On the training of the Japanese gunners on the eve of Tsushima
Not so long ago, the continuation of the cycle of Maxim Klimov was published on VO, in which the respected author set himself the goal of showing Z.P. Rozhdestvensky the main culprit of the Tsushima tragedy of the Russian fleet... The article contains many reproaches to the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, but one of them seems especially interesting to me.
This is a reproach for the improper training of the crews entrusted to Z.P. Rozhdestvensky ships, and first of all, of course, the artillerymen.
The logic of the respected M. Klimov is as follows - the Japanese at the beginning of the war did not shine with artillery skills, but quickly learned and learned the right lessons from combat experience, but Z.P. Rozhdestvensky did nothing of the sort. "The extreme scarcity of evolutions and shooting, their extremely poor tactical background" - this is how M. Klimov characterizes the quality of the exercises of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.
Hence, of course, there is a natural desire to consider what and how the Japanese learned. Fortunately, some aspects of the preparation of the Japanese fleet are reflected in the report of the British observer - Captain T. Jackson on May 6, 1905 (new style).
As you know, after the battle in the Yellow Sea, the main forces of the Japanese fleet were in constant readiness to intercept the Port Arthur squadron, if it decided on a second breakthrough. The need to be ready at any time to go into battle, combined with the need to be based on an impromptu base near Fr. Elliot was not very inclined towards intense combat training. And then Port Arthur fell, and in the period from December 1904 to February 1905, most of the battleships and armored cruisers of Japan underwent refurbishment.
Obviously, after all this, the Japanese needed to restore their combat skills, and, if possible, improve them, taking into account the received combat experience. After all, H. Togo was facing a battle with the squadrons of the Russian Baltic Fleet, and this battle should have been seriously prepared.
Accordingly, from about March 1905, the Japanese were able to intensively restore the combat capability of the crews and prepare for a meeting with the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons.
But how did this happen?
According to T. Jackson's report, until April 12 (hereinafter - according to the old style), the Japanese fleet regularly conducted maneuvering training (steam tacktic). Sometimes artillery and torpedo exercises were carried out - alas, the British attaché does not provide any specifics on them.
But T. Jackson especially noted the large number of barrel shooting with rifle cartridges (aiming rifle practice), thanks to which, in the opinion of the Japanese, they managed to significantly improve the shooting accuracy of their gunners. An English observer cites the figures: from 40 to 60 percent.
It happened like this - every day one or two warships were removed from the anchor and went out on artillery exercises, which consisted in conducting barrel firing with rifle cartridges at targets towed by steamers allocated for this purpose. This kind of shooting took place all day.
"Every day, weather permitting, one or two ships carry out target practice, andaiming rifle practice at targets towed by steamboats is going on all day loog."
Big shooting on April 12
The crown of the artillery preparation was the naval exercise held on April 12 (25 in the new style).
This is how they went.
The 1st Combat Squad was trained, consisting of four battleships and the Nissin with Kasuga. Ships H. Kamimura did not take part in the exercise, but he himself was on the battleship "Fuji" and watched what was happening.
The target was a small islet that was 80-100 feet long and 35-40 feet high. Obviously, T. Jackson gives approximate figures, when converted to the metric system it will be about 25-30 meters long and 10-12 meters high, however, the British attaché indicates that there was a depression in the middle of the island, that is, its height was there. below the specified value.
However, even with this amendment, it is quite obvious that the size of the island exceeded the standard shields used for artillery exercises.
But there was one more nuance: the island had a gentle beach 20-30 feet long (6-9 meters). And the falls of shells on this beach were counted as hits - thus, the target on which the fleet was training took on completely cyclopean dimensions.
It must be said that T. Jackson claims that no such hits were recorded during the shooting. But at the same time, he also points out that they still could have been, because the island was not under constant supervision of the officers checking the shooting.
Here I already have a question for the organizers of the shooting - then who and how determined the number of hits?
Was it really taken from the words of the ship gunners, on their word of honor?
The consumption of shells for shooting did not boggle the imagination at all. For each gun with a caliber of 254-305-mm, 2 shells were fired, for 152-203-mm - 6, they did not shoot with smaller calibers.
The firing itself looked like this - the ship "converged" with the island and upon reaching a certain heading angle opened fire on it, and when the island was beyond the traverse, it stopped firing. During this time, the 152-mm guns of the firing side were supposed to release all the ammunition they put in, and the turret guns - half. Then the ship turned around and repeated the exercise, but now on a different side.
The distance to the island during the shooting was 2500-3000 yards, that is, 12,5-15 cables. In fact, they fired at a direct firing distance, although, perhaps, not with direct fire - according to T. Jackson, a reduced charge was used when firing.
But, of course, no zeroing was required at this distance, and the British attaché does not mention anything like that.
The practice shooting of the fleet can be roughly divided into individual and squadron - of course, the division is very general, but I do not set myself the task of listing all the possible forms of training for naval gunners.
The point is different - either the ship is practicing the skills of firefighting individually, or the exercise involves the joint maneuvering and firing of several ships at once.
T. Jackson does not indicate whether this was a squadron shooting, but reports that H. Togo was present on all ships at the time they fired.
With this caveat in mind, it is clear that the teachings could only be individual.
As you know, in those years, the combat interval between ships in the ranks was at most several cables.
Accordingly, it was absolutely impossible to cross from one battleship to another, if they were in wake formation, during the time when one ship had finished firing and the second had not started yet, it was absolutely impossible.
On the basis of the above, we have the following:
1. The exercises of the Japanese fleet did not provide for joint maneuvering and were just a series of individual exercises of individual ships.
2. Shooting at 12,5-15 cables could not serve as a training in the ability to correctly determine the parameters of the target and refine it by zeroing in. That is, in fact, the gunners' ability to take a large target into the sight at a direct shot range was being practiced - and nothing more.
It would seem that in such and such preferential (if not to say - primitive) conditions, the Japanese having combat experience had to shoot with enchanting accuracy: one could expect something similar to the shooting of "King Edward VII", to which M. Klimov referred with his 95% hits with the main caliber.
Alas, the reality turned out to be far from rosy.
Rounds - shots, hits - hits.
The best shooter of the 1st combat detachment of H. Togo turned out to be "Sikishima" - 75% hits with the main caliber and 66,7% - 152-mm. The overall accuracy of the battleship was 67,4% - 92 shells were expended, 62 hits were achieved.
The worst, apparently, turned out to be "Mikasa" - 92 shells were used up, but only 19 hits were achieved, that is, 20,7%.
Why - "most likely"?
It is possible that "Nissin" shot worse than "Mikasa".
Out of 84 shells of 152 mm caliber, this cruiser was able to target only 16, which gives 19%. At the same time, "Nissin" used up 24 rounds of 203-mm caliber, but T. Jackson could not establish the number of hits from 203-mm guns. A simple calculation shows that if there were less than seven 203-mm hits, then the percentage of its accuracy will be worse than Mikasa.
However, the Mikasa's main caliber did not work so badly - 5 hits out of 8 fired shells, which gives an accuracy of 62,5%.
The overall accuracy of the 305-mm guns of the four Japanese battleships was exactly 50% - 32 shells fired and 16 hits.
The only ten-inch "Kasuga" used up 2 shells, but did not achieve hits, and it is impossible to establish the percentage of accuracy of 203-mm guns due to the lack of statistics on the "Nissin". The eight-inch Kasuga turret showed a very moderate 25% - 3 hits out of 12 shots.
The accuracy of 152 mm guns averaged 33,75% for six ships.
Long range shooting
T. Jackson's report mentions two cases of such shooting.
The first time was on April 20 (May 3, new style) Izumo, Asama and Akashi carried out practice shooting at a distance of 6 yards, that is, 000 cables. Unfortunately, T. Jackson does not give any details about these teachings.
The next shooting looked, perhaps, even somewhat comical.
They were conducted by "Sikishima", which showed the best result among the ships of the 12st combat detachment during the firing on April 25 (1). Now he anchored 5 yards (800 cables) from the very islet that was fired at on April 29 and fired one round from 12-mm guns and 305 rounds from 5-mm guns. As I said above, at a distance of 152-12 cables, the battleship showed excellent 15% accuracy for the main caliber and 75% for 66,7mm.
Now, no longer in motion, but at anchor, even from a greater distance, the firing accuracy of the main caliber became exactly 0%, since the Sikishima did not achieve a single hit with 305-mm projectiles.
But the gunners who served the 152-mm guns did a better job - out of five shells, two still hit the island (40% accuracy).
Other shooting
The next day after the “big shooting on April 12”, Kasagi, Chitose, Otova and Niitaka left to practice shooting, and in the afternoon they were joined by the armored cruisers Iwate, Tokiwa and Yakumo ".
It is not known what these exercises were, but T. Jackson mentions the use of devices similar to Percy Scott's "dotter" (the sailor moves the target along a vertically exposed plate in front of the gun's sight, and when fired, a special device mounted on the gun barrel marks the hit point with a pencil. The Japanese version had a slightly different design, but performed the same functions: thus, apparently, there was no talk of caliber firing).
On April 14, Izumo, Azumo and Asama went out for shooting practice, in the afternoon they were joined by the armored cruisers Naniwa, Takachiho, Tsushima and Akashi.
There is no information about what the teachings were. Perhaps caliber shooting or barrel, or even Japanese versions of "dotters" without any shooting.
Here, in fact, that's all.
And what is the result?
To be honest, the Japanese artillery exercises as presented by T. Jackson make a frankly depressing impression.
First. There is no evidence that the Japanese learned to shoot more than 30 cables, but exercises at such a range, judging by the descriptions of the British attaché, were extremely rare.
But maybe it was shooting at 30 cables that became an innovation for the Japanese fleet, and earlier it fired at shorter distances?
I have not yet fully translated the reports of the British attachés, and, perhaps, I will discover something new for myself.
But so far, only an indication has been found that before the war the Japanese gunners practiced a lot to shoot at 30–35 cables.
This is Trubridge's report, which explains how it happened that the Japanese fleet, attacking on February 12, 1904, three Russian cruisers that left the inner harbor of Port Arthur, could not sink them or even significantly damage them. The Japanese officers just explained this by the fact that before the war they learned to shoot only at 30-35 cables, and if it was possible to approach the Russians at such a distance, then ...
However, according to our information, the battle of Bayan, Askold and Novik with the main forces of the Japanese fleet began at 40 cables, but at certain moments of the battle the distance was reduced to 32 cables.
However, the study of the circumstances of this battle is beyond the scope of this article - I will only note that the Japanese learned a lot about shooting at 30-35 cables even before the war. And it turns out that the pre-tsushima firing of the Mikado fleet added absolutely nothing to this practice.
Second. There is practically no mention of the development of innovations in the control of artillery fire, with the exception of the centralization of fire under the control of a senior artillery officer (in the Russian fleet - it was adopted long before the start of the war).
Practicing advanced sighting techniques?
Not a single mention.
Practicing firing with volleys for zeroing in or hitting a target, about which my dear opponent A. Rytik wrote so much?
Not a single mention.
However, there is a mention of another method, which A. Rytik credited the Japanese fleet with - observing the flight of shells and their falls. The point is that the artillery shell is visible in flight, and the Japanese gunners had the duty to monitor the flight of the shells they fired until they fall into the water, or hit the target.
T. Jackson confirms the words of my esteemed opponent in the part that observation of the flight of shells was part of the combat training of the Japanese fleet in the pre-war period. But he also points out that as a result of the Battle of Shantung, this practice was
absolutely failed.
That is (if someone is completely unfamiliar with English) - it completely failed, completely failed to justify itself.
Simply put, at small firing distances it was possible, but with an increase in the range - no longer, the gunners, trying to track the flight of the shells, lost sight of them and could not determine their fall by the bursts.
The British attaché even cites an example of an artillery officer who, watching the flight of his shells, suddenly discovered that they had changed direction (!) And were flying towards his own ship. That is, in other words, his gaze, imperceptibly for him, switched from his shells to the Russians flying in the direction of his ship.
And T. Jackson writes that this "best practice" before the Battle of Tsushima on the ships of the Japanese fleet was canceled. And that the observations of the falling shells were to be carried out by the commanders of the plutongs, focusing on where the shells of the artillery group entrusted to him fall "on average".
To be honest, in such a transcription, the differences from domestic methods of correcting rapid fire are minimal.
The third. Training in conditions close to combat, for which the respected M. Klimov stood up. Alas, from the description of the British attachés: there are no such in the Japanese navy at all. There is not a single description of squadron firing, where Japanese armored ships would practice firing, maneuvering or at least simply moving in a wake column as part of a detachment.
The "epic" shooting on 12 (25) April was reduced to individual exercises of individual ships, which they performed in turn, and there are simply no other descriptions of the maneuvers of the 1st combat detachment in full strength. The consumption of projectiles for caliber fire is extremely low, 1-2 shots per 305-mm gun.
What are the "five ammunition", which allegedly shot battleships and armored cruisers H. Togo on the eve of the battle with the 2nd Pacific Squadron, about which the Japanese officers told tales to V. Semyonov, who was captured ...
What can be added to the methods of training Japanese gunners?
Is that regular barrel firing, but the use of the latest British invention - "dotter", which allows you to train a gunner without firing a shot.
But there are also nuances here.
T. Jackson writes that 1–2 ships went out on barrel firing every day.
It turns out that each of the 12 battleships and armored cruisers of the Japanese practiced barrel firing at most five days a month?
Is this so much, in comparison with the teachings that Z.P. Rozhestvensky arranged for his squadron off the coast of Annam?
Comparison of training of the Japanese fleet and the 2nd Pacific squadron
Oddly enough, but the comparison is not at all in favor of the Japanese.
Alas, I am not ready to provide the dear reader with comprehensive information about the artillery exercises of the ships of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.
To my deep regret, I have not yet managed to get to the complete collection of orders and circulars for the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which, probably, could shed light on some issues. Or maybe these documents will only raise new questions, because a number of information from them (obtained from second hand) directly contradicts the recollections of the artillery officers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.
But even if we take such odious sources as, for example, the memoirs of V.P. Kostenko, who, in any case, cannot be accused of loyalty to the squadron commander, we will see a very interesting picture.
For example, here is a description of the teachings on January 14:
“A column of 10 ships walked around the shields, keeping them in the center of the circulation. The distance was maintained from 6 to 30 cables. Oslyabya opened the sight. His shells immediately fell very close to the shield. With a signal, he showed the found distance. Following this, the rest of the ships, after zeroing in from 6-inch guns, opened rapid fire with their entire port side. "
That is, we see that the teachings of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky - this is precisely the squadron exercises.
The squadron went in combat formation, shooting began with zeroing (in T. Jackson's report, this is not mentioned at all), moreover, there is an information exchange between the ships of the squadron (Oslyabya showed the distance to the shield determined by the results of zeroing). At the same time, it is quite clear that it was not at all individual firing of a gun at a target that was being practiced, but a full complex of fire control.
Otherwise, where would V.P. Kostenko quoted:
“But it is especially deplorable that it was completely impossible to control the fire. The senior artilleryman, who was in the conning tower, could not get the towers and casemates to fire without slowing down on his order. Either the order did not reach the gun, or for some reason the tower was not ready for firing. "
About the shooting on January 18, V.P. Kostenko writes:
“In cloudy weather, it was very difficult to see the bursts of shells. At times it seemed that the shells were falling close to the target, but when the Eagle raised its shield at the end of the exercise, there was not a single hit in it. And this time our "old men" from their old guns gave a better result than the new battleships. "Suvorov", turning to the opposite course, fired at the shields through its ships. "
In other words, unlike the Japanese fleet, the 2nd Pacific Fleet trained not “when the weather permitting”, but in the visibility conditions that could have developed in battle.
Dull and cloudy?
And who dares to assert that when the time comes for a decisive battle with the forces of H. Togo, the clear sun will shine?
Shooting on January 19:
“This time the shooting was more successful. "Oslyabya" opened zero range, placing three shells at the very shield, and showed the distance. He was picked up by the "Eagle" and managed to make several successful starboard shots.
"Suvorov" tacked around the shield, turning back, cut off the stern of the "Donskoy", which went tail in the wake column.
After turning, "Eagle" transferred fire to the port side, quickly found a target and managed to release two 12-inch and four 6-inch shells almost into the shield itself. Further shooting was carried out on the port side. "
"Suvorov" tacked around the shield, turning back, cut off the stern of the "Donskoy", which went tail in the wake column.
After turning, "Eagle" transferred fire to the port side, quickly found a target and managed to release two 12-inch and four 6-inch shells almost into the shield itself. Further shooting was carried out on the port side. "
That is, the shooting was carried out in the squadron's formation, during the squadron maneuvering, while the squadron did not just pass by the shields, but maneuver so that the shooting board changed.
Conclusions
An analysis of the documents at our disposal irrefutably proves that the "extremely poor tactical background" (according to M. Klimov) of the training of artillerymen Z.P. Rozhestvensky was head and shoulders above the training of the Japanese fleet.
Of course, the conditions of the artillery exercises of the 2nd Pacific were very far from ideal and, possessing a post-mortem, the teaching methods of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky could have been significantly improved.
But there is also no doubt that in terms of the "tactical background" of artillery exercises, Zinovy Petrovich far outstripped the Japanese.
Which generally confirms my conclusion that the Japanese superiority in the force of fire on the enemy was based precisely on their material part (shells exploding when falling into the water, well-visible explosions of shells when they hit the target, excellent optical sights), and by no means on total superiority in the level of training of the Japanese gunners.
Of course, these conclusions are not final and are not the ultimate truth.
It is quite possible that later there will be some top-secret reports of the British attachés, which will contain a different description of the training of Japanese artillerymen, or other documents that refute the results of the analysis presented to you, dear readers.
But today I do not see documents that could confirm the correctness of the version of M. Klimov about the "poor tactical background" of the exercises of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.
And the question here is not that the teachings of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky were perfect - by no means! And the fact that the Japanese fleet trained on much worse methods.
And one more thing.
In a series of articles devoted to the sinking of the Oslyabi, I came to the conclusion that the reason for the rapid death of the battleship was the poor quality of its construction: only 2 or 3 heavy shells hit the waterline area, and entailed extensive flooding and the subsequent loss of stability of the ship.
But this my assumption was severely criticized: a number of readers (and my respected opponent A. Rytik as well) believed that Oslyabya received a much larger number of heavy shells than I indicated.
However, a simple calculation shows that in order to ensure the required number of hits on the Oslyabya for my opponents, the firing accuracy of the main caliber of the Japanese battleships should have been 40% on average.
However, from T. Jackson's report, we see that Japanese ships on the eve of Tsushima could demonstrate such accuracy only in greenhouse conditions - in calm weather, at a distance of 15 cables, and when no fire was fired at the Japanese ships. But already at a distance of 29 cables, even at anchor, the best shooter of the 1st combat detachment "Sikishima" could no longer confirm his high performance: four shots - and not a single hit.
And therefore, the version about the superprecision of the Japanese battleships in the outset of the Tsushima battle hardly has any basis under it - there was strong excitement, and poor visibility, and a very decent accuracy of the Russian ships firing at the Japanese squadron. And the distance to "Oslyabi" from the same "Fuji", according to the Japanese, in the outset of the battle varied from 34 to 26 cables.
To be continued ...
Information