Military Review

Titanium breakthrough into the depths and into the future

53

Submarine "Pskov" pr. 945A with a titanium hull. Photo by Alexander Merkushev.


Late 50s. was an amazing time of new scientific breakthroughs and technical achievements, the country, which had just risen from the ashes and huge destruction of the Great Patriotic War, had already escaped into space (outstripping the much more technologically advanced and wealthy United States), was making great strides in aviation.
A new front of military and scientific and technological confrontation has clearly emerged - underwater.

And for space, and for aviation, and for depths, the development of new structural materials has become extremely important, and one of the most promising areas of work has become titanium alloys, which had excellent specific strength, non-magnetism and high corrosion resistance.

The first was the project of the 661 Anchar missile high-speed nuclear submarine, chief designer N. N. Isanin, later replaced by N. F. Shulzhenko.

Work on it began at TsKB-16 (later merged with the Malachite SPMBM) on the basis of a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the creation of a new high-speed submarine, new types of power plants and the development of research, development and design work for submarines" dated August 28, 1958.

The Anchar project included exceptionally high speed characteristics, the latest Amethyst anti-ship missile system with underwater missile launch, new hydroacoustics (the Rubin complex with a high detection potential), and a powerful two-shaft nuclear power plant with two pressurized water reactors.

In 1969, during the State tests at 80% of the reactor power, the boat reached a speed of 42 knots (instead of the specified 38 knots). In 1970, with the reactors at full power, a record (so far) speed of 44,7 knots was achieved.
Mastering the production of titanium alloys and the construction of complex ship structures from it was very difficult, but the task was successfully solved by the entire chain of cooperation.


PLA K-162 pr. 661. Wikipedia photo source

In 1956, Plant No. 95 in Verkhnyaya Salda (the future VSMPO-Avisma) began mastering the technology for the production of pipes, profiles, stampings and forgings from titanium alloys. On February 17, 1957, the first titanium ingot of VT 1-1 alloy was smelted. The future general director of VSMPO-Avisma, the "people's billionaire" V. V. Tetyukhin, led the smelting.

Titanium breakthrough into the depths and into the future
Vladislav Valentinovich Tetyukhin, photo ural-clinic.ru

The boat itself was built at Sevmash in Severodvinsk. The plant in the shortest possible time all technological problems in the development of titanium alloys were successfully solved (together with the Central Research Institute "Prometey", TsKB-16 and the Central Research Institute named after A. N. Krylov).

It should be noted the significant role of the hull material in achieving high underwater speed: by lightening the hull, it became possible to place a power plant with a sharply increased power and achieve an underwater speed record.

The next project was a series of small automated high-speed multi-purpose nuclear-powered ships with reactors with a liquid metal coolant of project 705 "Lira" (development of SKB-142, in the future SPMBM "Malakhit"). The idea of ​​the project belonged to A. B. Petrov, the main designers were M. G. Rusanov (in 1977 he was replaced by V. A. Romin). Such a change of "main" in the project was largely a consequence of the dramatic stories creating a 705 project (see "Goldfish" of project 705: a mistake or a breakthrough in the XXI century? ") and extremely high specified requirements.

One of the design solutions to achieve these requirements was the use of titanium alloys for the hull and many ship structures. Initially, a depth of 705 meters was conceived for the 600 (project 661 - 400 meters), but after fierce disputes and difficult meetings, the ship industry management insisted on limiting it to 400 m. As a result, the "light" titanium hull had to be "loaded" with cast iron ballast.

The lead boat was built by the Leningrad Admiralty Association (LAO), and during its creation it was necessary to take a sip of all the problems of developing titanium in a new production. The head order went very hard, the fleet was transferred in 1971. With a number of restrictions, and a year later the boat was withdrawn from the Navy due to freezing of the coolant (bismuth-lead alloy) of the reactor. Subsequently, after the identified shortcomings were eliminated, the construction of the series was continued (3 more ships at LAO and 3 at Sevmash in Severodvinsk).


PLA K-373 pr. 705, photo source war-book.ru

The next titanium project was not only a "breakthrough into the depths", but also a starting point for our 3rd generation nuclear-powered ships.

Work on the ultra-deep-sea nuclear submarine of project 685 "Plavnik" began at TsKB-18 (future TsKB MT Rubin) in 1966, chief designer N. A. Klimov. Despite the fact that the technical project was protected in 1974, with the advent of new equipment, electronics and weapons, the boat was actually redesigned (already by the chief designer Yu. N. Kormilitsin) and laid down at Sevmash in 1978, adopted by the Navy in 1984 as K-278 "Komsomolets".

On August 4, 1985, a boat under the command of Captain 1st Rank Yu. A. Zelensky set an absolute world diving depth record - 1 meters. Unfortunately, the unique ship died on April 027, 7 while returning from its third combat service.


PLA K-278 "Komsomolets", project 685

By the mid 70s. in the USSR, 3 "underwater" design bureaus were formed: Leningrad "Rubin" (among whose projects was the titanium "Plavnik") and "Malachite" - with "its" 705 project and 661 TsKB-16, and Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) "Lapis lazuli".

The reason for the development of titanium "Lazurit" was a sharp increase in the requirements for promising multi-purpose submarines of the 3rd generation, especially for arms and secrecy (which required a significant part of the displacement of the submarine and, accordingly, its increase). At the same time, the production base of Lazurit, the Krasnoye Sormovo plant, had significant overall and weight restrictions on the construction of submarines (if possible, transfer them along the rivers for completion and delivery to the fleet). It was not possible to fulfill the new requirements of the fleet without titanium for Lazurit and Krasnoye Sormovo, the new multi-purpose nuclear submarine of project 945 Barracuda could only be made of titanium.

The task of its creation was successfully solved. At the same time, Rubin provided great assistance to Lapis Lazuli (Malachite, who saw a competitor in the 945th project as a competitor to its multi-purpose nuclear-powered ships, treated the titanium barracuda with a certain jealousy).

In total, two barracudas and two more were built at Krasnoye Sormovo according to the modernized project 945A Condor. The project 945AB submarine already laid down, which was supposed to become transitional to the 4th generation, was disposed of in connection with what happened in 1991.

Here it will be appropriate to draw certain conclusions from the experience of titanium shipbuilding, but three important factors should be noted.

First. Project 945 turned out to be unbearable in terms of technological requirements for all "underwater" shipyards, and for the series of the Amur plant "Malakhit" a steel project 971 was developed (subsequently continued in Severodvinsk). And it was 971 projects that became the mass multi-purpose nuclear submarine of the 3rd generation. The cost of titanium alloys was not decisive here: the cost of the Barracuda was close to the cost of the Bars (the unofficial name of the project 971, the official Pike-B) - the hull cost a little more (special steel of the submarine hulls themselves are very expensive), but on "Bars" with a cheaper case was a newer and more expensive first of our digital sonar complex "Skat-3".

Secondly, titanium alloys turned out to be extremely important for the new breakthrough direction of underwater shipbuilding of the so-called “deep-sea technical facilities” (nuclear deep-sea stations), which were created at Malachite in the 70s–80s and subsequent years.

Third: when creating the first project of the 4th generation - 957 "Kedr", "Lazurit" itself returned to steel as the main material of the hull. This made it necessary to work out a unique technical solution for the construction of these submarines at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant: in Gorky, make the bow and stern parts of the submarine separately (taking into account transportation along the rivers), and dock them together already in Severodvinsk. However, the most wise representatives of the leadership of the Ministry of Shipbuilding proposed the creation of a "titanium" version of the project - 957T, in order to preserve the technological backlog and experience with titanium.

The conclusion from this is not as simple as it seems.

Yes, it seems that titanium on conventional multi-purpose submarines did not justify itself. Yes, the characteristics are a little higher, but the slightly higher price of the issue and the production difficulties force steel submarines to be chosen for mass series.

Where titanium, of course, and fundamentally superior to steel is deep-sea technical means.

However, this was true only for the situation before the beginning of the 90s, the emergence and development of fundamentally new means of searching for submarines. And here it is worth appreciating the wisdom of the leaders of the USSR, who insisted on maintaining the "titanium direction" - for the future.

From the book by N. Polmar K. D. Moore “Cold War Submarines. Design and construction of American and Soviet submarines "(2004, translated from English by B.F. Dronov - St. Petersburg, OJSC" SPMBM "Malakhit", 2011):

Two experienced and knowledgeable Soviet naval officers in 1988 argued that satellite (space) reconnaissance fulfills multiple functions, including the detection of submarines, "and that radar on aircraft and satellites can be used to" detect the wave trail of submarines "(allegations Captain 1st Rank E. Semenov - "On the stability of submarines in an air threat" "Marine Collection" No. 1 of 1988 and the chief of reconnaissance of the Navy, Rear Admiral Yu. Kvyatkovsky - "Current state and prospects for the development of forces and assets for combat submarines" "Military Thought" No. 1 1988).
In 1993, the magazine of the Russian General Staff "Military Thought" (retired Major General M. A. Borshchev "On the military organization of the CIS" No. 3 1993) stated that "all-weather reconnaissance satellites and other types of space support will allow to detect surface ships and submarines at any time of the day with a high probability and provide target designation to high-precision weapons in almost real time. "

The commander of the TAVKR "Kyiv" captain 1st rank V. Zvada ("Naval Collection" No. 9 2021):

Combat service in 1987 ... in the Mediterranean Sea, an unconventional method of detecting a submarine was successfully used using the navigation station of the ship and the radar station of the Ka-27PL helicopter. This was a very promising area of ​​anti-submarine warfare.

That is, aviation and space assets have appeared that can, figuratively speaking, "look into the depths" and provide effective detection of submarines operating without taking into account the capabilities of new search facilities.

One of the obvious possibilities of "restoring stealth" of submarines is their operation at increased depths. Here it is necessary to clarify - in most cases, an increase in the maximum immersion depths is not required. However, the fact is that most of the time when at sea, all modern submarines operate at relatively shallow depths, a thin surface layer 100–200 meters thick. Yes, most of them have the ability to dive deeper. However, here for steel cases there is an extremely acute problem of fatigue strength. Such submarines can repeatedly go to the maximum depth, but the number of such deep-sea dives is severely limited, as is the time spent even at the working depth (the opinion that this is the depth at which submarines can be "permanently" was with a number of very unpleasant " discoveries” was refuted in the late 80s).

That is, the issue of ensuring the possibility of a long stay of our submarines at increased (from normal) depths is extremely acute - to ensure stealth from new search tools.

And this is where titanium hulls with a much longer resource get a decisive advantage over steel ones.

Given this factor, in no case can we agree with the already announced decommissioning of the Barracudas, their deep modernization is necessary (as well as the newer Condors), including to study new conditions and tactics for submarine warfare and counter anti-submarine forces enemy.

The issue of detecting submarines was disclosed in detail in the article. "Detect Submarine", and the importance of a large diving depth as a means of ensuring stealth - in the article "Fin" / "Komsomolets" - a mistake or a breakthrough into the XXI century".

Here the question arises about the promising project of the 5th generation multi-purpose submarine "Husky". Taking into account the new and sharply increased capabilities of non-traditional search tools, it is extremely important to study the titanium version of the project (especially since the new weapon makes it possible to provide high striking power in a compact manner).

And here a huge thank you should be said to all those who, despite the hardest 90s, managed to maintain (and develop!) Our “titanium direction”.

In the future, this factor will become even more important, taking into account diversification and the civilian market. The depletion of the main oil and gas fields on land will force the active development of the shelf, including the northern seas. And here environmental issues and, accordingly, the problems of corrosion resistance of pipelines and fittings are extremely acute. Taking into account the high cost of special steel alloys, their vulnerability to corrosion, and the issues of reliable control of long pipelines and fittings that have not been fully resolved, the use of titanium (for which we have preserved and have good groundwork) seems promising here as well.
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  1. Vladimir_2U
    Vladimir_2U 23 March 2022 04: 49
    +5
    In the meantime, we are still supplying a lot of titanium to our "partners". And sanctions-shmanktsii not a hindrance.
    1. andrewkor
      andrewkor 23 March 2022 05: 54
      +10
      Totally agree with you! Sanctions against sanctions. To deprive the "partners" of titanium, in this case, to redirect the released resources to their own needs!
      1. shahor
        shahor 23 March 2022 11: 33
        +6
        Quote: andrewkor
        Deprive "partners" of titanium, in this case, redirect the released resources to their needs!

        Guys, get behind life! The Boeing partner said that it was refusing to cooperate with the Russian Federation, stopped purchasing titanium products in Russia and closed its engineering center. So now we have plenty of titanium for our needs!
        1. DenVB
          DenVB 23 March 2022 13: 35
          0
          Quote: shahor
          So now we have plenty of titanium for our needs!

          Naivete. It's just that titanium will now go not directly to Boeing, but somewhere in Asia, where exactly the same products for Boeing will be stamped from it.
          1. shahor
            shahor 24 March 2022 11: 05
            +2
            Quote: DenVB
            It's just that titanium will now go not directly to Boeing, but somewhere in Asia, where exactly the same products for Boeing will be stamped from it.

            And then why all these cries about the ban on the supply of titanium to Boeing?
            1. DenVB
              DenVB 24 March 2022 14: 35
              +1
              Well, you need to amuse the lokhturat.
  2. Amateur
    Amateur 23 March 2022 05: 53
    +5
    Another interesting article from M. Klimov. Thanks!
    1. Nikolaevich I
      Nikolaevich I 23 March 2022 09: 22
      -7
      Quote: Amateur
      Another interesting article from M. Klimov.

      Another "ruinous" article from Klimov! If "miracles" had happened, and Klimov with his projectors was appointed "chief in the Ministry of Defense" back in "Soviet times", then the USSR would have hooted five years earlier, and the Russian Federation would have gone bankrupt without having time to "squeak"! Such "innovations" (not only titanium submarines ...) at one time undermined the economic health of the USSR; but whether such projects of Klimov will withstand the "organism" of Russia is a big question!
      1. avg avg
        avg avg 23 March 2022 12: 15
        -2
        On whom are you crumbling a loaf, dear? For a whole hydromajor, crumble! Well, stop messing around immediately! :)
        1. Nikolaevich I
          Nikolaevich I 23 March 2022 12: 38
          -1
          Quote: avg avg
          Well, stop messing around immediately! :)

          Excuse me, uncle! I won't do it again! (This comment is the only one ... I said everything ... I see no reason to add anything ...)
      2. timokhin-aa
        23 March 2022 22: 50
        +6
        Yaseni-M at several HUNDRED BILLIONS per unit, I see you are not embarrassed
        1. Amateur
          Amateur 26 March 2022 10: 57
          -1
          From Timokhin another "gnashing of teeth" about M. Klimov. Jealousy again...
        2. bayard
          bayard 26 March 2022 12: 46
          +4
          Such figures for one combat unit will confuse anyone - the price tag of the so-called. MAPL "Ash-M" as in the declared nuclear super-destroyer "Leader".
          I'm interested in something else. The MAPL Husky project, announced at the very beginning of the last decade, seems to imply the reincarnation and development of the Kedr project.
          Is it so ?
          After all, both the VI, and the liquid-metal reactor, and the general characteristics corresponded precisely to the "Kedr" project.
          And why was the project abandoned? Problems with the ZhM reactor? Or the lobby of the owners of the "Ash" program - who proposed the further development of this monster under the code "Laika"?
          And thanks to the author for the article. It turns out that the radar method for detecting submarines was also worked out using the radar of a PLO helicopter ... what a good direction they ruined ...
  3. sergo1914
    sergo1914 23 March 2022 06: 53
    +1
    About Lyra. On the first test exit, they tried "gas to the floor" in a submerged position. Came to the factory uncovered. All seams and rivets on the cabin and hull were ironed flush. The official speed characteristics are most likely underestimated. Anchar, like, she did.
    1. shahor
      shahor 23 March 2022 11: 37
      +2
      Quote: sergo1914
      Anchar, like, she did.

      But she scared away the partner’s fish and submarines in a radius ... you can’t even see it! Very noisy!
  4. Doccor18
    Doccor18 23 March 2022 09: 23
    +5
    Thanks to the author for the article.
    However, there are some doubts in this opinion. It is now clear that the surface component of the Fleet is being updated too slowly and will only decrease in the foreseeable future. Against this background, only the construction of the maximum possible MAPL series can save the situation. These boats should be simpler, smaller and significantly cheaper than the 885 project. You need dozens of them. Even at the limit of their technological power (late 80s), the USSR came to the conclusion that it was too difficult to create titanium submarines. Yes, they have a number of unique characteristics, they are better than steel ones, but they will never be able to become a mass product, and now a mass product is needed. What is the point in 2-3 unique nuclear-powered ships for two separated fleets? Now, in difficult times for the Navy, what is needed is not a "superweapon", but a technologically mastered project. Some time ago, they already talked about a possible MAPL project based on the 955 project, already mastered by the industry.
    1. Scharnhorst
      Scharnhorst 23 March 2022 18: 21
      0
      Thanks to the author for the article.

      I agree, I agree. But, either Maxim was in a hurry, or there was no access to more convincing arguments. If I had not been a supporter of the "titanium fleet", then he would not have drawn people with an unformed opinion on this issue to his point of view, and, moreover, he would not have convinced potential opponents.
      It is now clear that the surface component of the Fleet is being updated too slowly and will only decrease in the foreseeable future

      Let me disagree with you already looking at the results of the first 20 years of the new century.
      These boats should be simpler, smaller and significantly cheaper than the 885 project.

      Your own argument in the same place! Only the 885th Lada can be simpler than the 677th Ash. Less - 677th Lada (VI under water 2650 tons) and in the same weight category the French "Rubis" (VI under water 2670 tons), by the way, nuclear! Well, cheaper - a hybrid of Lada and Rubis in a titanium case (in the sense of a battery + reactor) within the body of a much more massive Varshavyanka (VI under water 3950 tons). For one ash tree, in all respects, we get a couple of submarines! sad
      1. Doccor18
        Doccor18 23 March 2022 19: 18
        +3
        Quote: Scharnhorst
        Only the 885th Lada can be simpler than the 677th Ash.

        And if, on the basis of the 955 project, by removing the BR compartment, start building the MAPL. At a cost, it will be half the price of the 885th, smaller in size. This project has been fully mastered by the industry. Such workhorses for the fleet could be riveted for twenty pieces by the beginning of the thirties. With titanium, everything will most likely be much slower, many times more expensive, and the series will be limited to the same 7-8 pennants...
        Quote: Scharnhorst
        I beg to differ...

        And what, some kind of breakthrough is planned in the mass construction of DMZ surface ships?

        Quote: Scharnhorst
        French "Rubis"

        I am somehow wary of such "ultra-small" nuclear-powered ships. Autonomy, survivability and ammunition - everything is at a minimum. For closed water areas of non-nuclear 636 and 677 for the eyes, and for the ocean expanses, something more capacious is still needed.
        1. Scharnhorst
          Scharnhorst 23 March 2022 23: 34
          +3
          And what, some kind of breakthrough is planned in the mass construction of DMZ surface ships?

          I apologize for answering a question with a question. And why do we, like China and the United States, need seven dozen ocean destroyers each? I consider even the bloated project 22350M redundant. In wartime conditions (it has already been a month of the current operation), it is frivolous to allow attempts to implement the program of ocean fleets for the Russian Federation. Even successful Germans abandoned such plans at the beginning of WWII.
          1. Doccor18
            Doccor18 24 March 2022 00: 00
            +3
            Quote: Scharnhorst
            And why do we, like China and the United States, have seven dozen ocean destroyers

            There is no need for 70 destroyers, here I agree with you, but it is simply necessary to have 20 frigates (8 each for the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet, and 4 for the Black Sea Fleet), as a necessary minimum. Although, it is necessary to proceed from the tasks that the Fleet faces, and even build ships for these tasks.
            Quote: Scharnhorst
            I consider even the bloated project 22350M redundant.

            I repeat, it is necessary to proceed from the tasks that are set for a particular ship.
            The problem I see is that many projects are clearly not conducive to serialization, leading to delays and cost overruns.
            1. dim999
              dim999 28 March 2022 12: 58
              0
              - To proceed, I repeat, it is necessary from the tasks that are set for a particular ship.

              Based on the tasks, there is no need to build NK at all. Bo, even having dominance at sea and in the air and a real enemy with a vast and not really covered coastline - the fleet even uses the BDK as ordinary traders (The landing ship has a familiar task - the delivery of military equipment, but the method of unloading armored personnel carriers is very unusual, with the help of The design features of the ships of Project 1171 also allow this. In total, ten large landing ships participate in the operation.
              Yes, if anything, a fleet is not required to calibrate Ukraine.
              1. Doccor18
                Doccor18 28 March 2022 15: 49
                0
                Quote: dim999
                Based on the tasks, there is no need to build NK at all.

                Very categorical.
                What is the fleet without a surface component? One submelt cannot solve the whole range of problems. The Navy must be balanced, as far as the current situation and capabilities allow.
                Quote: dim999
                the fleet even uses the BDK as ordinary traders

                So this is not from a good life ...
                Quote: dim999
                Design features of the ships of project 1171

                The design features of the 1171 project do not allow them to be mass-produced, and then I don’t quite understand “why they are”. Soviet BDKs are at the limit, we need a new series, namely a series, and not 2-4 ships.
                Quote: dim999
                for some reason, they are embarrassed to use warships even to cover them, not to mention independent tasks.

                Yes, they are not shy, but they are simply not enough. There are only a few new NK DMZs, the Soviet backlog will disappear in ten years and become history.
                Quote: dim999
                a fleet is not required to calibrate Ukraine.

                And to admonish the "partners" in the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Far Eastern basins ..?
                1. dim999
                  dim999 29 March 2022 12: 23
                  0
                  What is the fleet without a surface component?

                  Combat. Performing real tasks. Do not confuse "fleet without BNK" and "fleet without surface component". In the Great Patriotic War, pretentious battleships with destroyers stuck out in bases, and boats and trawlers with hastily screwed guns fought. In the Caribbean crisis, transports with hastily screwed ZUShki and boats went to Cuba, and the BNK again remained in the bases, more suddenly drowned. Those. balanced fleet - cheap civilian vessels with weapons, cheap units for narrow tasks (like Dugongs and diesel-electric submarines).

                  So this is not from a good life ...

                  What, there are absolutely no self-propelled barges and other ferries on the Sea of ​​Azov? So then, all the more, it’s not necessary to spend money on the BDK)))

                  The design features of the 1171 project do not allow them to be mass-produced, and then I don’t quite understand “why they are”. Soviet BDKs are at the limit, we need a new series, namely a series, and not 2-4 ships.

                  And you don’t need to build a BDK. Completely civil solutions for cargo delivery, incl. on an unequipped shore, enough. But Zushka and hail can be put on deck, all the same, the armament of the BDK for self-defense from something more serious than blacks on a rusty motor boat is about nothing.
                  Yes, they are not shy, but they are simply not enough. There are only a few new NK DMZs, the Soviet backlog will disappear in ten years and become history.

                  O_o ...))) From Sevastopol to Odessa by sea, it is less than 200 km, from Kerch to Berdyansk too. Are the DMZ ships really needed there? If it disappears, the road will go there, instead of the pretentious decorations of the native pier, resources will be spent on something that will really fight.
                  And to admonish the "partners" in the Black Sea, Mediterranean and Far Eastern basins ..?

                  Nobody canceled the Air Force and ground complexes.
                  1. Doccor18
                    Doccor18 30 March 2022 09: 39
                    0
                    Quote: dim999
                    In the Great Patriotic War, pretentious battleships with destroyers stuck in bases

                    If you study history, then you know why they "stuck" there and how the forces were distributed among the fleets.

                    Quote: dim999
                    In the Caribbean crisis, transports with hastily screwed ZUShki and boats went to Cuba, and the BNK again remained in the bases, more suddenly drowned.

                    The initial success of secrecy was, but then, when the United States began to slow down and deploy transports, it was necessary to bring in a squadron of cruisers / destroyers. Why wasn't it entered? Khrushchev and the land marshals decided in their own way. How they decided, it became clear later
                    At the same time, the contribution of the army commanders to the failure of the submarine campaign was decisive - it was Defense Minister Grechko who set the boats speed at the crossings, which led to their detection.
                    Analysis of the fact of surfacing is also "impressive", take at least the "legendary" phrase of the Minister of Defense:

                    “What kind of battery charging? What kind of batteries? Why didn't you throw grenades at the Americans when they surfaced? "

                    It was necessary to throw grenades on a US Navy destroyer. And then, having found out that it turns out that the boats were diesel, not nuclear (after the operation in which he gave orders!), The minister smashed his glasses on the table in a rage.

                    Awesome management quality, isn't it?

                    Quote: dim999
                    those. balanced fleet - cheap civilian vessels with weapons,

                    Just not. And the fact that this does not work out for us (where there is no fault of the fleet), it works out quite well for others. It's worth thinking about it.
                    Quote: dim999
                    What, there are absolutely no self-propelled barges

                    They must fall from the sky, sorry. It is necessary to build ships and ships constantly, without interruption for decades, build new shipyards, modernize old ones, allocate considerable funds for design work in shipbuilding, materials science, and so on. etc. How much of all of the above has been done in the last thirty years?

                    Quote: dim999
                    no need to build a BDK. Completely civil solutions for cargo delivery, incl. on an unequipped shore, enough. And you can put Zushka and hail on the deck, anyway

                    Partly agree. BDKs are needed, but they need to be built as much as possible focusing on the project of some kind of civil project. An inexpensive and massive ship is needed, and not what is coming out now.

                    Quote: dim999
                    Nobody canceled the Air Force and ground complexes.

                    Didn't cancel. But far from all tasks can be solved with the help of coastal aviation and anti-ship missiles. It was these slogans that the "young school" indulged in the thirties, "corn and co" in the fifties, the apologists for the "land power" in our time, and then "suddenly" it turns out that there is no one to cover our SSBNs in the seas, there is nothing to support army units in Syria (convulsive attempts to rent any floating rubbish over the hillock and winding the BDK begin, instead of supply transports), and so on ...
                    One can only hope that in the future there will be insight into the real strength and necessity of the fleet (commercial and military), and its irreplaceable qualities.
                    1. dim999
                      dim999 April 1 2022 17: 12
                      +1
                      Do you know why they were there?

                      Because Kuznetsov was fine with that. So the RGK fought quite well, but for this they had to be asked, but both the army men and the seamen, commanders of the operations of light forces, did not do this together, apparently equally "highly" appreciating the benefits of such a "reinforcement", and the leadership of the fleet did not offer the help of irons to the first and did not bug for not using the second.
                      Why wasn't it entered? Khrushchev and the land marshals decided in their own way. How they decided, it became clear later
                      ...
                      Awesome management quality, isn't it?

                      Because it was a little different.
                      1. In the summer, the navy held a Big Showdown, directly misinforming the leadership (they launched SLBMs from a diesel engine, but they said that from a nuclear one), and in general they sang "everything is fine, beautiful marquise."
                      2. The transition plan (note, PEACEFUL transition, when no blockade was foreseen) laid down the speed of the submarine as part of the squadron, without stealth and with a rembase.
                      2. When secrecy was everything, and transport from special warheads was still on the way, Khrushchev and the military began to look for options - and Gorshkov nevertheless offered them ... to send a submarine (NK, when the likelihood of hostilities arose, was NOT offered by the naval leadership) ... tadam. ..so that they drown THEIR transport with special warheads in case of a threat of capture. At the same time, which submarines to send were decided by the fleet, which the fleet did not say a word on the topic "we have nuclear ones here a little unreliable, we thought and decided, although the task had changed, from representative to combat, send diesel anyway, although they are secretly And they can't go fast." As a result, instead of IMBA, capable of nullifying any landing operation with a special torpedo, they got what they got.
                      3. Yes, there was no quality of management, so Gorshkov did not fly out with his entire staff to work as janitors in Dixon, but continued his struggle with the Soviet fleet.
                    2. dim999
                      dim999 April 1 2022 18: 11
                      +1
                      how the forces were distributed among the fleets

                      What difference does it make which pier the ship is standing at, instead of fighting?) There were tasks both in the Black Sea Fleet and in the Baltic Fleet, and later in the Pacific Fleet.
                      And the fact that this does not work out for us (where there is no fault of the fleet), it works out quite well for others. It's worth thinking about it.

                      The fault of the fleet - puts corporate interests above the interests of the country. Accordingly, it takes on tasks not those that it can solve, but those for which it is possible to squeeze out the maximum resources. After that, these tasks merge, and the country disentangles the consequences of this. The fault of the country's leadership is that the fleet (and the corresponding part of the industry) are allowed to do this.
                      They must fall from the sky, sorry.

                      Kyzyl- and Kazan-60, Vologda- and Dvinitsa-50 - did they fall from the sky or did they just buy used ones?)
                      Ships and ships need to be built, constantly, without interruption

                      And, mind you, they are building. Dozens of all kinds of river-sea and other icebreakers. That's who prevented the Navy from ordering ten penny Dugongs for each fleet and a couple of high-speed lighter carriers for them instead of perversions with BDKs and Mistrals?
                      But far from all tasks can be solved with the help of coastal aviation and anti-ship missiles.

                      Where there is everything. Where there is none, the fleet can not even be driven.
                      It was with these slogans that the "young school" indulged in the thirties,

                      To begin with, take an interest in what exactly the young school (represented by Aleksandrov) offered, and how it differed from the school of the small war.))) Which was just defeated by the adherents of Petrov and K, which for some reason we consider to be a classical school (Mehan go works as a fan in the coffin).
                      "corn and co" in the fifties,

                      It was only thanks to Khrushchev that the USSR got a missile fleet instead of a pure museum of rarities from the times of the Great Patriotic War and the first aircraft-carrying ships.))) By the way, the fact that there were so few and so peculiar is again the merit of the fleet, which in a few years, until I pestered everyone with a proposal to finish building 68 into something useful, but they did not bother to offer a light aircraft carrier.
                      apologists for a "land power" in our time, and then "suddenly" it turns out that there is no one to cover our SSBNs in the seas, there is nothing to support army units in Syria (convulsive attempts begin to rent any floating rubbish over a hillock and throw a BDK, instead of supply transports) and so on ...

                      Well, how about the idea itself, with the enemy dominating the sea, starting directly from our bases and having PGRKs to build new SSBNs, it draws in treason on the Motherland on an especially large scale with aggravating ones.
                      And who said that the fleet in the worst dreams saw to support the army or ensure the combat stability of the NSNF?
                      One can only hope that the Navy, as a corporation working strictly for itself, will nevertheless be dispersed, they will revise realistic tasks, and give their solution "according to ownership" - to the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force, border guards, supplies, etc. Which will order, if necessary, watercraft for specific tasks and solve these tasks.)
    2. timokhin-aa
      23 March 2022 22: 51
      +6
      Taking into account the price of submarine equipment, the difference in price between titanium and the same steel will most likely not go beyond 10%.
  5. soul
    soul 23 March 2022 10: 04
    +4
    The commander of the TAVKR "Kyiv" captain 1st rank V. Zvada ("Naval Collection" No. 9 2021)

    Was the commander of my ship (Baku/Gorshkov → Vikramaditya)
  6. avg avg
    avg avg 23 March 2022 12: 11
    -6
    Oh, Maksik Klimov was released!
  7. Wildcat
    Wildcat 23 March 2022 12: 15
    +1
    hi
    Interesting article, love it!
  8. max702
    max702 23 March 2022 17: 50
    -3
    The AUGophiles of the site claimed that the huge shipborne AUG could not be detected using satellite reconnaissance and given target designation, but here it is! In 1993, the magazine of the Russian General Staff "Military Thought" (retired Major General M. A. Borshchev "On the military organization of the CIS" No. 3 1993) stated that "all-weather reconnaissance satellites and other types of space support will allow to detect surface ships and submarines at any time of the day with a high probability and provide target designation to high-precision weapons in almost real time. " Kick tick then?!! It turns out that not only the AUG, but a meager submarine can be found at a depth of several hundred meters and target designation can be given to it ?! From this turn...
    1. agond
      agond 23 March 2022 20: 48
      0
      Titanium breakthrough? Piranha project 865 also had a titanium hull, and the immersion depth was only 200m !!! , the question is - why did she need titanium if she could make it, for example, from cast iron for the same 200m? (high-strength cast iron is stronger than titanium alloys) but it was just then fashionable to make shovels from tinat, and in other countries they do not consider it necessary to build boats from titanium at all.
      1. timokhin-aa
        23 March 2022 22: 57
        +4
        the question is - why did she need titanium if she could make it, for example, from cast iron for the same 200m?


        Firstly, it’s impossible, and secondly, to get away from non-acoustics, you need a kilometer, and you don’t dive there for an hour, but leave for a day or two.
    2. timokhin-aa
      23 March 2022 22: 56
      +6
      Everything is very simple for the unstoppable - the ship can go 30 knots or more, passing through dangerous areas, the submarine will have to sneak in any case, otherwise it will lose its acoustic stealth.
      For example, a satellite flies over a certain area of ​​​​the world ocean once every 15 hours, the scanning strip is 300 km, the ship will pass it faster than the satellite will make its 15 revolutions around the Earth, simply due to speed, a boat cannot cross the zone at such a speed, it is at 30 knots will be very noisy, and it will be copied by bottom acoustic systems from a very long distance. And it will crawl slowly - it will fall under the satellite.
      Paradox, yes, but that's how it is now.

      The stoned ones who live in their reality, of course, will not understand anything. But who cares?
      1. max702
        max702 23 March 2022 23: 15
        -4
        That is Retired Major General M. A. Borshchev stoned? And the agent of enemy influence Timokhin is a beacon in military thought? Well, it's lovely! Who is this written for? it was stated that "all-weather reconnaissance satellites and other types of space support will allow the detection of surface ships and submarines Anytime day with a high probability and provide target designation for high-precision weapons almost in real time» Notice "Anytime" Nearly real time is up to you a satellite flies over a certain part of the world ocean once every 15 hours And if not ? So what? I do not play this way? Not fair? . If reality does not agree with "I see it this way", then this is a reality problem ..
        1. timokhin-aa
          28 March 2022 15: 24
          +1
          So you have to get into the swath first
      2. dim999
        dim999 28 March 2022 12: 47
        -1
        And how does a submarine at a periscope at 30 nodes and an AB at 30 nodes differ for bottom systems?
        1. timokhin-aa
          28 March 2022 15: 25
          0
          Detection range, in some cases - an order of magnitude
          1. dim999
            dim999 29 March 2022 11: 53
            0
            Those. In your opinion, 4 turbines and 4 propellers on a 100 kt carcass are heard worse than 1 turbine with better sound insulation and 1 low-noise propeller at the same 10 meters of depth? And even less, if in positional? There is no need to compare AB with a submarine at a depth of 50-100, she can even enter the near-surface layer.
            1. timokhin-aa
              29 March 2022 12: 00
              0
              The record for acoustic detection of an aircraft carrier is about five hundred kilometers, a submarine is 6000.
              These are facts.
              True, the boat was old, of the first generation, but it did not go at 30 knots, it hid (tried).

              Taking into account modern ASW, the concept of "stealth" must be reconsidered in principle.
              1. dim999
                dim999 April 1 2022 16: 41
                0
                Those. ChiTD - "Submarines at high speed can be heard further than AB" it is said based on the detection range of a Very Noisy submarine that successfully hit the PZK and does not apply to the situation "a low-noise submarine goes at periscope depth or in a positional position" in any way from the word at all.

                Only now, secrecy then (and some naval officers in ranks and much later) considered "in the underwater - it means covertly", and the stealth coefficients were also derived from this.)))

                Necessary. But it is the same for everyone, and not "we count here, but here we wrap the herring."
    3. Boa kaa
      Boa kaa 23 March 2022 23: 11
      +4
      Quote: max702
      a meager submarine can be detected at a depth of several hundred meters and target designation can be given to it ?! From this turn...

      1. Find the "footprint" of the boat. Radiation or thermal after it "surfaces" to the surface of the sea. The speed of the "emergence" of the trace, if sclerosis does not lie to me, is about 1-2 m per hour ...
      2. Detect "standing" waves from the movement of an object under water. This is at a serious speed and with a small depth of movement ...
      3. If the transparency of the sea is good, then laser ranging with a "green" laser is possible at depths up to 150m
      Even without spacecraft, there are instruments on NK and PLA for detecting submerged boats ... All this is called non-acoustic methods for detecting submarines in a submerged position.
      And from acoustics, the method of detecting silent underwater objects, "illuminated" by low-frequency radiation or natural "noises" of the sea, comes to the fore. The famous brothers Valery and Viktor Leksins and their device of the "Delta" type. At the same time, even our DPL pr.677 carry GPBA in the plumage of a vertical rudder ... with an SHF (LF) antenna ...
      Therefore, the depth of immersion is important for stealth only in the first fields indicated above, unmasking submarine factors. But depth will not save you from low-frequency radiation, and this is the most important way to detect noiseless underwater objects today.
      1. max702
        max702 29 March 2022 19: 33
        -1
        You wrote all this very beautifully, but I have another question, if all this detects a small nuclear submarine, then why can’t this all detect a dozen AUG ships with a displacement of orders of magnitude greater? That's what my question was to Timokhin, an agent of enemy influence .. True, in the comments he managed to give birth like this The record for acoustic detection of an aircraft carrier is about five hundred kilometers, a submarine is 6000.
        These are facts.
        But that's okay, and if we proceed from Timokhin's logic, then nuclear submarines in the surface position will be detected not at 6000 km, but at 500 km. Timokhin is like this ..
        1. Boa kaa
          Boa kaa 29 March 2022 21: 23
          +2
          Quote: max702
          But Timokhin is like that ..

          Maxim, but Timokhin is right! The thing is that there is such a science as hydrology / hydroacoustics. And it is very "insidious" in terms of the propagation of sound energy in the aquatic environment (in the PZK, for example!). So, there have been cases when the signal via the SSC (underwater sound channel) went around the Earth ... Now the whole trick is in digital signal processing, separating it against the background of natural sea noise and numerous reverberations from the bottom, water wedges (layers with different density and temperature ) etc. The mat apparatus of these "black boxes" (software of the receiving tract equipment) is such that the devil himself will break his leg ... Therefore, the Lesins were pioneers with their Deltas ...
          In short, not everything is as simple as it might seem at first glance. Therefore, I propose to leave this question to specialists in the field of G/A. By birthright, I am a navigator-navigator, and not a hydroacoustic or torpedo pilot - I don’t know all the subtleties of the water element for sure. Therefore - I beg your pardon ...
          How could I explain. Sincerely, Udav.
          1. max702
            max702 29 March 2022 22: 31
            0
            I understand that hydroacoustics is not a simple thing, just explain how hydroacoustics works in the case of a submarine, but does not work in the case of an AUG? Why then release nuclear submarines if they are found at distances of thousands of kilometers greater than surface ships? What is the purpose of releasing them if they are such an easy target? It seems to me that this is a banal pulling of an owl on a globe, that yes they were able to decipher the signal from the nuclear submarine at such a distance, but what does it give? Most likely the fact itself, but in the real search and target designation of nuclear submarines, this does not help in any way, because then no one would simply produce them, which categorically does not happen .. I repeat if nuclear submarines can be tracked down in real time, then the bulk of the AUG, all the more, no There are no physical contradictions in this. but the nuclear submarine, which has a special hull shape, hydroacoustic coating, a cunning mover for the same tasks of increased stealth, and all this is absolutely useless because AUG / KUG is more difficult to find, then why is the submarine as a class? I see a contradiction .. nuclear submarines sharpened for secrecy are orders of magnitude simpler than AUG / KUG, which were categorically not sharpened for this secrecy .. Why then dancing with submarines?
            1. Boa kaa
              Boa kaa 29 March 2022 23: 35
              +3
              Quote: max702
              how does hydroacoustics work in the case of nuclear submarines, but does it not work in the case of AUG?

              All in accordance with the physics of the propagation of wave energy in the aquatic environment (in accordance with the type of hydrology of the sea - from 1 to 7!)
              Quote: max702
              Why then release nuclear submarines if they are found at distances of thousands of kilometers greater than surface ships?
              Well, there is no such thing! Because the boat always has an up-to-date g / a section of the water area where it is located and chooses the most advantageous position in relation to the target (PLC). Do not be lazy, look at the request in the I-net what I wrote about.
              Quote: max702
              Nuclear submarines sharpened for stealth are orders of magnitude simpler than AUG / KUG, which were categorically not sharpened for this stealth ..
              It is a very, very difficult task to find a submarine at low noise under a HED in a remote area of ​​\uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbthe world's oceans ... For this, all means are involved, from undercover intelligence (moles in headquarters, collecting rumors, etc.) to RTR KA and special search tools ... At the same time, the fleets conduct large-scale search operations, using the forces and means of the senior commander (RF Ministry of Defense) ... And such search operations last for days, weeks, if it is really necessary ... And everything that is on top is located during the day ... maximum!
              I have not read the opus of Alexander Timokhin, where he claimed the opposite. But according to my experience of serving in the Navy, I subscribe to what I said above.
              AHA.
              1. max702
                max702 30 March 2022 09: 14
                -2
                My dispute started with In 1993, in the journal of the Russian General Staff "Military Thought" (Ret. Major General M.A. Borshchev "On the Military Organization of the CIS" No. 3, 1993), it was stated that “all-weather reconnaissance satellites and other types of space support will allow detecting surface ships and submarines at any time of the day with high probability and provide target designation for precision weapons in almost real time». to which Timokhin said that it all works with submarines, but not with AUG! Everything is very simple for the unstoppable - the ship can go 30 knots or more, passing through dangerous areas, the submarine will have to sneak in any case, otherwise it will lose its acoustic stealth. Like AUG, it will quickly pass through a dangerous area and no one will detect it, but the nuclear submarine will lose its stealth and it will definitely be found! How is that ?!!! That those that others make noise in full but take the nuclear submarines at gunpoint, and the AUG quietly dissolves in the expanses of the ocean ... The AUG, noisy with dozens of propellers, hammering with radars and sonars in all directions, holding the DRL aircraft in the air and the duty link is invisible to the enemy, and the low-noise nuclear submarine is sliding in the depths is easily and naturally taken on the sight? Doesn't bother you? Okay! To hell with them! Surface AUGs are really impossible to detect closer than 500 km, but what about nuclear submarines that necessarily accompany AUGs in the amount of 1-2 pieces? They are easy to spot! And take off the whole AUG? I'm not climbing into the technical jungle. But into logic! Who is easier to detect a company of soldiers walking through the forest carrying heavy weapons or a scout with a load of plastids in a backpack? A squadron of strategists or a lone stealth aircraft? The principles of detection (what you described) are the same as for nuclear submarines and for AUGs. But Timokhin's ocean "it's different!" The whole point is that the belief in the invulnerability and effectiveness of the AUG is based on two pillars, this is the impossibility of detecting it outside the range of the AUG carrier-based aviation, as well as the impossibility of giving target designation to it at the same distances, as soon as this is not the AUG turns into an expensive target because the dogma of that anti-ship missiles for AUGs are an easy target, as well as the presence of hypersound in them .. That's why I say if in 93 retired Major General M. A. Borshchev declares the possibility of real-time detection and target designation of submarines and surface ships, then 30 years later, this was most likely implemented in practice, which calls into question the presence of KUG / AUG and other large surface formations for which Timokhin, an agent of enemy influence, drowns, because if we get into such a scam on other types of weapons, there will be no resources left .. Nothing else will be active in advancing the issue of the need for the Russian Navy to have several AUGs cannot be explained ..
  9. LanceUppercut
    LanceUppercut 23 March 2022 21: 20
    +2
    Initially, a depth of 705 meters was conceived for the 600 (project 661 - 400 meters), but after fierce disputes and difficult meetings, the ship industry management insisted on limiting it to 400 m. As a result, the "light" titanium hull had to be "loaded" with cast iron ballast.


    It's unclear.

    What is this depth? Limit? Working?

    Why does a decrease in this depth lead to the need for additional loading with cast-iron ballast?
    1. Podvodnik
      Podvodnik 16 May 2022 21: 35
      0
      What is this depth? Limit? Working?


      For "non-marine" (in simple terms):
      Limiting depth - pl can dive for a short time, after performing predetermined preparatory measures. For example, close certain "faucets" and cut off those. remedies for overpressure - some "things" will not withstand and "break". Each warhead commander on a submarine has a plan for such events.
      Working depth - a submarine can dive into it at any time and stay as long as necessary. No special events and preparation of those funds are required.
    2. Podvodnik
      Podvodnik 16 May 2022 21: 46
      0
      Why does a decrease in this depth lead to the need for additional loading with cast-iron ballast?


      As far as I understood, it was about replacing steel with titanium. Since the load of the boat during design is calculated based on the weight and volume of the ship - ballast, trim systems, etc., then when the hull is replaced, the weight of the ship and its displacement (dimensions) change. This violates the original calculations on the ability of the submarine to dive. If the received ballast (water) is not enough, then it will not be able to "dive". Therefore, in advance, to avoid weight distribution errors, additional ballast in the form of cast iron ingots with handles is provided. They are loaded on the submarine initially. According to the test results, these ingots can be loaded or unloaded to bring the weight distribution of the submarine to the norm.
  10. Bratkov Oleg
    Bratkov Oleg 25 March 2022 11: 21
    +1
    "The wisdom of the leaders of the USSR"
    Not all of them were wise, that is, they benefited the country and its people, some of the wise leaders worked for the collapse of the USSR, and this part won.
  11. Boa kaa
    Boa kaa 30 March 2022 18: 43
    +3
    Quote: max702
    There is no other way to explain the activity in promoting the issue of the need for the Russian Navy to have several AUGs ..

    Thank you for bringing up the case and the history of the dispute.
    Judging by your story, Alexander was engaged in apologetics for the AUS to the detriment of the submarine forces. It is not right. We need a modern ocean fleet balanced in terms of birth and strength, and at the same time in terms of quantity. Which without PLA (different classes) and NK, including AVU, is simply unthinkable. It's expensive and we can't afford it yet. But everything will certainly work out, and we will have normal aircraft carriers in sufficient numbers to solve problems for the fleet. There will be boats and "unparalleled" weapons ...
    Everything has its time. Those who deny this postulate lack education and understanding of the essence of armed struggle at sea.
    And further. Thank you for the conversation, but, I beg your pardon, it is better to discuss such issues in a personal, because specific persons are mentioned in the dispute.
    Sincerely, Boa. hi
  12. Boris63
    Boris63 24 May 2022 10: 57
    0
    In 1989 he was on a business trip to Gorky on Kr. Sormovo, in the welding assembly shop 2. I saw the welding of the hull floor, I was in the torpedo tube shop. Sormichi said that they just didn’t set up a cabin, and two floors of the hull were assembled in SSC-1 and further along the rivers and canals with a wooden barge on top of the hull they pulled it for completion. True, Zhdanovsky (Northern Shipyard) was also mentioned as a finisher. As they say: for what I bought ...