Military Review

"Maneuver" - the first Soviet automated battlefield control system

"Maneuver" - the first Soviet automated battlefield control systemThe end of the 60 of the last century is a period of great confrontation between the two superpowers, a period of exhausting arms race. The development of new types of weapons and military equipment is proceeding at a high rate. Microelectronics is developing especially rapidly and on its base telecommunications and computing equipment, which in turn was a powerful platform for the development of information management systems and control systems weapons.
The possible opponents of the USSR and the USA actively competed in the development of such systems. At the end of the 50 of the last century, the first ACS troops and weapons were Tacfire artillery units developed by Americans, Misail Monitor and rear units (CA-3).

In the Soviet Union, at the beginning of the 60 of the last century, the automated combat control system (ASBU) of the Strategic Missile Forces (Impulse Design Bureau, Leningrad), the missile attack warning system (SPRN, RTI USSR) were created first, CSA) of the Almaz-2 air defense forces (Scientific Research Institute Voskhod, Moscow), the Air-to-Air Traffic Control System Vozdukh-1М (OKB-864 of the Minsk Electromechanical Plant, Minsk), the automated command and control system of missile systems (ASURK-1, Zagorsky Design Bureau electromechanical plant). The latter work was carried out under the direction of the chief designer of the plant, Semenikhin VS, who from 1963 onwards became the director of the Scientific Research Institute-101 (Scientific Research Institute of Automatic Equipment). Subsequently, the ASURK, the Vector VZVA automated control system and the USSR Armed Forces automated control system were transferred to this research institute.

In May 1964, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR set the development of an automatic control system for troops by the front, and in 1965 the NIIIAA completed the creation of a conceptual design, and, in fact, the program for creating such a system. Taking into account the fact that NIIIAA is busy with work on creating an automated control system for the USSR Armed Forces (the "Center" system), a data exchange system (SOD) for this automatic control system, as well as the so-called "nuclear" or "presidential" case (the Cheget system from the Kazbek automated control system) ), work on the creation of an automatic control system for the Maneuver front in front-combined arms units (tank) the army - the combined arms (tank) division - the motorized rifle (tank or artillery) regiment were sent to Minsk in a separate design bureau of the Minsk Electromechanical Plant No. 864 (OKB-864).

26 February 1969 of the year OKB-864 was transformed into a branch of the Scientific Research Institute of Automatic Equipment (FNIAA), and with 16 June 1972 of the year, the Scientific Research Institute of Automation Facilities (NIISA) was created on the basis of which ACCS front "Maneuver".

The Director of the Design Bureau, and then FNIIAA and NIISA, the Chief Military Designer of the Front Control Command and Service “Maneuver” (from 1968) was appointed a professional military man, later Major General, a talented engineer Podrezov Yury Dmitrievich (1924-2001).

The automated control system of the Maneuver front was immediately created as a single integrated automated control system for the combined arms (tank) association (formation), which includes the subsystems for managing the combat arms of the ground forces, and the automated control system for the front aviation and military air defense, ACS rear, united by a single communication system and data transmission. It should be noted that the ACS of front-line aviation was functionally included in the ACS "Maneuver", but was developed as an independent ACS for a separate task and was called the "Etalon".

The main issues that need to be addressed when creating an automated control system for the “Maneuver” front were:
the creation of a system in its operational-tactical characteristics is not inferior to the best foreign analogues, and in some characteristics and superior to them, in the conditions of a significant lag in the USSR in the development of communications, computing equipment and general software, using only domestic components and materials, power supplies and life support;
• the need for the system to work in harsh climatic conditions (from –50 ° С to + 50 ° С), conditions of strong shock loads, intense characteristics of habitability and movement in the tactical level of control (division, regiment);
• the need to ensure the maximum unification of technical equipment, automated workplaces (AWP) to ensure the proper survivability of the system and the deployment of its mass production in the defense industry of the USSR, and later in the Warsaw Pact member countries;
• the need to provide very tough probabilistic-time characteristics of bringing information and the time of gathering information as a whole beyond the control link, which should have shortened the command and control cycle by an order of magnitude more than the existing non-automated system.

These and other problems and tasks were successfully resolved in the automated control system of the “Maneuver” front. During this period, many high-tech, corresponding to the best foreign analogues of the time, basic hardware and software necessary to create command and staff machines were developed, manufactured and passed all types of tests. For example, such as indicators of circular view, drawing and graphic machines, coordinate pickups, electro-optical tablets, consoles of the set of formalized codograms, various keyboards and boards for displaying information, data transmission equipment of different time scales and remote information input, switching equipment and operational communications, operating system software, database management.

Structurally, the basic technological and software tools are combined in the automated maneuver front automated control system into automated workplaces and installed at the tactical level — division, regiment (26 machines) into command-and-staff machines (CMM) and special machines (SM), and at the operational level — front and army (about 100 machines) to staff vehicles (CM). The MT-LBU self-propelled chassis was used as a transport base, and the Osnova body based on the Birthmark chassis, Ural-375, KP-4 trailers

The use of a systematic approach in the field of building distributed computing systems made it possible to organize distributed data processing and storage of data arrays in distributed databases. A systematic approach - the foundation of the GNAT Agat projects - made it possible to make optimal and unique software and hardware solutions that ensured maximum adaptation to changing user needs, compatibility of all system components and its subsystems, consideration of multiparameter functional subsystems, high-quality information processing in automated control systems severe restrictions on the amount of memory and computer performance with a positive result - the creation of an automated control system that is efficiently working in any external environment. Which approach led to control of troops, weapons, intelligence and electronic warfare is extremely reliable, survivable and operational. This was done on computer technology, which is significantly inferior in its characteristics to foreign models. The high reliability of the system was ensured due to the unification of the AWS equipment and the use of parallel algorithms (structural algorithmic redundancy) in information processing.

When designing automated control systems, it turned out that automatic control and automation systems should be based on completely new principles that had no analogues in the past, and for data-exchange systems of such scale and complexity, the basic fundamentals of building data transmission equipment were developed. The implementation of highly vibrant adaptive networks and communication systems could be tested to the extent necessary only at the Maneuver automated control system. The creation of a mobile automated control system required the solution of the main communication problem - the exchange of data between the control center and the control center. The volume of transmitted information has increased significantly, the time of its delivery has decreased, and the requirements for error-free data transfer for those times 1х10-6 were fantastic. It was necessary to create a new class of equipment that meets all the requirements for data transmission, operating in harsh environments (from -50 ° C to + 50 ° C), on the go, including and in armored vehicles.
The need to create data transmission equipment of three significantly different types was revealed:
• to transfer operational tactical information (GTI);
• for real-time data transmission (RMV);
• for remote entry of intelligence data (PD).

The task of creating an ADF for the transfer of OTI was entrusted to the Penza Electrotechnical Research Institute (PNIEI) and successfully solved by developing the T-244 “Basalt” (1972) equipment complex first, and then the T-235 “Redut” equipment complex (1985 g.). These unique complexes allowed building extensive data exchange networks and, by their characteristics, had no analogues in the world. The development of the ADF for the transmission of information RMV divided into two directions. The ADF for the country's air defense system was developed by the Leningrad PO Krasnaya Zarya with the scientific support of the Moscow Institute of Instrument Automation (AI-010 equipment).

The lead developer of the ADF RVM for mobile control points was determined by NIISA, which created and implemented products Polyaana, Ranzhir, PORI and other objects interfaced with KSHM (CMM), a whole generation of equipment: С23 (1976), AI-011 (1976 g.), С23М (1982g.), "Irtysh" (1985 g.).

The development of remote input equipment was also entrusted to NIISA and, for the radiation and chemical reconnaissance units, the Berezka equipment was first created (1976), and then the Sturgeon complex (1986).

The tactical unit of the maneuver ASUV is equipped with its own built-in mobile communications system, which provides all the necessary internal and external communications for the command center, from tone to digital. The security equipment of guaranteed resistance class was used. The organization of the telecode exchange system and data transmission equipment provided data transmission in any combat conditions (active and passive interference, protection against ionizing radiation, deliberate counteraction, etc.). The entire communications system was controlled from the headquarters of the communications commander and provided the opportunity to change the architecture of HF and VHF communications networks to the requirements of the combat situation.

One of the most serious scientific and technical problems of creating a tactical level of control of the front maneuver of the “Maneuver” front in the early 80s of the last century was the solution of the problem of suppressing industrial interference and ensuring electromagnetic compatibility during normal operation from 4 to 7 radio stations and receivers located in one crawler armored base, bringing the entire complex of automation equipment up to the given tactical and technical characteristics, first of all in terms of radio communication and normal functioning automation equipment. This task was successfully solved by a group of specialists from the institute.

When creating an automated command and control system for a tactical level, for the first time, the methodology of end-to-end design was developed and applied to create large integrated systems from the formal representation of the subject area in the form of a mathematical model to its implementation in technical, linguistic, informational and software.

The information system language (NRF) developed by the specialists of NIISA, which is a set of common syntax rules for the Maneuver automated information system, ensured information compatibility in the transfer of data between subsystems.

Over the 500 organizations and enterprises of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact member countries that organized industrial production of complexes and systems of tactical level, as well as complexes and systems of rocket forces and artillery, participated in the cooperation on the creation of the automated control system of the front "Maneuver".

The general customers of the Maneuver ASUV: the General Headquarters of the USSR Armed Forces, and then the head of the USSR Armed Forces Communications Forces — were brought to the military-scientific support of projects and tests of the system and its elements by leading military-scientific institutions: Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Military Academy armored troops them. R.Y. Malinovsky, Military Academy. Mv Frunze, Military Academy. F.E. Dzerzhinsky, Military Academy of Communications, Chemical Protection, Artillery Academy, Engineering Academy and others. In addition, the central scientific research institutes of the armed forces and combat arms, for which the maneuver automated control system components were created, were specially created for scientific research and testing in order to improve the Armed Forces.

In November 1981, the state tests of the “Maneuver” ACCS were completed and an act of the State Commission with positive results was submitted for approval. By decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR in December 1982, the tactical link of the Front Command and Command Administration "Maneuver" was adopted by the Soviet Army. NIISA was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, and the most distinguished industrial workers and military specialists (about 600 people) were awarded orders and medals of the USSR.

In 1988, the creation of an improved version of the tactical link of the AFC “Maneuver” front was completed during the 1989-1991 period. Separate prototypes of the advanced maneuver automated tactical and operational complexes for the front-end maneuvers were placed in a number of districts (BVO, MVO, DVO), the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Military Academy. Mv Frunze, headquarters of the 5 th Army Arms.

On the basis of the main technical solutions of the front-end maneuver for the automated control system of the front “Maneuver”, two major projects were implemented - the creation of an integrated automated control system of the air force and air defense of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the field control system of the Warsaw Pact countries. The experience of system design, obtained during the creation of the automatic control system of the “Maneuver” front, is invaluable.
Magazine "Arsenal" No. 3 / 2011 (with abbreviations)

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  1. Somad
    Somad 1 October 2012 10: 33
    In our control battery (I served in the artillery regiment) there were 2 pcs. based on MT-LBU. They were mothballed - they stood, dusted in our box, sealed and behind barbed wire. There were no specialists who could work for them (the commanders of these machines were trained at some radio engineering school of ensigns, as far as I know). In general, we still climbed into them. Inside there are computer monitors (which was a curiosity for the mid-90s), and the keyboards for them are adapted for PUW. It seems like the control was carried out on a dedicated digital (AND IT'S ALREADY TIME !!!) radio channel at the division level - artillery regiment - artillery division.
  2. Sheva777
    Sheva777 1 October 2012 11: 33
    And where did it all go. As always, there is technology but no people and vice versa
  3. leon-iv
    leon-iv 1 October 2012 11: 37
    And what level of training the operators should have had.
    And how do you evaluate ESU TK from the Constellation.
  4. Sirozha
    Sirozha 1 October 2012 14: 21
    Actually, I’ve been reading this site for a long time, but registered only now ...
    Let me make a remark to the author: In essence, the article is interesting, but, dear author, when you write an article, you could decipher the abbreviations!
    1. gregor6549
      1 October 2012 16: 51
      I will consider comments, thanks
  5. borisst64
    borisst64 1 October 2012 15: 07
    "The main problematic issues requiring their solution when creating the ACCS of the Maneuver front were"

    According to the memoirs of one of the creators of the TZ ACCS "Maneuver" VA Karpa, the main problem was the chief of the communications troops, Colonel-General (later Marshal) AI Belov. And the system went into the troops not thanks to, but in spite of this combat, but bone general ... The chief of the communications troops A.I.Belov created his own Field Automated Communication System (PASS). It was necessary with all our might to slow down the creation of the Maneuver automated control system, pushing forward the dead-end version with PASS.
    An example when personal ambitions are higher than state interests. I do not blame Belov, perhaps his system was better. The point is that two powerful institutes were mired in a confrontation, and there was no leader who would give them a head, and reminded who they work for.
    1. gregor6549
      1 October 2012 16: 42
      Yes, V.A. Karp was one of the creators of the communication and data transmission subsystem of the ACCS Maneuver, but firstly not its most important creator, and secondly, with all the importance of this subsystem, it was only one of many subsystems of the ACCS Maneuver. Further, since the beginning of the creation of the Maneuver system, its Gene Customers have changed several times and it is difficult to say which of them brought it more benefit or caused more harm. A system of this scale was created then for the first time and for more than one year, the conditions for its possible combat use changed and the views of customers on the system changed. Naturally, when oversight over the ACS Maneuver was transferred to Marshal of the Signal Corps Leonov, the interests of his department sometimes contradicted the interests of other departments, for example, the GRAU, or the General Staff of the Air Force. He also "dumped" as far as I know, the first and truly General Designer Podrezov Yu.D. Ostreiko and Azamatov, who replaced him, looked more like the infamous General Director of Almaz Ashurbeyli and cared more about their own pocket, which they were pretty good at. But this is a separate story for the investigating authorities, not for technology lovers. Thank God Yuri Dmitrievich Podrezov (his kingdom is heavenly) was a real Russian officer, a clever girl and, before his forced retirement, managed to create a very serious backbone of "clever men and women" who continued to do their job, despite the "paternal" care of his comrades who replaced him. Therefore, I would not so personalize the history of the creation of this system, although it was not without the influence of individual personalities on it.
      About training. I did not notice any special problems in the training of operators, there were much more problems with the training of command and technical personnel, because. the system was very complex, saturated to the limit with the most modern computer technology at that time and it was not at all easy to ensure its competent use and maintenance. Some generals, for example, could not even sit for half an hour at their RM if P <was, for example, behind the rear compartment of the KShM made on the basis of the BMP. Claustrophobia, damn it .. And the dimensions of the generals did not always fit well with the dimensions of the mobile units.
      On the other hand, a very high level of modularity, unification and standardization of technical means was achieved in the system, as well as from diagnostics and control, which ensured a rather quick finding of faulty modules, their localization and replacement. The issues of providing spare parts were also adequately resolved.
      It is difficult to say how much the current ACCS are superior to ACCS Maneuver, but there is a feeling that so far these are just stripped-down fragments of ACCS Maneuver, implemented on more advanced and modern technical means. It should not be forgotten that in addition to the techies, a whole army of highly skilled programmers worked on the creation of the Maneuver. and in the creation of the Maneuver system, the whole country took over from Brest to Frunze and further everywhere. Some of the equipment was produced under license in the Warsaw Pact countries. It is difficult to say how much the current brain and production potential was able to compensate for all this, but most likely it will still grow and grow to its previous level. Most of the old specialists are already either retired or in the grave, but you can't just prepare the new ones. It's not enough to be a great engineer or programmer. You also need to feel with your skin the environment where these "toys will be used. And to acquire such a feeling, years and years are needed, moreover, spent not only in design bureaus or factories, but also in military units, at training grounds and at exercises.
      1. smel
        smel 2 October 2012 07: 21
        Very good article. I feel the author's complete ownership of the information. I had the opportunity to get acquainted with these systems. Unfortunately, I cannot note the use of them with positive results. Since the late 70s, when the first computers (9v59) went into the artillery en masse, or to the missilemen 57th, their application was always inferior in time to simple manual data calculation. Moreover, it was significantly inferior. So even in those years, the use of computers was not particularly welcomed. And the "Maneuver" remained unclaimed. It turned out to be a very difficult complex for the troops. Several systems delivered (and even then not in a complete set) were rolled in the BVO as tracked vehicles or gathering dust under tents in storage facilities.
        In these difficult times, numerous designs of handicraft workshops are constantly demonstrated during exercises, where there is a military bohemia. I saw good subsystems in 2007. on "Peace mission", in 2009 on "West 2009". But before their introduction - like walking to the moon.
        The sad fate of "Maneuver" is currently shared by the expensive divisions with ASUNO. We riveted enough of them, a lot of different ones. I even saw a 2s3m division with hatches welded by specialists, with chopped off communication cables for loaders, without restoring the base, but with ASUNO. But they cannot and do not want to work. And it would be stupid. to hope that in six months of service, a specialist may appear on this weapon, capable of working and using the potential in full.
        So they didn’t like something new here, they don’t like it now. Why is this another topic that needs special consideration
      2. gregor6549
        20 October 2012 13: 38
        Major General Engineer Podrezov Yuri Dmitrievich. General Designer of ACS "Maneuver" and founder of NPO "Agat". A man with a capital letter. Eternal memory to him.
  6. Stasi.
    Stasi. 1 October 2012 19: 44
    Modern wars are quick and fleeting - new weapons and equipment are used, command and control of troops is increasingly subordinated to automatic control systems. In all the wars after the collapse of the USSR in which the Russian army participated, problems of automated control systems, communications, information exchange, and data transfer were quickly discovered. This has also been shown by the recent conflict with Georgia. The latest means of communication and control captured from the Georgians, as well as other models of military equipment, raised many questions for our specialists, which I hope will be successfully resolved.
  7. gregor6549
    2 October 2012 07: 00
    Among foreign analogues, attention is drawn to systems developed by firms:

    Thales Group

    actical_T-BMS /


    Lockheed Martin

  8. gregor6549
    2 October 2012 17: 55
    And another opinion (not mine) about ESU TK “Constellation M2”.
    To be honest, I thought about this system better. It turned out that the experience gained during the creation of the Maneuver system was indeed poher. Sadly
  9. cobra
    cobra 14 October 2012 23: 55
    Participated in the development of the control complex for the S-300, BukM1 anti-aircraft missile brigade of the aforementioned Polyana. Since the air defense officers are historically more friendly with any complex equipment, there were no special problems with the Polyana in the troops. Almost all brigades of the western districts received this system and successfully operated it with the most active participation of NIISA developers. As for the ground forces, yes .... There were big problems with the introduction into the troops .... often the commanders did not want to recognize anything except the field telephone. Motivated by the fact that only by the intonation of the subordinate could they understand whether the khan would hold out for him or another hour)). After the collapse of the USSR, the systems were of course buried ... The main backbone of the NIISA developers scattered in all directions ... On the basis of "Polyana", as far as I know, an air defense system and the air force of the Belarusian army was created. But the scale, as you know, is not the same ... Yes ... there were times ... but passed. I myself am already retired)
  10. studentmati
    studentmati 15 October 2012 00: 02
    I'm not really into the "topic", but I remember the last century when 286 processors were replaced by 386 ones, I read brochures of Belarusian manufacturers on control systems. Excellent solutions, then I got very interested, but inflation poured all the interest into the toilet (in the literal sense - the salary was only enough to work on the toilet). Sorry for being rude.
  11. cobra
    cobra 15 October 2012 00: 08
    The Polyana complex used a unique specialized computer with double redundancy. So the processor of this computer weighed 43 kg.
  12. studentmati
    studentmati 15 October 2012 00: 13
    Here are some developments that need to be given priority attention and financing, and not that God forbid that the soldiers wash floors and are on duty in the kitchen.
  13. cobra
    cobra 15 October 2012 00: 19
    Since the "Maneuver" was developed in Minsk, then after the collapse of the USSR, funding for the work, of course, stopped. And the young Republic of Belarus for such developments, of course. there was no money. That was the end of it. And the engineers went to trade in the markets or worked in the departments of the automated control systems of commercial banks. And NIISA has developed, for example, the ACS of the National Library of Belarus. But that was already in modern times ...
  14. gregor6549
    20 October 2012 13: 24

    Photo of KShM ACS "Polyanya D4"
  15. gregor6549
    20 October 2012 13: 43
    Workplaces of officers of the combat command of the KShM ACS "Polyana D4"
  16. gregor6549
    20 October 2012 17: 21
    Correction: In the photographs, not the KShM, but the PBU (command post) of the "Polyana D4" ACS