Military Review

On the training of the Japanese gunners on the eve of Tsushima

226

Not so long ago, the continuation of the cycle of Maxim Klimov was published on VO, in which the respected author set himself the goal of showing Z.P. Rozhdestvensky the main culprit of the Tsushima tragedy of the Russian fleet... The article contains many reproaches to the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, but one of them seems especially interesting to me.


This is a reproach for the improper training of the crews entrusted to Z.P. Rozhdestvensky ships, and first of all, of course, the artillerymen.

The logic of the respected M. Klimov is as follows - the Japanese at the beginning of the war did not shine with artillery skills, but quickly learned and learned the right lessons from combat experience, but Z.P. Rozhdestvensky did nothing of the sort. "The extreme scarcity of evolutions and shooting, their extremely poor tactical background" - this is how M. Klimov characterizes the quality of the exercises of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Hence, of course, there is a natural desire to consider what and how the Japanese learned. Fortunately, some aspects of the preparation of the Japanese fleet are reflected in the report of the British observer - Captain T. Jackson on May 6, 1905 (new style).

As you know, after the battle in the Yellow Sea, the main forces of the Japanese fleet were in constant readiness to intercept the Port Arthur squadron, if it decided on a second breakthrough. The need to be ready at any time to go into battle, combined with the need to be based on an impromptu base near Fr. Elliot was not very inclined towards intense combat training. And then Port Arthur fell, and in the period from December 1904 to February 1905, most of the battleships and armored cruisers of Japan underwent refurbishment.

Obviously, after all this, the Japanese needed to restore their combat skills, and, if possible, improve them, taking into account the received combat experience. After all, H. Togo was facing a battle with the squadrons of the Russian Baltic Fleet, and this battle should have been seriously prepared.

Accordingly, from about March 1905, the Japanese were able to intensively restore the combat capability of the crews and prepare for a meeting with the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons.

But how did this happen?

According to T. Jackson's report, until April 12 (hereinafter - according to the old style), the Japanese fleet regularly conducted maneuvering training (steam tacktic). Sometimes artillery and torpedo exercises were carried out - alas, the British attaché does not provide any specifics on them.

But T. Jackson especially noted the large number of barrel shooting with rifle cartridges (aiming rifle practice), thanks to which, in the opinion of the Japanese, they managed to significantly improve the shooting accuracy of their gunners. An English observer cites the figures: from 40 to 60 percent.

It happened like this - every day one or two warships were removed from the anchor and went out on artillery exercises, which consisted in conducting barrel firing with rifle cartridges at targets towed by steamers allocated for this purpose. This kind of shooting took place all day.

"Every day, weather permitting, one or two ships carry out target practice, andaiming rifle practice at targets towed by steamboats is going on all day loog."

Big shooting on April 12


The crown of the artillery preparation was the naval exercise held on April 12 (25 in the new style).

This is how they went.

The 1st Combat Squad was trained, consisting of four battleships and the Nissin with Kasuga. Ships H. Kamimura did not take part in the exercise, but he himself was on the battleship "Fuji" and watched what was happening.

The target was a small islet that was 80-100 feet long and 35-40 feet high. Obviously, T. Jackson gives approximate figures, when converted to the metric system it will be about 25-30 meters long and 10-12 meters high, however, the British attaché indicates that there was a depression in the middle of the island, that is, its height was there. below the specified value.

However, even with this amendment, it is quite obvious that the size of the island exceeded the standard shields used for artillery exercises.

But there was one more nuance: the island had a gentle beach 20-30 feet long (6-9 meters). And the falls of shells on this beach were counted as hits - thus, the target on which the fleet was training took on completely cyclopean dimensions.

It must be said that T. Jackson claims that no such hits were recorded during the shooting. But at the same time, he also points out that they still could have been, because the island was not under constant supervision of the officers checking the shooting.

Here I already have a question for the organizers of the shooting - then who and how determined the number of hits?

Was it really taken from the words of the ship gunners, on their word of honor?

The consumption of shells for shooting did not boggle the imagination at all. For each gun with a caliber of 254-305-mm, 2 shells were fired, for 152-203-mm - 6, they did not shoot with smaller calibers.

The firing itself looked like this - the ship "converged" with the island and upon reaching a certain heading angle opened fire on it, and when the island was beyond the traverse, it stopped firing. During this time, the 152-mm guns of the firing side were supposed to release all the ammunition they put in, and the turret guns - half. Then the ship turned around and repeated the exercise, but now on a different side.

The distance to the island during the shooting was 2500-3000 yards, that is, 12,5-15 cables. In fact, they fired at a direct firing distance, although, perhaps, not with direct fire - according to T. Jackson, a reduced charge was used when firing.

But, of course, no zeroing was required at this distance, and the British attaché does not mention anything like that.

The practice shooting of the fleet can be roughly divided into individual and squadron - of course, the division is very general, but I do not set myself the task of listing all the possible forms of training for naval gunners.

The point is different - either the ship is practicing the skills of firefighting individually, or the exercise involves the joint maneuvering and firing of several ships at once.
T. Jackson does not indicate whether this was a squadron shooting, but reports that H. Togo was present on all ships at the time they fired.

With this caveat in mind, it is clear that the teachings could only be individual.

As you know, in those years, the combat interval between ships in the ranks was at most several cables.

Accordingly, it was absolutely impossible to cross from one battleship to another, if they were in wake formation, during the time when one ship had finished firing and the second had not started yet, it was absolutely impossible.

On the basis of the above, we have the following:

1. The exercises of the Japanese fleet did not provide for joint maneuvering and were just a series of individual exercises of individual ships.

2. Shooting at 12,5-15 cables could not serve as a training in the ability to correctly determine the parameters of the target and refine it by zeroing in. That is, in fact, the gunners' ability to take a large target into the sight at a direct shot range was being practiced - and nothing more.

It would seem that in such and such preferential (if not to say - primitive) conditions, the Japanese having combat experience had to shoot with enchanting accuracy: one could expect something similar to the shooting of "King Edward VII", to which M. Klimov referred with his 95% hits with the main caliber.

Alas, the reality turned out to be far from rosy.

On the training of the Japanese gunners on the eve of Tsushima
Rounds - shots, hits - hits.

The best shooter of the 1st combat detachment of H. Togo turned out to be "Sikishima" - 75% hits with the main caliber and 66,7% - 152-mm. The overall accuracy of the battleship was 67,4% - 92 shells were expended, 62 hits were achieved.

The worst, apparently, turned out to be "Mikasa" - 92 shells were used up, but only 19 hits were achieved, that is, 20,7%.

Why - "most likely"?

It is possible that "Nissin" shot worse than "Mikasa".

Out of 84 shells of 152 mm caliber, this cruiser was able to target only 16, which gives 19%. At the same time, "Nissin" used up 24 rounds of 203-mm caliber, but T. Jackson could not establish the number of hits from 203-mm guns. A simple calculation shows that if there were less than seven 203-mm hits, then the percentage of its accuracy will be worse than Mikasa.

However, the Mikasa's main caliber did not work so badly - 5 hits out of 8 fired shells, which gives an accuracy of 62,5%.

The overall accuracy of the 305-mm guns of the four Japanese battleships was exactly 50% - 32 shells fired and 16 hits.

The only ten-inch "Kasuga" used up 2 shells, but did not achieve hits, and it is impossible to establish the percentage of accuracy of 203-mm guns due to the lack of statistics on the "Nissin". The eight-inch Kasuga turret showed a very moderate 25% - 3 hits out of 12 shots.

The accuracy of 152 mm guns averaged 33,75% for six ships.

Long range shooting


T. Jackson's report mentions two cases of such shooting.

The first time was on April 20 (May 3, new style) Izumo, Asama and Akashi carried out practice shooting at a distance of 6 yards, that is, 000 cables. Unfortunately, T. Jackson does not give any details about these teachings.

The next shooting looked, perhaps, even somewhat comical.

They were conducted by "Sikishima", which showed the best result among the ships of the 12st combat detachment during the firing on April 25 (1). Now he anchored 5 yards (800 cables) from the very islet that was fired at on April 29 and fired one round from 12-mm guns and 305 rounds from 5-mm guns. As I said above, at a distance of 152-12 cables, the battleship showed excellent 15% accuracy for the main caliber and 75% for 66,7mm.

Now, no longer in motion, but at anchor, even from a greater distance, the firing accuracy of the main caliber became exactly 0%, since the Sikishima did not achieve a single hit with 305-mm projectiles.

But the gunners who served the 152-mm guns did a better job - out of five shells, two still hit the island (40% accuracy).

Other shooting


The next day after the “big shooting on April 12”, Kasagi, Chitose, Otova and Niitaka left to practice shooting, and in the afternoon they were joined by the armored cruisers Iwate, Tokiwa and Yakumo ".

It is not known what these exercises were, but T. Jackson mentions the use of devices similar to Percy Scott's "dotter" (the sailor moves the target along a vertically exposed plate in front of the gun's sight, and when fired, a special device mounted on the gun barrel marks the hit point with a pencil. The Japanese version had a slightly different design, but performed the same functions: thus, apparently, there was no talk of caliber firing).

On April 14, Izumo, Azumo and Asama went out for shooting practice, in the afternoon they were joined by the armored cruisers Naniwa, Takachiho, Tsushima and Akashi.

There is no information about what the teachings were. Perhaps caliber shooting or barrel, or even Japanese versions of "dotters" without any shooting.

Here, in fact, that's all.

And what is the result?


To be honest, the Japanese artillery exercises as presented by T. Jackson make a frankly depressing impression.

First. There is no evidence that the Japanese learned to shoot more than 30 cables, but exercises at such a range, judging by the descriptions of the British attaché, were extremely rare.

But maybe it was shooting at 30 cables that became an innovation for the Japanese fleet, and earlier it fired at shorter distances?


I have not yet fully translated the reports of the British attachés, and, perhaps, I will discover something new for myself.

But so far, only an indication has been found that before the war the Japanese gunners practiced a lot to shoot at 30–35 cables.

This is Trubridge's report, which explains how it happened that the Japanese fleet, attacking on February 12, 1904, three Russian cruisers that left the inner harbor of Port Arthur, could not sink them or even significantly damage them. The Japanese officers just explained this by the fact that before the war they learned to shoot only at 30-35 cables, and if it was possible to approach the Russians at such a distance, then ...

However, according to our information, the battle of Bayan, Askold and Novik with the main forces of the Japanese fleet began at 40 cables, but at certain moments of the battle the distance was reduced to 32 cables.

However, the study of the circumstances of this battle is beyond the scope of this article - I will only note that the Japanese learned a lot about shooting at 30-35 cables even before the war. And it turns out that the pre-tsushima firing of the Mikado fleet added absolutely nothing to this practice.

Second. There is practically no mention of the development of innovations in the control of artillery fire, with the exception of the centralization of fire under the control of a senior artillery officer (in the Russian fleet - it was adopted long before the start of the war).

Practicing advanced sighting techniques?

Not a single mention.

Practicing firing with volleys for zeroing in or hitting a target, about which my dear opponent A. Rytik wrote so much?

Not a single mention.

However, there is a mention of another method, which A. Rytik credited the Japanese fleet with - observing the flight of shells and their falls. The point is that the artillery shell is visible in flight, and the Japanese gunners had the duty to monitor the flight of the shells they fired until they fall into the water, or hit the target.

T. Jackson confirms the words of my esteemed opponent in the part that observation of the flight of shells was part of the combat training of the Japanese fleet in the pre-war period. But he also points out that as a result of the Battle of Shantung, this practice was

absolutely failed.

That is (if someone is completely unfamiliar with English) - it completely failed, completely failed to justify itself.

Simply put, at small firing distances it was possible, but with an increase in the range - no longer, the gunners, trying to track the flight of the shells, lost sight of them and could not determine their fall by the bursts.

The British attaché even cites an example of an artillery officer who, watching the flight of his shells, suddenly discovered that they had changed direction (!) And were flying towards his own ship. That is, in other words, his gaze, imperceptibly for him, switched from his shells to the Russians flying in the direction of his ship.

And T. Jackson writes that this "best practice" before the Battle of Tsushima on the ships of the Japanese fleet was canceled. And that the observations of the falling shells were to be carried out by the commanders of the plutongs, focusing on where the shells of the artillery group entrusted to him fall "on average".

To be honest, in such a transcription, the differences from domestic methods of correcting rapid fire are minimal.

The third. Training in conditions close to combat, for which the respected M. Klimov stood up. Alas, from the description of the British attachés: there are no such in the Japanese navy at all. There is not a single description of squadron firing, where Japanese armored ships would practice firing, maneuvering or at least simply moving in a wake column as part of a detachment.

The "epic" shooting on 12 (25) April was reduced to individual exercises of individual ships, which they performed in turn, and there are simply no other descriptions of the maneuvers of the 1st combat detachment in full strength. The consumption of projectiles for caliber fire is extremely low, 1-2 shots per 305-mm gun.

What are the "five ammunition", which allegedly shot battleships and armored cruisers H. Togo on the eve of the battle with the 2nd Pacific Squadron, about which the Japanese officers told tales to V. Semyonov, who was captured ...

What can be added to the methods of training Japanese gunners?

Is that regular barrel firing, but the use of the latest British invention - "dotter", which allows you to train a gunner without firing a shot.

But there are also nuances here.

T. Jackson writes that 1–2 ships went out on barrel firing every day.

It turns out that each of the 12 battleships and armored cruisers of the Japanese practiced barrel firing at most five days a month?

Is this so much, in comparison with the teachings that Z.P. Rozhestvensky arranged for his squadron off the coast of Annam?

Comparison of training of the Japanese fleet and the 2nd Pacific squadron


Oddly enough, but the comparison is not at all in favor of the Japanese.

Alas, I am not ready to provide the dear reader with comprehensive information about the artillery exercises of the ships of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

To my deep regret, I have not yet managed to get to the complete collection of orders and circulars for the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which, probably, could shed light on some issues. Or maybe these documents will only raise new questions, because a number of information from them (obtained from second hand) directly contradicts the recollections of the artillery officers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

But even if we take such odious sources as, for example, the memoirs of V.P. Kostenko, who, in any case, cannot be accused of loyalty to the squadron commander, we will see a very interesting picture.

For example, here is a description of the teachings on January 14:

“A column of 10 ships walked around the shields, keeping them in the center of the circulation. The distance was maintained from 6 to 30 cables. Oslyabya opened the sight. His shells immediately fell very close to the shield. With a signal, he showed the found distance. Following this, the rest of the ships, after zeroing in from 6-inch guns, opened rapid fire with their entire port side. "

That is, we see that the teachings of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky - this is precisely the squadron exercises.

The squadron went in combat formation, shooting began with zeroing (in T. Jackson's report, this is not mentioned at all), moreover, there is an information exchange between the ships of the squadron (Oslyabya showed the distance to the shield determined by the results of zeroing). At the same time, it is quite clear that it was not at all individual firing of a gun at a target that was being practiced, but a full complex of fire control.

Otherwise, where would V.P. Kostenko quoted:

“But it is especially deplorable that it was completely impossible to control the fire. The senior artilleryman, who was in the conning tower, could not get the towers and casemates to fire without slowing down on his order. Either the order did not reach the gun, or for some reason the tower was not ready for firing. "

About the shooting on January 18, V.P. Kostenko writes:

“In cloudy weather, it was very difficult to see the bursts of shells. At times it seemed that the shells were falling close to the target, but when the Eagle raised its shield at the end of the exercise, there was not a single hit in it. And this time our "old men" from their old guns gave a better result than the new battleships. "Suvorov", turning to the opposite course, fired at the shields through its ships. "

In other words, unlike the Japanese fleet, the 2nd Pacific Fleet trained not “when the weather permitting”, but in the visibility conditions that could have developed in battle.

Dull and cloudy?

And who dares to assert that when the time comes for a decisive battle with the forces of H. Togo, the clear sun will shine?

Shooting on January 19:

“This time the shooting was more successful. "Oslyabya" opened zero range, placing three shells at the very shield, and showed the distance. He was picked up by the "Eagle" and managed to make several successful starboard shots.
"Suvorov" tacked around the shield, turning back, cut off the stern of the "Donskoy", which went tail in the wake column.
After turning, "Eagle" transferred fire to the port side, quickly found a target and managed to release two 12-inch and four 6-inch shells almost into the shield itself. Further shooting was carried out on the port side. "

That is, the shooting was carried out in the squadron's formation, during the squadron maneuvering, while the squadron did not just pass by the shields, but maneuver so that the shooting board changed.

Conclusions


An analysis of the documents at our disposal irrefutably proves that the "extremely poor tactical background" (according to M. Klimov) of the training of artillerymen Z.P. Rozhestvensky was head and shoulders above the training of the Japanese fleet.

Of course, the conditions of the artillery exercises of the 2nd Pacific were very far from ideal and, possessing a post-mortem, the teaching methods of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky could have been significantly improved.

But there is also no doubt that in terms of the "tactical background" of artillery exercises, Zinovy ​​Petrovich far outstripped the Japanese.

Which generally confirms my conclusion that the Japanese superiority in the force of fire on the enemy was based precisely on their material part (shells exploding when falling into the water, well-visible explosions of shells when they hit the target, excellent optical sights), and by no means on total superiority in the level of training of the Japanese gunners.

Of course, these conclusions are not final and are not the ultimate truth.

It is quite possible that later there will be some top-secret reports of the British attachés, which will contain a different description of the training of Japanese artillerymen, or other documents that refute the results of the analysis presented to you, dear readers.

But today I do not see documents that could confirm the correctness of the version of M. Klimov about the "poor tactical background" of the exercises of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

And the question here is not that the teachings of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky were perfect - by no means! And the fact that the Japanese fleet trained on much worse methods.

And one more thing.

In a series of articles devoted to the sinking of the Oslyabi, I came to the conclusion that the reason for the rapid death of the battleship was the poor quality of its construction: only 2 or 3 heavy shells hit the waterline area, and entailed extensive flooding and the subsequent loss of stability of the ship.

But this my assumption was severely criticized: a number of readers (and my respected opponent A. Rytik as well) believed that Oslyabya received a much larger number of heavy shells than I indicated.

However, a simple calculation shows that in order to ensure the required number of hits on the Oslyabya for my opponents, the firing accuracy of the main caliber of the Japanese battleships should have been 40% on average.

However, from T. Jackson's report, we see that Japanese ships on the eve of Tsushima could demonstrate such accuracy only in greenhouse conditions - in calm weather, at a distance of 15 cables, and when no fire was fired at the Japanese ships. But already at a distance of 29 cables, even at anchor, the best shooter of the 1st combat detachment "Sikishima" could no longer confirm his high performance: four shots - and not a single hit.

And therefore, the version about the superprecision of the Japanese battleships in the outset of the Tsushima battle hardly has any basis under it - there was strong excitement, and poor visibility, and a very decent accuracy of the Russian ships firing at the Japanese squadron. And the distance to "Oslyabi" from the same "Fuji", according to the Japanese, in the outset of the battle varied from 34 to 26 cables.

To be continued ...
Author:
226 comments
Ad

Subscribe to our Telegram channel, regularly additional information about the special operation in Ukraine, a large amount of information, videos, something that does not fall on the site: https://t.me/topwar_official

Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. Comrade
    Comrade 7 January 2022 05: 54
    +9
    "The extreme scarcity of evolutions and shooting, their extremely poor tactical background" - this is how M. Klimov characterizes the quality of the exercises of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

    We can only turn to M. Klimov as a person who is unconditionally responsible for his words, with a request to submit documents illustrating the richness of evolutions and the variety of firing of the Japanese fleet, thereby refuting the information of Captain Jackson.
    That the Japanese battleships conducted firing practice without passing by the island or at anchor, but maneuvering in formation, that the Japanese had a much higher firing range at a target than Rozhdestvensky's battleships.

    Dear Andrey, the article was written sensibly, in support of the main conclusions I will try to post a short note in a couple of weeks, supplementing the information of Captain Jackson.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 January 2022 10: 25
      +5
      Good day, dear Comrade!
      Quote: Comrade
      in support of the main conclusions, in a couple of weeks I will try to post a small note supplementing the information of Captain Jackson.

      I'm really looking forward to it, it's extremely interesting :)))
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 8 January 2022 05: 23
        0
        My respect, dear Andrew!
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I'm really looking forward to it, it's extremely interesting :))

        Dedicated to Mr. Klimov and Alexey our Rytik. A prosaic brick of facts and a sparkling showcase of propaganda and manipulation.
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 8 January 2022 16: 26
          0
          Quote: Comrade
          Dedicated to Mr. Klimov and Alexey our Rytik. A prosaic brick of facts and a sparkling showcase of propaganda and manipulation.

          Of course you and Andrey spoke about yourself? wassat
  2. yuriy55
    yuriy55 7 January 2022 07: 28
    +8
    Comparison of training of the Japanese fleet and the 2nd Pacific squadron

    you can spend as long as you like, but the result of the battle allows you to draw more truthful conclusions than the memoirs and notes of Jackson ...
    If my memory serves me, M. Klimov cited data (not a hunt to search) that it was the Japanese squadron that fired more shells and their firing was more effective. Something was wrong with the tactical maneuver ...
    And therefore, the version about the superprecision of the Japanese battleships in the outset of the Tsushima battle hardly has at least some basis.

    I remember something similar was said about the squadron under the command of Admiral Ushakov, but he was able to defeat the Turkish fleet precisely with the best skills of the gunners.
    ==========
    Among other things, I suppose that the expression: “winners are not judged” can refer to either side.
    1. Waterways 672
      Waterways 672 7 January 2022 10: 12
      +10
      Quote: yuriy55
      it was the Japanese squadron that fired more shells

      How we were trained on a destroyer ... 130 mm turret of the main ship SM-2-1. Sometimes, instead of physical loading, the gun commanders and loaders had to throw charges and shells from the feed to the tray and back. The pace is 5 seconds, 12 charges per minute. At the bottom, the tower is open, there is the commander of the main battery with a stopwatch. My fingers were covered in blood after training. The gunners had practically no training; during firing, the firing data came from the DAC to the turret instruments. The gunners have a steering wheel in their hands, before their eyes there are 2 dials. On the left - a dial with a coarse aiming scale, on the right - with a fine aiming scale. The task is to align the hands with 0 on both dials by turning the steering wheel. On the left dial, the arrow with 0 is easily combined, but the right one is hard to combine - it runs like a madwoman. When the arrows of both gunners were combined, a shot took place.
      1. yuriy55
        yuriy55 7 January 2022 10: 33
        +1
        Quote: Waterways 672
        How we were trained on a destroyer ...

        Thanks for the clarification. Appreciated.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 January 2022 10: 30
      +3
      Quote: yuriy55
      you can spend as long as you like, but the result of the battle allows you to draw more truthful conclusions than the memoirs and notes of Jackson ...

      It's even scary to ask which ones :))))
      Quote: yuriy55
      If my memory serves me, M. Klimov cited data (not a hunt to look) that it was the Japanese squadron that fired more shells and their firing was more effective

      I gave this data at one time :)
      Quote: yuriy55
      I remember something similar was said about the squadron under the command of Admiral Ushakov, but he was able to defeat the Turkish fleet precisely with the best skills of the gunners.

      By itself. Firstly, Ushakov was much less constrained by the authorities, secondly - he had enough time to prepare, thirdly - he was a genius who introduced a number of innovations in this very training, well ahead of their time and thereby achieved a clear superiority in the quality of shooting , fourthly, the quality of the equipment at his disposal was approximately the same as in Turkey. And Ushakov was also a genius of maneuver - well, here is the result.
      The Rozhdestvensky genius was definitely not, but he provided our gunners with training comparable to the Japanese, but he had nothing to compensate for the failures of the materiel.
      1. d_averk
        d_averk 10 January 2022 21: 31
        -2
        Shooting everyone (1otr) at Mikasa greatly complicated the process of zeroing in and holding the sight (in addition to still subtle bursts). I had to rely on rangefinders, and they lied and were broken.
    3. d_averk
      d_averk 10 January 2022 21: 29
      -1
      The effectiveness can be associated with the total suppression of the accuracy of shooting with the help of foGas and initially poor setting of rangefinders.
  3. gorenina91
    gorenina91 7 January 2022 07: 52
    +9
    On the training of the Japanese gunners on the eve of Tsushima

    - Once again I ran through another fragment of the endless "Tsushima theme" ...
    - Once again, it is rather unconvincing ... - In general, what is the goal pursued by the authors of this "Tsushima theme" ??? - What truth is everyone trying to find ??? - That pyroxylin was bad, and shimosa is progress; then the Russian ships sucked, and the Japanese were almost high-speed modern missile carriers, and so on ...
    - And for me more and more another truth looms - just Russian naval officers and sailors - they simply did not know how to fight ... - Well, there is simply no other reason ...
    - The Russian military squadron made a whole "round the world trip" - when it "went to war" with Japan ... - Even then, the entire squadron was at war ... - And during these few months (or how long the squadron went to the seas of the Far East) - all the crews of the ships were in a real combat situation - everyone was constantly involved - from stokers to signalmen (there were even live fires) ... - You can argue in different ways ... - but in reality - all the crews of the ships were constantly in their military work .... - And even the most inept during this period could already be taught to coherent combat interaction and the well-coordinated execution of their military operations - and combat maneuvering and quick execution of all kinds of commands, etc. ... and so on ...
    - In other words - even this long sea voyage itself was supposed to prepare Russian sailors in a military professional respect ... - despite the fact that Russian ships were inferior to Japanese ones in a technical aspect ... - But several months of combat field training of the Russian fleet should had a very, very positive effect on the combat qualities of the Russian fleet ... - All Russian officers and sailors - already practically knew all the qualities of their ships ... - they were no longer newcomers to their ships ...
    - And the Japanese - on the contrary - only more and more imitated and saved coal and fuels and lubricants ... - And all these Japanese "practice shooting" with rifle cartridges from gun barrels ... - somehow they don't look very convincing ... - Although this everything is widely practiced today ...
    - What conclusion ??? - And such that, under the command of admirals - FF Ushakov (Battle of Fidonisi); G.A. Spiridov (Battle of Chesme) and so on - the Russian fleet could win naval battles with a crushing score (being in an "absolute minority" in front of its enemy); but with all kinds of "rozhdestvensky" and others like him - constantly "grenades turned out to be of the wrong system" ... - then shimosa is better than pyroxylin; then Japanese sailors are so professional that they have no equal; then Japanese ships are just "shine and super" and so on ...
    - Yes, Russian naval officers and sailors did not know how to fight - that's the whole answer ... - If you had to exchange ships - the Russians with the Japanese - so the Japanese would have won a victory on the "Russian ships" ... - by firing pyroxylin shells at ships that have all artillery with "shimose shells" ... - And then it would have been said - that, they say - "shimose shells" were not destructive enough for armor - but armor-piercing "pyroxylin shells" are just what you need !!! - Well, so on and so on ...
    1. Maxim G
      Maxim G 7 January 2022 14: 12
      +5
      The Russians won battles only against the Turks and Swedes (in the sailing era) - NEVER did our fleet deal (full-scale military operations) with the fleets of the strongest sea powers (Britain, France, Spain).
      With the British, however, they dealt - and all the time there was some kind of shame.
      as soon as it came to well armed and prepared
    2. BastaKarapuzik And
      BastaKarapuzik And 8 January 2022 15: 24
      0
      The only thing I caught was that the Japanese were training using simpler techniques, single shooting, and so on. Not squadron training.
      Our ships, on the other hand, were conducting full-scale training, practicing interaction and a full range of fire control.
      But this paragraph draws attention to itself:
      “But it is especially deplorable that it was completely impossible to control the fire. The senior artilleryman, who was in the conning tower, could not get the towers and casemates to fire without slowing down on his order. Either the order did not reach the gun, or for some reason the tower was not ready for firing. "

      How can you control something without being aware of what exactly is happening in a gun turret, for example?
      That is, RUBKA does not understand why the shot does not occur immediately, on her order?
      It's not about the training of ordinary sailors at all. And in the control system, when the upper ones do not know at all what is going on down there.
      Global generalizations suggest themselves.
      I, of course, make an elephant out of a fly (maybe). But who would answer if the statement is true that the advancing German units went with their commanders at the head. And our command sat in a bunker far from the front line, and received information by phone?
      That is, at least with a huge delay, or even with the loss of all information that is being done there on the ground.
      Of course, it is easier for the attacking units, they choose the place and time of the strike.
      But still?
    3. Alexandra
      Alexandra 9 January 2022 23: 34
      +2
      Quote: gorenina91
      - And for me more and more another truth looms - just Russian naval officers and sailors - they simply did not know how to fight ...


      You were told in detail for a long time about the superiority of the materiel and Japanese naval artillery (shells, fuses, optical sights and rangefinders), about the superiority in the speed of Japanese fire (30 seconds for manual opening and closing of the shutter on a Russian 12 "/ 40 cannon, 3 rounds per minute on the barrel of a Russian turret 6 "cannon, while the Japanese (English) casemate or deck 6" cannon demonstrated a practical rate of fire of 5-7 rounds per minute), on the advanced methods of Japanese zeroing (salvo, with targeting in a fork, which ensured good observability of explosions Japanese shells) and the organization of detachment shooting with a quick transfer of fire to a particular target ...

      Can you tell us for a long time and in detail, with illustrative figures and combat examples, how exactly Russian naval officers and sailors did not know how to fight?
    4. d_averk
      d_averk 10 January 2022 21: 36
      -3
      - In other words - even this long sea voyage itself was supposed to prepare Russian sailors in a military professional respect ... - despite the fact that Russian ships were inferior to Japanese ones in a technical aspect ... - But several months of combat field training of the Russian fleet should had a very, very positive effect on the fighting qualities of the Russian fleet ...

      WHAT? In my opinion, you do not understand well, the difference between training in the base and what the 2TOE transition was like most of the time
  4. iskanderzp
    iskanderzp 7 January 2022 10: 44
    +8
    You know, there is a good anecdote. The husband shares his impressions of the fishing trip with his wife: "I behaved noisily, ran along the shore, I hooked the bait incorrectly, and in general, I caught more fish than I did." With regard to this discussion: And Togo as a naval commander is no better than the ZPR, and the training of the Japanese artillerymen is useless, but the result is depressing ... But seriously, this "holivar" has been dragging on for a very long time, and apparently "this music will be eternal" ... However, the discussion is very informative, so as a reader I am not offended ...)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 January 2022 12: 14
      +9
      Quote: iskanderzp
      And Togo as a naval commander is no better than the ZPR, and the training of the Japanese artillerymen is useless,

      She is not "useless", the Japanese gunners were not inferior to ours in terms of training. We just achieved this by different methods. In general, the Japanese outnumbered the 2TOE gunners, if only by virtue of their combat experience. But this superiority was not significant. and the decisive factor was the materiel
      Quote: iskanderzp
      But seriously, this "holivar" has been going on for a very long time, and apparently "this music will be eternal."

      I myself am not glad that Klimov started all this. And I can't help but answer - he writes bitingly and seemingly plausible, but there are three mistakes in each thesis ... Here is his thesis - about how the Japanese fired badly at the beginning of the war, and then again! - and raised the level of combat and political, and began to shoot wonderfully. We take the reports of the British observers, look. Is there such a thing? And not close.
      Quote: iskanderzp
      However, the discussion is very informative, so as a reader I am not offended ...)

      It's nice, thanks :)
  5. Undecim
    Undecim 7 January 2022 11: 24
    +9
    As one prominent political figure of our time very aptly remarked:
    In Russia there is also such an old Russian amusement - the search for a national idea. It's like looking for the meaning of life. The occupation as a whole is not useless and interesting, you can do it always and endlessly.

    Obviously, among such endless fun is the discussion of the Tsushima battle. The only question to the author is why the Japanese won, since from his articles the conclusion suggests itself that Togo's victory over Rozhdestvensky can only be explained by the participation of higher powers ?!
    Maybe it's time to move the discussion of Tsushima to a new level and move from describing primitive ships and cannons to looking for signs of supernatural interference?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 January 2022 11: 54
      0
      Quote: Undecim
      The only question to the author is why the Japanese won, since from his articles the conclusion suggests itself that Togo's victory over Rozhdestvensky can only be explained by the participation of higher powers ?!

      The conclusion I made in the article
      The ship's firing accuracy is based on the "three whales":
      1. Material part - shells, rangefinders, optics, fire control devices.
      2. Methods of fire fighting - the rules for choosing a target, organizing targeting and hitting it with artillery fire.
      3. Training of gunners.
      In Shantung, the Japanese had great superiority in materiel and training. In tsushima - big in materiel and insignificant in preparation. If you believe that superiority in materiel is a consequence of Amaterasu's interference, then OK :)
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 7 January 2022 12: 34
        +5
        The conclusion I made in the article


        1. gorenina91
          gorenina91 7 January 2022 17: 04
          0
          - Hahah ...
          - It was this "episode" (video) that I mentioned in my comment ...
          - My plus to you ....
      2. albert
        albert 8 January 2022 00: 25
        +1
        Here is a good video on this topic. Isaev says.
    2. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 7 January 2022 12: 01
      +6
      Quote: Undecim
      The only question to the author is why the Japanese won

      Strictly speaking, my colleague Andrey answered it several times. In his opinion, the matter is in the material part.
      Quote: Undecim
      go looking for signs of supernatural interference?

      If you look from this angle, you can find a fair amount of examples that are rather difficult to explain in another way :))))
      Well, at a glance. During the Battle of ZhM, Togo and Vitgeft ignore the armored cabin and stand on the bridges of their flagships. One is not scratched, the other is torn to pieces. In Tsushima Togo is again on the bridge, which was hit by as many as 12 "shells. On Togo (in contrast to the ranks of his headquarters) again not a scratch, and ZPR in the armored wheelhouse was seriously wounded.
      When the Japanese blew up "Petropavlovsk" Makarov died on it, although his flagship was not the first to pass through the ill-fated place. When we repaid the Japanese in kind, Togo was simply not there. It was the turn of another detachment.
      In fact, I think the formula from the theory of probability is playing.
      There are low probability events that can nevertheless happen and there are high probability events that do not happen. request
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 7 January 2022 12: 30
        +5
        In fact, I think the formula from the theory of probability is playing.

        “Even if in this case you will not agree to give me a guarantee, but I put the question more broadly: does there exist at all, can there be at least some kind of security in this world, at least something of a guarantee, or even the very idea of ​​a guarantee is unknown here ? "
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 8 January 2022 10: 29
        +2
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        There are low probability events that can nevertheless happen and there are high probability events that do not happen.

        By the way, this is a very interesting topic. yes What is the likelihood that a person will die from a brick that fell in from a passing car? From a truck moving in the opposite direction, a brick flew off pallet 1 (ONE), hitting the front of the oncoming car, piercing it and hitting the face of a woman in the passenger seat. Death came instantly. I have already decided for myself long ago that no matter what they say, there are no accidents in the world. It is we, by virtue of our view of the state of affairs in the world, that we assume that everything is accidental. But people, suppose looking at everything that happens around a little from a different angle, argue that nothing happens by chance in the world ... But they are looked down on, twisted with a finger at their temples. Although they may be right, because they know the truth. But this majority does not recognize it. Simply because recognizing this will have to revise all the foundations of society, admit the erroneousness of any physical dogmas, etc. It is more convenient that way. In this point of view, the Russians simply had to lose the RYV, because to some extent it was this defeat that led to the chain of events that led to the February Revolution, and later to the fall of the Republic of Ingushetia, the emergence of the USSR, etc. That is why Vitgeft died on the bridge, and Togo is not. Therefore, the fire in the Fuji tower was extinguished from a hydraulic line bursting at the right time. From the point of view of higher powers, everything happens as it should. "Bismarck" should not have left, and therefore received a torpedo at the most unnecessary moment in the weakest point (rudders), "Scharnhorst" should not have left, and therefore received a projectile in the place where, according to the theory of probability, it was least likely to hit ... But he got there, damaging the steam lines. Klimov explains this by the genius of the Aglitsk artillerymen. lol Beatty shouldn't have died at Jutland, so from our point of view, the sailor's heroic actions saved the Laon's cellar from an explosion. Only on the other three battlecruisers such sailors were not found, and in fact the "Lion" got the most charge, as in the flagship.
        And how many such "accidents" that influence the course of history are happening all the time. But we are talking about some kind of theory of probability. I somehow wanted to raise the topic of such "accidents", but I turned out to be hopelessly stupid in terms of dealing with a computer, and the desire disappeared without allowing my thoughts to the broad masses by the moderator laughing
        So from this point of view, the Russians would have lost the RYA anyway. Be even in the place of ZPR genius request
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 8 January 2022 12: 21
          0
          Quote: Rurikovich
          But people, suppose looking at everything that happens around a little from a different angle, argue that nothing happens in the world by accident ...

    3. Alexey Kuznetsov
      Alexey Kuznetsov 7 January 2022 18: 20
      +2
      And this has already been done, Igor Bunich explained the unprecedented accuracy and rate of fire of the Japanese gunners under Tsushima by a certain "tsakuga-zen". belay laughing wassat
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 7 January 2022 19: 02
        0
        a kind of "tsakuga-zen"

        With tsakuga-zen, the question is less clear. This is a kind of cognitive motor training. Apparently Bunich had read Herrigel, but did not bother to read Yamada Shoji.
        But GV Ozerov and KG Ozerov, in all seriousness, explain the defeat of the Russians "by the judgment of God."
  6. sevtrash
    sevtrash 7 January 2022 12: 00
    +1
    Another opus from the author is to pull an owl onto a globe, present black as white and vice versa. If the Japanese fleet did not know how to shoot, and the Russian, on the contrary, did it perfectly, then why did the RIF suffer a defeat that cannot be called otherwise than crushing? Why in the testimony of officers 2TOE repeatedly sounded - did not know how to shoot? The author is once again engaged in juggling facts to fit his "theories".
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 January 2022 12: 15
      +3
      Quote: sevtrash
      Another opus from the author is to pull an owl onto a globe, present black as white and vice versa. If the Japanese fleet did not know how to shoot, and the Russian, on the contrary, did it perfectly

      Do you generally read my articles, or so, just to blurt out? Where and when did I write that the Japanese were trained WORSE than the Russians in Tsushima?
      I understand, holidays and all that, but why carry such and such nonsense?
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 7 January 2022 13: 59
        +6
        Do you read your articles, analyze what you write? Or what to write? What are you writing about in this article if not about preparing for battle? The main weapon, artillery?

        From your article:
        "... An analysis of the documents at our disposal irrefutably proves that the" ... tactical. Background "of the training of the artillerymen of ZP Rozhestvensky was head and shoulders above the training of the Japanese fleet ..."
        "... the fact that the Japanese navy trained on much worse methods ..."
        "... it is also undoubted that in terms of the" tactical background "of artillery exercises, Zinovy ​​Petrovich has far outstripped the Japanese ..."

        Or is that exercise and training is not preparation for you? I understand, the holidays, of course, but at least elementary logic should be. Although it is peculiar for you, even very much. And you can't call it logic. Delirium, perhaps.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          7 January 2022 20: 16
          +1
          Quote: sevtrash
          You read your articles

          I write them.
          Quote: sevtrash
          Or is that exercise and training is not preparation for you?

          And such a simple thought that the Japanese gunners initially fired much better than the Russians recruited at 2TOE, but intensive (and best in quality) training pulled ours to a level comparable to the Japanese, couldn’t come to your mind?
          And why am I not surprised?
          1. sevtrash
            sevtrash 8 January 2022 00: 37
            +2
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            the Japanese gunners initially fired much better than the Russians recruited at 2TOE, but intensive (and better quality) training pulled ours to a level comparable to the Japanese

            Some kind of nonsense ... And why am I not surprised ...
            And why then did 2TOE not win, or at least not lose so much? This question did not occur to the author. Not surprised.
            Why is it constantly mentioned in the testimony of 2TOE officers that they did not know how to shoot? But the author, of course, knows better ... Not surprised.
            Why does Rozhestvensky's testimony say "... All the ships fired badly and, for lack of ammunition supplies, the officers could not practice fire control ..." But here, too, the author, apparently, knows better. Not surprised, the author is in his role.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              8 January 2022 10: 19
              -2
              Quote: sevtrash
              And why then did 2TOE not win, or at least not lose so much?

              That besides preparation, there are other reasons that can lead to defeat, it did not occur to you. And why am I not surprised? :))))
              Quote: sevtrash
              Why is it constantly mentioned in the testimony of 2TOE officers that they did not know how to shoot?

              Constantly - only in your fantasies. And the number of hits on Japanese ships speaks for itself.
              1. sevtrash
                sevtrash 8 January 2022 11: 40
                +2
                Flag officer of the squadron headquarters Demchinsky "... it would seem that the deplorable state of fire should have forced them to shoot every day ... but there were no shells for that ..."
                Senior flag officer Den "... during the stay at Madagascar four times went out for shooting (20-25 cables) and maneuvering ... they could not be considered satisfactory, which was indicated by repeated orders of the commander ..."
                Rear Admiral Enquist "... All the firing was poor and at fixed shields (20-25 cables) ...", "... the range finders began to be compared after Kamrang, the results were not satisfactory, the difference in the readings of neighboring vessels reached 10 cables. .. "
                Flag-captain of the headquarters Clapier de Colong "... did not know how to shoot and there was no move ..."
                Flagship Mine Officer Leontyev "... a squadron that did not have enough firing ..."
                Rear Admiral Nebogatov "... calibration of rangefinders at Rozhestvensky's squadron began a few days before the battle, after getting acquainted with the state of verification in my squadron ... the instructions for this were a corrupted version of my squadron ...", "... combat although shooting was carried out, it was rare and in some naively childish conditions ... "

                The author - do you consider it fantasies? Well, I am amazed at your ... stubbornness in non-recognition of facts. And from whom the facts - from the direct participants in the battle !!! However, it is not the first time that you put your own inadequate fantasies above the facts.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  9 January 2022 15: 10
                  +2
                  Instead of a thousand words

                  The best results of the RIF in a squadron battle in its entire history. And everything falls into place. "Bad" is a relative term, for someone it is bad - when there is nothing, for someone - when the purchase of a new yacht has to be postponed for a week.
                  1. sevtrash
                    sevtrash 10 January 2022 18: 06
                    +1
                    The outcome of the battle, in which the main weapon was artillery, determines the side for which this very weapon worked most successfully. In the case of the Tsushima battle, the victory of the Japanese is undoubted and with a huge advantage in the number of ships and personnel killed. The victory was won in an artillery confrontation. The conclusions are obvious - the Japanese possessed the best artillery, with the best quality - trained and trained - personnel, equipment, hence hits and the outcome of the battle.
                    What do you want to prove? That the 2TOE was headed by a brilliant naval commander, who was ahead of his time as an artilleryman, who raised the 2TOE artillery to a height unattainable for the Japanese? This is nonsense that is refuted by people who were direct participants in the campaign, and the shooting, and the battle. And even - even !, Karl! - the great and terrible himself, Rozhdestvensky (see above, the testimony of the officers of the squadron and "himself" indicated). And yes, the result of the battle itself, which turned out to be the most crushing defeat of the RIF in history, unfortunately.
                    What does your table say? That in some period of time, such as at the 1st stage, 2nd period, 3rd phase of the battle, the number of shells fired by the third turret on the left side of Suvorov exceeded the number of shells fired from the aft tower of Nissin? Like it all changes the outcome of the battle, negates eyewitness accounts? Some kind of nonsense. Not to mention the fact that I do not trust your calculations and calculations for a long time, even from the moment of your calculations of hits 5-6 years ago and "dashing" calculations of the speed of new battleships, which could not pull out almost 15 or even 10 knots ...
                    And your "... The best results of the RIF in a squadron battle in its entire history ..." in the same style. Are you comparing this since Predestination? Or maybe from Potemkin's flotilla? Or with the Battle of Gangut, Chesma, Tendra, Sinop? It's okay that there were other ships there, and what was the fire control system like?
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      10 January 2022 18: 18
                      +1
                      Quote: sevtrash
                      The outcome of the battle, in which the main weapon was artillery, determines the side for which this very weapon worked most successfully.

                      In-in. Therefore, only you can reduce everything to combat training.
                      Quote: sevtrash
                      What do you want to prove?

                      If you still do not understand this, then you will not understand. So swear further on what you are unable to comprehend.
                      1. sevtrash
                        sevtrash 10 January 2022 18: 32
                        +1
                        Why were they silent about the opinion of Rozhdestvensky and the other officers, whose testimony I gave? Nothing to say?
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        only you can reduce everything to combat training

                        Well, well, in your opinion, it does not play a role. Another pearl.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        If you still do not understand this, then you will not understand.

                        Well, it looks like you yourself do not understand what you are writing. This is the impression that some idea has come into your head, even if it contradicts the facts and eyewitness accounts, and you will cling to it no matter what.
                        You are self-centered, however.
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        10 January 2022 18: 40
                        +1
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        Why were they silent about the opinion of Rozhdestvensky and the other officers, whose testimony I gave? Nothing to say?

                        I said - alas, as always you did not understand :). Alright enough.
                        "- Girl, can I meet you?
                        - It is forbidden. You will not understand with me, but I will be bored with you.
                        - But why?!
                        - You see? You already don't understand, but I'm already bored "(c) :)))
                    2. d_averk
                      d_averk 10 January 2022 21: 56
                      0
                      calculations of the speed of new battleships, which are almost 15, and they could not pull out 10 knots.


                      WTF?

                      The conclusions are obvious - the Japanese possessed the best artillery, with the best quality - trained and trained - personnel, equipment, hence hits and the outcome of the battle.

                      A consequence would not necessarily follow from the premise.
            2. d_averk
              d_averk 10 January 2022 21: 49
              -1
              Lieutenant Roschakovsky's report.

              The skill of the servants in handling tower mechanisms was excellent.though imperfect in the sense of agility. However, I did not rush the servants, as I was sure that our shooting was invalid. With a rangefinder officer, - fore-mars, - communicated by voice. I am sure that the rangefinder did not show correctly, although he is also convinced of the officer's skill in handling Barr-Strood.
              It seems to me that this the device, calibrated before the battle, after the very first shots, from frequent and strong shocks of the ship, begins to give very erroneous readings... I say this because, at the very beginning of the battle, I managed to achieve a good hit: in the middle of one from class I cruisers. With the further continuation of the battle, I do not know if I had any hits; if there were, then random. No one, of course, would suggest that someone was so lazy as not to try in battle. My whole tower, our rangefinder and I myself were climbing out of my skin to hit, but nothing came of it.


              And after the very first minutes of fire contact on the ships of the first detachment, even such rangefinders and centralized fire control quickly gave oak. This is really not 2TOE, but the 3rd, but from the first squad ... somehow few survived. But hitting Mikasa didn't come from inferno, did they?
              1. rytik32
                rytik32 10 January 2022 22: 47
                0
                But hitting Mikasa didn't come from inferno, did they?

                And how do you explain such a difference in the calibers of the shells hit in Mikasa (according to bulkmanual)
                JM 21 hits, of which
                8 305-mm
                2 305 ... 254 mm
                2 305..152 mm
                4 254 mm
                5 152 mm

                In Tsushima, the first 15 minutes, 18 hits, of which
                3 305-mm
                12 152-mm
                1 152 ... 75 mm
                2 75-mm
                1. d_averk
                  d_averk 10 January 2022 23: 29
                  -1
                  A trivial explanation - before the loss of the "precisely measured distance" all calibers "hit" the target. And the distance from Suvorov to Mikasa was small enough so that the difference in ballistics 152-305 did not affect. In addition, from the category of assumptions, 152e ITOE were shot more than 1e Suvorov and whoever else had time to check on Mikasa.
                  1. rytik32
                    rytik32 11 January 2022 00: 24
                    0
                    Then why 2TOE in 15 minutes achieved only 3 12-dm hits at a distance of 7000 ... 4600 m.
                    And 1TOE achieved the same number of hits in a shorter period of time in the 2nd phase (9000 ... 10000 m) and the beginning of the 3rd (10000 ... 7500 m). Those. at much greater distances.
                    For me, the reason for the small number of 152-mm hits on 1TOE is clear as daylight: this is the distance. Packinham directly wrote about the results of the battle that the SC at such distances is not just useless, but even harmful. And this report influenced the creation of the Dreadnought.
                    1. d_averk
                      d_averk 11 January 2022 00: 50
                      -2
                      Then why 2TOE in 15 minutes achieved only 3 12-dm hits at a distance of 7000 ... 4600 m.

                      Because due to the specifics of zeroing, we may well have the fact of hitting Mikasa only by Suvorov or A3. After the first bursts nearby, the rest of the 1st squad did not aim. And not only him.
                      Still there.

                      Squadron zeroing does not exist with us; also not, to the side of the line of cruisers correcting firing; no, we have very smoky sighting shells etc. Therefore, shooting, I followed the flight on the clock; without 5 sec. falling began to look through his magnificent binoculars, but I saw a large number of bursts, and it was impossible to determine which my... My gunners, very little acquainted with shooting with the aid of optical sights, asked permission, in the midst of the battle, to replace them with ordinary ones; they had the confidence that the axis of the sight moved from firing, diverging more and more from the axis of the gun. Indeed, in Crete, we verified both lines by the method of aiming at a distant object; and since then we have not had any verification; more than 2 months passed and there were 2 shooting. It also always seemed to me that the tenderness of a telescopic sight can affect during long shooting. Spattering of sights is very important: the gunners have repeatedly suspended aiming in order to wipe the doused glass. Often they barely saw the target, while I saw it clearly from the cover.


                      Quote: rytik32
                      For me, the reason for the small number of 152-mm hits on 1TOE is clear as daylight: this is the distance.

                      Quote: d_averk
                      And the distance from Suvorov to Mikasa was small enough so that the difference in ballistics 152-305 did not affect.

                      I have a feeling that you old-timers have a showdown
                      they barely saw the target


                      It is necessary to wipe the optics! )
              2. d_averk
                d_averk 11 January 2022 17: 12
                0
                terrific Dialogue. For the given excerpt of real readings, stick in a minus - this is the edge of inadequacy
          2. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 8 January 2022 16: 45
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Do you read your articles?
            I write them.

            Classics! "Chukchi is not a reader, Chukchi is a writer!" (With) wassat

            Andrei is not at all embarrassed by repeating the lies of Rozhestvensky and his staff, for example, about the four shootings in Madagascar. True, he cannot find any documents confirming this! But the testimony of all the officers of the squadron, who refuted this for Andrei, does not seem to exist. Well, he does not see them! Andrey has such a special vision!

            But the incomprehensible reports of British observers, who often pass off their conjectures as the truth, are the ultimate truth for him. Meanwhile, these observers themselves more than once complained that the Japanese did not allow them to their documents and that they had to limit themselves to information from their words or even retellings.
            1. Alexandra
              Alexandra 9 January 2022 23: 58
              +1
              And why is the dilemma between or "the Russians did not know how fight shoot "or" the Russian material part was inferior "?

              Indeed, in fact, the Russians were shooting worse than the Japanese (but as the initial phase of the Tsushima battle showed, while the artillery fire control devices were operational, and the "raw" sights of the Perepyolkin system did not begin to misalign the sighting lines with the axes of the gun barrels, not radically worse), and the main thing is that the Russian material part was inferior.

              In the second decade of the XNUMXst century, to deny the decisive importance of technical superiority over the enemy in naval wars is a highly anachronistic approach.
              1. d_averk
                d_averk 11 January 2022 17: 18
                0
                Well said.
            2. d_averk
              d_averk 10 January 2022 21: 57
              0
              Meanwhile, these observers themselves have repeatedly complained that the Japanese do not allow them to their documents and that they have to limit themselves to information from their words or even retellings.

              Where did this observer complain about this?
    2. Oleg Zorin
      Oleg Zorin 17 January 2022 20: 13
      0
      Dear, did you read the article? Or, picking your nose, immediately pronounced a verdict?
  7. 27091965
    27091965 7 January 2022 12: 16
    +5
    Is that regular barrel firing, but the use of the latest British invention - "dotter", which allows you to train a gunner without firing a shot.

    But there are also nuances here.

    T. Jackson writes that 1–2 ships went out on barrel firing every day.

    It turns out that each of the 12 battleships and armored cruisers of the Japanese practiced barrel firing at most five days a month?

    Good afternoon.
    Dear Andrey. Very often we see the mention of the "Dotter", but Scott Percy developed another device that was used to train gunners and adjust shooting, it was used not only in the British Navy, but also in the navies of other countries. It was called "Deflection Teacher", training was carried out without going to sea and gave the commander of the plutong practice in giving orders for the necessary changes in the sights, and the gunner of the sight was given practice in following orders. This trained commanders, gunners, to adjust the sight in accordance with their last shot.

    I have not seen any mention of the fact that this device was used in the RIF for training artillery crews.
  8. rytik32
    rytik32 7 January 2022 14: 01
    +9
    Andrei, good afternoon!
    Unfortunately, this article turned out to be completely unsuccessful.
    In order to talk about the shooting of the Japanese fleet, one must have good sources. You don't have them. The reports of the British attachés are not complete or accurate sources.
    Who doubts please read http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=2501
    It is extremely unprofessional to draw conclusions "this was not because it was not written about it in the reports of the attaché".
    I just glanced through the sources on Japanese shooting that I have.

    So what? It turns out that the Japanese were practicing long-range shooting!
    Andrey, I congratulate you lying!
    PS removed the plate with shooting practice distances. Can't be shared.
    1. Maxim G
      Maxim G 7 January 2022 14: 08
      +3
      Quote: rytik32
      Andrey, I congratulate you lying!

      WOW.
      So Alexei Rytik (the most reserved participant in the discussions about Tsushima) has run out of patience ... to read this nonsense.
    2. Comrade
      Comrade 7 January 2022 15: 28
      0
      Hello, Alexey!
      Wouldn't it bother you to post the results of the Japanese long-range shooting?
      Which battleships fired how many shells, and how many of them hit the target?
      You do not like the reports of the English observers, so give other numbers.
      And then the situation is as follows: Andrey presents specific data, and in response you are a screenshot with general phrases.
      There is a disproportion. Therefore, facts, carry facts from "good sources", "accurate and complete", not empty words.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        7 January 2022 15: 36
        -2
        Dear Valentine, I can’t answer Rytik in full, I’m busy preparing for the holiday :)) I’ll translate a fragment of it for an hour. Can you tell me what is there? I only disassembled shooting at 6000 m, which does not contradict at all what is given in the article. About shooting at 30-35; I already have a cab.
        However, judging by the text of the commentary, Alexei has a Big Bang. He couldn't even read my conclusions :)
        1. Comrade
          Comrade 8 January 2022 04: 55
          0
          Dear Andrew,

          I apologize for the late answer. I turned to Alexey with a question early in the morning. And then the flywheel of the working day spun, and there was no time for that.
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Can you tell me what is there?

          Quite common places, nothing specific, relevant to the topic at hand - pre-war firing of the Japanese fleet.
          Judge for yourself.

          The text says that on December 20, 1904, the Japanese, who had by that time been enriched by the experience of hostilities with the 1st Pacific Squadron, in preparation for the fight against the 2nd Pacific Squadron, developed the so-called. "The Doctrine of Artillery Shooting of the United Fleet". According to this very "doctrine", practice shooting and intense training (gun crews).
          This distance, which was the maximum, was stipulated in the "Main fire tables for main caliber guns" published by the Naval University in 1903 and contained, in addition to firing tables for guns of all types, all recorded information about training and artillery firing.
          This is followed by a recommendation to avoid shooting at more distant (than 6 meters) distance.
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          However, judging by the text of the commentary, Alexei has a Big Bang. He couldn't even read my conclusions :)

          He just has nothing to cover.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            8 January 2022 10: 25
            +1
            Thank you very much, dear colleague!
            Hilarious. That is, Aleksey refutes me on the basis of data that confirm my innocence.
      2. rytik32
        rytik32 7 January 2022 16: 46
        +3
        Hello Valentine!
        Wouldn't it bother you to post the results of the Japanese long-range shooting?
        Which battleships fired how many shells, and how many of them hit the target?

        Of course it will be difficult, I do not know Japanese.
        Remember, I laid out Mikasa's combat diary for you and even indicated the page number where it is written about two barrel firing a day?
        I remember that you also very much doubted this data ...
        Have you been looking there? Maybe there is also about long-range shooting?

        You do not like the reports of the English observers, so give other numbers.


        Here are the figures for the accuracy of the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima.
        Can you refute?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          7 January 2022 20: 34
          -1
          Quote: rytik32
          Here are the figures for the accuracy of the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima.
          Can you refute?

          There is nothing to refute. It is IMPOSSIBLE to get reliable accuracy of the Japanese in Tsushima. It is impossible to determine the number of hits in the dead Russian ships, the Japanese and the captured "Eagle" really did not work out.
          Therefore, any accuracy figures are pitchforks on the water, and they have nothing to do with reality.
          1. rytik32
            rytik32 7 January 2022 22: 12
            0
            It is IMPOSSIBLE to get reliable accuracy of the Japanese in Tsushima. It is impossible to determine the number of hits in the dead Russian ships

            Andrey, not so long ago in an article about "Invincible" you wrote
            Secondly, we are forced to state the disgusting quality of the British shells. According to the British, they achieved 29 hits at Gneisenau and 35-40 hits at Scharnhorst.

            Explain why, in your opinion, it is possible to determine the number of shells hit by the sunken German ships, but not - to the Russians?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              7 January 2022 22: 33
              -1
              Quote: rytik32
              Explain why, in your opinion, it is possible to determine the number of shells hit by the sunken German ships, but not - to the Russians?

              And you yourself do not understand? Sadness ...
              Firstly, because the number of hits according to observer data is always MORE than real hits. That is, the number of real hits in the SHiG = indicated by the British or less. But even the number indicated by the British speaks of disgusting shooting. If it is even less, the shooting is even more disgusting.
              Second, the British interrogated the rescued Germans, and compared their data with the opinion of the sailors from Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Not that this makes the data completely accurate, but still.
              And now, Alexey, my question is
              Which of the above turned out to be so difficult for you that you could not come to this on your own and have to ask me? Do you have such big problems with logic that the calculations 2 + 2 = 4 are not obvious to you, or what?
              1. rytik32
                rytik32 7 January 2022 22: 54
                +1
                Firstly, because the number of hits according to observer data is always MORE than real hits. That is, the number of real hits in the SHiG = indicated by the British or less.

                Andrey, so make up your mind already. Is it always more or can it be equal?
                You have two sentences that contradict each other.
                In the case of Gneisenau, it turns out just the same.
                This means that it is possible to accurately determine the number of hits on the enemy.
                Thanks for the help, now we figured it out.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  8 January 2022 10: 22
                  0
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Andrey, so make up your mind already. Is it always more or can it be equal?

                  Probably, it may be equal, but such cases are unknown to me. The question is something else - it cannot be less.
                  Quote: rytik32
                  In the case of Gneisenau, it turns out just the same.
                  This means that it is possible to accurately determine the number of hits on the enemy.

                  I'm even afraid to guess what you have managed to draw such a conclusion. If anything, then the British made a list of hits in Gneinesau, checking their data with the testimony of the prisoners. It is not known how much the prisoners' testimony "thinned" the number of hits observed.
        2. Comrade
          Comrade 8 January 2022 02: 24
          +1
          Hello, Alexey!
          Quote: rytik32
          Remember, I laid out Mikasa's combat diary for you and even indicated the page number where it is written about two barrel firing a day?
          I remember that you also very much doubted this data.

          I'm afraid, dear colleague, you are confusing me with someone. Look through your comments, see for yourself.

          Quote: rytik32
          Maybe there is also about long-range shooting?

          You declare categorically that the Japanese conducted long-range target practice. And when you are asked to provide evidence, you refer to your lack of knowledge of Japanese and invite your opponent, that is, me, to look for evidence of your hypothesis in the diary of the battleship "Mikasa".
          Do you think that you are conducting the discussion adequately? You assert and prove to you. And since you have no proof, it means that what you say is just your fiction.

          Quote: rytik32
          Here are the figures for the accuracy of the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima.
          Can you refute?

          Easy, with your permission, just a couple of clarifying questions.
          1) Does this forty percent include hits in "Svetlana", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Vladimir Monomakh", "Navarin", "Emperor Alexander III", "Prince Suvorov", "Borodino" and "Oslyabya"?
          Simply answer, "YES"Or"NO."

          2) What calibers are meant by this forty percent?
    3. bk0010
      bk0010 7 January 2022 15: 37
      +2
      Quote: rytik32
      PS removed the plate with shooting practice distances. Can't be shared.
      Why not, if not a secret? The events of the beginning of the 20th century, more than 100 years have passed, all terms, both by secrecy and by copyright, should have expired long ago. Not that I was really interested in this table, but I would like to understand what bastard wants to forbid you to spread it.
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 7 January 2022 16: 18
        +4
        This book has been handed over to me on a non-proliferation basis. This is a common practice.
        I will write briefly. Distances of exercises up to 10 km. There is even a graph of the accuracy of 305-mm guns based on the results of the exercises in 1902-05. For 10 km it turns out about 3,5%
        1. bk0010
          bk0010 7 January 2022 16: 25
          0
          Quote: rytik32
          This book has been handed over to me on a non-proliferation basis.
          Got it, thanks. I thought that some historical document was not allowed to be published.
    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 January 2022 20: 32
      -1
      Quote: rytik32
      Andrey, I congratulate you lying!

      Really? Alexey, no, these are my congratulations to you. Have you read the article at all? If yes, please quote the place where I stated
      Quote: rytik32
      "it was not because it was not written about it in the reports of the attaché"

      I wrote
      Of course, these conclusions are not final and are not the ultimate truth.
      It is quite possible that later there will be some top-secret reports of the British attachés, which will contain a different description of the training of Japanese artillerymen, or other documents that refute the results of the analysis presented to you, dear readers.
      But today I do not see documents that could confirm the correctness of the version of M. Klimov about the "poor tactical background" of the exercises of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

      Which of these are you willing to dispute?
      Quote: rytik32
      So what? It turns out that the Japanese were practicing long-range shooting!

      Where? :))) 6 m = 000 cables. I write that the Japanese were shooting at 32,7-30 cables. What is the problem?
      Quote: rytik32
      PS removed the plate with shooting practice distances.

      Alexey, first of all: when you give a source, then we will discuss it. Otherwise, I don’t want to blame you, but it happens to you that you notice some numbers, and do not pay attention to others, although they are directly related to the discussion
      And secondly, the question is not in the distances, but in the "tactical background" You can try to shoot for 100 cables while at anchor, the distance of such exercises will be large, but the tactical background is poor
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 7 January 2022 22: 02
        +2
        If yes, please quote the place where I stated

        I quote:
        First. There is no evidence that the Japanese learned to shoot more than 30 cables

        Now on request
        Alexey, first of all: when you give a source, then we will discuss it.

        Please: Lengerer, Hans / Ahlberg, Lars
        Capital Ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1868-1945. Ironclads, Battleships & Battlecruisers. An Outline History of their Design, Construction and Operations. Band 1: Armourclad Fuso to Kongo Class Battle Cruisers
        c 568 - a graph of changes in the distance in the exercise by years
        from 575 - data on the accuracy of 305-mm guns in the exercises of 1902..05
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          7 January 2022 22: 28
          +1
          Quote: rytik32
          I quote:

          Cited Disclaimer
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Of course, these conclusions are not final and are not the ultimate truth.
          It is quite possible that later there will be some top-secret reports of the British attachés, which will contain a different description of the training of Japanese artillerymen, or other documents that refute the results of the analysis presented to you, dear readers.

          What specific word in the quoted passage is not clear to you?
          Quote: rytik32
          Please: Lengerer, Hans / Ahlberg, Lars

          Well, quote. What is the problem? Or do you suggest that I spend 90 euros for a purchase and a lot of time for translation? In principle, I can, but what is my profit from this?
          Quote when, what teachings, who participated, under what conditions, etc.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            7 January 2022 22: 48
            0
            And it would be very good if you could tell where the English-speaking author got the data on Japanese teachings from.
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 7 January 2022 22: 59
              +2

              From Japanese sources
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                8 January 2022 10: 34
                +2
                Quote: rytik32
                From Japanese sources

                Alexey, here is information from a Russian source about the training of Russian artillerymen. From the hands of senior art officers Sisoy and Eagle
                "Shooting was carried out at long distances, approximately, starting from 70 cab. And up to 40 cab., But" Sisoy the Great "usually started firing from 60 cab. Of 12" guns, and from 50 cab. of 6 "guns, because the elevation angles of the guns did not allow the use of a larger tabular range."
                и
                "The shooting was carried out by the whole squadron, at the pyramidal shields; they walked in wake formation; the distance between the ships was 2 cables; weather conditions were favorable. The distance was the greatest - 55, the smallest - 15 cables."
                Moreover, the source is well-known and solid.
                But you do not believe this, because it does not fit into your picture of RYAV. Therefore, you are looking for a refutation. Find the 2TOE collection of circulars and consider this evidence to be negligible, because such distances were not spelled out in the 2TOE firing plans. The fact that, generally speaking, the aforementioned evidence could only be refuted on the basis of the shooting report does not stop you for some reason.
                But a table from an English-language source, compiled on the basis of not knowing what, in which data is not yet presented, when exactly there were firing at 10 m (000 cables) who participated in them, what targets were fired at, was it fleet training or experimental shooting, etc. etc. accept as Truth In Last Instance.
                Do you notice any double standards?
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 8 January 2022 11: 37
                  +5
                  and here is information from a Russian source about the training of Russian artillerymen. From the hands of senior art officers Sisoy and Eagle

                  And Larionov and Ovander from the same "Eagle" and "Sisoya" say that they never fired at such distances.
                  So who to believe? laughing
                  Find the collection of circulars 2TOE

                  That's right, when the readings differ, and there are a lot of people for each of the positions, then you need to look for more reliable sources.
                  But the table is from an English-language source

                  And this article was not written on the basis of an English-language source?
                  Do you notice any double standards?

                  Or do you not notice double standards behind yourself?

                  In this article, they concluded that the Japanese could not shoot accurately at Tsushima because they did not show such results in the exercises.
                  I wonder if you write the same thing about the Russians? After all, the results of the shooting in Madagascar are unknown. Not a single shield was broken. How could you get into Mikasa? They just couldn't! laughing laughing laughing
                  1. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 8 January 2022 12: 28
                    0
                    Quote: rytik32
                    In this article, they concluded that the Japanese could not shoot accurately at Tsushima because they did not show such results in the exercises.

                    Alexey, for you to be healthy, but where is this written? !!
                    I understand that you are a communist, but fear God!
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 8 January 2022 13: 08
                      +5
                      And therefore, the version about the superprecision of the Japanese battleships in the outset of the Tsushima battle hardly has at least some basis.

                      Maybe I wrote too succinctly, but Andrei clearly draws conclusions about the actual accuracy of the Japanese in Tsushima based on fragmentary information about previous practice shooting.
                      This logic is unacceptable to me, hence the sarcasm in the post above.
                      1. d_averk
                        d_averk 10 January 2022 22: 25
                        -1
                        you're not right. He makes not exactly such conclusions in the article.
                        If compressed
                        The Japanese may have been preparing and improving their skill, but 2TOE trained even better, and according to more advanced methods. Something like this.

                        And, of course, there is no consequence that the 2TOE shot better than the Yaps. For there is a starting point of "experience / training", which is not concretized among the Yap and could be better.

                        However, the essence of the purpose of writing the article is completely incomprehensible to me, in the context of these pranks with Klimov.
                  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    8 January 2022 15: 51
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    And Larionov and Ovander from the same "Eagle" and "Sisoya" say that they never fired at such distances.

                    Perhaps because Larionov is the junior navigator, and Ovander is the senior mine officer?
                    Quote: rytik32
                    So who to believe?

                    battalion, probably :)
                    Quote: rytik32
                    That's right, when the readings differ, and there are a lot of people for each of the positions, then you need to look for more reliable sources.

                    I agree. Moreover, it should be understood that all the dots above the "i" can only be dotted by reports on the firing.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    And this article was not written on the basis of an English-language source?

                    Alexey, well, that's not necessary, eh? :))))))
                    This is not an "English-language source" but the reports of the British attachés. What is much more reliable than Lengerer, Hans / Ahlberg, Lars on the basis of unknown Japanese sources, it is not clear how "prepared"
                    You yourself have written many times that the Japanese considered it necessary to limit the maximum firing range of 6 m. This is confirmed by your own screen, which you posted here. This is confirmed by British reports, at least those included in the collection of reports of British attachés. But suddenly Lengerer, Hans / Ahlberg, Lars appear - and all of the above is thrown aside by you, because there is a plate compiled "according to Japanese data" laughing
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Or do you not notice double standards behind yourself?

                    I do not have them.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    In this article, they concluded that the Japanese could not shoot accurately at Tsushima because they did not show such results in the exercises.

                    If this expression is interpreted in terms of
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Andrei clearly draws conclusions about the actual accuracy of the Japanese in Tsushima based on fragmentary information about previous shooting practice.

                    then yes. If the accuracy of the main caliber on the island in peacetime with individual shooting is 50%, then it is very difficult to expect that in a battle on Oslyab, with more waves, being under fire, they would show comparable accuracy from a much greater distance. I would say - almost impossible. Because in battle, accuracy is always multiples of that shown in exercises.
                    And yes, if the Japanese fleet would shoot at 95% like a British battleship, it would be very difficult for Oslyab to be accurate at the level of 30-40%, but it was still possible to believe ... at least the probability of such an event became different from zero, although not much.

                    Quote: rytik32
                    I wonder if you write the same thing about the Russians? After all, the results of the shooting in Madagascar are unknown. Not a single shield was broken.

                    And about the Russians, I write the same thing, and do not attribute to them "five hits out of six shots" as follows from the eyewitness testimony.
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 8 January 2022 16: 37
                      +5
                      Larionov - junior navigator

                      Larionov is also a rangefinder officer. Those. I knew the distance not by hearsay.
                      that all the dots above the "i" can only be dotted by the reports on the firing.

                      In the orders for analyzing the results of shooting, there are also distances.
                      all of the above is thrown aside by you

                      It is known that the data of the British attachés in the collection that I and you have are initially incomplete. I already wrote that there are more detailed editions and even laid out screenshots of them.
                      Well, and the fact that the Japanese began fighting in the GM from long distances, but at the same time never trained to shoot at them - do you even believe in it yourself?
                      under fire

                      And who fired at the Sikishima and Fuji in the first 15 minutes of the battle?
                      I would say - almost impossible

                      There are facts that in the first phase of the battle, Russian ships after 10-15 minutes of Japanese fire turned into ruins. So it was with "Oslyabey", "Suvorov", "Alexander", "Eagle". Except for the high accuracy of the Japanese shooting, this cannot be explained in any way. In these 10-15 minutes, they could plant more shells than our battleship received for the entire battle in the ZhM.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 14: 55
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Larionov is also a rangefinder officer. Those. I knew the distance not by hearsay.

                        Hardly better than starart.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        It is known that the data of the British attachés in the collection that I and you have are initially incomplete.

                        Well, when the complete ones appear, then it will be possible to make adjustments to what I wrote in the article. If it contains something that refutes my hypothesis, of course.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Well, and the fact that the Japanese began fighting in the GM from long distances, but at the same time never trained to shoot at them - do you even believe in it yourself?

                        No problem. For the most part, the fight in WM did not take place at excessive distances, up to 50 cables. A certain number of hits from such distances could be made - which we see with the Japanese, and we, too.
                        Alexey, we know that 1TOE did not practice shooting at the distance of the 1st phase of the battle in WM. But a little and she did.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        And who fired at the Sikishima and Fuji in the first 15 minutes of the battle?

                        Maybe no one, given that the first hits in them were on the 22nd-23rd minute of the battle, although it is obvious that in order to hit on the 22nd minute, you need to start shooting a little earlier. Or maybe they shot, the same "Oslyabya" for example.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        There are facts that in the first phase of the battle, Russian ships after 10-15 minutes of Japanese fire turned into ruins. So it was with "Oslyabey", "Suvorov", "Alexander", "Eagle".

                        Alexander - perhaps, according to Oslyab, there is a reasonable explanation that does not require an extraordinary number of hits, the rest of the ships do not. It took much longer to turn them into ruins.
                      2. Alexandra
                        Alexandra 10 January 2022 00: 13
                        +1
                        So it was not the 12 "caliber at Tsushima" Russian ships after 10-15 minutes of Japanese fire turned into ruins ", but the fire of rapid-fire medium-caliber cannons.

                        In the battle in the Yellow Sea, the role of medium caliber is completely insignificant.

                        The difference between Tsushima and the battle in the Yellow Sea is that under Tsushima, Japanese ships initially fought artillery battles at the distance at which they were able to realize their cardinal superiority in the striking effect of medium-caliber artillery.
                      3. rytik32
                        rytik32 10 January 2022 00: 22
                        0
                        Alexander, good afternoon!
                        I ask you to familiarize yourself with the results of shelling a mock-up of the side armor of "Andrew the First-Called" in 1904. There, a 6-inch shell with a cap pierced the 8-inch armor and exploded behind it. The projectile speed was very high. But we're talking about pyroxylin!
                      4. Alexandra
                        Alexandra 10 January 2022 01: 15
                        0
                        Hello Alexey. During the entire Russo-Japanese War, there was only one case of penetration of 6 "armor reinforced by the Krupp method with the rupture of a Russian 12" shell about three meters behind the armor plate. About 6 "shells and say nothing.

                        Why are you sure that projectiles with pyroxylin, and not some kind of experimental, or vice versa, traditional explosive equipment were used for test firing at the layout of the side armor of "Andrew the First-Called"?

                        As you know, shells with an explosive charge of black powder usually managed to pass the armor plate before an explosion occurred. I don’t know how in the case of armor plates with a thickness of more than half the caliber shells with an explosive charge of smokeless gun pyroxylin powder, but you’re probably aware that for the case of armor plates corresponding to the thickness of the caliber of the projectile, we later determined that phlegmatized TNT was required. But even not phlegmatized TNT is much less sensitive to impact than conventional pyroxylin. During the First World War, the same Germans successfully used non-phlegmatized TNT in their large-caliber armor-piercing projectiles, using a number of measures to cushion TNT sticks of an explosive charge (if I am not mistaken, they took away about 10 percent of the useful volume of the projectile chamber).
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        10 January 2022 06: 38
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I ask you to familiarize yourself with the results of shelling a mock-up of the side armor of "Andrew the First-Called" in 1904. There, a 6-inch shell with a cap pierced the 8-inch armor and exploded behind it. The projectile speed was very high

                        Let me guess :))) The speed of the projectile corresponded to a distance of 1-2 cables, the deviation from the normal was near-zero :)
                    2. d_averk
                      d_averk 10 January 2022 22: 36
                      +1
                      If the accuracy of the main caliber on the island in peacetime with individual shooting is 50%, then it is very difficult to expect that in the battle on "Oslyab" with stronger waves, being under fire, from a much greater distance they would show comparable accuracy. I would say - almost impossible. Because in battle, the accuracy is always a multiple of that shown in exercises.

                      But what about the beloved ballistics specialist, whom you love so much to refer to ... in my opinion, it was he who stated that shooting in battle is quite accelerated in the results of peacetime. However, there is an opinion that he wrote this about the magnitude of the scattering of shells.
                      But nevertheless, the point is that in SOME moments of the battle, the accuracy can exceed the accuracy achieved in the exercises. Moreover, as a paradox, the worse the accuracy was in the exercises, the stronger the excess may be. For obvious reasons.

                      And yes, if the Japanese fleet would shoot at 95% like a British battleship, it would be very difficult for Oslyab to be accurate at the level of 30-40%, but it was still possible to believe ... at least the probability of such an event became different from zero, although not much.

                      You are not good at dealing with probabilities. The accuracy achieved in a small sample of a large event does not in any way depend on the "peacetime accuracy". Up to the point that, in general, the accuracy of a separate ship in Tsushima was at the level of 10%, but it was precisely on Oslyab that several volleys were closed with an accuracy of 50%.

                      Shooting accuracy depends very much on the zeroing accuracy, and on the "disturbances" introduced by the enemy.
                      As for Goncharov, there is theoretical, possible and achieved accuracy. So, practically standing still, Oslyabya shifted the possible accuracy close to the theoretical one, and, accordingly, increased the range of the achieved. Here's to believe that all The Tsushima battle, an arbitrarily taken Japanese ship showed an accuracy of 50% and it is very difficult to substantiate this probabilistically. Because any favorable premise is always limited in time. And an accuracy of 50% with several volleys in a row in a short time interval on a weakly moving target, well observed, is a very likely event.
          2. Comrade
            Comrade 8 January 2022 05: 16
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Well, quote when, what kind of teachings, who took part, in what conditions, etc. What is the problem?

            Judging by Alexei's silence, the problem is the lack of such information in this book.
      2. d_averk
        d_averk 10 January 2022 22: 21
        0
        From the moment when the ZPR ordered the entire 1st squadron to hit Mikasa, any tactical background of the exercises already played little role. There was practically no opportunity to effectively target and refine the sight by bursts, and the range finders either began to lie after the first shots, or were demolished by land mines.
  9. CHEREDA73
    CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 17: 05
    +6
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Undecim
    The only question to the author is why the Japanese won, since from his articles the conclusion suggests itself that Togo's victory over Rozhdestvensky can only be explained by the participation of higher powers ?!

    3. Training of gunners.

    I would like to cite an excerpt from Novikov-Priboy. It is clear that these are not docs, but very curious:

    Novikov writes that the Japanese were engaged in the selection of gunners, selected the most capable. Ours are not. It is clear that a trained and gifted person will shoot better than a trained but lacking ability. If it is true that Novikov writes, then this is one of the weighty reasons for the Japanese superiority in artillery.
    Can anyone document this?
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 7 January 2022 17: 42
      +4
      Quote: CHEREDA73
      Can anyone document this?

      There seemed to be a topic on Tsushima about this. EMNIP came to the conclusion that there are no such documents. But it was a long time ago, maybe that has surfaced since then.
      1. CHEREDA73
        CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 17: 55
        +5
        It is clear that this is fiction, but gathering the "best of the best" for the decisive battle is just logical.
        Interestingly, someone communicates with the Japanese on their forums?
        What do they think about this?
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 7 January 2022 18: 15
          +3
          Quote: CHEREDA73
          It is clear that this is fiction, but gathering the "best of the best" for the decisive battle is just logical.

          That's just not always possible :))
          There is such a thing. While the sailor receives a specialty in the training unit, it is possible to select the most promising cadets and send them after graduation to the newest ships. But whether this most promising frame will be able to develop its potential is a big question.
          But when he already got on the ship and began to really demonstrate something (and this requires experience), then not a single commander / first mate / starart in his right mind will ever give it to anyone. Especially if the sailor, with all his talents, is not yet prone to violations of discipline. Therefore, it is much more likely that the representatives of the bosses will retroactively remove all penalties from some gouging and give him class, and then send him as "the best of the best" to bang the brains of other commanders. yes
          1. CHEREDA73
            CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 18: 24
            +1
            I absolutely agree, only in relation to us. We have, yes, so it is. They won't give up a good specialist without a "fight". As in a children's verse - "you need such a cow yourself" smile
            But, does this apply to Japanese behavior? Especially at the most acute moment for Japan?
            1. 3x3zsave
              3x3zsave 7 January 2022 18: 38
              +3
              Absolutely right, Eugene! Ivan gave the brightest example of the Russian mentality. But not Japanese. Especially at the apogee of the Meiji era.
              1. CHEREDA73
                CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 18: 45
                +2
                Hello Anton!
                Merry Christmas to you!
                Yes, the mentality between us and the Japanese differs greatly.
                But the thought about Japanese forums sunk into my mind.
                After all, both the respected author Andrei and his opponent Maksim brought a lot of documents, diaries, testimonies ... This is great! But, obviously, there is not enough advanced "Tsushimologist" from the Japanese side.
                1. 3x3zsave
                  3x3zsave 7 January 2022 18: 58
                  +2
                  I will tell you a "terrible secret". The only person at the forum who lived and worked in Japan, and at least somehow understands its culture, is Viktor Nikolaevich. The rest are completely "gaijins".
                  1. CHEREDA73
                    CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 19: 08
                    +2
                    Well, Viktor Nikolaevich spoke out briefly what he thinks about this and, it seems, does not intend to continue.
                    1. 3x3zsave
                      3x3zsave 7 January 2022 19: 14
                      +2
                      VikNik has more than once expressed his opinion on the particulars of the local "tsusimiada". I think it was a summary coming from watching four seasons.
            2. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 7 January 2022 18: 57
              +2
              People are the same everywhere :)
              Dare shimo waga mi wa kawaii. (everyone is nicer to himself)

              Or if in the language of native sakura - your kimono is closer to the body :)))
              1. CHEREDA73
                CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 19: 01
                +3
                Maybe so...
                We urgently need to summon the spirit of Admiral Togo and ask a few questions what
                And then the readers suffer in ignorance.
                1. 3x3zsave
                  3x3zsave 7 January 2022 19: 17
                  +2
                  We urgently need to summon the spirit of the admiral
                  Rozhdestvensky or Togo?
                  1. CHEREDA73
                    CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 19: 29
                    +2
                    No, Rozhdestvensky is not relevant in this case. Moreover, following the results of Tsushima, he said everything to those who officially investigated the reasons. I would hardly add it now. But Togo ...
                    Wow, how interesting it would be to listen to him.
                    Imagine, Maxim Klimov asks a question about the "instant throw of the newest Russian battleships" during the "Togo loop", and the admiral replies that, they say, he would easily parry ... Or, on the contrary, that he was very afraid of such Russian actions.
                    Or a question like this:
                    - Mr. Admiral, is it true that you managed to collect the best gunners from all over the fleet for the upcoming battle? Or are they all lying?
                    Ooh yes! Such a witness would put everything in its place ...
                    1. 3x3zsave
                      3x3zsave 7 January 2022 19: 45
                      +2
                      Rozhdestvensky is always not relevant for some reason, ...
                      From Vesta to Tsushima.
                      1. CHEREDA73
                        CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 19: 58
                        +2
                        Anton, I'm afraid that right now you are puzzling Andrey with a new article good
                      2. 3x3zsave
                        3x3zsave 7 January 2022 20: 04
                        +2
                        I'm not puzzling, I just know about the conflict "Rozhdestvensky vs Baranovsky"
                      3. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 7 January 2022 21: 56
                        +3
                        Quote: 3x3zsave
                        I just know about the conflict "Rozhdestvensky vs Baranovsky"

                        With the inventor, the author of the landing cannon, or with his brother, the manufacturer? :)))
                        Or is it Baranov? tongue
                      4. 3x3zsave
                        3x3zsave 8 January 2022 07: 41
                        0
                        Yes, it's my fault. Of course, Baranov.
                      5. 3x3zsave
                        3x3zsave 7 January 2022 20: 46
                        +3
                        Leave it, Evgeny!
                        I know who "Andrey from Chelyabinsk" is, I doubt that he can write something on topics that interest me
                      6. CHEREDA73
                        CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 20: 24
                        +2
                        Oh, Tsushima-Tsushima ...
                        That would seem ...
                        And near Narva they gave a cap, and there was a devastating Austerlitz, but it was Tsushima who sat inside and did not pull out the needle ...
                      7. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 7 January 2022 21: 59
                        +3
                        After Narva there was Poltava and the Nishtad world. After Austerlitz, we visited Paris, but Tsushima, be it not okay ...
                      8. d_averk
                        d_averk 10 January 2022 22: 53
                        0
                        Rozhestvensky riveted on Baranov and on himself?
                      9. 3x3zsave
                        3x3zsave 10 January 2022 22: 57
                        0
                        About. There, the case almost came to court.
                      10. d_averk
                        d_averk 10 January 2022 23: 32
                        -1
                        About not necessary, about and I know.
                        And I'm very curious why 1 - didn't go to trial
                        2 - why the naval department let go of the "slander" on the brakes.

                        Rather, I would have believed that Rozhdestvensky was right in many ways (COM also doubted), and the Naval Ministry decided everything on the shelter so as not to revise all the results. And this, let me remind you, is orders, titles, glory ...

                        It is like a monument to two sailors from a destroyer from Port Arthur, who allegedly drowned themselves in it so as not to surrender to the Japanese. Then it turned out that they were not there, but the monument was opened))))
                      11. 3x3zsave
                        3x3zsave 11 January 2022 00: 22
                        0
                        Colleague, you, apparently, understand the issue better than me, I am more about the European Middle Ages ... hi
                      12. d_averk
                        d_averk 10 January 2022 23: 36
                        -1
                        The result of this creative boom, temporarily interrupted by the revolutionary events of 1905-1907, was the decision to erect a monument to “two unknown sailors-heroes”, the project of which was prepared by the sculptor K. V. Isenberg. In August 1908, his work was highly approved, and on June 22, 1909, a contract was signed with the author for the production of the monument.


                        ......

                        Considering that the invention should not be immortalized in the monument, the Naval General Staff on April 2, 1910 sent a report to the emperor, where he raised the question: “Should the monument, which was supposed to be opened, be considered erected in memory of the heroic self-sacrifice of the two unknown lower ranks of the command of the destroyer“ Guarding ”, or to open this monument simply in memory of the heroic death of the destroyer "Guarding?"

                        The tsar's answer to this request was unequivocal: "To consider that the monument was erected in memory of the heroic death of the destroyer" Guarding "in battle".

                        On April 26, 1911, the monument was inaugurated in the same place where it can be seen today.


                        The legend was never debunked in the general press.
                      13. d_averk
                        d_averk 11 January 2022 17: 34
                        0
                        and again minus for just facts ... B is a vendetta)
              2. 3x3zsave
                3x3zsave 7 January 2022 19: 16
                +2
                People are the same everywhere:
                "Blessed is he who believes" (C)
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 7 January 2022 19: 51
                  +3
                  Quote: 3x3zsave
                  believes

                  In this case, everything is according to Stanislavsky: - I don’t believe! request
                  In the East, clannishness is a common phenomenon. And Japan is no exception here. Remember the graters between the navy and army men and their constant pulling the blanket over themselves.
                  1. 3x3zsave
                    3x3zsave 7 January 2022 19: 59
                    +2
                    The rakes between the navy and the army happened a little later. By the way, the "tracing paper" of the British-English model.
                    1. Senior seaman
                      Senior seaman 8 January 2022 12: 32
                      +1
                      Quote: 3x3zsave
                      British-English

                      Oil-and-oil?
                      But in general, yes. In all communities there was a pulling of the blanket over oneself and in the Royal Nevi no less than in others. And I see absolutely no reason why Meiji Japan should be an exception. That the Satsuma clans never did anything like that?
                      1. 3x3zsave
                        3x3zsave 8 January 2022 13: 59
                        0
                        The role of the Satsumo immigrants in the Meiji Revolution is undeniable, but I do not know enough about Japanese history to debate this topic. We have an unfinished discussion about Clovis with you, I hope we will continue ...
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      7 January 2022 21: 01
      +1
      Quote: CHEREDA73
      Novikov writes that the Japanese were engaged in the selection of gunners, selected the most capable. Ours - no

      There is a feeling that this is true. Japanese EBR and BRKR fired much better than armored cruisers
      1. CHEREDA73
        CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 21: 11
        +2
        Hello Andrei.
        And you, by any chance, have no feedback from the "other side"? Surely, there are people there who have studied the topic inside and out ...
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          7 January 2022 21: 21
          +3
          Eugene, hello!
          Alas, I have nothing - other than publicly available sources. I'm not a historian, nevertheless, but I want to say this:
          From what I know (and I do not claim to be absolute truth) there are no people in Japan who are deeply interested in unearthing the nuances of the Russo-Japanese war at sea. Simply put, they won, and they won with a devastating score for us. So why poke around there?
          After all, we also have few people who want to deeply study the events of 1945, when our divisions tore the Kwantung Army like a hot water bottle. For about the same reasons - they broke in an exemplary way, and they broke in, the official version suits everyone.
          1. CHEREDA73
            CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 21: 32
            +2
            Yes, I didn't think about that ...
            Comparison with August 45 is a good one ...
            1. Undecim
              Undecim 7 January 2022 22: 12
              +3
              Comparison with August 45 is a good one ...

              Unsuccessful, illustrating a complete ignorance of Japanese culture and mentality.
              1. CHEREDA73
                CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 22: 49
                +2
                Hello, Victor Nikolaevich!
                Yes, I don't know about Japanese culture, practically nothing. I did not live or work there. You, as far as I know, are lucky.
                But you are silent, do not say anything ...
                It seemed to me that if we consider only the military side of the matter, then it’s appropriate to compare. But, I do not pretend, as they say ...
                1. Undecim
                  Undecim 7 January 2022 23: 09
                  +3
                  Yes, I have already spoken about this "eternal music". Without access to primary sources, this is a transfusion from empty to empty.
                  As for Japan, "lived and worked" is a loud saying. I had to go on business trips and communicate with the Japanese. This is very different from tourist travel.
                  Compared to 1945, the Japanese study their victories, as it were, no more thoroughly than their defeats.
                  1. CHEREDA73
                    CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 23: 36
                    +2
                    "Eternal music" - because it hurts ...
                    Since childhood, I still cannot accept this internally, always the question "well, how, damn it, how !?"
                    Therefore, we have discussed and will continue to discuss.
                    Although we have already driven along and across and diagonally ...
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                7 January 2022 22: 50
                +2
                Quote: Undecim
                Unsuccessful, illustrating a complete ignorance of Japanese culture and mentality.

                No question, so it will be easy for you to name several historians of Japan who are deeply digging the RYAV naval war - what Evgeny asked for
                1. Undecim
                  Undecim 7 January 2022 23: 03
                  +2
                  It will be easy for you to name several historians of Japan who are deeply digging the RYAV naval war - what Evgeny asked for

                  Suppose I name them for you. What will it give you? Do you know Japanese?
                  And in Japan, the history of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905 is not the lot of individual "deeply digging" historians. There it is studied even by schoolchildren in the section "Formation of a modern nation and the development of a national state", therefore it has been studied and continues to be studied, let's say, at the state level.
                  1. CHEREDA73
                    CHEREDA73 7 January 2022 23: 27
                    +2
                    In my opinion, it is a little different. As Andrei said, they won, and crushingly. Therefore, everything is interpreted quite unambiguously, without these "but if only".
                    For example, Suvorov near Ishmael: everything is sorted out and clear: the first column goes there, the fourth column goes there ... Victory in a tense battle. What the Turks suffered is not very important to us. Or the case at Novi: we are also not very moved by Joubert's throwing on the night before the battle.
                    So the Japanese: they won, so the shells are good, the ships are at the level, the personnel are prepared ... And the problems of the Russians are the problems of the Russians ... Everything is clear, understandable ... for them.
                    1. Undecim
                      Undecim 7 January 2022 23: 50
                      +2
                      Therefore, everything is interpreted quite unambiguously, without these "but if only".

                      With "these but if" - this is not history, it is, gymnastics for the brain. And the modeling of historical processes, including for the study of historical alternatives, is a serious scientific process that requires serious resources.
                      1. CHEREDA73
                        CHEREDA73 8 January 2022 00: 12
                        +1
                        So then there is nothing to discuss. Everything that happened is laid out on the shelves and almost minute by minute. Have learned and ... what? If you memorize only facts without comprehension, without this "what if", then this kind of ossification turns out, just like the ideology of the late USSR under Suslov.
                        And I'm used to this "and if", as the work requires it.
                      2. Undecim
                        Undecim 8 January 2022 00: 14
                        +2
                        So then there is nothing to discuss.

                        I did not write "there is nothing to discuss". I wrote
                        modeling historical processes, including for the study of historical alternatives, is a serious scientific process that requires serious resources.
                      3. CHEREDA73
                        CHEREDA73 8 January 2022 00: 27
                        +2
                        I agree completely.
                        It's like modeling the consequences of a nuclear explosion at a certain point on the earth's surface. The input conditions are such and such, the output will be such and such ...
                        OK. Good night, Victor Nikolaevich! It was nice to talk to you hi
                      4. Undecim
                        Undecim 8 January 2022 00: 32
                        +3
                        And all the best to you.
                  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    8 January 2022 10: 36
                    +1
                    Quote: Undecim
                    Suppose I tell you them. What will it give you?

                    Nothing for me. It was not me who asked them, but dear Evgeny.
                    Quote: Undecim
                    And in Japan, the history of the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905 is not the lot of individual "deeply digging" historians. There she is studied even by schoolchildren.

                    According to the official version, which no one checks or disputes. Or do you want to say that in Japanese schools, for example, the nuances of the shooting practice of the United Fleet are taught?
                    1. Undecim
                      Undecim 8 January 2022 11: 39
                      +2
                      According to the official version, which no one checks or disputes

                      I check and dispute. Even Togo's role in victory. And they write articles. And even professors-economists write.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 14: 39
                        +2
                        Quote: Undecim
                        I check and dispute.

                        Well, I'll know. I just read on the Tsushima forums once that there is little interest in the RYAV on the other side for the above reasons. And he wrote something like someone serious.
                        I'm not even going to Japan ... I won't even go :))))) Here, with English, serious problems arose with the translation of British reports, in some cases I turned to people who knew the language for help. So English is somehow familiar to me, I learned it at school all the same. What I "translate" from Japanese, it's scary to imagine ...
                      2. Undecim
                        Undecim 9 January 2022 14: 50
                        +1
                        I'm not even going to Japan ... I won't even go :))))) Here, with English, serious problems arose with the translation of British reports, in some cases I turned to people who knew the language for help. So English is somehow familiar to me, I learned it at school all the same. What I "translate" from Japanese, it's scary to imagine ...

                        Yes, there are language problems. At the same time, coverage of such issues, especially with a claim to some kind of conclusions and conclusions without using foreign language literature - you yourself understand ...
                        Today, ordering a translation seems to be no problem. I, if I am interested in something, appeal, from old memory, to our Chamber of Commerce and Industry. They have not refused yet.
                      3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 15: 15
                        +2
                        Quote: Undecim
                        At the same time, coverage of such issues, especially with a claim to some kind of conclusions and conclusions without using foreign language literature - you yourself understand ...

                        I understand :))) Therefore, I translate the reports, slowly :)))
                        Quote: Undecim
                        Today, ordering a translation seems to be no problem.

                        If you know what to translate - maybe. Not knowing how to translate articles and books - no money will be enough
                      4. Undecim
                        Undecim 9 January 2022 15: 20
                        0
                        Then there is only one option - to learn the language yourself, for a start, at least English. If you wish, you can reach the Advanced level in a year and a half.
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 15: 27
                        +2
                        Quote: Undecim
                        Then there is only one option - to learn the language yourself, for a start, at least English.

                        I don’t know, it’s not given to me, I tried it several times. Now I'm trying to expand my vocabulary once again in the process of translating reports. Slowly, sadly, very quickly forgotten. Some kind of incapable of languages, honestly ...
                      6. Undecim
                        Undecim 9 January 2022 15: 29
                        +3
                        As one ancient Greek said: "Who wants - is looking for a way, who does not want - is looking for a reason."
                        From my own experience, I remember that a pretty teacher contributes to the process. True, it was more than forty years ago, but pleasant memories of learning the language remained.
                      7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 15: 36
                        +3
                        Quote: Undecim
                        From my own experience, I remember that a pretty teacher contributes to the process.

                        "For my birthday, friends gave me a beer mug with a naked woman. I liked the gift, but my wife did not appreciate it - she broke the mug, drove the naked woman away" (c)
                        Quote: Undecim
                        Who wants - is looking for a way, who does not want - is looking for a reason. "

                        I tried to teach in courses, I tried it myself (I bought a good self-study guide on how many CDs there are), I tried to just stupidly learn words ... A lot of time and money wasted, the result is zero. Now here is another attempt.
                      8. Undecim
                        Undecim 9 January 2022 15: 44
                        0
                        Then the only cardinal way remains - to move to England and completely exclude the possibility of contact with native speakers of the Russian language. As another ancient but Chinese said:"Life is the best teacher. She constantly teaches us lessons, to teach us to be better and to admit our mistakes, to be persistent and achieve our goals and always hope for the best, because there are no hopeless situations.".
                      9. rytik32
                        rytik32 9 January 2022 15: 20
                        +2
                        Colleague, I totally agree.
                        For an article on the Japanese methodology, I needed a translation from Japanese, and I found a more or less working translator.
                        Now we know about the Japanese method of conducting the exercises (Andrey for some reason missed it in this article), about the zeroing method, the method of adjusting the fire.
                        On these holidays, I got to the memoirs of Japanese veterans of the RYA, recorded in the 20-30s. In Japanese, of course!
                        And I received a lot of valuable information. For example, I can say that the yellow pipes were very clearly visible in the opinion of the Japanese. And during the battle, Asama's gunners came to the H-shaped sights, tk. optical blurred from splashes. Another 6-inch gun of Asama was serviced by 8 people: 5 from their side, and 3 from non-firing. This accelerated the supply of ammunition.
                        To rewrite for the eleventh time well-known lines from the reports of British attachés is boring and unproductive.
                      10. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 15: 22
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Now we know about the Japanese method of conducting the exercises (Andrey for some reason missed it in this article), about the zeroing method, the method of adjusting the fire.

                        Because I did not see this description in the reports. At all:)))
                        Or do you mean a translation that you made yourself? So he is not about exercises, these were recommendations :)
                      11. rytik32
                        rytik32 9 January 2022 15: 28
                        +3
                        Those. information from Japanese manuals and magazines should be ignored because it is not in the reports of British attachés?
                        Hand face!
                      12. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 15: 38
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Those. information from Japanese manuals and magazines should be ignored because it is not in the reports of British attachés?

                        You translated the instructions, despite the fact that you did not give any data that they were used in the educational process.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Hand face!

                        Alexey is really a hand-face. What you are doing now is about the same as translating Grevenitz's instructions into Japanese, and claiming that this is how the Russian fleet trained in the RYAV
                      13. rytik32
                        rytik32 9 January 2022 15: 43
                        +1
                        There is a pre-war Japanese instruction on the teachings. From it there are pictures of rafts, sights in my article.
                        Its use is confirmed by Mikasa's combat diary (somewhat analogous to our VJ). But why didn't you take the data from Mikasa's combat diary, but from the attaché.
                      14. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 17: 17
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        There is a pre-war Japanese instruction on the teachings. From it there are pictures of rafts, sights in my article.

                        In which - what? :))))) Where are shooting in volleys, ledges, where shooting at long distances and so on and so on. from what you postulate?
                      15. rytik32
                        rytik32 9 January 2022 17: 34
                        +2
                        In which incl. methodology for conducting exercises. Your article on this technique is silent.
                      16. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        10 January 2022 06: 55
                        0
                        Alexey, be more specific :) What exactly in VZ Mikasa refutes what is written in the article? :)
                      17. rytik32
                        rytik32 9 January 2022 17: 07
                        +1
                        Alexey is really a hand-face

                        Found case C09020087400 on Jakar.
                        Translated the annotation:
                        The telegrams of April 26 and 27, concerning the firing of standard ammunition, say that the commanders and artillerymen of the fleet have very poor results when firing and were somewhat frightened, and for a long time doubted the quality of the weapon and lost confidence in it. The main forces of the enemy fleet are now at sea near Annam, and at a time when the Empire relies on the superiority of the United Fleet in control of the seas, we have received a report that is not entirely clear. The reason for the low efficiency of our shooting is defective powder, and we decided to return it to production.
                        There is even a sign in the case. Are these not the results of the shooting?

                        Still found how many cases on jakar
                      18. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        9 January 2022 17: 25
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        There is even a sign in the case. Are these not the results of the shooting?

                        Anything can be. I don't know Japanese. And where are the shooting conditions in this table?
                        I could assume that if the case is related to gunpowder and epic feil, perhaps we are talking about the shooting of Shikishima, but, of course, I have no idea what is written here.
                      19. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 9 January 2022 15: 23
                        +1
                        What else is interesting?
                      20. rytik32
                        rytik32 9 January 2022 15: 38
                        +4
                        Kasuga received scopes only after the fight in the ZhM. During the battle in the ZhM, the aft 8-inch turret had problems - the bolt did not close, the asbestos gasket on both guns was changed.
                        Asama had a lot of coal at the beginning of the Tsushima battle, some of the coal from the upper deck was thrown overboard. It is described how they tried to patch up the holes in the stern, that the pump broke down, and they dug it out with their hands. They were stuffed with blankets, bunks and props. All rice supplies were flooded - there were problems with lunch.
                        At Kasuga in Tsushima, the observer reported to the aft tower the result of each volley: hit / flight / undershoot.
                        Much damage to ships. For example, on Asam, the shell pierced the pipe right through, did not explode.
                        On Fuji, all but one gunner were killed in the tower. Killed incl. the best shooter of the Japanese fleet. 6-inch gun # 4 fired 76 rounds.
                        There's a lot ...
                      21. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 9 January 2022 19: 39
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        On Fuji, all but one gunner were killed in the tower. Killed incl. the best shooter of the Japanese fleet. 6-inch gun # 4 fired 76 rounds.
                        There's a lot ...

                        Alexey, you already have enough material for a very good book. You are already really deep into the topic, and the level is quite decent! Do you think to generalize and publish?
                      22. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 9 January 2022 20: 34
                        0
                        Nowadays, videos on YouTube are popular, not articles and books.

                        Now Fedor Lisitsyn and Alexei Isaev are releasing videos about RYAV.
                        Which are already being actively criticized.
                      23. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 9 January 2022 21: 19
                        +2
                        Quote: Maxim G
                        Now Fedor Lisitsyn and Alexei Isaev are releasing videos about RYAV.
                        Which are already being actively criticized.

                        And which of them is Alexei Rytnik? Anyway, the oral presentation of the material is for a very slow perception in my opinion. In a traffic jam, listen, well, maybe it makes sense. Well, yes, there are also many questions to Isaev, he also sometimes likes to cut corners and sometimes lie in details.
                      24. rytik32
                        rytik32 9 January 2022 21: 45
                        +3
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Well, yes, and there are many questions to Isaev too.

                        He was already nicknamed Lesha by two battleships for the fact that in WWII he placed two battleships on the Black Sea Fleet
                      25. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 10 January 2022 18: 30
                        +1
                        Yes, at Sidorenko's LiveJournal and Isaev's for Pearl Harbor, they spread, and Lisitsyn for RYAV. As I understand it, it's the same on Tsushima.
                        However, with FVL 01 I understood everything a few years ago when he praised the Chilean battleship Captain Prat.
                      26. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 10 January 2022 18: 23
                        +1
                        Which one is Alexey Rytнuk i don't know how and who is Alexey Rytнuk in general winked

                        The meaning of my message was that if you publish a work, it is desirable to be as specialized as possible, much more than in VO, moving away from the format of journalism (this format has replaced YouTube).
                        With an attachment in the form of used documents.
                        This is key.
                        Those. a collection of documents with the analysis and development of the topic that the author wanted to highlight.
                      27. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 10 January 2022 22: 57
                        0
                        Fact, sealed up. However, the essence is still the same. As before, there is a lack of quality books on RYAV.
                      28. rytik32
                        rytik32 9 January 2022 22: 49
                        +1
                        It's buulshit)))
                        I read the results of the shelling in 1904 of a log house imitating the armor of "Andrew the First-Called", 8 dm. krupp. In short: our shells were cool. 12-inch with a tip pierced with a gap behind the armor at a speed corresponding to Tsushima distances. Even a 6-inch tip with a tip was still dispersed so that it could pierce with a gap behind the armor.
                        So pyroxylin did not detonate ahead of time)))
                      29. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 9 January 2022 23: 58
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        So pyroxylin did not detonate ahead of time)))

                        Detonated, detonated. :))
                        But the fact that pyroxylin is better than many other explosives in terms of resistance to shock detonation is a fact. It has another big drawback, strong instability in humidity. It depended on her whether she would immediately explode or think.
                      30. Alexandra
                        Alexandra 10 January 2022 00: 42
                        0
                        Only in the course of the Russo-Japanese War, our cool shells never pierced Japanese armor over 6 "thick with a full gap behind the armor. And 6" armor reinforced by the Krupp method was pierced with a full gap behind the armor only once.

                        "Captain Maksimov ... He was the first to have the idea to introduce such compounds for equipping projectiles that, having sufficient detonating properties, would not explode when passing through solid barriers. So, for example, an armor-piercing projectile equipped with such an explosive must pass armor and then explode from the action of the detonator in the shock tube. He shared this idea with me and offered to work with him on its implementation. I willingly agreed to this joint work, and began to investigate in the laboratory various combinations of aromatic nitro compounds with picric acid trinitrocresol and not only to study their suitability from a physicochemical point of view, but also to investigate their explosive properties in explosions in the Sarro and Viell bomb. death of Maksimov, which followed in the early in 1898, such combinations of nitro compounds found great application in the equipment of shells, and my student at the Academy cap. A. A. Dzerzhkovich, who took the place of Maksimov, successfully continued the development of this issue. "

                        "... in view of the desire to increase the destructive effect of armor-piercing projectiles, the question was raised of equipping them with some highly effective explosive that would not explode from a projectile hitting the armor, and it was necessary to develop a type of fuse that would not deform itself upon impact projectile on the armor, would produce an explosion of an explosive charge upon the passage of the armor projectile or after it completely stopped in the armor; a sufficiently resistant explosive was found by the now deceased captain Maksimov, and the results of firing from a 6-inch cannon in 190 pounds with armor-piercing shells equipped with this substance, gave such favorable results that it was decided to proceed to experiments of equipping them with armor-piercing shells for 11-inch cannons arr. 1877, for 6-inch Canet guns and for 10-inch guns; experiments with fuses have not yielded the desired result so far. " From the most submissive report to the Ministry of War on the measures and state of all branches of military administration for 1905

                        And you probably remember how the 12 "armor-piercing projectile and the old-style tube were evaluated based on the results of firing at the" excluded vessel No. 4 "in 1913. And this was already a shell reloaded with TNT, less sensitive to the impact of the shell on the armor.

                        PS How many 12 "shells with an armor-piercing tip were in the ammunition load of the warships of the 2nd TOE at Tsushima?
                      31. rytik32
                        rytik32 10 January 2022 18: 25
                        +2
                        I also translated about the fight into WM
                        In this battle, the damage to our fleet was minor, with the exception of Mikasa and Nissin, but Mikasa suffered the most, it was hit by many enemy shells, its command and communication equipment was destroyed, its messengers were killed and wounded, especially the commanders of the rear tower and the aft group were wounded, the officer attached to the battery was killed in action, and his replacement was also wounded. Due to the loss of the battery commander, each gun ran to a neighboring battery to ask the gunner for distance, and some of them fired at their own discretion, but the gunners continued to fire calmly.

                        those. according to the state of artillery and its control Mikasa was roughly like the Eagle at the end of Tsushima
                      32. d_averk
                        d_averk 10 January 2022 23: 05
                        -1
                        which by the way leads to the fact that if it were not for a number of technical problems and high-explosive shells of Togo, several Japanese ships would also be experiencing the thesis "is it possible to sink a battleship with artillery."
                      33. rytik32
                        rytik32 11 January 2022 00: 15
                        +1
                        if not

                        What do you mean if not?
                        Our shells did what it took a lot more Japanese (I'm talking about the Eagle)
                        There is only one conclusion: in the outset of the battle it was necessary to hit, and not to jam the fish.
                        So the Japanese would be left without fire control.
                      34. d_averk
                        d_averk 11 January 2022 00: 43
                        -1
                        Oho ...
                        1) The Japanese once measured the distance, and then took aim at clearly visible bursts.
                        We are constantly going to rangefinders who began to lie, and then disappeared
                        2) .Our ships turned into flaming islands, where the fragments were mowing everything, and extremely quickly. The dastardly Yapas had little fear of our armor-piercing (and also fuasny ones with their mass of explosives) and calmly sent messengers, even if, contrary to expectations, the pipes were torn along with the wires.

                        Our shells did what it took a lot more Japanese (I'm talking about the Eagle)

                        These are assumptions. All damage to the Eagle associated with a violation of the centralization of moths be the result of literally 2-3 Japanese Fuass.
                        The total number of hits is not an indicator in this case.
                      35. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 9 January 2022 18: 55
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        And during the battle, Asama's gunners came to the H-shaped sights, tk. optical blurred from splashes.

                        By the way, the Japanese said this a long time ago. About the fact that sights and even range finders on the felling houses were flooded with water from nearby fountains. And that telephones and electric indicators are poorly insulated and completely out of order from the same streams of water. The Japanese knew this from the results of the battles with the 1st TOE, and therefore the Japanese messengers with plates headlong spreading the distance to the enemy in the casemates.

                        Someone, even you seem to have published a wonderful photo with such a messenger.
                      36. d_averk
                        d_averk 10 January 2022 22: 59
                        -1
                        About pipes - was it noticeable during the day or at night?
                2. rytik32
                  rytik32 7 January 2022 23: 07
                  +3
                  Koike Shigeki.
                  Not so long ago, I wrote an article about the Japanese RYAV shells based on the documents of the SSI.
                  I posted its translation in the Marine collection.
                  Just not sure if he is a historian.
                  1. Undecim
                    Undecim 7 January 2022 23: 37
                    +4
                    Just not sure if he is a historian.

                    He is not a historian, he is an economist, professor of economics at the University of Tokyo. But, as Andrei wrote, he loves to "dig deep", but not history in general. In 2003, he published a book "A Study on the History of Explosives Production for the Japanese Navy." Here is the topic and "digs". The article you mention was written by him in 2006.
      2. d_averk
        d_averk 10 January 2022 22: 56
        -1
        There is also a feeling that the shells on the EBR were different.

        "the fires were quickly extinguished and did not spread, which was difficult to imagine after those fires that were observed the day before on" Suvorov "," Alexander III "," Sisoy Velikiy "and other ships of our squadron, on which there was almost no tree, meanwhile, how "Donskoy" was covered in wood. ”This can be explained by the fact that the Japanese cruisers, in all likelihood, did not have shells filled with the explosive composition that was practiced on Japanese battleships, because, when shells burst, on the“ Donskoy ” there were also those suffocating gases from which people were suffocating on our battleships, for example, on "Sisoy the Great" both doctors and several lower ranks. "
  10. ban
    ban 8 January 2022 01: 57
    +3
    From Pakenham's report:
    If the result was sensational in the Battle of Tsushima, then the early battles staged a noticeably tougher test of the combat capabilities of the Japanese fleet. Although the miserable resistance shown by the Baltic Fleet cannot be compared with the strong rebuff that Port Arthur gave ...


    Some of the Russian fire was still concentrated on Mikasa, but more and more ships turned their attention to the pivot point of the Japanese fleet. It was interesting to watch the Japanese ships approach and then pass through this hotspot. Fortunately, everyone was lucky enough to get through it without being seriously injured. The Russians fired from a short distance, but they were much less fortunate than their enemy. And although their shells fell quite close to the Japanese ships, not a single shell with a caliber of more than 6 "hit the target.


    From Jackson's report:
    The Russian commander-in-chief did not undertake any tactical maneuvers worthy of mention, generously allowing Togo to knock out his ships one by one.


    And this is from A. Patients, written 12 years ago:
    It is interesting to note that a month before Tsushima, the Togo squadron conducted firing practice at an island from a distance of 2500 to 3000 yards, and the results were, to put it mildly, not impressive ... Togo took urgent measures. The training of gunners began using the latest methods of Percy Scott. We are talking about the famous Scot marker, as well as the method of constant tracking of the target. Several barrels were fired at targets towed by steam boats. Here we see a clear difference between That and Rozhdestvensky. After all, the second only ascertained the depressing results of the shooting practice, which were carried out while parking in Madagascar, but did not take any measures to remedy the situation. By the way, one can recall the fable launched by Semyonov about five ammunition sets shot by the Japanese in preparation for battle. However, as with all other dubious issues, not everything is clear and unambiguous here. Senior artilleryman Mikasa recalled that during anchorage in Mozampo for 10 days, the battleship used up 30 rounds for barrel firing, which was the annual rate. So maybe Semyonov didn't understand him?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      8 January 2022 10: 59
      0
      Quote: ban
      From Pakenham's report:

      From the Packinham report
      The first Russian volleys saved the Japanese from pleasant illusions. There was not even a hint of random firing in them, on the contrary, for a distance of 9 thousand yards it was unusually accurate shooting, and in the very first few minutes Mikaza and Sikishima received a number of hits with six-inch shells ...


      Quote: ban
      And although their shells fell quite close to the Japanese ships, not a single shell with a caliber of more than 6 "hit the target.

      Yes, because the main forces of 2TOE fired at Mikasa, only Sisoy and Navarin fired at other ships. And 3TOE, of course, but these fired badly.
      Quote: ban
      The Russian commander-in-chief did not undertake any tactical maneuvers worthy of mention, generously allowing Togo to knock out his ships one by one.

      It is quite difficult to do something when the fragments of your skull have gone deep into your head and you are in an unconscious state.
      Quote: ban
      And this is from A. Patients, written 12 years ago:

      As usual, when Sick begins to write something himself ... it begins.
      Quote: ban
      The training of gunners began using the latest methods of Percy Scott. We are talking about the famous Scot marker, as well as the method of constant tracking of the target. Several barrels were fired at targets towed by steam boats. Here we see a clear difference between That and Rozhdestvensky. After all, the second only ascertained the depressing results of the shooting practice, which were carried out while parking in Madagascar, but did not take any measures to remedy the situation.

      I forgot to mention that Rozhestvensky took exactly the same measures and, before the last crossing, conducted regular barrel firing off the coast of Annam.
      1. ban
        ban 8 January 2022 11: 07
        +3
        From the Packinham report
        The first Russian volleys saved the Japanese from pleasant illusions. There was not even a hint of random firing in them, on the contrary, for a distance of 9 thousand yards it was unusually accurate shooting, and in the very first few minutes Mikaza and Sikishima received a number of hits with six-inch shells ...


        Andrey, greetings and congratulations, you are lying - there is no such thing in Pakenham's report.
        There is no time for scribbling, I will lay out the beginning of the battle from the report in the evening, if possible
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          9 January 2022 13: 44
          0
          Quote: ban
          Andrey, greetings and congratulations, you are lying - there is no such thing in Pakenham's report.

          Anything can be. I haven’t gotten to it yet, and it’s difficult to translate without knowing English. Focused on the quote Chistyakov
          1. ban
            ban 9 January 2022 15: 42
            0
            This has all been translated long ago))
            Better to be guided by the source))
            And Chistyakov has pure fiction)))
            After all, Pakenham was on Asahi, if my memory serves me))
            And yes, in matters of transcription of English surnames it is better to trust a professional translator.

            I will definitely post it, only later - tomorrow is an anniversary)))
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              10 January 2022 15: 25
              0
              Quote: ban
              And Chistyakov has pure fiction)))

              Or some other report / report of Packinham.
              Yuri, Packinham could well have written something else besides the reports included in the collection you know, so I would not argue that Packinham did not say that, just because it is not in the report.
              It is clear that this is not proof, but here we need to dig into Westwood. Chistyakov further quotes him, and it is quite possible that he is quoting Packinham and repeating Westwood.
              1. ban
                ban 10 January 2022 15: 53
                0
                Andrey, I read this article for the first time in the very beginning of the 90s. So that...
                However, what's the difference?
                I brought the report, I personally have no questions - we were shooting so-so ... What the results of the first hour of the battle eloquently indicate
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  10 January 2022 17: 54
                  +1
                  Quote: ban
                  Andrey, I read this article for the first time in the very beginning of the 90s. So that...

                  I read it in 1989, when it came out in a marine collection. And so what?
                  Quote: ban
                  I brought a report,

                  And there is no quoted passage in it, I agree. But this does not mean that Chistyakov is lying - Pekinham's work was clearly not limited to this report, and Chistyakov refers to Packinham, and not to a specific report.
                  Quote: ban
                  I personally have no questions - we were shooting so-so ... What the results of the first hour of the battle eloquently indicate

                  Me too - the statistics of hitting the Japanese speaks for itself
                  1. ban
                    ban 11 January 2022 01: 18
                    0
                    Me too - the statistics of hitting the Japanese speaks for itself

                    Exactly - Oslyabya was sunk, Suvorov - incapacitated ... Yes!
                    The Yaps - by this time, not a single hit by heavy shells - the main weapon. That's just funny to me wink
                    Andrey - I have no time, well, count the number of projectiles fired 10-12 "for the number of projectiles in Tsushima and at Shantung (the battle in the Yellow Sea, I said) and% of hits - ON HEAVY AMMETS - and you will be surprised ...
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      11 January 2022 08: 03
                      +1
                      Quote: ban
                      Exactly - Oslyabya was sunk, Suvorov - incapacitated ... Yes!
                      The Yaps - by this time, not a single hit by heavy shells - the main weapon. That's just funny to me

                      Wee, of course, is a communist, but fear God. By the time the Oslyabi went out of order (14.20 in Russian), according to Japanese data, 10 heavy shells had hit the Japanese ships. There are doubts about two of them, but it must be remembered that we are talking only about hits, the time of which was taken into account, and the total number of hits is significantly greater.
                      At the same time, "Oslyaba" was enough from the strength of 3 hits with heavy shells :)
                      Quote: ban
                      Andrey - I have no time, well, count the number of projectiles fired 10-12 "for the number of projectiles in Tsushima and at Shantung (the battle in the Yellow Sea, I said) and% of hits - ON HEAVY AMMETS - and you will be surprised ...

                      I'm not surprised at all, and I can imagine the reasons very well.
                      1. ban
                        ban 11 January 2022 16: 33
                        0
                        If you don't want to - no question!
                        I will calculate how the time will be and lay out ...
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        11 January 2022 16: 46
                        0
                        Quote: ban
                        I'll calculate how the time will be and I'll post it ..

                        Good luck!
                        Quote: ban
                        well, count the number of projectiles fired 10-12 "for the number of projectiles in Tsushima and at Shantung

                        Here no one can understand how many shells were spent on the "Eagle", on the lost ships - it is generally unknown, the hits in Tsushima by heavy Russian shells are not clear, the results of the 3TOE firing should be considered separately from the 2TOE, and you - just like that :))))
                      3. ban
                        ban 11 January 2022 16: 48
                        0
                        And who says it's easy?
                        Andrey, you yourself made rough estimates - within the limits of what we know, errors are quite acceptable
                      4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        11 January 2022 16: 59
                        0
                        Quote: ban
                        Andrey, you yourself made rough estimates

                        Yes, I did 271 heavy shells from the top five EBRDs, how many Navarin and Sisoy were shot is unknown at all. Our officers regularly believed that 90% of the ammunition load had been fired, and when the Japanese took the ships, it turned out to be much less ... cases, I doubt that his data is correct) determine which 254-mm, which 305-mm, determine how many 305-mm hits the flagship of Nebogatov achieved ...
                      5. ban
                        ban 11 January 2022 19: 05
                        0
                        Andrey, this, again, is catching fleas, in my personal opinion - 10 "or 12" - there is little difference, the only thing that can be revealed here if broken by caliber is that the 3rd squad shot much better than the 1st)))
                    2. d_averk
                      d_averk 11 January 2022 16: 57
                      0
                      It's all about fuyness)
      2. 27091965
        27091965 8 January 2022 13: 44
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I forgot to mention that Rozhestvensky took exactly the same measures and, before the last crossing, conducted regular barrel firing off the coast of Annam.

        Dear Andrey. You can conduct a lot of exercises, read manuals, instructions, but the question arises not for those who are taught, but for those who teach, that is, the level of training of the officers. I will give one example, in my opinion, if I am not mistaken, in 1902, joint exercises of the army and the navy were conducted on the Black Sea. The task of the fleet was to shoot down the coastal batteries of a simulated enemy and land a landing force with main-caliber guns, the army had to counteract this. During the exercise, the mediators decided that the fleet had destroyed the coastal batteries, but representatives of the army did not agree with this. A commission was created to analyze this part of the exercises. Shooting tables were taken from the ships and the flight paths of the shells were calculated. It turned out that the ships could not destroy the battery, since the calculated trajectories were very different from those provided by the fleet. The reason was that the ships used firing tables intended for medium-caliber guns for firing from the main caliber guns, and no one on the ships saw the error. This raises the question. What was the level of training of the officers?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          9 January 2022 14: 03
          0
          Quote: 27091965i
          You can conduct a lot of exercises, read manuals, instructions, but the question arises not for those who are taught, but for those who teach, that is, the level of training of the officers.

          This is undeniable. But to get there, you need a ticket to the archives, full collections of preserved documents, but I don't have such an opportunity - for unclear reasons, there are no naval archives in my native Chelyabinsk crying
          1. 27091965
            27091965 9 January 2022 14: 58
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            This is undeniable. But to get there, you need a ticket to the archives, full collections of surviving documents

            I agree with you, but you can watch the artillery exercises of other navies, the French, the USA, England, two firing of 2 TOE, to be honest, and were not close. About the enthusiastic responses of the US Navy's naval gunners about the Percy Scott simulators. Trainings were carried out on them 2-3 times a week, on some ships every day. The shooting was carried out not only in calm weather, but without fail in bad weather, when the ship was subject to rolling. At night, shields were installed at sea and ships had to find them and fire. At the same time, only the approximate square where they are was known. In my opinion, such training at the RIF could not even dream of.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              9 January 2022 15: 20
              0
              Quote: 27091965i
              I agree with you, but you can watch the artillery exercises of other navies, French, USA, England

              It's problematic for me to get into our archives, but do you advise - in French and British ones? :)))
              Quote: 27091965i
              two firing 2 TOE frankly and did not stand nearby.

              Should have? By the way, one of the claims of the members of the historical commission was that Rozhdestvensky overcomplicated the Madagascar teachings, i.e. according to the level of 2TOE gunmen, they should have started with something easier :)
              1. 27091965
                27091965 9 January 2022 15: 48
                +1
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Should have? By the way, one of the claims of the members of the historical commission was that Rozhdestvensky overcomplicated the Madagascar teachings, i.e. according to the level of 2TOE gunmen, they should have started with something easier :)

                Andrei, well, you just put the sailors of that time, how to put it, as ignoramuses. Who made these claims, those admirals who, when considering the naval games of the Nikolaev Naval Academy, demanded to reduce the number of hits at a distance of 40 cables, arguing that so many cannot be hit at such a distance?
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  9 January 2022 17: 13
                  0
                  Quote: 27091965i
                  Andrei, well, you just put the sailors of that time, how to put it, as ignoramuses. Who made these claims

                  Members of the Historical Commission who wrote "The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905" :))
                  Quote: 27091965i
                  those admirals who, when considering the naval games of the Nikolaev Naval Academy, demanded to reduce the number of hits at a distance of 40 cables, arguing that so many cannot be hit at such a distance?

                  How many?
              2. finnbogi
                finnbogi 11 January 2022 17: 16
                0
                Should have?

                Well, if we assume that the intensive training about which was discussed was not for the sake of cutting, but was necessary so that the squadrons could effectively use their weapons, then yes, the intensity of the preparation of 2 TOEs should have been even higher than the data of peacetime fleets
    2. d_averk
      d_averk 10 January 2022 23: 11
      -1
      The Russian commander-in-chief did not undertake any tactical maneuvers worthy of mention,

      Actually, before the injury and before the loss, it was not so long that it was normal to transmit orders. Even if ZPR wanted to convey something "sort of" in tactics, he had few opportunities.

      After all, the second only ascertained the depressing results of the shooting practice, which were carried out while parking in Madagascar, but did not take any measures to remedy the situation.

      By that time, it was obvious that all the strategic reasons for sending 2TOE were canceled (exotic plants were not bought and Port Arthur fell later), and the ZPR fell into a psychological dead end of denial of the inevitable. However, it is possible that they would have brought military shells to M., but a number of exercises would have been intensified. In my opinion, the reproach towards ZPR in comparison with Togo from the Patients does not channel either into borscht or into the Red Army. Compare the conditions in which Togo and ZPR were and linearly compare the preparation ... well, this is ...
      1. ban
        ban 11 January 2022 03: 44
        -1
        Actually, before the injury and before the loss, it was not so long that it was normal to transmit orders.


        Not really))) But this is a moot point, I agree.
        And so - I am silent about the preparation of the ZPR - it was not from the word in any way, so that they would not write here. In the outset of the battle - not a single hit with a HEAVY shell on the enemy !!!
        As if Oslyabyu 6 "was sunk by the Japanese, and they also put Suvorov out of action.
        ))))
        We are given such statistics here.
        And about strategy - that's a completely different question.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          11 January 2022 08: 06
          +2
          Quote: ban
          In the outset of the battle - not a single hit with a HEAVY shell on the enemy !!!

          In the first 15 minutes - 8 hits with 254-305-mm shells (5 in Mikasa, 1 in Yakumo, 2 in Asama), 2 of them, possibly unreliable. But we are talking only about hits, the time of which is known for sure, in addition to this there could be other hits of heavy shells, the time of which the Japanese did not record.
          I repeat - "Oslyabya" received decisive damage from 2, possibly 3 heavy shells
          1. ban
            ban 11 January 2022 16: 36
            0
            Andrey, with all due respect!
            There is no need to pull the owl onto the globe, and let's write how many heavy shells hit Oslyabya
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              11 January 2022 16: 43
              0
              Quote: ban
              No need to pull an owl on a globe

              so do not stretch.
              Quote: ban
              and let's write how many heavy shells hit Oslyaby

              It is reliably known about two or three in the waterline area, plus, perhaps the bow tower was also hit by a heavy projectile. Most likely, however, it was 203 mm. It seems that that's all
              1. ban
                ban 11 January 2022 16: 46
                0
                Golden bullet, do you think?
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  11 January 2022 16: 48
                  0
                  Quote: ban
                  Golden bullet, do you think?

                  Yuri, I wrote two articles about this. And yes, I believe that 2 (but possibly 3) heavy shells were enough for Oslyaba to die. The rest, even if they were, did not have a significant impact on the fate of this ship.
                  1. ban
                    ban 11 January 2022 16: 52
                    0
                    I read them (articles).
                    With pleasure, to be honest.

                    The rest, even if they were

                    I'm not ready about the golden bullet, I need to think about it))

                    And the total is for statistics
        2. d_averk
          d_averk 11 January 2022 15: 01
          0
          In the outset of the battle - not a single hit with a HEAVY shell on the enemy !!!

          It's like ... and 3 or 5 in Mikassa 12 "????

          As if Oslyabyu 6 "was sunk by the Japanese, and they also put Suvorov out of action.
          Technically possible, I believe, just more time.
          1. ban
            ban 11 January 2022 16: 41
            0
            Technically anything is possible ...
            But, nevertheless, Borodinians were very well armored against 6-8 ", whatever they said

            It's like ... and 3 or 5 in Mikassa 12 "????

            For a 15 ton battleship, this is not essential, if you do not consider the golden bullet option.
            Something like that, in my opinion ...
            1. d_averk
              d_averk 11 January 2022 17: 05
              0
              But, nevertheless, Borodinians were very well armored against 6-8 "

              So Suvorov was first of all beaten by fuyasnogo impact, and not drowned stupidly by a breakdown below the waterline.
              The same beating could have been repeated cleanly 6 ", just much longer.

              Quote: ban
              For a 15 ton battleship, this is not essential.

              Quote: ban
              In the outset of the battle - not a single hit with a HEAVY shell on the enemy !!!


              Listen, this is already a circus. So there are no hits, or "were, but insignificant" ????

              But what about Rytik in this thread wrote a translation
              I also translated about the fight into WM
              In this battle, the damage to our fleet was minor, with the exception of Mikasa and Nissin, but Mikasa suffered the most, it was hit by many enemy shells, its command and communication equipment was destroyed, its messengers were killed and wounded, especially the commanders of the rear tower and the aft group were wounded, the officer attached to the battery was killed in action, and his replacement was also wounded. Due to the loss of the battery commander, each gun ran to a neighboring battery to ask the gunner for distance, and some of them fired at will

              Did "boch" punish that? Or did they reach Mikasa in the outset of the battle, while they still managed to remove the distance from the range finders?
              1. The comment was deleted.
                1. d_averk
                  d_averk 11 January 2022 19: 41
                  0
                  I want to say that due to many factors we could not show our strengths, but we did show all the weaknesses.

                  In other words, any battle from the point of view of commanders wins the one who makes fewer mistakes, and from the point of view of the troops - whose troops will be able to show more strengths and hide more weak ones.

                  Fewer mistakes, if we take not only the battle itself, but also the training in it was made by Togo, and our squadron was unable to show its strengths. Partly due to the mistakes of the ZPR and other senior officers of the squadron, partly due to objective reasons - mistakes made even before the ZPR in the design and production of shells, ships, the choice of strategy, the organization of supply and management, etc.

                  So we can say this - we are all about it. Almost since 1895.
  11. Andrey Tameev
    Andrey Tameev 9 January 2022 13: 13
    +1
    Andrey, thanks for the article! It makes you wonder - if the Japanese were so bad during the exercises, how did they do it so well in battle?

    In general, thanks to all the authors of the Tsushima cycle - truth is born in disputes.

    There is one interesting question: who invented the concentration of fire on the head? The Japanese applied this at Shandung and very successfully at Tsushima. How did they train?
    Where did this come from? There was no concentration of fire in the instructions, the concentration of fire appeared only in some circulars of the Rozhdestvensky beginning of 1905. But this was not practiced in the exercises.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      9 January 2022 14: 01
      0
      Good day, dear Andrey!
      Quote: Andrey Tameev
      It makes you wonder - if the Japanese were so bad during the exercises, how did they do it so well in battle?

      And why is it bad? :)))) As for me, it was normal for them - within the framework of the views on artillery preparation in those years.
      As far as I understand, this was the case - it was common for the Japanese to fire individual ships at shields, quite possibly - without any imitation of combat maneuvering, however, unlike most countries in the world, they fired at increased distances of 30-35 cables even before the war - which was facilitated by the rapid acquisition and development of optical sights. This gave them very good individual training - it turns out that before the war they shot farther than us, and probably more than us + optics.
      Then - the war, and good practice already in combat conditions, and to Tsushima - also centralized fire control within one ship.
      And no magic.
      Rozhestvensky received new artillerymen, but was able to raise their level quite decently by the fact that, among other things, he fired in squadrons, and maneuvered at the same time, etc. That is, the initial level of training of his gunners was much lower, thanks to a good tactical background, he, having much less time and opportunities, pulled up training to a level comparable to that of the Japanese.
      And the materiel decided everything.
      Quote: Andrey Tameev
      There is one interesting question: who invented the concentration of fire on the head? The Japanese applied this at Shandung and very successfully at Tsushima.

      In general, no, the Japanese noted that flagships are a priority target, if not he, then the closest one, but there is absolutely no information that they once practiced concentrated fire on one target. Each Japanese ship chose its own target.
      Quote: Andrey Tameev
      Where did this come from? There was no concentration of fire in the instructions, the concentration of fire appeared only in some circulars of the Rozhdestvensky beginning of 1905. But this was not practiced in the exercises.

      Here it would be to get somewhere a complete collection of orders and circulars on 2TOE, it is much more complete than appendices to volumes of official history, maybe there would be something clearer. And so - who will understand him, after all, during the exercises he tried to give targets and distances to other ships.
    2. 27091965
      27091965 9 January 2022 14: 38
      0
      Quote: Andrey Tameev
      There is one interesting question: who invented the concentration of fire on the head? The Japanese applied this at Shandung and very successfully at Tsushima. How did they train?
      Where did this come from? There was no concentration of fire in the instructions, the concentration of fire appeared only in some circulars of the Rozhdestvensky beginning of 1905. But this was not practiced in the exercises.

      Many have written about this, but if I may put it that way, the "scientific substantiation" of this was given by the British. They believed that the active phase of the battle would last 30-40 minutes, after which one of the squadrons would lose the ability to conduct an organized battle and would be forced to try to get out of the battle. If she does not succeed, she (the squadron) will be destroyed. On the basis of these views, the English fleet in 1903 began to switch to training in volley shooting.
      1. Andrey Tameev
        Andrey Tameev 9 January 2022 15: 23
        0
        Quote: 27091965i
        On the basis of these views, the English fleet in 1903 began to switch to training in volley shooting.

        I do not quite understand your answer. About firing in volleys, everything is clear, but where did the concentration of fire of several ships on one target come from? This was no longer used in squadron battles, since it is almost impossible to adjust the fire with such firing.
        1. 27091965
          27091965 9 January 2022 15: 35
          +1
          Quote: Andrey Tameev
          I do not quite understand your answer. About firing in volleys, everything is clear, but otktsda took the concentration of fire from several ships on one target? This was no longer used in squadron battles, since it is almost impossible to adjust the fire with such firing.

          The concentration of fire on the most significant ships of the squadron, flagships, the latest ships, the transition to salvo firing made it possible to adjust the fire, besides, the British ships already had devices for conducting such firing, of course, they cannot be compared in efficiency with those systems that appeared later, but they were installed on ships. Therefore, such exercises were carried out to determine the most optimal possibilities for firing a detachment against one or two targets.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 9 January 2022 19: 23
            0
            Quote: 27091965i
            Therefore, such exercises were carried out to determine the most optimal possibilities for firing a detachment against one or two targets.

            Exactly what the teachings are. In fact, at Jutland, we see that battleships land on whom it is more convenient. The concentration of fire at any distance is the dislocation of the Russian military sailors. What worked in the days of sailing battleships and boarding did not work well in the days of long-range cannons.
    3. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 9 January 2022 19: 17
      0
      Quote: Andrey Tameev
      There is one interesting question: who invented the concentration of fire on the head? The Japanese applied this at Shandung and very successfully at Tsushima.

      Who told you that? The recommendation to shoot at the flagships was, but the Japanese did not hesitate to transfer the fire to a more convenient target. And the very idea of ​​concentrating fire on a flagship has been known since sailing times. But then there were distances, 200-300 meters, no chances to miss. laughing
  12. SF127
    SF127 9 January 2022 19: 16
    +2
    Explanatory article
  13. ban
    ban 9 January 2022 20: 46
    +1
    From Pakenham's report:
    Mikasa was now heading almost directly for the lead ship of the former right-hand column of the Russians. Her first ships were still performing the aforementioned maneuver and deviated several points to the left of their original course. As soon as the Russians returned to their previous course (14.07), their lead ship opened fire. The first shell fell 20 m behind Mikasa, followed by others that fell even closer. The column, which had previously been on the left, did not seem to be about to rebuild and also opened fire.
    Few of the observers did not notice that the position of the Japanese was critical. Minutes turned into hours. While the lead ship of the Japanese fleet was approaching the Russian column, it came under fire, which grew stronger with each new Russian ship that entered service. Encouraged by the lack of return fire from the enemy, the Russians began to shoot more accurately, and any of them could incapacitate Mikasa. Many fears were inspired by the fact that the Russians could get optical sights, and the gunmen in the recent past went through a harsh school that hardened them. Many felt apprehensive about the outcome of the battle, which had begun so badly.
    Despite being the only target for the Russians, Mikasa continued to move without firing a single shot ...
    Deciding that the main target was the largest Russian battleships, and fully realizing the need to focus all the fire on them at the very beginning of the battle, he decided to take the risk, so as not to deviate from the plan.
    Mikase was lucky and he remained intact. At 14.10 he turned east, on the same course as the Russians, and opened fire.


    Then I gave above
  14. gorenina91
    gorenina91 10 January 2022 11: 38
    0
    AlexanderA (Alexander)
    Yesterday, 23: 34

    Can you tell us for a long time and in detail, with illustrative figures and combat examples, how exactly Russian naval officers and sailors did not know how to fight?

    - This should not be done ... - It is already quite enough (beyond measure) - all kinds of "interpretations and explanations" ...
    - To everything already stated - personally, I can add that ... that ... that the Russian fleet was simply fatally unlucky ...
    - And therefore, one had to pay great attention to absolutely all sorts of little things ... - And also - you had to be just manically superstitious ... - the rate was so high ...
    - What other commander - Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky ???
    - Yes (the now deceased wonderful actor Zinovy ​​Gerdt) - for an actor, everything can be quite extravagant and in no way this "unusualness" does not affect his fate (and, if it does, it is his fate, and not the fate of those around him and his subordinates) ...
    - And here a man with that name suddenly commands an entire Russian squadron ... - And what is the name Rozhdestvensky ??? - Not "Rozhzhestvensky" ... - and not "Rozhzhestvensky" - namely Rozhdestvensky ... - continuous incompleteness and uncertainty - like all his command of the Russian fleet ...
    - The British also had an admiral - a certain D. Jellico, who commanded an English squadron at the Battle of Jutland ...
    - What kind of Jellicoe ??? - Usually superstitious and scrupulous Britons are very careful in such questions - and then suddenly - some ... - "Jellico" ... What's that ??? - Such a name (surname) would be more suitable for disorderly Italians and so on ... - Admiral G. Nelson, and the English pirates - F. Drake and G. Morgan - just nervously smoke on the sidelines ... - So they "flew" the British with this "Jellico" - there was no sense from this "Jellicoe" ... - Being in the minority - the Germans did a good job - with this "Jellico"; the state of which the whole world used to correlate to the rank - "Mistress of the Seas" ... - And after Jutland - Britain was already somehow awkward - to call "Mistress of the Seas" ...
    - Damn - and then there is some kind of "Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky" (from the word "mug", or what ???) - a fatal loser ...
    - It was also necessary to find the "admiral" - Akaki Akakievich Bashmachkin - and appoint him to command the entire fleet of Russia ...
    1. d_averk
      d_averk 10 January 2022 23: 22
      0
      And then a man with that name suddenly commands an entire Russian squadron

      tin.
  15. d_averk
    d_averk 10 January 2022 21: 24
    0
    An unambiguous conclusion does not follow from the article, confirmed by a full set of facts that, apart from the teachings described in the article, there were no others. And since at least someone mentioned, albeit semi-mythical "5 sets per barrel" - it's too early to discard it right away

    Therefore, although I do not agree with Klimov, this article does not give a full explanation of why, nevertheless, the Japanese gunners gave good results under Tsushima. It gives rise to a paradox - they didn’t know how to shoot, they didn’t learn, but they did.

    In the section "Rozhdestvensky taught better, further, deeper", despite the fact that Klimov solemnly for some reason called me "an ADD addict" I saw nothing but, in general, "a declaration of intent." On the one hand, and what to do, the shells were not delivered. On the other hand, there are questions about what the exercises would be if the shells WERE, but there were NO expectations for an echotic cruiser and 3 TOE.

    "On the time of departure of the 2nd Pacific squadron to the Far East, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, Adjutant General Sakharov and partly Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich pointed out that the squadron does not have the qualities of a trained and close-knit connection of ships, and there are no conditions for acquiring these qualities in the campaign. At the same time, the Japanese fleet has achieved many successes in battles, trained and prepared. The result of meeting opponents in battle guarantees the Japanese victory. It is necessary to leave the squadron plus the completed and purchased ships for the winter in Russia, train them in shooting and squadron maneuvering, and only then send them to the Far East.

    Rear Admiral Rozhdestvensky objected, pointing to the already prepared organization of the supply of the squadron, the main element of which is the provision of coal. We must go now, otherwise the coal miners will disperse. Then it will no longer be possible to create the entire organization. He was supported by Admiral Avelan, who announced that the coal miners were on their way, and if they refused, they would have to pay 2 million rubles for nothing. "


    This point raises some thoughts.