June 22, 1941. An unexpected war at dawn

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GU - Headquarters, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, CBF - Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Cova - Kiev Special VO, NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, Og - operational readiness, OdVO - Odessa VO, PV - border troops, Software - border detachment, Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, sd - rifle division, BSF - Black Sea Fleet.

In the previous part we examined the events that took place on the eve of the war in the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy.

After 20:00 on June 21, the RM came to Stalin about the possible start of the war on the coming night.

By 20:50 he summons the People's Commissar of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and the 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense S.M.Budyonny. The message about the possible start of the war on the night of June 22, S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov did not worry.

After the departure of Marshal Budyonny, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were probably able to dispel Stalin's doubts about the German attack on June 22. These persons were sure that the German shock groups were still absent from the territory of East Prussia and the General Government.

Available tank regiments and divisions, according to intelligence, were distributed along the entire Soviet-German border. Therefore, in their opinion, there was nothing to fear ...

SK Timoshenko and GK Zhukov by 22:25 return to their NGOs. The People's Commissar of Defense spoke with his deputy K.A.Meretskov and sent him to the Leningrad Military District.

After that, Tymoshenko, Zhukov and a group of generals from the Operations Directorate draw up the text of Directive No. 1. At the same time, the People's Commissar calls five border districts, warning the leadership of possible provocations at the border. At the same time, he does not say a word about the content of the forthcoming directive.

Admiral V.A.Alafuzov at about 23:20 hears from Tymoshenko that "The People's Commissar doubts the attack of the Germans." This indicates that the SC leadership does not expect a full-scale war on June 22. Not believing in the beginning of the war, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, until the decryption of the directive in the districts, will not say a word on the phone about the content of Directive No. 1 ...

After 23:35, General Malandin revises the prepared text of the directive.

At 0:30 on June 22, the directive was sent to the districts.

Since Directive No. 1 does not contain instructions on the withdrawal of covering armies at positions to the border, the command of the districts is forced to act for their own reasons.

The chief of staff of the OdVO before decoding the directive gives instructions on redeployment aviation, on the withdrawal of part of the troops to the border, and the remaining garrisons (or part of them) are raised on a training alert. After reading Directive No. 1, M.V. Zakharov understands that what he gave: "The order to withdraw the troops of the district to the cover areas on the state border was in conflict with the instructions received."

From 3:30 to 4:00, enemy aviation strikes at stationary airfields in the district, but the bulk of the aircraft managed to relocate to field airfields.

The commander of the troops of KOVO acts in strict accordance with the requirements of Directive No. 1 and, among others, gives instructions: "Do not bring field troops to the border."

In ZapOVO, General DG Pavlov orders all units to be put on alert, to take pillboxes and positions on the border, to relocate air regiments to field airfields.

In PribOVO, instructions are given on the covert occupation of the main defense zone, on the immediate installation of mines and subtle obstacles, on the redeployment of aviation to field airfields.

N. M. Khlebnikov (Chief of Artillery of the 27th Army of the PribOVO):

[N. E. Berzarin - Commander of the 27th Army - Approx. author] added that he was ordered to cancel even the blackout that was introduced in the cities in case of air raid and to return the trains sent to the east with the families of the command staff ...

Having received a scolding from Moscow for facilitating the evacuation of family members of servicemen, the PribOVO Military Council inserted a special paragraph into its directive:

The families of the commanding personnel of the 10th, 125th, 33rd and 128th Rifle Divisions should be transported to the rear only if large enemy forces cross the border.

In the Leningrad Military District, they operate in accordance with the instructions of the directive: the units are on alert at the points of permanent deployment, the aviation is dispersed.

Unfortunately, in PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO, they did not have time to fully implement the instructions given from the VO headquarters before the Nazis attacked, because of directives that came late to each of the districts ...

In the People's Commissariat of the Navy fleets and the fleets were instructed to switch to exhaust gas No. 1, but the transition to a new level of readiness is not carried out quickly.

For example, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna switched to OG No. 1 at 4:49 am.

The instruction on the transition to full combat readiness was not conveyed to the fleets from the People's Commissariat. Therefore, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet did not dare to give the order to open fire on enemy aircraft. The permission to open fire on enemy aircraft was not communicated to air defense units and ships of naval bases, at least in Kronstadt and in Liepaja.

At 1:10, 14 German bombers took off from Konigsberg, and at 3:05 they began laying mines near Kronstadt.

Border troops of the NKVD of the USSR

We will begin the next part of the article by examining the events that took place in the PW of the western districts on the eve of the war.

One of the writers wrote: "All border troops ... were brought to full combat readiness at 21:30 on 21.06.41."... This version is very common.

It turns out that non-profit organizations do not expect a war at dawn on June 22, but L.P. Beria is expecting it.

Let's check if it was really so.

On June 20, the PO of the Belarusian and Ukrainian border districts (the author did not find a similar order for the Moldavian border district) received an order to stop scheduled classes, to cancel weekends, to strengthen border security at night.

However, on the night of June 22, the order to take up defensive positions at the outposts was not given. The border guards had to take positions under fire, and how many of them died without firing a single shot at the enemy is unknown ...

In the book "Russian Border Troops in Wars and Armed Conflicts of the XNUMXth Century." it says:

In the Leningrad border district, the decision to prepare to repel an attack also had to be made independently by the head of the 5th Red Banner PO A. M. Andreev:

On June 21, one of the border violators was brought to the detachment headquarters. He refused to answer questions. Only two words hissed through teeth: "Tomorrow is war" ... Everything indicated that from hour to hour one could expect a treacherous attack on our border ... After a meeting in my office in the city of Enso, together with the deputy chief of the detachment on the political side of the regimental commissar Zyablikov and the chief of staff of the detachment, Major Okunevich, we assessed the current situation and came to the following conclusion:
a) German-Finnish troops are completing the concentration of the operational offensive group. The most probable directions of the main blows: Imatra, Hitola, Kexholm; Lappeenranta, Vyborg, that is, in the zone of our 5th border Red Banner detachment. In the neighbor's lane on the right: in the direction of Lahdenpohja, Sortavala;
b) the enemy is most likely to go over to the offensive in the next few hours;
c) we know that according to the cover plan for the Enso line, the Vuoksi River, units of the 115th rifle division are to be moved ...
On the morning of June 21, the command of the 115th SD informed us: "We have instructions to be in full combat readiness in places of permanent deployment ..."

The head of PO Andreev issued an order to take up combat positions in the outposts, to withdraw families of servicemen to the rear on vehicles and other instructions.

On the eve of the war, alarming messages were constantly coming from the western border to Moscow.

Probably, especially a lot of them came from the Belorussian border district, which was headed by General I. A. Bogdanov.

The Belarusian border district guarded the land border on the territory of the ZapOVO and PribOVO. One of these messages could also include the report of the commander of the 43rd air division, G.N. Zakharov, who flew along the border at the direction of the commander of the ZAPOVO Air Force.

The RM from the western border reached the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, who was forced to send excerpts from these messages to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to the Government and to NGOs. In response, L.P. Beria could receive a scolding from these institutions for panic. This is probably why on June 20 or 21, the head of the Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR GG Sokolov with a group of commanders is sent to the Belarusian Border District for an inspection.

From a telephone message sent from Bialystok at 10:45 am on June 22, the route of movement of Generals Sokolov and Bogdanov is known: "Sokolov and Bogdanov left Lomzha, Avgustov, Bialystok, Vilno, we have no connection with them ...".

First, generals Sokolov and Bogdanov left for Lomza (87th PO) and on June 22 were supposed to arrive at the 86th August PO. Somewhere on June 23, they were going to return to Bialystok, probably for a report to Moscow. Further, their path ran to the Baltic States.

Thus, both generals did not expect the start of the war on June 22.

Why was Lomza the first point?

On the section of the border controlled by the 87th RO, on June 14, two saboteurs were detained, who told about the expected crossing of the border by a large detachment of up to 20 people in the period from June 15 to 22.

On the night of June 17-18, a group of 8 people crossed the border at the section of the same detachment. During the arrest, some of the violators died, and some were captured.

On the night of June 19, a group of 87 people again crossed the border in the area of ​​responsibility of the 12th PO. This group was also partially destroyed and partially captured. The detained violators showed that on June 22 Germany would attack the USSR.

A group of four saboteurs was detained on the territory of the neighboring 86th PO on June 10-12.

On the night of June 19, the detachment began to receive information about the regrouping of German troops near the state border in the Augustow Forest and against Grajewo (on the border of the zones of responsibility of the 86th and 87th PO).

Therefore, the route of the generals lay through Lomza to Augustow.

Since the head of the GU PV did not go to the Brest PO, it can be assumed that fewer alarming messages were received from this section of the border. But in this sector the concentration of the 2nd tank group was taking place, which was not known at the headquarters of the 4th Army, ZAPOVO and in the General Staff ...

From the book “Border Guards of Belarus. June 1941 - August 1944 "(From the description of the combat operations of border guards of the 87th PO on the border in the first days of the war. 1.02.43):

From the evening of 21.06.41, German aircraft ... carried out active reconnaissance flights. At the border line, the Germans finished the concentration of troops and military equipment ...
The current situation was reported to the head of the USSR PVD, Lieutenant-General Sokolov, to the head of the VP of the BSSR, Lieutenant-General Bogdanov, who had arrived at the detachment headquarters by that time, the commander of the 6th cavalry division, Major General Nikitin, neighbors on the right and left were informed ...

The former head of the 86th PO also wrote about the meeting with General G.G.Sokolov G.K. Zdorny:

It turns out that neither the headquarters of the Belarusian border district, nor the GU PV did not expect the start of the war on June 22.

Therefore, neither Moscow nor the headquarters of the border districts were instructed to take up defensive positions at the outposts. And some of the buildings of the outposts were at a distance of several hundred meters from the border, and enemy artillery batteries were installed opposite them on June 21. That is why many of the buildings of the outposts were unexpectedly subjected to artillery or machine-gun fire.

Provocations on the border on the eve of the war took place constantly.

For example, on the night of June 98, on the night of June 20, artillery fired at the village of Opalin in the area of ​​the XNUMXth PO. Also, German scouts cut out sections of telephone wires.

The Germans regularly fired machine-gun fire on border detachments and the village. The outfits often detected connections to our telephone network ...

Therefore, it was difficult for the leadership of the border districts and GU PV to make a decision to bring the outposts into full combat readiness. After all, they needed to know for sure: there was a war ahead or some kind of sophisticated provocation.

The atmosphere was tense. Calls from the border districts to GU PV on the night of June 22 and before the start of the war had to follow quite often.

Since from June 21 to June 22, alarming messages were received from the border, L.P. Beria was at night in the People's Commissariat. S. Beria confirms that his father was not at home at that time.

At 23:45 on June 21

the commandant of the 2nd border section, Captain Parizhev, the representative of the headquarters of the 98th PO, Captain Shinkarenko, political instructor Babenko and deputy political instructor Prischepa, crossed by boat to the German side. During the border commissar meeting with representatives of the German side, a memorandum was handed over, which indicated the facts of violations of border agreements ... The German officer gallantly stated that the misunderstandings would be eliminated the very next day. Upon his return from beyond the Bug, Captain Parizhev shared his suspicions about the preparation of the Germans for sabotage actions ...

The message about the meeting with representatives of the German side was to be sent to the headquarters of the border district and then to Moscow.

A. Horhordin (Leningrad border district):

On the night of June 21-22, 1941, a border detachment ... was ... captured ... Captain Hans Güngern ...
At 24 o'clock ... the prisoner reported ... 22.06.41 the Nazi troops will go over to the offensive ...

Chief of the 90th Border Detachment Major M. S. Bychkovsky:

We see that at the same time messages were going up on the command, which indicated that at the border "everything is quiet".

Political report On the activities of 106 PO for the first month of the war (21.07.41):

At 2:00 on 22.6.41, information was received from the line outposts that German troops with tanks appeared at the border line. The report was immediately transmitted to the district and to the headquarters of the leadership of the Red Army units in the mountains. Taurogen ...

The chief of the 86th PO GK Zdorny wrote about the clash of border patrols with a German military group after two in the morning. This message also had to go upstairs on command.

Telephonogram Directorate of the NKGB for the Lviv region in the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR (3:10 June 22):

[We are talking about the soldier Liskov - Approx. Auth.] Before the evening, his company commander, Lieutenant Schultz, gave an order and said that tonight, after artillery preparation, their unit would start crossing the Bug on rafts, boats and pontoons ...

Everything that happened at the border had to be reported at the instance, and the messages came to the Main Directorate of the Pole, and then went to Beria.

Only on the basis of the posted documents and memoirs of veterans-border guards, placed in the books "Border troops of the USSR 1941-1945" and "Border guards of Belarus. June 1941 - August 1944 "one can say for sure: how many outposts were subjected to an unexpected blow, after which the surviving soldiers ran out of the buildings of the outposts and took up positions:

- 90th PO: 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14 outposts;

- the headquarters of the 92nd PO. At 4:00, a sudden heavy artillery fire was opened and communication was disrupted;

- 98th PO: 8 outpost, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 outposts;

- 17th Red Banner PO: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18 and 19 outposts;

- 86th PO: 5, 7, 11 and 20 outposts;

- 87th PO: 2, 14, 17 outposts and the 2nd commandant's office;

- 105th PO: 3, 15 outpost and outpost adjacent to it.

The 106th RP says that the outposts met attacks in the trenches, but, probably, the order did not reach everyone.

For example, the deputy commandant of the 3rd commandant's office of the 106th PO S. D. Pomyanin recalled: “At 3:40, three German planes flew over the outpost, followed by heavy artillery shelling at the outpost ... 42 personnel occupied the trenches ...”

From the book "Border Troops of the USSR 1941-1945" (recording of a conversation between the chief of staff of the PV of the Ukrainian SSR with the operational duty officer of the GU PV, 4:50):

I am reporting the available data of the 90th, 98th, 91st, 92nd and 97th detachments. The Germans, after a short artillery preparation in the Parkhach area, launched an offensive in the area of ​​the 97th PO - 15th outpost ... All detachments and regiments were alerted ...

They did not expect the outbreak of war on the border of the Moldavian border district (from the book "Border troops of the USSR 1941-1945"):

2nd commandant's office. After receiving a message about the attack of the Romanian-German fascists on the 4th outpost, the 2nd commandant's office ... at 4:00 on June 22 was put on alert. Its units took up defense on the 52 km section of the state border ...
3rd commandant's office. With the outbreak of hostilities, all divisions of the commandant's office were put on alert ...

From the book “Border Guards of Belarus. June 1941 - August 1944 ":

“By phone from Bialystok. Sokolov (23.06.41/12/XNUMX, XNUMX o'clock):
1) At the beginning of the action, he was in the 86th border detachment.
2) At 4:20 am on 22.06.41, the outposts, as a result of concentrated artillery fire, took off into the air. The outposts' connection with the commandant's offices was immediately lost ...

It can be stated that the resting shift of border guards was taken by surprise in the premises of the outposts.

D. M. Miloslavsky (commander of the 5th department (reconnaissance) of the 1st Volchinskaya commandant's office of the 17th Red Banner PO):

After the war, this event was investigated by S. N. Martyanov... Then this story was outlined in the book "Patrols Listen to Silence". The inhabitant of the village of Stary Bubel, who sailed to our shore, was P.K.Dudko, and the boatman was P. Shumer, a resident of the village of Novoselki. It seems that the crossing took place in the section of the 3rd outpost. Since a rubber boat abandoned somewhere on our shore could be associated with the illegal stay of Soviet citizens on the German side, they developed a special operation to "locate the boat" and pursue border violators. If only the western neighbors did not make claims ...

M. A. Paschenko (the commander of the machine-gun section of the 3rd outpost) recalled:

A. P. Kuznetsov (Head of the 17th Red Banner Border Detachment):

After listening to Vidyakin's report, I immediately reported the incident to the officer on duty at the headquarters of the district troops, now Major General E. V. Ryzhkov, from whom I received the answer: “Wait for instructions” ...
Starting from 2:00 - 2:20 am from all commandant's offices, and sometimes directly from the outposts, alarming reports began to come in about the withdrawal of tanks and the accumulation of fascist troops directly to the line of the state border.
Several more times we called the district headquarters. The answers are the same: “Reported to Moscow. Wait "...

It should be noted that an order has already been signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs to dismiss Major A.P. Kuznetsov, chief of the PO, from his post. This is probably why A.P. Kuznetsov did not aggravate the situation and put the outposts on alert ...

Below are the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 41st SD, from which it is clear that the commandant of the 91st PO on the night of June 22 did not receive orders from the direct leadership. This is probably why he decided to get at least some indication from the headquarters of the division, the units of which were to move to the border during the attack.

And at this time, the commander of the KOVO troops demanded not to withdraw the field troops to the border, but they did not manage to bring such an order to the chief of staff of the 41st Rifle Division ...

At the Main Directorate of PW from 4:15 am, reports of shelling at the border begin to arrive. At 4:55 am, a message arrives from Tallinn. Only at 5:30 am the Deputy People's Commissar (probably General Maslennikov) gives an answer to Tallinn. It is possible that before that, the deputy commissar for PV and internal troops reported the situation to Beria and received some order.

On the site "Border" a few more pages of the Operational Record Journal have been posted.

G.K. Zhukov's version

G.K. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs:

Currently published Operational summary General Staff No. 01 at 10:00 on June 22, signed by the Chief of the General Staff.

The summary indicates a later date for the shelling and raids of German aircraft than that given in the memoirs. It is unlikely that the persons indicated in the memoirs call the General Staff and give one time, and later indicate another in the official reports.

It seems that the time of the reports from VO has been shifted in order to justify the call to Stalin at 3:40. In non-profit organizations, the leaders do not sleep, and the leader, confident that there will be no attack, sleeps in the country ...

Information about the meeting of the spacecraft leadership with Stalin at 4:30 on June 22 has not been documented.

The record of the arrival of the spacecraft leaders again in the Kremlin at 9 o'clock also contradicts Stalin's visit log. We are faced with a distortion of the chronology of events in order to attribute the activity to the leadership of the spacecraft from 3:30 onwards. The main provisions from these memoirs later began to be perceived as the official version of events, which was included in many memoirs.

If there is a distortion of the chronology, then someone needed to hide something behind it ...

The version of the raid on Sevastopol

There are different versions of the June 22 raid of enemy aircraft on Sevastopol.

Some of them differ in little things, while others contradict each other.

The author does not intend to highlight the most reliable version. He just needs to tie some time stamps to the chronology of events in Moscow in the early morning of June 22.

From different versions of the raid, the author would single out the following events:

- at 2:35 a.m. the radar station detected an unknown aerial target coming from the west;

- at 3:07 am the Konstantinovsky post of the observation and communication service (SNiS) reported on the approach of an unknown aircraft;

- at 3:13 a twin-engine aircraft was found by searchlights-air defense searchlights of the main base;

- at 3:15 am the plane dropped two objects on the fairway by parachute;

- at 3:20 am from the posts of SNiS and air observation, warning and communication (VNOS) reports were received on the approach of aircraft to Sevastopol;

- at 3:45 a.m. the third plane appeared from the side of Cape Fiolent;

- at 3:48 a mine self-destructed, hitting a residential area;

- at 3:52 a mine self-destructed in the area of ​​the monument to the sunken ships;

- at about 4: 00–4: 10 a fourth plane appeared over the main 6az.

Published documents of the Navy on the raid on Sevastopol are absent, and the memories of war veterans are contradictory.

The former chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Eliseev, indicates the start time of the raid at 3:07. According to the author, this is true only for assessing the events after the start of the war. If it is not known whether the war will start or not, then this time is incorrect to consider the beginning of the raid.

Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Admiral Panteleev, wrote:

Throughout the day on June 21 from Hanko and Riga, the fleet commander received reports and dispatches, imbued with the desire to give the provocateurs a firm grip. The commander of the Libau naval base ... persistently asked permission to open at least warning fire on German planes appearing over the base ...

But he was not even allowed to open warning fire.

It is unlikely that the People's Commissar of the Navy reported to Stalin by telephone on each flight of the German plane (s) over Hanko or Libau base.

People's Commissar N. G. Kuznetsov With reference to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, he writes about the start of the raid at 3:15: “An air raid has been made on Sevastopol. Anti-aircraft artillery repels the attack of the aircraft. Several bombs fell on the city ... I look at my watch. 3:15 ... "

In memoirs G.K. Zhukovapublished in 1969 said:

В 3:17 Admiral FS Oktyabrsky, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, phoned me on HF and said: "The VNOS system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea side of a large number of unknown aircraft ... I ask for instructions."
I asked the admiral: "Your decision?"
- There is only one solution: to meet the planes with naval air defense fire.
After talking with S. K. Timoshenko, I replied to F. S. Oktyabrsky: "Take action and report to your People's Commissar" ...

Probably, Admiral Oktyabrsky called to understand what to do. After this call, he needed to report his actions to his People's Commissar.

After a letter from Admiral I. D. Eliseev to the press department of the Central Committee of the CPSU in April 1970 that the raid on Sevastopol began at 3:07 am, in the next edition of G.K. Zhukov's memoirs, the time of the raid was corrected from 3:17 am to 3 am: 07.

According to the chief of staff of the 61st anti-aircraft artillery regiment I. K. Semenova, at 3:13 from the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet air defense there was an order to turn off the searchlight stations. Secondary floodlights were turned on at 3:15. In their light, it was seen how the plane dropped two objects on the fairway by parachutes (initially they were mistaken for paratroopers). The anti-aircraft artillery of the main base was silent and opened fire at 3:22.

I. I. Azarov (head of the department of the Main Political Directorate of the Navy, was in Sevastopol on a business trip): “Suddenly the silence was broken by artillery volleys. I automatically glanced at my watch: it was about half past four ... "

We have reviewed some of the sailors' memories of the raid, which differ in the timing of the opening of fire with anti-aircraft guns.

On the eve of the war, the 23rd separate border commandant's office was stationed in Sevastopol. Border guards were guarding the coast in this area. The 2nd Black Sea detachment of border ships was stationed in Balaklava, consisting of two divisions (8 boats of the MO type), which alternately patrolled the water area near the Crimean peninsula.

Probably, upon the opening of fire by anti-aircraft weapons of the fleet against enemy aircraft, the border guards could fix the time of the enemy's air raid on Sevastopol. In the reconnaissance report of the NKVD PV, the time of the raid is 3:20.

Back in Crimea, an NPO association was deployed - the 9th Separate Rifle Corps, the time of 3:20 was also noted in the combat log.

22.6.41 3:20 Enemy aircraft / German and Romanian raided the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet Sevastopol. The bombing destroyed and damaged several civilian houses. There are up to 168 civilians killed and wounded.
Data from the Headquarters of the Border Troops of the NKVD and the Black Sea Fleet.

It can be seen that the data at the corps headquarters were obtained from two independent sources: from the border guards and from the Black Sea Fleet.

Therefore, we take the time of opening fire by anti-aircraft weapons - 3:20.

If fire on enemy aircraft was opened at 3:20 am, then Admiral FS Oktyabrsky's call to the NKO at 3:17 am is logical, where he was not given an unambiguous order to open fire on enemy aircraft. Therefore, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet also did not take responsibility for opening fire and ordered the officer on duty: "Follow the instructions".

He took responsibility for opening fire Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral I. D. Eliseev.

After the opening of fire on them, Admiral Oktyabrsky was obliged to report the raid of enemy aircraft to his immediate superiors - the People's Commissar of the Navy. This talk could take place at 3: 20–3: 25.

Understanding the issue of the raid on Sevastopol, the People's Commissar of the Navy called G.M. Malenkov. Then N. G. Kuznetsov tries to get through to Stalin. According to the memoirs of FS Oktyabrsky, after a call to the People's Commissar of the Navy, he received a call about the raid on Sevastopol, Beria and Malenkov.
I. I. Azarov:

Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky spoke on HF with Moscow ...
In an unusually harsh voice, Oktyabrsky said: "Yes, yes, they are bombing us ..."
There was a violent explosion, glass rattled in the windows.
“Only now, somewhere near the headquarters, a bomb has been dropped,” Oktyabrsky continued in an excited voice ...
“In Moscow, they don’t believe that Sevastopol is being bombed,” said Kulakov muffledly [Member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet - Approx. auth.].

From the explosion, we can say that a conversation with one of the subscribers in Moscow took place at about 3: 48–3: 52. At this time, a subscriber in Moscow does not believe in the bombing of Sevastopol ...

People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov:

Events at the Foreign Ministry

Since June 21, the 1st Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, VM Berezhkov, has been trying to arrange a meeting between the ambassador and the German foreign minister. The invariable answer is given that the officials of the German Foreign Ministry are unable to contact Ribbentrop.

Until four in the morning (Moscow time) on June 22, nothing changes.

After four o'clock, the embassy is informed that the meeting will take place at 4:30.

Erich Franz Sommer (employee of the German Foreign Ministry):

From the memoirs it is clear that our diplomats in Berlin did not know for sure that the war would begin on June 22.

Somewhere in the first hour of the night on June 22, a message to the German ambassador in Moscow and a summary of the note to the Soviet government are sent to the telegraph bureau of the German Foreign Ministry for encryption.

R. Gottlieb (Head of the Telegraph Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany):

I received a telegram from the Secretary of State's office in a steel case, marked “State secrets. Extra urgent night! Personally in the hands of the ambassador. " According to her, the ambassador in Moscow ... was supposed to immediately go to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov and convey to him the information contained in the telegram ...
I cannot remember whether the words "declaration of war" were used in the text, but this is what is forever imprinted in my memory: our ambassador was supposed to inform Molotov in conclusion that our troops entered the territory of the Soviet Union in the early morning hours ...

ADAP D XII / 2 contains a draft of this telegram. In addition to the memorandum, the telegram contained instructions to the ambassador:

The Germans are in a hurry to destroy the ciphers, as they fear their seizure by our special services after the announcement of the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union. This is exactly what the Gestapo and Abwehr men did when storming the USSR consulate in Paris.

M. Ktorov ("Soviet intelligence in the Great Patriotic War" Journal "National Defense" No. 11, 2020):

On June 22, Gestapo and Abwehr officers tried to storm the building of the Soviet mission in Paris and seize the codes and correspondence of diplomats and intelligence officers. The deputy resident entered into hand-to-hand combat with the invading Nazis, making it possible for the ransomware to destroy secret documents ...

In the diary of the German embassy, ​​which the intelligence officer G. Kegel cites in his book, it is said about the receipt of an encrypted telegram at 3:00 on June 22. It takes a long time to decipher a telegram of 2,5 typewritten pages using a manual cipher. Before four o'clock in the morning, even two cryptologists would not have been able to decipher the text. If one ransomware was working, then the decryption of the message could have been completed at about five o'clock in the morning.

It is possible that after the decryption of the telegram from the German embassy they tried to contact VM Molotov, but the country's leadership decided to delay the meeting until information from the military was received. There is no information about this. It may or may not be ...

G. Kegel (from the diary of the German embassy):

5:25 am. Count von der Schulenburg, together with Hilger, goes to the Kremlin to fulfill the last order ...

In the recording of the conversation the German ambassador and VM Molotov indicated that the meeting began at 5:30.

The meeting ended before 5:45 am, as Molotov enters Stalin's office at this time.

Moscow air defense zone

Magazine combat operations of the 1st Air Defense Corps:

22.06.41/1/40 80:XNUMX. Based on the instructions received from the Military Council, the corps commander, Major General of Artillery Comrade Zhuravlev ordered to deploy XNUMX% of all units on alert ...
4:30. Upon receipt of data on the violation of the border by German aircraft and the bombing of Brest-Litovsk, the units of the 1st Air Defense Corps were alerted.
5:00. The corps commander ordered to deploy 100% of the units to full combat readiness and take [anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns and anti-aircraft searchlights firing positions - Approx. auth.].

The alarm is announced only after German air raids at 4:30, and at 5 o'clock an order is received to bring the corps to combat readiness. This order could only come from the commander of the Moscow Military District, General Tyulenev, to whom the Moscow air defense zone was subordinate.

Magazine combat operations of the 1st anti-aircraft searchlight regiment:

22.6.41. At 5:15 am, the command of the 1st Air Defense Corps announced a combat alert. The gathering of the command and command personnel to the regiment headquarters was organized.
At 6:08, basically the entire command and control staff was assembled.
At 5:40 am, an order was received to mobilize the regiment according to the wartime state with the summoning of the entire enlistment staff on the orders of the BUS [Large training camps - Approx. author] using the material, weapons, fuel and other property of the emergency reserve ...

The anti-aircraft searchlight regiment is cropped and cannot fulfill its tasks without raising the assigned personnel. For example, a searchlight installation had only its commander, a sergeant. The rest of the personnel have not yet been called up.

Therefore, at 5:40 am, an order was given to raise the enrollment staff. Only someone at a sufficiently high level should have given such an order.

D. A. Zhuravlev (commander of the 1st Air Defense Corps):

Another order was received: to withdraw all anti-aircraft artillery to the positions. At this point, we started a real rush-job. It was necessary to resort to the most urgent measures to provide the units in the camps with tractors and at least a minimum amount of transport. The fact is that in our units, intended for the semi-stationary deployment of subunits, and according to the staffing table, there was not a sufficient number of tractors and vehicles. And there were usually even fewer of them available ...

Chronology of events on June 22. Early morning

The events that took place in the early morning of June 22 can only be judged by recollections, which are very contradictory.

The author will present his version of events without using the words "probably" and the like.

About 3 hours In the morning, an unknown person called to the nearest dacha (dacha in Kuntsevo).

This could not be the People's Commissar of the Navy, since the raid on Sevastopol had not yet begun.

It could not have been VM Molotov, since the German embassy had not yet called, since the text of the instructions was not yet known to the ambassador.

These could not be the leaders of the spacecraft, since they also do not know about the beginning of the war and do not believe in its beginning.

According to the author, L.P. Beria called Stalin, worried about the activation of the Germans along the entire border.

At the same time, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs does not expect the start of the war at dawn on June 22, since he does not give an order to bring the entire personnel of the PV of the western districts to combat readiness. Therefore, part of the personnel was unexpectedly caught by enemy fire in the premises of the outposts.

As the head of the engineering service of the 4th army A.I. Prishlyakov said: “We were warned that the German military might go for provocations and that it is impossible to succumb to provocations. Nothing. There are no faint of heart in the army headquarters ... "

Demonstrating strong nerves, the leadership set up some of the servicemen of its People's Commissariat ...

Expecting German provocations at the border, Stalin is going to the Kremlin. He could have given an order to inform Molotov of his departure, or he could have given an order to Molotov to leave for the Kremlin.

В 3:17 the commander of the Black Sea Fleet calls the NGO and speaks to G.K. Zhukov in order to understand how he should deal with the unknown planes.

В 3:20 anti-aircraft guns of the Black Sea Fleet open fire on enemy aircraft. After opening fire, Admiral Oktyabrsky reports on the raid on Sevastopol to the People's Commissar of the Navy.

Stalin's driver P. Mitrokhin recalled: “In 3:30 On June 22, I gave the car to Stalin at the entrance to the dacha in Kuntsevo ... "

F. Chuev in his book "140 Conversations with Molotov" wrote that VM Molotov said about a trip from a nearby dacha to the Kremlin: "when you go from a dacha, you need 30-35 minutes."

A. T. Rybin (Stalin's security officer): “Already in four o'clock the leader came to the Kremlin. "

P.K. Ionochkin (Stalin's security officer): “LP Beria was the first to come to the Kremlin at night on 22.06.41, JV Stalin appeared after him, then the rest of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks began to arrive ...”.

The arrival of Beria first in the Kremlin indirectly indicates that he called Stalin.

About 3: 25 Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov tries to contact Stalin. Stalin prepares to leave and probably decides not to answer the phone. The guards should not inform outsiders about the departure and therefore the answer should be: "Comrade Stalin is not and where he is unknown to me".

Admiral Kuznetsov calls the People's Commissar for Defense and reports on the events in Sevastopol. It seemed to N.G. Kuznetsov that S.K. Timoshenko already knew about the raid.

According to the author, the People's Commissar of Defense simply did not believe what was said.

Further, the People's Commissar of the Navy again tries to contact Stalin, but the leader is on the way to the Kremlin.

Later, N.G. Kuznetsov was called back by Malenkov, who was informed about the call by a security officer or Poskrebyshev. Beria and Malenkov also call Admiral Oktyabrsky about the raid on Sevastopol.

For some time until four o'clock in the morning General N.N. Voronov, Chief of the Air Defense Directorate, receives information about the raid on Sevastopol. N.N. Voronov arrives at the office of the People's Commissar of Defense, in which there is also Mekhlis.

N.N. Voronov:

I reported all the data at my disposal about the actions of enemy aircraft.
Without expressing any comments on my report, the People's Commissar handed me a large notebook and offered to present the report in writing.
When I was writing, Mekhlis stood behind my back and made sure that I was accurately presenting what I was saying. After I finished, Mehlis offered to subscribe.
I signed my name and was allowed to continue in my current duties ...
It seemed to me then: [People's Commissar of Defense - Approx. auth.] it was hard to believe that the war had really begun...

After NN Voronov left, Mekhlis went to check the information.

At this time, SK Timoshenko received new data. The People's Commissar of Defense asks S.M.Budyonny to call Stalin about the raid on Sevastopol.

The People's Commissar can be understood: about six hours ago, he and the chief of the General Staff probably convinced Stalin that it was impossible for the Germans to attack.

S.M. Budyonny:

В 4:01 People's Commissar Comrade Timoshenko called me and said that the Germans were bombing Sevastopol and should I report this to Comrade Stalin?
I told him that it was necessary to report immediately, but he said: call you! I immediately called and reported ...
Comrade Stalin asked: Where is the people's commissar? I answered: here next to me (I was already in the office of the People's Commissar).
Comrade Stalin ordered to hand over the phone to him ...

About 4:10 the last German bomber leaves Sevastopol.

С 4:13 fighter aircraft begin patrolling over Sevastopol.

At five o'clock in the morning (probably, after 4:13) Admiral Oktyabrsky calls the chief of the General Staff and reports: “The raid was repulsed. An attempt to strike at the ships was thwarted. But there is destruction in the city ... "

In the period from 3 to 4 o'clockProbably, there are continuous calls to NGOs about the threatening situation at the border, but the KA leadership thinks that these are provocative actions.

The General Staff receives regular messages from the western VOs:

- at 4:00 - artillery fire and at the same time the raid of enemy aircraft on airfields and cities in the Baltic States;

- at 4:20 - artillery fire and at the same time a raid on Grodno and Brest. Shelling of borders in Ukraine;

- at 4:30 - raid of enemy aircraft on airfields and cities in Ukraine.

Commander of the Leningrad Military District MM Popov and a member of the Military Council NN Klementyev from the early morning of June 21 calmly ride the Polar Star train from Murmansk to Leningrad.

В 4 hours In the morning in Petrozavodsk, they are informed that, by order from Moscow, their carriage is being uncoupled from the train, attached to a separate steam locomotive, and sent to Leningrad outside the schedule.

M. M. Popov:

NN Klementyev and I were puzzled over what this order for urgent delivery of us to Leningrad meant ...
About 7 a.m our more than modest line-up made its first stop. The commandant who appeared in the car ... introduced himself and reported that the stop was caused by the need to check the axle boxes ...
About an hour ago it was reported over the intercom from Leningrad ... that the Germans had bombed a number of our cities in the west at about 4 o'clock in the morning ...

The ending should ...

Comments

[Lech from Android.]

The instruction on the transition to full combat readiness was not conveyed to the fleets from the People's Commissariat. Therefore, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet did not dare to give the order to open fire on enemy aircraft.

At 03:06 22 minutes on June 1941, XNUMX, the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev ordered to open fire on fascist planes that had invaded far into the airspace of the USSR, which went down in history: this was the very first combat order to repulse the fascists who attacked us in the Great Patriotic War. This order violated the instructions and orders of the higher command, which, according to the laws of that time, was punishable by shooting.

Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov writes: The first message about the beginning of the war arrived at the General Staff at 3 hours on June 07, 22. ... "At 1941 hours I received a call on HF from the commander of the Black Sea Fleet FS Oktyabrsky and said:" The VNOS [air surveillance, warning and communication] system of the fleet reports on the approach from the sea side of a large number of unknown aircraft; the fleet is on full alert . I ask for instructions. "

http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=8037

Beria's reaction was hysterical to the report of the attack ...
Oktyabrsky in provocation ... that's how the top leadership of the USSR was then ... did not believe their own commanders of the Red Army.

[for]

Quote: Lech from Android.

Beria's reaction was hysterical to the report of the attack ...
Oktyabrsky in provocation ... that's how the top leadership of the USSR was then ... did not believe their own commanders of the Red Army.

Have you even poured valerian water for him?

[Lech from Android.]

Pour this ...
he will think about poison and erase it into the dust of the camp for his kindness ... no really ... one must stay away from such figures as far as possible.

[AsmyppoL]

Probably, it was not that and they forgot ...

[swetlana1]

Lie O.

Kozinkina

[Konnick]

This order violated the instructions and orders of the higher command, which, according to the laws of that time, was punishable by shooting.

Most were tormented by the instinct of self-preservation. And this feat of Eliseev is undeservedly forgotten. Thank you, did not know about this feat. Everywhere they write what fellows Kuznetsov and Oktyabrsky are, and this is how it is, I followed the link, I learned a lot.
http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=8037

[28st region]

Quote: Lech from Android.

Beria's reaction was hysterical to the report of the attack ...
Oktyabrsky in provocation ... that's how the top leadership of the USSR was then ... did not believe their own commanders of the Red Army.

Who wrote this Zhukov? So he and Beria are like a cat and a dog.

On the eve of the war, taking general measures to repel possible aggression, the leadership of the USSR increased the density of protection of the western part of the state border of the state: from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. ........... border troops were brought to full combat readiness on June 21.

https://topwar.ru/5206-nkvd-sovetskogo-soyuza-v-nachale-velikoy-voyny.html
Both articles, the one I am referring to and the one under discussion, were published here on VO.
Question?????????????
Which article to believe.

[Keer]

Beria's reaction was hysterical to the report of the attack ...
Oktyabrsky in provocation ... that's how the top leadership of the USSR was then ... did not believe their own commanders of the Red Army.

The question arises, why did the good "Father" have such sheer indignation? That de families must not be evacuated, and that "not to shoot in order to prevent provocations." And the Bialystok cauldron, etc. Maybe he, 'Otets', too, was a spigun.?

[S. Nikolaev]

Lech from Android,
Georgy Konstantinovich famous writer

Read this first, then draw conclusions

[lelik613]

"October"! itself was a provocation and to believe the so-called. "memoirs" is strange.

[ivan2022]

"We slept soundly and knew nothing, because Stalin was also asleep."
"News", obstinately instilled in us for over 60 years.
Throughout the life of 2 generations.

And now, when everyone has become smart and looks down
on absolutely "stupid sleeping ancestors"?
“It is precisely the lag that is the main threat and this is our enemy.
If we do not reverse the situation, then it will inevitably intensify.
It's like a serious chronic illness that is tireless
step by step erodes and destroys the body from the inside. " /V. Putin /
Yes ... c ... c. Who is really smart, he can still sleep and wake up ...
It is only for the smart that there is a difference, sleep or stay awake ...

[Lech from Android.]

Yes ... c ... c. Who is really smart, he can still sleep and wake up ...
It is only for the smart that there is a difference, sleep or stay awake ...

It may be smart, but it is painfully incomprehensible.
They will make fun of you.
After all, they told Stalin that Germany would attack the USSR ...

[mediumpro]

And what was Stalin's plan ?? The man who was able to organize the rise of heavy industry with an incredible rise in the country's GDP, who was not even dreamed of even in China, who created the greatest army in the world (Red Army) .... what was his plan ??? Why did the top political leadership restrain all attempts to counterattack ..... during the first time of the attack ??? Why wasn't the preemptive strike struck ?? After all, to determine the intentions of the enemy in the event that in a day, an armada of 4 million people rushes at you along the entire front ..... It's hard not to see it IN ADVANCE.
Or did Stalin have no plan at all ??? those. built everything for the "Defense of the Socialist Fatherland", everyone in the USSR knew that the war would be on foreign territory ... and here you are. I think Stalin planned the capture / liberation (whatever) of Europe in order to put pressure on England, right up to its complete defeat. To do this, it was necessary to provoke Hitler into military actions against the USSR, to fight back in the border areas, and then to joke about to the West and FINALLY fulfill the great dream of the Soviet man from the La Manche to the Pacific Ocean. The strength was, the technique was .... well, the goal was .... AMBITIOUS.

[Lech from Android.]

the goal was .... AMBITIOUS.

Only the methods of implementation were chosen at an unacceptable price ... the price for our people turned out to be too expensive.

[antivirus]

RATIONALIST YOU - HAVE THE BEST ANALYSIS.
achieve now 100% snow removal from roads and sidewalks ... weak ...
it was smooth on paper ...

.............................................

[strannik1985]

After all, to determine the intentions of the enemy in the case when in a day

The army is a much more complex mechanism than a rifle company, battalion, or regiment. In order for the 04/100 state rifle division to be able to carry out combat missions for at least a day, it needs to mobilize, the 04/120 SD of the state 10-20 days, the military district with the deployment of spare parts, field hospitals and other things - 30 days... In parallel with mobilization, troops are withdrawn to the destination areas - to positions in the URs, to the reserve, to organize a strike (counterstrike). What day, what are you talking about?

[Konnick]

The army is a much more complex mechanism than a rifle company, battalion, or regiment. In order for the 04/100 state rifle division to be able to carry out combat missions for at least a day, it needs to mobilize, the 04/120 SD of the state 10-20 days, the military district with the deployment of spare parts, field hospitals and other things - 30 days... In parallel with mobilization, troops are withdrawn to the destination areas - to positions in the URs, to the reserve, to organize a strike (counterstrike). What day, what are you talking about?

If you are a serviceman, then I am very afraid for the country's defense capability. Also, Georgia suddenly attacked ... It seems that this is how they explain the reasons for the defeat in the initial period of the war in academies and schools.
What kind of deployment in border areas? You would have placed cropped divisions in the Bialystok ledge. The border was supposed to be covered by fully combat-ready units, regardless of whether there was a war or not. And our General Staff stuffed even under-formed mechanized corps into the first echelon ... 41 hours to mobilize ??? In a day, they will make mincemeat from the division, as the Germans did in the XNUMXst.
24 hours a day, it is necessary to keep the border cover units combat-ready, with a certain rotation of such units. Less is more. The bulk of the troops were framed. They built URs and barracks near the border instead of on alert.
Nothing has changed ... it turns out we need to warn our army at least for 30 days .

[strannik1985]

If you are a serviceman, then I am very afraid for the country's defense capability. Also Georgia suddenly attacked ...

By the time of the attack, two BTGs were hanging out near the Roki tunnel

What kind of deployment in border areas?

The most common thing, at the usual rate of 100 km / day for a mobile connection, it makes no difference to deploy an army on a new border or on an old one, except that beyond the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers

24 hours a day, it is necessary to keep the border cover units combat-ready, with a certain rotation of such units.

You need to know the hardware. We read "1941 - lessons and conclusions" Chapter 2. Subchapter 2.2 Operational - strategic planning.

Better less, but better.

How much is this?

[Konnick]

You need to know the hardware. We read "1941 - lessons and conclusions" Chapter 2. Subchapter 2.2 Operational - strategic planning.

"It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines."
From "1941 -..."

It was assumed that in the Minsk direction 63 divisions of border districts, conducting an active defense, could withstand the attack of the main enemy forces. This assumption did not take into account the real situation, when German troops preempted the Red Army in strategic and operational deployment.

63 divisions ... it turns out only after 30 days, in your opinion, they could really fight ... But it would not be better to have 6 divisions mobilized in advance to cover the border in the district, which made it possible to detain the Germans for a couple of days, and not jump out in some underpants from the windows of the barracks? Moreover, none of our commanders had a clue about mobile defense. hoped for pillboxes and trenches in the URs. The impression is that they did not know about the fate of the Maginot Line, but recalled the Mannerheim Line. No analysis of the fighting of the Germans against the Anglo-French has been carried out. Although Zhukov won the command-staff game over Pavlov.
About today, maybe we need to create our own rapid reaction forces? Which do not require mobilization measures. And do not make jokes about such NATO forces. And as for the 2 BTGs near the Rogsky tunnel, the Georgians simply did not have attack helicopters.

[strannik1985]

63 divisions

You are distorting.

Wasn't it better than the neighborhood

The Germans in the first echelon have 21 AP, 1 CD, 4 TD, where 6 divisions will be swept away, they will not be noticed.

And about 2 BTGs

Then the Kudar people will have an air defense system.

[Konnick]

The Germans in the first echelon have 21 AP, 1 CD, 4 TD, where 6 divisions will be swept away, they will not be noticed.

How primitive ... do they have to push among themselves. The Germans had traffic jams on their roads, and at the same time they were physically unable to act. That's what mobile defense is for. It was still used by Makhno. And in our Bialystok salient, only one mechanized corps of Khatskilevich was combat-ready, but it was safely lost, leaving it without air defense and supplies. It is not clear what other connections were doing there.

[strannik1985]

How primitive ...

https://www.soldat.ru/files/f/000002bc.jpg
Here are the roads along which the Germans can move, where will you place your divisions?
How to ensure mobility?
I draw your attention, in real life they were advancing in order to get a boiler in the Bialystok ledge, now there are no troops there.

[Siberian54]

something like this in real life, and it happened - throughout July, continuous resistance at the level of companies and battalions, and scattered at the level of divisions (the first tank oncoming battles, desperate resistance of individual UROV, stubborn resistance of some divisions) and only by September the first deliberate defensive battles (just in time for our luck, German "rollers" and German technicians suddenly realized that the "Ordung" had collapsed, there were sorely lack of engines, trucks, gearboxes on the schedule and planned replacement of engines) ..

[Shefango]

You my friend, apparently Rezun (Suvorov) read a lot? But...

[Eug]

I think that it was very important for the leadership of the Union that the Nazis were the first to attack - both from a moral point of view and from the point of view of Roosevelt's speech on June 12 about America's support for the defending side. The calculation was that the Germans would go deeper into the territory of the USSR by a maximum of 100-120 km, which is quite enough for the general recognition of the fact of aggression. And then the spacecraft will kick the Wehrmacht out of its territory and begin the liberation of Europa. But the spacecraft could not throw out the Wehrmacht ...

[strannik1985]

After all, they told Stalin that Germany would attack the USSR ...

If Germany attacks, it is necessary to mobilize, deploy and fight for a strategic initiative (i.e. strike first). The border with Germany is not like the Karelian Isthmus, from which it is possible to evict the population in advance and prepare a line of defense.

[paul3390]

hit first

How to hit something? Look at the state of most of the shock units - mechanized corps before the war, it’s a tear that breaks through .. Here is interesting - let's say you have a Vulgaris 1000 tanks and 10000 vehicles, which are enough for the state, say, for 5 corps. What will you do? That's right - you will form 5 complete enclosures, and as technology arrives, you will deploy the rest. Would a wild idea occur to you to rotate 15, at the same time - wildly incomplete and therefore extremely few combat-ready? But this is exactly what happened in reality !! Some kind of wicked sabotage. But was Comrade Stalin a fool and a pest? Certainly not. What happened then? Moreover, in the conditions of a world war ALREADY going on near our borders ..

[Eug]

I strongly disagree - at the first stage, I will form 15 complete divisions, which (already created without the formation of new ones) will then be "built up" by "supplementing" with the condition that the "enlarged" divisions are no more than 1/3 of the previously created ones. In fact, it was the same, only the level of leadership and communication was raised in advance to the corps. But the level of preparation of this guide left much to be desired - well, they did not have time for more ...

[strannik1985]

Strongly disagree

In general, the USSR showed the ability to form 8 more or less complete mechanized corps and 2 separate tank divisions, at most one more MK in the stage of formation.

[antivirus]

For many years I have been reading on VO military fantasies about "overslept, waited, did not wait. blamestalin" or someone else.
5 years ago our sous were shot down in Syria
TURKS .....
EVERYONE KNEW ABOUT THEIR HARMFUL ATTITUDE AND AREAS OF INFLUENCE IN THE NORTH OF SYRIA.
WARS DIDN'T DECLARE ONE-FRIEND. FRIENDS IN THE FATHER BUSINESS ....
AND THE HOTELS WORKED WITH OUR TOURISTS (ZHRACHKA IS FREE). MILITARY SUBMITTED UNDER TURKOMAN MACHINES AND TURKISH AIR FORCE ROCKETS.

WHAT IS IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE COMINTERN, MFA VBRIT, BULGARIA, GREECE, TITO-Yugoslavia?
who wanted the departure of 10-30 Wehrmacht divisions to another edge of Europe? is it easier to live with the Gestapo (2 thousand hours) without 70 thousand infantry (not fur groups) with artillery and aviation?
How did the Yugoslavs view the departure of the Germans, and the Italians against the onslaught in the USSR? without help in North Africa?
multifaceted and multifaceted, throughout the western. the border, the start of shooting is NOT A WAR. 10 DIVISIONS of the Wehrmacht (or 70) PALATS in the squads are provocations, and a piece of paper about the beginning of the war is a war !!!!
How are Armenia-Azerbaijan, Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan friendly with shelling?
and forced to endure NGOs, Timoshenko, Zhukov and Beria (border guards) until they received the piece of paper. and they were not allowed to blink ... until death

[Givi Jalagoniya]

Absolutely valid remarks!

[Moore]

Quote: Lech from Android.

After all, they told Stalin that Germany would attack the USSR ...

And then Stalin did not know that he would attack. Contradictory intelligence data only convinced him that he was right: a pragmatist to the marrow of his bones could not believe that a neurotic adventurer would dare to attack, having, in principle, no strategic reserves and not transferring the country to martial law.

[antivirus]

not having, in principle, any strategic reserves and not transferring the country to martial law.

just like everything is ingenious - Hitler was promised money by gnomes and other neutrals (from the City bankers and others who do not know how to clean hunting guns, all the servants do) to help, everyone wanted to help for 2-3 times more expensive than peacetime.
human blood is not water, and not money

[28st region]

Exactly.
And the numbers were called from March almost every day a new number. From trusted sources.

[tatra]

The anomalies of humanity, the enemies of the communists who seized the USSR, have an anomalous ideology, they really like to discuss everything that those from whom they took the country during their Perestroika did, how they worked and fought, and they really do not like to discuss what they themselves did how they themselves worked and fought.

[Krasnodar]

The communist doctors who made perestroika were themselves communists who took the country away from other communists, because of whom they were forced to carry out perestroika.

[Givi Jalagoniya]

Poems immediately come to mind - Doctors burned their own hut; They killed his whole family!

[Krasnodar]

And not a friend and not a doctor, but so)).

[alekseykabanets]

Quote: ivan2022

“It is precisely the lag that is the main threat and this is our enemy.
If we do not reverse the situation, then it will inevitably intensify.
It's like a serious chronic illness that is tireless
step by step erodes and destroys the body from the inside. " /V. Putin /

Well, yes, he is an amateur to talk, he speaks very well. But with things like that, to put it mildly, not very much.

[for]

Stop procrastinating on this topic!
The USSR won !!!

[Lech from Android.]

Stop procrastinating on this topic!
The USSR won !!!

I won unconditionally ... so now we are silent about all our heroes who fought and died on the first day of the war ... so what do you think?

[ivan2022]

Quote: Lech from Android.

I won unconditionally ... so now we are silent about all our heroes who fought and died on the first day of the war ... so what do you think?

Heh ... heh .... do you really believe that this propaganda campaign beats for more than 60 years stubbornly at one point, for the sake of the memory of those who died at the beginning of the War? It seems from your virtual "Android" that you can create an industry and win a war and be a clinical half-fool at the same time ... so trample, that here are the Victory and the second economy of the World ... no need to think! Is this on your "Android" right? And in real life this cannot be. Wars in the whole world are won only by the most talented ...

If it were all for the sake of the memory of the dead, it would have been about the fact that their death was not in vain. And not about how they were "stupid and helpless ...... slept through the war" ...I mean, the proverb says: "the clever will sleep it off, but" the first of the two troubles of Russia "- never!" Who would it be about? About those who are more useful if they sleep ...

Are you familiar, for example, with the history of the Patriotic War of 1812? The forces of the Russian army were approximately comparable to the forces of Napoleon and in June 1812 and at Borodino .... read. But they retreated and surrendered Moscow. Only the conclusions are completely different. This is what it means - the absence of political engagement. It turns out that you can retreat to Moscow, but at the same time the commanders and soldiers are quite normal ... as in all armies of the world.

[Moore]

What kind of USSR from the point of view of the Russian language?

[Givi Jalagoniya]

And why not "the USSR won!" ?! The country seems subconsciously feminine, suffering side?! Like, rape with men is nowhere to go - it doesn’t happen right up to Moscow and Stalingrad ?!

[Gardamir]

It's easy to judge when everything has already happened.

[Olgovich]

After 20:00 on June 21 to Stalin received RM about the possible start of the war on the coming night.

By 20:50 he summons the People's Commissar of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and the 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense S.M.Budyonny. Information about the possible start of the war on the night of June 22 S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukova didn't bother.

After the departure of Marshal Budyonny, the People's Commissar of Defense and the head of the General Staff, probably were able to dispel Stalin's doubts about the attack Germany June 22

Zhukov:

On the evening of June 21, Lieutenant-General M.A.Purkaev, the chief of staff of the Kiev Military District, called me and reported that a defector, a German sergeant-major, had come to the border guards, claiming that German troops were entering the starting areas for an offensive, which would begin on the morning of June 22nd.

I immediately reported to the People's Commissar and I.V. Stalin what was conveyed by M.A.Purkaev.

— Come with the Commissar in 45 minutes to the Kremlin- said I. V. Stalin.

Taking with you the draft directive troops, together with the People's Commissar and Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, we went to the Kremlin. On the way, we agreed at all costs to reach a decision on bringing the troops to combat readiness.

The chief of staff of the OdVO before decoding the directive gives instructions on redeployment of aviation,

From 3:30 to 4:00, enemy aircraft strikes at stationary airfields in the district, but the bulk of the aircraft managed to relocate to field airfields.

there was no redeployment on the NIGHT of June 22nd. The overwhelming majority of pilots simply did not know how to fly at night, in addition, it took more than one hour to organize flights. Yes, and the order did not reach many, and they learned about sales already after the start of the database: Pokryshkin, OdVO, June 22:

Frequent ringing sounds picked up from bed... They hit the rail. Anxiety!

- War! Fighting is already underway on the border. There might be a blow to the airfield

neither Moscow nor the headquarters of the border districts were instructed to take up defensive positions at the outposts... And some of the buildings of the outposts were at a distance of several hundred meters from the border, and enemy artillery batteries were installed opposite them on June 21. That is why many of the buildings of the outposts were unexpectedly subjected to artillery or machine-gun fire.

Alas, there was no order to the border guards to bring the drug into combat readiness and he suffered immediately and large losses.

The summary indicates a later date for the shelling and raids of German aircraft than that given in the memoirs. It is unlikely that the persons indicated in the memoirs call the General Staff and give one time, and later indicate another in the official reports.

20-30 min difference is about nothing.

Information about the meeting of the spacecraft leadership with Stalin at 4:30 on June 22 has not been documented.

At 5.45 a meeting with Stalin Zhukov, Molotov, Timoshenko, Beria and Mehlis is confirmed. The difference is small.

As for the Foreign Ministry, in the reports of the NKVD on the Geman embassy in Moscow, it was clearly reported on the complete evacuation of the families of the embassy workers from the beginning of June and the smoke from the burning documents, i.e. the workers had information in advance, and ours could draw conclusions, in a common piggy bank of facts ...

[svp67]

Sorry, but the author did not understand the material well.
The NPO Timoshenko and the NGSH Zhukov doubted, did not doubt the forthcoming attack, but in Directive No. 1 the order was clearly given to bring the troops into combat readiness "Complete"

I transmit the order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense for immediate execution:
1. During the period of June 22-23, 1941, a sudden German attack is possible on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO. An attack can begin with provocative actions.
2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.
I ORDER:
a) during the night on 22 June 1941, secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
b) before dawn on 22 June 1941, disperse all aircraft, including military, across field airfields, carefully disguise it;
c) bring all parts to combat readiness. Troops to keep dispersed and disguised;
d) to bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional lifting the subscription. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
e) do not carry out any other events without special order.
Tymoshenko Zhukov

At the same time, the People's Commissar calls five border districts, warning the leadership of possible provocations at the border. At the same time, he does not say a word about the content of the forthcoming directive.

Does the author know what secrecy is? It is not in vain that such orders are "stamped" at the highest level and are transmitted using encryption systems. Telephone communication is not considered resistant to secrecy, therefore, when negotiating it, there is a prohibition on the use and transmission of a certain type of information. So I'm not surprised that the NPO didn't say a word about the CONTENT of the Top Secret Directive

[AsmyppoL]

The author knows and understands a little ...
And how was Directive No. 1 transferred to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front? It seems that by phone from the headquarters of the KVO. But even at 15-00, the chief of staff of KOVO reported to the General Staff about the termination of the reception of the PC for the moving headquarters ... How why was the PC still sent? ..
And how was the information transferred from the headquarters of the PribOVO (North-Western Front) to the 11th Army before the directive came? Allegorically from the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Klenov.
And why did the leaders of NGOs shift the responsibility for such a transfer by telephone to subordinate headquarters?

[svp67]

Quote: AsmyppoL

And why did the leaders of NGOs shift the responsibility for such a transfer by telephone to subordinate headquarters?

Wait, in fact, such instructions are conveyed in a chain from the highest to the lowest. The headquarters of the armies, if they were not separate NGOs and the NGSH, should not have brought them directly to the headquarters.
But I know that already on June 20, 1941, all NKS communication lines in those districts were given over to the military. Apparently something "went wrong"

Quote: AsmyppoL

It seems that by phone from the headquarters of the KVO.

But not in plain text, but in the form of a cipher. Why the directive took so long to reach, it took too long to decipher it, and then to encode the orders to the lower headquarters. The order transmission system was poorly thought out. After all, it was enough just to introduce a system of signals into the troops, upon receipt of which the troops had to START acting in accordance with previously adopted plans ...
And NGSh Zhukov is guilty of such sluggishness, he should have thought over such a question ... could not

[paul3390]

But let's see how some of the lower authorities reacted to all this. Consider the activities of Comrade Ptukhin, an innocent victim of the Stalinist repressions.

Air Force Commander of the Kiev Special Military District, Lieutenant General of Aviation E. S. Ptukhin .. From the memoirs of Air Marshal N. S. Skripko:

“On the evening of June 20, 1941, the first echelon with the district's field control moved by a special train to a new command post located in Tarnopol, and on the morning of June 21, the main group of the district headquarters drove to the command post by cars.

A reserve command post of the district (front) air force was left in Kiev, headed by the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Organizational Affairs Major General of Aviation Maltsev. With him was a small group of representatives of various departments and services, including ransomware. Events required the very next day to involve the entire group in active operational work, although it was not intended for this purpose.

The fact is that the communications center of the Air Force headquarters in Kiev had communication with all the airfields of the district (front), while the command post in Tarnopol was not provided with it.

At dawn on June 22, 1941, when a column of staff vehicles was being pulled into Brody (65 km northeast of Tarnopol), enemy aircraft struck at our airfields.

The war found the regiments of the district in the border airfield zone, where they were taken out in the course of an operational exercise conducted by General E.S.Ptukhin. However, the units were not put on alert. The headquarters of the mixed air divisions, that is, the army aviation, were located in their places of permanent deployment.

Ptukhin, together with his deputy for combat training S.V. Slyusarev, by 14 o'clock on June 22, 1941 arrived at the command post in Tarnopol ... Direct wire communication was only with the 14th, 16th and 17th air divisions. With all other parts and connections, contacts were maintained through the Kiev communication center ...

The group of General Maltsev, who was there, collected data on the situation in all regiments and transmitted them to the command post of the front air force in Tarnopol, orders to the divisions were transmitted from Tarnopol through the same channel. However, due to the lack of encryptors in Kiev, a large number of urgent undeciphered codograms and cipher codes have accumulated - all this significantly complicated the management.

On the first day of the war, the losses of the Air Force of the South-Western Front amounted to 192 combat aircraft, including training - 301 aircraft. Of the total number of our losses on the ground, 95 combat aircraft, 109 training aircraft were destroyed and damaged.

24.06.1941, Ptukhin was removed from command and arrested. Contained in the Saratov prison. "

TOTAL:

Air Force Commander of the Kiev Special Military District, Aviation Lieutenant General E.S. And who, excuse me, is to blame? Ah, yes, why am I, everyone knows that this is Comrade Stalin, such a bastard, he did not bother about communication for the unfortunate commander! That's why the defeat .. At the same time, it’s the fact that the aforementioned commander with the headquarters moved Two days.. Just from 20 to 22, he could not command anything .. They arrived at 14.00 on June 22 !! The war has been going on for 10 hours already .. And when we arrived - oops, but there is no connection! What a bad luck, right? The victim of Stalinism had to steer through the old point. But he took almost all the ransomware out of there !! Oh, how .. Not curious, why did it happen? As well as how he managed to announce the exercise, leaving the command post? Kind of exercise by itself, commander by itself? Amusing ..

Agree - what is stated in the memoirs, to put it mildly, frightens and dumbfounded? IMHO - this is no longer a mess ..

[yashka12007]

Yes, most likely there was some kind of betrayal at the highest military level, maybe not a conspiracy of the military, but the fact that the top leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense wanted to merge the country is for sure, by the way, the protocols of Pavlov's interrogation are still classified.

[28st region]

A headquarters of such a rank in peacetime was left without communication at all? Just a regular telephone?
The District headquarters serves several communication centers to move somewhere, so that it is easy to interrupt communication IMPOSSIBLE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
It’s somehow strange that every day is not like war, the life of the state is scheduled by the minute, recorded. Any document is also filed into the archive for indefinite storage. But with unrestrained constancy, more and more "revelations" appear. As it was

[Seal]

They did not expect the outbreak of war on the border of the Moldavian border district (from the book "Border troops of the USSR 1941-1945"):

[Seal]

The commander of the KOVO troops acts in strict accordance with the requirements of Directive No. 1 and, among others, gives an order: "Do not bring field troops to the border."

The commander of the KOVO troops could not act in accordance with the requirements of Directive No. 1 in principle, since in the remnants of the KOVO Headquarters (in Kiev) there was no longer a cipher department, and in the South-Western Front Headquarters (in Tarnopol, now Ternopil), where Kirponos and Purkaev were already , there was no encryption department yet. That is, the signalmen accepted the directive, but there was no one to decipher it. The cipher department, together with the Operations Department, left Kiev for Tarnopol in the evening of 21.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX and learned about the beginning of the war after seeing how German planes bombed Brody.
Directive No. 1 in KOVO was deciphered after 12:00 on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.

[AsmyppoL]

About the absence of ransomware in Kiev - again your assumption ... We know that the encryption department has left from the memoirs. But the fact that all the ransomware left there not specified...
This simply could not be, tk. KVO participated in mobilization and instructions on mobilization activities, on the formation and dispatch of teams were sent to KVO. How could they read the ciphers from the General Staff ...

[Seal]

About the absence of ransomware in Kiev - again your guess ...

We know that the cipher department has left from the memoirs.

So you will somehow decide whether this is my assumption, or we will learn about this from my memoirs.

But the fact that all the ransomware left is not indicated there ...

It is indicated that the encryption department has left. But about the fact that the cipher department left, so to speak, not in full strength, just the same is not indicated.
And further. Even if we imagine that some encryptor was left in Kiev and on the night of 22.06.1941/1/XNUMX he deciphered Directive No. XNUMX - what will he do with it? To whom will the phantom ransomware give the decrypted Directive if it is addressed to the commander who is already in Tarnopol?

Quote: AsmyppoL

How could they read the ciphers from the General Staff.

Who are they? The names of those that "they" name please.
Let me remind you that according to the staff number 1941/2 of the military districts (peacetime), which was in force in 1, according to which, by June 1941, incl. management of KOVO, consisted of:
1) the organizational and mobilization department of the district headquarters, which consisted of 27 people (including 3 civilians) and consisted of:
department management (head of department and his deputy);
1st branch in the amount of 7 people;
2st branch in the amount of 10 people;
3st branch in the amount of 3 people;
a secret unit consisting of 2 military personnel and 3 civilian typists.
2) II. Department of staffing of the headquarters of KOVO

The second department, whose documents often have to be dealt with, is the staffing department, which was entrusted with the tasks:

preparation and conduct of regular calls and deliveries;
manning of parts and institutions with people and draft power;
staffing and line accounting of manpower and draft power;
and more

According to state number 2/1, it consisted of more branches, but its total number was equal to the number of OMOs and also amounted to 27 people (of which 6 were civilians). The department included:
head of department
1st department (for conscription and staffing) in the amount of 7 people;
2nd department (for the repair of horse stock) in the amount of 2 people;
3rd department (service of troops and accounting), consisting of 5 military personnel and 3 civilian statisticians;
4th department (organization and control of Soviet secret and secret office work in parts) in the amount of 2 people;
5th department (letters), consisting of 3 military personnel and 1 civilian typist;
a secret unit consisting of the chief of the unit and 2 civilian typists.
The head of the department before the war in 1941 was 37-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Nikita Filippovich Zhelyabin.
By the beginning of the war, 41-year-old Colonel Fyodor Ivanovich Konovalov headed the department.
3) III. Organizational department of OMO KOVO
In addition to the actual chief (Major Raznik), the department also included three senior assistants and three assistants to the chief of the department:
senior assistant 39-year-old quartermaster 3rd rank Mikhail Mikhailovich Buzun
senior assistant 37-year-old Major Alexander Leontyevich Lyalikov
senior assistant 34-year-old quartermaster 3rd rank Vasily Alekseevich Uskov
assistant 32-year-old captain Iosif Antipovich Olefirenko
assistant 30-year-old senior lieutenant Fyodor Kuzmich Ishchenko
assistant Amelkin (presumably a 27-year-old technician-quartermaster of the 2nd rank Amelkin Ivan Dmitrievich, although there is no complete clarity with him).

None of them have any reason to communicate with the General Staff of the Red Army and receive cipher programs.
I fully admit that the secret departments could have ciphers who could keep in touch both with the Headquarters of the SWF and with the corresponding departments in the People's Commissariat of Defense. But the fact that they possessed encryption pads that allowed them to decipher the encryption messages of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff — sorry, I don’t believe it.

[AsmyppoL]

You distorted again ... In almost your own words, you retold Baghramyan's memories and derived from them your assumptions that there were no ciphers in the remnants of the KOVO Headquarters (in Kiev) ...

Previously, the article had twice posted a link to the film "On the Eve".
The film examines the situation in PribOVO in detail. A situation very similar to the situation in KOVO occurred in this district. The front headquarters moved to the front command post.
Directive No. 1 arrived at the headquarters of the PribVO, was deciphered there, encrypted and sent to the command post of the front headquarters, where it was deciphered. They formulated it again and sent it to the armies, in which they did not have time to decipher it before the start of the war ...
The ransomware ended up in both places.
Don't take everything literally ...

Since the KVO was part of the emerging Southwestern Front and was led by the deputy commander of the former KOVO troops, the rank of the district should be close to the rank of an army - a separate corps, and these associations had their own codebreakers (there were also below). Therefore, every single encryptor simply could not leave with the operational department ... By 3 o'clock in the morning on June 22, Purkaev, from the commander of the troops, would learn about the contents of the Directive, which they could not have conveyed to him as if by phone. It also happened in PribOVO, where something about its content was transferred to the front command post ...

[Seal]

Quote: AsmyppoL

By 3 o'clock in the morning on June 22, Purkaev, from the commander of the troops, learned about the content of the Directive, which they could not convey to him by phone.

I did not quite understand the idea, as it is not written in Russian. But I believe that you mean that Purkaev himself began to call the army commanders after Zhukov called him and asked if he and Kirponos had received Directive No. 1 and what was being done to implement it. According to Zhukov's memoirs, in a conversation with Purkaev, he told him about the requirements set out in the directive

At about 24 o'clock on June 21, the commander of the Kiev district, M.P. 222nd Infantry Regiment, 74th Infantry Division. He swam across the river, came to the border guards and said that at 4 o'clock the German troops would go over to the offensive. M.P. Kirponos was ordered to quickly transmit a directive to the troops on bringing them to combat readiness

Everything indicated that German troops were advancing closer to the border. We reported this to JV Stalin at 00.30 in the morning. He asked if the directive had been passed on to the districts. I answered in the affirmative.

After the death of JV Stalin, versions appeared that some commanders and their staffs on the night of June 22, suspecting nothing, were sleeping peacefully or having fun carelessly. This is not true. The last peaceful night was completely different.

As I already said, upon returning from the Kremlin, the People’s Commissar of Defense repeatedly spoke on the HF with the commanders of the districts F. I. Kuznetsov, D. G. Pavlov, M. P. Kirponos and their chiefs of staff, who, except D. G. Pavlov, were at their command posts.

It goes without saying that Purkaev immediately sat down at the telephone and began calling the army commanders.
But they did not manage to bring to the commanders of the divisions. Well, or not before everyone had time.
From the responses of the Pokrovsky Commission
Response of the commander of the 135th SD KOVO General Smekhotvorov

“... The order to bring units of the 135th regiment into combat readiness before the start of hostilities was not received, and when the division on the march in the morning of 22.06 was subjected to machine-gun fire by German planes, the 5A headquarters received an order“ Do not succumb to provocation, do not shoot at planes ".
The order to put on alert and to carry out the mobilization plan was received only in the morning of 23.06.41/100/150, when the division's units were in Kivertsy, XNUMX-XNUMX kilometers from the permanent quartering points. "

On the night of June 22, after the "Directive No. 1" was sent to the districts on bringing all the troops of the western districts to combat readiness, it was generally "forgotten" to bring this "order of the People's Commissar", "Directive No. 1" to the Divisional Commander Smekhotvorov! And he learned that the War began when his division was shot on the march to the place of "camp gathering" by German planes!
Another answer. Major General S.F. Gorokhov (former chief of staff of the 99th Infantry Division of the 26th Army).

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the order on the withdrawal of units to the defense sectors was not received. Only artillery regiments by order of the commander of the 8th rifle corps, Major General M.G. Snegovs were pushed into the woods near the planned firing positions. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, he gave conflicting orders: the rifle regiments to occupy the defensive lines, and the artillery regiments not to open fire until further notice. Despite our insistent demands, until 10 o'clock on June 22, there was no permission to use artillery.

[tatra]

Stalin knew well that the mobilization of the Russian army on the border with Austria-Hungary gave Germany a reason to declare war on the Russian Empire, and did not want to give Hitler a reason for provocation.

[Cartalon]

Yes, if you forget that small nuance that the German army was mobilized for two years, then everything is correct.

[strannik1985]

Yes, if you forget that little nuance

What is characteristic of the spacecraft in September 1939 also carried out mobilization and until the beginning of May inclusively had more cover formations in the first echelon than the Germans (52 versus 53 SD, 3 CD, 2 rifle brigades, 1 or 2 tank divisions). Attention is the question, who is going to attack whom?

[Krasnodar]

Yes, tatra, everything went without provocation

[Catfish]

Why kick someone in the ass, if he himself has long been ready to jump from the roof.

Did you find a photo that you haven't seen before?

[Krasnodar]

Greetings, Constantine!
It was impossible to allow the concentration of significant units, but Stalin still hoped that Hitler would trample on the island and with this business would get bogged down until 1943, when the Red Army was already ready for war. And this despite the concentration of such a number of troops on the Soviet border. I believed in what I wanted to believe.

[Catfish]

Good afternoon, Albert!

What we are talking about ... Everyone suffers from this.

[AAK]

By the way, a rather curious photo. I specially looked at it in an enlarged format.
- the picture was taken at least in the middle of autumn (most of the leaves flew around the trees, the Red Army soldier is aged, who stands next to the commander behind the far gun - in a quilted jacket or jacket over a tunic, the shadows from objects are long, i.e. the sun is lower than in summer );
- all with buttonholes, i.e. still 1941-1942, out of 14 servicemen in the picture - 3 in caps, i.e. command staff, plus one more with a commander's bag. No one can see personal combat weapons (rifles, machine guns) and bags for ammunition with them, but, in my opinion, they have sewn on collars. The military's boots are dry, without traces of dirt and relatively clean, uniforms also without traces of fighting or trench life.
- of two howitzers, in dry weather, one (on the left) - on the inside of the rim and on the hubs, there is dirt, judging by the light shade in the photo - dried, the gun shield is also dirty. No dirt is visible on the wheel of the second howitzer, the shield is also cleaner. It is possible that they were brought to this place at different times.
- the flags of Germany are state flags (could be removed in any conquered village), and not banners or standards of combat units.
Typical rear staged photo.

[Catfish]

flags of Germany - state (

With these "flags" the Germans covered their armored vehicles from above, as an identification mark for their own aviation.
Otherwise, yes, you are very observant.

[Konnick]

Typical rear staged photo.

And there were no others. If only not portraits or group ones. All, for example, "Stalingrad" photos are staged with trophy teams. All photos of Anatoly Garanin staged, including the famous "Death of a Soldier". Garanin has every snapshot, an explosion, a "rare" coincidence.

[ccsr]

Quote: AAK

Typical rear staged photo.

And do you not allow the actions of the unit to collect trophy weapons and property (trophy team)? They were not sitting in the trenches, they were not fighting, so they have a different look. Most likely, the photographer was brought to the collection point for such weapons, and filmed not far from the front line. But this is my guess.

[paul3390]

Stalin knew perfectly well that Aloizyevich did not need any provocations to start the war, he himself organized them perfectly when necessary. If a country has decided on a big war, it will always find a reason. And if she didn’t dare, even a real scuffle would not be a pretext for a big war. Khalkhin-Gol is the clearest example of this.

Then the question is - WHOM then, was Comrade Stalin so afraid of provoking? If this is obviously not Germany?

[zenion]

The Americans said they would help the victim of the attack. The USSR understood that there was not enough weapons and the rest. The United States gave Germany the opportunity to attack, but did not think that the USSR would fight back and kick in the face. The USSR did not need the war, the USA needed it to survive. Let them kill each other, you need to arm both of them so that the war lasts as long as possible. Time is money.

[paul3390]

There is one more consideration - Hess did not fly to England in vain .. And who said that in fact - they did not agree? And that in the event of the alleged aggression of the USSR - England would not agree to conclude peace with Germany and not even to a further alliance against the USSR?

[zenion]

So the British had a plan to bomb Baku and other oil producing places. As Churchill put it, so that they do not fall into the hands of the Germans. Therefore, they kept Stalingrad at the cost of enormous blood, not to give the Naglichians a reason to leave the Red Army without fuel.

[Aviator_]

So the British had a plan to bomb Baku and other oil producing places.

This plan was developed during the Soviet-Finnish war. A couple of weeks the Finns did not have enough to hold out before the start of these bombings. And it’s good that it wasn’t enough - the army at Mannerheim ran out, they ground it.

[antivirus]

+ from the actions of the United States - who can be called the aggressor !!!!!! depended on who will get a third of the world economy as allies !!!!!!

but here, on VO straightforward in / s, it is superfluous to know.

.................................................. ..

[Seal]

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, commander-14 Frolov V.A. despite a strict order from above “not to succumb to provocations,” having correctly assessed the situation, he moved the troops to the border with his decision. By mid-July 1941, he stopped the exsanguinated enemy 20-30 kilometers east of the border. The very right flank of the war turned out to be the strongest.
Details
June 19 to the Kandalaksha direction, to the Alakurtti area, the transfer of the 1st tank division from near Pskov began. On June 21, the commander of the 14th Army, Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov applied to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District for permission to move troops to the border, but was refused. It was forbidden to hold any events "that could arouse suspicion among the Finns and provoke them to war." Despite this, Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov, at his own peril and risk, ordered the commander of the 52nd Infantry Division, located in Murmansk, Monchegorsk and Kirovsk, to prepare for redeployment to the border area of ​​the Murmansk direction. On the night of June 22, from the Titovka area, the 95th rifle regiment and the 35th separate reconnaissance battalion of the 14th rifle division of Major General A.A. were moved directly to the border. Zhurba. They occupied the so-called Titovsky defensive line (six unfinished and unarmed pillboxes near Lake Kuosme-jarvi), located between the border with Finland and the river. Titovka. And only after the attack of the Wehrmacht troops on the territory of the Soviet Union, the military council of the Leningrad military district instructed the commanders of the 14th, 7th and 23rd armies to immediately put into effect a plan to cover the northern state border. In accordance with it, the 104th rifle and 1st tank divisions moved west from Kandalaksha, and the 52nd rifle division to Murmansk by rail.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the command of the district was also not afraid to move troops to the border on the eve of the war. But it would be better if it didn't.
In mid-June, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M.M. Popov ordered the commander of the 14th Army, Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov secretly move the 122nd Rifle Division of the 42nd Rifle Corps, covering the Kandalaksha direction, to the border and take up defenses. Commander Frolov objected to this. He believed that it was more profitable to create a line of defense along the river. Sofyanga, fifty kilometers east of the border. “Frolov was right,” writes Veschezersky in his book Near Cold Rocks. - Wide Sofyanga with lakes covering the flanks would be a powerful obstacle for the enemy. Closer to the border, there were no such convenient lines for defense at all. However, they did not want to listen to Frolov. Forced to obey the demands of his superiors, he reluctantly moved one battalion to the border, maintaining positions on Sofyanga. Frolov, of course, knew better on the spot where the defense needed to be built. The very first battles fully confirmed his correctness. The enemy bypassed our frontier battalion, cut the road in the rear, and the soldiers with difficulty made their way out of the encirclement, throwing cannons and a baggage train in the woods. "

So, it turns out that on the flanks of the future great battle, war was expected. In Moldova, army units changed border guards in the area on June 10, 1941, and in Karelia, Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov gave the command to move to the border on June 21, 1941.

[AsmyppoL]

Lieutenant General V.A.Frolov gave the order to advance separate parts his army after inspecting the positions together with the commander of the LVO. The final decision was made not at the headquarters of the LMO, but at the headquarters of the army. this is evidenced by the form of negotiations before arrival at the headquarters of both commanders. And the order to nominate has already gone.
You probably missed one part of the article.
https://topwar.ru/188587-za-dva-dnja-do-vojny.html

I have repeatedly encountered inaccuracies in my memories. Here you cited the memoirs of a war veteran who occupied the border on the Prut. But this is the opinion of one person who can be wrong. In the ZhBD of the 9th Army there is no record of accepting the border from the border guards. In the reports from the border guards, there is also no message about the transfer of the border ...
As soon as you can find confirmation from the border guards about the surrender of the border to the army, then your version will become true. But you will not find such a thing ... There were many subdivisions and units of NGOs on the border in June, but the border was never transferred anywhere. There is no information about this ...

[Seal]

Quote: AsmyppoL

In the ZhBD of the 9th Army there is no record of accepting the border from the border guards.

Where could the Journal of Combat Actions come from two weeks before the start of these very hostilities, in conditions when the Red Army does not yet have a division into the Army in the Field and into parts that are not assigned to the Army in the Field? Maybe you should have looked not at the 9th Army's ZHBD, but at the 9th Army's IF?

[Seal]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I have repeatedly encountered inaccuracies in my memories. Here you cited the memoirs of a war veteran who occupied the border on the Prut. But this is the opinion of one person who can be wrong. In the ZhBD of the 9th Army

And by the way, what does the 9th Army have to do with it? The speech in the memoirs is about the 164th division, which was part of the 17th rifle corps 12th Army.

[Seal]

Quote: AsmyppoL

As soon as you can find confirmation from the border guards about the surrender of the border to the army, then your version will become true. But you will not find such a thing ... There were many subdivisions and units of NGOs on the border in June, but the border was never transferred anywhere. There is no information about this ...

[AsmyppoL]

The article said: “They did not expect the outbreak of war on the border of the Moldavian border district (from the book“ Border Troops of the USSR 1941-1945 ”the text was quoted:“ ... 2nd commandant's office. With the receipt of a message about the attack of the Romanian-German fascists on the 4th outpost 2 "The commandant's office ... was put on alert at 4:00 on June 22. Its units took up defense on a 52 km section of the state border ... 3rd commandant's office. With the outbreak of hostilities, all divisions of the commandant's office were put on alert ..."

Seal, posted a fragment of the article by A. A. Sviridov, which spoke about the replacement of border guards by military personnel of the spacecraft.

At the first answer, of course, I confused the army and the district. Everything confused the name of the Prut River.

After downloading the memoirs, it became clear that A.A. As far as I understand, there were no questions about the text given in the article. The question concerned the unit in which AA Sviridov served.

The figure below shows a fragment of the map of the Southwestern Front with the situation on June 22. The figure also shows the locations of the border commandant's offices and outposts of the 23rd Lipcan border detachment of the Moldavian border district.

The figure shows that the rifle regiments were not at the border on 22 June.

[AsmyppoL]

I was unable to find directives for the development of Coverage Plans in the armies of KOVO. However, there is a similar directive from the ZAPOVO headquarters to the 3rd Army:

…eight. Support for border parts.
To support units of the border guard before reaching the border of field troops, in case of violation by the latter by armed detachments or gangs, allocate one battalion for the 86th border detachment from 345th rifle division, 27th rifle division.
The readiness period of the detachment (border support detachment) is set 45 minutes from the moment of the announcement of the alert.
The detachment must be immediately notified to the commander of the border detachment. The right to call these detachments is given to the commander of the border detachment, who establishes a wire connection with the detachment and determines the signal to call.
The commander of the support squad, when called, raises the alarm and notifies his command.
When the border units call the support detachments, the fighters of the latter are given a wearable stock of cartridges. Support detachments, until the units reach the state border, are subordinate to the commanders of the border detachments.
With the exit of the Red Army troops to the state border, the border units of the NKVD, located in the sector of the cover area, come under your operational subordination.
The procedure for the relationship between the units of the Red Army and the border units of the NKVD shall be established in accordance with the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense for 1939 No. ..., an extract from which is in Appendix No. ...

From the presented text it is clear that they were guided by the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense on the procedure for interaction between the spacecraft and the border units of the NKVD. The text defines the order of interaction and the timing of the advancement of the spacecraft support units. 45 minutes is also found in the memoirs of war veterans.

It turns out that the border guards from the section of the state border could be replaced only after the withdrawal of the spacecraft troops to the state border: "Support detachments, before the units reach the state border, are subordinate to the commanders of border detachments ..."

There are the following reports from the chief of the border troops of the Moldavian SSR:
1) 9-15: "Setting: 7-20 June 22, 1941
Lipkansky border detachment: in the sectors of the 1st and 2nd outposts, up to four platoons of the enemy (the Germans) crossed the border, the outposts entered the battle. The 3rd, 4th and 5th outposts are fired at by the enemy with rare artillery fire. Communication with spacecraft support has been established ... "
At about 7-20, communication was established with the support squads of the spacecraft.

2) 14 hour.: “Situation: 12-00 June 22, 1941 for the border detachments of the Moldavian district:
Lipcani border guard detachment: at 10-30 am against the section 14th - 15th outposts Romanians launch boats to the river. Prut ... At 11-40 the enemy company in the area of ​​the 14th outpost formed a river. Prut, the outpost is fighting surrounded, a battalion of the spacecraft arrived to support.
2nd frontier detachment: at 10-05 a company with the support of the spacecraft with the 12th outpost are fighting on the northwestern outskirts of Kotu-Morii ... "

3) 17-30: "Setting: 16-00 June 22, 1941
Lipkani border detachment: at 14-00 the 1st and 2nd border outposts, with the support of the spacecraft, are fighting an enemy of up to two companies. In the sector of the 14th outpost, two platoons of the enemy tried to advance along the ravine between Lopatnik, Venshoara - the outpost with the support of the spacecraft was thrown back to the river. Rod…"

Spacecraft support detachments went to the border later. There is a mention that the 5th cavalry regiment of the 9th cavalry division was located on the territory of the OdVO directly at the border, or it is most likely that we are talking about a support detachment.

Here's what we managed to find about the border guards of the 23rd border detachment in the first hours of June 22.
«1st outpost... 5 attire fired 4 shots, the enemy responded with machine-gun fire. Artillery and mortar shelling of the 1st outpost (Tarasautsy village) began. A detachment of border guards disappeared without a trace (Elkin V.I. and Belyaev I.P.)
The enemy forcefully crossed the river up to the company. Rod and took several bunkers. A group of 8 border guards led by political instructor Shestakov came under machine-gun fire. Sergeant Artamonov was wounded. Bypassing the enemy through the village, the Shestakov group took the bunker that was not captured by the enemy and took up defensive positions. Came to the rescue
outpost chief Lieutenant Sirotkin with border guards. An attempt to approach the captured bunkers and knock out the enemy from there failed. 25 border guards of the reserve outpost, headed by the assistant chief of staff of the commandant's office for combat training, Lieutenant Vlasov, arrived to strengthen the outpost. The border guards attacked the enemy, but the Romanians, covered with smoke bombs, crossed to their bank. More attempts
the Romanians did not undertake to cross, but they were constantly shelling our territory.

2st outpost... At dawn, the enemy began to fire at the outpost and with. Vanchikovtsy. Frontier guard F.M. Molchanov, who was on duty at the observation tower, was killed. The border guards with their fire and attack knocked out the enemy infantry that had crossed over and subsequently did not allow him to cross to our shore. Head of the outpost st. Lieutenant P.A. Fartukh organized the evacuation of families of border guards to the city of Kamenets-Podolsk.

3rd, 4th, 5th outposts were subjected to artillery fire. Attempts by the enemy to cross were stopped by rifle and machine-gun fire.

8st outpost... It was located in an important direction in the Lipcani borough. Nearby was the road to the reinforced concrete bridge across the river. A rod through which the enemy could ferry tanks and motorized infantry. Head of the outpost st. Lieutenant Klimenko F.P. in advance, even before the start of the enemy's offensive, he ordered to occupy checkpoints and strong points in accordance with the combat calculation. The outpost was reinforced with a maneuvering group. Three enemy bombers on a small
altitude, they intended to drop bombs on the positions of the border guards. Chief of the outpost S.V. Butin installed a heavy machine gun on a tripod for shooting at aerial targets and opened fire on bombers. The rest of the border guards opened fire with rifles. One plane started smoking and crashed on the river bank. In an effort to seize the bridge, the enemy, with the support of artillery, attacked the border guards' positions in large forces. Several fierce
attacks were repulsed. The battle was led by the chief of the detachment, Major Kazak P.K. All the officers of the headquarters and the 2nd border commandant's office took part in repelling the attacks. The Nazis seized the bridge, began to dismantle the blockage in order to let armored vehicles pass. The border guards threw them back with a counterattack. Sergeant Major Butin S.V. with a machine gun, he moved forward, took a comfortable position and fired destructive fire at the enemy. Several times wounded, he continued to fire
until the fight is over. The enemy was regrouping, preparing to seize the bridge again. By order of the higher command, 10 sappers under the command of Captain Perfilov and Art. Lieutenant Komkov, under enemy fire, mined and blew up a reinforced concrete bridge. The enemy's attempt to seize the bridge intact and ferry motorized parts across it was thwarted ... "

The border guards fought in the first hours of the war, and therefore they were on the state border. The parts of the spacecraft support in the first hours of June 22 are not mentioned. Most likely, they have not yet been at the border ...

You did not find confirmation from the border guards (as I wrote about), but brought additional memories ...
I repeat that there are no official documents on the surrender of the border to the army team.
In my opinion, this did not happen and could not happen ...

As far as I understand, after providing a link about the decision of the commander of the Leningrad Military District to withdraw part of the 14th Army, the issue with the commander of the 14th Army was cleared ...

[Seal]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I repeat that there are no official documents on the surrender of the border to the army team.

Oh, how many documents of those days do not exist at all.

Quote: AsmyppoL

In my opinion, this did not happen and could not happen ...

Well, except that on this basis Although, for example, nowhere is there a document "On the meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers" with the agenda "On the dismissal and arrest of comrade Beria." The same applies to the document on the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU with the agenda "On the dismissal of Comrade Khrushchev." That is, if there were no such documents, then, in your opinion, Beria and Khrushchov were not filmed either?

[Seal]

From here: http://gm-vicsv.narod.ru/ww2/ww2_2_4.htm

In accordance with the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 6, 1941, a plan for the defense of the state border from Lipkana to the mouth of the Kiliysky mouth of the Danube and further along the Black Sea coast to the Kerch Strait was developed in the Odessa military district and submitted to the General Staff on June 20.

On the basis of this plan, the 176th and 95th Infantry Divisions of the 35th Corps were deployed on the right flank of the district from Lipcani to Ungheni, and one rifle division was in the second echelon. From Unghena to Reni and further along the Danube to the Black Sea and along the coast to Odessa, the defense of the border was assigned to the 25th, 51st Infantry and 9th Cavalry Divisions. These three divisions were deployed in one echelon. From Odessa along the coast to the east, the coastal defense units and the border detachment were defended, and in the Crimea - the 9th corps.

On average, for each division of the first echelon along the Prut River and the Kiliysky arm, 100 km were covered along the front. Since they were defended in a zone of 50-60 km, there were large gaps between them. The gap, for example, between the defenses of the 176th and 95th divisions was 70 km, and in these intervals there were only border guards, detachments, outposts, commandant's headquarters.

In the second echelon of the district there were: 2nd and 18th mechanized m, 48th rifle corps, 5th cavalry division, 3rd airborne corps, mobile formations were intended to strike at the enemy in cooperation with the troops of the first echelon cover the border.

Without waiting for the approval of the border cover plan sent to Moscow, the district headquarters gave instructions to the corps commanders to develop on its basis part of the division's action plans with the beginning of the war, many of which were partially verified during the staff training conducted.

I believe that it was the same in the area that was part of the area of ​​responsibility of KOVO (SWF). The divisions of the divisions replaced the border guards, who in turn ensured the defense of the border in the gaps between the divisions.

[AsmyppoL]

So you believe that a cover plan was introduced in KOVO ...
...
You also only suspect, believe, and are sure about the directive for the Covert Plan ...

[AAK]

Everything seems to be diversified, but only one moment is alarming:
- everywhere - in references to ZhBD, memoirs and other documents certain situations are noted: obtaining information about the enemy, referring to specific hostile actions, BUT, in any of the documents / memoirs, etc., all actions on our part are exclusively impromptu ... At the same time (competent colleagues will not let you lie), army actions in peacetime are always formalized, i.e. are built on the basis of several standard plans for different situations that are not tied to a specific time (D + / D- H + / H - system) ... However, in none of the listed documents / memories / ZhBD pages it is noted that for completing the task, proceeded to such and such a plan or opened such and such a package ...
That is, we are peaceful people, we strengthen our steel defenses, we do not succumb to provocations, but all this is somehow impromptu, not according to plan ... But do not forget that in the leadership of the party, the Soviet state, the Red Army and the RKKF according to as of 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX there were different people, but none of them had signs of oligophrenia in different stages ...

[avia12005]

We'll have to come to terms with the fact that we will never know the full truth. Stalin did not leave his memories. Molotov in "140 Conversations" Chuev talks about June 22, but, obviously, he was not fully privy to the details of the actions of the NGO. Marshals and generals, including Zhukov, are guilty of inaccuracies and omissions. One thing is clear: the troops on the border and in the operational depth were not ready to repel a strike. Everything was decided by the heroism of individual units and servicemen. Eternal great memory to them ...

[Konnick]

Marshals and generals, including Zhukov, are guilty of inaccuracies and omissions. One thing is clear: the troops on the border and in the operational depth were not ready to repel a strike. Everything was decided by the heroism of individual units and servicemen. Eternal great memory to them ...

The more I learn about the War from documents, and not from memoirs, the more confidence that we actually won at the expense of the heroism of the people at the front and in the rear. My grandfather, who died near Rzhev, is a winner and millions of others, not marshals and generals.
There were few smart generals, and even now only a few ...

You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you must know that we have no Hindenburgs in reserve.

(from I.V. Stalin's telegram to L.Z. Mehlis dated May 9, 1942)

[avia12005]

My father volunteered in January 43. He was a paratrooper, he said how lucky he was with the commanders, such losses. What can you do, war is such a thing ...

[Anatoly Mikhailenko 2]

comrade Stalin did not have to destroy the command staff of the spacecraft in 1930-1940.

[antivirus]

Keeping in mind the horrors of war,
With each new battle victim
I'm sorry not a friend, not a wife,
I'm not sorry for the hero himself ...
Alas! my wife will be consoled
And the friend's best friend will forget;
But somewhere there is one soul -
She will remember to the grave!
Amid our hypocritical cases
And any vulgarity and prose
Some I spied into the world
Holy, sincere tears -
That is the tears of poor mothers!
They do not forget their children,
Dead on a bloody field,
How not to raise a weeping willow
Of your drooping branches ...

AuthorN. A. Nekrasov

[Charlie]

Well, so, the pact until June 22 helped to postpone the war, and after that it no longer helped for some reason. Has gone bad. Rancid

[x917nt]

What the Soviet military did on June 22, 1941 - chewed and sucked to the last bone. And it’s not interesting anymore. But what did the Soviet diplomats do on the eve of 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX? If the country's leadership had been throwing intelligence reports about the concentration of German troops near the western borders of the USSR for several weeks before the invasion, then why did the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and its diplomatic corps in Germany absolutely refrain from any attempt to prevent a war and try to "sort out" the situation?

"History hardly knows a mistake equal to that made by Stalin and the communist leaders, when they threw away all possibilities ... and lazily waited for the terrible attack approaching Russia or were unable to understand what awaited them." (C) Churchill.

[Anatoly Mikhailenko 2]

x19nt, the NKID and the embassies of the USSR carried out the instructions of comrade. Stalin, transmitted through Comrade. Molotov - and no initiative was allowed.

[Grim Reaper]

I don’t understand one thing. Hundreds of planes fly across the border. Rod tanks. All with apparently unfriendly intentions. Does the command seriously consider this a provocation? Even if it is a provocation: the state border has been violated. We have the right to destroy the violator. Nobody will say meow.
I do not understand......
Nna you with the left in the jaw. So wait
Higher selections. Nna you on the right
Stop, don't fall and don't let go of your hands,
This is just a provocation ...

[Seal]

Memoirs of Boldin, as of 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX - First Deputy Pavlov


The clouds were gathering. Through numerous channels, more and more information flocked to the commander's office, one more alarming than the other: bombing, fires, the Germans were shooting civilians from the air.
Colonel Blokhin reappeared with a report. It turns out that at dawn on June 22, more than thirty German infantry, five tank, two motorized and one airborne divisions, forty artillery and five air regiments went on the offensive against the troops of the Western Front.
So, without declaring war, Hitler treacherously attacked our country!
Pavlov addresses me:
- Golubev called once, and there is no more information from the tenth army. I’ll fly there now, and you stay here.
- I think this decision is wrong. The commander must not give up commanding the troops, I argue. 
- You, comrade Boldin, - switching to an official tone, says Pavlov, - the first deputy commander. I propose to stay at the headquarters instead of me. I do not see any other solution in this situation.
I prove to Pavlov that it will be more correct if I fly to Bialystok. But he persists, gets nervous, now and then leaves the office and comes back.
Marshal S.K. Timoshenko calls again. This time I am reporting the situation. At the same time I inform you:
- Pavlov is eager to go to Bialystok. I believe that the commander should not leave command and control of the troops. Please allow me to fly to the Tenth Army.
The People's Commissar does not allow anyone to fly out, offers to stay in Minsk and immediately establish contact with the armies.
Meanwhile, more and more reports are coming in from corps and divisions. But there is nothing comforting about them. The force of the blows of Hitler's air pirates is growing. They bomb Bialystok and Grodno, Lida and Tsekhanovets, Volkovysk and Kobrin, Brest, Slonim and other cities of Belarus. Here and there German paratroopers are operating.
Many of our planes were killed before they could take off. And the Nazis continue to shoot Soviet troops and civilians from low-level flight. In a number of sections, they crossed the border and, having occupied dozens of settlements, continue to move forward.
In my office, phone calls are ringing one after another. In a short time, he summons the People's Commissar of Defense for the fourth time. I am reporting new data. After listening to me, S.K. Timoshenko says:
- Comrade Boldin, mind you, do not take any action against the Germans without our knowledge. I inform you and ask Pavlov to tell Pavlov that Comrade Stalin does not permit the opening of artillery fire on the Germans.
- How so? - I shout into the phone. - After all, our troops are forced to retreat. Cities are burning, people are dying!
I'm very excited. It is difficult for me to find words that could convey the whole tragedy that was played out on our land. But there is an order not to succumb to the provocations of German generals.
- To conduct reconnaissance by aircraft no further than sixty kilometers, - says the People's Commissar. 
I report that the fascists at the airfields of the first line have put out of action almost all of our aviation. Apparently, the enemy seeks to seize the Lida area to ensure the landing of an airborne assault in the rear of the main grouping of the Western Front, and then with concentric strikes towards Grodno and in the northeastern direction to Volkovysk to cut our main communications.
I insist on the immediate use of mechanized, rifle units and artillery, especially anti-aircraft.
But the People's Commissar repeated the previous order: no other measures should be taken, except for reconnaissance deep into the enemy's territory for sixty kilometers.

[ivan2022]

Quote: Seal

Memoirs of Boldin, as of 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX - First Deputy Pavlov ... The clouds were gathering ...

Dismissed from the post of commander of the front commander K. K. Rokossovsky during the East Prussian offensive operation on February 2, 1945 for unsatisfactory organization of reconnaissance: he did not reveal the enemy's withdrawal and spent many hours of artillery training in the army strip in an empty place. At the same time, General Boldin reported to the front headquarters for two days that he was waging a decisive battle with the enemy. What kind of memoirs can there be after that? Watering your former bosses with streams of shit means devaluing all your previous exploits. The Germans did not pour such shit on each other even after the lost war.

[Seal]

General Vlasov in 1942 generally became a traitor. And what, this completely cancels his merits in the defense of Kiev and Moscow in 1941?

[ivan2022]

Americans have the experience of Pearl Harbor and the 1944 Ardennes operation, when they kicked their heads in full measure, but they are not particularly keen on self-flagellation ...... I did not notice that they had the same grandiose problems as the "June 22 problem". Normal people with a healthy psyche. Vietnam at one time shook her somewhat, but recovered and as if in nothing ...

The Germans generally blew everything, and nothing, they write memoirs such that everything is "cheerfully and the tail with a pistol" ..... you might think that they were not only always the smartest, but also won the war ...

I believe that it is precisely with the minds of today's "dear Russians" that one can understand, namely, to understand that from the point of view of an adequate response to the history of their country, many have obvious problems. For more than 60 years, the poor have been hammered in their brains with propaganda, and they have continued everything through and through, judging by the presented literary opus. Who can stand it? Here it is! The main thing is to remain normal people in peacetime. Then it will become clear who is great and who is shit.

[Sychev Vitalii]

It was quite expected - they had been preparing for it for many years, they did not expect only that on June 22, 1941

[xomaNN]

Tragically worked by 22.06.1941 "The Big Human Factor". And his name is Stalin.
The system in the USSR in those years was built in such a way that the Chief (i.e. Stalin) is ALWAYS right, and the subordinates (from the comrades to the district officials and ministers, etc.) are ALWAYS just waiting for the TsAR to decide and order.
And the initiative and the ability to do their own military affairs, at least according to the Regulations of the Red Army, are hidden in 90% of the paints deep in their souls, for fear of what they will do according to the Charter, and this will not be liked at the top. And - to Siberia. The gulag is waiting.

[ivan2022]

The enemy has already settled in the former territories of the USSR, and a bunch of "eccentrics" continue to exercise about the problems on June 22, 1941, allegedly "so that this does not happen again" .... The case already smacks of a diagnosis ..

[Sergei Fonov]

Stalin knew about the war, he was preparing for it, Zhukov in the 70s admitted his responsibility for the tragedy of 1941, the border guards kept the border from 3 hours to months, and in the north it remained in the same place. Odessa Military District not only repelled the attack, but also defeated the garrison on the adjacent side. The planes were kept, in contrast to other districts. Zhukov, as the head of the General Staff, was obliged to monitor the execution of directives by the commanders of the districts, in fact, only the Odessa and Northwestern Fronts of Frolov were ready, and if there was a head start in the north, then the OdVO did not have it. So Beria and his troops were at their best, but he is still, unlike Pavlov, an enemy of the people. By the way, in the north, the front stood at the border of the state border, despite the fact that the Germans really needed Murmansk through which supplies were going.

[kig]

The more I read on this topic, the more I lean towards the version that Comrade Stalin was not at all opposed to Hitler attacking a little in order to immediately repulse the insidious aggressor and liberate all of Europe to the English Channel by autumn. Hence the demands not to succumb to provocations, to keep troops away from the border. Therefore, he was dumbfounded by the development of events.

[ivan2022]

Quote: Seal

General Vlasov in 1942 generally became a traitor. And what, this completely cancels his merits in the defense of Kiev and Moscow in 1941?

Yes.

[ivan2022]

Quote: kig

The more I read on this topic, the more I am inclined to the version that Comrade Stalin was not at all opposed to Hitler attacking a little,

Emperor Alexander 1 was also not opposed to Napoleon attacking a little. And then ? Mother honest! Already in September, the adversary entered Moscow. And the more I am inclined to the version that Alexander was already "doing it in his pants" a little .....
But for some reason, it is customary to believe that the memory of ancestors should be honored, because so far they themselves have "became famous" only for the fact that ..... their vast country without any war at all. Do you understand? You didn't defeat Hitler....

[Enemy]

and the Western (Belarusian) OVO turned out to be the most unprepared. On the fifth day of the war, Minsk was surrendered.