Versus. Javelin and Bayraktar against T-72
Recently, so many opinions have been poured out regarding how dangerous and omnipotent are the Javelin ATGM and the Bayraktar UAV, mainly coming from Ukraine, that we decided to give out our vision of this issue, especially since one of us is really a specialist in the field of application tanks, and the second one understands a little how to get somewhere with a rocket.
So, are the newfangled Bayraktar and Javelin so dangerous for Russian tanks?
"Bayraktar"
Photo: armyinform.com.ua
О drones we will talk separately. Now we just note that strike UAVs have been used for a long time, however, there has been no particular success. For example, you can take the same Libya last year. There, "Bayraktars" were used, they seemed to hit targets, however, the losses were more than impressive.
If you look at the practice of using "Bayraktars", then there is nothing new in it. UAVs are very effective against weakly armed forces such as Kurdish formations. In Libya and Syria, there were losses, despite the use of Turkish electronic warfare systems. As soon as they began to use serious air defense systems (like the same "Buk"), and "Bayraktars fell to the ground quite normally.
As for the modern battle with the use of tanks, it is worth remembering that each tank regiment includes an air defense division, which is armed with Strela-10 air defense missile systems and Tunguska air defense systems.
Strela-10 is a fairly old complex, created back in the 80s of the last century, but has undergone several stage-by-stage modernizations.
Photo: mil.ru
As a result of the modernization of the "Strela-10M4" and "Strela-10MN" complexes, they are quite capable of working on such targets as UAVs. And the new 9M333 rocket is quite suitable for solving such problems.
As for the "Tunguska" (meaning the modernized "Tunguska-M1" 2K22M1), then this machine, which already earned trust and respect, was modernized specifically for the fight against UAVs.
Not only the detection and tracking systems were modernized, but also the 9M311-1M missile. Overall, the Tunguska has become an even bigger problem for the UAV. And if you remember that ZRAK can fire on the move ... Yes, only from the barrels, but nevertheless. Although launching missiles from a short stop is also not very pleasant for the purposes.
And one more aspect. The maximum flight range of the UMTAS ATGM is 8 km. The Tunguska's defeat range is 10 km. That is, 2 kilometers "Bayraktar" will have to fly in the coverage area of our ZRAK. And these 2 km drone will fly at a speed of no more than 120 km / h. It simply cannot be faster with a combat load. These two kilometers difference, the UAV will fly in just one minute. Is it a lot or a little in battle? There are many in battle. And for a good operator, too, enough to point the missiles and fire.
In general, we repeat the message that an attack UAV is good only where nothing can be opposed to it, except for a small weapons and binoculars. Where the presence of a full-fledged air defense begins, UAVs end.
Yes, it's expensive to shoot full-fledged missiles at an aircraft armed with 2-4 ATGMs. But it's worth it.
Plus, if we are talking about full-fledged military operations, then no one canceled a preemptive strike on the sites of probable basing of UAVs and control points. As no one canceled the strengthening of the ATR of tank units with the same modernized "Shilki".
"Bayraktar" can be an effective anti-tank weapon, but it will be effective only in the absence of opposition. The presence of the enemy's air defense and electronic warfare systems significantly (if not completely) negates the entire effectiveness of an unobtrusive tank hunter.
Here you can also mention one more "roof-boy" on the battlefield.
Helicopter
A helicopter differs from a UAV only in that it is more tenacious, less noticeable, takes more weapons, and in case of defeat, more money falls to the ground. And everything given for the UAV is also true for the helicopter, plus the helicopter has another terrible enemy - aviation.
It will be somewhat difficult for the pilot to detect and attack the UAV, but the helicopter ...
And now we turn to the ATGM, specifically to the Javelin.
Javelin
Photo: 7th Army Training Command / flickr.com
A very serious opponent. It has infrared action, but with such nuances that conventional countermeasures cannot be applied here. The Javelin missile will simply ignore the "Bonfire" and, in general, any infrared trap.
The matrix, that is, something like a photo of the target, which is taken before the shot, allows the rocket not to be distracted by false targets. That is, the operator, before firing, shows the rocket who needs to be hit. The rocket understands and on the fly continues, as it were, to take pictures of the target and compare with what it was shown.
Ideal, of course, is to simply blind the rocket with the flash of the trap, but that is what it is, ideal. It is very difficult to deceive the Javelin. But you can protect yourself from it by blinding.
Yes, it is difficult to blind the homing head with a bright flash of a trap, but this is only one of the options. You can detect the lenses (and they are large for the Javelin) and the launching activity (either the starting pyro-charge, or the rocket entering the working trajectory, it doesn't matter) and react by firing grenades with smoke. Oddly enough, the good old 3D17 smoke grenades from the Shtora-1 protection complex very well close the visibility in the range up to 0,7-1,4 microns, that is, where the Javelina seeker is looking.
The advantage of the Javelin is that it has a separate launch, like a naval ICBM.
First, the expelling charge ejects the rocket from the launch container, and then the main engine is started.
At the start, the rocket is not fast, this is understandable. And at the finish line, when maneuvering and descending from the trajectory, the speed drops to 100 m / s.
The path of 2000 meters for a rocket takes about 16-17 seconds, which, in principle, is enough to respond to a launch in a "manual" mode.
And since 2013, the Javelins have been equipped with a laser rangefinder, so that in the case of a newer missile, the Shtora itself will work automatically, having caught the laser irradiation with its sensors. And he will smoke from the heart ...
But there are also more thoughtful suspensions. Aerosols containing aluminosilicate microspheres coated with aluminum and filled with hydrogen are an excellent means of combating HOS. Such a suspension (the balls filled with hydrogen are able to hang in the air for 5-7 minutes) for a long time closes the tank from the "gaze" of the seeker in the infrared range.
And this masterpiece is inexpensive: 1 kg of such balls costs about $ 100, and it is enough to completely hide the tank in the infrared range.
The main thing is to detect a missile launch. If aiming is in the optical range, it is, of course, difficult, but not impossible. If lasers are used, then everything is much easier.
In addition, the Javelin with its, so to speak, rather large lenses, is very easily detected from a distance of 2-3 kilometers by such a complex as the Russian Antisniper. Then just a shot from any large-caliber rifle, and 70% of the job is done. Considering that "Antisniper" is already included in the standard set of the ASVK sniper rifle, there is not much to talk about.
The Javelin appeared a long time ago. It entered service in the United States in 1996. Almost 30 years ago. So what? And nothing. No one rushed urgently-quickly-immediately-tired of the day before to develop means of protection against the Javelin. Because they considered and decided that there was no point in weakening the forehead and sides for the sake of the roof.
Yes, over the 25 years of its use, Javelin has somewhat changed the statistics. Slowly, but the work on counteraction began. The Americans invented MUSS, we developed the Afganit. Very beautiful and promising systems with great potential for development.
But - insanely expensive. The Germans put MUSS one by one on the new Leopards and Cougars on rare occasions. "Afghanit" seems to be on the "Armata", but everyone knows how many of them we have and what is the prospect of increasing the number of these tanks in the Russian army.
Few people talk about this, but Javelin has another very big drawback. Even two. The first is the very high cost. A set of launchers, a control unit and 6 missiles "for our own" (US Army and ILC) starts at $ 600, and for export - from $ 1,2 million. It is very expensive.
But the second part is the complexity of the preparation. The Javelin is a very complex weapon and requires (this is noted openly) special training of operators. It is impossible to take a person out of order, hand him the Javelin and send him into battle. Not that technical level, it's still not an RPG-7, and working with an RPG requires practice.
Practice with Javelin is also very expensive. Therefore, each operator will cost any army a pretty penny. Or the hryvnia, since it all started with the fact that the Ukrainians were so delighted with the Javelins that they thought they knew what.
Let's get some numbers?
At the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as many as 47 launchers and 210 missiles. They will receive another 150 missiles in the near future. It's a lot? It's a lot. If applied with intelligence and well-established interaction. Are the APUs different in this? Unfortunately no.
Correctly concentrated Javelins in sufficient numbers can disrupt any offensive operation involving tanks. Javelins in the hands of untrained and disorganized fighters will remain a scarecrow for the press.
A question of price and time. In general, as you know, Über weapons do not exist. Within the framework of international conventions, of course.
Although our tank expert highly appreciates the effectiveness of such a product as the 9M55K1 missile for the Smerch MLRS. This is a missile with a 9N142 cluster warhead with self-aiming submunitions. The cassette warhead carries 5 SPBE "Motiv-3M" equipped with dual-band infrared coordinators looking for a target at an angle of 30 degrees.
Each of the elements is capable of penetrating 30 mm armor from a height of 100 meters at an angle of 70 degrees. Suitable for use in open areas, in the steppe and desert, almost impossible to use in the forest, difficult to use in the city.
From an expert point of view, the Motiv-3M is much more terrible than the Javelin, since it is very difficult to track the Smerch salvo due to the range, and the power of the combat elements is sufficient to inflict critical damage on the tank.
What else can you say about the tank as one of the central figures in our story?
Tank
The tank was, is and will be the main striking force of the ground army. A tank is an armor for the infantry and a good cannon for the enemy. The tank and the infantryman are battle brothers and one without the other will never be a full-fledged combat force.
Accordingly, all advanced countries developing weapons pay attention to exactly how to destroy the tank. Because the tank is the main striking force. "Bayraktars", "Apaches", "Tou", "Javelins" are means of fighting the striking force. In fact - defensive weapons.
But the tank also needs to be protected from defensive weapons. And there is a lot of math here. The main task is precisely to calculate the impacts from which it is necessary to protect the tank in the first place.
Until now, it was believed that the main directions in which damage would be inflicted on the tank were the forehead and sides. Indeed, almost all of the enemy's fire is directed here. Of course, tanks are destroyed from the stern, from above, and from the bottom. But in percentage terms, these losses are not as great as the losses from damage inflicted in the frontal and lateral projections.
Mathematics is a science that is difficult to argue with. After each war, the statisticians sat down and began to count how tanks were destroyed. This is a normal practice, which determined the further development of tank building in all normal countries.
Yes, the eternal competition of armor and projectile. That exists thanks to mathematics and calculations and calculations. A cumulative projectile appeared - dynamic protection appeared. A tandem ammunition appeared - there was an internal built-in protection against it. It is clear that endlessly increasing the thickness of the armor is unrealistic and pointless. But the competition goes on, and so far the armor is winning. Equipped with active protection complexes.
Small percentage of defeats in the bottom, roof and rear played a role in the armor of tanks. The only ones who dealt with issues of protection from above are us. There was experience of installation on the tower DZ "Contact-1", and with such protection, very decent results were shown. In Chechnya. But this was not protection from the "roof-breaker", again. But it so happened that this defense very well kept a shot from the RPG-7 from the roof of the house into the tank turret below.
The T-72B3 has a bare roof again.
The emerging "roof-boy" is not a reason to panic, but to start thinking about ways of protection. The Javelin increased the danger of being hit from above, but not critically. Not critical yet.
Time will show how the concept of protecting a tank from attacks from above will develop. Mechanical methods (in the near future these "visors" will be considered), new optical or radio-electronic systems, improvement of active protection, or all at the same time - everything can be. Military engineering, driven by science, will not stand still.
However, it is worth remembering that not the most perfect weapon wins. An integral part is the people who operate this weapon.
By the way, the best example on this topic is the use of the same "Bayraktar" by the Azerbaijani army in the conflict with Armenia. The competent use of technique with the right tactics performed by trained people - and yes, the effect was very, very good.
The same is true for any type of weapon. It is possible to threaten Russia for a long time with a "miracle weapon" in the form of "Bayraktars" and "Javelins", but in order to win, the Armed Forces of Ukraine must have trained and trained fighters.
And yes, Russia must still come to this war.
But the main idea that we tried to convey to you is that the presence of Bayraktar in hangars and in warehouses of Javelins does not make the Ukrainian army a real army. Likewise, the presence of hundreds of tanks does not make Russia a country capable of conquering all of Europe.
All this requires people. For it is not the bullet that kills, but the man who pulled the trigger. Without a person (or, as an option - without a literate person), any "miracle weapon" is nothing more than a pile of metal.
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