It's hard to fight on two fronts
Offers of designers who cause serious doubts and the desire to get closer to the cherished walletOn the pages of NVO, the issue of the capabilities, role and place in the air defense system of various types of the Armed Forces and the arms of the anti-aircraft missile-cannon complex ZRPK developed in Tula by the Design Bureau has been repeatedly considered and discussed. Instrumentation ("NVO" № 1, 44; № 2011, 47; № 2011, 1; № 2012, 18). Moreover, the Pantsir-S2012 air defense system began to enter service as a means of direct cover to the C-1 air defense missile regiments of the Air Force and the Aerospace Defense troops, and also successfully defiled the military parade on Red Square this year. Their production in the interests of the Air Force and the East Kazakhstan Region is provided for by the GOZ-400 program. It would seem that all the dots above i are placed.
But, according to competent sources, the management of the Instrument Engineering Design Bureau (PCU) addressed the Ministry of Defense with an initiative to develop a new generation air defense system based on the Pantsir-С1 family of new-generation air defense systems with a significantly greater range of destruction. ". Such a family, according to the leadership of the PCU, would reduce the type of anti-aircraft missile weapons in the Armed Forces, the cost of its acquisition and operation.
There are no serious evidentiary arguments in favor of the Pantsir type air defense system in the proposal, nor does it contain the main combat and technical characteristics of the proposed weapons and justify ways to achieve them. But now with this family of air defense missile systems, the leadership of the PCU proposes replacing not only the Tunguska missile defense system and the Tor-M2 air defense system at the tactical level, but also the Buk-M2 medium-range air defense missile system at the operational level of the Ground Forces, as well as the final stage of development of the air defense system SD "Vityaz", created for the Air Force and EKO and already included in the GOZ-2020 program and expected for delivery to the troops from 2015, the system ZRO DD C-500. Thus, according to the CPI, only portable air defense systems (MANPADS), air defense systems of the Pantsir family and C-400 should be in service with the air defense forces of all types of the Armed Forces and types of troops.
As it became known, the General Staff and the head organization of the defense industrial complex in the sphere of air defense - the “Almaz-Antey” Air Defense Concern is supposed to set up the relevant commissions to consider proposals from the PCU. But, as they say in the people, you want to ruin the matter - instruct its commissions.
We will try once again, as independently and objectively as possible, without any commissions, to sort out the situation that has arisen, including appealing to already published materials, official documents and common sense.
BEST THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD
ZRPK “Pantsir-S1”, as already mentioned (“NVO”. 2012. No. 18), was assigned to KBP (general director and general designer - academician Arkady Shipunov) in 90-s as a promising short-range air defense system “to cover strategically important small-size industrial and military facilities from aircraft strikes, helicopters, cruise missiles and precision weapons, as well as the destruction of ground targets and enemy manpower. " In other words, at the time of assignment to development, the Pantsir-С1 air defense missile system was considered as a unified interspecific short-range air defense weapon. However, an analysis of the combat capabilities and technical characteristics of the Pantsir-C1 air defense missile system, already conducted at that time by a number of scientific research institutes and specially created by an expert commission, showed that it does not ensure the fulfillment of a number of tasks assigned to the air defense forces of the Land Forces, which by that time already had arming the complex "Tunguska", created under the leadership of the same general designer, that is, it was something to compare.
In connection with the conclusions of the commission, it was considered expedient to continue the development of the Pantsir-C 1 air defense system to continue only in the interests of the country's air defense forces as a short-range complex, and for the Ground and Airborne Forces to develop the Tunguska-M2 and Roman, respectively solutions ZRPK "Pantsir-С1». Thus, in the armament system of the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces, it was considered expedient to maintain and develop both the Tungusk-M2 short-range missile defense system and the Tor-M2 short-range air defense system, which do not compete, but complement each other in combat missions. , capabilities and characteristics.
For a number of reasons, including due to lack of adequate funding, the development of the Pantsir-С1 ZRPK, by the way, like the Tor-М2 SAM, was significantly delayed, and therefore the management of KBP made an unsuccessful attempt to attract foreign investment. During the negotiations with an external investor, the “Pantsir-C1” air defense missile system was skipped from short-range air defense systems (initially set and provided for by the presidential documents of the Russian Federation for negotiations with a foreign customer - “in range from 0,2 to 12 km at altitudes from 5 m to 6 km ”) into a short-range air defense system (up to 18 – 20 km in range and to 8 – 10 km in height, as well as an increase in the number of simultaneously fired targets to two). And in the domestic weapons system, this niche was already occupied by the multi-channel Tor-M2 air defense system, while not formally, for the sake of some momentary perspective, but in terms of the actually expected, significantly better combat capabilities and technical characteristics. This circumstance gave rise to the current conflict situation.
Apparently, it should be recalled that the Tunguska installation was the ideological and technical prototype of the Pantsir-С1 ZRPK.
Back in the 70s of the last century, one of the major military leaders, participant in the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Ivan Pavlovsky, summing up the results of major military exercises, said: “It’s better to have 10 tanksreliably covered from the air than 100 tanks without cover. ” His prophetic words were subsequently confirmed more than once during the Arab-Israeli conflicts, when, for example, in Sinai, for one combat mission, one Hugh-Cobra-type fire support helicopter (FOC) destroyed up to 10 open tanks from the air.
It was then that the epoch-making resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers “On urgent measures for the development of armaments and equipment of military air defense”, which was successfully implemented in its time, was born. This is done because the people of that generation understood the price of human life well and knew that in peacetime they paid money for miscalculations and in wartime they paid blood.
Motorized rifle and tank regiments added air defense missile and artillery divisions to the army, armed with self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 Shilka and air defense systems of short-range Strela-1М, and then successfully Strela-10, capable of successfully countering VOA, capable of resisting VOA-64М Hugh Cobra. But the likely "partner" had a new-generation AOP-6 Apache class with the Hellfire ATGM capable of hitting targets from long ranges (8 – XNUMX km), that is, without entering the affected areas of the above-mentioned air defense systems.
WEAPONS AGAINST HELICOPTERS OF FIRE SUPPORT
For the development of self-propelled gun-missile complex (ZPRK) "Tunguska", which according to the plan would have hit the APP-type SPM at distances before they use airborne weapons, as well as reduce the type of air defense weapons of the regimental level, the KBP took.
By the way, the Tunguska complex was called as an anti-aircraft cannon-rocket (and not a rocket-cannon, as an “Armor-С1”), as the main emphasis was given to the all-weather and all-day cannon-gun channel providing shooting at air targets with the 4500 – 5000 pace shots per minute in motion. In the Tunguska air-defense missile complex, the gun canal on the basis of the GSH cannons was indeed able to be created as a highly effective tool. Suffice it to say that in the 30 mm caliber, these guns (two twin-barreled rifles), having an extremely high rate of fire, ensured the likelihood of modern aerodynamic targets being hit at the 0,35 – 0,42 level during the span of the firing zone. This is significantly higher than, for example, in the battery (6 guns) of the Bofors anti-aircraft artillery complex (caliber 40 mm) and the American-Canadian Adats installation.
However, the range of target destruction by the cannon canal in the “Tunguska” was 4 km, which did not allow the GP “Apache” to be hit at launch ranges of the ATGM. For this purpose, a more long-range missile channel was needed, which would hit the SPM at ranges up to 10 km. However, it turned out to be not all-weather, not all-the-daily, and not providing auto-tracking of the target. But these shortcomings are repairable. The rocket was applied bikalybernaya construction scheme with a passive mid-flight stage, borrowed from the ideology of building anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). This predetermined its limited capabilities and, naturally, remained irreparable. Such a rocket in principle can not effectively "work" on maneuvering high-mobility small-sized air targets. It can be effective, especially taking into account the equipment of fragmentation-rod warhead, when fighting only with “flying” tanks (GPs “Apache”) or voluminous aerodynamic targets, but completely useless when fighting, say, with Harm anti-radar missiles. Replacing a rocket in the course of serial production of a laser proximity sensor for a radar target with visible radar of efficiency did not actually give.
The defeat of the frozen helicopter with the help of the Tunguska missile defense system required extremely high professional skills of the operator, and the defeat of high-precision weapons and maneuvering means of air attack by a missile with a passive marching stage in a given zone was not provided. These findings were confirmed in the course of special exercises with live-fire "Defense-92", conducted under the leadership of the then State Secretary, First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrei Kokoshin. As a result of the exercises, the integrated combat effectiveness of the units armed with the Tunguska and Tunguska-M installations was only 0,42, while the units and units of the air defense armed with other types of complexes were no less than 0,9 – 0,93.
When the Tunguska complex was put into service, all these shortcomings were indicated in the relevant documents, a plan was adopted to eliminate them before the start and during the deployment of mass production. However, the KBP from these works withdrew itself, concentrating its efforts on other areas, including Panzer, which was just conceived as an ideological continuation of the scientific and technical groundwork acquired by the KBP during the work on the Tunguska. In any case, this is a similar biklibernaya SAM with a passive sustainer stage, fragmentation core warhead, ineffective in dealing with small-sized high-speed and maneuvering precision weapons, the same method of targeting SAM (the classic "three-point") and the same non-recoverable problems. But contrary to common sense and physical abilities, most likely from short-term considerations, the range of the missile channel was called 20 km, and the number of target channels in the complex was 2.
At the same time, the radar target tracking system (single-channel) used in the Pantsir-С1 air defense system (single-channel), as shown by calculations and modeling (and even state tests, the results of which are “reliably hidden”), does not provide the required accuracy of missile targeting at the maximum range, even for targets with effective reflective surface 2 square. m and more. Under weather conditions of medium complexity, the optoelectronic channel provides reliable detection and tracking of targets at distances of no more than 12 – 15 km and is also single-channel. In addition, the radar and optoelectronic channels ZRPK "Pantsir-С1" are not parallel, but complementary to each other, does not increase the channel of the complex on the target. As for the cannon canal, due to its insufficient effectiveness of shooting at modern air targets, associated primarily with a low rate of fire, it can only be considered as an auxiliary means of self-defense and fighting mainly against the ground enemy.
Understanding the current situation, KBP, on its own initiative, developed a “simplified” version of the Pantsir-C1 ZRPK, excluding from its composition an expensive and inefficient target tracking station, as well as a gun channel. The “simplified” version of the ZRPK Pantsir-S1, named Pantsyr-S2, or Pantsyrenok, equipped with an optical-electronic target tracking device with 12 – 15 km ranges and located on the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle chassis, mounted on the BMP-1 combat vehicle, mounted and turned into a modern short-range anti-aircraft missile system (ZRK BD). Such a complex, along with other short-range systems, can occupy an appropriate niche in the weapons system and constitute an additional “brick” in the modern weapons system of military air defense. Full-scale ZRPK "Pantsir-СXNUMX", as already indicated, in its capabilities and characteristics is unacceptable for the air defense forces of the Ground Forces, even in the version on the tracked chassis.
COMPETITORS DO NOT HAPPEN IN FIGHTING ORDERS
The Tor-M2U short-range anti-aircraft missile system, which KBP and others like it today interpret as an analogue of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system and draw an equal sign between them, is actually a new development (new generation) of the Osa short-range air defense systems family "-" Thor ". Like the short-range complexes of the previous generation, the Tor-M2 air defense missile system (General Designer - Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Veniamin Efremov, Chief Designer - Iosif Drize) is intended for effective combat and defeat aviation air-to-ground missiles, guided and guided aerial bombs, anti-radar missiles and other high-precision weapons of a new generation, tactical and army aircraft, cruise missiles, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and other means.
The Top-M1 anti-aircraft missile system is easily loaded onto a railway platform.
In other words, the Tor-M2 air defense missile system is the main means of fighting high-precision weapons and their carriers operating at medium, low and extremely low altitudes in difficult situations. It differs from prototypes in the increased effectiveness of repelling the massed raids of modern air attack weapons under fire and electronic countermeasures.
The complex was originally developed as the main means of combat primarily to repel massive strikes of precision weapons in flight directly above the battlefield, that is, almost as the main "finish" air defense system. Closer to the front edge (to the front line) only the Tunguska-М1 submarine defense missile system is located, but their priority is fire support helicopters and portable Igla-S air defense systems, which are means of direct cover (anti-aircraft guns).
The Tor-MXNUMU air defense missile system with the 2М9 SAM system is a full-scale 331-channel for targets in the extended elevation-azimuthal zone of destruction (4X30 degrees) and with the distant border of the zone of destruction - 30 km. The missile complex, built on the aerodynamic "duck" scheme, was specially designed to ensure effective interception of small-sized intensively maneuvering targets, and by this parameter it is significantly superior to the missiles that borrowed the air-to-air missile systems and technology. For effective destruction of high-precision missile weapons that plan and correct bombs, the complex’s missile is equipped with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead with high-density fragments based on a tungsten-nickel alloy (VNZh) and an adaptive radio pickup tuned before launching under the type of target being hit, determined by the combat vehicle. In the nearest foreign counterparts of the Tor-M15 air defense system, and in the Pantsir-C2 air-defense missile system, this is not even close.
In fact, the Tor-MXNUMU air defense missile system still has no full-fledged analogues in its class in the world and remains the only means providing a highly effective fight against the WTO over the battlefield. In 2, the prototype of the Tor-M1998U complex - the Tor-M2 air defense system was optionally subjected to “comparative” tests with its closest competitor, the French-made Krotal-NZ air defense system in the United Arab Emirates, and confirmed its overwhelming superiority. The same results were achieved during the live firing of the Tor-M1 air defense system in Greece, provided by NATO UHV according to their scenario and using their own means of suppression (EW).
According to the integrated assessment of the total combat characteristics and the “efficiency – cost” criterion conducted using situational models, the Tor-M2-UMS with 9М331М anti-aircraft systems exceeds the Pantsir-C1 SAMs 1,2-1,3 times. But let the Air Force and the East Kazakhstan Region take care of the “Armor”, its strengths and weaknesses, there is someone to whom and how to fight, including by “mastering” budget funds.
For the military air defense, what is more important now is not the “Armor”, but bringing to mind the missile channel of the “Tunguska” missile defense system, including on the combat means, which are in the army. The tests of the modernized rocket channel conducted this year (20 has not passed years after the “Defense-92” exercises) have determined how and what needs to be done to do this. We need only the means, mutual understanding and common sense.
In general, in the light of the above, it is possible to state that the PZIR-type air defense missile system, as previously asked, should remain and be interpreted as a short-range direct-cover anti-aircraft defense system, and the Tor-М2 air defense system should be a widely used multi-channel short-range air defense system. At the same time, the Tor-М2 air defense system, the Pantsir-С1 air defense system and the Pantsir-С2 air defense system are not competing with each other, but mutually complementary prospective means of air defense, which should be used each in its own niche and in its intended purpose.
TRAINING ISHAK'S GRADUATE
Now about the “long arm” in the understanding of the PCU, and more specifically about medium-range missiles (SDS SD) according to the accepted classification. In principle, both in the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces and in the Air Force together with the aerospace defense, this problem has been rather deeply worked out and has not actually raised questions before.
The Buk-МХNUMX family of new-generation Buk family missiles is a promising anti-aircraft defense system designed to effectively combat aerodynamic targets of all classes, modern high-precision weapons, tactical ballistic and most importantly cruise missiles flying on midget heights.
By their significance, the Buk-М2 air defense system is the main system-forming means of anti-aircraft defense in theaters, in any case, its military component (“workhorse” or main “brick”), supplemented on the one hand (tactical) - short-range air defense missile system of the “Tor-MHNUMXU” type, from the operational side - long-range missiles of all classes.
At the same time, the Buk-М2 air defense system as the main means of fighting cruise missiles flying at ultra-low altitudes, according to the “cost-effectiveness” criterion, compares favorably with other air defense systems of both domestic and foreign production. The fact is that, in addition to the self-propelled multichannel fire installation (SOU), the Buk-М2 air defense system has a radar for illumination and guidance (RPN) - a device mounted on a self-propelled vehicle with a semi-telescopic mechanism that allows you to 23 altitude m antenna systems for tracking and target illumination, similar to those used in the LDS. This allows significantly (two or three times) to expand the radio horizon at extremely low altitudes of the target and, for example, provides for the defeat of a cruise missile flying at an altitude of 10 m, at a distance of up to 40 km. This engineering solution and the device itself also have no analogues in the world.
The Buk-М2 firing system with multi-channel RPN provides, in the span of the zone, shelling up to 8 – 12 cruise missiles (KR). At the same time, the probability of inflicting a missile attack on a single missile defense system in the Buk-М2 system is higher, and the average missile consumption per downed target is lower than that of the C-300P (C-400) family. In addition, the Buk-M2 missile defense system is almost twice as cheap as the main missile of these missiles. It makes sense to compare the Buk-М2 AAMS and the С-300П (С-400) family of C-XNUMX systems only in the sense that these special tools have highly elevated devices of antenna systems for expanding the line-of-sight (radio horizon) and thus increasing the far boundary of the zone defeat targets operating at extremely low altitudes. But all this is our means, there are no such developments abroad.
It is also relevant to note that in the version “Buk-М2-1” all combat elements of the system are placed on the wheeled chassis, which generally expands the possibilities of its combat use, primarily in the interests of the Air Force and EKR.
SDS SD "Buk-M2" has already established itself as a highly reliable means of combat. The prototype of the ZRS SD “Buk-М2” - the Buk-M air defense missile system was successfully used in the course of real hostilities to force Georgia to peace.
The “grandfather” of the Buk-М2 air defense missile system - the Kvadrat air defense missile system, which had an 3М9 rocket with a semi-active CGS similar to that used in the Buk-М2 air defense missile, but in a significantly simplified version, was also widely used in hostilities in foreign countries. During the October 1973 of the Arab-Israeli war, the Kvadrat air defense missile system (export name of the Kub air defense missile system) was destroyed by 68% of Israeli aviation (mainly aircraft of the Phantom and Mirage type) with an average consumption of 1,2 – 1,6 missiles per aircraft knocked down target.
Today it is theoretically proven and practically verified that existing and promising air defense weapons could and should have been used not in a “standard” uniform structure, but in a certain combination, that is, they could create polygamous (combined) reconnaissance-firing combat modules based on them. highly effective solution of specific problems.
This approach is aimed at asymmetrical opposition to the development and deployment of expensive high-precision weapons systems and UAVs in leading foreign countries.
So calculations, as well as fragments of field tests, show that the combined use of Buk-М2 and Tor-М2 air defense systems in the combat control of such an anti-aircraft missile division of polygamous personnel from a single command post and in a single information field allows its effectiveness to be more than 2,5 times, and resistance from defeat of the “Harm” type PI — 8 – 12 times
At the final stage, as already mentioned, the development of the air defense missile system Vityaz, created for the Air Force and EKR and already included in the GOZ-2020 program, is in progress. Even this complex seems superfluous to us, taking into account the multi-channel “Buk-М2-1” adopted on armament on a wheeled chassis, but this is the prerogative of the Air Force and East-Kazakhstan oblast. In general, the development directions of SD air defense systems and groups based on them are more than enough, the systems themselves remain competitive for the next 15 – 20 years.
RUSSIAN FUN OUT OF CONTRACTING KANATA
What new things can add to the family of air defense weapons of the SD "long arm" (significantly more than 20 km) in the interpretation of the PCU? As already mentioned, the ideology of the KBP is based on the use of the “Ptursovskaya” bicalyber rocket construction scheme with a passive marching stage and the command method of guidance. But we already went through the command guidance method in the SD air defense systems. These are the well-known C-75 and “Circle” systems, in which, taking into account the intercept accuracy that is realized, even aerodynamic targets at 45 – 55 km ranges, their 120 – 190 kg combat units were forced to use their effective destruction (by the way, with active marching stage) had a mass up to 2500 kg. The operation and combat use of these complexes showed that a promising direction for the development of SD air defense systems is the transition to self-homing of missiles or the use of a modified command method (guidance through a rocket), which was implemented in the SAM of the Buk-M2 and Vityaz as well as foreign systems ("Patriot", improved "Hawk"). This is physics, and it can not be Russian or American.
Currently, the United States, Germany and Italy are integrally (due to joint investment and intelligence) creating the newest air defense and tactical anti-ballistic missile defense system MEADS. So, the main element of this system is a multifunctional radar fire control with a circular view of the airspace, and the anti-missile Patriot PAC-3 missiles and, naturally, the same method of guidance through a rocket are used as antimissiles.
But the KBP proposes to create air defense systems differentially, dispersing efforts (note - and money), and even on obsolete physical principles. Apparently, they use their own, special mathematics. KBU has been developing Tunguska 9 for years, Pantsir-С1 for almost 16 years, and how long is it going to develop the proposed tools? Apparently, there is the place where Haji Nasreddin’s philosophy is about the terms of the donkey’s literacy training, but the “money” sucked out of the state wallet with the help of the “long arm” will “drip” all this time.
Recently, First Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Sukhorukov said that the military department would not allow any cuts in the funds allocated for the LG-2020. “No one will go anywhere to the right in terms of fulfilling the tasks of the state defense order ...” - assured Sukhorukov. But the implementation of the proposals of the CPI inevitably breaks the LG-2020 in terms of weapons and air defense equipment under a completely unreasonable "perspective." Apparently, Mr. Sukhorukov would need to respond to the situation properly.
In order not to look like a retrograd, it would be possible to propose the UAC to develop and create at least a working prototype of the long-range air defense system at the expense of the enterprise, conduct its comparative assessment tests with existing SDS SD and make a decision on their results. By the way, KBM in Kolomna near Moscow went on just such a way, developing the short-range “Archer” air defense system. Apparently, this approach is the product of a market economy and competition.
In order to stop the “rope pulling”, it would be useful to conduct comparative evaluation tests with live firing of the Pantsir-С1 air defense system and the Tor-МХNUMXУ air defense system on high-precision weapon simulators and modern combat scenarios.
Since ancient times, it is known that the best is the enemy of the good. But the paradox is that KBP, as we have seen, offers the worst, yesterday, an alternative to good. Of course, this cannot be tolerated, which was what the veterans of the air defense forces of the navy and garau moi, who, along with the defense industry specialists, invested their strength and soul in the development of competitive armaments and military equipment of the navy air defense forces, requested. We hope that Dmitry Rogozin, who is our guardian of the interests and security of the homeland, will also express his weighty word on this issue.
- Alexander G. Lusan - Retired Lieutenant-General, Doctor of Technical Sciences, State Prize Laureate
- http://nvo.ng.ru
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