Military Review

"Loop of Togo". On the quality of criticism of V. Chistyakov's theses

137

To begin with, let me remind the dear reader of the main theses of V. Chistyakov's version, which he outlined in his article "A quarter of an hour for Russian cannons."


Maneuvering the sides in the outset of the Tsushima battle


I have already said many times and will not tire of repeating that any schemes of naval battles, drawings of eyewitnesses, etc. abound in many different errors and cannot serve as a source of accurate analysis.

So, for example, to this day, despite the many sources from both the Japanese and the Russian side, it is impossible to establish reliably either the distance or the course angle to the Mikasa from the flagship Russian battleship Suvorov. But to visualize the general pattern of maneuvering, such schemes can sometimes still be used.

Here is the diagram presented by V. Chistyakov in his article published in "Marine collection" No. 2 for 1989.


It clearly shows the following.

By the time the main forces of the opponents saw each other, the Russian squadron was moving in two wake columns, and the Japanese fleet appeared to the right-in front of it and went across it.

I must say that the distance between the squadrons at that time was very significant, exceeding 7 miles.

Then H. Togo turned towards the Russian squadron (13:12 on the scheme of V. Chistyakov) and for some time walked with it in converging courses.

But already at 13:20 H. Togo again turns and goes almost perpendicular to the Russian course, crosses it and instead of “right-in front” of the Russian squadron, it turns out to be “left-front” of it.

At this time, the Russian ships follow without significant changes in course, and the only maneuver they perform is the rebuilding of two wake columns into one.

The Japanese fleet, having reached the “left side” of the Russian squadron, turns around again and goes towards it as if it wants to part ways with it on counter courses.

But, when the distance was reduced, according to Japanese data, to 8 m (000–43 cables), H. Togo begins his famous U-turn, which was later called "Togo's Loop".

Are there errors in V. Chistyakov's scheme?

Apparently, there are no fundamental flaws: it does not contradict either the descriptions of this episode of the battle, or the drawings of British observers, showing a generally similar picture.


Using these schemes and other data, V. Chistyakov built an interesting version of the plot of the Tsushima battle, which is completely different from the generally accepted one.

His main theses are as follows.

Thesis number 1.

H. Togo had an overwhelming superiority in speed and could implement it in the best possible way, putting the "crossing T" to the Russian squadron in the very beginning of the battle. Approximately as shown by the red line on the fragment of the diagram.


Thesis number 2.

Assuming that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky does not have time to reorganize into a single wake column before the start of fire contact, Kh. Togo abandoned his decision to put a “stick over T” and moved to the left side of the Russian squadron in order to attack and quickly defeat its relatively weak, left column of warships, led by Oslyabey.

Thesis number 3.

The fact that by the time the Japanese attack began, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky managed to withdraw his main force - the 1st armored detachment, consisting of four of the latest squadron battleships of the Borodino type, into the head of the left Russian column, became an extremely unpleasant surprise for H. Togo and violated his plan, because the object of attack, the weakest left column, no longer existed.

Thesis number 4.

"Togo's Loop" - a forced maneuver of the Japanese admiral, which gave the Russian squadron a fire and positional advantage in the outset of the battle.

Finally, thesis number 5.

Theses 1-4 are a consequence of the cunning plan of Z.P. Rozhestvensky, who tactically outplayed H. Togo at the beginning of the battle.

Where do I agree with V. Chistyakov's version and why


Let's start with a simple one - by itself, a turn of almost 180 degrees in the enemy's artillery area is an unsuccessful maneuver.

Firstly, because the squadron turning to a new course cannot put its artillery into action, since the ships that turned will close the Russian squadron for those Japanese ships that have not yet entered the turn.

Secondly, because a fixed pivot point makes it much easier to zero in on ships passing through it.

And the point here is not at all about the fact that the entire Russian squadron should have "hammered" at the turning point, showering every ship passing through with a hail of shells. This is how naval artillery does not work.

But, having aimed at the ship passing through the turning point, it would be easy for the Russian artillerymen in the future to transfer fire to another ship passing through it.

Why endure the fire, if you have already shot at one of the Japanese ships?

The fact is that the Japanese, after turning, lay down on a course converging with the Russian squadron. Accordingly, over time, the heading angle to the target for the Russian ship deteriorated so much that it could no longer effectively shoot at its chosen target. Then he should have transferred fire to another Japanese ship, entering or just completing a turn.

And zeroing in on such a ship was greatly simplified precisely due to the fact that they all passed through one turning point, at which the Russian ship had previously been shooting.

Thus, it can be argued for certain that the "Togo Loop" did not give the latter any immediate advantage, and at the same time caused significant inconvenience.

But maybe the Japanese ships received such an advantage after the "Loop of Togo" was completed?

Can we assume that H. Togo deliberately took a risk and set up his ships at the beginning of the battle in order to achieve an undoubted advantage of the position in the future?

It is possible to guess, but where is it, is this an undoubted advantage?

As mentioned above, the ships of the Japanese admiral, upon completion of the turn, lay down on a course converging with the Russian squadron.

We reliably know the parameters of the convergence: the Japanese went to NO 67, and the Russians - NO 23, so the squadrons converged at an angle of 44 degrees.

At the same time, the faster Japanese ships, being left in front, “pressed” on the lead Russian battleships.

But such a maneuver did not pose any noticeable danger to the Russians and was easily parried by a lapel to the right, which, by the way, happened later.


So, the first reason why I am inclined to agree with V. Chistyakov's suggestion that the Togo Loop was a necessary measure for the Japanese is that this maneuver not only created difficulties for the Japanese at the time of its commission, but also did not provide any clear advantages in the future.

Critics of V. Chistyakov often undertake to assert that upon completion of the Togo Loop, the Japanese 1st Combat Detachment covered the head of the Russian column.

In fact it is not.

But even if it were so, then this situation has developed only because Z.P. Rozhestvensky continued to lead his squadron to NO 23, trying to get as close to the enemy as possible and realize the fire advantage presented to him by the Japanese. But he could not do this, and turned to the right immediately, as soon as the new course of "Mikasa" was determined.

In this case, there could be no question of any "coverage" at all, and the fire advantage, albeit not so significant, would still have remained with the Russians all the time while H. Togo was "twisting" his "loop".

It is quite obvious that H. Togo could not read the thoughts of the Russian admiral and did not know how he would react to his maneuver.

The second reason why I am inclined to agree with V. Chistyakov's opinion regarding the "Togo Loop" is the contradictions in the Japanese interpretation of those events.

Kh. Togo himself, in his report on the Battle of Tsushima, claimed that from the very beginning, even before he saw the Russian system with his own eyes, he had chosen the left, weak Russian column as the object of his attack.

"Loop of Togo". On the quality of criticism of V. Chistyakov's theses

But why then, knowing everything about the position of the Russian squadron and its formation from his scouts, did he maneuver with his own forces so that in the end he came into line of sight not to the left, from where it was quick and convenient to strike, but to the right of the Russian column?

Indeed, as a result of this, he had to spend a lot of time on rebuilding in view of the enemy, who, of course, could somehow try to oppose the Japanese plan.

And why then the official Japanese Meiji writes that H. Togo made a turn towards the Russian squadron in order to attack right Russian column?


Let me remind you that at 13:40 Japanese time H. Togo performed this maneuver.


Of course, I am not a great naval commander, but if H. Togo, being to the right of the Russian squadron, turns towards it, then he probably really plans to attack the right, and not the left, Russian column?

Well, let's write off the translation errors.

Again, critics of V. Chistyakov sometimes undertake to argue that both the transition to the left side of the squadron and the "Loop of Togo" were conceived by H. Togo from the very beginning that this was exactly the case, and that was the only way he was going to attack the Russian forces.

In principle, such a version has the right to exist (however, the question of why H. Togo appeared not to the left, but to the right of the Russian forces, in this case remains open), and here is why.

If during the "Loop Togo" the Russian squadron continued to march in two wake columns, then the four best battleships Z.P. Rozhestvensky would have been excluded from the battle - the left column of Russian ships prevented her from firing.

In this case, "Togo's Loop" is full of deep tactical meaning.

“Having endured” the moment of a turn, the Japanese admiral would have brought down on eight of the weakest Russian ships (of which three, I remind you, were just coastal defense battleships, and the total displacement of all three was less than that of Mikasa alone) with a terrible blow of twelve of his battleships and armored cruisers. At the end of his “Loop”, he would have laid down on a converging course, but “Oslyabya” could hardly have turned to the right without risking a collision with Borodino-class battleships.

In this version, H. Togo, having "rolled" his "loop", really received an excellent positional and fire advantage.

However, if H. Togo had decided not to turn the loops, but simply to disperse with the left Russian column on counter courses, it would not have seemed enough to our ships, but I will return to this issue later.

Finally, as follows from the passage I have already cited above, H. Togo himself confirmed that he was going to attack the left column of Russian ships.

However, the fact is that when the Japanese naval commander went into position to strike (it does not matter at all whether he was going to "twist the loop" or diverge from the left Russian column on the counter-courses), there was no longer any separate left column.

Yes, due to a mistake made by Z.P. Rozhestvensky in the calculation of the rebuilding maneuver, our squadron did not line up in a single wake, but a separate left column, as an object of attack, no longer existed.

As a result, Kh. Togo had only two options: either to diverge on counter courses with the entire Russian squadron, which would be extremely fraught, or ...

Or still “twist” his noose, which now already put him in a losing position at the time of the maneuver, but did not give any advantages at its completion.

Why could this happen?

I see only one reason: H. Togo untimely noticed the rebuilding initiated by Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

The Japanese admiral simply did not understand that the four squadron battleships Borodino would be able to hit the heads of the ships of the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments.

This reason is extremely logical, and it explains everything.

But, if this is so, then it turns out that the main forces of the Japanese fleet were brought into battle far from in the best way, and the reason for this is the maneuvering of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

According to the reports of the Japanese admiral, he was going to attack the left column of the Russians. But the Russian squadron was divided into two columns by none other than Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

And it was precisely the "careful" attitude of the Russian commander to the Japanese cruisers that allowed H. Togo to know that the Russians were following in two columns, not one, and also the composition of these columns.

Consciously or unconsciously, but Z.P. Rozhestvensky gave H. Togo information, on the basis of which he built his battle plan.

Consciously or unconsciously, but Z.P. Rozhestvensky violated this Japanese plan, as he managed to rebuild his squadron before H. Togo was able to inflict the blow he had planned (and it does not matter how he intended it - a loop or a divergence on the counter courses).

Here, in fact, that's all.

Criticism of V. Chistyakov's version


Unfortunately, I will not be able to answer all the comments that have ever sounded about V. Chistyakov's version, although some of my answers are contained in the text above.

Point by point, I will analyze the objections of the respected M. Klimov, expressed by him in the article “Tsushima: Rozhdestvensky is guilty.”

So, thesis number 1.

M. Klimov writes:

"The devastating response to V. Chistyakov was already known."

And as such leads the article "Tsushima: in defense of traditional points of view from analytical myth-making", the author of which is the respected E.M. Shuvalov.

The article is undoubtedly very interesting.

Especially - the fact that E.M. Shuvalov not only refutes, but does not even undertake to refute V. Chistyakov according to his main theses "A quarter of an hour for Russian cannons." EAT. Shuvalov does not like the methodology of V. Chistyakov and a number of other authors, V. Kofman, for example.

EAT. Shuvalov quotes the magazine "Naval":

“So much contradictory has been written about Tsushima that if you take only some part of the data, a priori considering it reliable, and “omit” all the rest that do not work for the author’s version, then you can prove anything.

Moreover, E.M. Shuvalov does not agree that the editors of "Naval" just put the works of V. Chistyakov and V. Kofman as an example of an analytical approach that "does not take the initial data on faith, but, on the contrary, casts doubt on them."

But now I will not hide behind the authority of this magazine and remind the dear reader that the work of V. Chistyakov was not considered “shameful” (according to M. Klimov) by the editorial board of the magazine “Morskoy Sbornik”, and even before the collapse of the USSR, and the editorial board of “Naval” turns out even appointed as a guideline, which should be followed by other authors. After all, there are people in the newsrooms too, and they can, of course, be wrong.

Here is E.M. Shuvalov just undertook to show that V. Chistyakov's approaches are not "an example of an analytical approach", but sin with one-sidedness. To prove this, he analyzes in detail a number of statements made by V. Chistyakov, such as, for example, that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, in the outset of the battle, did not make a mistake with the rebuilding, as is commonly believed, but built a certain system of a “stretched ledge”.

Everything would be fine, but in "A Quarter of an Hour for Russian Cannons" V. Chistyakov has no "extended ledge". V. Chistyakov came to such conclusions in his later publications, with which, by the way, I did not express solidarity.

This is, in fact, the whole article.

EAT. Shuvalov in no way refutes the main theses of "A Quarter of an Hour for Russian Cannons", which I have listed above. He proves the erroneousness of a number of other judgments by V. Chistyakov: about the mutual position of the "Eagle" and "Oslyaby" at the time of opening fire by "Suvorov", for example.

Moreover, in some cases E.M. Shuvalov corrects V. Chistyakov in favor of V. Chistyakov's version. The last one in "Quarter of an hour ..." indicated a very sharp heading angle to Japanese ships (11 degrees).

This is quite consistent with many critics of V. Chistyakov's version - that the Japanese, although they turned at the muzzles of Russian cannons, did it at such a sharp heading angle that only a few could shoot at them.

But E.M. Shuvalov refutes these critics and writes:

“If we proceed from realities, then most likely the bearing from the Japanese“ Description ... ”corresponds to an earlier point in time than indicated (before the Mikasa entered the“ loop ”and the Suvorov entered the combat course”). It is possible that the Japanese side deliberately introduced a distortion associated with the location of the "loop" in order to soften the impression of danger for Togo's squadron, which could be attacked by Russian battleships. "

Perhaps, E.M. Shuvalov is his opinion that the battleships of the Borodino type did not open fire immediately after the Suvorov, but with some delay (up to 4 minutes) due to the fact that they did not complete the rebuilding. And that, because of this, it is impossible to talk about 15 minutes of Russian advantage - only about 10.

But the fact that this is an advantage for the Russians было, EAT. Shuvalov in no way refutes.

Thus, E.M. Shuvalov in his work:

1. It does not at all destroy the main theses of "A quarter of an hour for Russian guns."

2. Disputes the secondary theses of V. Chistyakov, which he, moreover, for the most part expressed after this publication.

My conclusion is this: to position the work “Tsushima: in defense of traditional points of view from analytical myth-making” as a “crushing answer” to “A Quarter of an Hour of Russian Cannons” can only be a person who himself article E.M. Shuvalov did not read.

I understand that it is not written in the simplest language, through which not every lover of the naval stories... But I strongly recommend respected M. Klimov in the future to read the source before referring to it in the discussion.

Thesis number 2 .

About radio intelligence.

The idea of ​​V. Chistyakov is that the radiotelegraph operators of the Russian ships could determine the distance to the Japanese main forces, "evaluating the intensity of the spark signal" of their radio stations.

M. Klimov believes that such intelligence:

... did not provide the accuracy necessary for the declared by the adepts of the Nativity plan ... All the "accuracy" there is obtained at the level of "close-far".

First, I would like to note that nothing but "close-far" Z.P. Rozhestvensky was not required to implement his plans.

Second - personally, I still doubt that Z.P. Rozhestvensky used radio intelligence, because I don’t remember that any of the eyewitnesses reported on it in the reports and testimonies.

And the third - for the version of V. Chistyakov, such radio intelligence is desirable, but not at all mandatory.

As I said earlier, in order to mislead X.

1. Convince the Japanese admiral that the squadron should be in two columns and will not have time to rebuild by the time of the attack.

2. Make a maneuver that would allow the Russian squadron to rebuild by the time of the attack, but so that H. Togo did not notice this maneuver in time.

To do this, it was necessary to allow the enemy cruisers to follow the squadron and slightly increase the speed of the 1st armored detachment as soon as the Japanese main forces opened ...

And not at all to control their movement over the horizon.

Thesis number 3.

“An extremely simple question for Mr. Kolobov: why did he decide on behalf of the One that he was“ going to attack on counter courses ”?

Because it was a great way to defeat the left column of Russian forces - provided that the 1st armored detachment would not have time to stand at the head of the squadron, of course.

In the event of such an attack, the Russians would naturally concentrate their fire on the Japanese battleships, as on the most dangerous targets, but they were able to withstand such a blow.

When H. Togo in the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung, trying to overtake the Russian squadron that had escaped forward, slowly walked along the formation of six Russian battleships, his tactical position was much worse, but Mikasa survived.

But could withstand "Oslyabya", "Sisoy Veliky" and "Navarin", with their unarmored extremities, first hit by short 305-mm land mines, and then - a hail of medium-caliber high-explosive shells from armored cruisers - an extremely interesting question.

Given the fact that we know about the injuries they received and their consequences, we can safely say that they would not have survived.

At the same time, the three coastal defense battleships in the tail of the left Russian column could represent at least some kind of combat value only in conditions when no one shoots at it.

But if H. Togo portrayed something like this maneuver.


Then from the 3rd Pacific squadron of Nebogatov, only horns and legs would remain, and the advantage in the heavy guns of the Russian forces would be largely leveled. And with minimal damage to the Japanese.

M. Klimov's appeal to the experience of previous battles:

"He made such a mistake near Shantung, almost missing the First Pacific Squadron."

In this context, this makes absolutely no sense - the mistake of H. Togo in the battle on July 28 in the Yellow Sea was not a discrepancy with the Russian squadron in a counter-course as such, but that soon after this discrepancy he lagged behind the Russian squadron by about 10 miles.

Having dispersed from the left Russian column on the counter courses and lagging behind it after that by 10 miles, H. Togo would not have made any mistake.

But the most important thing is that, as mentioned above, it makes absolutely no difference how exactly Kh. Togo planned to attack the left column of the Russian squadron.

The fact is that any of his plan of attack, even with a counter-course, even with a “loop”, was thwarted by an exit to the head of the squadron of the 1st armored detachment of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

But this is exactly what happened.

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  1. A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 13 January 2022 06: 29
    +3
    Good morning Andrey!
    Thank you, the article is interesting!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 January 2022 09: 22
      +3
      Good morning! hi Thank you!
    2. carpenter
      carpenter 13 January 2022 14: 06
      +8
      Quote: A_Mazkov
      Thank you, the article is interesting!

      Andrey's articles are always distinguished by the specificity and clarity of the presentation of the material. He does an awesome job. Sincerely.
  2. Kuroneko
    Kuroneko 13 January 2022 06: 43
    +10
    As always, both the winners and the vanquished must have a sea of ​​​​okiyan mistakes. It's just a matter of who gets the most.
    I am sure that Suvorov, although being undefeated, made mistakes more than once in battles. It's just that his opponents did it an order of magnitude more. And of course, Suvorov had a well-trained Russian veteran soldier (then the service lasted 25 years), and the dependence on the quality of equipment and shells was not so high.
    1. Glory1974
      Glory1974 13 January 2022 09: 27
      +11
      I am sure that Suvorov, although he was undefeated, made mistakes more than once in battles. It's just that his opponents did it an order of magnitude more.

      The one who does nothing is NOT mistaken. But to say that Suvorov was just lucky 63 times and was opposed by fools making a bunch of mistakes is categorically wrong.
      Suvorov had a well-trained Russian veteran soldier (his service then lasted 25 years), and the dependence on the quality of equipment and shells was not so high.

      This is the talent of a commander to smash the enemy with the available forces and means. Suvorov won in all battles because he prepared his soldiers for battle (built a copy of enemy positions in the rear and conducted training assaults), skillfully used the available weapons (the well-known expression "Bullet is a fool, a good fellow"), applied innovative tactics and neutralized technical superiority enemy weapons. Therefore, he is the Generalissimo, who has never lost a battle, and Rozhdestvensky is the one who is.
  3. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 13 January 2022 07: 00
    +17
    Having dispersed from the left Russian column on the counter-courses and lagging behind it after that by 10 miles, H. Togo would not have made any mistake

    Togo drew conclusions from the maneuvering during the battle at Shantung, placing the end ships of his armored detachments of junior flagships and practicing a "all of a sudden" turn on the opposite course. So, having passed the end ships of Nebogatov on the counter courses, he simply turned around, making the end heads and would have continued to smash the left column.
    But the most important thing is that, as mentioned above, it makes absolutely no difference how exactly Kh. Togo planned to attack the left column of the Russian squadron.

    I personally understand everything. For the millionth time I will repeat myself - by appealing with an afterthought, you can come up with whatever you want and how you want to criticize the results of the battle and its participants. But the intention of the Russians to pull the transports along with them led to a total squadron move of 9 knots, which actually became the key moment of the defeat. At that time, Rozhestvensky really intended to endure even at such a speed that it was his mistake. Not maneuvering, I personally have no questions for him (an attack by the Borodiners on the loop would be an even greater mistake), namely speed. If the Russians had at least 12 knots, then the Japanese would not have felt the advantage in speed so sharply, they would not have come out on top of the Russians so quickly, and it would have been much more difficult for them to destroy the lead ships. They would still have beaten on points, but it would have taken more time and not the fact that with the same success.
    It is the fact of speed that I consider the key in the defeat. EMNIP, Togo was very surprised when he realized that the speed of the Russians was less than expected ...
    Material plus hi
    1. Niko
      Niko 13 January 2022 09: 01
      +3
      Therefore, Rozhdestvensky's supporters and defenders sort out various "trifles" such as "brilliant maneuvering", and gross MISTAKES such as deliberately reducing the speed of the squadron (planning a BREAKTHROUGH) are hushed up as insignificant.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        13 January 2022 09: 18
        +3
        Quote: Niko
        and the grossest ERRORS such as deliberately reducing the squadron speed

        (a heavy sigh) That is, you ignore the numerous indications of numerous breakdowns of the CMU at a squadron speed of over 9 knots during the transition.
        1. Niko
          Niko 13 January 2022 10: 31
          +3
          I do not find fault with "trifles," rather I do not like the interpretation "in one direction" of all the actions of a person who led to the death of the people introduced to him and who did not even dare to die with them. however, he climbed upward, pushing his elbows). Every second caperang of Her Majesty's Fleet would be at least no worse in his place. Even the Germans had the courage and honesty to either die with their people like Spee or shoot themselves like Langsdorf. And our "peacekeepers" all surrendered to captivity ..... why did they need to cling to eagles on shoulder straps?
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            13 January 2022 11: 00
            +4
            Quote: Niko
            rather, I do not like the "one way" interpretation of all the actions of a person who led to the death of the people introduced to him and did not dare to at least die with them

            He was seriously injured, unconscious. The Japanese then for a long time did not dare to remove the fragments of the skull, they went deep into the head. What more do you want? Or in your opinion, after a heavy defeat, the military leader should shoot? So we would have lost Zhukov in 41, and not only him.
            Quote: Niko
            A careerist, mediocrity, an uninitiated official out of place (however, he climbed up, pushing his elbows). Every second caperang of Her Majesty's Fleet would be at least no worse in his place.

            Excuse me, but you can somehow confirm such a diagnosis? So, in general, Rozhdestvensky's track record is very inspiring, and EMNIP Makarov spoke well of him.
            Quote: Niko
            Even the Germans had the courage and honesty to either die with their people like Spee or shoot themselves like Langsdorf

            Yes, Langsdorf is a particularly striking example here :)))))
            He went into battle against the weakest enemy, managed to lose this battle, destroyed the ship because of a non-existent threat ... Yes, you picked up an excellent example :)))
            1. Niko
              Niko 13 January 2022 12: 32
              -3
              In terms of Langsdorf, "and those like him." It's not about mistakes that even geniuses make, and not about the talent of naval officers, who are now stretching themselves over the mediocre Roger Stersky like an owl on a globe, they say "how he farted beautifully, for sure there is a hidden meaning "It's about the fact that Rozhdestvensky did not have EVEN what any mediocrity and" not a naval commander "can have - honor, conscience, etc. (and about the "severe wounds" tell hundreds of thousands of people who, being wounded, continued to show the above-mentioned good qualities plus valor and courage, and not about the whining admiral who was "seriously wounded" just so that he could be acquitted in court
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                13 January 2022 19: 18
                +4
                Quote: Niko
                and about "severe wounds" tell hundreds of thousands of people who, being wounded, continued to show the above-mentioned good qualities plus valor and courage

                That is, you do not know that Rozhestvensky was seriously wounded with loss of consciousness.
                Quote: Niko
                and not about the whining admiral who was "badly wounded" just so that he could be acquitted in court

                And the fact that no trial over Rozhdestvensky took place, if he himself had not demanded it - too.
                I'm not surprised
                1. Pilat2009
                  Pilat2009 14 January 2022 10: 10
                  +1
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Quote: Niko
                  and about "severe wounds" tell hundreds of thousands of people who, being wounded, continued to show the above-mentioned good qualities plus valor and courage

                  That is, you do not know that Rozhestvensky was seriously wounded with loss of consciousness.
                  Quote: Niko
                  and not about the whining admiral who was "badly wounded" just so that he could be acquitted in court

                  And the fact that no trial over Rozhdestvensky took place, if he himself had not demanded it - too.
                  I'm not surprised

                  For the British, for example, all defeats and shoals are examined by the naval court. For us everything is decided by the Tsar
              2. d_averk
                d_averk 15 January 2022 00: 49
                +1
                In general, until the squadron is defeated, the admiral shoots somehow ... Go to another ship ..
                And then the injury, loss of consciousness. Here you are wrong, these are just some kind of hysterical reproaches.
        2. rytik32
          rytik32 13 January 2022 17: 46
          +1
          Andrew,
          judging by the orders and circulars 2TOE move 1BO was planned at 15 knots, and the entire squadron - at 12 knots.
          Those. the admiral himself did not assess the current breakdowns as capable of reducing the squadron speed.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            13 January 2022 19: 16
            +1
            Quote: rytik32
            Andrew,
            judging by the orders and circulars 2TOE move 1BO was planned at 15 knots, and the entire squadron - at 12 knots.

            Agas. That is, the admiral was going to maneuver at 12-15 knots, but maneuvered at 9. Alexey, you don’t find a logical contradiction in anything here? :)
            You took this from the Madagascar orders, do I understand correctly? :) Didn't you think that after trying to follow these circulars (if it came to that at all), the admiral changed his mind?
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 13 January 2022 20: 23
              -1
              Didn't you think that after trying to follow these circulars (if it even came to that) the admiral changed his mind?

              But Nebogatov then walked at 14 knots.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                13 January 2022 21: 00
                +2
                Or sometimes accelerated to 13. Many opinions
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 13 January 2022 22: 18
                  -1
                  There are 14 knots in the VZh of the Emerald and in the telegram of Fersen.
                  If you have a more reliable source, please let me know.
                  Yes, and according to the speed of the "Eagle" it turns out rather 14 knots.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    14 January 2022 14: 22
                    0
                    Actually, the sources you have already listed are contradictory.
                    Eagle reported that
                    "At night, following in the wake of Nicholas I, several times they brought the number of revolutions of the car to 92."
                    It's not 14 knots all the time.
                    "Walking in the detachment, at night from May 14 to May 15, behind the admiral, they saw that the speed of the detachment did not exceed 12 - 13 knots, which move the Eagle could go without extreme tension" (Shwede)
                  2. d_averk
                    d_averk 15 January 2022 00: 52
                    +2
                    It seemed to me that no one exactly controlled the speed all the time. As Nicholas 1 succeeded in drowning, they kept up with him
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 13 January 2022 09: 43
        +7
        He hadn't planned a breakthrough. He planned to endure. But under Shantung, the Japanese had problems in the form of the Russians, who were really going for a breakthrough. He concluded that "we will shoot and go through with acceptable losses and damage." Therefore, I reached out with the transports. I believe that it is more out of stupidity and my assumptions than deliberately. The result is known ....
        1. d_averk
          d_averk 15 January 2022 00: 56
          +3
          There was a moment in Shantung when Togo collectively drenched Poltava with battleships .. and not only didn’t sink, but didn’t mutilate either!

          Togo at that time did not doze, he immediately increased his speed, and the slender, formidable line of the Japanese was quickly advancing on the Poltava. Midshipman de Livron from the roof of the upper navigational cabin all the time gives the distance: 60, 50, 45, 40 cables - is transmitted through the battery and towers. The enemy is approaching, we are alone, our squadron is far away, and just about all the enemy forces will fall on the Poltava.

          And these forces were formidable: 4 battleships and 3 armored cruisers, they had 12 ~ 16 cm guns, one 10 cm, ten 8 cm and forty-seven 6 cm guns, all this against Poltava.

          Togo walked in open formation, he slowly overtook us, rapidly discharging guns at the Poltava. “Asahi” also passed, followed by the 3-pipe “Shikishima”, she became ahead of the beam, along the beam - “Nissin”, followed by “Kassu-ga” and “Yakumo”.

          The furious fire of the Japanese is almost harmless to Poltava: all the shells with a roar, an ominous howl rush overhead, hit the tops, but occasionally no-no and fall into the stern.

          BUT!

          Shells hitting the tops, which Lutonin quite rightly considers harmless for the Poltava on the day of July 28, 1904, exploded on May 14, 1905, barely hitting these tops, and swept away all life from open spaces.


          And Retvizan, who went "ramming" at the Japanese, and then turned around and left, also quite alive.
    2. Non-fighter
      Non-fighter 13 January 2022 09: 33
      +4
      But the intention of the Russians to pull the transports behind them led to a general squadron move of 9 knots, which actually became the key moment of the defeat.

      War is supply, supply, and possibly fighting. Who will supply the squadron in Vladivostok and repair the combat damage?
      In Vladivostok, the squadron would have a bare coast or so. For each nut brought from central Russia, one would have to fight with "boots", for each nut is a minus cartridge, roughly speaking. For we have one railway for all :(
      Connoisseurs, appreciate the possibility of correcting combat damage without the Kamchatka floating workshop. And at the same time the likelihood that she will be able to independently reach Vladivostok.
      So either we drag the transports with the squadron and go to Vladik with the whole bunch, or the defenseless / with minimal escort will be easily intercepted by the Japanese.
      1. Per se.
        Per se. 13 January 2022 10: 01
        +4
        Quote: Not the fighter
        In Vladivostok, the squadron would have a bare coast or so.
        Most importantly, the war was actually lost. With the loss of Port Arthur, the main point of the 2nd Pacific squadron's campaign was also lost - to unblock the base and reinforce 1 squadron.
        Different opinions are interesting, but, by and large, Rozhestvensky in that situation could only sell the lives of our sailors cheaper or more expensively. As a result, he put the squadron to the glory of the emperor, Nicholas II did not cancel the suicidal breakthrough of the squadron, did not make another decision under the changed situation with the fall of Port Arthur and the death of the 1st Pacific squadron.
        Probably, analyzing the pogrom of Tsushima, one must also understand that this is already a consequence, and not the main reason for the lost war. Was Port Arthur needed, from which a lot of forces and means were plundered and dragged to Dalny, the same question. Maybe it was necessary to immediately make Vladivostok the main base, investing funds there. At the same time, they would not have crushed the forces, they would have a prepared base on their territory, and not a "bare coast".
        1. Non-fighter
          Non-fighter 13 January 2022 10: 51
          +3
          Is Vladivostok port freezing?
          Remarkably, given the fact that our main opponents are located to the south, this is a direct invitation to start a war when the squadron is blocked. This is the beginning of the war. As for Dalny, I agree, it is not clear why it was built at all for the state account.
          Let's go further. The presence in Vladivostok of at least two combat-ready battleships requires its blockade like Port Arthur, otherwise the transportation will be under attack. Will the Japanese cope with such an event? The economy seems to have been very bad for them there. In general, the presence of a less efficient squadron in Vladik is a stronger position for negotiations. Although there they loved everything that was possible, let us recall Count Witte "Polusakhalinsky".
          1. Per se.
            Per se. 13 January 2022 13: 49
            +3
            Quote: Not the fighter
            Is Vladivostok port freezing?
            Now in Vladivostok, our main base of the Pacific Fleet. However, on the subject of Tsushima, as I said earlier, the war was lost, first of all, by the incompetent tsarist leadership, backwardness from the West, dependence on the Anglo-Saxon lobby. The war was first lost on the hills of Manchuria, and the sailors are least to blame here. For many it is "Varyag" and "Korean" a symbol of valor, like "Rurik".

            Bitterness, shame of Tsushima, this is already a natural result, a consequence of the reasons.
            One can involuntarily become a fatalist, but one way or another Tsushima became the forerunner of the February Revolution and the Red October, and with the defeat of the Kwantung Army and the capture of the Kuriles, the already mighty Soviet Union got even with Japan.
            History, as noted, teaches nothing, but it repeats itself. In this "Tsushima" for the country and the fleet under Yeltsin and his followers will also most likely confirm the optimists' thesis, "whatever is done, everything is for the better", in this new, better USSR there will be ...
            1. Non-fighter
              Non-fighter 13 January 2022 18: 42
              +2
              The war was first lost on the hills of Manchuria

              How did the Japanese get there? Teleport? 1 TOE failed the main task - to interfere with the sea transportation of the Japanese.
              Well, the initial landing of troops was overslept, the sudden start of the war.
              But the supply and further delivery of troops by the Japanese was carried out in greenhouse conditions, with the exception of VOK raids.
              1. rytik32
                rytik32 13 January 2022 19: 08
                +3
                1 TOE was objectively weaker than the Japanese fleet.
                It is not clear who believed that our 7 EBR in squadron combat would be stronger than the Japanese 6 + 6. But Bayan and VOK were not created for squadron combat.
                1. Rurikovich
                  Rurikovich 13 January 2022 20: 05
                  +1
                  Quote: rytik32
                  1 TOE was objectively weaker than the Japanese fleet.
                  It is not clear who believed that our 7 EBR in squadron combat would be stronger than the Japanese 6 + 6.

                  Alexey hi It was at that moment in time. We now know that Russian experts in their world, as it were now said, believed that the war would begin no earlier than the 05th year, and by this time it was planned to assemble a squadron of 10 EDBs in the Far East (5 Borodino, Tsesarevich, " Retvizan" and 3 "Peresvet"). Which completely equalized the forces. Well, ours are not to blame that the Japanese thought differently and started earlier, as they wantedrepeat
                  Quote: rytik32
                  But Bayan and VOK were not created for squadron combat.

                  At least the VOK pulled off 4 Kamimura BrKr, therefore, against the 7 EBR of the Russians, it was at the beginning 6 + 2 + 2 (let's add Kasuga and Nissin, which appeared a little later than the start of the war. Well, Bayan was all more stable in battle than the same "Askold" smile
                  1. 27091965
                    27091965 13 January 2022 20: 14
                    +2
                    Quote: Rurikovich
                    believed that the war would begin no earlier than 05, and by that time it was planned to assemble a squadron of 10 EBRs in the Far East (5 Borodino, Tsesarevich, Retvizan and 3 Peresvet).

                    Dear Andrey, according to the admirals, she didn’t equalize; for this, another squadron had to be prepared in the Baltic. The prototype of the future 2TOE.
                2. Non-fighter
                  Non-fighter 14 January 2022 09: 54
                  -1
                  What 1 TOE did in fact Tsushima version 0. They died unable to do ANYTHING !! They couldn't even escape to Vladik.
                  What could be done: bring out the same "Bayan" and "Novik" under the cover of the entire squadron, take a walk and let them be caught. The return is the same under the cover of the whole crowd.
                  Further. The mines killed one Japanese battleship, the second was injured. The fact that he later learned about the drow after the war is still a window of opportunity. While it was being repaired, it was possible to go to the Elliots and throw mines / block them with fireworks.
                  1. Oleg Zorin
                    Oleg Zorin Today, 14: 21
                    0
                    Блестяще! Непонятно только как Витгефт до этого не додумался laughing
              2. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 13 January 2022 20: 14
                +2
                Quote: Not the fighter
                1 TOE failed the main task - to interfere with the sea transportation of the Japanese.

                A consequence of the successful start of the war - 2 new EBRs are torpedoed. It remains to sit and wait at Elliot's, when the Russians, with their 5 remaining battleships (of which 2 with 10 "armament") will climb onto your 6. That's it, you can safely transport the troops request
              3. Per se.
                Per se. 14 January 2022 11: 16
                +2
                Quote: Not the fighter
                How did the Japanese get there? Teleport?


                Manchuria is not literally near Vladivostok, it is a large territory. If General Kuropatkin did not order a prayer service before each battle, but thought more about the art of war, Port Arthur would not have fallen. All significant battles, under Liaoyang, Shahe, Sandep and Mukden, he lost.
                1 TOE failed the main task - to interfere with the sea transportation of the Japanese.
                And here you can connect where and how many naval and repair bases the Japanese have, and the 1 Pacific squadron, which was initially driven into a "mousetrap", blocked in Port Arthur.
                No desire to repeat, thank you for your attention.
              4. d_averk
                d_averk 15 January 2022 01: 01
                -1
                This is where the trouble lies. If the main task was to master the sea, there would be other approaches and other results. Initially chose "cheap" strategy.
            2. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 13 January 2022 23: 48
              +2
              Quote: Per se.
              The war was first lost on the hills of Manchuria, and the sailors are the least to blame here.

              Manchuria is far behind Port Arthur. In order to at least get to Manchuria, the Japanese need to land and capture Korea, land and capture Dalniy from its railway. A Ukrainian will land and put to flight the troops of the Kwantung. And the sailors here turn out to have nothing to do with it .. Just by chance they were there nearby ..
        2. rytik32
          rytik32 13 January 2022 11: 23
          +5
          With the loss of Port Arthur, the main point of the 2nd Pacific squadron's campaign was also lost - to unblock the base and reinforce 1 squadron.

          The most interesting thing is that Kudryavsky has this moment underlined.
          Civilians on Alexander 3, when they set the conditions for contracts, they all wrote ... after arriving in Vladivostok ...
          Those. even before the squadron left, everyone understood that there would be no Port Arthur.

          This guide was played with boats
          1. Maxim G
            Maxim G 13 January 2022 13: 43
            +1
            Well, the letters from 2TOE are creepy, the same Jung.
        3. Pilat2009
          Pilat2009 13 January 2022 13: 20
          +1
          Quote: Per se.
          Quote: Not the fighter
          In Vladivostok, the squadron would have a bare coast or so.
          Most importantly, the war was actually lost. With the loss of Port Arthur, the main point of the 2nd Pacific squadron's campaign was also lost - to unblock the base and reinforce 1 squadron.
          Different opinions are interesting, but, by and large, Rozhestvensky in that situation could only sell the lives of our sailors cheaper or more expensively. As a result, he put the squadron to the glory of the emperor, Nicholas II did not cancel the suicidal breakthrough of the squadron, did not make another decision under the changed situation with the fall of Port Arthur and the death of the 1st Pacific squadron.
          Probably, analyzing the pogrom of Tsushima, one must also understand that this is already a consequence, and not the main reason for the lost war. Was Port Arthur needed, from which a lot of forces and means were plundered and dragged to Dalny, the same question. Maybe it was necessary to immediately make Vladivostok the main base, investing funds there. At the same time, they would not have crushed the forces, they would have a prepared base on their territory, and not a "bare coast".

          Vladivostok is a freezing port. How would you plan to conduct bd in winter?
          1. Per se.
            Per se. 13 January 2022 14: 02
            +1
            Quote: Pilat2009
            Vladivostok is a freezing port. How would you plan to conduct bd in winter?
            Then you will ask why the cruising detachment was kept there, and why then did Rozhestvensky go there with the whole squadron?
            Also, I have already said, I repeat, our main base of the Pacific Fleet is now in Vladivostok. In any case, on the southeastern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, the light did not converge like a wedge, and if they decided to build a fortress and a base there, it was necessary to think a hundred times and play it safe.
            1. Pilat2009
              Pilat2009 13 January 2022 16: 40
              0
              Quote: Per se.
              then Rozhdestvensky went there with the whole squadron?

              Firstly, he went to summer. And secondly, he had nowhere else to go. And about the cruising detachment, you ask Uncle Alexei
            2. Pilat2009
              Pilat2009 14 January 2022 05: 43
              0
              Quote: Per se.
              Quote: Pilat2009
              Vladivostok is a freezing port. How would you plan to conduct bd in winter?
              Then you will ask why the cruising detachment was kept there, and why then did Rozhestvensky go there with the whole squadron?
              Also, I have already said, I repeat, our main base of the Pacific Fleet is now in Vladivostok. In any case, on the southeastern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, the light did not converge like a wedge, and if they decided to build a fortress and a base there, it was necessary to think a hundred times and play it safe.

              The fact that our vmb is there is because there are no other options. Everything freezes there in winter
              1. Alexandra
                Alexandra 15 January 2022 05: 52
                +1
                Do you really think that the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers waited until spring when everything thawed out in order to go out on the first campaign with the outbreak of war?
          2. Alexandra
            Alexandra 15 January 2022 05: 50
            +1
            "A telegram from Port Arthur about the beginning of the war came on the night of January 27. The cruisers were asked, acting with "due courage and caution," to immediately go to sea in order to inflict "a sensitive blow and harm to Japan's communications with Korea and trade." After the morning collection signal - three blank shots and a boat flag raised on the "Russia" - the ships prepared for the campaign. Icebreaker "Nadezhny" broke the ice around the cruisers, and at 13:40 they began to leave the bay.
      2. Niko
        Niko 13 January 2022 10: 26
        +3
        But after the brilliant actions of the "naval commander" there is no need to supply anyone in Vladivostok, there is no squadron - the problem has been resolved
      3. nemoXX
        nemoXX 14 January 2022 09: 40
        -1
        There is an objection! The transports could go to Vladik around Japan, arriving there later 2TOE. That is, they could have been met and protected by it, with a much higher probability of breaking through at 12 nodes. Of course, with a different maneuvering, combat and organization of detachments. In my unenlightened opinion, the 1st BO was supposed to look like 4 Borodino + Oslyabya and Sisoy. 2nd BO - three shooting black powder + 3 BBOs. Cruisers - as a separate detachment, and "Donskoy" and "Monomakh" - maybe even an appendage to the 2nd BO, maneuvering separately and aiming at some "Ivata" to help "Ushakov". I would shoot in pairs or triplets at one target, in volleys, which made it possible to correct the shooting.
    3. Dmitry V.
      Dmitry V. 13 January 2022 13: 47
      -1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      But the intention of the Russians to pull the transports along with them led to a total squadron move of 9 knots, which actually became the key moment of the defeat. At that moment in time, Rozhestvensky really intended to endure even at such a speed that it was his mistake.

      Exactly. I took it off my tongue. Squadron speed was limited by transports.
    4. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 13 January 2022 23: 42
      +3
      Quote: Rurikovich
      At that point in time, Rozhdestvensky really intended to endure even at such a speed, which became his mistake.

      If Rozhdestvensky really planned to "endure", he would have begun preparing for this in advance. For example, taking care of increasing the survivability of their ships before the battle. In reality, as we know, the opposite is true. He not only scored with coal, but also demanded to fill it with water, so that they would certainly drown. Did not use the Rozhdestvensky head. He ate in it.
  4. Daniil Konovalenko
    Daniil Konovalenko 13 January 2022 08: 16
    +4
    "O field, field, who dotted you with broken feathers? Filled you with ink?"
  5. mmaxx
    mmaxx 13 January 2022 09: 00
    +5
    I remember Chistyakov's article very well. Unlike all articles on VO on this topic, it is written with emotions and signs of elementary manipulation. The author clearly lacked reasons. For example, he denied the problems of "Oslyabi" during the rebuilding of the 1st detachment. Like, I figured it out, and it couldn't be.
    Even then, all these things were surprising. Moreover, now there is evidence that Togo just wanted to destroy the flagship. He had an example. The rationale for the desire to fight on countercourses is also completely incomprehensible. Generally incomprehensible. Fly along and incapacitate the oldies? What for? At an overall speed of 24-25 knots?
    But a simple desire to be out of the wind for some reason is not justification. Six-inch Japanese (i.e. English) battleships were flooded. Even on the leeward side, the casemate was flooded with waves. The entire course of the battle does not in any way confirm the desire to fight the old ships. Togo found the Russian squadron, went out in the head and hollowed out the head.
    Yes, and the main message - a quarter of an hour for Russian cannons - is unconvincing. If Rozhestvensky counted on 12-13 knots, it would still be possible to agree.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 January 2022 09: 21
      +4
      Quote: mmaxx
      For example, he denied the problems of "Oslyabi" during the rebuilding of the 1st detachment. Like, I figured it out, and it couldn't be.

      This is not a "quarter of an hour", but later publications :)
      Quote: mmaxx
      The rationale for the desire to fight on countercourses is also completely incomprehensible. Generally incomprehensible. Fly along and incapacitate the oldies? What for?

      Look at the number of heavy guns on them - and everything will become clear.
      Quote: mmaxx
      But a simple desire to be out of the wind for some reason is not justification.

      And who prevented from initially taking such a position? Togo knew everything about the movement of the Russian squadron
      Quote: mmaxx
      The entire course of the battle does not in any way confirm the desire to fight the old ships.

      Naturally, she did not walk in a separate column.
      Quote: mmaxx
      Togo found the Russian squadron, went out in the head and hollowed out the head.

      Substituting Kamimura under the guns of the "oldies", and if 3TOE could shoot ...
      Quote: mmaxx
      Yes, and the main message - a quarter of an hour for Russian cannons - is unconvincing. If Rozhestvensky counted on 12-13 knots, it would still be possible to agree.

      These things are completely unrelated
      1. mmaxx
        mmaxx 13 January 2022 10: 24
        0
        Well, we differ in views here. And we can write to each other the same thing many times. wink drinks
        And so thanks for the warm-up.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          13 January 2022 11: 01
          +6
          Quote: mmaxx
          Well, we differ in views here

          So yes :) Yes, and God bless him drinks
  6. Dmitry V.
    Dmitry V. 13 January 2022 13: 42
    +5
    The "sofa" experts came together in a fierce battle for a long-lost battle ...

    In Japan, obviously no one crosses keyboards in a fierce argument - they won and there are no questions.

    And how many generations of "losers" are haunted by the question "why"?
    And everyone has known for a long time that there is no definite answer - there are even worse trained artillerymen and shells and bad maneuvering and "the appendage of samotopes."

    No successful or unsuccessful maneuvering would have saved the second Pacific squadron from defeat - too many negative factors converged at one point in time.
  7. Undecim
    Undecim 13 January 2022 14: 03
    +10
    I have already said many times and will not tire of repeating that any schemes of naval battles, drawings of eyewitnesses, etc. abound in many different errors and cannot serve as a source of accurate analysis.

    So, for example, to this day, despite the many sources from both the Japanese and the Russian side, it is impossible to establish reliably either the distance or the course angle to the Mikasa from the flagship Russian battleship Suvorov. But to visualize the general pattern of maneuvering, such schemes can sometimes still be used.

    A sacramental phrase, which is the essence of the author's research. That is, the primary sources compiled by direct participants or with their participation cannot serve as a basis for analysis, but the endless movements of a spherical horse in a vacuum, based on information received from ... eleventh hands, than numerous authors, including the author of today's article studying for a long time (and not going to stop) - this is the basis of the foundations of accurate analysis.
    I will specifically give an example of a similar parsing of the Togo loop from one of the Japanese Tsushima sites. True, real sailors are practicing there, not sofa ones, therefore the approach is somewhat different - the basis is just the primary sources - maps, diagrams and other information from "Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji (in 1904-1905) / compiled by the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. "
    I will not cite the text, only the schemes for determining the very "distances" and "course angles", only for the artillerymen of "Mikasa".

    [Center]

    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 January 2022 14: 44
      +5
      Here it is

      Also the original source
      And here it is

      Also the original source
      So what you quoted
      Quote: Undecim
      sailors are real

      They are engaged in choosing a certain version that seems to them the most correct (out of many mutually contradictory others) and, further, calculate it in detail.
      How am I different? At least I honestly report that the exact data is unknown, respectively, all these schemes are here.

      They may be true, they may not be entirely true, or they may not be true at all.
      That's all
  8. sevtrash
    sevtrash 13 January 2022 16: 30
    +1
    The author wants to say that Rozhdestvensky performed a brilliant act - he fooled Togo himself and thwarted his planned attack. Using the author's methodology, we can say that in the 1st phase of the 2nd period of the Tsushima battle, in the third movement, Rozhdestvensky defeated Togo. For some reason, the battle didn't end there. Strange, of course.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 13 January 2022 19: 29
      +6
      Quote: sevtrash
      It's strange, of course.

      Why is it strange. In fact, yes, Rozhdestvensky broke the battle plan of Togo. Then, according to the logic of the Russians, they had to shoot for several hours and, with acceptable losses, go to Vladivostok. BUT! Who knew that the Japanese would not fight at 9 knots in parallel columns! In the end, yes, tactically, the Russians, albeit with jambs, but rebuilt and then ... And then they made themselves felt an advantage in speed, in rate of fire, in the ability of Japanese shells to inflict unacceptable damage before the Russians, which led to a loss of combat effectiveness of key ships and a decrease fire efficiency. Then Tsushima happened. For more than one year, we have been trying at VO to achieve objectivity when considering certain nuances of the defeat of the Russians in the RYA (especially Tsushima). Yes, they did, but the shells did not cause the necessary damage to the enemy, the speed was lower, which led to a decrease in the variability in decision-making. Yes, the armor held a blow, but it did not make sense, because during a long battle, quantity turned into quality and, according to the theory of probability, which thread the next projectile would find a weak point, which would lead to a loss of the ship's combat capability (or controllability). In these main aspects we were weaker than the Japanese. And one fanatical desire to sell a soul at a higher price will not go far. You cannot leave, because the enemy is faster, you cannot change tactics, because the enemy is faster and parries your actions with his own. And you realize that you lost at the stage of preparation for the battle. Your ships are not as fast as the enemy's and your guns shoot slower than the enemy's. All this was enough ... request
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 13 January 2022 23: 38
        +1
        Quote: Rurikovich
        All this was enough.

        All this was known before the battle itself. A more experienced enemy, crews that have gone through more than one battle, close to their bases, etc. etc. What did Rozhdestvensky do, certainly understanding the advantages of the Japanese fleet? Hoped that 2TOE would be recalled back? They didn't call back, so what? Folded paws? Nord-Ost 23 and maybe break through, that's his choice. It wasn't enough for more. You can, of course, think up and attribute to him "brilliant" solutions, which, probably, would be surprising to him. But Rozhdestvensky lost long before the battle, when he was actually "going with the flow". There was not enough courage and enterprise to do something that could change the inevitability of defeat. Were there options? Of course they were. Stay in Cam Ranh, or, as Clapier-de-Colong wrote, in the Chusan archipelago. There was also the La Perouse Strait. Nebogatov and his headquarters assumed active operations by a cruising detachment near the Korea Strait to divert the attention of the main forces of the Japanese fleet, send their main forces to the La Perouse Strait and considered it quite possible to load coal and follow this strait according to weather conditions. Enquist considered the route around Japan more prudent. The allocation of a "fast detachment" for active operations would imply extraordinary efforts to develop the strategy and tactics of all the forces of the 2TOE in the face of opposition from a stronger enemy. Rozhdestvensky preferred a different plan. More precisely, its absence, since there was no plan - both Enquist and Nebogatov spoke about this, and not only them. How can you evaluate Rozhdestvensky? He did not have the courage to reverse the course of events, he himself survived, but more than 5 people died, three dozen ships were sunk or captured.
    2. Oleg Zorin
      Oleg Zorin Today, 14: 38
      0
      У Вас явный когнитивный диссонанс.
  9. 27091965
    27091965 13 January 2022 17: 22
    +7
    The fact is that any of his plan of attack, even with a counter-course, even with a “loop”, was thwarted by an exit to the head of the squadron of the 1st armored detachment of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

    Dear Andrey. Tsushima is an indicator of the general state of industry, education, qualifications of workers, engineers, training of all military personnel and leaders of the country, therefore all actions of Z. P. Rozhestvensky are just weak attempts to do something.
    You asked a question about hits, the developers were of the opinion of 2,5-3 percent, the middlemen were 1-1,5 percent. At the same time, the intermediaries believed that the shooting would be carried out with armor-piercing shells. By the way, one of the mediators was ZP Rozhestvensky. As for Tsushima, it seems to me that Admiral NI Nebogatov said very well, it sounds like this;

    " You can not impose on the dog what is available to the horse and vice versa.."

    I will give you one more statement belongs to it Admiral A. A. Birilyov, he, like Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, if I’m not mistaken in my opinion, commanded the Training and Artillery Detachment of the Baltic Fleet for four years, so this is what he said when determining the balance of forces between the Japanese and Russian fleets;

    ".....Yes, we have a combat coefficient, we have our own "Russian coefficient" and this coefficient says "strength is not in strength, strength is in determination."..... "04 December 1904.

    This is what we were going to fight, battleships, cruisers, guns, shells and preparation are all secondary. The main thing " Russian coefficient ".
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 January 2022 19: 11
      +3
      My respect, dear Igor! hi
      Quote: 27091965i
      Dear Andrey. Tsushima is an indicator of the general state of industry, education, qualifications of workers, engineers, training of all military personnel and leaders of the country, therefore all actions of Z. P. Rozhestvensky are just weak attempts to do something.

      And there is. Actually, I once "hacked" on the topic of Tsushima, that it was not necessary to hang all the dogs on him alone - he initially had few opportunities, but he did a lot. Yes, Rozhdestvensky is not a genius, and he had enough mistakes, but he was a good admiral, clearly above average among our others. He did something well, he tried to do something well, but they didn’t let him, and now all this has been forgotten, and all the dogs were hung on him, which I don’t like
      Quote: 27091965i
      "You can not assign to the dog what is available to the horse and vice versa."

      That's for sure. But in the place of Rozhdestvensky, if anyone could do it, only a genius of the level of Ushakov, such people are born once every hundred years, and then not every one. Yes, and about Ushakov, I doubt it, to be honest. As far as I remember, he didn’t have any problems with the training of commanders, as much as he needed, he spent so much on it. Although I could be wrong here, in the sailing fleet I am very so-so.
      Quote: 27091965i
      It turns out that we were going to fight, battleships, cruisers, guns, shells and training are all secondary. The main thing is the "Russian coefficient".

      And I would be glad to object, but there is nothing ...
      1. 27091965
        27091965 13 January 2022 19: 41
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        That's for sure. But in the place of Rozhestvensky, if anyone could have coped, so only the genius of Ushakov's level, such are born once in a hundred years and then not in every

        It seems to me that after the Russo-Japanese War, I mean 1905-1907, the admirals' thoughts did not change much. You wrote in a previous article that ZP Rozhestvensky did not know plans for the actions of the fleet in the Far East, this is not so. All plans were based on the "games" of the Nikolaev Academy, the details, but he might not know, but after the war this issue was raised and the admirals expressed that plans for a separate theater of military operations should be developed on the spot and the details of these plans should not be sent to St. Petersburg. So the views have not changed much. But the training program, the development of new types of ships had to change. The throwing of our diplomats between France and Germany led to the fact that the types of future ships were chosen not according to the best projects, but according to political preferences.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          13 January 2022 19: 45
          +2
          You wrote in a previous article that ZP Rozhestvensky did not know plans for the actions of the fleet in the Far East, this is not so. All plans were based on the "games" of the Nikolaev Academy, details, but he might not know

          Sorry, but from the game to the plan ... the distance, so to speak, is enormous. These are generally two different categories.
          Quote: 27091965i
          but after the war this question was raised and the admirals expressed that plans for a separate theater of military operations should be developed on the spot and the details of these plans should not be sent to St. Petersburg. So the views have not changed much.

          I looked from a different viewpoint: there is no point in blaming Rozhestvensky for preparing the ITOE and the war plan if he had nothing to do with it.
          1. 27091965
            27091965 13 January 2022 19: 54
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Sorry, but from the game to the plan ... the distance, so to speak, is enormous. These are generally two different categories.

            Andrey, let me send you a report on these "games" by mail, in it the calculations are "cut off", and if you have not read them, compare them with the actions of 1 TOE, edition of 1903 in my opinion.
        2. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 13 January 2022 20: 40
          +1
          Quote: 27091965i
          The throwing of our diplomats between France and Germany led to the fact that the types of future ships were chosen not according to the best projects, but according to political preferences.

          Why politically ... The cruiser was chosen well for the prototype of the series - the German Bogatyr. And they were not elected politically. Cloned just failed. They chose it based on the TTZ of the cruiser for the Pacific Fleet - and it assumed a speed of 23 knots. "Bayan" was generally built for the Baltic Fleet as a search for a way to develop a cruiser. Of the two proposed battleships, the French "Tsesarevich" was chosen for the prototype. And I will not say that it was a bad project. SK tower artillery (subsequently everyone will switch to SK tower artillery) with strong longitudinal fire (on paper). "Boyarin" was built for political reasons, so a solid ship turned out. Unlike the leader...
          1. 27091965
            27091965 13 January 2022 21: 16
            +1
            Quote: Rurikovich
            The cruiser was chosen well for the prototype of the series - the German Bogatyr. And they were not elected politically. Cloned just failed. They chose it based on the TTZ of the cruiser for the Pacific Fleet - and it assumed a speed of 23 knots.

            By that time, the point of view had already been developed in the fleets of the world that the reconnaissance officer in the squadron should be with a displacement of 3000-4000 tons, the Bogatyr cruisers are very good to confront the Japanese cruisers, but if you look in relation to other fleets, you can see that in the French the reconnaissance detachment consisted of armored cruisers; in the English fleet, in cases of war, armored cruisers were also supposed to escort the squadron and reconnaissance. The reform launched by Admiral Fisher simply put an end to these cruisers. In cases of war with England, they could no longer carry out full-fledged intelligence. For the war with Japan, I repeat, they corresponded, but with England no longer. The ship is built for service for more than one year.
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 13 January 2022 21: 54
              0
              Quote: 27091965i
              cruisers "Bogatyr" to confront the cruisers of Japan are very good

              So they were built to confront Japan, for the needs of the Far East smile
              Quote: 27091965i
              By that time, in the fleets of the world, a point of view had already been developed that a reconnaissance officer with a squadron should have a displacement of 3000-4000 tons,

              So the Novik with pebbles corresponded to this - quite successful ships for serving with the squadron: both for reconnaissance and for operations with destroyers yes
              I don't see any contradictions. The only catch is in the development of the armored cruiser to the REV. But these are the problems of shying from side to side of a too bureaucratic state system. And while digging with armored raiders with the British, the Japanese simply built a series of squadron cruisers with similar characteristics, which allowed them to use these ships in line if necessary. So the big ocean raiders in the battle on August 1.08.1904, XNUMX with the Japanese squadron cruisers saved the size. Well, except for "Rurik" .... hi
              1. 27091965
                27091965 13 January 2022 23: 15
                +1
                Quote: Rurikovich
                So they were built to confront Japan, for the needs of the Far East

                This is just the name of the program, I think you understand that the types of ships to replenish the fleet were determined.
                the Japanese simply built a series of squadron cruisers with similar characteristics, which allowed them, if necessary, to use these ships in line

                Much has been written on the topic of the reasons that led to the appearance of these and similar ships, unfortunately in foreign publications. This is a very interesting topic of revising the concept of action for both individual and squadrons of armored cruisers.
                But these are the problems of shying from side to side of a too bureaucratic state system

                I completely agree with this, but in my opinion the armored cruiser O'Higgins was the most suitable instead of armored decks, although its speed qualities did not much correspond to the views of the admirals.
          2. d_averk
            d_averk 15 January 2022 20: 27
            0
            The concept was good, but the solutions were not worked out. Alas, this happens with rapid development (
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 January 2022 19: 19
      +2
      Quote: 27091965i
      developers held the opinion of 2,5-3 percent, intermediaries 1-1,5 percent.

      Well, if we take only heavy shells - then yes, it is underestimated, and if we take into account the six-inch shells - I was not much mistaken
  10. Sneaky Urus
    Sneaky Urus 13 January 2022 18: 59
    +1
    Gorgeous article. Respect to the author. Zadolbal Klimushka nervously smokes on the sidelines.
  11. Boris1812
    Boris1812 13 January 2022 19: 54
    +7
    Dear Andrey, I read all your articles on the site with great interest. According to Rozhdestvensky, I do not agree with your position, because. in my opinion, he did not do what even the average admiral should have done before the battle, namely:
    1) Give a clear order to prepare ships for battle (maximum possible unloading, elimination of combustible items, etc.)
    2) He dragged the transports behind him to break through (it is clear that without them it would have been difficult in Vladik, but you still have to reach Vladik and this is the main task, and the transports were definitely fettered in battle)
    3) He did not gather the commanders of the ships before the battle and did not try to give a certain moral impulse and talk out his battle plan, because even every soldier must understand his maneuver, and the commanders of the ships for sure, while you cannot describe everything on paper, and just a conversation in a calm, confident tone would give people extra confidence.
    4) Speed ​​- I didn’t even try to determine how fast a squadron could actually go, and speed is one of the most key elements of the battle, while with a speed difference of 6 knots it is extremely difficult to fight for the slow side. I have been playing Jane's naval tactical games for many years, and I can say from my own experience that even evading the enemy's lapel coverage with such a difference in speeds would hardly work. At a speed of 12 knots, the picture would be different, Rozhdestvensky had to understand this.
    5) The morale of the squadron: most of the memoirs say that Rozhdestvensky literally twitched the commanders of the ships.
    6) An unforgivable mistake during the rebuilding maneuver, in one of the previous articles you wrote that the commander of Oslyabi could easily fix it, but it seems to me that this is not so, since he could not turn either to the right (to Borodino) or to the left, i.e. because in this case, he took out all the aft artillery from the firing sector when the battle started. The only thing he could do was slow down, which he did.
    I don’t believe that it would be possible to win the fight by doing all this, but Rozhdestvensky was simply obliged to do it all. The conclusion is simple: Rozhdestvensky is a bad admiral and his share of guilt in Tsushima is not small.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      14 January 2022 14: 12
      +1
      Good day, dear Boris!
      Quote: Boris1812
      1) Give a clear order to prepare ships for battle (maximum possible unloading, elimination of combustible items, etc.)

      Agree partially. Rozhdestvensky really could throw something overboard, but hardly enough for it to have any significant effect on the speed. For an armadillo, even 250-300 tons will not give a big profit. But he did the main thing - he guessed so that the coal reserves for the battle were enough for the battle and the passage to Vladivostok, and nothing more.
      As for the liquidation of combustible objects, yes, it has not been done.
      Quote: Boris1812
      2) He dragged the transports behind him to break through (it is clear that without them it would have been difficult in Vladik, but you still have to reach Vladik and this is the main task, and the transports were definitely fettered in battle)

      I can't agree. Transports did not fetter Rozhdestvensky in battle. He did not put transports in the battle formation of his main forces and could control the latter as he saw fit. Simply put, the battle is a "dance", the main forces maneuver, regularly changing courses. Thus, it is possible to move at 15 knots, but at the same time move towards Vladivostok at 7-8 knots, while low-speed transports, following at a distance, having a speed of 9 knots, can go constantly NO23 and even overtake "15-knot » main forces:)
      In addition, transports are a tasty target for the armored cruisers of the Japanese, in which they had a great advantage in numbers. Thus, one could count on diverting their attention from the main forces and linking them with our cruisers in battle. Again, Donskoy and Monomakh were clearly not suitable for cruising due to their low speed, but they could protect transports.
      In view of the foregoing, and the obvious usefulness of vehicles in Vladivostok, I do not consider taking them with me a mistake
      Quote: Boris1812
      3) He did not gather the commanders of the ships before the battle and did not try to give a certain moral impulse and talk out his battle plan, because even every soldier must understand his maneuver, and the commanders of the ships for sure, while you cannot describe everything on paper, and just a conversation in a calm, confident tone would give people extra confidence.

      I agree. If I were in the place of Rozhdestvensky, I would definitely collect them
      Quote: Boris1812
      4) Speed ​​​​- I didn’t even try to determine how fast the squadron could actually go

      Here I cannot agree. You will remember the shooting near Madagascar - every shooting, then breakdowns. First, "Eagle", then - "Borodino" and again "Eagle" ... Simply put, the squadron during transitions, having 9 knots, constantly encountered breakdowns in the CMU of one or another ship. What are the tests? What to experience? You can order to give, say, 12 knots for half a day, and let's say it even works out. And tomorrow - someone will break again at the front 7-9 knots.
      In general, you proceed from the fact that the squadron could go at high speed, but Rozhdestvensky did not determine at what speed. And I'm talking about the fact that it broke down constantly at low speed.
      Quote: Boris1812
      5) The morale of the squadron: most of the memoirs say that Rozhdestvensky literally twitched the commanders of the ships.

      Both agree and disagree. Most of the memoirs, unfortunately, do not mention the colossal apathy of these same commanders, who were so lack of initiative that Rozhdestvensky had to rearrange their legs regularly. If the admiral doesn't say anything, nothing will be done.
      Rozhdestvensky is from a breed of authoritarian commanders, such as they respect and are afraid of, and slobs are afraid without any respect. This is an acceptable leadership style, although I personally like Makarov much more. But I have seen authoritarian people achieve great things.
      But behind their backs, their subordinates slandered terribly, and told soooo ....
      Quote: Boris1812
      6) An unforgivable mistake during the rebuilding maneuver, in one of the previous articles you wrote that the commander Oslyabi could easily fix it, but it seems to me that this is not so,

      Just don’t forget, please, that on the morning of the same day, Rozhdestvensky rebuilt the squadron into battle formation with exactly the same maneuver (they went 9 knots, the column going to the head gave 11 knots and reorganized). Only he brought out not the 1st armored, but the entire 2TOE in the head of Nebogatov. The maneuver took about an hour and was completely successful - there were no problems there.
      Here, for about half an hour, he rebuilt the 1st armored ship, that is, half the number of ships in half the time. But for some reason problems arose. Here I admit Rozhdestvensky’s mistake rather from the position that the squadron commander is responsible for everything, including the mistakes of his subordinates, and not because he did something very wrong.
      He could, seeing how the 1st armored was being rebuilt, to reduce the speed a little earlier, for example. Here a lot of peaks were broken on the topic that they say the armadillo has great inertia and cannot, etc .... Thank God, our sailors did not know about all this, and managed to respond to a much more significant threat - when Oslyabya braked sharply, without even warning the matelots, they had enough time to take the necessary measures and avoid a collision. Despite the fact that they had several times less time to react than the Oslyaby commander, who watched the maneuver of the Borodino four for almost half an hour and could assess how it threatened him
      Quote: Boris1812
      The conclusion is simple: Christmas bad admiral and his share of the blame in Tsushima is not small.

      Well, I'm sorry I couldn't convince you. hi
  12. Soldatov V.
    Soldatov V. 13 January 2022 20: 05
    -1
    A very good article, specific but well understood for specialists and amateurs of the fleet.
    What I would like to point out. All ship commanders and commanding admirals graduated from the Naval Corps.
    Then and now in military schools they study the battles and defeats of the Russian army and navy. Richest experience. Why Rozhdestvensky did not use it. I apologize why he stupidly went forward in two columns. I understand the sailing fleet, the wind, the current. But they are all mechanical. Yes, the speeds are different, but they could be divided by speed and formed some kind of floating citadel from low-speed ships and it was possible to maneuver high-speed ships around.
    The problem is in the logistics of the feudal tsarist system. Rozhdestvensky was appointed squadron commander, Leader, and no one dared to contradict him. And he didn’t invite anyone to brainstorm.
    So the king lost his throne, all by himself.
    What else is the problem? Crew training. On the one hand, saving ammunition, on the other hand, the reluctance to tediously engage in crew training every day. These problems still exist.
    They brag that everyone, well, almost all contractors. And God forbid, the losses will begin to be large, who will replace them?
    Whom we will send to reserve ships or new ones.
    I don’t believe that the Japanese had all the ships completely new and with thick armor.
    Could have won soldier
    1. nemoXX
      nemoXX 14 January 2022 10: 34
      +1
      "The problem is in the logistics of the feudal tsarist system ..." - absolutely true! As the historian I. Bunich aptly noted, "... the fleet of the 19th century came out to fight against the fleet of the 20th century." Russia, with the "nationwide" denial of this fact, is the "legal successor" of the Horde's lawlessness with the "drag and don't let go" mentality. The sovereign, the house manager Bunsha, commanded "to knock the Crimean Khan off the Izyum Way" and the servant army marched where it was ordered. And whatever the collapse, defeat and ruin, there will be no conclusions or punishment for the "organizers and inspirers of our victories". You couldn't even think about the modernization of society and a change in mentality! Which means, among other things and taking into account the basic instinct of "gathering lands" - new Port Arthur and Tsushims - to be. Russia could not win in Tsushima. To reduce the war to any acceptable result, avoiding the Tsushima defeat - could well.
    2. d_averk
      d_averk 15 January 2022 20: 22
      +1
      And God forbid, the losses will begin to be large, who will replace them?
      Whom we will send to reserve ships or new ones.


      Scolded himself.
  13. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 13 January 2022 23: 19
    +4
    It should be noted that the so-called version of Chistyakov was rejected and buried a long time ago, as sheer nonsense. However, our friend from Chelyabinsk still wanted to dig up her remains for some reason. Probably to pick up some raisins (or worms) in favor of your favorite theory about the infallible Admiral Rozhdestvensky. wink

    Well, let's dig a little.
    So, for example, to this day, despite the many sources from both the Japanese and Russian sides, it is not possible to reliably establish either the distance or the heading angle on the Mikasa from the flagship Russian battleship Suvorov.

    This is not a conspiracy. This is a direct consequence of the technological backwardness of the era. The armadillo had neither a gyrocompass nor a built-in log. The speed was estimated approximately by the revolutions of the car. Well, the course of the magnetic compass during excitement showed very approximately, guess the rhumb and that achievement! And even after attaching a ruler to the map, the commander pointed out with pathos - course NO23! The helmsman, of course, nodded, well, and turned - somewhere there! So they swam.

    We reliably know the parameters of the convergence: the Japanese went to NO 67, and the Russians - NO 23, so the squadrons converged at an angle of 44 degrees.

    Well .. Andrey from Chelyabinsk also wrote this. Literally a couple of paragraphs below the top of his statement. He knows how. tongue

    Let's get back to the points though:
    H. Togo had an overwhelming superiority in speed and could implement it in the best possible way, putting the "crossing T" to the Russian squadron in the very beginning of the battle. Approximately as shown by the red line on the fragment of the diagram.

    The very first and most ridiculous thesis however. Turn Togo along the red arrow and Suvorov, with a simple turn to the right, took the battle to counter courses at full speed. When you try to turn around then "all of a sudden" Togo immediately substitutes his weakest ships under Borodino. There is no smell of "crossing-T" here, nothing even similar to the planned concentration of fire in such a scheme shines.

    In continuation of thesis number 1
    H. Togo’s mistake in the battle on July 28 in the Yellow Sea was not a discrepancy with the Russian squadron in a counter-course as such, but that soon after this discrepancy he lagged behind the Russian squadron by about 10 miles.

    But Togo didn’t even know that he needed a Russian squadron! I decided to take a break, to fish in the muddy Yellow Sea! Has the author heard about the fact that a more or less controlled turn takes time? At the same time, Witgeft is in full swing, not even paying attention to Sevastopol, which is a few miles behind .. And the visibility at Tsushima is only 6-7 miles, let me remind you that in the middle of the battle Togo still lost the Russian squadron in the haze when trying to turn around as expected. I searched for almost an hour, it was good that I kept to the north, obviously on the path of Rozhdestvensky.

    Thesis number 2.
    Assuming that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky does not have time to reorganize into a single wake column before the start of fire contact, Kh. Togo abandoned his decision to put a “stick over T” and moved to the left side of the Russian squadron in order to attack and quickly defeat its relatively weak, left column of warships, led by Oslyabey.

    It was reasonable to assume that Rozhdestvensky was going to go further in two columns. For half a day, the ZPR walked with contact with the enemy, but did not consider it necessary to take a battle formation. But then the question is for the author - why did our Andrey decide that the phrase "attack the lead ships of the left column" means precisely "defeat the left column"? Togo goes towards the enemy, he still needs to turn around on a passing course to implement that very concentration of fire .. In such a situation, it is logical to take advantage of the enemy’s ridiculous formation and turn around from the side of the left, weak column, covering it from a stronger detachment and attack both Russian flagships building a "crossing-T" for both Russian columns.

    Yes, Rozhdestvensky caught himself and rushed in the last minutes to rebuild the detachments, turning the squadron into a heap and temporarily withdrawing the 2nd and 3rd detachments from the battle. Well, here Togo does not lose anything, since ZPR himself set up Borodintsev for him under concentrated fire, having solved half the task for the Japanese.

    Secondly, because a fixed pivot point makes it much easier to zero in on ships passing through it.

    But, having aimed at the ship passing through the turning point, it would be easy for the Russian artillerymen in the future to transfer fire to another ship passing through it.

    But this is an obvious blunder of our "expert". The author forgets that the Russian ship itself is also moving, and at a decent speed. This means that the virtual point always goes somewhere, and without an external reference point in the form of an enemy ship, there is no simplification of sighting. For each next enemy at the turning point, you still need to shoot from scratch. Well, or shoot into the white light for good luck ..

    It turned out to be a bit long, but I hope I managed to explain why Chistyakov's version was rejected and buried as ridiculous.
    1. finnbogi
      finnbogi 14 January 2022 01: 39
      +2
      It was reasonable to assume that Rozhdestvensky was going to go further in two columns. For half a day, the ZPR walked with contact with the enemy, but did not consider it necessary to take a battle formation. But then the question is for the author - why did our Andrey decide that the phrase "attack the lead ships of the left column" means precisely "defeat the left column"? Togo goes towards the enemy, he still needs to turn around on a passing course to implement that very concentration of fire .. In such a situation, it is logical to take advantage of the enemy’s ridiculous formation and turn around from the side of the left, weak column, covering it from a stronger detachment and attack both Russian flagships building a "crossing-T" for both Russian columns.

      Yes, Rozhdestvensky caught himself and rushed in the last minutes to rebuild the detachments, turning the squadron into a heap and temporarily withdrawing the 2nd and 3rd detachments from the battle. Well, here Togo does not lose anything, since ZPR himself set up Borodintsev for him under concentrated fire, having solved half the task for the Japanese.

      in my opinion, it is often underestimated that Togo WANTED to go at medium distances in order to defeat the enemy, Togo was ready for an artillery duel on such conditions

      The loop of Togo can therefore be interpreted by the result, and the result of the fact that Togo began to turn to the left side was that Rozhestvensky did not actually change course sharply, in fact Rozhdestvensky continued to go into the trap, now turning to the right side (and thus completing the loop) Togo received the opportunity to make a wand and Rozhdestvensky's natural attempt to turn to the right now led to an artillery duel on parallel courses and a distance at which Togo expected decisive results.


      Well, Rozhdestvensky turns out to obediently follow Togo's maneuvers, but he also aggravated everything with his construction and then an unsuccessful rebuilding.
      1. d_averk
        d_averk 15 January 2022 03: 32
        0
        Moreover, the Japanese were classically stronger on parallel courses.

        For 15 years we learned to shoot on countertacks, while the Japanese systematized in shooting on the same course and constant distance. On January 27, the battle showed that on the countertack, with a quick change in distance, the accuracy of the Japanese is close to zero, while ours is increasing. Then everyone recognized that with our primitive sights and in terms of the number of shells, it is more profitable for us to fight at short distances.
      2. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 15 January 2022 18: 10
        -1
        Quote: finnbogi
        in my opinion, it is often underestimated that Togo WANTED to go at medium distances in order to defeat the enemy, Togo was ready for an artillery duel on such conditions

        Exactly! In the Yellow Sea, Togo became convinced that it was problematic to cause serious damage to the enemy at long distances; at the end of the battle, he had to sharply reduce the distance. Close combat Togo is not needed, here he will lose the advantage in training gunners and the Russians will gain an advantage due to armor-piercing shells. Because it is the middle distance!

        Togo certainly took risks in this loop. But he risked precisely in the sense that Klimov wrote about, like many officers of the fleet a hundred years ago. Attack the Russians at the moment of the turn and there is nothing to repel the attack of Togo, half of the squadron is in the second line, immediately instead of concentrating fire, a duel is obtained, and at distances unpleasantly close to the Japanese.
  14. Pushkowed
    Pushkowed 14 January 2022 04: 35
    +1
    however, the question of why H. Togo showed up not to the left, but to the right of the Russian forces, in this case remains open
    Meanwhile, this issue is very important.
    1. Japanese scouts are watching the Russian squadron. Rozhdestvensky consciously does not interfere.
    2. Rozhdestvensky is in two columns. The strongest ships (and Rozhdestvensky himself) are on the right.
    3. Togo wants to attack the left column, however appears on the right.
    4. Togo is forced to maneuver to take a position to attack the left, the weakest column.
    5. Rozhdestvensky parried. AND almost managed to reorganize into one column.
    6. Togo is forced to turn the loop. The rest is known.

    If Togo wanted to attack the left column, then the most logical step on his part would be:
    A. Appear to the left of the Russian squadron and
    B. Immediately collapse with all your might on the left column on the counter courses.
    In this case, no rebuilding of Rozhdestvensky would have helped... He simply would not have time to do anything. But his 1st armored detachment would have been covered from Japanese fire by the dying ships of the left column. Which, moreover, could not turn away from the enemy, tk. there would be a threat of collision with Rozhdestvensky's ships.

    However, Togo somehow appeared on the right. Why?!

    The simplest assumption is a plotting error. Well, I didn't calculate a little. It happens. Then he corrected himself, albeit at the cost of a risky maneuver (the same loop).

    Could Rozhdestvensky have foreseen this mistake? And build your cunning plan (rebuilding at the last moment) based on the inevitability of the appearance of the Japanese, namely to the right? The questions are rhetorical. Of course he couldn't.

    And here very unpleasant questions arise as to what kind of cunning plan actually was at Rozhdestvensky? Let's remember that he was going to
    ... to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships
    How many is a few?

    So:
    1. Rozhdestvensky singles out the 4 strongest (and fastest) battleships in a separate detachment ("fast wing");
    2. This fast wing runs in a separate right column;
    3. Rozhdestvensky does not interfere with Japanese intelligence;
    4. Togo quite reasonably decided to unleash the first crushing blow on the weaker (albeit more numerous) left column.
    5. If Togo did immediately as he wanted, the left column would have perished, but the right one (together with the precious body of Rozhdestvensky himself) would have been covered from Japanese fire by the perishing left column.
    6. In addition, at the beginning of the battle, the right column would serve as a "detachment" to prevent the left column from evading the battle. The last fight.
    7. After all this, Rozhdestvensky would have found himself with 4 fast and powerful battleships in front of the main forces of Togo, so that he would have to chase him (as in Shantung for Witgeft), and between Rozhdestvensky and Vladivostok there would no longer be significant enemy forces ( Kamimura was with Togo this time).

    Some kind of bad assumption suggests itself ...

    But Togo's mistake forced both sides to improvise, and the famous maneuvers before the battle began.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      14 January 2022 07: 38
      +3
      Quote: Pushkowed
      If Togo did immediately as he wanted, the left column would die, but the right one (together with the precious body of Rozhdestvensky himself) would be covered from Japanese fire by the perishing left column.

      Then what? :))) Borodino is inferior in speed to the Japanese fleet, and it takes more than one day to go to Vladivostok (the Japanese planned to give several battles in a row with a break for night attacks by destroyers).
      Quote: Pushkowed
      After all this, Rozhestvensky would have found himself with 4 fast and powerful battleships ahead of the main forces of Togo, so that he would have to chase after him

      And 12 ships against 4 - the chances are absolute zero.
      1. Pushkowed
        Pushkowed 14 January 2022 09: 07
        +2
        Run away from the bear by throwing distracting baits.

        Of the left column, the fastest was the Oslyabya in the head. He still would have had a chance to break away and join the tail of the "Borodino". To be the first to die later, when the main forces of Togo begin to overtake them ...

        Then it will be the turn of the "Borodino" themselves. But they had more high-speed "stones" and destroyers ...

        In general, the result of the battle in this situation would hardly be very different from what it was in reality. And even if it did, it’s not a fact that it was for the better (for the Russian fleet). But for Rozhdestvensky personally ...

        On the other hand, if Togo did not twist the noose, but at the countercourse collapsed on the tail of a single column (with its subsequent cutting off), how much would have changed from this? It would also be the death of the "chests", also the pursuit of the "Borodinites" (and, optionally, "Oslyabey") ... But Togo still took a chance, turned around and hit the Russian column on the head. And he came out the winner. Winners are not judged. The result was the same alignment - the next day there were 12 against 4 (of which 1 "Borodino" and 3 "chests"), and Nebogatov surrendered, and the "pebble" who was present at the same time left. And he reached the Russian coast.

        Rozhestvensky himself could have made it to the Bedovy (which was successfully proved by the Terrible). But cunning plan in any case, he could not have foreseen the appearance of a hole in the skull of the author of this plan. If "Suvorov" had not come under attack at the beginning of the battle (for example, hiding behind the left column), then the chance to avoid getting this hole would have been more real. And what else did the Admiral-More-Expensive-Destroyer need for complete "happiness"? ..

        In general, with the chosen passive tactics for the Russian squadron, which was much inferior to the enemy in squadron speed, there was no chance of victory. Klimov theorizes, trying to prove that with more aggressive tactics there was a chance. It is interesting to follow the discussion. But in any case, there is an afterthought. Rozhdestvensky chose passive tactics for a reason. Lagging behind in speed, it is foolish to expect that the enemy will not dare to attack at least those who are lagging behind. In any case, they were doomed, and even Rozhestvensky understood that. And he was mentally ready to sacrifice them in order to break through himself.

        Would he have acted differently if he had magically found out in advance how it would all end? Definitely yes! He wouldn't get into this fight at all. Your own head is more expensive. It is necessary to eat in it, and not to receive fragments. But without an afterthought and with the chosen passive tactics, the best that he could count on was to deliver himself to Vladivostok (having ruined part of the squadron for this), to report that he did not succeed in taking possession of the Sea of ​​Japan, and to forget what happened like a bad dream.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          14 January 2022 09: 40
          +2
          Quote: Pushkowed
          Run away from the bear by throwing distracting baits.

          You can hold out on this for four hours at most.
          I. Most importantly, what kills your "rationalization proposal" in the bud - if Rozhestvensky wanted to hide behind the left column, he would not push the right one, but would hide behind the left one when he saw that the Japanese turned and went to the left side of the Russian squadron. That is, even during real maneuvering, Rozhestvensky had the opportunity to hide behind the left column, but did not do it.
          1. Pushkowed
            Pushkowed 14 January 2022 09: 53
            +1
            Togo almost put up crossing-T both columns, however, did not attack the lead ships (including the "Suvorov"), but went to the left side, tempted by easy prey. After this, it was already impossible to write off what was happening on the surprise attack of the enemy on the left. But it is unlikely that Rozhdestvensky could have foreseen "Togo's noose." More expected would be an attack by the Japanese on the countercurrent against the tail of the left column. So getting into her head is essentially the same as covering up. Fail. I had to take the fight for real.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              14 January 2022 14: 16
              +1
              Quote: Pushkowed
              Togo nearly put a cross-T on both columns

              But it’s not a fact - Rozhdestvensky could retort in a very funny way
              Quote: Pushkowed
              So getting into her head is essentially the same as hiding behind. fail.

              Absolutely not. In any case, the turn of the Japanese began to the left-in front of Suvorov, that is, he went under the very fire
              1. Pushkowed
                Pushkowed 15 January 2022 00: 00
                0
                parry in a very funny way
                1. I wonder how?
                2. Can there be something funny in this?
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  15 January 2022 10: 10
                  +1
                  Quote: Pushkowed
                  1. I wonder how?

                  We see that Togo is approaching, we turn to the right (it is possible not by 90 degrees, but less), the signal to the 2nd detachment is to keep in the wake. As a result, we disagree on counter courses
              2. d_averk
                d_averk 15 January 2022 03: 49
                0

                Like this. Without the loop, he would have gone counter-courses with 2-3 squads (which he did not want), and risked getting a stick over BrK from the accelerated B.
            2. d_averk
              d_averk 15 January 2022 03: 39
              0
              The Japanese did not like to shoot at counter courses. And getting them to do so would already be a success.
          2. d_averk
            d_averk 15 January 2022 03: 38
            +1
            4 hours is almost 60 miles head start.
            With the advantage of Yaps in 2-3 knots (and even xs what damage they would have scored on counter courses 2 and 3 neg) this is 20-30 hours "in pursuit", this is almost 400-480 miles and still find a day later. It's better than nothing and Nebogatov's empty surrender.
        2. finnbogi
          finnbogi 14 January 2022 11: 41
          +1
          oh anyway, here's the afterthought. Passive tactics were chosen by Rozhdestvensky for a reason. Conceding in speed, it is foolish to count on the fact that the enemy will not dare to attack at least those who are lagging behind. In any case, they were doomed, and even Rozhdestvensky understood this. And he was morally ready to sacrifice them in order to break through himself.


          he thought the following:

          Taking into account that in the second detachment of battleships, Navarin could not develop more than 12, and the third detachment had a maximum speed of 11½ knots, the main battleships, in closed ranks, had no right to hold more 10 knots. According to the current opinion, the battle could have taken a different turn, if the battleships of different mobility did not seek to keep together, but were divided into separately operating units. I do not agree with this opinion.
          Twelve Japanese battleships acted in close formation, concentrating their fire in the first period of the battle, successively on the lead ones, from among our most high-speed battleships, who nevertheless received some support from the followers of the Matels.
          If four or five of our battleships, having developed their maximum speed, separated from their weak comrades, the Japanese battleships, having the opportunity to develop a speed greater than our best walkers, would have kept their way and, only in a shorter period of time, would have overcome with concentrated forces the color of our squadron, in order, then, jokingly, to overtake and overcome the abandoned.
          The only correct tactic of the second squadron for inflicting any significant harm on the Japanese main forces was the combined action of our armored detachments, possibly close formation and only entering, as necessary, the trailing detachment for action from the front or bearing, even if it was wrong, on the tail, running into our head, the Japanese armored squadron. But even this approaching flank should not have been separated from the other ships of the line. So, in order for our squadron to be able, with a persistent good desire, to maintain a close formation and so that the trailers, forcing the move, could execute a run-in without breaking the formation, the head of this formation should have by no means more than 10 knots.


          with such ideas, he himself limited himself to maneuvering and gave up a shooting range long before the start of the battle
        3. d_averk
          d_averk 15 January 2022 03: 34
          0
          Would he have acted differently if he had magically found out in advance how it would all end? Definitely yes! He wouldn't get into this fight at all.

          It would help. All this sending of the squadron to the end already smelled bad, but he would not have dared not to fulfill the order.
      2. Victor Leningradets
        Victor Leningradets 14 January 2022 15: 12
        +1
        Good day, Andrey!
        Then what? :))) Borodino is inferior in speed to the Japanese fleet, and it takes more than one day to go to Vladivostok (the Japanese planned to give several battles in a row with a break for night attacks by destroyers).

        And 12 ships against 4 - the chances are absolute zero.

        In my opinion, Vice-Admiral Rozhdestvensky brilliantly realized all the "advantages" of the battle 4 against 12 within 40 minutes, when he REALLY commanded the squadron, and did not ballast the battered squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov" with himself and the headquarters. Rear Admiral Nebogatov added to the chronicle of the shame of the Russian fleet by not taking command of the squadron upon the failure of the senior flagship. And so, yes, Togo competently and purposefully destroyed the best ships of the Russian squadron, providing it with scraps of Kamimura.
        Question! And what would happen if Togo really missed the first armored detachment? I think the situation on May 15 would be repeated. Yes, they might have been able to go further, but it is not known how the Japanese destroyers would have acted on the night of May 14/15, and how tightly the Japanese reconnaissance forces would have clung to the first detachment.
        In any case, the defeat of the Second Pacific Squadron is due to the level of the operation concept: go to VladivostokAnd not give a general battle to the Japanese fleet in order to defeat it
        1. d_averk
          d_averk 15 January 2022 03: 44
          +1
          If the 2nd and 3rd detachments had connected the main forces of Togo in battle, preferably on counter courses, maybe 1 would have had time to leave.

          the defeat of the Second Pacific Squadron is due

          sending her further without exotic cruisers and without 1 TOE.
      3. d_averk
        d_averk 15 January 2022 03: 29
        +1
        In the universe before Tsushima, this maneuver would have made little sense. So yes, it's kind of tight. But knowing the outcome of Tsushima, there could be a certain meaning. Occupy Togo with the 2nd and 3rd detachments (extermination anyway), perhaps the high-explosive shells would still not sink quickly, but bypass 4 Borodino and put a wand over the terminal BrKs of Togo.

        According to a number of testimonies, the BrK was fired with a classic shimoza, while the armadillos, according to the semi-conspiracy theory, were re-equipped with "special forces". In any case, while Togo was at odds with counter courses with the 2nd and 3rd detachments (and he was still weaker in counter-course shooting), the Borodinians could pretty much peck at the tail BrK and try to leave. The next question is, what kind of damage would Togo receive on the counter courses, what kind of BrK would he get from B. and would he begin to finish off 2 and 3 about. or leaving, he rushed after B. With a fair amount of luck, he would no longer have the opportunity to divide his forces. Handicap literally at 3-4 o'clock, and if the KMU B. had not been let down, by the morning B. would have already been out of the strait, and there look for them, and even belatedly. Of course, the chances are again minuscule, but no worse than beating and SHAMED surrender. On counter courses with Togo, 3ot. there were chances to sell themselves dearly.
    2. mmaxx
      mmaxx 14 January 2022 14: 48
      +1
      Togo just came up to the right and that's it. Seeing the enemy moved to the left. I see no point in looking for riddles. Intended to attack the left column. Because it was unprofitable for him to attack with the right from the leeward. And then Rozhdestvensky withdraws the 1st detachment. We need to deal with them urgently. It makes no sense to fight with the old men now. No riddles.
  15. nemoXX
    nemoXX 14 January 2022 09: 52
    0
    I never cease to be amazed at the variety of data on the plot of the battle! At Novikov-Priboy, Mikasa began to turn the Togo loop, "being on the Eagle's traverse, and the reports and diagrams that I came across draw a Togo loop far ahead and to the left of Suvorov. Over more than 100 years have not been able to find out the truth? If, according to Novikov-Priboy, "Mikasa" is on the traverse of "Eagle", then why is the Japanese unavailable for its stern artillery?
    1. rytik32
      rytik32 14 January 2022 12: 30
      +3
      I never cease to be surprised at the variety of data on the outset of the battle!

      I will simplify the task.
      Where the Russians were relative to the Japanese is clear - there is data from the database of the commanders of Japanese ships.
      Where the Japanese were relative to the Russians is not entirely clear here, because. at the rate of Russian there are questions. Not everyone writes about NO23 and it is not on Japanese schemes
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        14 January 2022 14: 17
        +1
        Quote: rytik32
        Where the Russians were relative to the Japanese is clear - there is data from the database of the commanders of Japanese ships.

        Alexey, you have already "simplified"
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 14 January 2022 14: 33
          +2
          Andrei, have you tried to calculate the distance using this scheme, if the distance between the ships in the wake or the length of the ship should be the basis? laughing
          In terms of information content, the result will be the same laughing
          You deliberately did not take the diagram on which the direction to the Russians is indicated?
          At the same time, you are trying to calculate the direction according to the scheme on which it is not indicated ...
          But why are you doing this???
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            14 January 2022 14: 43
            0
            Quote: rytik32
            You deliberately did not take the diagram on which the direction to the Russians is indicated?

            Alex, everything is easier. I quote Shuvalov again:
            “So much contradictory has been written about Tsushima that if you take only some part of the data, a priori considering it reliable, and “omit” all the rest that do not work for the author’s version, then you can prove anything.

            It was necessary to prove to you that the Russians did not have time to reorganize - you presented this scheme, even if it contained gross errors. You now need to prove the heading angles - you will present another diagram, where the same moment of the battle is depicted in a completely different way. That you use contradictory data to confirm your points of view - obviously does not bother you
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 14 January 2022 15: 19
              +1
              It was necessary to prove to you that the Russians did not have time to rebuild - you presented this scheme

              The Russians did not have time to rebuild on any Japanese scheme.
              even though it contained gross errors

              In any of your Tsushima articles, I will find gross errors. And what, after that, declare all your articles and posts unreliable?
              No, I won't do it. Only that which is unreliable is unreliable.
              You now need to prove the heading angles - you will present another diagram, where the same moment of the battle is depicted in a completely different way.

              The heading angle must be looked at in the diagrams where this heading angle is indicated.
              The rest is from the evil one.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                14 January 2022 16: 21
                0
                Quote: rytik32
                The Russians did not have time to rebuild on any Japanese scheme.

                In reality, they did not have time, the question is how much they did not have time.
                Quote: rytik32
                In any of your Tsushima articles, I will find gross errors.

                I have no doubt that you are sure of it.
                Quote: rytik32
                And what, after that, declare all your articles and posts unreliable?

                You are now comparing the incomparable. It's one thing - on the basis of individual mistakes of one witness to declare that he is wrong in everything - this is your example. And yes, of course, you shouldn't do that, I agree.
                Another thing is when the testimony of several witnesses contradict each other. You can not choose from them what suits and declare "the rest is a mistake to which the witness has the right." It is necessary to consider the whole range of possibilities, and even choosing the most logical option, in favor of which the majority speaks, you still need to keep in mind that this option is not a dogma, but a version, even if it is the most reasonable of the possible
                Quote: rytik32
                The heading angle must be looked at in the diagrams where this heading angle is indicated.
                The rest is from the evil one.

                Well, here's another diagram of yours.

                here, however, the distances are marked, but the scheme is clearly from the evil one - well, Russian ships did not turn at 2.15 in Russian in the direction of the enemy
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 14 January 2022 18: 22
                  +1
                  In this scheme, you can take the distance and approximate direction to the target.
                  The fact that Asama turned to the left, but the distance did not change, seems like a mistake. Rangefinder error or report error - not clear, but maybe the fire was moved to a closer target.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    15 January 2022 10: 11
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    The fact that Asama turned to the left, but the distance did not change, seems like a mistake. Rangefinder error or report error - not clear

                    And the heading angle could be taken at the moment of the turn, when he "walked" in the widest possible range
        2. nemoXX
          nemoXX 19 January 2022 08: 57
          0
          Here is another version drawn!...not counting the sub-versions depicted on it. Particularly striking is the parallel movement of squadrons in counter-courses, despite what is considered indisputable: the Japanese crossed the course of the Russian squadron from the right (from the Suvorov) to the left at an angle immediately before the start of the Togo loop. I think that even the modest fact that the Suvorovs started firing from the left bow 6-dm cannon should hint that the Mikasa was on the left ahead of the course. Let's not forget the inaccessibility - according to Novikov - "Mikasa" for the rear artillery of the "Eagle". According to this picture, "Mikasa" could have been fired upon by the 2nd and 3rd armored detachment, which in fact did not happen.
  16. finnbogi
    finnbogi 14 January 2022 19: 59
    +1
    But even if it were so, then this situation has developed only because Z.P. Rozhestvensky continued to lead his squadron to NO 23, trying to get as close to the enemy as possible and realize the fire advantage presented to him by the Japanese. But he could not do this, and turned to the right immediately, as soon as the new course of "Mikasa" was determined.


    I quote Rozhdestvensky:

    If this is true, then, then, by the time of my first shot, I brought into battle not 12 ships, but only 11. It must, however, be borne in mind that when the first shot was fired from the Suvorov at the battleship Mikaza ”, from a distance of 32 cables, then, “Mikaza” was less than one rhumb ahead of the traverse of “Suvorov”; and, since the length of the formation of three detachments of battleships of the second squadron was to be 2,8 miles, then from the end matelot in the III detachment to the battleship Mikaza, the distance should have been no more than 42½ cables. Thus, I brought into battle the second squadron in the ranks, in which all my battleships should have been able to fire at the first moment on the Japanese lead line from the distances of its aiming reach for the main calibers. Not because of my ingenuity, but due to completely justified arrogance, and, perhaps, due to the erroneous calculation of the Japanese admiral, at the time of the first shot from the Suvorov, only the battleship Mikaza had already managed to lie on a course parallel or somewhat converging with course of the second squadron. Of the other Japanese battleships, two turned around after the Mikaza, and the remaining nine had not yet approached the point of a sequential turn and lay in relation to the second squadron, behind the Mikaza with their nose in the SW-th quarter.


    if Rozhdestvensky at this moment, 32 cables to Mikasa, turns to the right and Mikasa begins the pursuit, also gradually turning to the right, then the Russians get the problem with the turning point of the squadron .... since the Russian battleships following Suvorov will have to pass this turning point, moreover that the Russian line is moving at a speed of 10 knots...

    By now, everything has been decided.

    Rozhdestvensky made a mistake before that, I suspect that Togo, having turned to the left, intentionally gave Rozhdestvensky the illusion of being able to disperse by shooting on counter courses while maintaining the desired direction, so Rozhdestvensky made a mistake already when he led 1 detachment to the left to lead the general system, to avoid a battle on the terms of Togo, he was in At that moment, he could only turn 1 squad sharply to the right and signal the 2 squad to follow him.
  17. Alexandra
    Alexandra 15 January 2022 05: 38
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    He was seriously injured, unconscious. The Japanese then for a long time did not dare to remove the fragments of the skull, they went deep into the head. What more do you want? Or in your opinion, after a heavy defeat, the military leader should shoot? So we would have lost Zhukov in 41, and not only him.


    Was Zhukov captured? Perhaps you remember such a Russian general as Samsonov. After the defeat of his army in the battle of Tannenberg "On the night of August 30, 1914, General Samsonov, who was among the encircled units, shot himself. General Martos was taken prisoner, General Klyuev tried to withdraw the troops from the encirclement in three columns, but two columns were defeated, and Klyuev gave the order to surrender. After the defeat at Tsushima, not a single Russian admiral shot himself. All boldly surrendered.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 January 2022 10: 54
      0
      Quote: AlexanderA
      Was Zhukov captured?

      Karbyshev hit. Will you also accuse of cowardice?
    2. d_averk
      d_averk 15 January 2022 20: 16
      0
      The Voroshilov Bialystok Brigade was commanded by Major F.F. Kapusta, who had escaped from captivity and served in the 375th artillery regiment of the RGC during the first days of the war. By the end of the war, he became a general. The commander of the 1st division of the same regiment, Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain G.K. Berezhok, was seriously wounded in July 41 and was also captured. He ran successfully, then fought in the Kutuzov detachment,

      The division under the command of MP Konstantinov as part of the 6th Cavalry Corps conducted heavy defensive combat operations on the territory of the Byelorussian SSR. Having accepted the first battle near the city of Lomzha, the 6th Cavalry Division retreated to Minsk with heavy fighting, but was surrounded in the area southwest of Minsk.[1] A group of cavalrymen no more than 300-350 sabers fought their way out of the ring, which retreated to the Orsha region, but there, in unequal battles, these fighters also almost all died.[2] General Konstantinov himself was seriously wounded on June 29 in a battle near the village of Ross, Volkovysk region (wounds in both legs and in the back), was left with reliable local residents on the outskirts of Minsk. Returning to the front, the general received a cavalry corps, which he commanded before the Victory, earning the title of Hero.
  18. Alexandra
    Alexandra 15 January 2022 06: 20
    +2
    Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
    In Japan, obviously no one crosses keyboards in a fierce argument - they won and there are no questions.


    In Japan, the battleship "Yamato" in the anime was even launched into space (Space Battleship Yamato), they were so worried that battleships of this type were on the list of the three most useless things in the world.

    And then how do you know in what kind of disputes Japanese otaku cross keyboards in their reasoning about alternative options for the battle for Midway?

    Victories are conducive to mental laziness. The fact that the Japanese forgot to shoot what shells they won at Tsushima led to the fact that in the battle in Leyte Gulf, the shooting of their heavy artillery ships was ineffective.
  19. Niko
    Niko 15 January 2022 13: 32
    0
    Quote: d_averk
    In general, until the squadron is defeated, the admiral shoots somehow ... Go to another ship ..
    And then the injury, loss of consciousness. Here you are wrong, these are just some kind of hysterical reproaches.

    He lost consciousness and was HEAVY wounded only in the versions of people whom he himself would have expected not just a court, but a court verdict
    1. d_averk
      d_averk 15 January 2022 20: 03
      -1
      Japanese doctors mean in a share - they didn’t designate a simulator?
      Enough blablabla here. In the same WWII, many commanders of the defeated units did not shoot, they were captured. And absolutely not everyone was later convicted, only those who collaborated or doubtfully were captured.
  20. Mikhail Tikhonin
    Mikhail Tikhonin 15 January 2022 13: 58
    +3
    "Togo's Loop" is a clearly thought-out maneuver to enter the decisive battle distance, very risky, but conscious. Togo suffered with Witgeft, who led him by the nose like the last dunce for half a day, and decided that enough was enough, we will start this fight where we finished the previous one - 23 cabs from the enemy’s head! Experience is a great thing, Togo had it, but Rozhdestvensky, alas, didn’t, he didn’t have it under Shantung, and those who were unable to draw the right conclusions ..
    1. finnbogi
      finnbogi 15 January 2022 14: 08
      +2
      to this we can add that under Shantung in the second phase, the Japanese main guns began to self-destruct en masse, that is, a long-term skirmish without decisive results was simply dangerous for the Japanese, Togo drew conclusions.
      And Rozhdestvensky and his headquarters made fundamental mistakes in planning, but they were not alone, in this war the Russians in the fleet and the army seem to be everywhere and always made the most serious mistakes, and therefore they lost.
      1. Mikhail Tikhonin
        Mikhail Tikhonin 15 January 2022 14: 38
        0
        Yes, Rozhdestvensky planned everything correctly, based on the available data. How was Shantung presented to the command and the public? Like, we shot no worse (and even better) than the Japanese at all distances of the battle, and if it weren’t for an unfortunate accident that led to the loss of the formation, we would certainly have won. Well, that's what he planned - the main thing is to keep the formation and sustained to shoot back no matter what happens. But in fact, under Shantung, we kept well only at distances of more than 30 cab., And as soon as it came to a decisive battle, it immediately became clear that the enemy was simply head and shoulders stronger, the battle would last another half an hour and Peresvet would have been waiting for the fate of Oslyabya, and Tsesarevich - Suvorov. Now, if someone had conveyed this information to the flagship, everything could have been completely different ..
        1. finnbogi
          finnbogi 15 January 2022 15: 25
          +2
          you never know what was presented to the public ...

          He had people who participated in ZhM, he should have had an idea about the effectiveness of artillery, the level of information analysis is higher than that of the "public".

          The fact of the matter is that he himself planned to go at a lower speed than Vitgeft was walking, Rozhdestvensky himself did not plan active maneuvering, and at the very beginning it was he who did not dodge, he himself did everything so that the battle would not go on at a long distance.
          1. Mikhail Tikhonin
            Mikhail Tikhonin 15 January 2022 15: 39
            -1
            "To the public and to the command" - in official reports there was the same bullshit. And the people who participated in Shantung sang about the same thing, the same Semyonov .. well, maybe everything looked like that from Diana, I don’t know. The point is that Rozhdestvensky simply did not know that it was necessary to evade combat at medium and short distances, and therefore did nothing to evade.
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 15 January 2022 18: 22
              +1
              Quote: Mikhail Tikhonin
              "To the public and to the command" - in official reports there was the same bullshit. And the people who participated in the Shantung sang about the same thing, the same Semyonov .. well, maybe everything looked like that from Diana, I don’t know.

              At the disposal of Rozhdestvensky was the flag officer of Vitgeft. He shoved it away from his eyes, to the Urals. he left the sweet-voiced Semyonov with him only.

              Rozhdestvensky did not even try to use the experience of the 1st TOE, he just scored.
              1. Mikhail Tikhonin
                Mikhail Tikhonin 15 January 2022 22: 21
                -1
                And what is wrong with the Urals, that it was impossible to carry out an adequate analysis of what happened and issue it in the form of a report? And it would have been even better to do it in Qingdao, along with other surviving ranks of the headquarters, this is their direct duty, actually. But if this were done, then we could talk about the use / non-use of experience.
                1. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 16 January 2022 19: 34
                  +1
                  Quote: Mikhail Tikhonin
                  And what is wrong with the Urals, that it was impossible to carry out an adequate analysis of what happened and issue it in the form of a report?

                  According to the results of the battle, a report is written without fail, but did someone read them?
                  1. Mikhail Tikhonin
                    Mikhail Tikhonin 18 January 2022 23: 01
                    0
                    Well, someone probably read it .. but what's the point - "the Japanese suffered no less than ours, we shot less often, but more precisely, the lower ranks and gentlemen officers were beyond praise." No one has written that at medium and short distances the enemy is head and shoulders stronger, that the practice of shooting "rarely but accurately" is vicious and leads to the fact that we shoot 2 times less often, and hit 3-4 times less, because it is impossible to shoot accurately under a hail of shells. And in this state of affairs, it is generally indifferent what kind of shells to shoot - the result will be the same, and no tactical delights will also help.
            2. finnbogi
              finnbogi 15 January 2022 22: 15
              +1
              the point here is that how do we know about the large number of hits on Russian ships in the second phase?

              And these are damages registered, as a rule, by the Russians themselves, here it was not some secret knowledge of our era that was in demand, but an analysis of the information of Russian sailors, or Rozhdestvensky was too lazy to do this and / or an analysis of this kind in general in the Russian fleet was put at a level below the plinth.
              1. Mikhail Tikhonin
                Mikhail Tikhonin 15 January 2022 22: 48
                0
                It is the second, although, of course, responsibility cannot be removed from Rozhdestvensky, but nevertheless, analysis is more staff work and not team work. The headquarters of the 1st squadron, the headquarters of the fleet in Vladivostok, the headquarters of the governor, the General Staff in St. Petersburg - and no one really bothered to analyze Shantung and Ulsan.

                "The battle on this tack was the most fierce, and although we suffered heavy damage, it was clearly visible that the enemy ships suffered greatly"
                1. finnbogi
                  finnbogi 15 January 2022 23: 59
                  +1
                  but it was Rozhestvensky who commanded 2 TOE and had to command in battle, and he had a lot of time, there was an article here recently where there were many examples of Rozhdestvensky's attitude to the "team" .... say something like that, the person had his own opinion and the rest he didn't seem to be interested
                  1. d_averk
                    d_averk 16 January 2022 03: 22
                    0
                    In his memoirs, dedicated to them "with deep respect" "Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky, his former commander and teacher", the watch officer of "Oleg" midshipman Boris Karlovich Schubert describes his "Madagascar impressions" in this way.

                    Rozhdestvensky has always been my favorite admiral of our modern fleet. I heard a lot about his energy, severity, sometimes severity - I knew that he was a man of great intelligence and iron will, but at the same time they spoke of him as a man of the highest degree just and noble, a gentleman to the marrow of his bones. And I was convinced of the latter myself, having met him in society.

                    ... When, on the next day of our arrival in Nossi-Be, Rozhdestvensky visited Oleg, we saw with our own eyes that he should have brought the squadron here intact, without losing a single destroyer along the way. Thin, yellow, with sunken eyes, this man appeared before us, a year ago he looked fine and far from old. But the sparkle of his eyes, his voice full of determination and the charm of his appearance, having remained the same, now made an even greater impression than ever.

                    ... On the Oleg, where the wardroom has merged into a single close family, there has never been a grumble about the burden of service, and I have never heard a faint-hearted voice speaking in favor of returning to Russia or condemning the orders of the Commander. Everyone loved and respected the latter, and there was a common desire that he had enough strength to bring the matter to the end, since, apart from Rozhdestvensky, we did not consider any of the other Russian admirals capable of accomplishing this feat ...

                    I also had to read ... about the unheard-of cruelty of our Admiral towards his subordinates ... It was written more than once that several people who disobeyed his will were hanged on his orders. Needless to say, this is the purest fiction of his ill-wishers, and that if the Admiral could be reproached for anything, it was only for being gentle towards his subordinates, especially towards the lower ranks.


                    Sh-t B. New about the war. Memories of sea voyages. 1904–1905 SPb., 1907. S. 66–75. In the 2009 reprint: Schubert B.K. On the cruisers "Smolensk" and "Oleg". SPb., 2009. S. 65–69.

                    There are a lot of opinions about the ZPR. Learn to read different
                    1. finnbogi
                      finnbogi 16 January 2022 14: 38
                      +1
                      thanks for the advice!

                      There will be criticism of that evidence in the article, evidence not originally intended for the public, and not like what you quoted ...

                      The important question for me is on what basis did Rozhdestvenksy work out his plans until he saw evidence of special involvement of the officers of the squadron in this matter.
                      1. d_averk
                        d_averk 16 January 2022 18: 22
                        0
                        Not a single commander of the fleet is obliged to involve the officers in the development of a decision. This is a right, not a duty. Rozhdestvensky developed his plan solely on the basis of the facts known to him about 1 TOE. Actually, the plan was therefore extremely poor tactically - It was not clear where and how the Japanese fleet would strike.

                        Meanwhile, after the end of the battle in ZhM, it was obvious that there was a clear order to go to Vl. no matter what, even after the death of Vit. - most of the 1 TOE had a chance to pass - that's what I hoped for. In fact, it's extremely unfortunate. The fact that ZPR is not an ideal tactic is beyond doubt. But in fact, after the first minutes of the battle, he was not able to transmit orders - all transmission methods were destroyed on Suvorov, and he himself was wounded.
                      2. finnbogi
                        finnbogi 16 January 2022 21: 38
                        +1
                        Not a single commander of the fleet is obliged to involve the officers in the development of a decision. This is a right, not a duty. Rozhdestvensky developed his plan solely on the basis of the facts known to him about 1 TOE. Actually, the plan was therefore extremely poor tactically - It was not clear where and how the Japanese fleet would strike.

                        he is not obliged, but then he himself is primarily responsible, and then he relied only on his own analysis of the facts about ZhM, he himself made such a decision
                        Meanwhile, after the end of the battle in ZhM, it was obvious that there was a clear order to go to Vl. no matter what, even after the death of Vit. - most of the 1 TOE had a chance to pass - that's what I hoped for. In fact, it's extremely unfortunate. The fact that ZPR is not an ideal tactic is beyond doubt. But in fact, after the first minutes of the battle, he was not able to transmit orders - all transmission methods were destroyed on Suvorov, and he himself was wounded

                        even if he wasn't hurt, what could he do?
                        2 battleships are almost knocked out and other ships in 1 squad seem to have received a lot of damage

                        After all, he didn’t tactically prepare anything except to “endure”, so without being wounded and after heavy losses at the beginning of the battle, what else would he have left?

                        Complex maneuvering requires many months of preparation before the battle, and most importantly, junior flagships and senior officers must be aware of what maneuvers to perform in what situations; after heavy losses in the initial phase, Rozhdestvensky, who had begun to see clearly, could not organize anything.
                      3. d_averk
                        d_averk 17 January 2022 11: 31
                        0
                        is not obliged, but then the responsibility lies primarily with him

                        You don’t know anything about the army and the principle of unity of command, do you? Yes, at least 100 tips, the responsibility still always lies with the senior in position and rank ...

                        After all, he didn’t tactically prepare anything except to “endure”, so without being wounded and after heavy losses at the beginning of the battle, what else would he have left?

                        Bast soap, start over. You will not realize that without seeing the enemy, without presenting the plan, it is impossible to develop a tactical response! If on land reconnaissance shows enemy fortifications, redeployment in advance, and this does not take hours or days, then at sea it is a matter of often tens of minutes, especially not when you attack yourself. It is impossible to come up with a plan for any feint of the enemy.

                        For complex maneuvering, many months of preparation are needed before the battle.

                        tired. the squadron was not at the base, but was walking.
                        But with all this - there is multiple evidence that at least 1 detachment maneuvered perfectly during training in Madahscar.

                        most importantly, junior flagships and senior officers should be aware of what maneuvers to perform in what situations

                        You don’t know anything at all either about the naval battles of those times, or, specifically, about Tsushima.
                        You stubbornly draw parallels with land battles, but this is not at all the case.
                      4. finnbogi
                        finnbogi 18 January 2022 23: 57
                        0
                        You don’t know anything about the army and the principle of unity of command, do you? Yes, at least 100 tips, the responsibility still always lies with the senior in position and rank ...

                        I am aware and I do not forget the subject of discussion with whether Rozhdestvensky’s delusions had no alternative, and so he did everything himself in order to get a minimum of information
                        Bast soap, start over. You will not realize that without seeing the enemy, without presenting the plan, it is impossible to develop a tactical response! If on land reconnaissance shows enemy fortifications, redeployment in advance, and this does not take hours or days, then at sea it is a matter of often tens of minutes, especially not when you attack yourself. It is impossible to come up with a plan for any feint of the enemy.

                        in fact, this was what the fleets were doing then, to invent and practice maneuvers and counter-maneuvers for various tactical situations, have you really never seen anything like this?
                        tired. the squadron was not at the base, but was walking.
                        But with all this - there is multiple evidence that at least 1 detachment maneuvered perfectly during training in Madahscar.

                        Let's take a turn all of a sudden and reverse course, it’s not intelligence that should “report” before the battle, the squadron should have been ready for this before the battle so that the admiral, depending on the development of the situation, could use such maneuvers in combat conditions, for example, Togo was sitting on the terminal ships of the detachments junior flagships, and the line was divided into 2 squads.

                        Togo thus ensured for himself the high maneuverability of his line long before the start of the battle, and this maneuverability was available to him (and available to his forces) regardless of the development of the tactical situation, even if Togo was killed, these opportunities for the Japanese would remain.

                        And at Rozhdestvensky, with the younger flagships, he generally organized a complete disaster, did not draw up a battle plan, an attempt at such a maneuver would have few prospects for the execution of his squadron, since he, unlike Togo, was not prepared.
                        You don’t know anything at all either about the naval battles of those times, or, specifically, about Tsushima.
                        You stubbornly draw parallels with land battles, but this is not at all the case.

                        I would say that you are describing your own problems
                      5. d_averk
                        d_averk 17 January 2022 11: 41
                        0
                        it is precisely because of this difference that the generals are in the rear, and the admirals are always in the ranks and on the flagship, subject to maximum risk.
                  2. d_averk
                    d_averk 16 January 2022 03: 28
                    -1
                    Relationship example

                    Order of the Commander of the 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet

                    Indian Ocean, March 10, 1905. #157

                    On the roadstead of Nossi-Be, by orders of diving officers Lieutenant Vyrubov 2nd and Michman Yakovlev, divers ... carried out work of great combat importance to correct the rudders on the cruisers of the II rank Zhemchug and Emerald.

                    I will be happy at the first opportunity to bring to the attention of the Higher Authorities about the excellent orderliness of Lieutenant Vyrubov 2nd and Midshipman Yakovlev and the significance of their merit.

                    I bow before the lofty feelings of these youths and think that if at least half of the officers of the squadron are inspired by the same noble zeal for service and the same selflessness, we will not have to count the number and hang the calibers of Japanese guns on the scales.

                    Thanks to the young divers, not for the first time helping us out of trouble.

                    I propose to those named on the list to give out one pound sterling in excess of the wages laid down by law.

                    Signed: Adjutant General Rozhdestvensky.


                    Vyrubov P.A. Ten years in the life of a Russian sailor... S. 128.

                    What a scoundrel this ZPR. There would be no tyranny as it should be for a tyrant.

                    Like here for example
                    The senior artilleryman of the Suvorov, Lieutenant Vladimirsky, in letters to his wife, expresses obvious dissatisfaction with the Commander: “The Admiral seems to be completely crazy soon. At night, he still seems to think of rockets, that is, that destroyers are attacking, and in dealing with subordinates he got to the point that he grabbed one destroyer commander, captain of the 2nd rank, by the collar.


                    True, the captain of the 2nd rank, Shamov, admitted drunkenness, aggravated because of the drunkenness of the sailors, the boat capsized and three of them drowned in the days of the USSR, he would probably have flown from his post ... or even from the fleet. It is a pity there is no one to replace in the campaign.
          2. d_averk
            d_averk 15 January 2022 19: 52
            0
            Here it is.

            With ZhM
            In response to our challenge from the entire port side of the 7 battleships, a volley was heard at the Poltava, but it did no harml, as it was torn down prematurely. A mass of fountains rose between us and the enemy: Togo, probably, prepared a volley for 30 cables, and therefore the shells, having missed the cable by 2, sprinkled us with a bunch of fragments. Following the 6-inch turret, the 12-inch turret also spoke, the battery and turret No. 3 opened fire.

            Togo walked in open formation, he slowly overtook us, rapidly discharging guns at the Poltava. “Asahi” also passed, followed by the 3-pipe “Shikishima”, she became ahead of the beam, along the beam - “Nissin”, followed by “Kassu-ga” and “Yakumo”.

            The furious fire of the Japanese is almost harmless to the Poltava: all the shells with a roar, an ominous howl rush over their heads, hit the tops, but occasionally no, no, and fall into the stern.