"Fight to the last fighter." The defeat of the 1st German tank army near Rostov

Red Army soldiers in street battles for the liberation of Rostov-on-Don. November 1941

Plans and forces of the parties

For an offensive in the Rostov direction, the German command deployed the 1st tank Kleist's army, consisting of two motorized corps and one army corps, an Italian mobile corps. They included German: 3 tank, 3 motorized, 1 infantry, 2 mountain rifle divisions, 3 Italian and one Slovak motorized divisions. The Germans at that time had complete air supremacy in this sector of the front.

The German Headquarters strove to seize the Caucasus with its oil resources as soon as possible. Therefore, the 1st Tank Army, after reaching Taganrog (Battle of the Sea of ​​Azov) received the task of destroying the Soviet grouping in the Rostov direction, seizing a bridgehead between Rostov and Tsimlyanskaya. Then develop an offensive to the south, capture Maykop and Tuapse. In the spring of 1942, the Nazis planned to occupy the entire Caucasus, reaching the borders of Persia.

The command of Army Group South, in order to avoid heavy fighting on the outskirts of Rostov, where the Russians were clearly expecting an attack, planned to deliver the main blow to Shakhty - Novocherkassk. Break through the front, carry out deep coverage from the northeast, encircle and destroy the main forces of the Southern Front (SF) in the region of Rostov-on-Don, then calmly advance deep into the Caucasus. Part of the forces of the 1st Panzer Army were going to turn north in order to, together with the 17th Army, advancing in the Voroshilovgrad direction, destroy the Soviet forces in the eastern part of Donbass. A massive blow from mobile units was supposed to easily break the enemy's defenses.

The crew of the German ZSU Sd.Kfz.7 / 2 is preparing for battle in Rostov-on-Don

The Germans were opposed by the 9th Army of General Kharitonov, which took up defenses in an area 87 km wide along the line Dmitrievka, Kuibyshevo, Novo-Spasovka, Kryukovka, the eastern bank of the river. Tuzlov to Stoyanov. The 9th Army included the 30th, 150th, 339th, 136th Infantry and 66th Cavalry Divisions, the Novocherkassk Cavalry School, the 2nd and 132nd Tank Brigades (38 tanks in total). The basis of the defense was formed by battalion areas located on river banks, heights, communication centers, approaches to settlements, and the most tank-accessible directions. In the main defense zone, 7-8 km deep, 27 battalion districts were created.

Rostov was directly defended by the Separate 56th Army of Remezov, created on the basis of the troops of the North Caucasian Military District. In mid-November 1941, the army included 5 rifle divisions, 4 cavalry divisions, the Rostov Artillery School, the 6th Tank Brigade (more than 100 tanks). Remezov's army was supposed to hold back the enemy's onslaught, cover the concentration of the front's shock grouping, and prevent the Germans from capturing Rostov and the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Don.

In the meantime, the Soviet command was preparing an offensive operation with the aim of defeating the 1st tank army of the enemy and preventing the breakthrough of the Germans into the Caucasus. The offensive of the enemy army created a favorable situation for an attack on the flank and rear of the enemy in the northern sector of the front. The 37th Army under the command of Lopatin was created from the divisions of the Southwestern and Southern fronts withdrawn to the reserve in the Kamensk region. The 37th Army included 6 rifle divisions. Lopatin's army was supposed to be ready for the task on November 15, 1941.

9th Army holds the blow

By October 27, 1941, the mobile formations of the Germans completed their concentration in front of the leading edge of the 9th Army. On October 29, the Germans started a battle with units of the 30th rifle division of Goncharov. By the end of the 29th, the Nazis broke through the advanced defense of the division and captured Kuibyshevo. Our troops withdrew to the main position. October 30 - November 1, the German 16th Panzer Division of Hube continued the offensive and advanced 7 km, reached the second line of defense, creating conditions for a breakthrough of the main army forces.

On November 5, 1941, the attack group of the 1st Panzer Army began the offensive - the 16th and 14th Panzer Divisions, the 5th Viking Motorized Division, one regiment of the 60th Motorized Division. Using their advantage in forces, the Germans broke through the front on the adjacent flanks of the 136th and 150th Infantry Divisions and advanced 17 km. However, breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops, the Germans suffered significant losses. The battle took on a stubborn character. By order of the front command, the headquarters of the 9th Army formed a strike group and launched a counterstrike at the wedged enemy.

The Germans, having an advantage in the mobility of the troops, outflanked the 136th division, the 150th division was surrounded. By the evening of November 6, the German army advanced another 6 km. Commander Kharitonov decides to withdraw the army to the rear line of defense. On the second line of defense, the withdrawal of the army was covered by units of the 136th division and the 132nd tank brigade, which relied on anti-tank defenses in the Dyakovo area. Until November 9, they repelled the attacks of the German 1st Mountain Rifle and Slovak divisions. Further attempts by the Germans to break through the defenses of the 9th Army were unsuccessful.

Thus, the breakthrough of the 1st Panzer Army in the direction of Shakhty and Novocherkassk failed. In the course of heavy battles and significant losses, the Nazis were able to push the divisions of the 9th Army 35-40 km to the east. But they could not develop tactical success into an operational one. On November 11-16, German divisions advanced another 25 km in the Novocherkassk direction, 15 km in the Shakhty direction, and 10 km in Krasny Sulin. The German 13th Panzer Division, which was delivering an auxiliary blow to Rostov, did not advance at all. On the northern flank of the offensive, in the sector of the Soviet 18th Army, German infantry divisions in 12 battles advanced only 2-10 km.

In the Voroshilovgrad direction, the German 17th Army (4th Army Corps) struck from the Bakhmutka River along the right bank of the river. North. Donets in the general direction to Voroshilovgrad. The Germans wedged 20 km into our defenses in the Artemovsk region. Soviet troops with stubborn defense and counterattacks held back the enemy's onslaught, although the Germans were still able to advance 35 km east. The 12th Army's front was not broken through.

The positions of the Soviet infantry on the outskirts of Rostov-on-Don. 1941 g.

The fall of Rostov

The German command had to abandon a long-range offensive in this direction. The Germans quickly regrouped their forces directly on the Rostov sector, against the 56th Army. The 13th and 14th tank divisions, the 60th motorized division and the SS Adolf Hitler motorized division were aimed at the Rostov direction. The 1st Panzer Army was to take Rostov-on-Don from the northwest. On November 17, 1941, the Germans attacked Rostov.

At the same time, the strike group of the Law Firm, as part of the 37th Army, launched a counteroffensive on the northern flank of Kleist's army. But the German command at first underestimated the enemy and continued the offensive on Rostov. The Germans believed that they would quickly wear down the Soviet troops, and the offensive would stall.

Remezov's 56th Separate Army defended itself in a 75 km wide strip. One division defended a 10-16-kilometer section of the front. However, the line of defense was not prepared in engineering terms. Some divisions were understaffed. The main attack of the enemy was expected on the left flank of the army, where the 343rd and 353rd rifle divisions were stationed. The Germans dealt the main blow on the right flank of the Soviet army, where the guard detachments and the 317th Infantry Division were located. The second echelon housed the weak 31st Infantry Division and the 6th Tank Brigade, which were planned to be used for counterattacks.

On the morning of November 17, German troops delivered the main blow to Generalskoe and Bolshiye Sala. The Nazis quickly hacked into the defenses of Seredkin's 317th Division. Despite the resistance of the brought up units of the 353rd division and the tank brigade, on the second day of the offensive, the Germans expanded and deepened the breakthrough, occupied the Red Crimea. The 31st division, which was on the defensive in an open area, could not stop the enemy's breakthrough. On November 19, German tanks broke through to the northeastern outskirts of Rostov, into the rear of the 56th Army.

Remezov's army received an order to retreat to the line of the Rostov defense region. On November 20, Headquarters ordered Remezov:

“The city of Rostov must be kept under any circumstances. Fight to the last fighter. "

On November 20, stubborn battles were fought on the near approaches to Rostov and its outskirts. German attacks were repulsed by units of the 343rd, 353rd and 31st rifle divisions, the 230th NKVD regiment and the 347th rifle division, which had been moved from the reserve to the northwestern outskirts of the city. The Soviet army suffered heavy losses in personnel and materiel, a lot of artillery, tanks and 3 armored trains were lost. The position of our troops was extremely difficult, the battles were already fought in the city, especially stubborn ones - in the area of ​​the Green Island, where the Germans tried to seize the crossings. On the night of November 21, an order was given to withdraw to the left bank of the Don.

Meanwhile, Soviet troops were able to develop an offensive on the northern wing of the 1st Panzer Army, in the Bolshekrepin direction, hanging over the flank and rear of the German strike group in the Rostov area. Therefore, the Germans could not cross the Don on the move and develop an offensive in the Caucasus. German troops went over to the defense with a front to the north, east and south.

Red Army soldiers waiting for the enemy at the intersection of Osoaviakhim Avenue (modern Chekhov Avenue) and Krasnykh Zor Street in Rostov-on-Don. November 27, 1941

German tanks Pz.Kpfw. III move along the 29th line near mill No. 3 of the Glavmuk trust in Rostov-on-Don. November 1941

German tanks Pz.Kpfw. III move along the street 29th Line in Rostov-on-Don. The frame shows the pontoon bridge leading to Zeleny Island. November 1941

37 Army Offensive

While the troops of the 9th and 56th armies were fighting in the Shakhty and Rostov directions, the Soviet command prepared a counteroffensive.

The troops of the newly formed 37th Army of Lopatin were to defeat the enemy in the Astakhovo, Millerovo, Agrafenovka area and reach the line of the r. Tuzlov, at the second stage - to the r. Mius. The offensive used parts of the forces of the 18th and 9th armies, a cavalry corps (2 divisions). Our troops were supposed to bridge the gap between the 18th and 9th armies, which created a danger for the enemy to break through into the Shakhty industrial region and the most important railway Rostov-Voronezh, and strengthen the position of Rostov.

By the end of November 16, 1941, 4 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades (92 tanks) were concentrated in the initial area for the offensive. On the 17th, after a 30-minute artillery barrage, Soviet troops launched an offensive in the general direction of Bolshekrepinskaya. By evening, our troops, pushing the advanced enemy units, advanced 16-18 km.

But then the 37th Army faced strong resistance from the Viking motorized division and part of the 16th Panzer Division of the Germans. The Nazis skillfully defended themselves and counterattacked. In four days, our troops advanced 18–20 km. Due to bad weather conditions, the Soviet aviation she could not provide active support at this time. On the left flank of the offensive, the 9th Army did not achieve much success, as did the 18th Army on the right flank, meeting strong resistance from the German 49th Mountain Corps.

As a result, at the beginning of the operation, the 37th Army was unable to penetrate the enemy's defenses and only pressed against him. Affected by haste during the preparation of the operation, the lack of mobile units, command errors, poor interaction of the infantry with tanks, artillery and aviation. By November 21, Soviet troops reached the Tsimlyanka, Millerovo and Agrafenovka line. Therefore, the German command at first was not particularly worried about the Soviet counterstrike. He believed that he would be stopped by the available forces, without regrouping the tank army.

Only the introduction of the cavalry corps of General Khorun into battle, reinforced by a tank brigade and an NKVD brigade, and the improvement of the weather, which led to the activation of the Soviet Air Force, led to a turning point in the battle.

The strike group of the Law Firm was able to break the defense of the 16th tank, motorized and 1st mountain rifle divisions and on November 22-23 reached the line of the r. Tuzlov.

Thus, the Rostov group of the Wehrmacht faced the threat of encirclement.

The German command begins to transfer parts of the 13th and 14th tank divisions, heavy artillery to the northern flank, and a Slovak division is sent from the reserve to battle. Only the Adolf Hitler division and a reserve training regiment were left in Rostov. The commander of the 1st Panzer Army, Kleist, covering the most dangerous areas with mobile formations, began to withdraw all other troops.

Soviet intelligence did not detect the withdrawal of enemy tank divisions from Rostov in time. The command of the Law Firm planned to destroy the main forces of the 1st Tank Army in the Rostov region. The commander of the Law Firm decided to first recapture Rostov, and then begin an offensive on the river. Mius and Taganrog. Several days were spent regrouping the front forces. The main forces of the 37th Army and the cavalry corps castled to the left.

The killed Red Army soldiers at the broken Soviet 76-mm gun of the 1939 F-22 USV model in Rostov-on-Don. November 1941

Liberation of Rostov

On November 24, 1941, the Soviet Headquarters set the task of defeating the Rostov group of the Wehrmacht and liberating Rostov. The 9th and 37th armies were advancing from the north, and the 56th Separate Army from the southeast. In the army of Remezov, two groups were formed - eastern and western. The eastern one was headed by General Grechkin, it included the 353rd Infantry, 64th Cavalry Divisions. The group attacked Bolshoi Log, Ordzhonikidze was supposed to break through to the eastern outskirts of Rostov. General Kozlov's group included the 31st rifle, 62nd and 70th cavalry divisions, two rifle brigades. Kozlov's group stormed the western part of the city. Parts of the 343rd and 347th rifle divisions, the Rostov regiment of the people's militia also took part in the attack.

The assault was difficult.

The city was located on the dominant right bank of the Don. The Germans could view and shoot through the battle formations of our divisions to the full depth. The situation was especially difficult on the left flank of the 56th Army, where the river valley and floodplains were completely open to the enemy. The Germans, on the other hand, had the opportunity to place firing positions in convenient places and heights, including dug-in tanks, and equip stone buildings for defense. In addition, the ice on the Don was still thin, which excluded the use of heavy weapons by our troops.

The assault began in the early morning of November 27. The 31st division, which was advancing under enemy fire through open terrain and floodplains, with difficulty and heavy losses reached the Don. On the ice, the Germans fired at our soldiers from machine guns, mortars and tank guns. Therefore, the division was able to break through to the other side only on the night of November 29. Our troops began a battle for the western part of the city, intercepted the Rostov-Taganrog road. At the same time, units of the 9th Army entered Rostov from the north and north-east. Under the threat of encirclement, the Germans began to withdraw.

The main role in the liberation of Rostov was played by the troops of the 347th and 343rd rifle divisions of Davidovsky and Chuvashev with the 230th NKVD regiment Demina attached to them and the Rostov rifle regiment of Varfolomeev's militia. They were able to break through under enemy fire across the Don. In the vanguard, NKVD fighters and militias were advancing, they were the first to break into the city. During three days of fierce fighting, our troops liberated Rostov on November 29.

Meanwhile, the divisions of the 37th army, developing an offensive to the west, crossed Tuzla on the 27th. On December 2, the advanced units of the Soviet army reached the river. Mius. It was not possible to surround at least part of the German Rostov grouping. The Germans, hiding behind strong rearguards, Luftwaffe strikes and using the advantage in mobility, successfully retreated to the Mius line and established themselves there. In addition, the Soviet strike group did not have powerful armored formations to build on the success. The Germans repelled the attempt of the 37th Army to develop an offensive on Taganrog. To strengthen the position of the 1st Panzer Army, the command of Army Group South transferred 4 divisions from Kharkov.

The front has stabilized.

German infantry on the outskirts of Rostov

56th Army in the battles for Rostov

Results

Thus, our troops recaptured Rostov, did not allow the enemy to break through to the Caucasus.

True, due to the slow advance of the JF strike group, the absence of a strong armored group in the second echelon and reserve, and command errors, the motorized corps of the enemy's 1st tank army were not surrounded and destroyed.

However, Army Group South suffered heavy casualties. The commander of Army Group South, Rundstedt, unauthorizedly withdrew his troops to the Mius River, 70 km west of Rostov. Hitler removed him from command and replaced him with Reichenau. Together with the victory near Moscow, which buried the German Typhoon (How Operation Typhoon failed), The Rostov operation finally defeated the German blitzkrieg strategy.

The southward front stabilized for a long time.

The resources of Army Group South were shackled and depleted, which did not allow the German High Command to transfer divisions from the south to the Moscow direction. This helped to defend Moscow in November and conduct a successful counteroffensive in the main (central) strategic direction in December 1941.

“The battle for the southern outskirts of Rostov-on-Don. 1941 g. " - photo signature in the exposition of the Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Troops of the RF Ministry of Defense in the city of St. Petersburg

Comments

[Alex 1970]

Sometimes one gets the impression that part of the material was taken from foreign sources and without much processing was put into the article, as it sounds badly "the Russians were clearly waiting for an attack", "A massive strike of mobile units should have easily broken the enemy's defense.", As if from "the other side" wrote. Although I may be too strict.

[Vladimir61]

Quote: Alexey 1970

Sometimes one gets the impression that part of the material was taken from foreign sources and without any special processing was included in the article, as it sounds badly "the Russians were clearly waiting for the attack"

Well, if you rip out individual words from the text ...

Command of Army Group South to avoid heavy fighting on the outskirts of Rostov, where the Russians were clearly expecting an attack

[Alex 1970]

Does this sound differently? During the Second World War there were Soviet troops, which by the way is also written in the text below.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Alex 1970

Does this sound differently? During the Second World War there were Soviet troops, which by the way is also written in the text below.

I think that "Russians" are quite appropriate here, since the phrase shows a reference to German vocabulary. Well, for example, in his report to GA South headquarters regarding operations in Crimea, Manstein wrote (October 1941):

The army command should expect that русские during the battles for the Crimea, additional forces will be transferred from the Caucasus and from Odessa. There are indications of this. Anyway, русские they would rather leave Odessa than Sevastopol.
In addition, you need to reckon with the garrison of Sevastopol and actions Russian
fleet.

There is not a single epithet "Soviet" in the entire three-page report.
Although, of course, I agree - the Samsonovs' artel, in view of the well-known concern about the "Russian superethnos", often clumsily and out of place substitutes soviet on Russian... This is a known fact

[Daniil Konovalenko]

I think that "Russians" are quite appropriate here, since the phrase shows a reference to German vocabulary.

... Samsonov, tea is not German Or under the "apseudon" Samsonov, the German "avtyr" is hiding?

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Daniil Konovalenko

... Samsonov, the tea is not German. Or is Samsonov hiding under the "apseudon" of the German "avtyr"?

I, frankly, do not care if he is even an Armenian. I say that in the context of this phrase, the epithet "Russians" is appropriate.

[Daniil Konovalenko]

Well, yes, especially since the article from different sources is cobbled together.

[210ox]

Look at the author's name and you will understand everything. Why are the Russian troops "and not the Red Army, the Red Army. He still flies to the topic of the Civil War" Soviet troops. It seems from somewhere copy-paste, without correcting.

[Alex_1973]

Samsonov, he is Samsonov, but the photo for the article is interesting.
The first photo looks like Pushkinskaya street is the very center of the city. The second looks like the intersection of Voroshilovsky Prospect and Sadovaya Street.
By the way, the Germans in earflaps in the second photo, this is some kind of surrealism.

[novel66]

Quote: Alex_1973

, Germans in earflaps in the second photo

they are the smartest, they knew which trophies are more valuable

[volodimer]

I also noticed, but if you take this photo:

There is also a ushanka, a general's one, but a ushanka.
Or this:

So that they also had.
What's interesting is that all the bourgeois earflaps, although they have a similar design, are just clear at a glance that they are not ours. They cannot do them right.

[zenion]

Alexey 1970. This is one of those that are ours and yours. They are a bit stutterers and forget a little for whom they write at all, if only and so on ...

[nikvic46]

Good for the current generation. They will all chew on them. We, boys born right after the war, had to listen to the stories of the front-line soldiers about this, and there were stories not only about glorious deeds, but sometimes completely opposite ones. It is difficult to write about the past war. But every time it is necessary to emphasize why some height, a railway junction were important for the country, otherwise other hacks will write something that makes you sick.

[Vladimir61]

Quote: nikvic46

Good for the current generation.

And they, like, are not particularly interested in it. Most have clothes on their minds, iPhones, flash mobs, social networks and more!

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: nikvic46

Good for the current generation. They will all chew on them.

and what, wasn't it "chewed" in Soviet times?
Military Publishing published a six-volume history of the Second World War back in 1965. Plus memoirs and much more.

[nikvic46]

Ashes of Klaas. In 1965 I was already looked after by girls. And then the army for 3 years.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: nikvic46

Ashes of Klaas. In 1965 I was already looked after by girls.

What then do you demand from modern people? They are also interested in the opposite sex much more than history. As for the iPhones - if they were in your time, you would also be interested. But then not everyone had wired telephones.

[nikvic46]

Ashes of Claes. I also read my memoirs. But everything is smoothed out. The stories of the front-line soldiers were such that you cannot mention in any memoirs. Their first toast was that there was no war. A very good toast.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: nikvic46

The first toast they had was that there would be no war, a very good toast.

Listen to you, the front-line soldiers only said that about the war) My grandfather (personnel) from Khalkhin-gol to Vienna went on rare occasions, on Victory Day or at veteran meetings. The rest of the time he did not remember the war and did not raise any toasts to peace. He also did not like "public veterancy" with constant dragging around schools, he himself did not participate in it, because he said - "they compose."

[petrakimov]

Agree. I am 53 years old. And they asked me the question: "Why did our people defend Stalingrad so stubbornly? There are only ruins left, who needed them?" And the question was asked to me not by a student, but by a history teacher not so much younger than me. Probably, not all chewed was accepted. Someone spat it out ...

[Ashes of Claes]

Unther in a trophy hat, go. The hat-builders of the Reich only in the winter 42/43 began to plan Aryan earflaps, like)

[Anatole Klim]

In the photo, the dead Red Army men have a broken gun, one Red Army soldier lies without boots in some footcloths, although next to another is a dead Red Army soldier in boots. I don't even know what to think, looting ?, maybe the boots fell off as a result of the explosion, you can't see them lying around. Good article, but the photo somehow didn't go

[boris epstein]

No. Removing shoes from a corpse (even of one of your fighters), picking up food and a flask with alcohol looting was not considered. The Germans, too, did not disdain. This was considered a trophy.

[Olgovich]

During three days of fierce fighting, our troops 29 November freed Rostov

.

The most important victory for the ongoing battle of Moscow at this time.

We could, no matter what.

[Alex 1970]

By the way, the command that led this important operation for some reason in the future did not advance to high command positions. I recently heard about it on the radio. Andrey Svitenko has such a project.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Alexey 1970

Andrey Svitenko has such a project.

one of the few normal people on Vesti FM, untouched by the propaganda mold. You can also listen to Khodarenka, although not Satanovsky talk to him.
This is exclusively my opinion.

[Alex 1970]

I don't listen to everyone there either.

[boris epstein]

The article does not say that the front in that operation was commanded by KE Voroshilov, on whom all the dogs are now hanged, and this is not his only victory in 1941. There was also the defeat of Manstein's mechanized corps near Soltsy in the Leningrad direction.

[Marine engineer]

"The front in that operation was commanded by KE Voroshilov,"

You are mistaken. The commander of the south-western direction was Marshal Timoshenko.

[boris epstein]

Southwest direction, yes, but it included several fronts.

[Marine engineer]

Southwest direction and Southwest front. At the expense of the latter, the 37th army was restored, which went on the offensive. Semyon Konstantinovich struck prudently, unfortunately after Vyazma all reserves went to the Western direction and their own forces were not enough to end Kleist.

[boris epstein]

He commanded the South-West direction, I agree. But the South-Western direction included the South-Western Front and the Southern Front. You forgot, Rostov was liberating the Southern Front. Song of Klavdia Shulzhenko, if you no longer want to look at the map, "Let's smoke:" "... And thaw again on the Southern Front. The snow is melting in Rostov, it is melting in Taganrog ...". Read about the battle of Moscow. The Central Direction included the Kalinin, Western, Southwestern, Bryansk and Reserve fronts. Moreover, in the course of the battle, the fronts were repeatedly united and renamed. For example, the Reserve Front was first united with the Western Front, then the Moscow Reserve Front was created, then it was united with the Southwestern Front, then the Southwestern Moscow Region Front was given the name Bryansk, and the Southwestern Front was named South direction. It's just that modern prejudices take over in you and in some others. Yes, Timoshenko, Budyonny and Voroshilov in 1941 were not brilliant, but no worse than others. The future Marshal of the Soviet Union Eremenko also failed in the fall of 1941, the future twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky lost his mechanized corps in 1941, but for some reason none of you throw stones at them. Large losses and failures of the first period of the Soviet-Finnish war on the account of the future Marshal of the Soviet Union Meretskov, for which he was under investigation. And only then, at the beginning of 1940, SK Timoshenko was appointed by the front and he sorted out the situation - he connected the Baltic Fleet, brought up heavy artillery, and stopped head-on assaults on pillboxes with a population of over one million

[Marine engineer]

".... you and in some others are overwhelmed by modern prejudices."
I wonder on what basis you made such a conclusion?
Based on the fact that they dared to object to you that Marshal KE Voroshilov has nothing to do with the defensive and offensive operations described in the article?
The southern front was commanded by Colonel-General Cherevechenko, but he did not act on his own, but in line with the plan that Timoshenko proposed to the headquarters and implemented.

[boris epstein]

It is difficult, and almost impossible to prove anything to someone who DOES NOT WISH to accept the truth. General CherevEchenko was not in the Red Army.
"... that they dared to object to you ..."
Do not juggle, pl. I did not object to the very fact of your objection, I object to the fact that you are wrong. And these are different things. And you do not want to admit the truth. This can be the end of the dialogue.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Boris Epstein

The front in that operation was commanded by KE Voroshilov, on whom all dogs are now hanged, and this is not his only victory in 1941. There was also the defeat of Manstein's mechanized corps.from Soltsy in the Leningrad direction.

it was not he who prepared and performed that operation.

And the "achievements" of this uneducated person is a catastrophic blockade of Leningrad-read Stalin to him

The catastrophe of the 41st, another of his "achievements" as the people's commissar of defense until 1940, read the Act of the transfer of the people's commissariat of defense from May 1, 1940 from Voroshilov to Timoshenko.

[Sandro1977]

The most important victory, the first large city liberated from the Nazis ... And the Hero City was never appropriated to Rostov ... There was a very interesting article on how the NKVD troops were used in urban battles for Rostov. The losses of the Germans were almost 10 for one of our
https://amp-topwar-ru.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/amp.topwar.ru/73533-posledniy-rubezh-na-zelenom-ostrove-konvoynyy-polk-stoyal-nasmert.html?amp_gsa=1&amp_js_v=a6&usqp=mq331AQKKAFQArABIIACAw%3D%3D#amp_tf=%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%3A%20%251%24s&aoh=16385410951404&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2Ftopwar.ru%2F73533-posledniy-rubezh-na-zelenom-ostrove-konvoynyy-polk-stoyal-nasmert.html

[faterdom]

For me, a lot has to do with these places.
I grew up in Bataysk (the left bank of the Don opposite Rostov, a junction railway station), and in the 70s we were quite often found unexploded bombs, mines (found it myself), in yards and on heaps of scrap metal that we pioneers collected you could come across rusty German helmets, or even cleavers from carbines ...
Rostov - maybe the only large city besides Kharkov, which was given twice and taken twice - after the second occupation of Rostov, the Germans organized widespread repressions against civilians and shot tens of thousands in Zmiyeva Balka.
My father-in-law was born in 22 - then a cadet of the Baku Naval School was seriously wounded on the streets of Rostov, and he became an officer with stripes for the wound and a Red Star.
Unfortunately, it is again an almost front-line city: two Chechen campaigns were carried out largely through Rostov, now the LPNR is close by.
Cossack service is a dashing lot ...

[bubalik]

Added to all +, those who did not pass by such an article, even if it seems that not for everyone, it means not for everyone.

[Switchman]

I want to clarify, the commander of the 347th rifle division, Nikolay Seliverstov. And General Davidovsky, a very worthy warrior, was at that time on a different sector of the front.

[Alex1968]

Grandfather told me that the call was in the autumn of 1939, he started the war as a sergeant, a castle platoon commander, after a drape from the Crimea to Taman, part of the personnel of his 156th engineer battalion was transferred near Rostov, to build fortifications. They dig, while troops and civilians run past. Then they stopped running, and they keep digging. They just forgot about them. Then comes the order to attack, and they have a shovel and pick from their weapons. They brought rifles, went on the offensive, no artillery, no tanks, no, thank God, Germans in commercial quantities, the patrol fired at them a little and moved away. He spoke a little about Rostov, I only remember that there were no battles where they operated, the Germans reached there in very small numbers, rather ours surrendered the city in a panic. According to his stories, it was much tougher in the Crimea. Something like this))