Russia and Israel: paths so similar
Yes, today, during the ongoing special operation on the territory of Ukraine, it is very useful to recall another special operation forty years ago. We are talking about Operation Peace in Galilee, which began in June 1982. These are two very similar operations in terms of goals and objectives.
I will not go into details of how many units and subunits were involved in the operations, since there is no data from the Russian side and it is not worth waiting for them. One can only estimate, and very approximately. It will focus on the goals and methods of solving problems.
Goals were about the same
The Palestine Liberation Organization, which set up bases in Lebanon, terrorized Israel, which in response sent rockets and shells into Lebanese territory. In fact, there was a war of two forces on the territory of a third state. There was no political solution in sight, since Arafat and his PLO were supported by all neighboring Arab countries, from Syria to Iran.
The goals pursued by Russia in principle are not very different from those of Israel. Yes, there were no shellings of Russian territory from the territory of Ukraine, but for eight years there was a war in the Donbass. Which the world, by the way, also stubbornly did not want to notice, like the PLO guerrilla war against Israel. In addition, Ukraine's stubborn desire to say goodbye to the non-bloc neutral status and join NATO can be compared in the long term with the position of Israel, which at that time was surrounded by by no means friendly countries.
Although today's Russia, as it were, is not surrounded by three rows of friends, let's be honest.
So, in principle, the goals of the countries can be called exactly the same. Maximum security for your territory by maximally weakening the enemy.
What is happening today on the territory of Ukraine can be called an increased operation "Peace in Galilee" or the First Lebanon War.
In count. Israel allocated seven full-fledged divisions and two additional formations to participate in the operation. About 76 thousand military personnel, 800 tanks, 1500 armored personnel carriers, 634 combat aircraft. Plus the army of South Lebanon (about 5 thousand fighters and 97 tanks) and the army of the "Christian Lebanese Front" (about 18 thousand fighters).
In total - about 100 thousand fighters, equipment is mainly Israeli.
Enemy. Four Palestinian brigades (essentially one reinforced division), an artillery regiment and a tank regiment. 15 thousand fighters (I note - very good fighters), 100 tanks, 300 guns and mortars, 100 MLRS, 150 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, 200 anti-tank guns, 200 anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems. The numbers are round because everything is approximate.
Plus Syrians. The Syrian army was represented in Lebanon by two tank brigades, two motorized infantry brigades, a tank regiment, and a defensive tank company. Then there were fourteen commando battalions, twelve artillery battalions, two anti-tank companies armed with the Malyutka ATGM, and two anti-aircraft missile brigades (9 Kub batteries, 2 S-125 batteries and 2 S-75 batteries).
Total 22 thousand military personnel, 300 tanks, 300 guns and mortars, up to 300 armored vehicles.
As part of this group, which numbered 22 thousand military personnel and was equivalent to at least two divisions, there were at least 300 tanks (according to other sources, the Syrians had 352 tanks in Lebanon), the same number of artillery pieces and heavy mortars, and about 80 ( according to other sources, up to 300) armored vehicles of various types.
Why these numbers? But why. Israel gathered about 100 thousand people who were supposed to act against 37 thousand enemy fighters. The depth of the offensive was planned at about 100 km, the width of the front was about 60 km. The mountainous relief of Lebanon added difficulties, but there were no large rivers in the country.
In general, it is a real operation on a limited area. Which, however, thirty years later, was nevertheless recognized as a war.
The operation in Ukraine is a matter of a completely different scale.
Events unfold on the territory of ten regions, each of which is two or three times the size of the whole of Lebanon. The features are like this.
The composition of the Russian group is not announced, Western experts give a figure of 150-190 thousand people, but the figure is very doubtful. Even if you use the entire composition of the Airborne Forces (about 50 thousand), which no one will do, the Corps of the LPR and the DPR (about 34 thousand) and 40% of the total number of the Ground Forces (about 280 thousand people), the maximum that can happen is 100- 120 thousand. It just won't work anymore for security and logistical reasons. Perhaps, due to parts of the LDNR, 140 thousand will turn out.
Ukraine has an army of about 200 thousand, but again, it is impossible to use all of them for a number of reasons. So, approximate parity, but Russia has superiority in the air and in technical terms. Although Israel also had the air under control, it did not help much in the end.
There was a clear message in the plans of both countries: to scare the enemy. Definitely, the Russian side showed hope for the “Crimean scenario”. That after the first, maximum, second strike, the Ukrainian army, together with state structures, will collapse and simply scatter home. That did not happen. Definitely, the work carried out in the Armed Forces of Ukraine by American instructors has borne fruit. And a large number of ATO veterans in the army played a role.
The Israelis did not have those problems associated with huge areas that the Russian army has. And Ukraine is a huge distance by European standards, and if we take Lebanon and Israel, then they are cosmic in general.
Control over communications (so that the rear supply columns are not destroyed), control over the movement of the population (especially those who will disguise themselves as it) - this requires an impressive number of people reinforced with armored vehicles. These are the same checkpoints along hundreds of kilometers of roads.
The problem of large cities, in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine have equipped their positions in residential areas, hiding behind the civilian population. In general, the capture of large settlements is a big problem, since it requires a large number of human and technical reserves.
The blockade in our case is absolutely not an option, because in the context of a humanitarian catastrophe, the military and that part of the population to whom weapon, they will be the last to feel the shortage of food and medicine. It is much easier to take away, which has already been demonstrated more than once.
The big problem: an assault is not an option for the development of events, a blockade too. Considering that the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the military battalions do not let civilians out of the cities along the “green corridors”, they fire at them, this is really difficult to solve.
And while it is impossible to judge the results, we can look at the results of the Israeli operation.
Has Israel managed to solve the tasks set?
No. That's what they think even in Israel.
The military part of the operation: the access to the Beirut-Damascus highway within a week, as an active phase of the operation, did not occur. The PLO forces suffered losses, but not critical ones. And the evacuation of the Palestinian army to Tunisia and other countries was carried out, as we would say, “crookedly”, and according to various estimates, from several hundred to several thousand PLO militants remained in Lebanon, who subsequently staged a guerrilla war for the Israeli army, in which they were stronger.
Results in numbers: if during the active phase from June to September 1982, about 350 Israeli soldiers died, then in subsequent years without war, losses are estimated at about 600 people.
The political part of the operation also failed. The main idea was to put "their" pro-Israeli representative at the head of Lebanon, who would be able not only to sign a peace treaty, but also to ensure its implementation. That is, to guarantee the absence of PLO fighters in Lebanese territory and shelling of Israeli territory.
More precisely, there was such a person and he was brought to power. But Bashir Gemayel was in the position of President of Lebanon for a very short time, he and 26 people of his headquarters were killed as a result of sabotage organized in Gemayel's headquarters. His brother, Amin Gemayel, first concluded a peace agreement with Israel in 1983, but it lasted a year, after which it was broken under pressure from Syria and Iran.
And the PLO fighters in Lebanon have been replaced by fighters from Hezbollah, a Shia organization backed by Iran.
But most of all, the reputational, foreign policy and economic losses of Israel became significant.
The crisis in relations with the United States, which did not appreciate the occupation of West Beirut and the blockade, their own losses, increased military spending and, as a result, hyperinflation, which reached 1984% in 445.
And the world community was cheering Israel and Israel's aggression in Lebanon with all their voices. All attempts by Israel to tell that the PLO militants are deliberately based and operating from cities, hiding behind the civilian population, like a human shield, were unsuccessful.
How useless are Russia's attempts to talk about the Donbass and many other things that the more luxurious Ukrainian propaganda dumps on the heads of the world community.
And quite expectedly, Israel caught its package of sanctions. Of course, the sanctions against Israel cannot be compared in quantity and quality with Russian ones, but Israel is also a country more vulnerable to any sanctions.
Indeed, everything is very similar, the only question is the scale.
And if we are talking about comparisons, then it is worth remembering that the Lebanese Christians, involuntarily drawn into hostilities and found themselves on the line of contact with the same Syrian troops near the city of Zahle, also received huge problems. Yes, no one specifically sought to destroy them, like the inhabitants of Donbass, but there were enough “accidents” as well.
However, I repeat, the comparisons are very close, although not joyful.
At one time, Israel was able to solve its problems partially. Yes, the main forces of the PLO were taken out of Lebanon, but exactly what the main ones. And some time later, Iranian-supported Shiites from Hezbollah, which still remains quite a decent force in the region, entered the empty seat. With which even official armies are not considered shameful to cooperate.
In Ukraine, the alignment is somewhat different.
There is a place to be a stratification of society into two parts, one of which is quite loyal to Russia. But we will return to this issue together with Oleksiy Kuznetsov in the article “West vs. East in the Conditions of Ukraine” literally this week.
Whether Russia will be able to solve the tasks set in Ukraine is also a question, since this is a completely separate conversation that will have to be continued separately.
In fact, Russia faces a very difficult task in terms of minimizing losses for the civilian population, minimal destruction of infrastructure in settlements, because it is up to us to restore it, and transferring the population to its side. It is very difficult. As I understand it, this is what caused the slowdown in the implementation of the special operation program.
Of course, Russia has its own way here. Israel was divided with its opponents by many factors, both national, and territorial, and religious. Russia is a little easier, it does not have so many divisive factors in its work with Ukraine, but they also exist and are no less significant than Israel.
The way both countries have solved / are solving their security problems suggests that today we simply have to take into account the experience of Israel, which spends the entire time of the country's existence in conditions, to put it mildly, with unfriendly neighbors. By many indicators. And yet, the country lives on.
Russia is artificially plunged into something similar. The links of the same chain, the promotion of NATO, the unwillingness to listen to arguments, the war with the Russian Donbass - everything is almost the same with Israel. However, a small state successfully solves its problems, including by force.
Indeed, if from the territory of the Golan Heights it is possible to shoot through all of Israel, then ... If Ukraine wants to leave the nuclear-free zone and neutral status ...
The security of any country is the most important task. Therefore, it is not a sin in this regard to take the experience of other countries. Especially if it is so similar to our conditions.
Information