Not a godfather, not a matchmaker, not a destroyer, not a frigate
And the situation is such that all hope is exclusively on Soviet-built ships. And today, project 1144 TARK, project 1164 missile cruisers and project 1155 BOD are the main ships of the Russian Navy capable of operating in the far sea zone. Unfortunately, even an inveterate optimist will not turn his tongue to call them new. All of them come from the eighties of the last century.
New ships of this class in Russia are clearly not yet built according to their strength and capabilities, so they have to use what they have. Modernizing, repairing, it is clear that it is unrealistic to do this indefinitely, but so far this is how it is. The presence of Russia in the DMZ can only be indicated by Soviet-built surface ships.
"Admiral Chabanenko" was initially somewhat different from its counterparts, since it was the only representative of the improved project 1155.1. The rest of the ships, of which seven have survived to date, the Project 1155 BODs were slightly smaller in terms of displacement and weaker in terms of weapons.
In general, project 1155 can be safely called one of the most successful projects of Soviet shipbuilding. These were ships with very decent seaworthiness, with good means of detecting submarines and anti-submarine weapons by the standards of that time. Plus two helicopters. The disadvantages were very weak (mainly artillery) air defense and the absence of strike anti-ship weapons. But for the designated function of anti-submarine ships, weapons were more than enough.
Project 1155.1 BOD was significantly different from its predecessors: more displacement, better hydroacoustics, anti-ship weapons appeared: Moskit missiles. Air defense has become more modern, with the advent of the Kortik ZRAK, which replaced the Dagger. The Vodopad-NK anti-submarine complex made it possible not only to fight submarines, but also quite successfully the torpedoes of the complex could be used against surface ships.
And so, in 2014, the most modern of the BOD went for modernization. And after 8 years, repairs and modernization are completed.
And now the Admiral Chabanenko is no longer a large anti-submarine ship, but a frigate. Here are the changes.
It turned out interesting that the frigates were played by a ship that, in terms of displacement, corresponds to the American destroyer Arleigh Burke. Yes, in terms of displacement, but not in terms of weapons.
What was the newly-minted frigate armed with?
Four PU anti-ship missiles "Uranus", each for 4 missiles. A total of 16 missiles, which are more modern than the Mosquitoes, but are designed to destroy ships up to 5 tons, and optimally for boats of different classes.
Next are the universal cells of the 3C14 complex. 16 cells in which you can charge anything you want, "Calibers", "Zircons", "Onyxes".
Total - 32 missiles. 16 for small ships, 16 for larger targets.
"Arleigh Burke" can take into its cells (32 in the bow and 64 in the stern) from 8 to 56 Tomahawk missiles. Plus two PU anti-ship missiles "Harpoon" for 4 missiles each.
If you look at the frigates, then if you take the German "Baden-Württemberg", then yielding about 1155.1 tons in displacement to the 1M project, the German carries only 000 Harpoon anti-ship missiles and about 8 missiles of the ship's direct anti-aircraft defense. Artillery and torpedoes are also present, of course.
The British new type 26 frigate under construction is similar in displacement to the Admiral Chabanenko, but is armed with the Mk.41 UVP, which, as you know, can include everything from the Tomahawk to the LRASM. Plus the CAMM air defense system with its own UVP for 48 cells.
Like the Russian ship, the German and the British carry two helicopters each.
In general, it looks like. Considering that many media outlets said that Admiral Chabanenko had significantly shaken up the radio-electronic filling, I would like to believe that this is exactly the case.
As a result, the reclassification of the BOD into a frigate looks justified. The ship will be able to attack not only submarines, but also surface ships and targets on the coast. This is generally useful and justified. Versatility is in fashion today.
But there is also a not very pleasant moment. There is no information about how much repair and restoration work was done on the Admiral Chabanenko. Let me remind you that the ship was launched in 1992 and entered service in 1999. His almost classmate "Marshal Shaposhnikov" was launched in 1984, the ship entered service in 1986.
In April last year, after a modernization repair that lasted more than five years, Marshal Shaposhnikov returned to the Pacific Ocean.
According to available information, 80% of the cable routes were replaced on the ship as part of the repair and about 40% of the hull structures were replaced. The structures had to be rebuilt.
What does it say? This indicates a decent wear of the ship. It is clear that the Chabanenko has less wear and tear, but we have 6 more such ships in the ranks of the fleets, which will also have to be repaired, replacing the "tired" structures.
Do you think 40% is a lot or a little? Wouldn't it be easier in this situation to build a new ship, immediately equipping it with the most modern weapons and equipment?
The shipyards in Kaliningrad (the BOD was built at Yantar) seem to be intact, the engines seem to have appeared (M-70FRU from Saturn as an option), the question arises: is it worth it to patch and patch the old ships of project 1155 instead of building new ones ?
Next in line is the BOD of the Pacific Fleet "Admiral Vinogradov", which is also about to begin to modernize. The press service of Dalzavod reported that almost all combat systems would be replaced, except for the AK-630 gun mounts. PU for Caliber-NK, anti-submarine Package-NK, hull upgrade and so on. “Vinogradov will receive” not 2, but 4 launchers 3S14, 8 cells each. That is, the former BOD will be able to carry up to 48 cruise missiles at the same time.
Next, it should be the turn of Admiral Panteleev and Admiral Tributs to become destroyer-sized frigates.
Unfortunately, this says today only one thing: Russian shipbuilding is simply not able to repeat the successes of Soviet shipbuilders. Therefore, instead of initially building new and modern ships that meet all the requirements of our time, we enthusiastically continue to patch up and use Soviet-built ships.
It's good that the margin of safety allows you to do this.
But in any case, the “Trishkin caftan” for Russian ships of the far sea zone is not exactly what I would like to see in the end.
Of course, it's better than nothing. An old ship that allows you to install and use more modern weapons systems is better than nothing, more precisely, ships that will never be built. However, forty years is forty years. And is it reasonable to spend so much money and resources building the country's defense capability at the expense of such ships?
However, the question is rather rhetorical. We still do not have others and are not expected.
So the answer to the question posed at the beginning may be that behind the modernization of the forty-year-old Project 1155 ships is Russia's inability to build modern destroyers and frigates on its own. And I would like to.
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