Military Review

Tajikistan in the real 90s: provocations, clashes, shelling on the border

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Tajikistan in the real 90s: provocations, clashes, shelling on the border

Voennoye Obozreniye continues to acquaint readers with chapters from the book Not One Step Back! It was written by the head of the 117th Moscow border detachment, retired colonel Vasily Kirillovich Masyuk.


If you are the commander's wife


Much has been said and written about the hostilities at the 12th outpost named after 25 Heroes. It would be unfair on my part if I do not tell about the heroic events that are associated with the defense of the 11th outpost. Journalists have already written a lot about this, documentaries have been released, and yet I want to share my memories of how and what really happened.

The background to these events is as follows.

At the beginning of May 1994, the situation in the detachment's sector continued to remain rather complicated and tense. Assessing the situation and making a decision for the spring-summer period of guarding and defending the border, it was envisaged to evacuate wives and children from the outposts to the garrison of the border detachment.

There, all the conditions for living were prepared by the rear, and the children had the opportunity to go to kindergarten and study at school. The command of the detachment came to the general conclusion that this measure was correct and timely. Neither I nor the command of the detachment as a whole had the right to risk women and children.

One day in May, I personally took the wife of the chief of the 11th outpost Dmitry Busurin - Irina to the detachment. They were a wonderful couple, they found each other in this hard times. Embraced by strong love, they tied their feelings in marriage for the rest of their lives. I and the entire officers' meeting of the detachment were at the wedding and rejoiced in their happiness.

Irina is from the cohort of those officers' wives who follow her husband like a thread by a needle. Behind her external softness and smile, she felt will and character. And this character manifested itself in her. Knowing about my ban, Irina with the column left without permission to the 10th outpost.


I was informed about this, called her on the phone, explained the situation and asked not to do anything stupid, to stay at the 10th outpost and return to the detachment on the first side. The commander of the 10th outpost, Captain O. Polyakov, was ordered by order to not send her to the outpost to her husband.

On May 27, Busurin arrived at the 10th outpost to clarify the issues of interaction, reception and escort to his outpost of the second company of the 3rd MRB from the 149th MRR, which was going to replace the first MRR. After engineering reconnaissance of the road and the terrain, and with air cover with two MI-24s, the company entered the combat mission assigned to it in the general system of protection and defense of the 11th outpost area.

In a word, he took her away, and she, being pregnant with a small child, was again at the outpost.

What was it on his part? How to explain his act?

This was personal, of course, but the fact was that he had neglected their safety.

Film director Alexander Sokurov at that time was at the outpost and filmed his philosophical and psychological film about the behavior, life and way of border guards and motorized riflemen in a situation of extreme combat conditions. In his film, there are also shots of Irina with her little daughter.

From outpost to outpost


The situation was getting more complicated and aggravated by the fact that provocations and shelling of the Berkut post did not stop at the junction of the Moscow and Pyanj POGOs from May 26 to May 27.

At that time, my deputy lieutenant colonel V.N. Chebaev, who, together with the commandant of the "Parkhar" border commandant's office, Colonel V.G. The Pletnevs deployed a PPU at the junction of the 1st and 1nd outposts. We met a reinforcement unit from the 2th MRP as part of the 149th motorized rifle company on the BMP-5, reinforced by the D-2 artillery platoon, and took additional measures to cover the butt direction from the Kamsalyk stronghold to the Berkut runway.

On May 27 at 07:30 I arrived at the border crossing point at the junction of the 1st and 2nd outposts, where I heard reports from Colonel V.G. Pletnev and Lieutenant Colonel V.N. Chebayev and checked the fulfillment of the tasks previously set by him. At the same time, I conducted a training session with introductory training. He clarified the plan for the defense and effective engagement of the enemy, the organization of interaction and communications.


We moved to the post "Berkut".

The feeling of anxiety and anxiety never left me. My head was constantly spinning: the 11th outpost and the situation that developed around it.

I shared my thoughts with Valery Gavrilovich and Viktor Nikolaevich, after which I gave the command to the signalman to go to the detachment's command station and connect me with the NSh, Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Stratonov.

After listening to his report, I asked the question:
“Valery Alexandrovich! When was the last report of Major Politikov (senior staff officer) and the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant Busurin, on the situation and acceptance of the support unit from the 149th MRR? "

Hearing that the report had not yet arrived, I ordered to urgently connect me with the 11th outpost.

The communications officer reported that the outpost commander was not present, and he was at the 10th outpost. I gave the command to connect me to the 10th outpost and listened to the report of Captain Polyakov. The head of the outpost confidently and intelligently reported the situation to me.

He and Busurin worked out the issues of interaction. He carried out the acceptance of the personnel of the reinforcement unit from the 149th MRP and is currently on the march. He scolded Polyakov that he could not convince Busurin not to take his wife with him.

It became obvious that the order not to take his wife had not been fulfilled by him. After talking with Polyakov, he gave the command to connect me with the head of the intelligence department, Major V.P. Sokol, who reported on the activation of militants and mujahideen on the air.

It was alarming that in the last forty minutes their activity on the air stopped, and there is complete silence. From experience, this did not bode well, which means you need to be prepared for serious troubles and an active phase of hostilities.

After clarifying and setting the tasks for reconnaissance, it was necessary, in the shortest possible time, to orient and assign combat missions to the headquarters and commanders of the units of the first line to conduct hostilities.

There was little time, and for the convenience of control, I decided to move to the deployed PPU located at the 10th outpost. I set a task for the chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Stratonov send an MI-8 helicopter after me.


I said goodbye to Valery Gavrilovich and Viktor Nikolaevich and flew to the 10th outpost, where, upon arrival, he held an operational meeting, heard the reports of the deputies. Made a decision and reported it to the commander of the GPV of the Federal Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan, Lieutenant General A.T. Chechulin, which he approved.

Two hours later, the chief of staff of the group, Major General A.I. Novikov, who held an operational meeting to hear all officials at the PPU. All activities were carried out accurately and on time. Everything depended on the nature of the enemy's actions, but the grouping of forces and assets was ready for any scenario.

It happened at the 11th outpost


At the 11th outpost there were 215 personnel. This, together with reinforcement units from the DShMG, MSR (without one motorized rifle platoon), three tank T-72, five BTR-70, six BMP-2 and two mortar platoons of 120 and 82 mm mortars.

The next day, at 11:40, the enemy subjected the outpost to massive shelling and began crossing in two directions. First: up to 80 people on the left flank of the outpost section (an old cable car crossing 3 km from the POGZ), and on the PF - up to 50 people, who immediately ran into minefields and came under direct fire from the BMP-2 cannons and mortars.

The convenient and hidden location of temporary border posts and outposts made it possible to control and correct artillery fire. Battery BM-21 "Grad" from the 10th outpost was carried out an area fire raid on the scouts in the area of ​​the cable car.

The threat of the enemy's flank coverage of the outpost and access to the Bay Garden area were thwarted.

Local hostilities continued until 20:15. Direct fire of the T-72 destroyed the NP and enemy fire spotters.

Through the communication channels through Khamza, I protested to field commander Gafur and set out a demand for the immediate termination of the use of the territory under their control by the UTO militants, which endangered the lives of the Anzhiz village residents.

On May 29, from 15:30 to 17:15, after aerial reconnaissance and RBU, an assault force was landed on the detected targets for the final destruction of the remaining manpower on our territory in the Shpilyau tract.

The enemy did not reach the surprise factor. The outpost was in the stronghold, at the commanding heights were exposed and equipped with three PBO "Don-1", "Don-2", "Don-3". The Shpilyau tract was covered by a platoon on an infantry fighting vehicle and a mortar platoon. During the battle, senior sergeant V. Ivanov was killed and six border guards were wounded.

Irina Busurina showed the best qualities of a commander's wife during the battle. Being in position, having a little daughter in her arms, she bandaged the wounded and looked after them, was an example of self-control and self-control. She was awarded the medal "For Courage".


During the hostilities, he once again noted with a kind word the work of the detachment's signalmen. The task I set for the organization of wire communication in the unit detachment - WFP - PBO - Outpost - support unit from the 149th MRR, commandant's office and UPOGO was completed in a timely manner and efficiently, which ensured stable and uninterrupted control of battle formations during the battle.

The most important thing is that the presence of wire communications throughout the sector made it possible to covertly conduct control and set combat missions. The headquarters of the detachment organized and carried out colossal work by signalmen on laying wire communication lines, and by military engineers on engineering equipment of the terrain and mining dangerous areas.

Beyond politics?


The command and personnel of the Moscow border detachment, solving complex service and combat tasks, did not engage in politics, we accurately and on time carried out the orders of the leadership of the Federal Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation and the commander of the RF GPV in the Republic of Tatarstan, which was a pledge and guarantor of the successful solution of the assigned tasks in the entrusted area.


Photo: Sergey Evlanov

We had no right, by definition, to bow our heads one way or the other and take any of the positions, since we clearly understood that it could be easily lost overnight.

But politics is politics. And, as they say, if you do not engage in politics, then politics will take care of you.

Here is just one of the typical examples to support my words.

Once, the commander of the 201st MRR, Major General Mukhriddin Ashurovich Ashurov, during a telephone conversation inquired about the situation and clarified the main issues of interaction with the 149th MRR. Are there any questions and comments to the commanders of reinforcement units who were on a mission for their combat mission with border outposts?

I brought him the conclusions from the situation, clarified where and at which outposts the support units from the 149th MRR are located. Concluding the conversation, he asked not to be disconnected, since one of the leaders of the UTO Said Abdullo Nuri wants to talk to me now.

From the first seconds of the conversation with me, Nuri switched to a raised tone, began to shout, threaten and insult. I did not listen to him further and asked to pass the phone to the general.

Then he asked the question:

“Comrade General! Who are you? Why is the leader of the armed opposition in your office? What is he doing with you? You are out of politics, right? Instead of discussing the issues of strengthening border units, have you stooped to providing communication channels so that I am a Russian border commander to listen to threats against me?
I am extremely surprised and annoyed by your action and have to report this fact to the commander of the Group, Major General V.F. Gritsan. Let him figure it out with you, General. "

Subsequently, he did so. It was a hard time. I clearly understood that Mukhriddin Ashurovich, a Tajik, was doubly uneasy.

Politics and chaos broke people and made them hostage to the situation.

Nevertheless, I did not want to understand this, since I had the fate of the entrusted section of the Tajik-Afghan border, the officers and warrant officers with their families, who stood firmly, guarded and defended this bleeding line for the benefit of peace and tranquility in Tajikistan.

To be continued ...
Author:
Photos used:
from the archives of the authors
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  1. d4rkmesa
    d4rkmesa 23 December 2021 19: 29
    +1
    Hmm, the story is very informative, thank you. It's funny that Nuri was then presented as a kind of "dove of peace". Judging by the fact of incontinence, he was stupid and ardent, a typical Islamist.
  2. your vsr 66-67
    your vsr 66-67 23 December 2021 20: 25
    0
    Thank you!!! I did not know such details! Thanks again to the author!
  3. svoit
    svoit 24 December 2021 08: 12
    0
    ... Everything depended on the nature of the enemy's actions.
    that is, it was not yet possible to act in anticipation and dictate your will to the enemy? That is, even the commanders of the tactical echelon were not free to make a decision?
  4. faterdom
    faterdom 24 December 2021 22: 31
    0
    Those were the times ...
    The leader of the opposition was visiting the 201st division commander, Rabbani flew to Kulyab from Kabul, met with someone, in my opinion, with Rakhmonov.
    Who is where and who is with whom ...
    One Masud was sitting in his Panjshir, selling rubies ...
    Taliban? They appeared later, for myself I can reliably remember this word in 1998.
  5. X
    X 27 December 2021 20: 35
    0
    October 92 .. We are going with the guys along Kulyab from the regiment towards the pilaf market to eat. There are 6 of us, all the second year of service .. in armored vehicles, with machine guns .. towards the Afghans, about the same .. adult men in their characteristic robes, hats, with bleached AKM .. we, ect, did not expect to see them, they, probably they didn’t expect to see us .. (and we were brought from Termez yesterday on turntables) .. the shock has passed, we catch the bacha, we ask 'who is this?' .. he answers - the Afghans ... we: what are they doing here (read in the Soviet Union) ??? The border is like 'locked' and so on ??? bacha: they help us with the 'vovchiks' to fight .. they are our brothers .. and the border? - everything is fine there .. then the captain Marudin said that without his permission no one will come to our side ..))) about 10 months in Tajik you can write a book .. it will be fascinating reading)))