people remember how during the American operation "Desert Storm" Iraqi OTRK "Elbrus" or "Scud" according to NATO classification were practically not affected by the American Patriot air defense systems, despite the comprehensive information superiority of the USA and Israel.
By the way, the inability of the warhead of the Patriot air defense missile system to destroy the warhead of the Elbrus OTRK missiles is mentioned as a possible reason, as a result of which even the damaged Elbrus OTRK missiles reached their targets and inflicted significant damage to them.
“Modern Israeli research suggests that not a single Iraqi OTRK Scud (R-17) missile was shot down over Israel. Even close detonations of the Patriot air defense system did not destroy the warheads of the R-17 missiles, but only deflected them from the course. The use of R-17 missiles is considered one of the main successes of the Iraqi army in the Gulf War.
One more assumption can be put forward. Potentially, the US electronic intelligence satellites can determine whether the radars of Russian long-range air defense systems are active or they are turned off, for example, to carry out the necessary regulatory procedures. Given the saturation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with American satellite communication terminals, the United States can notify its "partners" about the optimal moment for striking, in terms of the absence of opposition from Russian air defense systems.
Conclusions
To minimize the likelihood of strikes by the Tochka-U OTRK, the Russian Armed Forces had to use a significant number of long-range air defense systems along the entire perimeter of the border with Ukraine, as well as in the liberated territories.
Even if this condition is met, it is impossible to guarantee a XNUMX% interception of Tochka-U OTRK missiles, both due to the non-XNUMX% probability of intercepting an OTRK ballistic missile, and due to the likelihood that the warhead of a downed missile can survive if its missiles are hit.
No quantity and quality of air defense systems is capable of 100% eliminating the breakthrough of air defense missiles or aviation enemy, it is only possible to minimize the probability of this event.
Nevertheless, taking into account not only the military, but also the informational significance of the impact of the strikes of the Ukrainian Tochka-U missiles, it is necessary to take all measures to prevent breakthroughs of the Russian air defense by building up a group of long-range air defense systems, ensuring mutual spatial and temporal overlap of detection zones and hitting ballistic targets.
In the context of the foregoing, the declared defeat of the Russian large landing craft or aircraft at the airfield in the city of Millerovo, Rostov Region, is more likely the luck of the Armed Forces of Ukraine than a systemic advantage. The most important role in this "luck" was played not by the skills or valor of the fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but by the effectiveness of the system created in the USSR weapons - OTRK "Tochka-U", and the most powerful information support provided by the United States to the armed forces of Ukraine.
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