Tarutinsky march maneuver and counteroffensive plan
The Tarutinsky maneuver of the Russian army under the command of Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov is one of the outstanding achievements of the art of war. As a result of the maneuver, the strategic situation was finally changed in favor of the Russian army. Russian troops not only broke away from the enemy, but received time for the necessary rest, staffing and armament. The Russian command ensured a connection with the reserves and bases that were located in Kaluga, Tula and Bryansk, covered them from the French. The Tarutinsky maneuver was highly appreciated by contemporaries, and not only in the Russian army, but also as an adversary. Napoleon Bonaparte called the maneuver a movement that put the French army in a difficult and even terrible position.
Even at the military council in Fili 1 (13) September, after the decision was made to leave Moscow, the question arose about the direction of withdrawal of the army. Bennigsen and Toll proposed to immediately go to the Kaluga road without entering Moscow. But to make this maneuver in front of the enemy was the wrong step. Barclay de Tolly suggested moving back towards Vladimir or Nizhny Novgorod in order to move to Tver to cover Petersburg. However, in this case, Napoleon got the opportunity to go to Kaluga and Tula. Kutuzov at the council did not express his opinion, agreeing that it was necessary to step aside towards Ryazan. Therefore, the troops marched from Moscow through the Ryazan outpost and after it moved in two columns along the Ryazan road.
The first overnight stay was made in the village of Panki 3 September. At the same time, carts were sent along the Nizhny Novgorod road, it was supposed to be covered by a large cavalry detachment under the command of Wintzingerode, which later was heading for the Petersburg road. In the evening of September 3 (15), the troops received a disposition on the march to the Borovskoy ferry across the Moscow River, where, when they were ferried, they were to set up camp. The convoy headed for Bronnits under the cover of the Cossacks. After a day, the army suddenly turned to the west and moved towards Podolsk.
Only now Kutuzov revealed his intention. On September 3, he told Ferdinand Wintzingerode that 4 was going to make the crossing on the Ryazan road, the second crossing to go to Tula, and from there to the Kaluga road to Podolsk. 4 (16) September Kutuzov in the report to the sovereign Alexander revealed the value of his maneuver. He wanted to protect the military factories of Bryansk and Tula, food and other resources, to maintain contact with the armies of Tormasov and Chichagov. On the same day, the commander-in-chief sent quartermasters to reconnoiter the position at Podolsk. Miloradovich was ordered to send a detachment of Cossacks to the Tula road.
As a result of the maneuver of the Russian army, the French lost contact with it. 11 (23) of September Kutuzov wrote to Emperor Alexander that the army, after crossing the Moscow River, doing the flanking movement on the Old Kaluga Road, for the secrecy of its movement, made cavalry false motions, making demonstrations to Kolomna and Serpukhov. The French command had no idea about the direction of withdrawal of the Russian army. The French avant-garde Klaperda took the departure of two cavalry regiments on the Vladimir road for the movement of the main Russian forces and followed him. By September 5 (17), the French reached almost Pokrova. Parts of Sebastiani in the same way were carried away by the Cossacks and followed them along the Ryazan road almost to Bronnitsy. Mikhail Kutuzov managed the cavalry forces, which were taken by the enemy as the Russian rearguard, to completely disorient the French command. Then the Russian cavalry slipped away. Marshal Joachim Murat was forced on September 9 (21) to report to Napoleon that the Russian army was lost.
The French emperor was suspicious that Kutuzov was preparing a sudden blow. Napoleon ordered to find the Russian army no matter what. Delzón’s division was directed north to Dmitrov, Michel Ney’s 3 corps east to Bogorodsk, Louis-Nicolas Davou’s 1 corps south to Moscow region. Murat, Ponyatovsky and Bessière searched for Kutuzov's troops south of Moscow for five days. Only 14 (26) of September, the French stumbled upon the Russians from Podolsk. “On this day of September 26, we again found Russians,” says General Michelle Marie Claparede, “who seemed to have sunk into the abyss from the moment when we saw them on the top of a hill near Bogorodsk.”
The Russian army approached Podolsk on 6 (18) of September. The position was comfortable for the battle. She allowed to defeat both the forces of Murat and the detachments of Ponyatovsky and Bessieres, if they had ventured to attack the Russian troops. However, in the event of a battle, Napoleon could quickly lead his troops to Podolsk. Therefore, Mikhail Illarionovich decided to withdraw the troops to Red Pakhra. The rearguard of the army was located on the Borovsk transport until 7 (19) of September, and on the night of that day leaving posts at the transportation itself, withdrew quickly after the main forces of the army. The enemy could not detect this movement and pursued a cavalry cover, retreating along the Ryazan road to Bronnitsy itself.
Under the cover of part of the forces stationed on the Kolomna road, the Russian army 8 (20) of September moved to the position of Red Pakhra, where it was camped until 15 (27) of September. The main forces were located south of Red Pakhra, the avant-garde detachments were deployed in the directions where the enemy could appear. The first avant-garde under the command of Miloradovich stood on the Desna River, he covered the army from Moscow. The second avant-garde commanded by Rajewski led from Podolsk. In addition, the patrol unit was sent to the west of the Red Pakhra. The position of the Red Pakhra was also convenient as that of Podolsk, but it had the same drawback - Napoleon in the event of a collision of the Russian army with the advance units of the French army could quickly transfer reinforcements. Therefore, Kutuzov found it expedient to transfer troops to a new position - to Tarutin. The location of the troops at Tarutino increased their security and made it possible, if necessary, to quickly deploy an army in the right direction.
10 (22) September Napoleon was informed about the appearance of the Cossacks on the Mozhaisk road. This greatly alarmed the French emperor, and he gave instructions to conduct more vigorous intelligence, to strengthen the protection of communications. Observing the Mozhaysk Road, Napoleon laid upon General Philip Antoine d'Ornano, Jean-Baptiste Bessieres was sent to Kaluga, Yuzef Ponyatovsky and Murat to the Tula road to Podolsk. Thus, Napoleon admitted the likelihood of the Russian troops entering his communications and preparing for a new confrontation.
Following Napoleon’s order, Murat and Bessier began active searches. The French appeared in the Podolsk area and on the Desna River 10 and 11 (22 and 23) of September. Finding 14 (26) in September of Russian troops, Murat began to press Raevsky’s flank vanguard, trying to bypass it from the south. The appearance of Murat's forces and the appearance of the Bessiere corps on the Desna accelerated Kutuzov’s decision to withdraw to Tarutino. Bennigsen and Barclay de Tolly opposed this decision. Barclay de Tolly believed that the position of the Red Pakhra will allow to take the fight. Bennigsen offered to launch an offensive and smash Murat's forces. However, Mikhail Kutuzov rejected these proposals and ordered the withdrawal. When discussing the choice of a new position, Bennigsen proposed moving away to Borovsk or Maloyaroslavets. But Kutuzov chose a position from Tarutin on the grounds that it was close to Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets at the same time, and allowed him to control the Old Kaluga, Tula and Ryazan roads. September 21 (October 3) Russian army camped near the village Tarutina in 80 km from Moscow.
For Tarutinsky camp a very convenient place was chosen south of the Nara River. From the front, the position was protected by a river and seven batteries; the right flank was located on the heights and enclosed by a ravine, besides reinforced by three batteries. The left flank adjoined a dense forest and was covered by the river Istya, and the rear of the army was a solid forest. Kutuzov ordered to cut through a number of glades and make blockages to prevent possible detours from the left flank and rear. The position was somewhat tight, but well fortified. The troops settled down as follows. Between the villages of Gladovo and Dednya stood the avant-garde — the 2 and 4 cavalry corps and the first line troops — the 2 and 6 infantry corps. Second line troops stood behind - 3, 4, 5 and 7 infantry corps. Behind the 4 Infantry Corps was the 1 Cavalry Corps. In the third line stood the 8 Infantry Corps and most of the cavalry. There was a fourth line - there were two cuirassier divisions and reserve artillery located there. The right flank of the Russian army was guarded by two Chasseurs regiments, the left flank - by five. In addition, several cavalry regiments were located in nearby villages. The main apartment of the army first settled in Tarutino, and then moved to the village of Letashevka.
Tarutinsky maneuver of the Russian army was of great importance for the outcome of the war. With this march, Mikhail Kutuzov disrupted the possible offensive of the French army against Petersburg. Having 100-th Russian army behind him, Napoleon was not able to make a throw to the north and capture the capital of the Russian Empire. The probability of a strike in the direction of Petersburg existed: Napoleon sent his cavalry towards Tver, but then stopped it at the village of Black Dirt and returned it to Moscow. Now the strategic initiative was in the hands of the Russian commander.
Counter attack plan
Having accomplished the Tarutinsky maneuver, Mikhail Kutuzov conceived a grand-scale plan for encircling and destroying Napoleon’s army. Napoleon's numerous "Great Army" was scattered over a vast area. The main forces of Warsaw-Moscow were located on the main forces: Schwarzenberg’s Austrian corps and Rainier’s 7 corps — at Drogogina; Victor 9 corps and part of the Augereau 11 corps in Smolensk; Junot's 8 Corps is in Mozhaisk and Napoleon’s main forces are in Moscow. The right flank at Bobruisk was covered by the division of Dombrowski. Riga had a MacDonald Prussian corps. The 2 and 6 corps of Oudinot and Saint-Cyr were located in Polotsk. At the end of August, under Napoleon, there were about 350 thousand bayonets and sabers.
Moving deep into Russia, Napoleon did a great job in creating a rear base. In addition to the main rear bases, which were located on the Vistula, the French created four lines of intermediate bases. The first line was located on the Neman River: in Kovno, Olite, Mereche and Grodno. On the second line there was a powerful base in Vilna, the third line was located between Berezina and Ulla - in Glubokoye, Borisov and Minsk. The fourth line was the base in Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. In addition, a major transit point was located in Smolensk. Concentrated on these bases and warehouses, food and ammunition allowed the French command, if necessary, to withdraw to the area of the Western Dvina, the Dnieper and the Berezina, winter there and start a new campaign in the 1813 year.
Napoleon had several escape routes, but each concealed a certain danger to the French army. The most radical solution was a retreat along the Smolensk road. However, the area there was severely ravaged. The most tempting path looked through Kaluga to Volyn. The road went through unaffected terrain and allowed to connect with the Austrians of Schwarzenberg. But for this it was necessary to enter into a new battle with the army of Kutuzov. In addition, troops of Tormasov and Chichagov could appear on the way of withdrawal. Napoleon was embarrassed by the behavior of the Austrians - Vienna was in no hurry to fulfill its obligations and increase its contingent for war with Russia. The passivity of the Schwarzenberg corps allowed Napoleon to fear any surprises. The fact that there was not a single prepared food base in this direction was taken into account and it was necessary to rely only on requisition and seizure of Russian stocks. A departure was possible along the line running north of the Smolensk road. In this case, Napoleon could connect with the corps of Oudinot and Saint-Cyr and reach the Lower Neman, where large reserves were procured. But then Russian troops could preempt the enemy from Glubokoye or Vitebsk and strike at the flank.
Some commanders offered the French emperor not to risk and stay for the winter in Moscow. But he rejected this offer. Napoleon understood the need for retreat, but the word "retreat" confused him, and he delayed this decision.
Kutuzov was thinking about the complete defeat of the enemy, while still on his way to the army, when he was appointed commander-in-chief. He instructed Chichagov and Tormasov to increase pressure on the right flank of the enemy. This pressure, combined with the general battle at Borodino, was to force the enemy to retreat from Moscow. However, the lack of reliable communication, which could ensure proper coordination of actions in such a short time and the lack of necessary reserves, did not allow Kutuzov to realize his plan.
September 6 (18) while in Podolsk, Kutuzov repeated his former directive to Chichagov. Mikhail Illarionovich still did not leave the idea of the environment and a concentric strike on the enemy. He demanded that Chichagov unite as soon as possible with Tormasov’s forces and take the shortest route to Mogilyov on the Smolensk road in order to cut off enemy communications and threaten his rear. Tormasov on the same day a directive was sent to ensure the flank of Chichagov’s army from the possible actions of the Schwarzenberg and Rainier corps. Kutuzov sent Wittgenstein reinforcements and set himself the task of fortifying the forces of the enemy on the Western Dvina line with his actions, and then to be ready for the forthcoming offensive actions. "The main defeat" enemy Kutuzov planned to inflict in the area between the Dnieper, Berezina and Western Dvina. Chichagov and Wittgenstein were supposed to launch an offensive as soon as the Main Army struck with Tarutinskaya position.
Thus, the commander-in-chief developed a plan for encircling and destroying the enemy army in the area between the rivers. Kutuzov was confident that the enemy would retreat in that direction. With his Tarutinsky maneuver, Mikhail Kutuzov anticipated the possible movement of French troops through Kaluga, or to the north. At the same time, Kutuzov did not forget to strengthen the defense of the northern borders of the Volyn, Kiev, Chernihiv and Kaluga provinces. The main role in this plan was to be performed by the Main Army, and the forces of Chichagov and Wittgenstein played a supporting role. However, Emperor Alexander intervened in Kutuzov's orders, in his opinion, the main role in defeating the French was to be played by the flank attack of Chichagov’s army. Admiral Chichagov had never been in a hurry to carry out Kutuzov’s instructions, and after the intervention of the emperor, he began to behave even more independently. Mikhail Kutuzov, in a letter to Alexander, expressed displeasure with Chichagov’s actions and asked for instructions to transfer the army’s efforts to Borisov.
At the same time, Kutuzov had to fight the "internal enemies", the court clique, which had its agents in the army and tried to slander the commander-in-chief. I had to fight the machinations of Bennigsen and others, to insist on their withdrawal from the army. British military representative in the Russian army Robert Wilson led the subversive work against Kutuzov. He conducted direct correspondence with the Russian emperor and in every possible way tried to defame the Russian commander. British General Wilson pushed the Russian command to a decisive battle with the French. Not yielding to the pressure of the British, Kutuzov, in a conversation with Benningsen, said bluntly: “We will never agree with you, my dear. You think only about the benefits of England, but for me, if this island today goes to the bottom of the sea, I will not go quiet. ” The actions of the emperor, the enemies of Kutuzov, took time and effort.
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