Military Review

About sighting and adjusting fire on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

95

Japanese fleet in the Battle of Tsushima. Painting.


Introduction


In connection with the ongoing disputes regarding the assessment of the artillery preparation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, this article prepared a study of the method of sighting and adjusting fire on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

To get a general idea of ​​the organization of firing on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, the author recommends that you first read the article Tsushima. Accuracy Factors of Russian Artillery.

In connection with the extremely emotional and contradictory statements about the artillery preparation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in narrative sources, most of this article is based on more reliable documentary materials, primarily orders and circulars.

However, relying solely on orders and circulars, it is impossible to get a complete picture.

The fact is that the shooting technique in the documents of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was never fully described, only some features or “weak points” identified during training firing were indicated.

Moreover, this technique has evolved, and therefore an attempt to assemble a puzzle from all available orders and circulars is obviously doomed to failure.

The fact that the manuals never published a complete shooting technique suggests that there was some basic principle known to the gunners of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which was not necessary to repeat.

A careful acquaintance with the contents of the artillery orders and circulars of the 2nd Pacific Squadron allows us to assert that the shooting technique used by the Training Artillery Detachment was taken as the basis.

And this is not surprising: the flagship gunner of the squadron, Colonel F. A. Bersenev, before moving to a new position, was the head of training for quartermasters and gunners in the Training Artillery Detachment.

Methods of zeroing in and adjusting the fire of the Artillery Training Detachment


About sighting and adjusting fire on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron
A. E. Shpynev

A textbook on artillery for students of the gunnery class of the Baltic Artillery Unit will help us get acquainted with this technique. fleet.

This book was published with changes and additions in 1896, 1900 and 1904. Its author is A.E. Shpynev, since 1902 the chief artilleryman of the Kronstadt port, and before that he was the head of training for gunners in the Training Artillery Detachment.

Now let's consider the very method of sighting and adjusting the fire, set out in the 1904 edition.

Do not rely solely on the accuracy of rangefinder measurements. To ensure the accuracy of the fire, the range and the rear sight correction must be specified by zeroing.

In order to better see the falling shells, cast-iron shells should be used.

When firing on land, the “fork” principle was applied, i.e., observing the result of the fall of the first projectile, the next shot was fired with such an amendment that it fell from the opposite side of the target.

Thus, the target was taken into a "wide fork", in other words, it turned out to be between the falling shells.

The third shot was fired at an average setting between the first and second, and the fourth shot was fired at an average setting between those closest to the target.

A "narrow fork" was obtained if the difference between the settings of the two shots that fell closest to the target did not exceed 3-4 divisions of the sight. In this case, it is already possible to open fire from all guns with rapid fire or volleys according to the average data of these shots.

When firing at sea, sighting had to be carried out in the same way as on land, but its completion should be the fall of a shell close in front of the enemy ship (if it was approaching). Accordingly, at the moment of opening fire, the enemy had to be in the middle of the projectile dispersion ellipse.

Next was to observe the results of the shooting. If the number of undershoots exceeds the number of flights, then it is necessary to increase the range, if vice versa, then reduce it.

Methods of sighting of the 2nd Pacific squadron according to the "Organization of the artillery service"



A. F. Bersenev

Initially, the firing technique was set out by A.F. Bersenev in a separate document “Organization of artillery service on ships of the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet”, approved by order No. 5 of 8.07.1904/XNUMX/XNUMX.

"Organization of the artillery service" indicated the need for shooting if the battle began at long distances. The purpose of zeroing is to determine as accurately as possible the moment of opening rapid fire from all guns.

The organization of the sighting was assigned to the fire manager - a senior artillery officer. He had to indicate the plutong, which starts zeroing, based on the readings of the rangefinder, calculate the distance data and rear sight corrections for undershoot and transfer them to the guns.

Further, it was required to make sighting shots and, observing the falling shells, change the rear sight corrections to clarify the direction to the target, while, if possible, without changing the range. The enemy ship itself had to approach the distance at which sighting shots were fired.

When the projectile fell directly in front of the target, it was necessary to complete the sighting and open fire to kill.

In squadron combat, fire must be concentrated on the first number of the enemy battle line. The ship that started zeroing in had to show the distance and the setting of the sight, so that those following it could use this data instead of zeroing in.

As we can see, in the “Organization of the Artillery Service”, in comparison with the textbook on artillery for students of the class of gunners of the Training Artillery Detachment of the Baltic Fleet, a simplified methodology was adopted.

"Fork" was not required, apparently, out of the hope of being able to accurately determine the distance with the latest rangefinders, which were equipped with the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Artillery preparation in Reval



Z.P. Rozhestvensky

In August-September 1904, the squadron in Reval began intensive artillery training. From the experience gained, some changes were made to the zeroing technique.

Firstly, the question arose of the difference between the falls of their shells.

Circular No. 330 of 18.09.1904/XNUMX/XNUMX suggested doing this at the moment of the fall, counting to oneself as many seconds as the ammunition should fly, based on tabular data.

Secondly, in circular No. 334 of September 18.09.1904, XNUMX, squadron firing was described in detail.

The first shot should have been fired by the flagship or any other ship at the signal of the squadron commander.

At the beginning of sighting, it was required to raise the "0" flag so that other ships would not fire shots.

Fire should have been fired from two cannons located close to each other.

The most distant ship of the squadron (from the side is more visible) should observe the falling shells and show the values ​​of the observed overshoot or undershoot.

4 shots were allotted for shooting. Before the last shot, the aiming ship had to inform the rest of the squadron of the range and the installation of the rear sight with flags.

These data, taking into account the results of the 4th shot, had to be used to open fire to kill.

During the battle, at the signal of the flagship, the fire could be interrupted, and the shooting procedure started anew.

To consolidate the skills in practice, firing from 75-mm cannons with live cast-iron shells was carried out at the layba. At the same time, the squadron walked in a wake column along the line at a distance of 32 ... 40 cab.

Each gunner was given just 4 shots in a row so that he could observe the fall of his shells and adjust the aiming on them.

The choice of anti-mine caliber for practicing sighting looks very strange. Moreover, for 75-mm guns, the distances were close to the limit.

Despite the fact that the regulatory documents do not explicitly state the need to take the target into the "fork", the restriction of sighting shots to 4 leaves little doubt that this particular method should have been used.

Artillery preparation in Madagascar



Teachings of the 2nd Pacific squadron in Madagascar

A new stage in the evolution of the shooting technique began with the arrival of the squadron to Madagascar and several live firings.

On January 10.01.1905, 29, Z. P. Rozhestvensky, in preparation for the exercises, issued order No. XNUMX, which significantly changes the rules for sighting.

First, order-by-squad fire control was proclaimed. The squadron commander before the start of the battle or already during it could indicate the target to other units. If he did not do this, then he should have concentrated fire on the same ship at which the squadron flagship would begin to fire.

At distances over 30 cab. only one ship closest to the enemy was supposed to start zeroing. Having achieved the result, he transmitted the distance and the correction of the rear sight to other ships.

To test the new methodology, a practical shooting plan was drawn up on 13.01.1905/4/15. The squadron was supposed to drop 25 shields indicating enemy ships, retreat to 6 ... XNUMX cab. and start shooting with XNUMX-inch shells from the flagship of the squad that will be closest to the targets.

Shooting was required to be carried out slowly, at the command of the fire manager, from each gun in numerical order. Moreover, if possible, the fire of the ship should be divided into different shields.

On January 14.01.1905, 42, based on the results of the last shooting, Z. P. Rozhestvensky issued order No. XNUMX, in which both errors were sorted out and the rules for shooting were clarified.

All ships, with the exception of the Aurora, earned a negative assessment of the admiral.

Often the shots were fired with large and uniform errors, completely without correction. 12-inch guns opened fire after a long period of time after 6-inch guns, when sighting data was long out of date.

The squadron stretched for 55 cab., So that the transfer of zeroing data to the other end of the formation lost all meaning, and therefore, for the future, the flagship of each detachment had to start zeroing independently.

Particular attention was paid to the need to first take the target into a wide fork, and adjust the third shot according to the results of the fall of the previous ones.

Fire from 12-dm guns should have been opened only with actual results of sighting from 6-dm guns, and then continued at a high pace, correcting according to the observed results.

The next combat shooting took place on 18.01.1905/19.01.1905/XNUMX and XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX according to the same plan as the previous one.

The squadron commander appreciated its results better, but still noted cases of firing without adjustment, especially with 12-inch shells.

For the new shooting, the shooting rules have changed a little again. Now it was necessary to first capture the target in the fork with shots from two 6-dm guns, and then, according to the results obtained, hit it with a 12-dm gun.

The last live firing of the squadron on January 25.01.1905, XNUMX was interrupted by Z. P. Rozhestvensky, barely starting.

It is known that the Eagle managed to fire only two shots from 6-inch guns and one from 12-inch guns.

In order No. 71 of January 25.01.1905, XNUMX, Z. P. Rozhestvensky called the past exercises "a useless disposal of ammunition supplies," since no one understood that the third shot needed to be corrected according to the data of the first two.

Some fired the third shot after a long pause according to outdated data, while others fired all the shells altogether without changing the sight.

Despite the fact that during the exercises several ships fired at the same target, they did not interfere with each other due to the limited number of shots fired and the low rate of fire.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron did not conduct live firing anymore.

The shooting method has not changed.

Order No. 170 of March 21.03.1905, XNUMX contained only a reminder that shooting should be leisurely and meaningful, the gunner should not fire a new shot without waiting for the sight to be adjusted based on the results of the previous one.

Thus, the squadron went into battle without even completing the practice of sighting.

Zeroing of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in the Battle of Tsushima


The most complete information about the shooting of the "Prince Suvorov" was gleaned from the diary of the senior flag officer, Lieutenant N. L. Krzhizhanovsky.

The first shot was fired from the left bow 6-inch turret on the 32 cab. (5 926 m), but the projectile fell with a flight. Then the distance was reduced by 2 cab. and fired a second shot - its result is not specified. They opened fire with 12-inch guns.

I note from myself that, according to Japanese data, the distance at the time of the opening of fire by "Prince Suvorov" was 7 m.

That is, a ranging error of about 1 m was initially made. It is doubly strange that at the same time the projectile fell with a flight, in other words, the guidance error was more than 000 m.

"Prince Suvorov", without completing the sighting, switched to fire to kill.

Accordingly, the distance was not transferred to the other ships of the squadron. Instead, flag "1" was raised, meaning that all squadron units should focus their fire on the first enemy ship, if possible. Obeying the order, even the coastal defense battleships in the rear of the column opened fire at the Mikasa from the maximum distance.

What happened next is eloquently described by Lieutenant S. Ya. Pavlinov, who commanded the Orel’s bow 12-inch turret:

As soon as the admiral showed in battle which ship to hit, the entire squadron opened fire at the same time and, of course, a huge number of splashes formed near the head enemy, and not a single artillery officer was able to correct the shooting by sighting. It remained to correct the shooting either by eye, or using a rangefinder.

The commander of the Orel artillery group, Lieutenant K. P. Slavinsky, began firing from the left bow 6-inch turret.

After three shots were fired, we had to abandon zeroing, due to the complete impossibility of observing the fall of our shells in a mass of splashes, which at times completely covered the Mikasa from our eyes.

The senior artillery officer of the Orel, Lieutenant F.P. Shamshev, was unable to correct the fire.

It was impossible to distinguish bursts of their sighting shots. There were too many splashes around Mikasa. Stopwatch didn't help.

Alas, the miracle did not happen.

Artillerymen, who did not learn how to shoot at the exercises, naturally could not shoot at the battle.

Moreover, a new serious problem was discovered: the concentration of fire made it impossible to observe the falling shells and adjust the fire. I had to fire "blindly", focusing only on the readings of the rangefinder.

The gunners of the "Eagle" only about half an hour after the start of the battle dared to disobey the order of the admiral and abandoned useless fire on the Japanese flagship.

K. P. Slavinsky:

About 21/2 hours. from the conning tower it was transferred:
- Start shooting at the Japanese cruiser abeam, similar to our Aurora.
... Nobody shot at him, and the fall of our shells was perfectly visible ...

In the combat report of "Izumo", well-aimed fire of "Eagle" on him was noted.

But the transfer of fire from Mikasa was very late.

Precious time was wasted.

The Japanese had already inflicted heavy damage on the Oslyaba and Knyaz Suvorov and were heavily shelling the Alexander III.

The outcome of the Tsushima battle was actually already a foregone conclusion.

Thus, due to the insufficient training of shooting skills and the ill-conceived concept of concentrating the squadron's fire on the enemy flagship, the 2nd Pacific squadron was doomed to very inefficient firing at the outset of the Tsushima battle.

PS


A little about projectiles


Repeatedly in articles and discussions, it was hypothesized that one of the key reasons for the defeat in Tsushima was the absence of an explosion in domestic shells when falling into the sea, similar to that observed in Japanese shells - with a high burst and a cloud of black smoke. As a result, it was difficult to observe the fall of their own shells.

Yes, there was such a problem.

254-mm, 203-mm and 152-mm shells equipped with a Brink tube did not usually explode on impact with water.

305-mm and 120-mm high-explosive shells, which had a tube of the 1894 model, more often exploded when they fell into the sea, but the cloud from the explosion of smokeless powder was poorly visible.

In some phases of the Tsushima battle, in conditions of long distance and fog, it was indeed difficult to observe the fall of one's own shells.

But did this problem exist in the key first phase?

Numerous testimonies of officers from the "Prince Suvorov" and "Eagle", given in this article, indicate that in the first phase of the battle, bursts of their own shells were perfectly visible.

The observation problem was different: when several ships fired intensively at the same target, a “wall of bursts” from overshoots arose, beyond which the target was not visible.

Could a high-explosive projectile like the Japanese one solve this problem?

Of course not!

The “wall of splashes” would only get higher and would be complemented by a wall of black smoke.
Author:
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  1. sevtrash
    sevtrash 14 January 2022 18: 12
    +3
    Enquist said that the difference in range estimation with the help of rangefinders from neighboring ships reached 10 cable lengths. Nebogatov said that they began to conduct rangefinders from above before the battle.
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 14 January 2022 23: 16
      +5
      Quote: sevtrash
      Nebogatov said that they began to conduct rangefinders from above before the battle.

      One of the junior artillery officers of Nicholas I testified that the bow rangefinder, on the wheelhouse, was upset almost immediately from the concussion from his own shots. The second rangefinder, on the aft deckhouse, lasted longer, but also began to show garbage after an hour of shooting. However, the third rangefinder, on the fore-mars, in his opinion, worked relatively well to the end.

      The problem is in the fastening, the delicate optical system was attached to a rigid gun-type machine that did not have any dampers from shocks and tremors. Accordingly, rangefinders located closer to the guns were the first to fail. Alas! Real shooting experience is minuscule!
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 16 January 2022 18: 05
        -2
        Quote: Saxahorse
        a delicate optical system was mounted on a rigid gun-type machine that did not have any dampers from shocks and tremors

        You are talking nonsense, and the most outrageous thing is that you speak categorically and confidently.

        1) What caused problems with the rangefinder settings, we discussed in one of Alexey's articles.
        2) The gun machine was installed directly on deck, and the rangefinder pedestal - no.

        The rangefinder itself, in turn, was not attached to anything (learn the materiel).
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 16 January 2022 19: 38
          +3
          Quote: Comrade
          2) The gun mount was mounted directly on the deck, but the rangefinder pedestal was not.

          In the picture, the mount of the base is precisely the Russian rangefinders of the 2nd TOE?
          Quote: Comrade
          The rangefinder itself, in turn, was not attached to anything (learn the materiel).

          Hanging in the air? Maritime?? laughing
          1. rytik32
            16 January 2022 19: 53
            +4
            Quote: Saxahorse
            Hanging in the air? Maritime??

          2. Comrade
            Comrade 17 January 2022 03: 33
            -3
            Quote: Saxahorse
            In the picture, the mount of the base is precisely the Russian rangefinders of the 2nd TOE?

            This is a standard setting for a rangefinder.
            Quote: Saxahorse
            Hanging in the air?

            It was fixed with two clamps.
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 17 January 2022 22: 31
              0
              Quote: Comrade
              This is a standard setting for a rangefinder.

              The base of the Russian rangefinder in the photo above clearly does not correspond to the drawing you provided. The holes are small, for bolts or rivets. No bushing was used in them. What I wrote about, a deaf installation, without a damper.
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 18 January 2022 03: 44
                -1
                Quote: Saxahorse
                The base of the Russian rangefinder in the photo above clearly does not correspond to the drawing you provided.

                It is useless to explain anything to you, I am writing for those who read our conversation. All, I emphasize, all the holes through which the bolts must pass are empty. One of them is specially circled in red.
                This means that the entire structure will tip over at the appropriate angle of heel of the Glory, and in fresh weather it will simply move along the deck.
                Again.
                The photograph does not correspond to the drawing fragment, since the pedestal simply stands where it was placed, it not attached to the deck.
                In addition, on the right it is also bent. This means that the pedestal cannot be properly fixed, since there is a deformation of the part of the base through which the bolts must pass. The red arrow indicates curvature.

                Yes, just don’t tell me that there are no bolts, because the whole structure was glued to the deck with snot or epoxy or just planted on some kind of pin.
                So here's a challenge for you, old friend. How is the entire installation attached to the deck if the holes are empty? If it is hard to see, write, I will give empty holes close-up.
                Suggest options! Bolder!
                1. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 19 January 2022 20: 35
                  0
                  Quote: Comrade
                  So here's a challenge for you, old friend. How is the entire installation attached to the deck if the holes are empty?

                  Certainly not attached at all. Photo for memory, next to a freshly arrived rangefinder. It's not the right place.

                  However, you again successfully missed the essence of the question asked to you. You see that the holes SMALL ? You can't fit a damper bushing into them. The Russian rangefinders did not have a damper.
    2. Andrey Tameev
      Andrey Tameev 14 January 2022 23: 27
      +1
      Quote: sevtrash
      Enquist said that the difference in range estimation with the help of rangefinders from neighboring ships reached 10 cable lengths.

      There were about 100 cabs, so 10 is close to the accuracy of Barr and Strood rangefinders at this distance
    3. Jura 27
      Jura 27 15 January 2022 10: 22
      +9
      The unsuitability of the commander, and even the gunner, is clearly visible. He didn’t teach anything, having a bunch of training shells on the remnants, and even ordered to hit on the head, i.e. I didn’t even understand the elementary thing - that in principle it’s impossible to shoot with such a number of ships, because. no one can distinguish their bursts from others.
  2. Thrifty
    Thrifty 14 January 2022 18: 25
    +1
    I don’t know, but in my opinion, shooting from two guns close to one another is absurd. It is necessary to conduct sighting from the tank and stern guns in order to introduce an average correction for the guns of a given ship based on the results.
  3. Avior
    Avior 14 January 2022 21: 50
    +6
    You read the article and catch yourself thinking - why, no one in the squadron has fired before, except for direct fire? officers did not know the shooting technique? From the article, the impression was that they started shooting only after the 2 squadron went to sea, as if training had begun from scratch. :((
    No matter how you maneuver in battle, if you do not get into other people's ships, then no talent of a naval commander will help.
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 14 January 2022 23: 24
      +10
      Quote: Avior
      From the article, the impression was that they started shooting only after the 2nd squadron went to sea, as if the training had begun from scratch. :((

      Yes! The squadron was staffed with new recruits. Moreover, most of the newcomers went to the main forces of the squadron, Borodino. Although the same Melnikov long ago asked the question, what exactly prevented Rozhdestvensky from transferring crews from the Black Sea .. Ready and trained ..

      Words are not enough to scold the admiral beloved by some .. Truly the "Black Swan of the Empire" ..
  4. Konnick
    Konnick 14 January 2022 22: 16
    +4
    That's right, we had erratic sighting, which did not allow us to shoot accurately in the future. The Japanese, on the other hand, shot at one ship in turn, then concentrated aimed fire at this ship.
    1. Avior
      Avior 14 January 2022 23: 08
      +8
      I read about shooting practice in an article and wonder, did they have shooting before that? How did they shoot at all, if they couldn’t not only master the simple method of shooting with a fork, but even simply understand? Couldn't they have had their first shootings?
      In order No. 71 of January 25.01.1905, XNUMX, Z. P. Rozhestvensky called the past exercises "a useless disposal of ammunition supplies," since no one understood that the third shot needed to be corrected according to the data of the first two.

      Some fired the third shot after a long pause according to outdated data, while others fired all the shells altogether without changing the sight.

      After all, we are talking about senior artillery officers, and not simple sailors at the guns.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 January 2022 08: 22
        0
        Quote: Avior
        I read about shooting practice in an article and wonder, did they have shooting before that?

        Of course :)))) They are listed in great detail at Tsushima in the topic "shooting of the 2nd squadron" - there were quite a few of them.
        Quote: Avior
        How did they shoot at all, if they couldn’t not only master the simple method of shooting with a fork, but even simply understand?

        Here the question is rather to Alexei, according to what documents he describes them.
    2. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 14 January 2022 23: 30
      +5
      Quote: Konnick
      The Japanese, on the other hand, shot at one ship in turn, then concentrated aimed fire at this ship.

      You misplaced the accents. The Japanese concentrated their fire wherever possible. But each shot separately. Again, if it works. Centralized zeroing is a serious mistake of the Russians. All errors add up, starting from determining the distance to the enemy by the flagship, and ending with the errors of helmsmen and signalmen in determining the distance to their ships. Separate shooting gives an order of magnitude higher percentage of hits. Which was confirmed by the battles of WWI in the Black Sea.
  5. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 14 January 2022 23: 10
    +4
    Not bad! In terms of information content, the material is very good. However, I cannot fail to note not the most successful text formatting, which significantly impedes perception.

    At the same time, questions also appeared, since the text is rich in real facts!
    In August-September 1904, the squadron in Reval began intensive artillery training. From the experience gained, some changes were made to the zeroing technique.

    Shooting in Reveli is an extremely interesting episode. Who exactly how and how much shot there? The question is serious. It is known that at the same time, the ships of 2-1 TOE continued to load supplies and, most importantly, recruits! From here I want to understand what and who fired when the ships themselves were clearly not ready for battle or for a campaign .. It is known that Oslyabya and Aurora went through the full course of firing there, as fully equipped a year earlier. By the way, this is also noticeable later, according to the positive marks addressed to Oslyabi and Aurora as the best shooters in Madagascar, for example. It is known that other ships went out at least for mine caliber firing. However, how serious were the firing of the main calibers of our armadillos?

    The last live firing of the squadron on January 25.01.1905, XNUMX was interrupted by Z. P. Rozhestvensky, barely starting.

    There is an interesting nuance here. According to some reports, in these shootings Rozhdestvensky decided to try to shoot in two lines, through the system, so to speak. They say that he interrupted these firing almost immediately, after the first successful hit on Dmitry Donskoy. Do you have confirmation for what reasons ZPR interrupted the third shooting? And I have a vague feeling that going into battle at Tsushima in two columns, the ZPR still kept in mind the very idea of ​​shooting through the ranks ..

    It has been repeatedly hypothesized in articles and discussions that one of the key reasons for the defeat in Tsushima was the absence of an explosion in domestic shells when falling into the sea, similar to that observed in Japanese shells - with a high splash and a cloud of black smoke.

    Good question. There is a feeling that the Russian shells were quite torn when they hit the base of the wave, but at the same time they mediocrely ricocheted without breaking, falling into a relatively calm and even surface of the water.
    1. rytik32
      14 January 2022 23: 26
      +7
      Shooting in Reveli is an extremely interesting episode. Who exactly how and how much shot there?

      Muddy topic. It was known that there were barrel firing, firing from the PMK. From all calibers they shot at about. Kalos. Then shooting at the layba. Allocated 5000 75-mm shells, but did not use them all. According to Kudryavsky, there were several exits for firing at lifes. The eagle did not have time to shoot Revel.
      According to some reports, in these shootings Rozhdestvensky decided to try to shoot in two lines, through the system, so to speak. They say that he interrupted these firing almost immediately, after the first successful hit on Dmitry Donskoy.

      This is about the previous shooting. On January 18.01, Suvorov hit Donskoy, missing by 7 cab., And on January 19.01, he could not be forced to shoot through gaps in his formation.
      Do you have confirmation for what reasons ZPR interrupted the third shooting?

      The order mentions "waste of shells" - I have no other data. Rozhdestvensky did not like to share his thoughts)))
      1. 27091965
        27091965 14 January 2022 23: 46
        +2
        Dear Alexey. very interesting article, thanks. Comments tomorrow night already.
      2. Maxim G
        Maxim G 15 January 2022 13: 30
        +2
        It turns out (according to Japanese data), "Eagle" could lay shells accurately, 3BO too.
        And whose accuracy do the Japanese still celebrate?
        1. rytik32
          15 January 2022 14: 06
          +3
          I don’t remember right away, but I don’t have complete translations of the database. I only searched for fragments that were interesting to me.
          1. Maxim G
            Maxim G 15 January 2022 14: 20
            +5
            It turns out (according to Japanese data), the "Eagle", 3BO could shoot accurately.

            There seems to be no doubt that the "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyabya" could also shoot accurately.

            The conclusion suggests itself that the result of the battle, if there had been normal training (which would have been led by a normal commander), was not at all predetermined.
      3. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 15 January 2022 18: 27
        +3
        Quote: rytik32
        This is about the previous shooting. On January 18.01, Suvorov hit Donskoy, missing by 7 cab., And on January 19.01, he could not be forced to shoot through gaps in his formation.

        Super! For a long time I could not understand what kind of shooting was discussed in this incident.

        Quote: rytik32
        Allocated 5000 75-mm shells, but did not use them all.

        This is the same feeling that in reality there were shootings in Revel mainly with a mine caliber. And only Aurora and Oslyabya danced the full program.
    2. Maxim G
      Maxim G 15 January 2022 16: 10
      +4
      I would also note that the article does not contain a list of used literature, both paper and in the form of links to Internet sources.
      Those who study the topic, they could come in handy.
      1. rytik32
        15 January 2022 23: 23
        +5
        Shpynev's 1904 textbook is available online. Requisites https://search.rsl.ru/en/record/01003725976
        Orders and circulars of the 2TOE are in the RGAVMF https://rgavmf.ru/fond/531/fond-531-opis-1
        Krzhizhanovsky's diary is in the National Library of Russia, in the Larionov fund
        Japanese data taken on jacar https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/default
        1. Maxim G
          Maxim G 16 January 2022 02: 46
          +2
          Thanks Alexey. smile
        2. Maxim G
          Maxim G 16 January 2022 08: 18
          +2
          Will it be about the preparation of the 3TOE, which later merged into the 2TOE?
          1. rytik32
            16 January 2022 10: 34
            +2
            I don't have any sources. It is necessary to read the orders and circulars of the 3TOE in the archive
            1. Maxim G
              Maxim G 16 January 2022 10: 50
              +2
              And Japanese data too.

              By the way, Alexei, will there ever be an article devoted to the "ideal" campaign and battle?

              Those. then how could it ideally be, taking into account the real state of affairs, and what could lead to (alternative plan (s) of the campaign and battle)?
              1. rytik32
                16 January 2022 11: 37
                +4
                I can only write one more article with the experience of 1TOE
              2. rytik32
                16 January 2022 11: 57
                +4
                Of the alternatives, it would be possible to break through if the ships were brought to normal displacement, removed combustible materials, reconnoitered, kept the speed at 12 ... 14 knots, actively maneuvered, refused to concentrate fire ...
                1. Maxim G
                  Maxim G 16 January 2022 12: 02
                  +2
                  Well, we discussed this with you and Saksahors, plus get rid of slow-moving transports, go through the Sangar or La Perouse Strait.

                  Send 3TOE ahead of La Perouse to connect with the WOC and organize a rendezvous operation.
                2. 27091965
                  27091965 16 January 2022 19: 11
                  +2
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Of the alternatives, it might have been possible to break through

                  Dear Alexey. It is difficult to give such an assessment, two sides are involved in the battle, and if one side can be tried to calculate, then problems will arise with the definitions of the actions of the second side.
  6. Andrey Tameev
    Andrey Tameev 14 January 2022 23: 21
    +9
    Thanks for the article, Alex!
    Now the artillery preparation of the 2nd TOE for Tsushima becomes clear.
    1. Rozhdestvensky, being the head of the Main Staff, was responsible for combat training. However, we did not have a single instruction for firing, each formation and even individual ships composed something of their own. Accordingly, there was no unified system for training artillerymen according to unified rules.
    2. During the campaign, Rozhdestvensky issued separate circulars in order to form "shooting rules", however, the circulars both complemented and contradicted each other. There has never been a single instruction.
    3. Quite logically, Rozhdestvensky's described sighting did not work during practical shooting. However, no "debriefing" was carried out with the gunners, and the shooting in Madagascar was interrupted in the middle, without having achieved anything and without having worked out and consolidated the correct skills.
    4. The concentration of detachment fire is described by Rozhdestvensky indistinctly. Either the detachment was supposed to concentrate fire, or the entire squadron. The concentration of fire has not been tested in practical firing.
    5. In the outset of the battle, the number "1" raised above the "Suvorov" meant one thing for everyone - "hit in the head." And all 12 of our ships were supposed to shy away at Mikasa. Regardless of the fact that the end simply could not shoot to her.
    6. "Suvorov", without finishing sighting and not finding the exact distance, switched to rapid fire. For everyone, "Mikasa" was hidden behind a forest of splashes, which made it absolutely impossible to adjust the fire.
    7. When ours came to their senses and began to transfer fire to other Japanese ships, it was already too late - the Japanese crushed the Suvorov and Oslyabya. Minus two. And further on the rise.
    With a concentration of fire on the head, Rozhdestvensky lost the battle in the first half hour.
    9. Shooting was carried out with quick fire, firing in volleys was essentially prohibited. This made it difficult to adjust the fire.
    10. It was necessary to shoot each of our ships at their own Japanese. Perhaps on "Mikasa" it was worth concentrating the fire of our two lead ones. If, of course, they fired in alternating volleys. However, this was not worked out.
    11. The leadership style of Rozhdestvensky, who pressed down officers, captains, and admirals, did not at all contribute to the manifestation of initiative. No preliminary study of the battle. Everyone has turned into non-reasoning robots.
    12. With such a commander, the result was natural.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 January 2022 09: 47
      -2
      Andrey, alas, but the article is a "parameter adjustment" in its purest form.
      I won't take it all apart, but...
      The article is full of internal contradictions - they didn’t know how to shoot, but in battle
      In the combat report of "Izumo", well-aimed fire of "Eagle" on him was noted.

      Further, Alex writes
      The next combat shooting took place on 18.01.1905/19.01.1905/XNUMX and XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX according to the same plan as the previous one.

      That is, they shot 2 days in a row? :) Maybe, after all, there were 4 shootings, and the fourth was interrupted? :)
      Further Alexey writes
      The squadron commander appreciated its results better, but still noted cases of firing without adjustment, especially with 12-inch shells.

      But, in order to make a positive impression, he immediately proceeds to Rozhdestvensky's "crushing" reaction to the shootings on January 25th. But it was precisely according to the results of the shooting on January 19 that the Suvorov officer, Vyrubov, wrote:
      The first shooting was poor, but the second and especially the third were great. It's obvious how we need practice. The 12-inch turrets fired especially well: the bow, for example, laid 6 out of 5 shells, so the admiral of Togo would have to sign for receiving them in full

      so maybe not everything was so bad with the shooting? :)
      The article often ignores conflicting sources.
      So, for example, to evaluate the results of the shooting, Krizhzhanovsky's diary is taken. But what about Packinham's report, which indicated
      As soon as the Russians returned to their previous course (14.07), their lead ship opened fire. The first shell fell 20 meters behind Mikasa, followed by others that fell even closer.

      By the way, Alexei read this report .... And here such a version is quite possible - Suvorov's first shot is a cover, with a small error on the rear sight, but on the ship it was considered a flight. The second shot - reduced by 2 kbt - undershoot - the distance was determined - they switched to defeat. The first shell hit Mikasa 2-3 minutes after the opening of fire, it seems to be true
      Accordingly, the distance was not transferred to other ships of the squadron. Instead, the flag "1" was raised, meaning that all units of the squadron should, if possible, concentrate fire on the first enemy ship.

      "1" - the order to the detachment to shoot if possible. The order says in Russian in white:
      The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. This issue should focus if possible the fire of everything detachment.

      And finally, the alternate reality went:
      But the transfer of fire from Mikasa was very late.
      Precious time was wasted.
      The Japanese had already inflicted heavy damage on the Oslyaba and Knyaz Suvorov and were heavily shelling the Alexander III.

      13.50 the fight began
      14.02 - 12 minutes from the beginning of the battle - a heavy shell falls near the "Azuma" - that is, at least 2 ships are under fire, and not the lead one
      14.02 - 75mm hits Tokiwa. Let's ignore, 75 mm is not an indicator, the ship could shoot at Mikasa, and a 75 mm battery fired at Tokiwa because it got
      14.05 - 15 minutes from the beginning of the battle - Iwate - 203-mm projectile. That is, Nakhimov did not shoot exactly at Mikasa. 3 ships under attack
      July 14.07 - 17 minutes from the start of the battle - hit in Yakumo. Theoretically, you can ignore it - the projectile was 120 mm could fly from Zhemchug there or Emerald. But if it was a projectile with BRBO - 4 ships under fire from the main forces
      14.09 - 19 minutes from the beginning of the battle - hit in Izumo 152-mm - 4-5 ships under fire! (depending on who got into "Yakumo")
      14.10 -20 minutes from the start of the battle - one or two hits on Asama, caliber 254-305-mm Five or six ships at gunpoint!
      And now let's remember that the ship, in order to hit, also needs to shoot. That is, it selects a target and opens fire much earlier than it hits.
      Who shot at Mikasa in the outset of the battle
      1st armored - in full force
      "Oslyabya" - unknown
      "Sisoy the Great" - definitely not, the commander's report:
      "At 1 p.m. Oslyabya opened fire on the enemy ... ... the battleship Sisoy Veliky entrusted to me could open fire, but not at the lead enemy ship, but first at the 42th in their formation , ("Nissin"), then on the 5th ("Kasuga"), and then on the cruisers.

      "Navarin" - unknown
      "Nakhimov" - not in the outset of the battle and quickly transferred fire to the cruisers:
      The distance was 55 cables. to "Mikaz", heading angle - 30 °. "Oslyabya" has already fired. The Japanese began to respond. As soon as the distance became 42 cables, "Nakhimov" began firing, first at "Mikaz", and when he left the firing angle, then at the one on the traverse.

      That is, "Nakhimov opened fire on Mikasa belatedly, when the distance decreased, and given that at the beginning of the battle on Mikasa the heading angle was already 30, he barely fired more than a few shots at him.
      "Nikolai" did not shoot at the Japanese in the beginning of the battle - they did not get guns. Nebogatov showed:
      At 1 hour 35 min. from br. "Prince Suvorov" fire was opened and all our ships also began to shoot, except for br. "Emperor Nicholas I", since the distance from him to the enemy (50 cab.) Was inaccessible to his guns.

      Apraksin - according to Mikasa, but obviously not for long
      From the battleship, while it was possible, they fired at the head battleship Mikaza, then the fire was transferred to the armor. cruiser Nissin.

      Senyavin - definitely not
      During the opening of fire by the squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov", the enemy ship closest to my battleship was number 5 or 6, on which I opened fire

      Ushakov - unknown.
      In total, out of 12 ships, we know that 5 ships fired at Mikasa (the 1st armored, short-lived and Apraksin), Nakhimov joined them later and briefly, 3 did not shoot at Mikasa accurately (Sisoi, Nikolai, Senyavin) and at 3 more ships - No data. At the same time, the Japanese did not hesitate to shoot at one target from 5-7 ships at Rytik
      In other words, from the very beginning of the battle, our ships fired at 2 or 3 ships (depending on whether Senyavin and Sisoy chose the same target), and possibly more, and 15 minutes after the start, the squadron fire dispersed - shot at Nissin and/or Kasuga (Senyavin and Shisoy) Iwate (Nakhimov) "Azume" - no one knows who, well, Mikase, of course, where would it be without him, and perhaps someone from the BRBO was aiming Yakumo, but this is not certain :)
      That is, according to Rytik
      The Japanese had already inflicted heavy damage on the Oslyaba and Knyaz Suvorov and were heavily shelling the Alexander III.

      Less than 15 minutes after the start of the battle wassat
      1. rytik32
        15 January 2022 11: 17
        +6
        Andrei, good afternoon!
        they didn’t know how to shoot, but in battle

        Moreover, much later, the Eagle's well-aimed fire on the Mikasa was noted, and not only in Abo's memoirs, but also in the database.
        I didn't see any contradictions at all. Ours shot, but not quickly. The same "Suvorov" eventually shot.
        That is, they shot 2 days in a row? :)

        Yes, organizationally it was one shooting, which took place for 2 days.
        But it was precisely according to the results of the shooting on January 19 that the Suvorov officer, Vyrubov, wrote

        1. Rozhdestvensky forbade writing in letters about combat training.
        2. Cutouts from the upper deck (or where was he?) could incorrectly observe the results and it seemed to him that there were hits.
        3. A completely different picture was described in the Marine Collection


        14.02 - 12 minutes from the beginning of the battle - a heavy shell falls near the "Azuma" - that is, at least 2 ships are under fire, and not the lead one

        Yeah, a fragment broke the barrel - where has this been seen? But there was not a single hole in the side from other fragments ... But two wounded on the upper deck ... The fragments of that shell were very tricky ... Wouldn't I forgive you to admit self-explosion?
        14.05 - 15 minutes from the beginning of the battle - Iwate - 203-mm projectile. That is, Nakhimov did not shoot exactly at Mikasa. 3 ships under attack

        Perhaps the fire shared. And the bow and middle tower - according to Mikasa.
        "Oslyabya" - unknown
        By Mikasa
        "Sisoy Veliky" - definitely not, commander's report
        There are other versions. Pancakes:

        At about 1 hours a short alarm sounded to the port side. Distance about 45 cab. They opened fire from 55 "guns, and soon from 12" and 6 m / m. It was ordered to shoot in the head.

        Navarin. Stepan Kuzmin.
        At the beginning of the battle, we could not fire from 6 "guns and until the death of Oslyabya, not a single shot was fired from 6" guns, since the enemy was from the bow and only the bow tower could shoot.
        Those. the target was well ahead of the beam. Who could it be??? laughing
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 January 2022 11: 58
          -3
          Quote: rytik32
          I didn't see any contradictions at all. Ours shot, but not quickly.

          At 13.49-50 they opened fire, at 13.52 the first hit. Not fast:)
          Quote: rytik32
          Yes, organizationally it was one shooting, which took place for 2 days.

          Organizationally - yes, but in fact there were two shooting exercises.
          Quote: rytik32
          Vyrubov from the upper deck (or where was he?) could incorrectly observe the results and it seemed to him that there were hits.

          I don't know at all. But the fact is that eyewitnesses just showed that they shot well. You have the same verdict "have not learned anything", and there is not even a mention of other opinions.
          Quote: rytik32
          The Sea Collection described a completely different picture.

          The same one. Quote the order referenced by MS :)
          Quote: rytik32
          Yeah, a fragment broke the barrel - where has this been seen? But there was not a single hole in the side from other fragments ... But two wounded on the upper deck ... The fragments of that shell were very tricky ... Wouldn't I forgive you to admit self-explosion?

          Everything is possible, and if the Japanese reported a hit in the barrel, I would unconditionally agree, but the hit next to the ship ... is noticeable :)
          Quote: rytik32
          Perhaps the fire shared. And the bow and middle tower - according to Mikasa.

          Said quite clearly
          As soon as the distance became 42 cables, "Nakhimov" began firing, first at "Mikaz", and when he left the firing angle, then at the one on the traverse.

          About the division of fire - not a word. But it is indicated that the fire was opened when the distance decreased by 13 cables, that is, for the first ten minutes at least Nakhimov did not shoot at anyone at all
          Quote: rytik32
          There are other versions. Pancakes:

          Who was ordered? :)))) Specifically, Blinov, or the entire squadron? :)
          Quote: rytik32
          Navarin. Stepan Kuzmin.
          At the beginning of the battle, we could not fire from 6 "guns and until the death of Oslyabya, not a single shot was fired from 6" guns, since the enemy was from the bow and only the bow tower could shoot.
          Those. the target was well ahead of the beam. Who could it be???

          In fact, anyone except "Mikasa" :)))))) By the time the "Navarin" approached the distance of its main guns, hardly even the bow turret could fire at it
          1. rytik32
            15 January 2022 12: 54
            +6
            At 13.49-50 they opened fire, at 13.52 the first hit. Not fast:)

            Is this a hit from Suvorov? And can a downed antenna be considered a hit? In fact, this is a big flight.
            From Suvorov, they noticed their first hit 5 minutes after the start of the fire.
            Said quite clearly

            Aft turret commander:
            I got the distance by voice from the stern rangefinder and tried to shoot at the end ship "Iwate"

            Those. no shooting at the Mikasa, the distance from the stern rangefinder is all signs of separation of fire.
            Who was ordered? :)))) Specifically, Blinov, or the entire squadron? :)

            Blinov. How could he in the battery know what was ordered to the entire squadron?
            By the time the Navarin approached the range of its main guns, hardly even the bow turret could fire at it

            Those. "Nakhimov" from room 42 could, and "Navarin" with a range of 58 cab. could not?
            Andrey, lower the owl as soon as possible. laughing
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 January 2022 13: 14
              -3
              Quote: rytik32
              Is this a hit from Suvorov? And can a downed antenna be considered a hit? In fact, this is a big flight.

              We count the Japanese hitting the masts and pipes, I don’t see any problems.
              Quote: rytik32
              From Suvorov, they noticed their first hit 5 minutes after the start of the fire.

              What are you, you yourself wrote that there was nothing to make out :))))
              Alexey, both stararts on Suvorov died. So who is there and what he noticed, historical science is unknown.

              Quote: rytik32
              Aft turret commander:
              I got the distance by voice from the stern rangefinder and tried to shoot at the end ship "Iwate"

              Those. no shooting at the Mikasa, the distance from the stern rangefinder is all signs of separation of fire.

              Alexey, why don’t you quote in full?
              At the very beginning of the battle, all messages from the aft tower with the conning tower were corrupted or interrupted - neither the dial, nor the telephone, nor the mouthpiece worked. I got the distance by voice from the stern rangefinder and tried to shoot at the end ship "Iwate"
              .
              That is, there is no indication that this transmission happened at the outset of the battle, it is likely that this was after Nakhimov received injuries. In any case, there is a clear indication that Nakhimov did not shoot at all in the outset of the battle.
              Quote: rytik32
              Blinov. How could he in the battery know what was ordered to the entire squadron?

              And who said that he himself saw the signal? But if it was Blinov who was ordered, then it was also not in the outset of the battle. He, sorry, the firing sector of the guns did not allow shooting at Mikasa

              Quote: rytik32
              Those. "Nakhimov" from room 42 could, and "Navarin" with a range of 58 cab. could not?
              Andrey, lower the owl as soon as possible.

              You are ... it’s good to write me down here as bird lovers. I will not lower the owl :))))))
              Alexei, it's you, please release the unfortunate bird.
              Both Nakhimov and Sisoy show that at the beginning of the battle the distance to Mikasa was 55 cables. (And Nakhimov DID NOT FIRE at Mikasa until the distance decreased to 42 cables, and this was not fast). It is clear that it is geometrically impossible that both before Shisoy and before Nakhimov at 13.50 there were 55 cables from Mikasa, but it is obvious that Navarin could shoot at Mikasa only at an elevation angle very close to the limit, which was not practiced. Moreover, Navarin's gunners had other, closer targets at their disposal.
              1. rytik32
                15 January 2022 13: 41
                +5
                We count the Japanese hitting the masts and pipes, I don’t see any problems.

                As a hit - yes, we count. As a positive result of shooting - of course not.
                So who is there and what he noticed, historical science is unknown.

                You don't know this! Please do not confuse with historical science. The officers from the "Suvorov" managed to tell the Japanese everything in detail, and they even made a sign.
                For example, such emotional remarks in the wheelhouse:
                14:05:40
                Mikasa is turning! They will turn around and go in a parallel course! We will win! Togo is crazy!
                14:06
                The bow turret of the main battery and the turrets of the SC on the left side are pointed at the Mikasa. The gunnery officer cannot give correction and range while the ship is turning.
                14:06:40
                The senior artillery officer decided that the ship was on course and began calculating the corrections

                Japanese time

                At the very beginning of the battle

                there is no indication that this transfer happened at the outset of the battle

                How shoud I understand this???
                And who said that he himself saw the signal?

                He was ordered from the cabin to shoot at Mikasa. What's not clear?
                But if it was Blinov who was ordered, then it was also not in the outset of the battle. He, sorry, the firing sector of the guns did not allow shooting at Mikasa

                Right at the start of the fight! It was only then that Mikasa stepped forward.
                that Navarin could shoot at Mikasa only at an elevation angle very close to the limit, which was not practiced

                Fantasy again...
                Moreover, Navarin's gunners had other, closer targets at their disposal.

                Navarin understood the order that way. He fired from the bow turret, apparently at Mikasa, but did not dare to violate the order from other guns.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 January 2022 14: 25
                  0
                  Quote: rytik32
                  As a hit - yes, we count. As a positive result of shooting - of course not.

                  Of course yes. Because there is no reason to consider this hit the result of a sighting shot.
                  Quote: rytik32
                  You don't know this! Please do not confuse with historical science.

                  Let's say.
                  Quote: rytik32
                  The officers from the "Suvorov" managed to tell the Japanese everything in detail, and they even made a sign.

                  Okay. Let's assume that everything is so, no one has forgotten or confused anything. Here are just A. Rytik, a man much better than me, familiar with historical science, for some reason indicates,
                  The first shot was fired from the left bow 6-inch turret on the 32 cab. (5 926 m), but the projectile fell with a flight. Then the distance was reduced by 2 cab. and fired a second shot - its result is not specified. They opened fire with 12-inch guns.

                  That is, after the second shot, they switched to fire to kill. And the fact that a hit from Suvorov was noticed only after 5 minutes does not in any way indicate that this was the first hit from Suvorov. Moreover, I generally don’t understand well how they could notice a hit on the antenna from Suvorov.
                  But the funny thing is that Suvorov was the first to open fire, and if someone else hit at 13.52, it turns out that he shot even faster. And after 2 minutes - another hit ...
                  In general, your owl does not fit on the globe, Alexey
                  Quote: rytik32
                  How shoud I understand this???

                  As written. There is evidence that Nakhimov did not shoot at the beginning of the battle, and from the indicated evidence it is assumed that the transmission of the distance generally occurred after Nakhimov received damage
                  Quote: rytik32
                  He was ordered from the cabin to shoot at Mikasa. What's not clear?

                  The commander is not clear, which indicates that there was no order for Mikasa.
                  Accordingly, it can be assumed that Blinov either quotes a general order for the squadron, or received such an order after Mikasa entered the sector of fire of his guns (there is about 100 degrees)
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Fantasy again...

                  Harsh reality. Nicholas 2nd could not shoot - he did not get it, although he was walking right behind Nakhimov. And Navarin walked in front of Nakhimov, despite the fact that
                  305-mm and 152-mm guns had ballistic data, ammunition and machine tools, similar to similar guns of the battleship "Emperor Alexander II" (For more details, see the author's book "Battleship" Emperor Alexander II "". St. Petersburg 1997)

                  It is interesting, by the way, that Arbuzov gives the firing range of the Navarin and Alexander GKs - 9600 m at 15 degrees, that is, 52,5 cab
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Navarin understood the order that way. He fired from the bow turret, apparently at Mikasa, but did not dare to violate the order from other guns.

                  And this is really a fantasy
                  1. rytik32
                    15 January 2022 14: 39
                    +4
                    Suvorov was the first to open fire

                    No, the first "Oslyabya".
                    From the "Suvorov" they noticed a hit at 14:13. According to the manual, this was most likely hit number 2, because. first antenna, and No. 1 without a break.
                    Hit No. 3 was also noticed from Suvorov - everything matches.
                    or received such an order after mikasa entered the sector of fire of his guns (there is about 100 degrees)

                    Somewhere around 13:55...14:05, the angle still allowed shooting at Mikasa.
                    i.e. 52,5 cab

                    I could still get it.

                    Andrey, so what about shells?
                    Could land mines like those of the Japanese help with this method of concentrating fire?
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 January 2022 15: 26
                      -2
                      Quote: rytik32
                      No, the first "Oslyabya".

                      "Suvorov" :)
                      Quote: rytik32
                      From the "Suvorov" they noticed a hit at 14:13. According to the manual, this was most likely hit number 2, because. first antenna, and No. 1 without a break.

                      Everything is possible, but the whole problem is that by that time Suvorov had already been fired at quickly, and not only Suvorov was shooting at Mikasa. That is, from the fact that they saw a hit, it does not mean that it was they who achieved it.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Somewhere around 13:55...14:05, the angle still allowed shooting at Mikasa.

                      This is what you thought, if not a secret?
                      Quote: rytik32
                      I could still get it.

                      Taking into account the fact that both Nakhimov and Sisoy showed 55 cabs to Mikasa? Yes, even if Nakhimov is right, and not a sisoy, he still could not. But he could shoot at other ships
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Andrey, so what about shells?
                      Could land mines like those of the Japanese help with this method of concentrating fire?

                      Of course, I stated the reasons in my articles.
                      1. rytik32
                        15 January 2022 16: 13
                        +4
                        This is what you thought, if not a secret?

                        Figured it out according to the plans.
                        Taking into account the fact that both Nakhimov and Sisoy showed 55 cabs to Mikasa?

                        What time is this, remember?
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 January 2022 17: 55
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        What time is this, remember?

                        In the outset of the battle, it was already quoted in this discussion. I brought artilleryman Nakhimov
                        The distance was 55 cables. to "Mikaz", heading angle - 30 °. "Oslyabya" has already fired. The Japanese began to respond. As soon as the distance became 42 cables, "Nakhimov" began firing, first at "Mikaz", and when he left the firing angle, then at the one on the traverse.

                        That is, he showed 55 cables even after ours began to shoot
                        And you quoted Sisoy
                        At about 1 hours a short alarm sounded to the port side. Distance about 45 cab. They opened fire from 55 "guns, and soon from 12" and 6 m / m. It was ordered to shoot in the head.
        2. Comrade
          Comrade 16 January 2022 04: 25
          -1
          Hello, Alexey!

          Quote: rytik32
          2. Cutouts from the upper deck (or where was he?) could incorrectly observe the results and it seemed to him that there were hits.
          3. A completely different picture was described in the Marine Collection


          All shields were intact


          In the memoirs of Kostenko there is such a picture:
          1. rytik32
            16 January 2022 16: 29
            +2
            Valentine, good afternoon!
            In memoirs

            I don't have official shooting results. For some reason, the officers of the 2TOE and Rozhdestvensky himself are silent about them.
            Unfortunately, the description of the Madagascar shootings is so contradictory that I have used only the most reliable sources - orders and circulars.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 January 2022 18: 00
              +1
              Quote: rytik32
              I don't have official shooting results.

              But they shot badly. Dot.
              Stunned
              1. rytik32
                16 January 2022 19: 04
                +4
                In the article, I did not give my personal opinion, but almost quotes from orders and circulars.
                I have no other orders or circulars for you.
                Go on laughing
                1. Comrade
                  Comrade 16 January 2022 19: 19
                  -2
                  Quote: rytik32
                  In the article, I did not give my personal opinion, but almost quotes from orders and circulars.

                  Due to the lack of figures illustrating the accuracy of shooting, these emotional orders and circulars are worthless.
                  What is "bad" shooting, and what is "good" shooting, how much in percentage?
                  I understand your desire, Alexey, to understand the topic, but in the absence of statistical data, you have no chance.
                  Percy Scott liked to scold the shooting of some guns on the cruisers entrusted to him, called her useless. An outside observer, unfamiliar with the statistics of shooting at other British cruisers, had a misconception about the supposedly poor shooting of the cruiser.
                  However, if you compare it with the firing of other cruisers, it will turn out to be brilliant.
                  Personally, I have an idea why there are no statistics on Madagascar shootings, but this is just a hypothesis.
                  1. rytik32
                    16 January 2022 19: 49
                    +3
                    Due to the lack of numbers illustrating the accuracy of shooting

                    Here are the figures for the Japanese.
                    Barrel shooting 7.04.1905/250/580, passing direction, distance from 1703 to 894 m. Out of XNUMX bullets, XNUMX hit.
                    Is this a good shot or bad???

                    However, if you compare it with the firing of other cruisers, it will turn out to be brilliant.

                    He also has 7 cab. missed and hit your cruiser? laughing

                    And there are unambiguous conclusions of the commission of inquiry.


                    So you will find the statistics of training firing - there will be a reason to reconsider the official point of view, which has long become traditional.
                    Until then, alas!
                    1. Comrade
                      Comrade 17 January 2022 03: 05
                      -1
                      Hello, Alexey.

                      Quote: rytik32
                      Here are the figures for the Japanese

                      Why are you showing them to me, because we are talking about the 2nd Pacific Squadron?
                      Quote: rytik32
                      And there are still unambiguous conclusions of the commission of inquiry

                      Everything is relative.
                      An unknown author laments that twelve-inch guns in Madagascar were made twice "only" in 3-5 shots, and it was terribly small.
                      But the fact that the Japanese on April 25, 1905 were able to afford as much as two projectile on one twelve-inch gun, the so-called. The "investigative commission" is silent.
                      This is understandable, she is busy manipulating consciousness, there is no time for objectivity, hehe .. Not for comparing six to ten Russian shells with two Japanese shells.
                      Total, emotions over the edge, zero statistics. The feeling is that it was not a naval officer who wrote, but a certain journalist.
                2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 January 2022 20: 37
                  +1
                  Quote: rytik32
                  In the article, I did not give my personal opinion, but almost quotes from orders and circulars.

                  No, Alexei, if you had simply brought them, there would have been no questions. But you brought them in and gave a conclusion - they shot BAD, they didn’t know how to shoot. And this despite the fact that you don’t have a debriefing for firing 18-19.
                  That is, you did not add anything to the known (except for the shooting plans) and ... just added your personal opinion.
                  1. rytik32
                    16 January 2022 22: 14
                    +2
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    they shot BAD, they didn’t know how to shoot

                    In Tsushima, "Suvorov" missed by more than 1000 m, took aim for 5 minutes.
                    How else to evaluate it? Of course "bad!"
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 January 2022 06: 33
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      In Tsushima, "Suvorov" missed by more than 1000 m, took aim for 5 minutes.
                      How else to evaluate it? Of course "bad!"

                      The whole point is that a miss of more than 1000 m is not a historical fact, but your guesses. And, as follows from your own data, as many as 2 shots were spent on sighting, after which they switched to rapid fire. Which, generally speaking, is a very good result.
      2. rytik32
        15 January 2022 11: 30
        +5
        Forgot about Packinham.
        But what about Packinham's report, which indicated

        Alas, neither the Russians nor the Japanese confirm this point.
  7. geniy
    geniy 15 January 2022 01: 40
    -4
    The fact that the manuals never published a complete shooting technique suggests that there was some basic principle known to the gunners of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which was not necessary to repeat.

    That's exactly what existed BASIC PRINCIPLE! But the highly professional author of this article who has read many documents knows nothing about it! As well as all the other "experts"! And not knowing this basic principle, everyone here and on other resources is trying to be clever and put forward their own theories ....
  8. geniy
    geniy 15 January 2022 01: 59
    -3
    254-mm, 203-mm and 152-mm shells equipped with a Brink tube did not usually explode on impact with water.

    Fathers! Yes, how is it? It turns out that Russian shells usually did not explode on impact with water - is that really true?
    And what is meant by the word usually? Maybe it's 60% or 80%, or even 95% of non-explosions on water? And did the Russian sailors know that their shells do not explode on the water? Have any of the VO participants heard at least one word about this?
  9. The comment was deleted.
  10. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 15 January 2022 10: 16
    +6
    A plus. The material is an addition to the general picture of the factors that influenced the Tsushima pogrom.
    Personal opinion. Rozhdestvensky at that time had knowledge about the "Tsesarevich". He understood that taking the flagship out of action was key to presenting combat at that point in time. Confirmed by the example of 1TOE. Therefore, the desire to concentrate fire on "Mikasa" is quite healthy and natural. Another thing is HOW it came to life .... The fact that some kind of training gave results and the Russians got into Japanese ships (unlike Chemulpo) suggests that there was an idea of ​​\uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbshooting. The mistake of the ZPR was firing ONLY at the head. Here I agree with the author - the lack of a clear adjustment for each ship due to the mass of general bursts only worsened the quality of shooting. When the Russians began to realize this and began to shoot at visible targets, they hit Japanese ships constantly. The fact that these hits did not lead to critical damage, which refers to the quality of the shells, has already been said.
    By shooting. If the Russians immediately distributed the targets among themselves (i.e., a classic battle in a column, where everyone shoots at their counterpart), weak visible bursts of special weather would not do, because. You can only observe your results through binoculars. Another mistake was the same sighting with a smaller caliber. Zeroing the main gun gave big bursts, which is better for adjusting. But they came to this after Tsushima, in her lessons. But, I repeat, it is now easy for us to reason with afterknowledge. At that time, people thought in their own way.
    An error with the firing of the entire squadron at the flagship, plus low speed, when the Japanese quickly move forward, excluding some of the Russian heavy guns from such firing, and led to the fact that the Russians could not take advantage of the number of heavy guns. And so, almost all Japanese ships that were not fired upon by anyone in the outset of the battle were able to calmly shoot at visible targets, find the distance and, based on their data, shoot at the heads. And they couldn’t get their shells ... Who knows, if the same Eagle had started firing at Izumo right away, then he would have received not 5 - 12 "shells, but more. Japanese armored cruisers would immediately be fired upon from heavy guns, what could affect them more than what they received in the whole battle.Then one could talk about some benefit from the advantage in the GK...
    And so this advantage turned out to be leveled by an error in the overall fire control of the squadron. But it was based on that knowledge and intentions at that moment in time. Does this justify Rozhdestvensky? In no case. This is indeed one of the mistakes that led the Russians to not make the best use of their artillery, which also fired more slowly. And this is precisely the commander's mistake ...
    The same Jutland showed that the experience of the REV was used. The ships distributed targets among themselves (running south). The ships concentrated fire at the turning point (shelling of the 5th squadron during the turn), the ships chose visible and convenient targets, and did not shoot everything at the head ...
    Personally, my opinion hi
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 15 January 2022 19: 13
      +2
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Therefore, the desire to concentrate fire on Mikasa is quite healthy and natural.

      The desire to concentrate fire is healthy and natural for a sailing fleet. When the distance is 200-300 meters, they shoot in order to clear the decks of the enemy flagship for our boarding. The decision was forced, because the flagship is usually the largest battleship with the largest crew, and it takes at least two or three people to board such a fortress.

      In the conditions of an artillery battle, conditions conducive to the maximum number of hits should come to the fore. The concentration of fire here is in the background.

      Quote: Rurikovich
      Another mistake was the same sighting with a smaller caliber. GK zeroing gave big bursts

      Error however. At that time, they considered the main caliber to be just the average - 6. "That's why they were shot at. And they considered large guns only an additional argument, and therefore they were not particularly worried about their low rate of fire.
  11. 27091965
    27091965 15 January 2022 11: 35
    +3
    To consolidate the skills in practice, firing from 75-mm cannons with live cast-iron shells at the layba was carried out. At the same time, the squadron walked in a wake column along the line at a distance of 32 ... 40 cab

    It is very difficult to consider this shooting as training. In this question, I will give an example from shooting and training in the English fleet. After installing telescopic sights on 76 mm and 57 mm guns, it was noted that the quality of shooting improved, respectively, and the number of hits increased, but at the same time, attempts to get good results when shooting at a distance of 5000 yards did not live up to expectations. Therefore, when firing at such a distance in the English fleet, it was believed that one could only hope for good luck. This despite the fact that in 1900 a change was made in artillery calculations, the number of l / s was increased, a "sight-setter", a spotter, was added. I think we should not forget that at that time the real distance at which the gunner could visually see the fall of shells in various fleets was determined from 1500 to 1800 yards. For this reason, firing from 75 mm guns at a distance of 32-40 cabs could not be of practical use.
  12. Maxim G
    Maxim G 15 January 2022 12: 42
    +3
    Thanks Alexey for a good article, briefly and intelligibly told about the preparation of the Russians and what it led to.
  13. Niko
    Niko 15 January 2022 13: 54
    +4
    Good article, thanks. And much closer to reality: they prepared poorly, did not hit the exercises, lost the battle dry. Everything is logical. Much more logical than the opinion on this issue of another respected author, who believes that they shot better than the Japanese in the Tsushima battle, better than the 1st squadron, and in general the indicators are almost the best in the history of the fleet. The logical question is "why then lost"? requires long and confusing explanations, but the logic is not visible - the commander is a genius, they shot better, they maneuvered - excellent. GAME SCORE???????
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 January 2022 17: 59
      0
      Quote: Niko
      they prepared poorly, did not hit the exercises, lost the battle dry.

      For those who like simple answers - will do. For those who paid attention at least to the fact that Alexei did not disclose the results of firing on May 18 and 19, that there was no concentration of fire on the Japanese flagship, that the Russians dispersed fire on the Japanese ships in less than 15 minutes from the start of the battle, etc. d. etc. - aldeady no.
      But alas, people like simple answers :)
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 15 January 2022 19: 15
        +5
        "...What can be done on the basis of fewer assumptions should not be done on the basis of more..."
        Everything and everything indicates that the 2TOE ships fired worse. Not even talking about the result, which in itself is sufficient evidence of this. Maneuvering, apparently, is also worse. Rozhdestvensky, as the head of the squadron, seemed to be inferior not only to Togo, but also to Nebogatov and Enquist.
        The results of the battle were predetermined, extraordinary actions of the commander-in-chief could have avoided this, but Rozhdestvensky was incapable of that.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 January 2022 08: 26
          -1
          Quote: sevtrash
          Everything and everything indicates that the 2TOE ships fired worse.

          Naturally. That's just the level of training they were not much inferior to the Japanese. However, they did not have combat experience, and the main reason for the worst shooting is the material part - it is more difficult to adjust the fire + the weak effect of Russian shells on the artillery potential of Japanese ships
      2. Comrade
        Comrade 16 January 2022 04: 37
        -1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        alas, people like simple answers :)

        Especially on questions that they sometimes cannot even formulate.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 January 2022 08: 28
          -1
          Quote: Comrade
          Especially on questions that they sometimes cannot even formulate.

          Greetings, dear colleague! That is how it is
  14. Pushkowed
    Pushkowed 16 January 2022 17: 00
    +2
    It is strange that our gunners, even seeing a complete failure with zeroing (a wall of splashes, the inability to distinguish their own) and having no range data from the flagship, still continued to stubbornly throw shells "somewhere in that direction", without thinking about the results.

    It seems to me that under such conditions, even having a strict order to "hit on the head" (but not having received the promised data for firing) - the most natural reaction and the best way to fulfill the order is to shoot at the second (third, fourth, just well visible ...) to the ship, around which there are fewer bursts, to clarify the distance in this way, and then, according to these data, transfer the fire to the lead one. The difference in distance between the leader and the target should not be too great. And it's basically calculable. In a pinch, one can move the fire smoothly along the enemy line, keeping an eye on bursts as long as possible.

    Perhaps some of our gunners decided to do so (this explains the bursts and accidental hits on other Japanese ships in the outset of the battle). And some could even succeed, because 3-4 times more shells flew into Mikasa than other Japanese battleships. But then Suvorov went out of order, Oslyabya drowned, and all the remaining Russian ships themselves began to choose their targets ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 January 2022 18: 00
      0
      Quote: Pushkowed
      It is strange that our gunners, even seeing a complete failure with zeroing (a wall of splashes, the inability to distinguish their own) and having no range data from the flagship, still continued to stubbornly throw shells "somewhere in that direction", without thinking about the results.

      They didn't do that :)
      Quote: Pushkowed
      It seems to me that in such conditions, even with a strict order to "hit on the head"

      Allotted for the 4th EBR of the 1st detachment ...
      Quote: Pushkowed
      the most natural reaction and the best way to follow the order is to shoot at the second (third, fourth, just clearly visible ...) ship

      Which was done, since from the very beginning of the battle, out of 12 ships, at least 2 did not fire beyond the distance, and the rest divided the fire into 2 or 3 ships at least.
      And after 10-15 minutes from the start of the battle, from 3 to 5 Japanese ships were already under fire
      1. Andrey Tameev
        Andrey Tameev 16 January 2022 19: 06
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

        They didn't do that :)

        Andrei, what signal was raised on the Suvorov? How did you determine that he belonged to only 1 detachment, and not to the entire squadron?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 January 2022 20: 40
          +1
          Quote: Andrey Tameev
          Andrei, what signal was raised on the Suvorov? How did you determine that he belonged to only 1 detachment, and not to the entire squadron?

          Signal "1"
          In Order No. 29 of January 10, 1905. said
          The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. The fire of the whole squad should be focused on this number, if possible.

          I have already quoted this order many times, by the way :)
          1. rytik32
            16 January 2022 22: 10
            +5
            Andrew, you still haven't answered the question.
            I'll repeat it again:
            How did you determine that he belonged to only 1 detachment, and not to the entire squadron?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 January 2022 06: 35
              0
              Quote: rytik32
              Andrew, you still haven't answered the question.

              Order No. 29 - written in Russian in white. What can be unclear there, if it is said directly
              should concentrate as far as possible the fire of all detachment

              What other answer do you need?
              1. rytik32
                17 January 2022 09: 22
                +3
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Order No. 29 - written in Russian in white. What can be unclear there, if it is said directly
                if possible, the fire of the entire detachment should be concentrated

                What other answer do you need?


                Those. the order does not say that it is necessary to concentrate fire the first squad.
                So why are you lying?

                The command should be read like this:
                The signal [of the squadron commander] will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the account from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. If possible, the fire of the entire detachment should be concentrated on this number [the number of the detachment (s) to which the order will apply will be indicated by the call sign, for example 8B - 1BrO, 8V - 2BrO, without a call sign - to the entire squadron. These rules are not spelled out in a specific order, because. these are the general rules of signal production, they are spelled out in the Signal Book].
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 January 2022 10: 33
                  0
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Those. the order does not say that it is necessary to concentrate the fire of the first detachment.
                  So why are you lying?

                  Wow:)))
                  Quote: rytik32
                  The command should be read like this:
                  The signal [of the squadron commander] will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the account from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front.

                  Alex, this is nonsense. The order must be read AS WRITTEN. AND WRITTEN IN IT
                  The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. The fire of the whole squad should be focused on this number, if possible.

                  DOT. That is, the order does not say that the signal is raised by the squadron commander, nor specifies the detachment.
                  You're just twisting the order
                  Quote: rytik32
                  These rules are not spelled out in a specific order, because. these are the general rules of signal production, they are spelled out in the Signal Book].

                  If this were so, then the members of the historical commission would note this. But it's not.
                  1. rytik32
                    17 January 2022 19: 14
                    +2
                    That is, the order does not say that the signal is raised by the squadron commander, nor specifies the detachment.

                    The order mentions both the first and the second detachment, and the entire squadron.
                    Only the squadron commander can give orders to all of them.
                    FLAGSHIP SIGNAL APPLIES TO THE FIRST TEAM ONLY

                    Why did you decide that only the first one?
                    Why not to the second, he is also mentioned in the order as well as the first. And the whole squadron is mentioned.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 January 2022 22: 33
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Why did you decide that only the first one?

                      Because the order DOES NOT PROVIDE fire control of the entire squadron with signals. According to the text of the order, the squadron concentrates fire on one target only when the FLAGSHIP DOES NOT RAISE THE SIGNAL.
                      And the SIGNAL implies EXCLUSIVELY THE FIRE CONTROL OF THE SQUAD.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      The order mentions both the first and the second detachment, and the entire squadron.

                      Our destroyers, Japanese docks and underwater parts of Japanese ships are also mentioned there. They, probably, in your opinion, could also be given instructions to shoot at a specific target.
                      1. rytik32
                        18 January 2022 18: 16
                        0
                        Because the order DOES NOT PROVIDE fire control of the entire squadron with signals


                        The concentration of the entire squadron on one ship was prescribed a long time ago.
                        Circular No. 334 of September 18, 1904
                        August 24, 2021
                        In addition to Circular No. 322 of the Headquarters, on the orders of the Squadron Commander, the following rules for zeroing in when firing a squadron at long distances are announced.

                        1. Zeroing is carried out by the lead ship or another at the signal of the Leader of the squadron or detachment.
                        2. At the time of zeroing, a conditional flag 0 (zero) is raised on the topmast of the zeroing ship, indicating that other ships must temporarily stop firing so as not to interfere with zeroing.
                        3. Shooting is carried out from two cannons standing nearby in turn. The fire manager, having given the setting of the sight and rear sight, commands: "sighting fire"
                        The plutong commander repeats the command of the fire manager, naming the number of the cannon that is currently ready to fire. Zeroing must be completed with the fourth shot. Immediately after the fourth shot, flag 0 (zero) is lowered.
                        4. Before the fourth shot, the aiming ship shows with numerical flags the sight in the cable (- on the right leg of the yardarm) and the installation of the rear sight (- on the left leg), these numbers are rehearsed for the 4th shot by all ships. The aiming ship, after firing, releases its readings if they have been rehearsed by at least two ships.
                        5. The most distant ship shows with numerical flags the apparent deviation of the projectile in range (number of cable lengths) of the first sighting shot, raising flag B (overshoot, more) or M (less than, undershoot) together with numerical flags: for example, when flying at 3 cable lengths, 3 B, and with a shortfall of 2 cables - 2 M.
                        6. Flag-lowered (zero) 0 on all courts they play a short alarm and open fire (by gun, by command) guided by the setting of the sight shown during the last sighting shot and adjusting it according to the place occupied in the formation and changing shooting conditions.
                        7. With each subsequent rise on the flagship of the call signs of an individual ship and the signal "to aim", all ships stop firing, and with the lowering of the signal flag and call signs, the indicated ship begins sighting, guided by the above rules.
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 January 2022 20: 46
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The concentration of the entire squadron on one ship was prescribed a long time ago.

                        Really?
                        Does this have anything to do with the issue under discussion? And what, if not a secret?
                        Alexey, of course, I understand everything, but in what place do the shooting rules refer to "1" in Tsushima?
                2. 27091965
                  27091965 17 January 2022 18: 44
                  +2
                  This is certainly not an order, but also interesting;
      2. Pushkowed
        Pushkowed 16 January 2022 19: 41
        +5
        Allotted for the 4th EBR of the 1st detachment ...
        Even four of us for 1 goal will be a bit too much. Especially if there is no data for firing, and each ship must determine them for itself. In addition, many from the 2nd and 3rd squads also tried to shoot at Mikasa, further interfering with the sighting of the 1st squad.

        We do not know how the Stararts behaved at Borodino and Alexander-3. But you can try to put yourself in their place.

        The order is to fire on Mikasa. There is no shooting data. This means: either start shooting yourself, or spit on it and stupidly shoot at the rangefinder. Both options are lousy. Around Mikasa the sea boils with splashes.

        If you shoot at the rangefinder and miss (which is exactly what will most likely happen - it’s almost impossible to guess the data the first time), then it’s impossible to correct your fire, because. not to distinguish their mistakes from other people's bursts. Pre-shooting for the same reason is all the more impossible. And what to do?

        The most natural reaction is to quickly (while the admiral does not see) shoot at Asahi, Shikishima or Fuji (there are fewer bursts around them), get at least some data, and then dance from these numbers, transferring fire to Mikasa. Perhaps due to this, Mikasa really got into, and not just boiled the sea.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 January 2022 20: 45
          0
          Quote: Pushkowed
          Even four of us for 1 goal will be a bit too much.

          The Japanese did not hesitate to shoot 5-7 ships at one target
          Quote: Pushkowed
          Especially if there is no data for firing, and each ship must determine them for itself.

          The Japanese themselves determined
          Quote: Pushkowed
          In addition, many from the 2nd and 3rd squads also tried to shoot at Mikasa

          I gave an approximate layout above, and I wrote to you.
          1. Pushkowed
            Pushkowed 17 January 2022 01: 08
            +4
            The Japanese did not hesitate to shoot 5-7 ships at one target
            After they took aim and knew the parameters for shooting.

            The Japanese themselves determined
            Take turns without interfering with each other.

            I gave an example layout above.
            From which it follows that Oslyabya, Navarin and Ushakov fired at no one knows who (and therefore could have at Mikasa), Nakhimov and Apraksin - at Mikasa, and commander Shisoya for some reason justified himself that he could not shoot at Mikasa.

            Why did Nakhimov, Apraksin and Sisoy mention Mikasu in their reports? Where does this mania come from? If order "1" concerned only the 1st detachment, then what orders did the ships of the 2nd and 3rd have? "Each unit chooses its own target, at the signal of its flagship" or even "Each ship fights independently"? If, according to the signals of their flagship, then what did Baer and Nebogatov order to their detachments?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 January 2022 06: 32
              0
              Quote: Pushkowed
              After they took aim and knew the parameters for shooting.

              Nothing like this:))
              Quote: Pushkowed
              Take turns without interfering with each other.

              I'm sorry, but that wasn't even close. Each Japanese ship chose a target for itself, they were given only priorities (if possible, hit the flagships or the nearest ones). There was no sequence and there was not close, everyone just decided for himself whether he could shoot or not. That is why the Japanese often endured fire. Here, for example, they shot at Oslyaba according to Sidorenko's analysis

              Quote: Pushkowed
              From which it follows that Oslyabya, Navarin and Ushakov shot at no one knows who (and therefore they could at Mikasa),

              Agas. Only now, purely technically, it was difficult for Navarin to shoot to Mikasa.
              Quote: Pushkowed
              Nakhimov and Apraksin - by Mikasa

              Only now Nakhimov - with a long delay, he was 55 cables from Mikasa when the battle began, and opened fire from 42 cables. At a speed of 9 knots, 13 cables can be passed roughly in 8,5 minutes, only he did not go in a straight line to Mikasa.
              In other words, in the outset of the battle, Nakhimov did not shoot at Mikasa and did not prevent others from doing so. Further, already at the beginning of the battle, he had a heading angle on Mikasa of 30, and after the indicated time he was able to open fire only for a short time, since Mikasa went to too sharp headings. Accordingly, for 3TOE it happened earlier
              Quote: Pushkowed
              Why did Nakhimov, Apraksin and Sisoy mention Mikasu in their reports? Where does this mania come from?

              It's very simple - like the Japanese, we had a rule that the lead Japanese ship was a priority when shooting, but you should shoot at it if possible. That is, it is a desirable but optional goal.
              Quote: Pushkowed
              If, according to the signals of their flagship, then what did Baer and Nebogatov order to their detachments?

              Alas, nothing.
        2. rytik32
          18 January 2022 12: 31
          0
          Quote: Pushkowed
          So what to do?

          According to the experience of the 1TOE, abandon the concentration of fire and switch to volleys. At least this experience reached Nebogatov and officers were even acquainted with it. It is more than likely that he reached Rozhdestvensky ...
          and then dance from these numbers, transferring fire to Mikasa

          So did Essen in ZhM
    2. rytik32
      16 January 2022 19: 11
      +5
      It is strange that our gunners, even seeing a complete failure with zeroing (a wall of splashes, the inability to distinguish their own) and having no range data from the flagship, still continued to stubbornly throw shells "somewhere in that direction", without thinking about the results.

      The root cause is that the 2TOE did not have a shooting technique.
      For example, I described the Japanese technique https://topwar.ru/183235-cusima-faktory-tochnosti-japonskoj-artillerii.html
      2TOE didn’t have anything similar, that’s how the Japanese clearly point out one-two-three ... who does what.
      It was clear to the Japanese what to do if the fall of their shells was not visible / indistinguishable - to crush the fire and (or) start shooting at a new target. In 2TOE, this is not spelled out anywhere.
      Observation of falling shells. The Japanese posted officers on the fore mars. Ours didn't even think about it.
      And this is even if we do not talk about volleys ...
  15. Andrey Tameev
    Andrey Tameev 16 January 2022 23: 51
    +4
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Andrey Tameev
    Andrei, what signal was raised on the Suvorov? How did you determine that he belonged to only 1 detachment, and not to the entire squadron?

    Signal "1"
    In Order No. 29 of January 10, 1905. said
    The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. The fire of the whole squad should be focused on this number, if possible.

    I have already quoted this order many times, by the way :)

    Andrey, what signals at whom to shoot were raised on the 2nd and 3rd detachments?
    Having trouble answering?
    It is understandable - none.
    The only signal was raised on the "Suvorov" and it referred to the entire squadron, since no additional signal was raised that it concerned only 1 detachment.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 January 2022 06: 37
      -1
      Quote: Andrey Tameev
      Having trouble answering?

      None. What are the difficulties?
      Quote: Andrey Tameev
      The only signal was raised on the "Suvorov" and it referred to the entire squadron, since no additional signal was raised that it concerned only 1 detachment.

      Andrew, one more time. There is an ORDER - the signal raised by the flagship refers to the SQUAD :)))
      And the fact that Nikolai and Oslyabya didn’t raise the signal, well, that doesn’t refute the fact that Suvorov’s signal belonged to the 1st armored.
      No "additional" signals were provided for by orders - and they were not needed
      1. Andrey Tameev
        Andrey Tameev 17 January 2022 08: 58
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Andrew, one more time. There is an ORDER - the signal raised by the flagship refers to the SQUAD :)))
        And the fact that Nikolai and Oslyabya didn’t raise the signal, well, that doesn’t refute the fact that Suvorov’s signal belonged to the 1st armored.
        No "additional" signals were provided for by orders - and they were not needed

        Andrey, did I understand you correctly that Rozhdestvensky deliberately did not give a damn about the fire control of the 2nd and 3rd detachments, let them, like, shoot where they want?
        Well, this is clearly overkill and not in the nature of Rozhdestvensky. If the course is already - then N023, if the lead one is knocked out, then the next matelot leads the squadron, if you shoot, then at the indicated ship. Everything is top notch! And there were no other orders, no matter how much you would like
        1. rytik32
          17 January 2022 09: 31
          +1
          In the same order No. 29 there were the following lines:
          "whereas the second detachment will continue to operate on the originally chosen target"
          uv. Andrei from Chelyabinsk, what flags, in your opinion, should be raised on the squadron flagship in order to order the 2nd detachment to continue firing at the same target?
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 January 2022 10: 38
            -1
            Quote: rytik32
            uv. Andrei from Chelyabinsk, what flags, in your opinion, should be raised on the squadron flagship in order to order the 2nd detachment to continue firing at the same target?

            NONE.
            The order is written in Russian in white
            If there is no signal, then, following the flagship, fire is concentrated, if possible, on the lead or flagship of the enemy.

            That is, it was necessary to focus fire on the head one IF THE SIGNAL IS NOT RAISE
            And further, if such a fire is concentrated
            So, for example, when approaching with head-on courses and after concentrating fire on the head, the number to which the action should be directed by all artillery of the first (lead) squadron of the squadron, while the second squad will continue to operate on the originally chosen target.

            It is written in Russian in white and nowhere is clearer - both that there SHOULD NOT BE A SIGNAL to concentrate the fire of the entire squadron, and that the SIGNAL OF THE FLAGSHIP APPLYS ONLY TO THE FIRST SQUAD.
            But no, which topic are you bullying over this order
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 17 January 2022 10: 35
          -1
          Quote: Andrey Tameev
          Andrey, did I understand you correctly that Rozhdestvensky deliberately did not give a damn about the fire control of the 2nd and 3rd detachments, let them, like, shoot where they want?

          Certainly. He could not control their fire with all his will.
          Quote: Andrey Tameev
          Well, this is clearly overkill and not in the nature of Rozhdestvensky.

          This is an objective reality. It is impossible to control the fire of 12 ships from the flagship, and Rozhdestvensky understood this.
          Quote: Andrey Tameev
          If the course is already - then N023, if the lead one is knocked out, then the next matelot leads the squadron, if you shoot, then at the indicated ship.

          And by what order was this indicated? Andrei, let's still study history as it is.