Tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - its strengths and weaknesses

Yuri Podolyaka
In order to properly assess the events taking place on the fronts of Ukraine, you need to understand what the tactics of the parties look like. And in this material we will talk about the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Comments

[svp67]

Interesting thoughts, an analogue of the "fortified cities" tactics created by the Germans ... well, we'll see, we'll see.

[prior]

I repeat, it is necessary to surround not cities, but territories.
The Nazis will do everything else themselves: both denazification and demilitarization.
We just have to help and wait a bit.

[kytx]

The Germans had a Volkssturm. Here with him somehow not so much.

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: kytx

The Germans had a Volkssturm. Here with him somehow not so much.

So the Germans with the Volkssturm were not particularly ...

[kytx]

It worked quite well. A one-time fuss-patronschik, with luck, could raise the core of the assault group tank or self-propelled guns. Ours did not like them very much. From Faust, characteristic microburns from gunpowder remain on the hands. They weren't taken prisoner.

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: kytx

It worked quite well. A one-time fuss-patronschik, with luck, could raise the core of the assault group tank or self-propelled guns. Ours did not like them very much. From Faust, characteristic microburns from gunpowder remain on the hands. They weren't taken prisoner.

That's exactly what with luck ...

[vladcub]

Volkssturm - despair. It is ridiculous to hope that 14 year old boys with ersatz weapons will perform a miracle.
A werewolf is another story

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: svp67

Interesting thoughts, an analogue of the "fortified cities" tactics created by the Germans ... well, we'll see, we'll see.

And at the same time, the tactics of the barmaley from the Middle East

[svp67]

Quote: Alexey Sedykin

And at the same time, the tactics of the barmaley from the Middle East

In the same way, Saddam's troops built their defenses in the last war with the States, but then the Americans managed to trivially buy many of his generals and governors

[iouris]

Having a huge number of very effective anti-tank systems in service, acting from ambushes and hiding behind "peace" (terrible newspeak), it is possible to inflict significant combat losses on the advancing troops. The tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine follow from its strategy. The tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are "scorched earth tactics". They play for a long time. The strategy is the total destruction of everything Russian, including Ukraine itself, in the interests of the owners.

[Asad]

I will support your point of view, soon the food and medicine will run out and banderlogs squealed about a humanitarian catastrophe. And the Red Cross caravans will go, but we are not animals and we will miss it. And what peaceful people will get is not important.

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: iouris

Having a huge number of very effective anti-tank systems in service, acting from ambushes and hiding behind "peace" (terrible newspeak), it is possible to inflict significant combat losses on the advancing troops. The tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine follow from its strategy. The tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are "scorched earth tactics". They play for a long time. The strategy is the total destruction of everything Russian, including Ukraine itself, in the interests of the owners.

"Mirnyak" is not newspeak, but from military slang.

[musketon64]

I will repeat my thesis once again about which I wrote earlier.
Of course, I have never been a military specialist of the General Staff, but in my opinion the military leadership launched a too large-scale offensive operation on such a wide front with such a numerically insignificant grouping, SPRAYING forces. I read books by A. Isaev on the Second World War, and in his narratives the thesis lies as a red thread that the success of an operation, both defensive and offensive, depends on the DENSITY of the troops. The entire operation had to be carried out only to liberate the territories of the LDNR and eliminate the main forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. To do this, concentrate strike groups south of Kharkov and strike at the rear of the forces concentrated against the republics and conduct an offensive with the formation of an outer ring of encirclement, occupying advantageous positions and delivering air strikes in the "open field" and on columns of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hurrying to deblockade. At the same time, to maximally strengthen parts of the LDNR with heavy artillery and, especially, the TOC system, in order to destroy the strongholds of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And also to conduct an offensive on the southern flank only to the Dnieper and to close the "cauldron" from the opposite direction. Well, strikes on the entire military infrastructure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, up to the bombing of the buildings of their Defense Ministry, SBU, etc.
I also see the mistake of the military leadership in the fact that from the very beginning they began to "mandalize" with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, instead of immediately inflicting the most severe losses on their personnel. No need to capture hostile Ukrainian cities (except Mariupol) and be responsible for the population there and incur unnecessary losses to take them under control. It is necessary to demilitarize Ukraine. This is clear. But with denazification, and even the whole of Ukraine, this is another question. It requires reflection on how to achieve this and whether it is possible in the conditions in which our country finds itself.

[Simple]

The density of troops can be compensated by military cunning.
For example, one Russian ensign, stationed on several landing ships, can keep a couple of brigades of the Armed Forces in good shape.

By the way, railway troops with special trains joined to supply the troops.

[iouris]

The hope that without changing the political and economic system of the Russian Federation, it is impossible to transform Ukraine. "The main thing is to get involved in a fight." (Napoleon... and Lenin)

[musketon64]

I also always emphasized the same idea that, first of all, it is necessary to transform Russia according to the principle - Russia first (but not above) everything, making our country attractive, and not engage in the transformation of Ukraine or anyone else, spending your resources on them. When Russia becomes a prosperous country, all these "brothers" will come running on their own.
But if you get into a fight, you should always act according to the principle - "Beat first, Freddie!" And beat very hard, without any sentimentality. Especially traitors and other Nazi rabble.
In my post, I just wanted to emphasize that the enemy needs to be beaten piece by piece. First, they piled on the main grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Donbas, hiding behind the outer ring. And then he will switch to finishing off the rest of the groups in the northern part of Ukraine.

[Simple]

Look at the Ukrainian issue from the side of the common market with Russia. Belarus and Kazakhstan.
This is a matter of survival.
For wheat alone, these four countries provide about forty percent of the world's wheat.
What will remain of Ukraine. This is for the winner to judge.
I do not think that Russia will want to step on the Ukrainian rake again.

First, they piled on the main grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Donbas, hiding behind the outer ring. And then he will switch to finishing off the rest of the groups in the northern part of Ukraine.

Most likely there were big doubts about the adequacy of NATO.

[Glagol1]

Yes, it is unlikely about denazification. There it is like water in the sea. And they are active and without brakes...

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: musketone64

I will repeat my thesis once again about which I wrote earlier.
Of course, I have never been a military specialist of the General Staff, but in my opinion the military leadership launched a too large-scale offensive operation on such a wide front with such a numerically insignificant grouping, SPRAYING forces. I read books by A. Isaev on the Second World War, and in his narratives the thesis lies as a red thread that the success of an operation, both defensive and offensive, depends on the DENSITY of the troops. The entire operation had to be carried out only to liberate the territories of the LDNR and eliminate the main forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. To do this, concentrate strike groups south of Kharkov and strike at the rear of the forces concentrated against the republics and conduct an offensive with the formation of an outer ring of encirclement, occupying advantageous positions and delivering air strikes in the "open field" and on columns of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hurrying to deblockade. At the same time, to maximally strengthen parts of the LDNR with heavy artillery and, especially, the TOC system, in order to destroy the strongholds of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And also to conduct an offensive on the southern flank only to the Dnieper and to close the "cauldron" from the opposite direction. Well, strikes on the entire military infrastructure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, up to the bombing of the buildings of their Defense Ministry, SBU, etc.
I also see the mistake of the military leadership in the fact that from the very beginning they began to "mandalize" with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, instead of immediately inflicting the most severe losses on their personnel. No need to capture hostile Ukrainian cities (except Mariupol) and be responsible for the population there and incur unnecessary losses to take them under control. It is necessary to demilitarize Ukraine. This is clear. But with denazification, and even the whole of Ukraine, this is another question. It requires reflection on how to achieve this and whether it is possible in the conditions in which our country finds itself.

That's why not at the General Staff, but at home on the couch.

[musketon64]

That's why we have such losses, because the General Staff, instead of studying and comprehending the experience of past wars and conflicts, were engaged in all sorts of crap, such as "tank biathlons" and other window dressing, and not a real re-equipment of the army with modern equipment and weapons. This can be seen simply with the naked eye from video reports from Ukraine, to those who understand at least something about this after serving in the army. While serving in the army, he often observed how not the most capable, but the officers well known to the command, were moving faster in the service.
And therefore, it is not at all surprising for me that it was by no means the Suvorovs and Zhukovs who settled in our headquarters, but exactly the same "employees of the General Staff" who commanded in both Chechen companies, suffering serious losses due to poor planning, coordination of interaction between troops and ignoring the basics military art - to beat the enemy in parts, concentrating forces and means in the most advantageous directions.
What they are doing now is the maximum coverage of the forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by a small grouping of troops for such a theater. As a result, communications have been stretched out, which are being smashed by numerous Ukrainian DRGs. I would like to ask them --- what did they, the employees of the General Staff, think when planning the operation? Now they urgently began to apply the "Syrian experience" using the cover of transport convoys by helicopters ..... substituting them for Ukrainian MANPADS.
It is high time to transfer these "wise men" themselves from headquarters to sofas, and not to be entrusted with the command of large masses of troops.

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: musketone64

That's why we have such losses, because the General Staff, instead of studying and comprehending the experience of past wars and conflicts, were engaged in all sorts of crap, such as "tank biathlons" and other window dressing, and not a real re-equipment of the army with modern equipment and weapons. This can be seen simply with the naked eye from video reports from Ukraine, to those who understand at least something about this after serving in the army. While serving in the army, he often observed how not the most capable, but the officers well known to the command, were moving faster in the service.
And therefore, it is not at all surprising for me that it was by no means the Suvorovs and Zhukovs who settled in our headquarters, but exactly the same "employees of the General Staff" who commanded in both Chechen companies, suffering serious losses due to poor planning, coordination of interaction between troops and ignoring the basics military art - to beat the enemy in parts, concentrating forces and means in the most advantageous directions.
What they are doing now is the maximum coverage of the forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by a small grouping of troops for such a theater. As a result, communications have been stretched out, which are being smashed by numerous Ukrainian DRGs. I would like to ask them --- what did they, the employees of the General Staff, think when planning the operation? Now they urgently began to apply the "Syrian experience" using the cover of transport convoys by helicopters ..... substituting them for Ukrainian MANPADS.
It is high time to transfer these "wise men" themselves from headquarters to sofas, and not to be entrusted with the command of large masses of troops.

The couch army strategist...

[musketon64]

A strategist is not a strategist, but I have no direct prohibition to have my own opinion. So if you have your own thoughts, post them. Or just sit in front of the TV screen with your mouth open and listen to the victorious reports of the generals - everything goes according to plan, we wanted the best, but it turned out - as always. Unjustified losses, for which who will be responsible?

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: musketone64

A strategist is not a strategist, but I have no direct prohibition to have my own opinion. So if you have your own thoughts, post them. Or just sit in front of the TV screen with your mouth open and listen to the victorious reports of the generals - everything goes according to plan, we wanted the best, but it turned out - as always. Unjustified losses, for which who will be responsible?

I have enough mind not to climb into those areas of knowledge where I know nothing. I prefer to leave it to those who do it. And not to argue with a smart look while sitting on the couch.

[musketon64]

I have enough mind not to climb into those areas of knowledge where I know nothing. I prefer to leave it to those who do it. And not to argue with a smart look while sitting on the couch.

Yuriy Podolyaka is also not a military specialist, which does not prevent him from commenting and analyzing situations on the military fronts of Ukraine. Because:
"Warfare
simple and complete
accessible to the sane
the mind of man.
But it is difficult to fight." (K. Clausewitz)
About the necessary density of troops in decisive directions, as a guarantee of success in conducting operations, I didn’t come up with it, and this is obvious to anyone, not even a military person. I would also understand if the Russian army had the same technological level as the US army or, at least, Israel. But this is not the case, and this is equally obvious. Hence such losses due to the heroism of our guys. 500 people are only the losses of the army, without voicing the losses of the Russian Guard and the LDNR police, and they are hardly much less.
Our government has the same many jambs in governing the country, and this does not mean that citizens cannot criticize them or express their opinion only under the pretext - "you do not understand anything" in the economy.

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: musketone64

I have enough mind not to climb into those areas of knowledge where I know nothing. I prefer to leave it to those who do it. And not to argue with a smart look while sitting on the couch.

Yuriy Podolyaka is also not a military specialist, which does not prevent him from commenting and analyzing situations on the military fronts of Ukraine. Because:
"Warfare
simple and complete
accessible to the sane
the mind of man.
But it is difficult to fight." (K. Clausewitz)
About the necessary density of troops in decisive directions, as a guarantee of success in conducting operations, I didn’t come up with it, and this is obvious to anyone, not even a military person. I would also understand if the Russian army had the same technological level as the US army or, at least, Israel. But this is not the case, and this is equally obvious. Hence such losses due to the heroism of our guys. 500 people are only the losses of the army, without voicing the losses of the Russian Guard and the LDNR police, and they are hardly much less.
Our government has the same many jambs in governing the country, and this does not mean that citizens cannot criticize them or express their opinion only under the pretext - "you do not understand anything" in the economy.

Podolyaka makes an analysis of tactics and does not climb with advice on how to fight ... Do not equate yourself with him, you are like walking to the moon.

[musketon64]

Podolyaka makes an analysis of tactics and does not climb with advice on how to fight ... Do not equate yourself with him, you are like walking to the moon.

Once again, he is a blogger and journalist, not a military specialist, in order to competently analyze even military tactics. I did not write anything about tactics. I expressed my conclusions on the offensive strategy with a limited number of troops operating on a wide front.

...... and does not climb with advice on how to fight.

To whom do I advise? This is just my opinion and nothing more.

[Puzoter]

Why so many military analysts? There were normal virologists.

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: puzoter

Why so many military analysts? There were normal virologists.

And don't say ...

[YOUR]

So what are the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and what are its strengths and weaknesses

[Vladimir61]

Quote: YOUR

So what are the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and what are its strengths and weaknesses

The fact that this is no longer the armed forces, in the usual sense. These are war criminals, terrorists and ordinary bandits, first of all, in relation to the citizens of Ukraine!

[alexey sidykin]

Quote: YOUR

So what are the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and what are its strengths and weaknesses

In my opinion, Yuri explained it very intelligibly ... but if you still don’t understand ..

[fif21]

Tochka-U is flying, probably the Armed Forces of Ukraine have other short and medium-range missiles. The question is - where are the S-300, S-400, Bug air defense systems ..... There are none in the LDNR, but what about the Russian troops? Where is the work of drones? Where are the counter-battery combat stations? And who said that leaflets from the sky are not effective?

[Ivanushka Ivanov]

Well, if there is already such parsley, then why not use the enemy’s tactics ourselves ...

1. Somewhere in the area of ​​the Kremenchug reservoir - choose a convenient parade ground, land troops. But not 200-300 fighters are suicide bombers, but really saturate - 5000-10000, plus equipment. Expand the zone to a square of 30 * 30 km. Organize a helipad. And iron bare rears in all directions. Ramzan has been asking for a real job for his boyfriends for a long time. Here they will cope with such a slave with a bang.
2. Bridges. Well, since such parsley, why don't we break these bridges ourselves - where the enemy is being fed. They are now in some places more needed by the enemy than by us.
3. Leaflets, propaganda. Explain that the so-called. Ukrainians, like Russians for the West, are all the same. Are to be destroyed. Let them come over to our side. They need to save their lives, they are men, their family needs them more. How will they then survive without a man (s)? After all, everything is just beginning. Everywhere. And the state of Ukraine is long gone. For history shows that the real homeland of the Little Russian is a family, a hut, trochs of tilka for sebe, they don’t believe in everything else in the depths of their souls. All the Ukrainian saints - they didn’t say in vain that they shouldn’t be separated, those heroes who pour water on the Western mill of extermination of Russian people (Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians) will go to hell. Together we will have to survive the third world nuclear war. And then build a single Slavic state. The time of the oligarchs, one fig, is coming to an end.

[anykin]

Yes, leaflets are neglected in vain.

[Sergei Fonov]

A clear explanation should be given to the troops that when they shoot at you, it is the enemy who shoots, not the brother, and without thinking about the return line, whoever thinks for a long time has less chance of winning. There is no need to divide into national battalions and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, everything is intertwined, they don’t give up, shoot without delay, delay will cost you or your comrade your life. The enemy must know that in case of resistance when using fire to kill, the living are extremely rare, and the living and without wounds do not remain at all. We do not have enough soldiers to allow ourselves to receive bullets and rocket strikes in response to persuasion to surrender. The most correct tactic and strategy in the war is to kill the enemy, and to stay alive yourself, there is no other way, so take care of yourself and your friends, kill the enemy, he is not your brother, friends and relatives of the burnt Odessans will be grateful to you.

[Bayun]

What does a TERRORIST need? Money and transport are safe. GIVE! The impunity of 10 bandits costs 000 civilian lives.

It is ideal, of course, to make it clear to the ringleaders that if there are 100 of them, then the amounts will increase 100 times. Bandits are like bandits.

[voyaka uh]

Podolyak is cunning ... But at least he marked the cities taken on the map.
Not a single city was taken, except for Kherson.
The surroundings of Sumy are completely under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to the Russian border.
But it was declared by Podolyaka "a city of no use to anyone."
The red line is "as it were, the front line." But this line does not exist.
Behind her are cities controlled by the UAF, not the Russian army.
It is becoming increasingly difficult for Podolyak to describe the not-so-pleasant state of affairs.
for the Russian army, without lying frankly.

[Essex62]

Not docking at Yu. Podolyaki on "short strikes" from the fortified area, no more than 30 km. Support tanks and armor, not racing Ferraris. Having struck and escaping, they must inevitably come under attack from the air. With our complete dominance there. Based on this fact, there is a doubt that all the air defense of the outskirts was destroyed. So the armored groups are covered by mobile complexes. The reaction time of the VKS here cannot be a factor in any way. 20-30 km march, plus a battle, enough time to raise planes and turntables, not to mention constant watch in the air.

[alexey sidykin]

What all the warriors have gathered here ... right through one great strategist and tactician ... Shame.

[boris epstein]

About short injections of the APU. Article: "Expert: NATO transfers all information about the movements of Russian troops and flights of the Aerospace Forces to Kiev."
NATO handed over to Ukraine several special laptops that work with American satellites and AWACS aircraft. As a result, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, having received information, transfer company battle groups to weak points. Having received data on the flights of the Russian Aerospace Forces in motion, they hide in settlements and forest plantations. One of these laptops would have been captured by the DPR case. It seems to be great, but was it worth it to advertise? Wouldn't it be better to plant your operator and use the enemy's power against him? Type of SMERSH radio games in the Great Patriotic War.

[lomograph]

They change the codes there every day (or even more often), so it wouldn’t work.

[lomograph]

To win the war, you need to destroy the enemy army.
For example, Napoleon took Moscow number one, and now Parizhik has a bistro, and Napoleon himself ran away, barely managing to grab spare underpants.