The difficult future of Russian attack UAVs
The rapid development of military UAVs around the world over and over again raises a natural question - why is Russia so far behind, both in the field of their design and production?
In most cases, the main reason for this is the inert thinking of the military and engineers, however, it is impossible to completely agree with such a formulation of the question - although the indicated reasons certainly have a place to be. But one of the most important and completely unreported problems lies in a completely different plane - the technical one.
And today we propose to find out why.
Imported components
We need to start our conversation today with the fact that not all elements of the Russian high-tech weapons are Russian in the full sense of the word - its main components in the form of microelectronics and computers are produced in the United States and its allied countries.
This is not classified information: for example, in the article "Engineering on the verge of extinction" from the publication "Military Industrial Courier" you can read data that Bulava ballistic missiles use chips from the Latvian production association "Alpha", and on the frames of the studio's documentary Russia Today "K-433 Svyatoy Georgiy Pobedonosets: Nuclear Triad Workhorse", dedicated to domestic nuclear submarines, you can see American FPGA chips from Atmel and Altera (frames in the film - at 7:20 and 7:38). According to the available data, drones (and in general, with all areas of the defense industry) the situation is absolutely similar - the possibility of their production directly depends on the purchase of imported parts abroad.
Here is what the Primakov Institute of IMEMO RAS "Military-Economic Development and Security, 2020" writes about this:
It goes without saying that one cannot talk about free legal purchases of microelectronics for the Russian military-industrial complex - since the days of the Soviet Union, semiconductors have been a technology of strategic importance and cannot be sold to Moscow.
Perhaps the reader remembers a number of scandals related to the industrial espionage of the Russian Federation on the territory of the United States from 2008 to 2012, when the FBI regularly reported on the arrests of dozens of Russian citizens who were accused of illegally purchasing large consignments of various high-tech products. Be that as it may, Russia was able to organize the supply of Western microelectronics in sufficient quantities to carry out a large-scale modernization of the armed forces.
But roughly in 2015–2016, this process began to stop for no seemingly obvious reason.
This trend was clearly manifested, including in the design and production of UAVs - and this was by no means an accident.
In 2014, the NATO bloc carried out a number of covert operations on the territory of Ukraine and then Syria. The US Special Operations Forces, the Royal Marines commandos and the British Special Air Force created a number of task forces to capture high-tech samples from the Russian military-industrial complex - with special priority given to UAVs.
Reportedly, at least 3 military drones RF Armed Forces: 9 - on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and 11 - on the territory of eastern Ukraine.
The exported samples were carefully studied, and information on their components was transferred to a number of analytical centers - as you know, at least three think tanks conducted research on this topic only in the interests of the UN.
All operations were started with an extremely prosaic goal: their task was to track the supply chains of technologies to Russia (for which, in fact, the components were investigated) - and, accordingly, their further suppression.
Of course, at the moment it is difficult to give an unambiguous assessment of the results of the activities of the United States and its allied countries, given the closed nature of both the structures of the Russian defense industry and the Ministry of Defense. Let's face it, it is simply impossible to find out specific details by legal means.
But the facts speak for themselves: work in the development of unmanned aviation for some reason, they are experiencing a serious crisis, which equally applies to the development of high-precision weapons (which should be discussed separately), and may well be related to the lack of microelectronics - it is probably the blocked access to procurement channels that makes itself felt in this way.
The information below is not a military / state secret and is taken from the report "Weapons of the war in Ukraine" prepared by the British investigative organization "Conflict armament research" for the UN. Below you can see the list of imported components in Russian military UAVs given there.
UAV "Outpost"
UAV "Forpost":
1. Single-cylinder 3W-55i engine of the German company 3W-Modellmotoren Weinhold GmbH.
2. The Spartan XC3550 user programmable gate array of the American company Xilinx.
3. Elements of the fuel system from the Irish company Tillotson.
4. GPS antenna of the American company Antcom.
5. Navigation modules of the Swiss manufacturer MicroEM.
6. Dynamic measuring unit (DMU02 or DMU10 - depending on the UAV year of manufacture), manufactured by the British company Silicon Sensing Systems.
7. RF module 9XTend 900 MHz, manufactured by the American company Digi International.
8. Network controller iEthernet W5300, manufactured by the Korean company WIZnet.
9. GNSS receiver NV08C-CSM of the American company NVS Technologies AG.
UAV "Eleron"
UAV "Eleron":
1-bit microcontroller from the Swiss manufacturer STMicroelectronics.
2. The main photographic equipment Sony FCB-EX11DP manufactured by the Japanese company Sony.
3. Auxiliary photographic equipment Olympus Stylus TG-860 manufactured by the Japanese company Olympus.
UAV "Granat"
UAV "Granat":
1. Photo equipment of the Japanese company Canon.
2. Electronic components manufactured by the American companies Intel Corporation and Pulse Electronics.
3. Battery of the American company MaxAmps.
4. The engine is produced by the Czech company Model Motors.
UAV "Zastava":
UAV "Zastava":
1. Electronic components of Israeli defense companies Elbit Systems and Data Links.
2. Electronic components of the American corporation Vweb.
3. Engine of the German company Hacker Motor.
4. Autopilot AP04M of the Spanish company UAV Navigation.
5. GPS-module of the Swiss company u-blox.
UAV "Orlan-10"
UAV "Orlan-10":
1. GPS tracker: chips marked HC4060 2H7A201 and STC 12LE5A32S2 35i are made in China.
2. Starter-generator PTN78020 manufactured by the American company Texas Instruments Incorporated.
3. Internal combustion engine with ignition module (photos 1 and 2) 4,8-9V, 500mA manufactured by the Japanese company SAITO.
4. The flight controller is assembled on the basis of the STM32F103 QFP100 microcircuit of the French-Italian manufacturer STMicroelectronics. The MPXA4115A and MPXV5004DP microcircuits of the American company Freescale Semiconductor (currently owned by the Dutch NXP Semiconductors NV) are used as pressure sensors. The HMC6352 compass sensor was manufactured by the American company Honeywell.
5. The GPS module is based on the GLONASS / GPS / QZSS LEA-6N receiver of the Swiss company u-blox paired with the Russian MNP-M7 (built on the American ADSP-BF534 chip manufactured by Analog Devices).
6. The telemetry transmission module is based on the ATxmega256A3 microcontroller of the American company Microchip, the transmission range is 902-928 MHz. The RF3110 transmitter is manufactured by the German company Municom. Receiver DP1205-C915 manufactured by the German company AnyLink.
Disassembled Russian UAV Orlan-10. One of the vehicles of this type was raised by British combat swimmers in the Caspian Sea within XNUMX hours after the crash. Photo source: Conflict Armament Research
Judging by the picture presented, Russian UAVs are assembled mainly on the basis of civilian components. Perhaps this is the reason for their rapid wear with regular use and relatively low reliability, as a result of which a large number of vehicles were captured, both in Syria, and in Ukraine, and even in the Baltic states. It was stated that most of the vehicles that fell into the hands of NATO experts were wrecked for technical reasons.
Do people in Russia understand the meaning of the concept of attack drones?
Analyzing the situation with Russian drones, few people touch on the topic, which is the main obstacle, both for their export sales and for their introduction into the Russian Armed Forces - namely, the topic of lack of weapons.
Dear reader will probably be surprised - what kind of lack of weapons are we talking about, if, say, "Orion" (today we will talk about it, since this UAV is presented as the device most ready for mass production) produced demonstration launches demonstrated by the media ?
But, as is the case with the components of Russian drones, the situation is far from being as straightforward as it seems.
To begin with, the Russian military industry has not come close to creating analogs of the American guided missile Hellfire or, say, Turkish gliding bombs of the MAM family. When, after the events in Syria, Libya and Karabakh, it was urgently required to demonstrate any success in the creation of Russian-made strike drones, the defense industry was able to issue only a design that raises very big questions - the Orion was attached ... the Kornet anti-tank complex ( with a launch container).
This solution can in no way be called adequate (if only because the ATGM tube affects the aerodynamics of the drone, and it also simply weighs a lot, which is completely unacceptable in the case of the Orion with its low carrying capacity), and it is probably was originally seen only as temporary.
The difficulty lies in the fact that the Russian defense industry simply has nothing to replace the Kornet with something else, but the Russian Federation also cannot ignore the growing world market for attack UAVs.
The solution was found, and it turned out to be no better than the previous one.
At Dubai Airshow-2021 in the UAE, Russia demonstrated a model of the Orion with ... a helicopter ATGM Vikhr-M.
What is the disadvantage of this solution?
"Whirlwind" was created for the specific tactics of attack helicopters and has a number of features that are completely useless in the context of the tactics of attack UAVs. This is a high-quality, but very expensive weapon, which, moreover, has a very large mass - for example, the Orion will be able to lift no more than two such missiles.
What are two anti-tank missiles on an attack UAV in 2021?
This is a ridiculous and ridiculous result even against the background of the very first modifications of the American MQ-1 Predator mod. 1994 of the year.
The lack of adequate weapons on the Orion completely kills the whole essence of the well-established concept of using attack drones. The more missiles on your UAV, the longer your ground units have a "flying battery" over their heads, which can hover in the sky for hours, waiting for new targets.
In the case of active hostilities, this is a critical factor: imagine, for example, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, but adjusted for the 2-3 times reduced effectiveness of Azerbaijani UAVs. I think the reader understands perfectly well that in such a scenario, the pace of advancement of the Azerbaijani units could significantly decrease, and their losses due to the lack of air support could increase.
Namely, such results would be provided by the Russian Orion, if it were in the place of Turkish and Israeli attack drones - because its ridiculous combat load would not allow organizing full-fledged air support for ground forces.
Doesn't look too optimistic, does it?
Separately, it is worth talking about another know-how of the Russian defense industry in the form of unguided bombs on MALE class drones.
Talking about a certain "economy" of such a solution, Russian gunsmiths demonstrate a complete lack of understanding of the very essence of the concept of an attack UAV.
What is it, if you explain the concept in the most accessible language?
UAV is a device with the cost of a flight hour of a piston attack aircraft of the Second World War and the combat effectiveness of an Apache attack helicopter, while invulnerable to the most common air defense systems (for example, MANPADS or MZA). This is achieved largely precisely due to controlled weapons. Armament for a drone is such an integral part of its complete set as the "sniper rifle - cartridge - optics" complex.
What is the main problem of using aerial bombs on an attack UAV?
It cannot take heavy ammunition due to its low carrying capacity, and in the case of operation with light (100-150 kg), for acceptable bombing accuracy, the drone will have to work from low altitudes, entering the engagement zone of any, even the most primitive air defense systems - and taking into account its low speed characteristics and poor maneuverability (well, they are not designed to play the role of IL-2!) losses in the event of their collisions, even with a low-tech enemy, can be extremely high. The enemy, more organized and well-equipped, will be able to eliminate Russian UAVs as a threat factor, simply exterminating them in a fairly short time.
What kind of savings are we talking about if on each departure it is planned to deliberately expose a machine worth millions of dollars for almost inevitable destruction or damage?
It is worth asking another reasonable question - against which hypothetical adversary (and, accordingly, for which potential buyer) such aircraft are made, obviously inferior to absolutely all competitors in the world arms market?
In battles with the regular army, they will be practically useless (again, imagine the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, but with the Orions, which either carry a scattering of light bombs, or two Vortexes each), and in clashes with insurgent formations they do not carry any economic benefits: when using air bombs, "Orion" can be destroyed even with the help of ZPU-4, and in the case of using "Kornet" and "Vortex", the UAV will need to be constantly returned to the base to replenish the stock of missiles (which, we recall, he will have two pieces), which in general will negatively affect their support for ground forces - and, of course, throughout the entire course of hostilities.
Summarizing
Summing up, we can say that neither the essence of the concept, nor tactics, nor as such the value of strike UAVs in Russia has yet been realized and understood - and all current practical developments are more than vivid evidence of this.
Without the development of appropriate high-precision weapon systems, no strike UAVs in Russia are possible, both as part of the RF Armed Forces and for export deliveries - with the exception of propaganda videos and headlines of high-profile articles about “Bayraktar killers”.
- Andrey Voskresensky (Anzhey V.)
- Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Conflict Armament Research
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