Who did not want to build aircraft carriers in the USSR
For decades, admirals did not understand their meaning.Recently, the creation of aircraft carriers (AB) in our country has not disappeared from the pages of various print publications and is actively discussed in social networks. However, in order to publish and discuss information, the right to present which everyone who is interested in this topic has, you must at least have a minimum of reliable information.
Unfortunately, most of the participants in lively disputes, referring to the arguments of various military and political figures, have never seen real documents (including minutes of government meetings) and have not heard the real statements of representatives of the country's military-political leadership, and therefore build their conclusions on basis of actively circulating rumors.
Let us try to clarify this problem and tell about what was hidden from ordinary citizens "by the formidable guardians of many useless secrets of the USSR and Russia."
To begin with, let's see: who didn't want to build aircraft carriers in the USSR? But for this you have to do a little excursion into history and name some names.
Mobile Airfield Debut
The first in 1918 began to create the British Navy AB, having converted the Furios battleship (LC) into an aircraft carrier ship. As the royal leadership believed fleet, aircraft carriers were required to solve auxiliary problems, in particular weakening the enemy’s linear forces before the main artillery battle, and also to shield their own battleships from enemy air strikes.
In Japan and the United States, aircraft carriers were built later, but conceptual views on their use were close to the point of view of the British admirals (with some differences in the Land of the Rising Sun). Japanese and American naval commanders believed that all AVs should act as a single operational connection to inflict the greatest losses on the main enemy forces before the start of a linear artillery battle, and not be distributed among LK squadrons.
Based on this, it is clear why the “large” 10-year program for the construction of the Soviet fleet of 1938 included 15 battleships and only two aircraft carriers, and it was planned to create “floating airfields” not in the first five-year period. Then everyone believed that the AB are auxiliary ships. The command of the Navy has intended to entrust them with providing air defense of linear forces and conducting reconnaissance. It believed that since the Soviet fleet at that time should primarily solve the problem of defending its coastal zone in closed seas, air defense and reconnaissance could be provided to a greater extent by the coastal aviation, and aircraft carriers need to be additionally, just in case.
To foresee the great future of the AV and, therefore, build them instead of the LC, it was necessary to be as brilliant and authoritative as a naval figure, as the Japanese admiral Yamomoto. Yes, the naval aviation of the USSR Navy itself had mainly reconnaissance-fighter orientation and weak strike capabilities (impact machines less than 15% of the entire aircraft fleet), and its further development was also assumed in the same vein. Thus, there is no reason to throw reproaches to the leaders of the USSR and the Navy 30 for insufficient attention to the AB.
The concept of aircraft carrier support was also implemented at the beginning of the Second World War. British AV aircraft torpedoed three Italian battleships in the Taranto base in 1940, hit the German battleship Bismarck in the Atlantic Ocean in 1941, which was then sunk by artillery fire, only damaged the Italian battleship Vittorio Vineto at Cape Matapan (only the rapid restoration of combat capability and the proximity of the base saved the ship from the fate of "Bismarck").
The Japanese, taking advantage of the British experience, struck Pearl Harbor aircraft carrier formations in December 1941 and disabled all US Pacific fleet battleships, sinking and damaging eight American LCs. However, only after the battles in the Coral Sea and near the Midway Island in 1942, the ABs became the main combat units of the leading fleets of the world, and not as ships in themselves, but as mobile airfields for aviation. It was she who turned into the main force at sea, defeating first surface ships, and then - since 1944, and submarines. By the way, even earlier - in the 1939-1940 years of the Luftwaffe, not German Tanks defeated the ground forces of Poland, France and Great Britain.
The prophetic words of the Russian naval theorist N. L. Klado, spoken by him in the 1910 year, came true: “... when the air force overcomes the obstacles that hinder its development (mainly low payload), it will immediately take a dominant position among the means of warfare. .. "
The Great Patriotic War made the Soviet admirals seriously think. In the north, transport convoys for the USSR with weapons and strategic materials from the USA and Great Britain suffered the main losses not from German submarines, but from German aviation. On the Baltic Sea, an attempt at first to keep ships in Kronstadt under the protection of powerful air defense only led to the death of the Marat LC, one leader, several destroyers and submarines. In the future, only the camouflaging and redeployment of ships in Leningrad saved them from the inevitable destruction of the Luftwaffe. On the Black Sea, while German aviation was in the Crimea, it completely displaced our surface ships and even submarines from the range of its aircraft, ensured the blockade and the capture of Sevastopol. Right up to the end of 1943, the appearance of the Luftwaffe’s daytime even a combination of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet resulted in his death. As it turned out, providing air defense to ships at sea with coastal fighters was possible only at a distance of 50 – 100 kilometers from the coast, and then only in some cases.
Submarine bet
What lessons did the command of the USSR Navy and the leadership of the country as a whole learn from the experience of the past war?
From the unpublished notes of the head of the Main Naval Directorate of the Navy, Admiral N. V. Isachenkov, the following is known: “In June 1945, I was summoned to the narco-admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, who informed me that, at the beginning of the year, on the direction of I. V. Stalin work began on the elaboration of the future fleet. Today, I. V. Stalin asked me what was the main conclusion from the ongoing battles at sea I did. He replied that submarines and aircraft had become the main forces at sea. "Still, the first submarine?". I confirmed it. “Strange,” he replied. “Prepare a shipbuilding program for the 1945 – 1955 years.” So, Nikolai Vasilyevich, prepare proposals for the shipbuilding program taking into account the developments of the commission of Vice Admiral Abankin. ”
As we see, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov gave priority to submarines, which somewhat perplexed Stalin.
The Navy Theorists Commission chaired by Vice-Admiral P. P. Abankina presented in March 1945 of the year “Considerations on the most rational ratio of the number of ships of various classes in various theaters and on the expediency of creating new classes of ships or merging into one class of existing ones”. This document had a “Top Secret” vulture for a long time, since it analyzed possible military operations of the USSR Navy against the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition in all theaters. At the same time, the importance of aircraft carriers was still determined by the provisions of the old concept (air defense and weakening the enemy to a decisive artillery battle), but their ratio depending on the theater was already this - one or two AVs for each LC. At a minimum, it was supposed to have nine LC and 13 AB.
Submariners differed in their special “appetite”, which required the deployment of submarines with X-Numx with the tasks of fighting enemy warships. Later, under N. S. Khrushchev, N. G. Kuznetsov insisted on building the 430 PL, which caused the rage of the first person of the state because of the huge costs and contributed to the admiral's dismissal.
Thus, the command of the Soviet Navy and after the Great Patriotic War - in 1945-m relied on the submarine, and aircraft carriers, as in 20 – 30-s, considered as auxiliary ships in comparison with the battleships. At the same time, the political leadership of the USSR did not consider this concept correct.
In September, the report of N. G. Kuznetsov on the future shipbuilding program, which, judging by Admiral N. Isachenkov’s notes, suggested the construction of four LC, 1945 AB, 1956 cruisers, 12 destroyers and 94 Submarine However, the meeting greatly corrected these plans. We will touch only the aspects connected with AV and PL.
“Moving away from the initial application, the People's Commissar of the Navy requested to build four large and four small AVs. V. Stalin replied: “Let’s wait with both of them,” recalls N. V. Isachenkov. Then, bearing in mind the needs of the Northern Fleet, the Generalissimo, after a brief discussion, summarized: "We will build two small pieces." (However, later at the insistence of the shipbuilding industry and with the tacit consent of the new command of the Navy, aircraft carriers disappeared from the program.) Stalin also doubted the need for so many submarines: "Do we need so many boats in general, and especially do we need large submarines?". NG Kuznetsov managed to defend only part of the submarine. "
Who did not need mobile aerodromes? Presumably, not to Stalin, but to the shipbuilding industry and the new (after N. G. Kuznetsov) command of the Navy. For example, all attempts by Admiral Kuznetsov to organize the completion of the captured German aircraft carrier "Graf Zeppelin" were rejected by the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry, even with the conclusion of the Baltic Plant about the possibility of carrying out the necessary work.
Means of defense
In the middle of the 50-ies, the scientific and technological revolution began in all countries, including the USSR, a review of the importance of different types of weapons for the future war began. Even in the leading maritime powers (the United States, Great Britain and France), against the background of general nuclear-nuclear hysteria, they began to question the expediency of AB existence. In the USSR, a huge number of naval specialists appeared who believed that it was the missiles that would finally help to cheaply “overtake without catching up” with the traditional naval forces of the leading maritime powers.
In October, a meeting of government members was held in Sevastopol under the leadership of N. S. Khrushchev in October with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy to work out ways to develop the fleet for the coming decade. The event was held under the slogan "Past experience in the formation of fleet combat vehicles is unsuitable under new conditions."
Initially, N. S. Khrushchev expressed his view on these problems: “With modern means of detection, communications, powerful missile weapons, can surface ships with their large sizes perform their tasks? Surface ships will become a burden ... I believe in submarines. The submarine fleet and naval aviation must be made the main force for fighting at sea ... Covering communications requires the creation of aircraft carriers to solve air defense tasks. But this task is not near. It may be advisable to design and build for the beginning one aircraft carrier with the aim of gaining experience to determine the procedure for their further construction when it is required ... "
Defense Minister G. K. Zhukov expressed the following views: “... The actions of the naval aviation and powerful missile weapons will be decisive in the war at sea ... A powerful submarine fleet is needed to break sea and ocean communications ... Aircraft carriers will not need to be built in the near future. Our strategic position is different in comparison with the likely adversary ... "
If the marshal knew that for a real breach of communications of the likely adversary (excess of losses over new construction), it was necessary to sink transport ships monthly with a total displacement of more than two million tons, which required, according to the most conservative estimates, to maintain the number of operating submarines at 1000 units and monthly production of at least 15 000 torpedoes, he would most likely have refused to set this task for the Navy.
Finally, according to the plans of the General Staff, it was supposed that in the event of a war between NATO and the Organization of the Warsaw Pact (ATS) countries, within two weeks our troops would reach the coast of the English Channel and begin to force it. This water barrier was considered by the then Soviet strategists as a “wide river”, armored vehicles had to force it on special high-speed disposable equipment. And the first convoys from the USA could arrive in Europe only in three weeks.
Giving priority to naval aviation as the main force at sea, the military-political leadership of the USSR either assigned the AV only the role of one of the air defense weapons (N. S. Khrushchev) to cover what communications were unknown (after all, the USSR had them only on land or in the coastal zone and they , of course, did not require AB to cover), or completely denied the need to create such ships (G. K. Zhukov). If they viewed an aircraft carrier as a floating mobile airfield with a whole division of naval aviation on board, then the expediency of building even a small number of AVs would have been justified by their own priority of naval aviation. Finally, the danger of the destruction of stationary objects with nuclear weapons required the deployment of a mobile fleet-based system. But AB is actually such. Unfortunately, in the speeches of naval sailors concerning the AV, the latter were also considered as a means of air defense of various connections of surface ships.
As we see, in 50 – 60-s, the leaders of the country, not opposing the construction of an AB in principle, simply did not know the goals of this construction. But the naval specialists could not (or did not want?) Correctly orient the government, leaving its views on the AB at the level of 20 – 30's.
Fantastic offers
Finally, at the beginning of 70, some of the leaders of the Soviet Navy began to realize that “powerful rocket weapons” could not by itself solve all the problems arising in confrontation with the US Navy even at its shores, including with American aircraft-carrier strike formations ( AUS), for which a very good air defense system was created. Turned around design work on the first domestic aircraft carriers, similar to AB of the United States.
In 1973, the finished advance design of an aircraft carrier with a nuclear power plant (NPP) of the 1160 project with a displacement of approximately 100 000 tons was on the table at the Minister of Defense of the USSR A. A. Grechko. Marshal then said: “Why are you there for wisdom! Make, like the Americans, with such a fleet. ” He personally crossed out the rocket cellar with RCC, so beloved domestic admirals, with a blue pencil, and wrote the composition of the air group: Su-24K deck bombers, Su-27K fighter jets and attack aircraft (then the conventional name "Buran") and a number of other aircraft. The head of the military department immediately determined the universal purpose of the ship.
Grechko was the only Minister of Defense of the USSR who correctly understood the naval issues and clearly defined the tasks of domestic AVs. Unfortunately, after his death in 1976, the project was “shut down” and speculation began on the well-known words of L. I. Brezhnev: “Carrier aircraft are the weapon of the aggressor.” Who wrote this for the Secretary General, in principle, it is unclear. But since Brezhnev infinitely respected Grechko and never said anything without agreeing with the Politburo and, of course, with him, then this phrase could hardly belong to him.
At the end of 70, an ardent supporter of all sorts of science fiction (WIG, large air-cushion warships, vertical take-off and landing aircraft, etc.) the new USSR Minister of Defense DF Ustinov nevertheless allowed to design and build an aircraft carrier as a heavy aircraft carrying cruiser (Tavkr). During construction, he received the design number 11435, and after 1991 of the year, his deserved name was “Admiral Kuznetsov” (the full name is long and does not correspond to the traditions of the Russian fleet). However, it was also written on the design specification for the design of this ship by the hand of the Navy Commander Admiral S. G. Gorshkov: “Place 12 – 24 anti-ship missiles, power plant is a boiler-turbine”. So to build a full AB again failed.
Later it turned out that the ban on the AEU imposed Ustinov, and Gorshkov did not strongly object. Moreover, he suffered for a long time, as if his beloved PKPs were to be connected with the AB planes. According to the memoirs of the head of the 1 Central Directorate of the Central Research Institute of Rear Admiral B. A. Kolyzaev, one of Gorshkov’s assistants suggested considering the anti-ship missiles as non-returnable attack aircraft, and the ship-based fighters as a means of defending and tracking the flight to the target. “Now I know why aircraft carriers are for us!” Admiral S. G. Gorshkov happily answered.
Admiral N.N. Amelko, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for the Navy (1979 – 1986), was distinguished by a special approach to the development of the Navy and in general to the surface fleet. He wrote to every imaginable and unimaginable authority right up until his death: “Surface ships with a displacement of more than 2000 tons are nonsense and unnecessary expenses for the country, and submarines must be built”.
Admiral N. I. Smirnov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, distinguished himself with an original “approach” (although many naval commanders later said that these were all Gorshkov's ideas), who personally supervised the development of the “armored missile cruiser” with a 80 displacement 100 tons in 000s with 1000 percussion missiles, a kind of revival of the Japanese superlinkor like Yamato. But this ship, instead of AV, the Main Headquarters of the Navy continued to support and push into the programs of military shipbuilding under the guise of "coastal missile cruiser" until the middle of the 90-s. The compilers of these programs barely got out of such strange ideas. Naturally, the ministers of defense of the USSR, well-versed only in tanks and artillery, unconditionally believed the leadership of the Navy, and it sometimes gave rise to very strange ideas.
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