Military Review

Tsushima battle and Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. Execution cannot be pardoned

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Personally, as an author of articles, I am always pleased with the responses to my materials, even if they are of a critical nature. Constructive criticism from a competent reader is especially good. At the very least, it will give rise to a fruitful discussion during which the parties will have a pleasant time, even if in the end each will remain unconvinced.


But it often happens that knowledgeable people tell me the facts that I missed, provide me with materials that I did not have, or explain why my interpretations of this or that event are erroneous. Thanks to this feedback, I become more competent in issues that are interesting to me and about which I write.

Learning new things is in itself invaluable, and my materials only benefit from this.

And therefore - with all my heart I greet the respected M. Klimov, who published the article "The main culprit in Tsushima", in which the author opposes my numerous materials on this topic. Indeed, unlike me, who saw warships only from the beach, Maxim Klimov is a naval officer who gave a considerable part of his life the fleet.

From whom, if not from him, should constructive and competent criticism be expected?

About theses


M. Klimov has so many of them that just listing them will take half of the article. And therefore, it is not surprising that the author did not have enough space for at least some detailed substantiation of these theses. It's a pity. In the very first paragraphs of his work, M. Klimov indicates:

“In the February 1989 issue of the central printed organ of the USSR Navy, the magazine Morskoy Sbornik, an absolutely shameful (both in terms of level and content) article by V. Chistyakov“ A Quarter of an Hour for Russian Cannons ”was published.

Alas, the respected M. Klimov does not give any explanation why this article deserved the term "shameful", and it would be very interesting to know his argumentation. Moreover, without giving any proof, M. Klimov deprives me of the opportunity to argue on the merits.

I can only repeat that I largely agree with V. Chistyakov's version even today.

Simply put, the Japanese possessed such great superiority in speed that they could easily impose their will on the Russian squadron and join the battle in the most advantageous position for them. They did not do this: Kh. Togo's loop seems to be a forced decision that the Japanese naval commander had to make when he realized that the four Borodino-class battleships still manage to take their place in the ranks, and not a weak left column would have to attack on the countercourse, and the entire Russian squadron.

Further, my esteemed opponent writes:

“The absolutely inadequate, neurasthenic control of the Rozhdestvensky squadron in the outset of the battle almost led to a collision of ships and demanded stopping the course of the Oslyabi.

Again, there is no explanation for such a harsh characterization of Z.P. M. Klimov does not give Rozhestvensky.

So I just have to remind dear readers that a maneuver, like any action, has a plan and there is execution. Z.P. Rozhestvensky, in the testimony of the Investigative Commission, presented a mathematical explanation of his maneuver, it is logical and quite convincing: the Russian admiral was sure that the entrance to the head of the Russian squadron of the 1st armored detachment would not create problems for the 2nd.

But the maneuver, as we know, did not work out - and why?

There can be two reasons: either Z.P. Rozhestvensky miscalculated, or the performers of the maneuver made a mistake in its production (for example, "Borodino" was heavily delayed in the ranks). In the second case, one should probably still talk about the admiral's mistake, for in the squadron he is the first after God and is responsible for everything. But the terms "inadequate" and "neurasthenic" in this case will hardly be applicable.

So, if Z.P. Rozhestvensky made a mistake in rebuilding, and not just a mistake, but a gross mistake that casts doubt on his sanity, then, probably, M. Klimov, who is not by hearsay familiar with the sea, would have had no difficulty in explaining what it was. Alas, there is nothing of the kind in his article. But we read:

“Of course, according to the lawyers,“ Zinovy ​​has nothing to do with it ”.

Who are these lawyers?

If you open my article Tsushima. Errors Z.P. Rozhdestvensky and the death of "Oslyabi", then it says:

... ZP. Rozhestvensky, of course, made a mistake when rebuilding: for one reason or another, listed above, he created a situation in which the "Eagle" did not have time to pass in front of the "Oslyabey".

What then do they reproach me for?

And here's what: in the discussion of the article "The Experiences of Admiral Rozhestvensky" in one of my comments, I wrote:

“So in this situation, any sane commander of the Oslyabi would smoothly reduce the speed in advance, perhaps, he would make the coordonate to the right, but would let the Eagle go ahead, avoid a collision and stop the battleship. Ber, however, proudly lane forward to the last, and when the collision was already inevitable - arranged emergency braking and stood up in view of the enemy ... "

On the one hand, I should probably be proud that I have reached the level at which reviews are published not only on my articles, but also on my comments. And not a "shtafirka" that publishes - a professional, a naval officer!

On the other hand, dear readers, I offer you my deepest apologies. I certainly shouldn't have spoken in such a derogatory manner about a military officer who died along with his battleship. The thing is that a comment is usually not perceived as something public, it is like a conversation between two people. And in such a conversation, sometimes even stronger expressions can slip through ... And I really did sometimes allow myself too much. Henceforth I pledge to be more attentive to my words.

But back to "Oslyaba" and its commander. Dear M. Klimov completely disagrees with my calculations and writes:

“Briefly: the“ coordonat to the right ”offered by the sofa naval commanders to Beru led, with a high probability, either“ Eagle ”- under the ram of“ Oslyabi ”, or“ Oslyabyu ”- under the ram of“ Eagle ”(in Makarov's“ Discourses ... ”this question was good painted), simply because to the right of the "Oslyabi" "Eagle" was located. "

I can only remind my opponent that the maneuver of rebuilding the 1st combat detachment in the head of the left Russian column lasted 29 minutes. That is, V.I. Baer watched for almost half an hour as the 1st Armored Detachment entered the head of his battleship. And if Zinovy ​​Petrovich didn’t see that during the rebuilding his terminal Oryol didn’t have time to pass in front of the Oslyabey, then on the Oslyab it was obvious long before there was a real threat of collision, and the Oryol turned out to be to the right of Oslyabi.


I described all this in detail in the above article. And in it I came to the conclusion that it was possible to take measures to avoid it long before the "Eagle" was to the right of the "Oslyabi". At least a coordinate, at least a simple decrease in speed. In automotive terms, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky cut off Oslyabya. On the road, this maneuver is dangerous, because it leaves the driver a few seconds (or even fractions of a second) to react, and V.I. Baer had much more time ...

In my opinion, the flagship of the 2nd Armored Detachment had enough time to rule out an emergency. Instead, "Oslyabya" continued to go on a given course at a given speed, as they say, "to the last", and then made an "emergency braking", and even without notifying the battleships following the "Oslyabya" about their maneuver. This, in my opinion, is a mistake, and a very gross mistake: from here I concluded that Z.P. Rozhestvensky could be easily corrected by V.I. Baer, ​​who instead made her worse.

The article "The main culprit of Tsushima" does not contain a refutation of this assumption of mine.

Further M. Klimov writes:

"Mr. Kolobov's attempts to justify the extremely unfortunate coloring of the ships of the Second Squadron cause frank bewilderment."

But again does not explain to us why the coloring of the 2nd Pacific was "extremely unsuccessful"?

Yes, many of our officers believed that it would be easier for the Japanese to aim at black and yellow ships. But the Japanese themselves did not seem to think so - in the documents available to me I did not see anything like that, and from their reports it turns out that they poorly observed our ships at about the same distance as we, the Japanese.

“The yellow pipes, according to A. Kolobov, was it also some kind of“ clever disguise ”?

Let's take a look at a photo of any Russian battleship of that era. "Oslyabya" and "Prince Suvorov" are given above, here's another.


Does yellow stand out strongly against a gray sky?

Was the coloring of the 1st Pacific Squadron better in this respect and, if so, how much better?


It is clear that photographs are such a thing, after all, retouching was often used there, which distorts color perception, and they are also black and white. But yes, I actually suggested that “it is possible that Z. P. Rozhestvensky, planning to protect his ships from night attacks with black and yellow paint, did not make a big mistake and did not make it easier for the Japanese to shoot in the way it is considered today. " At the same time, I was guided mainly by the Japanese reports known to me. I fully admit that I could be wrong, and I am ready to accept a reasoned refutation.

Where is it?

It is completely incomprehensible that M. Klimov has an objection to the refusal of the German coal miners to accompany the Russian squadron beyond Madagascar. There are well-known facts - Z.P. Rozhestvensky insisted on an early withdrawal from Madagascar, and the refusal of the German coal miners to accompany the 2nd Pacific Squadron became one of the "stop factors" that prevented him from doing so.

Or is it just that I have not fully quoted the corresponding volume in the official stories?

It's true. I wrote:

"The company refuses to supply coal to the Russian squadron otherwise than in neutral waters, and therefore there can be no talk of any overloading of coal in the ocean."

Whereas the original says:


I confess I am a sinner. However, this mistake of mine, as well as its correction, have nothing to do with the decisions of Z.P. Rozhestvensky, nor to the circumstances of the delay of the squadron in Madagascar.

Why, then, was my respected opponent wasting his time on it?

Further M. Klimov made 6 points from the claims against Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, which I see no point in listing, because none of them is concretized. Well, here's what you want to answer to:

"Firstly, there was more than enough critical information about the lagging behind and the frankly abnormal situation in our fleet on a whole range of military issues."

What questions?

What was Rozhdestvensky supposed to influence?

About this I can only guess. Well, since a fortune-teller is not so-so of me, I would rather answer those theses of my respected opponent, which he backed up with at least some evidence.

Battle, "turn of Togo" and Rozhdestvensky's last chance


Here M. Klimov's thesis is very simple.

To the head detachment Z.P. Rozhestvensky, as part of the four Borodino-class battleships, should have developed a 15-knot course in the outset of the battle and rushed to the Japanese fleet. In this case, in the opinion of the author, the 1st armored detachment would have gone a short distance (10–12 cables) with the battleships of H. Togo. It was then that the quality of Russian armor-piercing shells, which at such and such a distance would probably have broken through Japanese armor, would have affected. At the same time, the four "Borodino" were well protected from high-explosive shells and, according to M. Klimov, would not have suffered excessive damage in a "short" battle. But the Japanese - how they would have suffered, my respected opponent predicts, no less, the death of several Japanese battleships and the victory of the Tsushima battle by the Russian squadron!


Alternative-historical "photo": "Borodino" finishes off "Asahi". So him, an adversary!

But for this, according to M. Klimov, it was necessary to reach a short distance.

In this last statement, I completely agree with my opponent.

If there was a distance from which the Russian ships in the outset of the battle could inflict decisive damage to the Japanese - it was from 10-12 cables.

The question is small - what miracle Z.P. should have performed. Rozhdestvensky, to get along with "Mikasa", "Asahi", "Shikishima" and "Fuji" in short?

I do not know this, but let's see what my dear opponent offers. Below I will quote M. Klimov and give my comments to him.

"Firstly, the initial distance of the battle to Mikasa was 32 cab."

Unfortunately, we do not know the exact distance from the Russians to the Japanese ships.

According to Z.P. Rozhestvensky, when the Suvorov opened fire, there were 32 cables before the Mikasa. But the Japanese have a different opinion - according to their data, "Mikasa" opened fire on "Suvorov" from 6 meters or from 500-35 cables (depending on which one counts - international or artillery). "Sikishima" - and at all from 35,5 6 m (800-36,7 cables).

Let's not forget that the Japanese, in the outset of the battle, passed through the turning point of the "Loop of Togo", to which the Russian ships were approaching, and therefore the "Sikishima" that opened fire, after turning to a new course, should have been noticeably closer to the Russian ships than the "Mikasa" "Three minutes earlier. But for the Japanese it turns out the other way around, because 37 cables are noticeably more than 32 cables.

That is why it cannot be said that the battle began on 32 cables.

We can say that the battle began at a distance of 32 to 37 cables. And everything I said above is not a secret sealed with seven seals, all this is available in official Russian and Japanese sources, which have been available for more than a dozen years.


"T. That is, at a speed of 15 knots of battleships (2,5 cabs per minute), it could be reduced to 8–10 cabs in 12 minutes. "

You can not.

It is impossible geometrically.

Let's assume that M. Klimov is right and that “Suvorov” opened fire on “Mikasa” from a distance of 32 cables. Suppose also that Z.P. Rozhestvensky had a magic wand, which made it possible to instantly increase the speed from 11 knots to 15 knots. Suppose that "Suvorov", as soon as the new course of the Japanese squadron became clear (ie, after the turn of "Mikasa"), rushed at 15 knots to the location of this very "Mikasa".

After 8 minutes "Suvorov", it will take 8 minutes * 2,5 cables = 20 cables and will be 12 cables from ...

What?

Mikasa?

Yes, it never happened.

“Suvorov” will approach the point where “Mikasa” was located eight minutes ago by 12 cables.

But Mikasa will no longer be there. Because all these 8 minutes calculated by M. Klimov he was moving away from the point at which the Japanese flagship was at the moment of the opening of fire by "Suvorov". I left on the same 15 nodes, having walked the same 8 cables in 20 minutes.


The scheme is very simplified and is only suitable for illustrating the basic principle of calculation.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate the exact distance to Mikasa with such a maneuver, since the course angle to Mikasa from Suvorov at the beginning of the battle is not reliably known.

If the Japanese are right, then it will be much more than if the Russians are right. But in no case there can be no talk of any 12 cable cables.

And yes, of course, the Russian battleships could not turn to the turning point, but across the Japanese battleship in order to get as close as possible to it, taking into account the speed and direction of its movement. But such a point will be as far away from the starting position of "Suvorov" as 32 cables, so one cannot even dream of approaching 10–12 cables (where did these 10 cables from M. Klimov come from? 32–20 = 12).

Well, okay, what are we all talking about "Mikasu", as if it were the only Japanese battleship?

There were others! But, for example, the fourth in the ranks of the Asahi was the last of the battleships to pass the turning point and lay down on a new course about 3-4 minutes after the Suvorov opened fire. But in order to get closer to him on the 12 cables designated by M. Klimov, the Russian squadron had to overcome 20 cables not in 8, but in 3-4 minutes. Through simple calculations, we see that for this our battleships would need to develop a speed of not 15, but only some 30-40 knots.

I am forced to state that the esteemed M. Klimov, in his calculation, confused the concepts of "speed of a Russian squadron" and "speed of convergence of a Russian squadron with a Japanese one."

How can I explain this in a nutshell?

If I run at a speed of 10 km / h towards a person who is standing still, our approach speed is 10 km / h. But if this person turned away and leaves me at a speed of 4 km / h, then, despite my speed of 10 km / h, the distance between us is reduced by only 6 km / h. If my memory serves me, a more detailed explanation is contained in the mathematics textbook for the fifth grade.

In fact, at the time of the opening of fire by "Suvorov" the distance between him and "Mikasa" was 32-37 cables. If the Russian battleships would immediately rush to the point where the Japanese flagship was, moreover, they immediately developed 15 knots, then, after about 4 minutes, the fourth in the Asahi formation would be in it (or near it), and the distance between “ Suvorov "and" Asahi "would have been 22-27 cables and further would not have been reduced.

To put it simply, in the ideal version for the Russians, giving the fastest reduction in distance, the courses of the Russian battleships "on the dash" and the Japanese detachment were perpendicular. The distance from "Suvorov" to "Asakhi" would become the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle.

Our ships would cut one of the legs at a speed of 15 knots, but the Asahi would increase the second leg at the same speed, so the hypotenuse (that is, the distance between the Suvorov and Asakhi) would remain unchanged. The rest of the Russian battleships, obviously, would have been even further from the Asahi, since in the outset of the battle the distance between them and Mikasa was more than 32-37 cables.

I am not at all inclined to accuse M. Klimov of deliberate falsification of facts.

But I ask him very much in the next article, devoted to the defeat of the mind-set of the “couch naval commander Kolobov,” to take a closer look at both historical facts and his own calculations.

How is it?

Hastened - got a real opportunity to go to 10-12 cables and melt all the battleships of H. Togo. But it was worth noticing an error in the calculation - and the calculated 10-12 cables turn into 22. It was worth checking the distance data at the beginning of the battle - and even these 22 cables turn into 22-27.

And if even before writing about

"Powerful longitudinal fire (2x12 inch and 6x6 inch guns of each battleship)",

which the Russian battleships allegedly could develop with such a throw, with a pencil in hand, simulate the movement of Russian ships and look at the sectors of shelling of their guns ...

Yes, after that the version about the possibility of the best Russian battleships going to "dagger" fire - no longer remains a stone unturned.

Well, we are trying to find the truth, and not to confirm our own theories at any cost, aren't we?

What would Z.P. Rozhestvensky, should he follow the recommendations of the respected M. Klimov?

In fact, only one thing - approached about 15 cables with the end of the Japanese column "Nissin", "resting" at the same time "Suvorov" in the order of the armored cruisers of Kamimura.

Was there a chance to destroy the Japanese armored cruiser with concentrated fire from the best Russian battleships?

Yes, I was. Scanty.

What is the price?

This is quite obvious, because the Russian squadron tried to do a similar maneuver when "Alexander III" turned under the stern of the 1st combat detachment of Togo, which had gone ahead. I can only remind the timing:

14:26 - Suvorov is out of order. "Alexander III" first follows him, then, realizing that the flagship Z.P. Rozhestvensky is not controlled, returns to the previous course and then turns to the Japanese system.

14:40 - "Alexander III", completely beaten, goes out of order. Later he took a place either behind the "Eagle", or behind the "Sisoy the Great", but he could not lead the squadron and could not have a significant impact on the battle either.

In total, the Japanese squadron, with their "helpless" high-explosive shells, took only 14 minutes (with a poor heading angle for the four battleships H. Togo) to knock out the battleship of the Borodino class attacking their formation. Despite the fact that they were shooting at this time, of course, not only at "Alexander III".

In fact, having thrown the 1st armored detachment forward, it would be possible, with luck, to exchange it (and after it the rest of the squadron, unable to hold out for any length of time under Japanese fire) for one Japanese armored cruiser, happiness - if by two, but the latter is highly doubtful. But the likelihood that it will not be possible to sink even one Japanese ship is very high.

It was possible to decide on this, only knowing in advance that the Tsushima battle would be lost by us dry. But not a single naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War, not a skirmish on January 27, 1904, not a battle at Shantung, not a battle of "Russia", "Thunderbolt" and "Rurik" with Kh. Kamimura's cruisers - did not in any way testify to the fact that the Japanese were under the force.

Accordingly, to sacrifice their best ships in the outset of the battle of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky had no reason.

About sighting, calibers, firing range and "bunch" of fire control methods with maneuver


Speaking about the distances of the artillery battle, M. Klimov writes:

"Allegedly" innovator "Rozhdestvensky (from 25–32 cab) looks somewhat amusing against the background of Klado, who wrote back in 1898 in a textbook for midshipmen of the Marine Corps about effective artillery fire from cab 53".

In this case, M. Klimov, in my opinion, again makes a mistake, but it is quite forgivable. He is, of course, a naval officer, but (like) not an artilleryman.

I am pleased to explain that long-range fire control is not a handwritten note that "it is possible." This is a technique, and I strongly recommend M. Klimov to familiarize himself ... Well, for example, with this:


Here, the general provisions of the method of successful shooting, including at distances over 50 cables, are presented in a very accessible way.

Yes, this is a later book (1927), but this is a plus - it contains the experience of not only the Russian-Japanese, but also the First World War. I am ready to send this book to the esteemed M. Klimov so that he could compare and see how far Klado's thoughts were from the real mechanisms of successful artillery fire.

Writing about the ability to shoot at 53 cabs is not an innovation. Innovation is to start learning to shoot at long distances for those years and try to develop mechanisms that would allow not only to shoot at them, but also to hit them.

One can argue at what distances Z.P. taught his gunners to shoot. Rozhestvensky, but it was he who went to increase the distance of artillery fire from what came before him. And that did not reach the ideal method - so no one, not a single fleet reached the beginning of the Russo-Japanese one.

Further considerations of M. Klimov about zeroing are interesting, but, alas, they have nothing to do with the issue under discussion.

The innovation of Z.P. Rozhestvensky lies not in the fact that he applied zeroing, it was used on all formations of ships that fought in the Russo-Japanese (including those armed with old guns, for which M. Klimov for some reason considers zeroing impossible), but in the fact that he personally introduced the fork method as a must.

And yes, M. Klimov is absolutely right that both the sighting and the "fork" were known long before the events described, but the fact is that before Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the "fork" principle was not introduced as mandatory on any combination of Russian ships.

I will not pretend to be a connoisseur, claiming that I know why this happened (because I don’t know), but I’ll give you one guess.

Russian sailors closer to the Russo-Japanese War were going to shoot at short distances, avoiding "throwing" the projectile over the target, because they fired projectiles that did not explode when hitting the water. Bursts of such ammunition are poorly visible, but best of all - against the background of the target. Accordingly, it seemed logical to give first undershoot, and then, adjusting the range, bring the falls closer to covering the target - in this way, good observability of the falls of their own projectiles was achieved.

Were these considerations guided by our naval officers or some other? But, I repeat, it was the “fork” principle that later became obligatory even when firing armor-piercing shells that did not burst into the water. And in our fleet he was appointed as such by Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

I, of course, am not an artilleryman either, and I could be wrong. But, if this is so, then M. Klimov does not disclose my mistakes. Moreover, I am compelled to state with regret that my esteemed opponent, having begun to talk about Japanese ships, did not bother to study either the statistics or the peculiarities of fire control on them. So, M. Klimov writes:

"Having started the war in terms of artillery, it is frankly" pale "(for example, the first battle with the Port Arthur squadron and the shelling of Vladivostok)."

In the battle on January 27, 1904, the Japanese used up 79 rounds of 305-mm caliber, having achieved 8 hits on Russian ships. The accuracy was 10,1%, which hardly deserves the epithet "pale" for a squadron that entered the battle for the first time. Moreover, it could have been even higher if the Japanese deliberately spent a certain number of 305-mm shells not in the Russian squadron, but in the city.

I also note that six months later, in the battle in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese, having spent 633 254-305-mm shells, achieved 58 hits (for the entire time of the battle), the accuracy of their main caliber was 9,16%. It, of course, did not decrease, it was just that there were completely different and much more difficult shooting conditions.

The Russian squadron of heavy guns at Shantung achieved 19 hits from the force, using up 567 shells, that is, the accuracy of our heavy guns was almost three times lower (3,35%).

"... they worked decisively and persistently to improve the main instrument of war, and received a sharp leap in efficiency in its course."

Oddly enough, ours worked too - as a result, in Tsushima, the Russian squadron demonstrated a much higher class of shooting than the 1st Pacific. More details - here "On the quality of the shooting of the Russian squadron in the Battle of Tsushima"; "On the effectiveness of the shooting of the main forces of the Japanese in the battle at Shantung" и "On the accuracy of Russian ships in Tsushima and Japanese ships at Shantung".

Therefore, M. Klimov's conclusion that

however, in our fleet all this happened only after the "Tsushima pogrom",

completely untrue.

In addition, there is an amusing contradiction in the reasoning of my respected opponent.

M. Klimov says that it was necessary to learn to shoot at sufficiently large distances (according to Klado - so 53 cab), while H. that in Tsushima one should fight no further than 33 cables and, in any case, no more than 38 cables (7 m).

Personally, by studying the sources available to me, I came to the conclusion that the state of the materiel, the level of theory of artillery work, etc., etc. allowed the ships of the Russo-Japanese War era to conduct an effective fire battle for 25-45 cables. And I saw absolutely nothing from M. Klimov that could refute this conclusion.

The facts are that the Russian Imperial Navy, after the appearance of rapid-fire guns in the pre-war years, really "looked for itself", trying to find the most effective methods of fire control. And that along the way, our current naval artillery officers made a number of mistakes - which was worth the firm belief that zeroing is generally unnecessary and harmful. It is also true that our fire control techniques were far from optimal. All this was revealed by me in my "Tsushima" series of articles.

But Z.P. Rozhestvensky made an important contribution to the formation of artillery work - the principle of the "fork" approved by him, combined with the increased intensity of artillery preparation and the transition to exercises at an increased range (over 25 cables) gave a completely natural result - in the outset of Tsushima, the 2nd Pacific Ocean shot very, very good - at the level of the Japanese in the Yellow Sea.

Another question is that the Russian artillerymen were in obviously worse conditions - the shells did not burst when dropped into the water and hit, which made it difficult to control the fire, the optical sights were massively out of alignment with the line of sight, etc.

That is, the Russian fleet had a certain level, Z.P. Rozhestvensky took certain measures that led to a positive result.

What is he to blame?

In the fact that he did not reach the ideal technique of conducting firefighting?

So, I repeat, no one came to her in those years.

My esteemed opponent's next argument:

“I repeat once again - during this period of time, artillery in terms of methods of firing (and maneuvering at the same time!) Developed by“ leaps and bounds ”, and the result of these literally“ several years of work ”is especially evident not even in Tsushima, but in the example of the shooting of an English battleship King Edward VII in October 1905 ".

This raises several questions to M. Klimov.

Why as an illustration of success pre-war British Navy training data used postwar shooting?

Is it not known to M. Klimov that British observers were on the Japanese ships permanently and had the opportunity to transfer invaluable combat experience to the Admiralty of Foggy Albion, without waiting for the end of hostilities?

Why is the best result of the exercise taken as an illustration?

And why does this best result not compare with the best results of the exercises of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky?

According to the letter of the junior mine officer of the ship, Lieutenant P.A. Vyrubova 1st, during the third practice shooting in Madagascar, which took place on January 19, 1905, out of six training shells fired by the bow turret of the main caliber, five (83%) hit the shield. The distance is not known exactly, but, taking into account the recollections of artillery officers of the 2nd Pacific Ocean, it was about 25-40 cables (possibly more) against 30 cables for the British. And this result was achieved after difficult transitions, in the tropics, in general - the conditions are hardly comparable to the British.

Separately, I would like to say about the "maneuvering with shooting", which M. Klimov writes about.

Of course, the conditions of the artillery exercises should be as close as possible to the combat ones. But it is also true that before the Russo-Japanese War, in almost all fleets, these exercises were very far from this. Actually, if any fleet practiced squadron firing on the move (not a maneuver, but still), it was the Russian Imperial Navy that existed.

Yes, he did it in far from the best way, but he did it.

Perhaps M. Klimov, in the second part of his material, will tell us about similar exercises of the Japanese fleet?

I personally do not know about those.

I can also note that maneuvering exercises at the 2nd Pacific were carried out quite regularly.

“Actually, this is the answer to the thesis about the allegedly“ high efficiency ”of the fire of the Second Squadron (supposedly“ perfectly prepared ”ZPR): while there was a distance, there was optics and accuracy. Only now it ended very quickly. "

I agree that the massive failure of the optical sights played a role. But I cannot fail to note that the optical sight is just one of the elements of the artillery fire control system. This system has a lot of tasks that need to be solved in order to successfully defeat the enemy, but in the solution of which the telescopic sight cannot help. Here is the need to determine the distance and parameters of the target's movement, here is the calculation of corrections, and observation of the falling shells and much, much more. With the beginning of the battle, Russian ships suffered damage in all directions - the same failure of the centralized fire control with its transfer to the plutongs.

Therefore, it is impossible to reduce everything solely to sights.

But another thing is also funny.

M. Klimov expresses so many unflattering words about the insufficient training of the Russian fleet, the lack of methods and other things. And here, in his words, it turns out: none of this was necessary - it was enough to set good sights, and now - excellent shooting results are guaranteed ...

And finally, to the high-explosive shells.

According to M. Klimov:

"As will be shown later, Rozhestvensky himself bears responsibility for this personally and personally as the head of the MGSH."

There is only one confirmation of this thesis - it turns out that Clado himself spoke about the usefulness of high-explosive shells in 1898! But Z.P. Rozhestvensky did not listen, he ignored, which means he is guilty!

Well, I bring to the attention of the respected M. Klimov how things really were with the high-explosive shells in the Russian fleet.

Although - stop!

Before moving on to the shells, I have to remind you that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky in 1903-1904 I was not (and could not have been) the chief of the MGSh, simply because the MGSh (Naval General Staff) appeared in the Russian Empire in 1906. A Z.P. Rozhestvensky was the chief of the General Naval Staff (General Naval Staff).

It seems to be - what's the difference: well, just think - a typo, with whom it does not happen, I myself sometimes could blast something in a publication that I was ashamed to read it later ...

And I would not focus the attention of the dear reader on this, if not for one "but".

The thing is that the GMSh and the MGSh had fundamental differences.

In 1903-1904. The GMSh consisted of a naval accounting department and a personnel department. Everything! Other structures were engaged in armament. Therefore, to demand high-explosive shells from the chief of the Main Marine Staff, to put it mildly, is at the wrong address.

Yes, it may seem strange, but in 1903 the General Staff of the General Staff was not just weapons, he could not even really deal with the strategy and tactics of battle.

Yes, the strategic part was supposed to be in charge of the questions:

1. Combat use of ships of the fleet, formations of ships, navigation, strategy and tactics of battle, improving the forms and methods of combat operations of the forces of the Navy.

2. Providing all the necessary supplies of ships at sea.

3. Collecting and processing information on the activities of the military fleets of other states.

4. The use of new technical weapons, the improvement of education of all categories of personnel of the Navy, the development and publication of guidance documents on the activities of ships and fleets.

But as a part of the General Music School, she appeared only on the basis of order No. 28 of February 14, 1904, in accordance with the Imperial Decree of February 2 of the same year.

And yes, someone may have a question: “Why Z.P. Rozhestvensky did not immediately demand the necessary powers for himself? "

A question on the matter, I answer - our officers and admirals have been talking and writing about the need to create such a department within the General Music School since 1888. In 1903, none other than F.K. Avelan, who in the same year becomes the manager of the Naval Ministry. And in comparison with which the newly minted "chief of staff" Z.P. Rozhdestvensky ... Well, do you understand who this caliber is?

But even the Adjutant General F.K. Avelan did it a year later, after the start of the Russo-Japanese War!

For my part, I can only ask my respected opponent in the future, assessing the activities of Z.P. Rozhestvensky as head of the General Music School still take into account what the General Music School was in reality in the period 1903-1904.

But back to the shells.

The need for high-explosive projectiles with a high content of explosives was realized already in 1889. The problem was that the domestic industry simply could not then produce thin-walled projectiles, which was necessary to ensure a high content of explosives. As a result, they produced what our industry can produce.

The decision to abandon the testing of "Tsushima" high-explosive shells was made in 1897, and not at the level of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, but at the level of the Head of the Naval Ministry (at that time - Tyrtov). But later, in 1901-1902. Some limited tests were nevertheless carried out (the Black Sea Fleet, firing at the coastal battery on the Tendrovskaya Spit) and found the effect of 152-mm high-explosive shells to be quite satisfactory. The dear M. Klimov can learn more about all this from the document:

Tsushima battle and Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. Execution cannot be pardoned

Z.P. himself Rozhestvensky at the time of these tests served in the Baltic Fleet and could not attend them, and then he knew about them only from reports.

In view of the above, how does M. Klimov make Z.P. Rozhdestvensky is a mystery to me.

But let's imagine that immediately after being appointed to a new position in 1903, in the writing desk of his predecessor at the post of chief of the General Music School Z.P. Rozhdestvensky found a magic wand. Yes, yes, the one with which our battleships were supposed to instantly increase their speed from 11,5 to 15 knots or more at the outset of the Tsushima battle. And, swinging it, he acquired the necessary powers to resolve the issue of high-explosive shells.

Then what?

There was no production capacity for thin-walled shells, and there was no pyroxylin for their equipment. And the shells themselves are not.

Let me just remind you that good high-explosive shells, even when the need for them was realized, were developed (and not delivered to the fleet, the difference M. Klimov, I am sure, knows very well) only in 1907, that is, 2 years after Tsushima.

Well, that seems to be all.

At the end of the article, I want to tell the esteemed Maxim Klimov that I am very glad to see in his person a new author who writes on the topic of the Russian-Japanese war on the electronic pages of VO.

I thank M. Klimov for his indifference to "the affairs of bygone days" and look forward to the continuation of his criticism of my humble works. After all, if my respected opponent in the future manages to refute my "sofa-admiral's" theses (well, at least one of them), then this will undoubtedly benefit everyone - both me and dear readers.
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  1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
    Kote Pan Kokhanka 24 November 2021 05: 49
    +9
    Well, we have survived! Inspired by something from the old Soviet school curriculum - the answer of the revolutionary Belinsky to the letter of the writer Gogol!
    To be honest, I have only one complaint about Z.P. Rozhdestvensky - if you could not avoid the battle, then do at least something! Alas, during Tsushima on the part of the vice admiral, not even to win, but to "get out of the battle with his head raised" was done exactly - nothing.
    Thanks to Andrey for the article, although my opinion is that the truth is somewhere in the middle!
    1. Machito
      Machito 24 November 2021 06: 04
      +7
      Andrey, there are too many Klimovs in the article.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 06: 47
      +10
      Well, how? :)
      Togo's noose nevertheless did not appear out of nowhere, in the outset of the battle - he kept on the same course, allowing the gunners to show themselves. Then - he went to the "small circle" - he had no other ways to avoid covering the head. And then - a serious wound, and how can you command? While he was in his mind, he kept himself well, and then what was the demand from him?
      1. A_Mazkov
        A_Mazkov 24 November 2021 07: 45
        +7
        Good day, Andrey!
        There are 2 versions of maneuvering:
        1. Clopier de Colonga that after 14.05 NO23 - 2 rumba to the right - NO23 - 4 rumba to the right,
        2. Rozhestvensky that after 14.00 4 rumba to the left (for the Japanese), then the lapel to the right (in the diagram attached by Semenov to the book it is).
        It should be noted that in both cases, a return to NO23, and even more so to turn on the Japanese, means to substitute for their coverage. That is, Rozhestvensky made the task of Togo easier in any case.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 November 2021 18: 05
          +5
          Greetings, Anton!
          Quote: A_Mazkov
          2. Rozhestvensky that after 14.00 4 rumba to the left (for the Japanese), then the lapel to the right (in the diagram attached by Semenov to the book it is).

          Maneuvering there is generally a rather confusing topic. I’m thinking, sit down at my leisure and try, having gone through all the sources, to determine the position of the ships in the outset of the battle. It is as if nothing can be restored there, but at least the most reliable option - you can try
          Rozhestvensky was not substituted for coverage - here I don’t even understand how you did it
          1. A_Mazkov
            A_Mazkov 24 November 2021 20: 58
            +2
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

            Rozhestvensky was not substituted for coverage - here I don’t even understand how you did it


            It was not me, but near Rozhdestvensky. The Japanese were shooting for about 10 minutes: at first only fragments and splashes from shells exploding into the water hit, but already at 2 o'clock the enemy began to hit continuously, while we were shooting badly.
            Thinking to change the distance, I inclined the course by 2 points to the left, but held out on the new course for no more than 5 minutes, because the Mikaza and 5 battleships with it moved a lot and concentrated their fire on the Suvorov and Alexander, moreover, the Mikaza itself was not sufficiently exposed to the fire of our ships. At about 2 hours 5 am I ordered to turn 4 rumba to the right. Having approached as a result of this turn to the left traverse of "Suvorov", "Mikaza" began to move forward rapidly again. "
            I was just wrong about the points.
            But in general, I think that Rozhdestvensky, perhaps due to a head wound, is confusing something, and the maneuvering described by Clapier-de-Colong is correct, since it does not contradict Filippovsky's testimony.
          2. A_Mazkov
            A_Mazkov 24 November 2021 21: 36
            +6
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

            Rozhestvensky was not substituted for coverage - here I don’t even understand how you did it

            PS: But according to Fillipovskiy it turned out badly: “At 2 hours 07 minutes we changed the course to the right by 2 R., in order to change the distance, since the enemy was well aimed.
            At 2 hours 15 minutes. lay down on the old course NO 23 °. About this time, the admiral, the flag-captain was wounded, the 2nd change of helmsmen and 2 galvaners were killed while measuring the distance. The left rangefinder of Barr and Stroud was broken, they moved the right rangefinder to the left side, but after a few minutes it was also broken. "
            Therefore, the conclusion: Rozhdestvensky facilitated the task of Togo for any option (either according to the 1st, or according to the 2nd).
            I want to note that, first of all, I personally am surprised by Rozhdestvensky's maneuvering in battle. For the commander of the Training and Artillery Unit of the Baltic Fleet, it is at least strange and, strictly speaking, absurd.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              25 November 2021 17: 45
              +7
              Quote: A_Mazkov
              PS: But it turned out badly according to Phillippovsky: "

              I think it's time for me to sit down for the article on maneuvering in the outset of the battle :)))))
              1. A_Mazkov
                A_Mazkov 25 November 2021 18: 01
                +4
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Quote: A_Mazkov
                PS: But it turned out badly according to Phillippovsky: "

                I think it's time for me to sit down for the article on maneuvering in the outset of the battle :)))))


                Better then a series of articles, as you wrote about the battle in the Yellow Sea.

                But it will be difficult, because when reading the testimonies, reports and memories of the Tsushima battle, including Japanese ones, only the saying "Lies like an eyewitness" comes to mind.
          3. Kayuk
            Kayuk 27 November 2021 20: 32
            +2
            Maneuvering there is generally a rather confusing topic. I'm thinking, sit down at my leisure and try,

            Greetings, Andrey Nikolaevich! For the article, plus.
            The article by M. Klimov is of course written defiantly and even provocatively, but it gave you a new impulse for thoughts and actions. I read the thoughts in this article, and I did not find anything new for myself, everything is true as always for those who carefully read your reasoned articles before.
            As for the actions: Analysis of the maneuvering of squadrons is a very complex topic and so far only Chistyakov has approached it. After that, many new theories and assumptions about this battle appeared. The second version, supporting Chistyakov, I read from B. Galenin. There is even greater continuation of Chistyakov with fantastic conclusions, though not devoid of logic and meaning. And everything seems to converge, but only if - the distance of the first opening of fire from 32 cables .... But no, Aleksandrovsky in his book "Tsushima" writes that the Japanese are still right with the distance (37 cab., Not 32 ), since the senior artillerymen of the ships, and the magazines, and the first reports have survived. True, he writes that in the Japanese scheme we periodically move with 15 knots, which is also not true. But after all, from the first distance, you can then try to establish the course angle of the meeting of the squadrons in this battle, which is why so many spears are broken. I agree that the work here is major, not easy. But it is worth it, because now you look at the official scheme of the outbreak of the battle and you realize that even a non-military man in this position did not start a battle at this angle, where only the bow towers of 5-6 ships can shoot. And this scheme is criticized, and there are many other schemes, but for some reason it is still official ... Everything is very strange, like what we discussed with Alexei Rytik - about the Conclusion on the Tsushima battle, drawn up in 1906 (along with this supposedly official scheme), and published already in September 1917 ...
            Good luck!
          4. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 09: 13
            +1
            A very good idea.
            Better yet, if you prepare material on the real balance of forces.
            Real, taking into account all the known nuances.
            It is very good that you have refuted the version, established in the traditional historiography, about the refueling of the ships of the Russian squadron with fuel.
            And write about the overloading of Japanese ships.
            But it is a pity that after taking one step, you do not take another.
            As early as February 15, 2013, that is, more than eight years ago, on the site "Alternative History" there was an article by the Compatriot "On the issue of overloading battleships in the Russo-Japanese War." , calculated the overload of the flagship Togo.
            According to his calculations, the battleship took, in addition to the normal displacement, another 2191 tons of fuel, ammunition, oil, and water.
            Taking into account its construction overload of 784 tons, the total overload in comparison with the design was 2975 tons.
            Thus, the upper edge of its main belt was approximately thirty centimeters below the waterline. You participated in the discussion of the article. the arguments have convinced you. And then neither the author of the article, nor you went.
            Meanwhile, two conclusions follow from the information provided.
            Firstly: in the Tsushima battle, the Mikasa's waterline was protected only by the upper, short belt 152 mm thick from the Krupp armor. The waterline extremities are not protected. All ships were overloaded, even destroyers. Three modern Japanese battleships grew out of the "Canopus", had approximately the same size and displacement. Accordingly, they took about the same amount of fuel and other materials as the flagship for reloading.
            Taking into account the fact that Sikishima according to the project had a higher belt, and in real life it had less construction overload (510 tons instead of 784 tons for Mikasa)
            then in Tsushima the upper edge of the main belt should have been at the level of the waterline. "Asahi" did not have a construction overload (in any case, I do not have such information), which means that its main belt protruded above the waterline by twenty to twenty-five centimeters. About "Fuji" ("Fuji") for a long time, back in 2004, Balakin wrote: even without overloading with fuel, its booked volume was so small that if the extremities were damaged and filled with water, positive buoyancy was not ensured.
            "Nissin" and "Kassuga" in connection with the overload "drowned" their belts in the extremities under the waterline. It is not known how much the belts of Kamimura's "underdogs" sank, but even before the overload, in normal displacement, they protruded above the waterline by only sixty centimeters.
            Conclusion from the first consequence: the protection of the waterline of most of the Japanese ships was much worse than is commonly thought. This is due to the enormous fuel overload. In fact, "Mikasa" in this regard came close to "Oslyaba", the protection of which, due to overload (construction, operational "0 at the waterline, was provided by the upper short belt 102 mm thick of Harvey armor.)
            Secondly: such a significant increase in displacement caused by fuel overload led to a significant increase in draft, and all this together, to a decrease in travel speed. Real, not achieved under ideal conditions.
            Balakin wrote back in 2004 that the battleship "Fuji" ("Fuji") already in July 1904 could not reach a speed of more than 15 knots. Balakin gave this information in the section on the power plants of Japanese battleships.
            I am not inclined to give rash numbers, and significantly underestimate the speed of this obsolete battleship, significantly overloaded with fuel, in the Battle of Tsushima. I believe that a ship that had a speed of 15 knots before the event cannot maintain this speed after a significant overload.
            For example, in WWI and WWII, no one succeeded, even the Japanese ships. that is, the laws of physics are the same for everyone. Therefore, I consider the speed of 14 knots to be completely realistic for this battleship, and, accordingly, for the entire first Japanese detachment. Likewise for the ships of Kammimura. The same Balakin, in 2006, wrote that the speed of the Azuma by September 1904 did not exceed 16 knots. And he could only hold it for a very short time. Immediately I remember that after the second repair "Varyag" briefly reached a speed of 18 knots, but its long-term speed did not exceed 14 knots. Based on this, I assume that in Tsushima, the real long-term speed of the Azuma, enormously overloaded with fuel, like all Japanese ships, did not exceed 14 knots. And, therefore, the entire Kammimura squad.
      2. 27091965
        27091965 24 November 2021 08: 26
        +13
        Good afternoon.
        Dear Andrey, thank you for the interesting article.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Togo's noose nevertheless did not appear out of nowhere, in the outset of the battle - he kept on the same course, allowing the gunners to show themselves. Then - he went to the "small circle" - he had no other ways to avoid covering the head

        On the issue of actions at the beginning of the battle, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, one can only make a guess. Everything he undertaken coincides very much with what Admiral Philip Howard Colomb wrote about in one of his theories, he pointed out that the superiority in speed of one of the squadrons does not give it an advantage in battle. If a squadron with a lower speed has an advantage in large-caliber guns, then a squadron with an advantage in speed will not be able to win a battle. When making a maneuver to take a more advantageous position in relation to the enemy squadron, the lead ships will come under concentrated artillery fire from the enemy squadron. This was what ZP Rozhdestvensky tried to accomplish by pushing the first detachment to the head of the squadron. But at the same time, Philip Howard Colomb pointed out the need for competent maneuvering, he determined the speed of the squadrons at 15 and 10 knots. I do not know whether ZP Rozhdestvensky was an admirer of the works of Philip Howard Colomb, so I repeat this is just an assumption.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 November 2021 18: 07
          +5
          Quote: 27091965i
          On the issue of actions at the beginning of the battle, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, one can only make a guess. Everything he undertakes is very much the same as what Admiral Philip Howard Colomb wrote about in one of his theories.

          Thanks for the tip! This moment did not occur to me, I will have to look, although there are doubts that Rozhdestvensky fought in Colombes. But anyway:) hi
          1. 27091965
            27091965 25 November 2021 12: 59
            +5
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Thanks for the tip! This moment did not occur to me, I will have to look, although there are doubts that Rozhdestvensky fought in Colombes. But anyway:)


            Andrey in the footnotes to the article of Rear Admiral A. Bubnov "On the 25th Anniversary of the Rusko-Japanese War" there is an indication;

            " Not long before the Battle of Tsushima, the Headquarters of Admiral ZP Rozhdestvensky sent to the ships of the squadron for information (which means he approved of it) a note by LF Dobrotvorsky about the tactics of "modern naval combat" applied to the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Ocean; this tactic is entirely based on the outdated ideas of Fournier, even at a superficial examination, it did not stand up to any criticism, and therefore was not introduced on the squadron ... but at the same time, no other tactics existed on the squadron "

            I wrote the way the text goes in the note.
            I think one can only guess what views ZP Rozhestvensky adhered to when planning the battle, but he did not say anything about it.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              25 November 2021 17: 51
              +3
              Quote: 27091965i
              Not long before the battle of Tsushima, the Headquarters of Admiral Z. P. Rozhdestvensky sent to the ships of the squadron for information (which means he approved of it) a note by L. F. Dobrotvorsky about the tactics of "modern naval combat" as applied to the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Ocean

              Honestly, I'm not sure. He already had a lot of work to do to re-read such notes, and it is unlikely that they should be considered as a guide to action - in part of the same artillery, he did not mind the presence of directly conflicting works on the squadron. At the same time, one was official, and the second, it turns out, was just for information .... Still, according to tactics, one should look at Rozhestvensky's orders. But to dig deeper into the literature distributed by 2TOE, of course, it would be interesting ...
              1. 27091965
                27091965 25 November 2021 20: 43
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Honestly, I'm not sure. He already had a lot of work to do to reread such notes, and they should hardly be considered as a guide to action.


                He had plenty of time for the entire campaign of the squadron, besides, his position obliged him to get acquainted not only with these notes, but also most innovations in matters not only of tactics, but also of artillery, shipbuilding, etc.
      3. Very kind
        Very kind 24 November 2021 10: 33
        +4
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        While I was in my mind, I behaved well,

        and stand in front of the front - is it "while I was in my mind"?
        I saw such bosses in the sea - with NERVOUS maneuvers, and not only senseless but also "put the steering wheel right 5, the steering wheel right 30 !!!" etc.
        and they also used to poke buttons from behind the backs of the operators
        just as pointless
        so not every maneuver at sea makes sense
        to put it mildly
        sometimes - nerves and inability to control them
        1. Very kind
          Very kind 24 November 2021 11: 20
          +1
          Quote: Very kind
          stop the front

          in the sense that I expected him from the Japs
        2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 November 2021 18: 08
          +2
          Quote: Very kind
          and stand in front of the front - is it "while I was in my mind"?

          Yes, Maxim :)))) If you carefully study the circumstances, then there was every chance (and reason to assume) that the squadron was about to go out on the enemy deployed to the front line.
          1. Very kind
            Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 49
            -2
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            reason to assume) that the squadron is about to go out on the enemy deployed to the front line.

            fool
            WHAT KIND?!?!? -
            do not offer false nonsense in the testimony of the ZPR
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              25 November 2021 17: 55
              +3
              Quote: Very kind
              WHAT KIND?!?!? -

              In short, it was under the supervision of cruisers for a long time and it was necessary to wait for the main forces from minute to minute, and walked in a wake ... And there was fog ahead. Perfect trap spot
              Quote: Very kind
              do not offer false nonsense in the testimony of the ZPR

              So it's enough to analyze the visibility of the squadron :))))))
      4. kalibr
        kalibr 24 November 2021 15: 29
        0
        Dear Andrey! I understand everything, read it with interest. But the volume of the article is too large. Such articles are not well received ...
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 November 2021 18: 09
          +2
          Good day, dear Vyacheslav! What to do - Maxim did not want to stretch the answer to 2 articles
          1. kalibr
            kalibr 24 November 2021 18: 21
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Maxim did not want to stretch the answer to 2 articles

            That is why I wrote that I "understand." But you still think in terms of the future ...
    3. Edward Vashchenko
      Edward Vashchenko 24 November 2021 06: 57
      +4
      Vladislav,
      good morning.
      The articles are good and the discussion is wonderful.
      But, amateurish,
      there is no reliance on sources and historiography, photos of some documents taken out of context, with which there is also a hodgepodge, just a dispute between: I see this way, and I see it this way. "
      And in this perspective, the dispute can be endless.
      I repeat, no references to primary sources, documents of headquarters, archives of the Navy, memoirs of participants, with their verification by other evidence, etc. Just on the page of Novikov-Surf, with all due respect to this, my beloved writer since childhood.
      Yours faithfully,
      hi
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        24 November 2021 07: 02
        +12
        Forgive me, it's like - there is no support? :)))) I usually indicate in articles where from what comes from Tsushima - I usually write on the basis of official historiography (six volumes), with appendices, since there are officers' reports, testimony of the commission of inquiry, etc. Official history Japanese - Meiji, translations of Japanese media reports by interested ...
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 24 November 2021 07: 05
          +9
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Excuse me, is it like there is no support?

          E. Vaschenko, the official historian, candidate and.s. own point of view smile
          1. Edward Vashchenko
            Edward Vashchenko 24 November 2021 12: 50
            +2
            Dear Andrey Nikolaevich,
            this is not a point of view laughing , that's just how it works.
            The author has his own opinion, has the right, but this is dilettantism, in a good way, but dilettantism.
            If you went to school, you are probably familiar with history textbooks, who wrote them? Where did A. Pushkin or A. Dumas come from to find out about Boris Godunov or Richelieu to write their wonderful inventions?
            Where did the respected author of this article come from? He didn’t sit in the archives of the Navy, etc., he doesn’t read Japanese?
            etc. etc.
            All this was done by historians and according to the methods that I described.
            And in a friend appeared ... thorns, people learned to read, read one or two books by the same historians and found "terrible contradictions" !!! Where there!
            And the province went to dance: historians know nothing.
            I think, before you say this, you need to at least achieve a little something in your specialty.
            How is it in the Bible: in someone else's eye?
            Yours faithfully,
            hi
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 24 November 2021 14: 54
              +8
              Thank God I graduated from school (one might say Soviet) without grades. I like to read books since childhood (thanks to my parents), especially historical and nautical ones. And what is Samon interesting when he asked the now-poorer history teacher questions designed to deepen his knowledge, and the answer was "Glinsky, I give what you are supposed to know." This is because of WHAT we were taught in school. With the advent of the Internet, there has simply been a lot more data. It remains only to tie them together and draw certain conclusions for yourself. And suddenly it turns out that historians often operate with data as it suits them. Often you see references to works that are no different from the one where the infa is taken from. On uncomfortable questions, on other points of view, which are based on archeology, genetics, the same mechanics, chemistry, historians frankly lay down a bolt. Even the usual logic is lame! Many are declared to be almost heretics. You don't have to go far - Volansei's studies of the Slavic language are ignored because the unreadable Etruscan inscriptions suddenly began to speak if they were disassembled on the basis of the Slavic runic alphabet. Brick, invented at the end of the 15th century, resurfaces in 12th century temples. Historians are not sinless, and they do not want to accept conclusions that do not suit them, and they do not want to carry out revision with the involvement of narrower specialists, because the whole chronology will collapse.
              I read both the official works of the authors with regalia, and the so-called alternatives. And often for me the latter win. Because they dig, search, think and analyze, and do not refer only to the convenient conclusions of other authors in regalia.
              Come on, if historians would give quite logical and reasonable answers, but they are immediately hostile - ignorant, how dare you doubt the science of history and do not believe historians. Read books and continue in the same spirit. Tested on its own skin smile
              Poscriptum. History textbooks may have been written by respected people, but where is the guarantee that this version of history is true? Do you give it ?? Or it will continue to be "probably", "we suppose" to be accepted as true wink
              I repeat, I have read and read a lot, and for me "paper will endure everything" does not work. Metallurgy, paper, coins, and more recently paintings with architecture and linguists refute many historical statements. For me personally.
              Not everything is so clear ...
              Yours faithfully, hi
              Pps I am sorry for the spelling, I am writing from the phone
              1. Edward Vashchenko
                Edward Vashchenko 24 November 2021 15: 29
                +1
                And suddenly it turns out that historians often operate with data as it suits them. Often you see references to works that are no different from the one where the infa is taken from. On uncomfortable questions, on other points of view, which are based on archeology, genetics, the same mechanics, chemistry, historians frankly lay down a bolt. Even the usual logic is lame!

                Andrey Nikolaevich,
                so it is in life! Didn't you notice? And among historians there are non-professionals, opportunists, like everywhere else.

                I fired perhaps a couple of dozen IT employees whose logic was lame and everything that you listed, but on this basis I can't even think of drawing conclusions that IT employees are not familiar with the logic of life, etc. For me, such a conclusion is just evidence of its absence.
                Is it strange to hear that historians are ignoring something? numismatics or something, so this is a part of historical science and all research on numismatics is done by historians. Archaeologists are also historians. Various types of chemical, etc. it was archaeologists, not chemists, who brought it into archaeological analysis. Anthropology is also historians.
                Mathematical methods of analysis in the historical sciences, also a discipline that historians teach and apply.
                I repeat, everything that you know about history, everything is provided by humanity exclusively by historians, from the twentieth century. exclusively by professional historians. But any science is developing, what was relevant in the 19th century, in the 21st looks extremely naive, but this is the case in all sciences, especially those related to the development of man and his society.

                And the last, I am now talking about the "deniers". You can argue with someone who has equal or similar knowledge. It's like a five year old will prove a mechanic. that he is not repairing the car like that. When a "refutation" comes, who has never seen the chronicle, cannot read in Old Russian, is not familiar with the tradition, and begins to prove that everything in the chronicles is not so. Well, how it's called then?
                By the way, why be unfounded, give examples of the works of professional historians that you read, and someone refuted them there?
                Yours faithfully,
                Edward
                1. Rurikovich
                  Rurikovich 24 November 2021 21: 50
                  +3
                  Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
                  Well, how it's called then?

                  This, dear Edward, is called a different point of view. smile
                  you have not convinced me, I do not intend to enter into polemics with you, because it will not lead to anything anyway. You will stay yours. I'm at my place.
                  Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
                  I repeat, everything that you know about history, everything is provided by humanity exclusively by historians,

                  This is what leads to the fact that many alternative versions appear, because what is written by historians raises questions.
                  I have long sworn not to enter into polemics with historians, because in this case it is useless. Give a link? And the point is if historians will still appeal only by the fact that they will only believe in the references of the same official historians as they request I will give. At least read A. Tamansky "Another history of the Roman Empire" hi
                  1. Edward Vashchenko
                    Edward Vashchenko 27 November 2021 11: 15
                    0
                    A. Tamansky "Another history of the Roman Empire"

                    Good morning,
                    the point is that none of the "alternative" will name the works of scientists, in which something is not the same, but will pass off his fantasy as truth.
                    I asked you "not those" works of professional historians (although of course there is a marriage here, I can say and name it). and not alternatives, who, like a certain Tamansky in Latin and Ancient Greek, does not read, but to try to talk about something, any grandfathers playing dominoes will tell stories better.
                    Don't read nonsense, don't ruin your karma.
                    But I haven't watched YouTube, I'll take a look.
                    Yours faithfully,
                    hi
                    1. unknown
                      unknown 28 November 2021 09: 30
                      0
                      Kalyuzhny and Volansky ":" Another history of wars "," Another history of technology "," Another history of literature ".
                      Need a more solid approach?
                      Read Andrey Stepanenko's live journal.
                      Real historians constantly participate in the comments.
                      1. Edward Vashchenko
                        Edward Vashchenko 28 November 2021 15: 10
                        0
                        Dear ignoto,
                        Read Andrey Stepanenko's live journal.

                        Leave your advice to yourself, somehow I myself can figure out what to read. Moreover, wasting time on all sorts of rubbish.
                        good
                    2. Rurikovich
                      Rurikovich 28 November 2021 14: 22
                      +1
                      Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
                      the point is that none of the "alternative" will name the works of scientists, in which something is not the same, but will pass off his fantasy as truth.

                      That says it all smile
                      Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
                      Don't read nonsense, don't ruin your karma.

                      Believe me, very often the works of historians look exactly like nonsense from the point of view of logic and common sense.
                      hi
                      how someone Tamansky does not read Latin and ancient Greek, but to try to talk about something, any grandfathers playing dominoes will tell you more interesting stories.

                      You see, you have not even read it, but already a priori delivered a verdict. And the problem is not that they do not give references to official historians, on the contrary, a lot of them are given, because on the basis of officialdom, research is done showing how ambiguous everything is in official history. The bottom line is, you don't even want to understand on what basis certain conclusions are drawn. And often they are made on the basis of available materials. Only not those that are written by official historians, but those that they do not even consider, adjusting the results to their work. Because you now have a lot of opponents, because you know in advance the answer you need. Therefore, you have Pompeii and perish in 79, as you need, and not in 1631, as the cards say ...
                      1. Edward Vashchenko
                        Edward Vashchenko 28 November 2021 15: 07
                        0
                        Believe me, very often the works of historians look exactly like nonsense from the point of view of logic and common sense.

                        That's all, pardon the ball blah, not a single work of professional historians, where something is wrong.
                        Words words words ... sorry ... to the wind.
                        PS I know such works. But I'm not unfounded ...
                        hi
                      2. Rurikovich
                        Rurikovich 28 November 2021 18: 10
                        +1
                        Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
                        professional historians, where something is wrong.

                        You, like all historians, are fixated on covering up your own kind. To you, if a person has given his opinion and it is logically and technically different from those recognized by historians, but he is not a professional historian, then he is a priori wrong smile You need proof of his work to be recognized by you, learned historians. Vicious circle request
                        In the post below, you virtually all the opinions of people who do not agree with the school curriculum declared heresy smile
                        Because they question the works of scholarly historians ....
                        You know, Edward, in any case I will remain unconvinced. Because I have long doubted the HISTORICAL SCIENCE, which itself winds among the three pines. This is my personal opinion. It's just that I'm already tired of reading about the nonsense of the Tatar-Mongol yoke and nonsense about "forgotten and then remembered" in order to justify the lengthening of the chronology on paper. Because you will never accept opinions other than those of your own kind, and there will still be more of us, those who look wider than official historians.
                        Therefore, in order not to have these welds on the site, I will not comment on your work. As I do not comment on Shpakovsky (well, except for the marine theme smile ). As a person, I have no questions for you, we have discrepancies in our knowledge. And since you are a Ph.D., and I am not, then it will be impossible to prove something to you, because I do not cite the work of other Ph.D. or ordinary historians smile And you will not prove anything to me, because for a number of my own knowledge based on logical, technical reasons, I will not accept your work (especially on Ancient Rus) as the truth.
                        PS On the facade of the Villa Pharaone Minnela, 15 km from Naples, there is an epitaph dedicated to the eruption of Vesuvius on December 15, 1631. among the cities that perished in this eruption, Pompeii and Herculaneum are also mentioned. Do you like Latin? Here's the original

                        Well, if you are too lazy to translate, then here is the translation:
                        "68 years later, on the 17th calendars of January (December 16, 1631) in the reign of Philip IV.

                        Smoke, flame, roar, vibrations, ash, the eruption of Vesuvius, which was terribly wild at that time, obviously aroused fear in not one, but among the masses of people.

                        The incandescent heat from the opening of the fiery cave, roaring furiously loudly, punched a path through the holding surface to the exit, moved towards the Hellespont, violently destroyed the top of the mountain, monstrously and suddenly opening the mouth of the mountain wide open, the next day the tail of ash dragged everything like a sea, a hostile sea.

                        A river of sulfur, burning bitumen, fetid alum stones, various deformed metal ores, a mixture of water and fire, sweeping avalanches, smoke, ash, disastrous sewage unloaded the ridge of the mountain.

                        Pompeii, Herculaneum, Octavianum, partially Retina and Portici, forests and villas, and houses in an instant scattered, burned, destroyed, (flowing) carrying it all in front of him, like prey in a mad devastating triumph. In fact, marble monuments have also disappeared, they are deeply buried, the inquiring monument to the Viceroy was indeed destroyed. Emmanuel Fonseca and Zunica. As a memory of the scale of the human disaster, as well as of the measures taken to free ourselves from the stone rain and completely rescue each of our fellow tribesmen.

                        Year of Salvation 1634. Prefect of the road Antonio Suarez Messia. "

                        About a number of indirect signs confirming the death of cities in the 17th century, and not 2000 years ago, you can find yourself on the Internet. Only official historians do not notice this, but those who want to know the real history will find ... wink
                        https://ss69100.livejournal.com/3670870.html
                        Just do not say that SUCH evidence is fake - it does not paint historians who declare such findings as heresy or silence them. In the 21st century, there is much more information than in Soviet textbooks and it will no longer be possible to hide behind authority. Now there are no authorities - now there is information and if they are confirmed (even if it does not coincide with officialdom), then it is more authoritative than regalia ...
                        I will no longer bother you with my "ignorance" in the vastness of VO, continue to live in your own world. I will live and develop in mine.
                        With best regards, hi
                      3. Edward Vashchenko
                        Edward Vashchenko 28 November 2021 20: 02
                        +2
                        Andrey Nikolaevich,
                        good evening,
                        I don't care much about this story (about Vesuvius), but the stele you cited about the eruption in 1631 is clearly written there?
                        what does the eruption of 79 have to do with it?
                        Vesuvius periodically erupts. The fact that someone's author, an "alternative," lacks causal relationships is not a reason to confuse different events.
                        Moreover, I myself was, as a tourist, both at the excavations and in Naples, in the Archaeological Museum, and the finds there are in huge numbers and, of course, have absolutely nothing to do with the material culture of the 17th century.
                        And if it comes to that, Logic just tells us that the arguments of the alternativeist cited by you are just devoid of logic itself: a person is not able to logically connect processes, and even more so to justify them. Such behavior of your disliked "historians" and other humanitarians is called "pralogical thinking", i.e. thinking completely devoid of logic.
                        Forgive me for one more remark, but what kind of connection between Logic and technical specialty, by God, I don’t know. Logic as a science arose as a philosophical trend, associated not with technology, but with abstract thinking, and so it remains today. Do not confuse logic and mathematics, social life partially has philosophical logical laws and is not organized according to mathematical laws.
                        You don’t live by the laws of mathematics, you don’t plan your life with the help of a mathematical model, or you check what you have lived with mathematical analysis?
                        Think about it.
                        But logic tells us not to believe PR people, mmm and the like, including the naive and completely illogical, as our ancestors wrote, cunning wisdom.
                        And finally, dear Andrei Nikolaevich, here at VO I constantly have to deal with chauvinism on the part of people with a technical education or specialty. YOU are certainly not like that, but I am not just a historian who spent his whole life in the quiet of offices. This is a hobby in my first and favorite profession.
                        I am writing just to convey scientific knowledge, in a world where ignoramuses have flooded everything. Our entire country has turned into an alternative, where instead of professionals, alternative workers work, wherever you look. Think about it.
                        As for technology, I think that few of my arguing opponents can boast that he did not just work at a factory, but built it like me.
                        I dare not detain you any longer.
                        Always ready for constructive discussion.
                        Yours faithfully,
                        Edward
                      4. Rurikovich
                        Rurikovich 28 November 2021 22: 27
                        0
                        Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
                        I don't care much about this story (about Vesuvius), but the stele you cited about the eruption in 1631 is clearly written there?
                        what does the eruption of 79 have to do with it?
                        Vesuvius periodically erupts. The fact that someone's author, an "alternative," lacks causal relationships is not a reason to confuse different events.
                        Nicely jumped off
                        laughing I brought this to you so that you would understand that Pompeii and Herculaneum died in 1631, which is clearly indicated. And this does not fit in any way with the 79th year. Bingo wink And the fact that "some alternative man" pointed out this, so it is clear, this is not an argument for historians ...
                        Forgive me for one more remark, but what kind of connection between Logic and technical specialty, by God, I don’t know.

                        And I will briefly explain to you. It is one thing to write on paper (paper will endure everything), and another thing to TECHNOLOGICALLY substantiate the possibility of making a certain thing in a certain period of time. If scientists from mineralology say that glass in the form in which it was found in excavations in Pompeii was learned, for example, to make in the Middle Ages, then how does it date from the 79th year? , then it crystallizes, darkens, and after another couple of hundred years it becomes a mineral. That is, in the 500 years that have passed before the historical discovery of Pompeii, there would not have been transparent glass. And they were ... Miracles ... If metallurgists say that cranes from such an alloy learned to make in the Middle Ages, then how they ended up in Pompeii. In order to obtain the same bronze, it is necessary to withstand a certain temperature of 1700 degrees and the proportions of the components. This is why today there are so many opponents in the official history! But because she neglects other branches of knowledge. Therefore, when the same Tamansky (and the person has carried out an enormous analytical work BASED ON OFFICIAL DATA. One can argue with him in some places, BUT! with a certain technical order, with the emergence and development of metallurgy, and for the smelting of certain alloys, furnaces with certain temperature characteristics are needed, for this you need FUEL with certain characteristics, for this you need a BRICK, which, according to official data, appeared in the 950th century. Technologically very difficult it is sensible to link up what is in reality and what historians say. The man tried very hard to do this, and personally I have more confidence in him than in the historian proving fables 15-2 years ago. And he explained it much more logically and more clearly than official historians. And even why Roman coins are found all along the route of Vasco de Gama to India precisely in the places of his anchorage, and in India itself. Explain how the coins of the sunken state with images of the so-called Roman emperors got to the east coast of Africa and to India ... And the man explained.
                        I mean, dear Edward, that in today's world, with its accessibility to information, you can learn a lot of interesting things. And you don't have to have degrees in history to do that. Therefore, it is much more interesting when not only historians, but also metallurgists, chemists, geologists, builders, linguists, geneticists, artists are connected to the explanation of historical absurdities. With their knowledge, the picture becomes clearer and clearer. smile
                        I am writing just to convey scientific knowledge, in a world where ignoramuses have flooded everything. Our entire country has turned into an alternative, where instead of professionals, alternative workers work, wherever you look. Think about it

                        The fact of the matter is that I think ... It's just that the unscientific knowledge of the comrades described above does not always coincide with the scientific knowledge of historians.
                        And people who do not agree with your conclusions on the basis of any of their conclusions can always be called ignorant ... Or ignorant ... And I also agree with this wording when it really comes down to fool people, such as flat-earthers of different ... But when people painstakingly prove the erroneousness of historical truths with an evidence base based on technological knowledge regarding the subject of the search, then believe me, they are worthy that their opinion would be listened to, analyzed and taken into account, if the truth is really in what they unearthed.
                        True, dear Edward, it can be much more interesting than fiction. hi
                        PS I’m not just being opponents of historians. Because I want to UNDERSTAND why certain things look like this, and not BELIEVE what they tell you. And if I am convinced of something for myself, then the evidence base of my knowledge is much clearer and more logical than the officially proposed one.
                        I, dear Edward, a person who is still thinking, able to analyze something and draw certain conclusions.
                        With all respect, Andrew hi
                      5. Liam
                        Liam 28 November 2021 23: 26
                        +2
                        Quote: Rurikovich
                        On the facade of the Villa Pharaone Minnela, 15 km from Naples, there is an epitaph dedicated to the eruption of Vesuvius on December 15, 1631. among the cities that died in this eruption, Pompeii and Herculaneum are also mentioned

                        You will probably be surprised, but cities with the same names exist for now in those places. And they existed in the Middle Ages. 500 - fake and hoax by unscrupulous official historians, but in fact everything happened in 79)

                      6. Edward Vashchenko
                        Edward Vashchenko 28 November 2021 15: 12
                        +1
                        Therefore, you have Pompeii and perish in 79, as you need, and not in 1631, as the cards say ...

                        It is strange after this to ask questions why people who graduated from the Soviet school destroyed the USSR and continue to destroy Russia.
                        As the saying goes, the proof is there.
                        hi
                  2. unknown
                    unknown 28 November 2021 09: 27
                    0
                    This is called historiography.
                2. Rurikovich
                  Rurikovich 26 November 2021 20: 07
                  +1
                  Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
                  It's like a five year old will prove a mechanic. that he is not repairing the car like that. When a "refutation" comes, who has not seen the chronicles in his eyes, who cannot read in Old Russian, who is not familiar with the tradition, and begins to prove that everything in the annals is not so

                  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kRI6xk89UXs
                  Just like an opinion hi
              2. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 24 November 2021 23: 24
                +6
                Quote: Rurikovich
                You don't have to go far - Volansei's studies of the Slavic language are ignored because the unreadable Etruscan inscriptions suddenly began to speak if they were disassembled on the basis of the Slavic runic alphabet.

                Why are they ignored .. Repeatedly came across "explanations" that the name Etruscan (Rassen) means Russian. The level of argumentation is, however, about the same as in stories about ancient Ukrainians .. lol
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 26 November 2021 12: 26
                  +2
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  The level of argumentation is, however, about the same as in stories about ancient Ukrainians.

                  That is a rare case when I absolutely agree with you!
              3. Vagabung
                Vagabung 25 November 2021 22: 05
                +1
                Without triples and "lay down". But....
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. Edward Vashchenko
          Edward Vashchenko 24 November 2021 12: 17
          +6
          Dear Andrew,
          I wrote that the dispute is interesting, but amateurish, although there is nothing wrong with it, as it seems to me, there is nothing.
          The fact is that when we talk about a professional approach, we are talking primarily about the use of all sources, knowledge of the source language is a determining condition, and at least knowledge and use of most of the scientific literature on this issue.
          Does anyone, having studied some documents, have the right to make their own opinion, of course and certainly yes. But whether it will be professional research - of course not.
          This will be just an opinion, which can in no way be equal to scientific work.
          Again, I liked everything very much, as a reader, but I expressed my opinion from the point of view of a professional assessment.
          Yours faithfully,
          Edward
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            24 November 2021 18: 25
            +6
            Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
            The fact is that when we talk about a professional approach, we are talking primarily about the use of all sources, knowledge of the source language is a determining condition, and at least knowledge and use of most of the scientific literature on this issue.

            Dear Edward, you understand that with such requirements, the overwhelming majority of sources on RYV should be sent to the dustbin of history.
            As for me, I still write my articles not at the level of some documents - due to the fact that the RSL translates many documents into publicly available electronic archives, I get many opportunities, and as for Russian-language works on the topic of RJV - I read them if not all, so 85-90 percent, starting from Novikov-Priboy and Semenov and to Polutov and Polomoshnov.

            Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
            But whether it will be professional research - of course not.

            Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
            whether it will be professional research - of course not.

            Articles are my hobby, not my main income. This is how my professional activity is in a completely different field. Yes, I would love to do professional research, but who will give me the money and who will feed my three children at this time?
            Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
            This will be just an opinion, which can in no way be equal to scientific work.

            Yes, I, in general, do not pretend.
            1. Edward Vashchenko
              Edward Vashchenko 24 November 2021 19: 09
              +4
              Andrew,
              in no case did I want to accuse you of anything, forgive me if this is so.
              Yours faithfully,
              Edward
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                24 November 2021 19: 11
                +5
                I understand, and absolutely no claim hi
                Now, if I live to retire, I’ll turn around there :)))))
            2. unknown
              unknown 28 November 2021 09: 34
              -1
              I would like you to use all available information in your articles, not excluding information that does not fit into your concept, as many historians do.
          2. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 09: 32
            0
            The level of scientific work is often very low, from the point of view of professional assessment.
      2. Kote Pan Kokhanka
        Kote Pan Kokhanka 24 November 2021 14: 08
        +8
        Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
        The articles are good and the discussion is wonderful.
        But, amateurish,
        there is no reliance on sources and historiography, photos of some documents taken out of context, with which there is also a hodgepodge, just a dispute between: I see this way, and I see it this way. "
        And in this perspective, the dispute can be endless.

        Good afternoon Edward, good day comrades! Three times I tried to post my comment under Andrey's article - it did not work.
        Well, God loves the stubborn trying the fourth time.
        The question of amateurism.
        At the suggestion of Edward, I was puzzled who in our homeland could professionally illuminate the issue of Tsushima and the navy in particular, and alas, I came to the conclusion that only the teaching staff of three military universities. Moreover, professionally, only two have (had) military history departments (with appropriate academic advice and dissertations on the topic of military history). I do not specifically mention the names of universities, because further it is sad. In the open access, none of the applicants for scientific degrees speaks the language of the second half of the sources about Tsushima (that is, Japanese).
        So, technically, Edward is right.
        Now let's get back to our "rams". Unexpectedly for myself, digging all this husk, I found two fresh dissertations on Borodin's topic (abstract). That is, on the topic, where in principle there is nothing to catch for as long as a century, new defenses have gone !!!
        So early are we burying Tsushima?
        Andrey has been digging the topic for seven years and honestly, in my opinion, he has already achieved an evolution on the topic at the level of other “historians from the plow”. Yes, not Dotsenko, but already close to Shirokorad. Yes, he is greatly hampered by bias against certain personalities of history, but many of our and not our historians suffered from this. For example - Shtenzil.
        I personally disagree with many of Andrey's theses, but I respect him as an Author with whom one can discuss. And I admit that lately it has become more and more difficult for me to discuss with him because of the high-quality baggage of his knowledge.
        Conclusions: yes Eduard Andrey's articles on VO are not science, but high-quality journalism. But it is far from being a tabloid press, but painstaking work, which, as it is not surprising, has scientific potential. Let the methodology and "limp", since he, as the author of articles, did not set himself the tasks of scientific novelty, but works with open and published sources. Moreover, their volume is impressive.
        P.S. If you see your grandson or granddaughter, the head of the department must comply with three conditions of the respected Edward (see his commentary). Seriously, the topic is not a godfather and is waiting for its Rybakov and Fortyanov !!!
        Sincerely, Vlad!
        1. Edward Vashchenko
          Edward Vashchenko 24 November 2021 15: 10
          +2
          Thank you Vladislav for such an extensive comment!
          I am rather not for you, but in general.
          Once again I will add that I did not in any way make claims to Andrey that the topic was "not the right one" or that it was written "not so", but on the contrary, I really liked his ideas. I myself am far from the topic, you cannot be an expert in everything, but as a child I read the 4-volume Novikov-Priboi book to holes ... and so on.
          I wrote only and only what is the difference between a scientific and an amateur trip.
          And, by the way, we have an example when a person who is fond of history, Isaev, became a professional ... but he strove for this and did not reject the generally accepted principles of research.
          PS Possibly on Borodino historiographic topics? and perhaps there is no dissertation on them laughing

          Yours faithfully,
          hi
      3. unknown
        unknown 28 November 2021 09: 25
        0
        Unfortunately, reliance on sources and historiography does not provide much.
        And this applies not only to this historical event.
        All traditional history is bursting at the seams.
        And it began when the techies came to the study of history.
        At the moment, there are several researchers who have made significant progress in studying the history of our civilization.
        First of all, I would single out Andrey Stepanenko, who has been studying real history for more than twenty-five years. His new developments regularly appear in his live journal, and there are professional historians among the competent commentators.
    4. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 24 November 2021 07: 53
      -5
      Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
      if you could not avoid the battle, then do at least something! Alas, during Tsushima on the part of the vice admiral, not even to win, but to "get out of the battle with his head raised" was done exactly - nothing.

      the fact that Andrei their Ch is trying to smear the coward and traitor Rozhesvensky raises questions ... the very concept and logic of Andrei is depressing illogicality ... suppose the Japanese would begin to move away at high speed from our ships, as Andrei writes ... well and what do we need? we simply push them out, and they actually give us a passage into the Japanese sea, which is what we need! Rojesvensky's main betrayal was in the formation of ships not by the front, but by a marching column, and as a result, the issuance of battleships to the Japanese one by one to be torn apart ... Klimov (despite the fact that he often argues with me) is right. you can discuss the effectiveness of atrillery, speed if they are given the opportunity to shoot and move, and if everyone is hidden behind the head and he is fighting alone, then one is not a warrior in the sea, against four ... the bastard Roesvensky aggravated his betrayal = the culprit of the death of thousands of sailors with a shameful flight at the beginning of the battle
      1. Pilat2009
        Pilat2009 24 November 2021 10: 13
        +7
        [quote = vladimir1155 [/ quote]
        the fact that Andrei their Ch is trying to smear the coward and traitor Rozhesvensky raises questions ... the very concept and logic of Andrei is depressing illogicality ... suppose the Japanese would begin to move away at high speed from our ships, as Andrei writes ... well and what do we need? we simply push them out, and they actually give us a passage into the Japanese sea, which is what we need! / quote]
        And we get a turnip from the whole squadron
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 24 November 2021 10: 20
          0
          Quote: Pilat2009
          And we get a turnip from the whole squadron

          in your words there is neither sense nor logic, explain what kind of turnip is and why did you decide what they will receive (list), from whom and to whom? so that despite the large number of Japanese destroyers, they had four times less battleships than the Russians, while we still had cruisers that could snipe Japanese destroyers ... and more, even if the entire fleet had not been torn even if there were losses ... worse than what happened in tsushima is hard to imagine, it was a collective beating of Russian ships one by one, betrayal is obvious
          1. Pilat2009
            Pilat2009 24 November 2021 10: 30
            +5
            Quote: vladimir1155
            Quote: Pilat2009
            And we get a turnip from the whole squadron

            in your words there is neither sense nor logic, explain what kind of turnip is and why did you decide what they will receive (list), from whom and to whom? so that despite the large number of Japanese destroyers, they had four times less battleships than the Russians, while we still had cruisers that could snipe Japanese destroyers ... and more, even if the entire fleet had not been torn even if there were losses ... worse than what happened in tsushima is hard to imagine, it was a collective beating of Russian ships one by one, betrayal is obvious

            In the article, everything has already been chewed up - 5 ebras break away from the rest in the hope of closing the distance, the Japanese leave them, holding them under fire, while the Japanese at any time can turn left or right, engulfing them, or breaking into 2 squads. it was, as it were, more than ours. You calculate the battle, knowing its outcome, Rozhdestvensky did not know the outcome
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 24 November 2021 10: 50
              -3
              Quote: Pilat2009
              5 ebras break away from the rest in the hope of closing the distance, the Japanese leave them, holding them under fire, while the Japanese can turn left or right at any moment, engulfing them, or breaking into 2 squads. US
              Well, at first, the Japanese had an advantage in speed, but not total, that is, just bypassing our 5 ebr from the flanks (while being under fire from our five (and not one BR) the Japanese would not have succeeded ... so your concept is not tenacious , especially since we did not have 5 ebr! but much more ... I already announced that it was obvious that it was necessary to line up in the FRONT with ALL battleships, single-turret in the middle, double-turret sickle covering the positions of the Japanese so as to use both towers, along the edges of the cruiser for the anti-mine fight, and only transports behind the formation ... but even your concept about the line of the strongest in front, is still more fruitful than the treacherous advancement of a marching column, obviously vicious, for everyone even a little bit familiar with tactics, this does not need tsushima for this they knew ancient Greeks
              1. unknown
                unknown 28 November 2021 09: 38
                +1
                The Japanese did not have an advantage in speed, in reality they could not give more than 14 knots. All Japanese ships were heavily overloaded with fuel. So, "Mikasa", according to calculations, took in addition to the design normal displacement of about 2191 tons. Taking into account the construction overload of 784 tons, its total overload in relation to the design normal displacement was approximately 2975 tons.
            2. Very kind
              Very kind 24 November 2021 11: 09
              -1
              Quote: Pilat2009
              5 EBRs break away from the rest in the hope of closing the distance

              AND THEY REDUCE IT
              up to the SURE PERFORATION distance
              Quote: Pilat2009
              the Japanese are leaving them

              do they jump on Mikasa? lol

              Quote: Pilat2009
              the Japanese can turn left or right at any time

              "you are welcome" - for all this at sharply reduced distances
              and to retreat to increase - to leave knocked out for finishing
              Quote: Pilat2009
              The Japanese had more cruisers than we did

              only now they are perforated at the correct distances at once
          2. Trapperxnumx
            Trapperxnumx 24 November 2021 10: 54
            +6
            Quote: vladimir1155
            they had four times less battleships than the Russians

            Wow! That is, we had 16 ebres? cool. And Rozhestvensky, a scoundrel, apparently drowned 4 of his own people the day before.
            Well, then, do you really equate Ushakov and Asahi?
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 24 November 2021 11: 01
              -6
              Quote: Trapper7
              Do you really equate Ushakov and Asahi?
              Well, Ushakov did not participate ... but in vain .... about the quantity? the Yaps had only a couple of decent EBRs, but at the same time they were still inferior to Borodin, so Ushakov was also a battleship and in the squadron he would have been a good judge too, so we had an advantage in EBR by about 4 times, you underestimate the capabilities of our fleet both in shells and in the composition of ships ... Just the obvious betrayal saddens you and you are psychologically trying to escape into a kind of virtual blue chimera where there is no betrayal, but there are simply shortcomings of ships and shells ... especially after reading other traitors publicly declaring his dream of "imitating Russia in the war" who sent terrorists to destroy Makarov and Kondratenko with terrorist attacks, and ... blamed the tsar for everything .... "The revolutionary class cannot but wish defeat for its government."
              Lenin openly advocated the defeat of Russia in the war https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2015/07/26_a_7656873.shtml
            2. unknown
              unknown 28 November 2021 09: 44
              +1
              Why equate "Ushakov" with "Asahi"?
              The Japanese have only four battleships with 12 "guns.
              One is outdated, with an incomplete waterline belt, non-rapid-fire main caliber mounts, mostly barely armored by medium-caliber artillery. And speed, up to Tsushima at 15 knots.
              All Japanese ships entered Tsushima overloaded, for example, the Mikasa's main belt sank thirty centimeters under the water, leaving a short 152 mm thick upper belt to protect the waterline.
              In addition to battleships, the Japanese have eight low-speed armored cruisers, the main caliber of which was loaded with 95,3 kg shells.
              The mass of the Ushakov projectile is 254 mm, -225 kg.
      2. Ol willy
        Ol willy 24 November 2021 17: 47
        +8
        Christmas coward? Prince Suvorov came under fire at around two o'clock in the afternoon, Rozhestvensky was removed from the ship only around five, moreover, wounded in the head. Moreover, they were looking for him for quite a long time: the wheelhouse was ripped into trash, and Rozhdestvensky himself was found in one of the gun turrets where he tried to command fire.

        At the trial he asked to be shot for himself, was pardoned
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 24 November 2021 18: 42
          -6
          Quote: Ol Willy
          At the trial he asked to be shot for himself, was pardoned

          I haven't seen, I'm not sure, I don't believe
        2. Very kind
          Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 46
          -2
          Quote: Ol Willy
          Christmas coward?

          COWARD
          At the trial he asked to be shot for himself, was pardoned

          he knew perfectly well that after the H2 telegram, if he kept silent (about the really significant), then nothing bad would happen for him
      3. mmaxx
        mmaxx 25 November 2021 04: 20
        +2
        A coward and a traitor shouldn't be called. There was no ZPR for either one or the other.
        Just the usual incompetence emanating from the general order in the fleet and the country.
        Apparently, he also broke down mentally before the fight. Because everything did not go as it had seen from St. Petersburg. This I refer to that doom and planlessness along the passage of the Tsushima Strait. According to the principle: come what may.
    5. Doctor
      Doctor 24 November 2021 08: 52
      -2
      To be honest, I have only one complaint about Z.P. Rozhdestvensky - if you could not avoid the battle, then do at least something! Alas, during Tsushima on the part of the vice admiral, not even to win, but to "get out of the battle with his head raised" was done exactly - nothing.

      Yes sir. In fact, they just continued to drill forward, giving Togo complete freedom of action.
    6. Jura 27
      Jura 27 24 November 2021 09: 50
      +2
      [/ quote] But Mikasa will no longer be there. Because all these 8 minutes calculated by M. Klimov he was moving away from the point at which the Japanese flagship was at the moment of the opening of fire by "Suvorov". I left on the same 15 nodes, having walked the same 8 cables in 20 minutes. [Quote]

      So this is great, "Suvorov" comes out from under the fire of Japanese nasal guns, and 6 "s, including the starboard fires the outgoing Nissin, the left side of the Kamimura flagship, that is, cuts the yapov into two parts, + lethal short distance on relatively weakly armored Japanese battleships "for the poor".
    7. Very kind
      Very kind 24 November 2021 12: 10
      +1
      Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
      if you could not avoid the fight

      in this one phrase defeat is laid
      Tsushima (even if it took place anywhere else) could not help but be a BATTLE WITH DECISIVE GOALS
      and one side was preparing for this, and the other "hoped to endure"
  2. The comment was deleted.
  3. Edward Vashchenko
    Edward Vashchenko 24 November 2021 06: 51
    +5
    "the Japanese have Togo, and we have ANYONE"

    They knew this already in 1905.
  4. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 24 November 2021 06: 51
    +7
    Damn, it is necessary to give articles on the subject of RYAV either in the evening or on weekends, because when you go to work in the morning and you only have time to read, there is no time for an intelligible opinion crying
    Briefly - I respect adequate, intelligible authors who write on the case, logically and reasoned yes hi
    This material is a plus. But I would like that when passions boil, the truth does not evaporate ...
    Even before the battles on the AO, I had questions about the throwing of the front line, so I personally always considered this to be absurd, especially with increased combat ranges and speeds compared to sailing ships, for which cutting through the formation under those conditions was possible. So (again, exclusively my personal opinion) the respected A. Kolobov wins in this dispute - geometry and common sense will be more powerful than emotions. request
    That's it, there is no longer for more time (and it is inconvenient to write from a mobile phone during the day). Yes, and I would like to know the material of the respected M. Klimov in full in order to form a general picture of his opinion and claims. hi
    1. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 24 November 2021 08: 01
      +9
      Gentlemen, "this music will be eternal." Every year, on the anniversary of Tsushima, a holivar flares up between approvers and critics. Moreover, everyone remains with their convictions, because everyone is Nelson in their souls. Meanwhile, all these questions have long been spread on Tsushima forums from the point of view of mathematics and logic. I will add that the British during the Battle of Jutland had enough jambs, and the Germans. The British 5 squadron lagged behind Beatty's cruisers, during the deployment of LK in line they had the same mess at the end as Rozhdestvensky and Oslyabey. the flag of the officers of the junior flagship of one of the squadrons of the gf told him: "sir, if you go ahead now, you will go down in history," which, as it were, hints at the jerk of the four of Borodino, but the junior flagman was accustomed to following orders ...
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 24 November 2021 09: 03
        +3
        The British lagged behind the 5th squadron from the cruisers Beatty, in ho

        Um, but the fact that the cruiser Beatty was faster than the battleships of the 5th squadron is nothing? We take into account that Beatty was in the role of catching up and he had no choice but to kick the gas and chase after Hipper, who calmly led him into the trap. As a result, when Evan-Thomas entered the fighting distance, Beatty already had minus 2 units. Go Hipper at 25 knots, the 5th squadron trudged along and beyond the range of the guns. But Hipper went slower (EMNIP 22-23 knots), completing his task, because the battleships made his life difficult for the peoed by the very meeting with the main forces of Sheer. This is because speed means a lot in the long run of a fight.
        during the deployment of the LK in the line, they had the same mess at the end, h

        With the number of ships that Jellicoe had, nothing surprising smile But having made the right decision during deployment, we got the classic crossing T Scheeru. So battleships with 305mm art practically failed to shoot except those that followed the Iron Duke. With so many ships that were at Jutland, with those speeds and time for making decisions, there is nothing surprising in the jambs.
        And about the breakthrough of Borodino, the author seemed to lucidly told his opinion. hi
        I beg your pardon for the spelling - writing on a mobile is still a task ... request lol
        1. Pilat2009
          Pilat2009 24 November 2021 09: 47
          +2
          Quote: Rurikovich
          The British lagged behind the 5th squadron from the cruisers Beatty, in ho

          Um, but the fact that the cruiser Beatty was faster than the battleships of the 5th squadron is nothing? We take into account that Beatty was in the role of catching up and he had no choice but to kick the gas and chase after Hipper, who calmly led him into the trap. As a result, when Evan-Thomas entered the fighting distance, Beatty already had minus 2 units. Go Hipper at 25 knots, the 5th squadron trudged along and beyond the range of the guns. But Hipper went slower (EMNIP 22-23 knots), completing his task, because the battleships made his life difficult for the peoed by the very meeting with the main forces of Sheer. This is because speed means a lot in the long run of a fight.
          during the deployment of the LK in the line, they had the same mess at the end, h

          With the number of ships that Jellicoe had, nothing surprising smile But having made the right decision during deployment, we got the classic crossing T Scheeru. So battleships with 305mm art practically failed to shoot except those that followed the Iron Duke. With so many ships that were at Jutland, with those speeds and time for making decisions, there is nothing surprising in the jambs.
          And about the breakthrough of Borodino, the author seemed to lucidly told his opinion. hi
          I beg your pardon for the spelling - writing on a mobile is still a task ... request lol

          Everything would be fine, but Beatty and Jellicoe were late to the meeting point, and 5 Squadron lagged behind not because of speed, but because of a location error. Naturally at the beginning of the battle.
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 24 November 2021 15: 02
            0
            So these are the problems of the British, not the Germans smile hi
            1. Pilat2009
              Pilat2009 24 November 2021 18: 38
              +2
              Quote: Rurikovich
              So these are the problems of the British, not the Germans

              So I don't mind. I wrote that both the British and the Germans had jambs.
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 24 November 2021 21: 37
                +1
                Quote: Pilat2009
                I wrote that both the British and the Germans had jambs

                Duc yes, only the Germans did not lead to the loss of 2 dreadnought cruisers in the outset of the battle (running to the south) request smile
                In fact, the Battle of Jutland shows how difficult the management of large fleets is and depends on many unknowns that arise in the course of the battle and which must be resolved quickly and correctly regarding the situation.
                In short, the first was the jamb of the British - they already talked about the belated entry into battle of the 5th squadron. The second, in my opinion, the Germans have - the procession of the main forces in one column, which led to the fact that the British quickly emerged from the trap as soon as they saw the lead ships of the Germans. As a result, at the right time when the entire fleet needed fire, the ships entered the battle one at a time as the enemy was visible. As a result, the British managed to turn around and now the prey turned into bait. Take Hipper Aglichan to the traverse Hochseeflotte so that not only battleships of the 3rd squadron, but also the 1st, then the result for the British would be more deplorable. But alas .... Come on, let's go further. Taking part in the battle only with the head battleships of the column and battle cruisers, Scheer went into the trap of the British, who, unlike Hipper, amazingly led him straight into the center of the successfully deployed Grandfleet formation. The trap slammed shut, and on the dark side of the horizon, Scheer opened up an enchanting picture of the volleys of Jellicoe's battleships. The Germans were saved by a perfectly worked out maneuver of evasion by turning from the enemy. Scheer did not believe who was in front of him and poked his head a second time. Jamb? Jamb. I had to give a suicidal order to Hipper to save the battleships and turn aside again. It was saved by the fact that the large squadrons are sooooo clumsy. As a result, the British cut off the Germans from the base and the only thing left to do was survive the night. Here came a joint at the British. Having won the position, they looked ahead, and the enemy remained behind due to the slower squadron speed due to the Mauve battleships. That saved the Germans. They passed literally under the tail of the British. As a result, roughly on the jambs, the advantage towards these in the British smile
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        24 November 2021 18: 37
        +4
        Quote: Pilat2009
        Meanwhile, all these questions have long been spread out on the Tsushima forums from the point of view of mathematics and logic

        You are deeply mistaken, Mikhail
        1. unknown
          unknown 28 November 2021 09: 46
          0
          I totally agree.
          For example, there is no analysis of the forces of the parties taking into account all the real nuances.
      3. mmaxx
        mmaxx 25 November 2021 04: 25
        +2
        These are strange proposals for the formation of the front. No options with commanders were considered before the battle. What the commanders should have understood during the battle if Rozhestvensky rushed to the Japanese? And with that speed difference, this maneuver was most likely not feasible. Despite the large amount of space in the sea and low travel speeds, there are still seconds left to make decisions. I missed it, and it makes no sense to do something. The visibility was bad, the weather was bad, the layouts were not clear at the beginning.
        If Togo's loop had been foreseen in advance, then something could be considered. And it’s late during the battle. That would have just passed, Kamimura can turn in the other direction. At the same time, the formation of the front is very disadvantageous for artillery combat. Extreme crabs can be simply wiped off the surface. Because they are simply substituted.
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 25 November 2021 23: 04
          +2
          Quote: mmaxx
          At the same time, the formation of the front is very disadvantageous for artillery combat.

          The formation of the front is unprofitable for the Japanese, casemate battleships. For Borodintsy, with their gorgeous sectors of fire, on the contrary, it is beneficial.
          1. mmaxx
            mmaxx 26 November 2021 07: 03
            +2
            Nobody benefits from nose to side. And strong fire is clear in the nose. The guns must be guided by turning the ship. And I never heard that tests were carried out by firing our battleships at full firing angles. You can draw any. But in the case - then destruction, then almost there and half of the trunks falls out. In general, there are nuances everywhere.
            1. It is necessary to make a decision. 2. Set the signal. 3. Make sure the signal has been disassembled. 4. Signal for execution. 5. Increase speed + turn. Everything is under fire. Someone did an analysis of how long it takes? One steering wheel shift is tens of seconds. Nobody trained the squadron for such maneuvers. According to all schemes, "Oryol" was at that time abeam "Oslyabi". Where should he turn? Some questions. While you are thinking, the situation is already gone, you had to think before.
            I think that in spite of a certain sanity, our squadron could not, in principle, carry out this maneuver.
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 27 November 2021 23: 01
              0
              Quote: mmaxx
              Nobody benefits from nose to side.

              Complete abstraction, however .. Reread again what you have written above.
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 28 November 2021 05: 37
                0
                There are beautiful pictures of the "Borodino" type EBR. If you look from the nose, there are 2 and 305 barrels looking at you. The beauty! But this is the course. the angle is exactly 8. Slightly to the right and to the left and 152 guns become already 0. The other 152th must shoot on the other side without a rangefinder. It’s not the same. And against the wave. And any Japanese had 4 and 4 on the leeward side and remained.
                No benefits are visible.
                Everyone considered this maneuver as an adventure, since the whole campaign was an adventure. And the regular fight did not give a chance. Well, there was also the illusion of non-combatant officers that the main role belongs to the medium caliber.
                On the diagrams, at the beginning of the Togo loop, the "Eagle" is almost behind the "Oslyabey" - so there is no point in starting. Or start with 3 battleships. And then not at all. It is enough just to estimate the timing of all operations for the implementation of this throw. And the Japanese at this time go out one by one into the wake.
                And the dream of any admiral of the English school begins - a stick over t.
            2. rytik32
              rytik32 28 November 2021 01: 26
              +1
              Quote: mmaxx
              Nobody trained the squadron for such maneuvers

              Did you dig this topic well?
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 28 November 2021 05: 29
                0
                In response, I will ask: has such a maneuver ever been considered? Or practicing?
                I do not remember. ZPR wrote the order for the battle. Nothing of the kind was visible there. There were no meetings.
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 28 November 2021 14: 09
                  +1
                  And was considered and trained at least in Madagascar.
            3. Maxim G
              Maxim G 28 November 2021 19: 22
              0
              The board against the nose is beneficial for those who hit with the board, because shells flying into the ship, going towards it with the nose during flights do not fall into the water, but fall into the ship.
          2. Kayuk
            Kayuk 28 November 2021 02: 33
            0
            For Borodintsy, with their gorgeous sectors of fire, on the contrary, it is beneficial.

            It is possible and profitable to march in front of the Japanese, but there are several small BUTs:
            1) Here they correctly figured out that the Japanese would begin to retreat, and at some point this "Four" turned out to be against 12, plus a bunch of esms and more advice notes that would rush into the attack (And the Japanese attacked during the day). Our second and third detachments could not keep up with the leaders in speed. In this situation, the battle would have ended even earlier. 2) It is much easier to get into a ship heading towards you (oddly enough) than one going alongside you, since there will be an order of magnitude less flights and undershoots. The Japanese would not let us in on 10-15 cables.
            3) It was already discussed here that our squadron was even undesirable for a short-range battle.
        2. unknown
          unknown 28 November 2021 09: 54
          +1
          Yes, there was no need for any front formation.
          It was enough just to unload the ships before the battle.
          Well, the fuel was not accepted in excess of the norm.
          And other supplies, so necessary in the campaign, but useless, and even harmful in battle, why didn’t they take them off? And these supplies were hundreds of tons.
          For example, why drag grates into battle?
          Replace in battle? It is easier to shut down the boiler.
          And the unloaded ships would have a speed no different from the Japanese.
          The Japanese overloaded their ships before the battle. For example. Mikasa received about 2191 tons of fuel, ammunition, water and oil. And this is to the normal displacement. Not only did the speed decrease, so the main belt was under water (the upper edge is thirty centimeters below the waterline).
  5. parusnik
    parusnik 24 November 2021 07: 46
    +10
    It's a pity, there are no talents, I would have written the script ... I would have taken the script for the film "The Red Tent" as a basis. his not-so-brilliant role in the 1928 tragedy. In his imagination, the general again and again gathers the participants in those events in the room in order to demand that they judge themselves. Pilots Lundborg and Chukhnovsky, researchers Amundsen and Samoilovich, meteorologist Malmgren and his beloved Valeria, radio operator Biagi and captain of the base ship Romagna become prosecutors, jurors, witnesses and lawyers. They revisit with passion every step of Nobile from the departure of the expedition from Kingsbay to the rescue of the survivors by Soviet pilots and sailors. And again, everyone remains unconvinced. Or maybe Andrey from Chelyabinsk and M. Klimov join efforts? Get support from the Ministry of Culture? To invite T.Bekmambetov as directors? I don’t insist on his candidacy ...
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Trapperxnumx
      Trapperxnumx 24 November 2021 10: 36
      +2
      By the way, consider, so to speak, the issue from all sides)
    3. Catfish
      Catfish 24 November 2021 14: 38
      +5
      Hi Aleksey! hi
      I remember this film, I watched it with great interest, it was shot with a very high quality and a lot of great actors.
      Hardy Kruger as Lundborg.



      And if you make films about Tsushima, then they will be very different for different screenwriters, and the Japanese will lose the battle.
      And Andrey's articles are good, although sometimes tendentious. I am somehow not drawn to participate in disputes on this topic, neither these ships nor people have long been gone, only memory remains. You can get to the bottom of individual details, but the essence will remain the same - defeat. request
      1. parusnik
        parusnik 24 November 2021 15: 21
        +5
        but the essence remains the same - defeat.
        In truth, speak ...
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 25 November 2021 13: 54
        +5
        Do not. For our "artists" to shoot something like "Admiral" .... Better to let them not touch anything at all.
        1. Catfish
          Catfish 25 November 2021 18: 17
          0
          Well, not all of them are cretins, I dare to hope.
          1. mmaxx
            mmaxx 26 November 2021 07: 11
            0
            Vice versa. It is even difficult for a normal person to imagine that there are such cretins.
      3. Korsar4
        Korsar4 25 November 2021 19: 35
        +1
        I don’t know why, but even Novikov-Priboy is not readable.
        1. Catfish
          Catfish 25 November 2021 20: 05
          +3
          I had his "Tsushima" was the reference book of my childhood.
          By the way, there is a video on the Internet with computer graphics of this fight, look, if you haven't seen it, I have no link, but Phil knows where to look.
  6. ban
    ban 24 November 2021 09: 11
    +4
    the Russian squadron demonstrated a much higher shooting class than the 1st Pacific

    Tsushima's results as bae suggest otherwise.

    Therefore, M. Klimov's conclusion that

    however, in our fleet all this happened only after the "Tsushima pogrom",

    completely untrue.


    Oh really? Look at the distribution of ships into squadrons, which are on the 1st, that on the 2nd squadron. Our superiors simply did not care about the centralized control of artillery fire, they did not even have an idea about it, in fact it could only be organized on a detachment of Borodino, and even this was not done.

    while "decisively and persistently" raising the level of combat and political training H. Togo for some reason came to the conclusion that in Tsushima one should fight no further than 33 cables, and certainly no more than 38 cables

    Imagine yes!
    Having an overwhelming advantage in medium guns, Togo did everything to realize this advantage. Why would he fight at long distances, where medium-caliber fire is ineffective?
    And what did Rozhestvensky do to realize his overwhelming advantage in heavy artillery?

    Indeed, the
    the Japanese have Togo, and we have ANYONE
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 18: 43
      +5
      Quote: ban
      Tsushima's results as bae suggest otherwise.

      Well, if 230 is less than 38 for you, then yes.
      Quote: ban
      Oh really? Look at the distribution of ships into squadrons, which are on the 1st, that on the 2nd squadron. Our bosses simply didn’t care about the centralized control of artillery fire, they didn’t even have any idea about it.

      And if you knew the material even a little, you would be aware that the Japanese did not know about it all the more. Moreover, perhaps the only fleet that practiced centralized firing at one target before the RYaV is the Russian one.
      Quote: ban
      Imagine yes!
      Having an overwhelming advantage in medium guns, Togo did everything to realize this advantage. Why would he fight at long distances, where medium-caliber fire is ineffective?

      Read at least here
      https://topwar.ru/186620-o-strelbe-na-dalnie-distancii-v-period-russko-japonskoj-vojny.html
      1. ban
        ban 24 November 2021 19: 16
        +1
        Moreover - perhaps the only fleet that practiced centralized firing at one target before the RYA - Russian

        And so they brought 10 ", 12" / 40, 12 "/ 35 and 8" into one squad. Andrey, how do you imagine the centralized fire control of these guns for one target? I can not imagine. If they really did this before the war, they would start coming to all big guns, like the Americans or Kuniberti. And in our country 3 "continued to be considered effective artillery.
        Somehow
        https://topwar.ru/186620-o-strelbe-na-dalnie-distancii-v-period-russko-japonskoj-vojny.html

        I read it. Not very convincing. There was no time to write comments.
        I repeat, you shouldn't put an owl on the globe, protecting Rozhdestvensky
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 18: 05
          +3
          Quote: ban
          And so they brought 10 ", 12" / 40, 12 "/ 35 and 8" into one squad. Andrey, how do you imagine the centralized fire control of these guns for one target?

          And what do you suggest? Do not form a second armored one, leave one "Sisoy", and send 2 ships instead of 5 as part of 8TOE? :))))) For the sake of unification?
          The second - the centralized control of these guns for one target is exactly the same - as in the four "Borodino". If you had studied history, or at least my articles, you would have known that the main caliber in terms of fire control was essentially "fastened" to the middle one. That is, they controlled the fire of 152-mm guns, and the main battery turrets recalculated all amendments independently and fired according to their ability
          Quote: ban
          If they really did it before the war, they would start coming to all big guns, like the Americans or Kuniberti

          Before RJAV, no Americans and no Queenberties came to anything. The idea of ​​only big guns before RYAV is extremely premature
          Quote: ban
          I read it. Not very convincing.

          Really? And what did not convince you? Do not you understand that with a rate of fire of 1 shot in 2 minutes or more, it is unrealistic to conduct accurate fire at long distances? Or maybe you are disputing the fact that our guns lost their materiel when firing at long distances? Oh well
          1. ban
            ban 25 November 2021 22: 35
            -1
            Do not form a second armored one, leave one "Sisoy", and send 2 ships instead of 5 as part of 8TOE? :))))) For the sake of unification?

            Andrey, and nothing smarter comes to mind?

            If you studied history, or at least my articles

            What conceit have you developed ...
            I became a regular on this site after reading your wonderful articles about battleships ...
            But your last series, excuse me, into any gates ... Centrally control the fire of guns with completely different ballistics, etc. Yeah)
            In the course, for what reason Nicholas I (which was not completed) did not begin to arm 14?

            Before RJAV, no Americans and no Queenberties came to anything.

            In what year did Cuniberty write the article "The Ideal Royal Navy Battleship"?
            And when did the Americans start designing Michigan?

            Do not you understand that with a rate of fire of 1 shot in 2 minutes or more, it is unrealistic to conduct accurate fire at long distances?

            The flight time of the projectile for 100 cabs take an interest

            Or maybe you are disputing the fact that our guns lost their materiel when firing at long distances


            If, as you write, our fleet was engaged in combat training before the war, as it should be, it would all be found out BEFORE the war, and not during it
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 November 2021 18: 41
              +5
              Wow:)
              Quote: ban
              What conceit have you developed ...

              In general, the phrase "study history, or at least my articles" puts my articles in a somewhat subordinate and even slightly derogatory position in relation to history. To see my conceit here ... it is necessary to have a talent.
              Quote: ban
              Andrey, and nothing smarter comes to mind?

              It would be wiser to ignore your remarks. Which I did for a while. But I'm obviously not very smart.
              Quote: ban
              But your last series, excuse me, into any gates ... Centrally control the fire of guns with completely different ballistics, etc. Yeah)

              With this phrase you are showing a complete lack of familiarity with the topic. Yeah :)
              Before the advent of dreadnoughts, EBRs were forced to solve issues of centralized fire control of different calibers on one ship (meaning - within one ship). So, as I already wrote to you, you can read my articles, you can, if you don’t trust them, read the originals of documents - instructions to the artillerymen of those times (before RYAV and RYAV, and even something once after RYAV). And if you do this, then you will find out that the fire of ONLY medium artillery was centrally controlled - that is, the chief chief gave amendments specifically for it. Exception - if you had to shoot at a distance exceeding the firing range of 152 mm
              With a rangefinder, or there was something else that measured the distance, the chief artist estimated the parameters of the target's movement and determined the corrections for the horizontal sight to the 152-mm guns. In terms of range, he gave, apparently, the distance at which a shot should be fired, the vertical angle was determined at the gun independently. But the Glavart did not control the main caliber, the main battery turrets received corrections to the rear for 152-mm and then recalculated them for 254-305-mm independently. They also independently counted in the towers and the change in distance by the time the gun was ready to fire the next shot. With this control, it was absolutely all the same what the ship had for the main battery - 305-mm / 35 or 254-mm / 40. It would be possible to put on one ship a pair of 305-mm / 35, one 305-mm / 40 and one 254-mm - no difference, anyway, each calculation would recalculate the amendments to its guns from the data for 152-mm independently.
              That is, the existing order did NOT REQUIRE the uniformity of the main caliber. But such an order had a significant drawback - the accuracy of the main command line largely depended on the people on the ground, the most experienced artilleryman on the ship, the chief art officer, did not control the main command fire.
              But it simply could not be otherwise in RYAV.
              You mechanically impose the experience of dreadnought management on the realities of RYAV, which is the BIGGEST mistake.
              Quote: ban
              In what year did Cuniberty write the article "The Ideal Royal Navy Battleship"?
              And when did the Americans start designing Michigan?

              You should familiarize yourself with what Queenberty wrote at your leisure. You are writing about the all-big-gun concept in terms of the convenience and efficiency of fire control. Do you know how you explained the need for a large number of 305-mm guns of Queenberty? His reasoning was completely different: they say, at a long distance, only a 305-mm projectile can penetrate thick belt armor. Accordingly, the more guns, the more chances that at least one will get to the right place :) I would not want to offend this talented Italian, but what he wrote, to put it mildly, is just in no way. The thing is that the 305-mm shells of the guns of those years from a long distance did not penetrate the main armor belt from the word "in any way." In our country, for example, on the 305-mm BB, according to the instructions, it was necessary to move at a distance of no more than 20 cables.
              And what is important in our debate is that Quinberty's proposal had nothing to do with fire control.
              Michigan - I'm sorry, are you even lazy to look at the directory? You do not know that not only before, but even during the RYAW, that is, in 1904-1905, the Americans laid down 2 series of battleships with as much as 3 calibers? :))))) Virginia with 305-mm / 203 mm / 152 mm and "Connecticuts" with 305 mm / 203 mm / 178 mm? What is the "all-big-gun"? Where?:)))))
              I’ll tell you a secret that you are right in some ways - the American navy did offer to build single-caliber ships. Such proposals have been heard since 1901, and in 1903 the idea of ​​such a ship was drawn up by the annual naval conference - moreover, on the basis of the naval game. But the General Council of the Fleet, although at first it seemed to support the idea, in 1904 demanded to design a ship with 4 * 305-mm, 8 * 254-mm and 76-mm. That is, the Americans came to the idea of ​​Michigan after the RYA.
              Quote: ban
              The flight time of the projectile for 100 cabs take an interest

              Yes, I inquired many years ago. I report that a 305-mm projectile for 100 cables did not fly, because for it the maximum range on our Borodino-type EBRs is 80 cables at an elevation angle of 15 degrees. At the recommended distance, the projectile flew for about 33 seconds. If you shoot from the Black Sea installations, then for 100 cables the projectile flew for about 47 seconds.
              AND?:)
              Quote: ban
              If, as you write, our fleet was engaged in combat training before the war, as it should be,

              "Is it supposed to" - how is it? :))) Tell me, unreasonable, in which fleet of the world before the RYAV were exercises on firing at 70-80 cables with at least a dozen and a half shells per gun?
              You turn off the afterthought when you undertake to judge. I understand that it was much more convenient for Alexander Nevsky to shoot the German knightly "pig" of 122-mm howitzer-cannons, but he did not have them, and to reproach in the style of "but he didn't do it, he's a prince!" slightly absurd. So this is what you are doing now. The preparation of the fleets of ALL countries before the Russian-Japanese one suffered from a number of shortcomings - they fired at too small distances, the artillery exercises were cut off from reality, the consumption of shells for them was low, the methods of controlling the artillery fire were extremely imperfect. The Russian imperial did not stand out for the worse here. Here you are reproaching Rozhestvensky for not concentrating fire according to the method of the Black Sea battleships. And who concentrated? The Japanese did not consider it necessary to centrally control the fire of one ship at the beginning of the RYA. RYAV shook everyone, everyone fussed. And the materiel there was already completely different - the same Geisler of 1910 is a huge step forward relative to what was in the RYAV, 9-foot rangefinders in the RYAV could only be dreamed of, the rate of fire of 305 mm was tightened, etc. etc.
              1. ban
                ban 26 November 2021 20: 00
                -1
                Michigan - I'm sorry, are you even lazy to look at the directory?

                Start of design - 1902, approved for construction - March 1905.
                More questions?
                On this, I think, the fruitless discussion need not continue.
                Somehow
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  27 November 2021 11: 18
                  +2
                  Quote: ban
                  Start of design - 1902, approved for construction - March 1905.
                  More questions?

                  Where did you get this nonsense? In reality, South Caroline began to be designed in September 1904 with 4 * 305-mm and 8 * 254-mm.
                  Quote: ban
                  On this, I think, the fruitless discussion need not continue.

                  I think so too
          2. ban
            ban 25 November 2021 22: 45
            -3
            You would know that the main caliber in terms of fire control was essentially "strapped" to the middle one.

            If by this you mean the centralized control of the fire of the Squadron of ships for one target, then I don't even know ...
            Take an interest in the post-war shooting of the Practical Detachment of the Black Sea Fleet in more detail, for example, then we will discuss
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 November 2021 18: 46
              +4
              Quote: ban
              If by this you mean the centralized control of the fire of the Squadron of ships for one target, then I don't even know ...

              Yes, I know that you do not know. The problem is that you don't even want to know. If they knew, it would never have entered your head to demand from our pre-war squadrons the methods used by the Black Sea squadron.
              But if you had known the history, you would not have demanded it.
              Years of training. No one spared shells - the same 305-mm were spent in dozens per gun during one campaign. Rate of fire 305 mm - less than a minute. MSA - Geisler 1910, with automatic vertical correction. Rangefinders that Rozhdestvensky could not even dream of. Individual artillery training for artillery teams is EXCELLENT.
              We organize centralized shooting at m Sarych at Goeben - 1 hit in 15 minutes. Remind me, how many ships of Rozhdestvensky (individually, much weaker than the prepared Black Sea battleships) in the Japanese were hammered into the first 15 minutes? The distance, let me remind you, did not differ fatally.
              The second shooting is at the Bosphorus. 2 EBRs conduct centralized fire on Goeben for a long time and persistently. Achieve one hit. "Potemkin", intervening without any centralization, broke into the second hit on the move, which took him much less time and much less ammunition consumption.
              That is, the centralized methodology, for which you here speak out yourself, even at the EXCELLENT level of training of the Black Sea battleships did not "play". But they didn’t just pick it up, they tested at least FIVE different techniques, spent several hundred 305-mm shells for this, and then worked it out for years ...
              1. ban
                ban 26 November 2021 20: 05
                0
                Yes, and finally.
                This is what, before the war, it was necessary to deal with not SPARE shells, and not stand in an armed reserve.
                WHERE was the great artilleryman - he was sitting at the headquarters and picking
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  27 November 2021 11: 27
                  +4
                  Quote: ban
                  This is what before the war, and it was necessary to deal with not SPARE shells

                  Unfortunately, you did not understand that for the pre-war tactical views, the consumption of shells was considered quite sufficient. Another thing is that the war demanded something completely different, and these views turned out to be incorrect. In all fleets of the world.
                  Quote: ban
                  WHERE was the great artilleryman

                  He lived in a country where the head of the Ministry of the Navy regretted 70 rubles. to test a new type of shells, i.e. the main weapon of the ships. In your anger, you do not even understand that Rozhdestvensky was not almighty at all.
                  Just as you don’t understand that he very quickly got his bearings based on the results of the war, and 2TOE received much more intensive training than it was supposed to be according to the pre-war rules.
            2. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 27 November 2021 20: 38
              0
              Quote: ban
              Take an interest in the post-war shooting of the Practical Detachment of the Black Sea Fleet in more detail, for example, then we will discuss

              Organized in 1906. When the Black Sea Fleet has exactly three battleships with new guns. "Three Saints" and "Pantemellon" from 12/40 and "Rostislav" from 10/45. There are also two battering rams with 12/35 and two battering rams and "Twelve Apostles" with 12/30.
              How do you think the units were formed?
              In fact, the brand of the main caliber and the length of the barrel do not matter.
              1. ban
                ban 27 November 2021 23: 21
                -2
                Centralized artillery fire is a concentrated variety. art. shooting, in which control-e fire several. ships on one target is carried out from the flagship.
                Naval Dictionary, M. 1990.
                If anything, Panteleimon and Three Saints worked out the technique, then Eustathius and John Chrysostom joined them. Rostislav before the beginning of WWII was a ship of the 2nd line.
                Something like that.
                In fact, the brand of the main caliber and the length of the barrel do not matter.

                Ask for one of the reasons why Nicholas I 14 "was not armed ...
                And so yes, it doesn't matter ... Take an interest in ballistics ...
                It’s surprising to me that you and Andrey have no ear for artillery fire, excuse me, and make such far-reaching conclusions.
                But the results of Tsushima speak for themselves, how do not pull an owl on the globe
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 28 November 2021 19: 39
                  +1
                  Quote: ban
                  Ask for one of the reasons why Nicholas I 14 "was not armed ...

                  There is a version that they wanted the entire line brigade to have a single main caliber.
                  But rather, there was not a) a sufficient number of trunks. b) finished towers. c) the ability to stick 14 "towers in place 12".
              2. ban
                ban 27 November 2021 23: 27
                -2
                There are also two rams with 12/35 and two rams

                Are you sorry, out of your mind? What rams? These ships were designed to deal with the Bosphorus batteries, well, something like that wassat
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 28 November 2021 19: 43
                  +1
                  In his. There were no other battleships on the Black Sea Fleet. "Eustathius" and "John Chrysostom" were commissioned in 1911.
                  Quote: ban
                  These ships were designed to deal with the Bosphorus batteries.

                  This is just one of the challenges.
          3. mmaxx
            mmaxx 26 November 2021 07: 16
            +2
            Centralized - or not, but the artillery business was not involved. Otherwise, they would immediately reveal that the rate of fire is insufficient and the materiel is out of order from firing. Not to mention shells ..., sights ..., rangefinders ...
          4. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 10: 01
            0
            Instead of looking for an ideal prototype for serial construction, wasting no time looking for it, waiting for drawings, their alteration, build a second series of ships of the "Poltava" class. Do you want a belt at the extremities? Reduce the thickness of the Poltava belt and use the saved mass for the belt at the extremities.
            It is better not to touch the power plant, and this is enough.
            Acceptance tests - 16 knots for twelve hours.
            And more than 15 knots the Japanese did not go in detachments.
            On the other hand, we will build it faster and transfer it to the theater of operations faster.
            I'd like to add "Sisoy" too.
      2. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 44
        -3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Perhaps the only fleet that practiced centralized firing at one target before the RYAF is the Russian one.

        You, Andrey, have forgotten WHAT - to the island of Carlos!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 17: 57
          +3
          Quote: Very kind
          You, Andrey, have forgotten WHAT - to the island of Carlos!

          You would at least read about the teachings of Madagascar, or something :)
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 25 November 2021 23: 08
            +3
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            You would at least read about the teachings of Madagascar, or something :)

            And there, Madagascar had three shields. You would have re-read something. lol
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 25 November 2021 23: 47
              +4
              Moreover, in the manual before firing, it was recommended to separate the fire of different groups on different shields, if possible.
              This is such a strange centralization of shooting. wassat
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 November 2021 18: 36
              +2
              Quote: Saxahorse
              And there, Madagascar had three shields.

              Yes. One for the ship 2TOE and 2 more shields on top wassat
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 27 November 2021 22: 55
                0
                I'm glad you finally woke up something like a sense of humor. hi
  7. Astra wild2
    Astra wild2 24 November 2021 10: 22
    +3
    Colleagues, Andrey, good morning.
    I have said more than once that I am a "land", but thanks to Andrey, for example, I became a little interested in the history of the fleet.
    I am captivated in my works: 1) accessible language of presentation (I do not like scientific); 2) argumentation (which is noticeable); 3) openness to dialogue and criticism.
  8. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 10: 30
    +2
    The difference between KRP and KOP (bearing course) - in the text of the article
    Moreover, no "observance of the order" was needed here, it was necessary in the "shortest" reduce the distance "according to ability".

    I know wink
    As for the EXACT calculation of the maneuver, it is also not a problem to calculate - with one BUT - in the presence of EXACT DATA (but with them - leaves much to be desired).
    Accordingly _ KRP (by the way, what for?) KOP or something in between KOP on Mikasu and KRP to the turning point - already BY SITUATION - based on the main goal - to reach the Def of artillery.
    And I return to the "Togo loop" - yes, the "nimble" ones would have managed to escape, but the end battleships of the Japs - clearly fell under attack (not to mention the fact that 15 knots - was a very real speed of the EBR of the 1st detachment)
    + to this - reducing the distance and piercing the armor - how many EBR Japs would keep the move?
    + to this, such a maneuver when Mikasa was moving "according to Kolobov" sharply reduced the effectiveness of her fire (constant changes in KU and D)


    "Rozhdestvensky's Fork" - DOES NOT WORK (in the form, so to speak, "fire control" (in quotes) adopted by the ZPR), and obviously - that Tsushima showed

    As for the "dancing around the distance", ONCE AGAIN - THE PRIMARY METHODOLOGY (that is, what the ZPR had a complete blockage with - simply due to the impossibility of adjusting the target behind the many and it is not clear whose sultans)
    the angles worked on the METHOD
    and the distances are already here - a special case and conclusions

    and as for "ah, we didn’t know - it would turn out this way"
    KNEW! - once again - it was even in the textbooks for midshipmen
    and "it" was called - BATTLE WITH DECISIVE GOALS
    at effective distances

    and it was the BATTLE WITH DECISIVE PURPOSES that was "the only acceptable option" - for Togo and for ZPR, and for smart people it was OBVIOUS
    That was what I was preparing for
    ZPR was preparing to "endure"
    WASTE

    detailed answer after part 2
    1. Darkesstcat
      Darkesstcat 24 November 2021 14: 32
      +3
      Endured sounds ironic))))
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 18: 49
      +5
      Quote: Very kind
      And I return to the "Togo loop" - yes, the "nimble" ones would have managed to escape, but the end battleships of the Japs - clearly fell under the blow

      Maxim, one more time. Throwing on the enemy leads to the fact that Suvorov will be 15 cables to the terminal Nissin, while the Russian EBRs during the dash will "shove" directly into the Kamimura's BRKR system. But it will not be possible to get closer to the latter under any layouts - in an extreme case, "all of a sudden" will unfold and leave
      In my opinion, you are missing the fact that the Japanese had two "turning points" - Togo and Kamimura deployed their troops on their own.

      Quote: Very kind
      As for the "dancing around the distance", ONCE AGAIN - THE PRIMARY METHODOLOGY (that is, what the ZPR had a complete blockage with - simply due to the impossibility of adjusting the target behind the many and it is not clear whose sultans)

      Maxim, you have forgotten one thing - Rozhdestvensky allowed to transfer fire to other enemy ships in case shooting at the designated target is difficult. The order says twice “if possible”. And yes, the Japanese were shooting in the same way :) They initially (by order) set a priority target, and in battle everyone was free to shoot wherever he wanted. That is why the Japanese very often transferred fire from one Russian ship to another.
      Quote: Very kind
      the angles worked on the METHOD

      And we worked - I gave an analysis of as many as 3 methods, although there were more of them :))))
      1. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 41
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In my opinion, you are missing the fact that the Japanese had two "turning points" - Togo and Kamimura deployed their troops on their own.

        The details are not important.
        Simply because in the "alternative reality" the enemy will not act "in the old way," he will act in a NEW way for our new actions.
        However, there is no doubt about the essence and meaning of the maneuver - throw - shortening the distance of the battle, moreover, which is extremely important - in the outset of the battle!
        As for the "run away" - this is to Kamimura, but a pair of terminal EBRs of Japs is far from the fact that it had a speed higher than the "Borodino" - especially if we consider the issue from the point of view. optimal KU.
        The question is in the active actions of "Borodino"!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 18: 06
          +3
          Quote: Very kind
          The details are not important.

          These "details" bring down your idea of ​​rapprochement - simply by virtue of geometry. And so not important, yes.
      2. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 43
        -2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Rozhestvensky allowed to transfer fire to other enemy ships in case it was difficult to fire at the designated target. The order says twice "if possible"

        yyyyy
        and "just to think" - what kind of porridge will be with HIS "methodology" in a real battle?
        and with this in mind, ASSIGN goals?
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. rytik32
          rytik32 25 November 2021 18: 34
          +3
          what kind of porridge will be with HIS "technique" in a real battle

          Yes, Rozhdestvensky did not have any method of shooting. There was a set of conflicting teachings that were not tested in practice or even in the teachings.
          If the Japanese technique can be described without any problems in some notation, then if you try to do the same with the Russian technique, there will be an oil painting!
          By the way, Rozhestvensky never practiced concentrating fire on one target during exercises.
      3. unknown
        unknown 28 November 2021 10: 03
        0
        Turn around and leave?
        Very good.
        Then they won't catch up.
        With its real detachment speed of 14 knots.
  9. Maxim G
    Maxim G 24 November 2021 10: 32
    -1
    Hang with Enquist.
  10. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 10: 41
    -1
    The problem was that the domestic industry simply could not then produce thin-walled shells, which was necessary to ensure a high content of explosives. As a result, they produced what our industry can produce.


    COULD
    a simple question - where is the tighter tolerance - at the projectile or at the gun? - guns "for some reason" were also produced in normal series
    the question is in the price and volume of shells
    but the main thing is that practically nothing was done for this
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 24 November 2021 15: 26
      +4
      Quote: Very kind
      COULD
      a simple question - where is the tighter tolerance - at the projectile or at the gun? - guns "for some reason" were also produced in normal series
      the question is in the price and volume of shells

      Judging by "The relation of the Marine Technical Committee - to the Chairman of the Investigative Commission in the Tsushima battle case. February 1, 1907 No. 234. On No. 34.", the problem with high-explosive projectiles with a large explosive charge was precisely the production problem. Moreover, the industry could not, not only in Rudnitsky's projectiles with a 22% explosive charge, but even in MTK land mines of the first sample with an explosive charge of 7,7%.
      The test carried out at the same time **) steel 6 dm. bombs of the Rudyitsky plant, who had the opportunity to study the production of shells of this kind abroad, showed that for the indicated purposes it is possible to have thin-walled shells safe enough from breaking and breaking in the gun, with good accuracy and a very large explosive charge weight - from 18% to 22% of the total weight of the loaded projectile.
      Note. Rudnitsky's shells were not tested for destructive action when firing, both because of the small number of them in the delivered batch and because the usefulness of such a large explosive charge was considered undoubted.
      Such shells, called "high-explosive", the Committee and thought to introduce for the supply of ships. But in the further progress of the case it turned out that our factories, both state-owned and private, due to the state of their projectile equipment, find it difficult to manufacture steel of such high qualities as in Rudnitsky's shells, and it was not possible to limit ourselves to this one plant, due to its low productivity, from the economic point of view, in view of the large number of shells to be prepared. At the same time, after considering the calculation of the cost of combat supplies for ships under construction, the Manager of the Maritime Ministry, Admiral Chikhachev, ordered to attend to the cheapening of shells ***) and decided to order the required high-quality shells exclusively from state-owned factories. until private ones lower prices ****).
      The only way out was to sacrifice the qualities of steel and, so that the shells did not break in the gun, to thicken their walls, reducing the explosive charge. On this basis, The committee designed high-explosive projectiles with an explosive charge of 7,7% from the total weight of the projectile, and the metal of the projectiles required an elastic limit of 3800 atmospheres with an elongation of 20%.
      But even this requirement was beyond the power of our factories, which declared extremely high prices and uncertainty about the possibility of making shells without a big waste. Therefore, the drawings of the projectiles were again revised, with a decrease in the weight of the explosive charge to 3½% and a decrease in the elastic limit of the metal to 2700 atm., With an elongation of 8%. Shells of this kind were prepared for supplying ships, later arriving at the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Ocean.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 24 November 2021 23: 43
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The test carried out at the same time **) steel 6 dm. bombs of the Rudyitsky plant, who had the opportunity to study the production of shells of this kind abroad,

        You yourself indicate that there was a shell and at least one plant. The question is turned upside down here. Instead of organizing the production of the NECESSARY shells, the sailors took care of placing orders at the NECESSARY factories. That these factories, beloved by the management, were able to do it and considered it sufficient. After Tsushima, we got it right.
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 25 November 2021 00: 06
          +6
          I leafed through several shell files in 1903 in the archive, and I got the impression that ours were doing the wrong thing: how many copies were broken over 47-mm shells! They didn’t pierce the 70-mm armor plate during trials - and in marriage. And photos are attached of broken shells and blind potholes in the slab. A little more focus on 75mm shells. We thought about how to reduce the cost - to abandon crucible steel. And for large calibers everything seems to be fine - there are not even correspondences.
          Those. in fact, the shelling of the Belaila passed by. Nobody even bothered to draw conclusions.
          1. Very kind
            Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 34
            -1
            Quote: rytik32
            Those. in fact, the shelling of the Belaila passed by. Nobody even bothered to draw conclusions.

            At the same time, Klado considered this issue abundantly in a number of books (before the RYAV)
        2. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 25 November 2021 11: 31
          +3
          Quote: Saxahorse
          there were at least one plant.

          More like a workshop.
          Quote: Saxahorse
          placing orders at the NECESSARY factories.

          On state-owned.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 25 November 2021 22: 34
            +1
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            On state-owned.

            This means that the authorities are concerned with loading these factories. This was asked so as not to stand. But the result was not at all concerned.
        3. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 25 November 2021 14: 17
          +3
          Quote: Saxahorse
          You yourself indicate that there was a shell and at least one plant.

          And the capabilities of this plant are written further:
          ... our factories, both state-owned and private, due to the state of their equipment, make it difficult to manufacture steel of such high quality as in the shells of Rudnitsky, and it was not possible, from the economic point of view, to limit oneself to this plant, due to its low productivity, in view of the large number of shells to be prepared.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 25 November 2021 22: 38
            +2
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And the capabilities of this plant are written further:

            Well, this problem had to be solved. Whether to expand this plant, or buy technology and expand several other plants.

            When the battleships were impatient to build, huge money was invested in the expansion of shipyards and metallurgical plants in the first place. Otherwise, if the factories were given the freedom to dance from it, the fleet would still have been supplied with cast-iron cannonballs. And not the fact that they are round enough.
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 25 November 2021 04: 34
        +2
        Yes, Verkhovsky just took a "calculator", figured out how much money was needed for new shells and said "figs".
        All accountants have the same logic at all times.
      3. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 36
        -1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        the problem with high-explosive shells with a large explosive charge was precisely the production

        as follows from the link given by you, it was exactly ORGANIZATIONAL
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 25 November 2021 14: 23
          +5
          Quote: Very kind
          as follows from the link given by you, it was exactly ORGANIZATIONAL

          By and large, it is financial. And nothing depended on the fleet - the Ministry of Finance stood to death. Even for the second set of shells, money was allocated only at the beginning of the war. Go hunting - feed the dogs. ©
          Back in July 1900, the Head of the Naval Ministry informed the Minister of Finance in a special letter that the fleet did not have a second combat set of artillery supplies. - The Maritime Ministry could not carry out this measure due to the circumstances set forth in the above letter, a copy of which, No. 22887, I present to the Investigative Commission.
          A petition for the allocation of loans for the formation of a second combat kit was considered in a special meeting on the issue of additional appropriations to the maximum budget of the Maritime Ministry in the period 1900-1904. The HIGHEST approved on August 14, 1900, the magazine of the special meeting, confirmed the need to eliminate for the entire remaining period of the maximum budget any further encumbrances on the treasury by strengthening the credits of the Maritime Department.
          Then, upon consideration of the special journal of the general meeting of the State Council on the financial estimates of the Ministries and Main Directorates, and on the State list of income and expenses for 1903, it is HIGHEST commanded: to direct the most energetic efforts to contain the growth of expenses. - However, the insistent petitions of the Naval Ministry for the allocation of additional loans for the procurement of a spare combat kit were partially satisfied - in view of the military events: in 1900 - 1.300.000 rubles were given and in 1903 - 1.800.000 rubles.
          In view of the opening of hostilities, at the beginning of 1904, a special loan in the amount of 10.700.000 rubles was opened to the Naval Ministry for the procurement of ammunition.
          © Testimony of the Assistant Head of the Department of Structures of the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Supply, Major General Ivanov.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 25 November 2021 14: 26
          +5
          Moreover, even taking into account a special loan, the fleet in real life received half of the amount required for the second set of combat supplies:
          Currently, the fleet does not have a second combat artillery supply kit. The Naval Ministry could not implement this measure due to lack of funds and due to the recent transition to new types of guns and smokeless powder.
          This meant the formation of a second combat set of shells, cartridges, gunpowder and other items for all ships to carry out with some gradualness. But under the alarming circumstances, the slightest slowdown seems absolutely impossible. The cost of the second set of combat supplies is estimated at 22.600.000 rubles. This amount is divided into two parts: the first, 6 mil. ruble - for the ships of the Pacific squadron at this time and is an urgent military need. On account of this amount, the Marine Ministry has already been allocated 1 million. ruble For further immediate orders for the procurement of supplies, it is necessary to allocate another 5 million to the Marine Ministry in the same manner. ruble - Then the remaining 16.000.000 rubles. can be paid in installments until January 1, 1905 at 4.150.000 rubles. annually.
          © Letter from Vice-Admiral Avelan, Temporary Governor of the Maritime Ministry, to Minister of Finance S. Yu. Witte. 19th July 1900 No. 22887.
      4. bk0010
        bk0010 25 November 2021 20: 46
        0
        Tell me, could anyone (from either side) pierce Des Moines' armor with the shells of that time? It is clear that from 3 "and 6" we are not talking, but 12 "could a suitcase? Or no chance?
        1. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 25 November 2021 21: 11
          0
          Quite simply, distance and bearing are important. But for a 12 "projectile along the traverse, there is a continuous affected area (the distance at which the main armor belt and all decks break through).
          An analogy is the battle of obsolete coastal 280-mm guns with the heavy cruiser "Blucher" 09.04.1940/XNUMX/XNUMX.
        2. unknown
          unknown 28 November 2021 10: 09
          0
          And what does the Des Moines armor have to do with it?
          “Mikasa”, due to overload, deepened its main belt thirty centimeters below the waterline. In fact, its waterline protection consisted of a short, 152mm thick upper belt of Krupp armor. Only the central part, the extremities, with such an overload, were left without protection.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 18: 51
      +5
      Quote: Very kind
      COULD
      a simple question - where is the tighter tolerance - at the projectile or at the gun?

      I could not. Maxim, the gun and the projectile have "slightly different" production technologies. The barrel of the gun in those years was either composite (several cylinders nested into each other) or "wound" - that is. winding hot wire. The British from the "wire" guns in the WWII fired with might and main. Making a projectile using "gun-barrel" technologies is a little absurd, and no one else in the world has done this. Further - the equipment on which the gun barrels were made, it was so little, and it was "a little" occupied - the gun barrels were making, so it was impossible to convert it to shells.
      Maxim, you are a little confused by the technical feasibility and practical implementation. In fact, the Russian Empire was not able to provide the fleet with a sufficient number of Tsushima-type shells. 1TOE was forced to “finish off” with cast-iron shells, and even 2TOE had difficulty gaining shells, but they could not assemble the 2nd set in Vladivostok. Where are the new ones to do? Pyroxylin was not enough for "small-sized" projectiles - they had to fill up smokeless powder, where would it come from for thin-walled projectiles? In 1903, orders for the supply of shells were placed on the 2TOE ships (and for the most part - have already been completed). And it was already "a little" late to run to develop new shells, to purchase equipment for their production, to place orders. This is provided that everyone in one fell swoop realized the inferiority of our shells. And no one then realized it - the same MTC was in the confidence that although there was little explosive, but it was pyroxylin, not gunpowder, and everything would be fine.
      There was initially a miscalculation in the fact that the new shells were not subjected to versatile tests. But they could not get them from Tyrtov in 1897 (he felt sorry for 70 rubles + another consideration: “why test, since we have already equipped the ships with them anyway). And you from Rozhestvensky want him to make the post-war USSR from the Russian Empire in a year, with its planned economy, and "the party said: we must!"
      1. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 33
        -5
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Making a projectile using "gun-barrel" technologies is a little absurd

        no need to ascribe to me what I did not say
        and I said that for implements - CLEARANCE HIGHER
        nevertheless they were successfully produced
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In fact, the Russian Empire was not able to provide the fleet with a sufficient number of shells of the "Tsushima" sample

        And this is also a cant of ZPR !!!
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        1TOE was forced to "finish off" with cast-iron shells, and 2TOE had difficulty collecting shells, but they could not assemble the 2nd set in Vladivostok. Where are the new ones to do?

        Did you write this (the last phrase) just soberly?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        This is provided that everyone in one fell swoop realized the inferiority of our shells. And no one then realized it

        Yes and no
        see textbook 1898
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Do you want from Rozhdestvensky

        HE IS FOR THIS ANSWERED
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 18: 09
          +3
          Quote: Very kind
          no need to ascribe to me what I did not say
          and I said that the guns have a HIGHER CLEARANCE

          You talked
          Quote: Very kind
          COULD
          a simple question - where is the tighter tolerance - at the projectile or at the gun? - guns "for some reason" were also produced in normal series

          That is, you linked the possibility of producing shells with barrel manufacturing technologies.
          Quote: Very kind

          And this is also a cant of ZPR !!!

          Come on :))))) Well, let's wait for the article where you will justify this :)))
          Quote: Very kind
          Did you write this (the last phrase) just soberly?

          Of course. But what you write, I will not write a curve like a Tatar saber :)
          Quote: Very kind

          HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR IT

          I look forward to new discoveries :)
          1. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 10: 21
            0
            By the way, about new discoveries.
            A comrade who defends the version that the Japanese received ready-made shells and stuffed them with their mixture of picric acid forgot to mention that the bulk mass of the new shells will be less than that of the old ones. Accordingly, their length will increase.
            Is there any information that the Japanese altered the shell lifters on their ships?
            For example, Japanese armored cruisers used light projectiles due to the fact that the lifts were originally designed for light projectiles.
            On the Black Sea, after the introduction of a new projectile of the 1907 model, the lifts of the battleships were redesigned. Among the British cruisers of the Lion class, only Queen Mary used heavier shells.
            If there is no such information, then what new shells can we talk about?
            Used the English standard, equipped with liddite, or the Swedish experimental series, but in weight - the dimensions of the English standard.
            And for propaganda purposes, they used a fake about miracle shells equipped with miracle explosives.
    3. rytik32
      rytik32 24 November 2021 23: 47
      +5
      Quote: Very kind
      but the main thing is that practically nothing was done for this

      Absolutely.
      If in the mid-90s domestic shells were the best in the world, then 10 years later, due to the increase in the distance of sea combat, they lost their advantage. The British, French and Japanese had thin-walled landmines with a large amount of picric acid inside, just effective at long distances. And our shells remained at their previous level: they were effective at the distances at which the battle was planned 10 years ago.
      1. unknown
        unknown 28 November 2021 10: 25
        0
        That is, they flew out of the barrel and immediately fell into the water?
        The Germans used lightweight shells with might and main.
        Baden: 380 mm - 750 kg
        "Canada": 356mm - 720kg
        Izmail: 356 mm - 745 kg
        Queen Elizabeth: 381mm - 886kg.
        Bismarck: 380mm - 800 kg
        Duke of Wales: 356mm -720kg.
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 29 November 2021 00: 07
          0
          The question is that our 6-inch shells in Tsushima did not penetrate anything thicker than the 25-mm roof of the casemate. Then what is the point of thick walls and Makarov tips? What is the point of slowing down Brink fuses? Yes, with 10 cab. all this would work, but with 30 cab - no! At these distances, a completely different shell was needed.
  11. BAI
    BAI 24 November 2021 10: 50
    +2

    Does yellow stand out strongly against a gray sky?

    Evaluating color from a black and white photo is a powerful move. Although the author himself is a little lower and admits that this is not an entirely adequate solution. At the same time, there are color photographs, and it is not difficult to find them, for example:
    http://armedman.ru/fotogalereya/tsvetnyie-fotografii-rossiyskih-sudov-pervoy-polovinyi-20-veka.html
    or
    https://fishki.net/1437140-cvetnye-prizraki-bylogo.html

    Even if it's a coloring, it's still a more reasonable option.

    I can't insert a photo - there is an error message:
    File download: kreyser-Varyag-1901.jpg failed
    Watermark /templates/topwar/dleimages/watermark_dark.png is missing from your template files

    And the file is jpg.
    1. Astra wild2
      Astra wild2 24 November 2021 11: 58
      +2
      Colleague VAI, it seemed to me that: "Borodino" yellow pipes do not open up at all, and coloring of pipes does not help "Varyag" at all
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 18: 56
      +3
      Quote: BAI
      There are color photographs, and it is not difficult to find them, for example:

      The coloring is useless - it does not convey a real shade (these are pipes, there is coal dust and so on). At the same time, at a long distance, it is the shade that is important - lighter colors will be less visible against a gray sky than dark ones.
      In the future, camouflage, which included horizontal stripes of various colors with a transition from dark shades (near the water) to light ones, was quite used.
      1. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 29
        -3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In the future, camouflage, which included horizontal stripes of various colors with a transition from dark shades (near the water) to light ones, was quite used.

        fool
        those. the coloring of Zinovy's ships is "camouflage" ???? belay
        Wow please go on lol
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 18: 10
          +3
          Quote: Very kind
          fool
          those. the coloring of Zinovy's ships is "camouflage" ????

          Don't juggle, Maxim.
        2. unknown
          unknown 28 November 2021 10: 26
          0
          Initially, it was planned to pass the strait at night.
          But due to sabotage of "Admiral Senyavin" they postponed for a day.
    3. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 24 November 2021 19: 11
      +5
      Quote: BAI
      Even if it's a coloring book

      Exactly. This is a colonized photo. The resulting image has very little to do with reality. Believe it or not, look at the colonized copies of black and white films. Fear and horror.
      I can not insert a photo

      Do you insert a picture from the Internet or save it to yourself before?
      In theory, in the second case, it should work
      1. BAI
        BAI 24 November 2021 20: 19
        0
        First, I save it.
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 24 November 2021 20: 43
          +1
          Strange. request Although, of course, the site engine is a thing in itself ...
      2. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 24 November 2021 23: 46
        +1
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Exactly. This is a colonized photo.

        Colored all the same. But you are right, the coloring is very far from reality.
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 25 November 2021 11: 27
          +2
          Quote: Saxahorse
          colonized

          Pancake!!! lol
    4. mmaxx
      mmaxx 26 November 2021 07: 27
      0
      Photographers say: no light, no color. When the weather is in Tsushima, you can judge by the b / w picture.
  12. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 10: 54
    -1
    If I run at a speed of 10 km / h towards a person who is standing still, our approach speed is 10 km / h. But if this person turned away and leaves me at a speed of 4 km / h, then, despite my speed of 10 km / h, the distance between us is reduced by only 6 km / h. If my memory serves me, a more detailed explanation is contained in the mathematics textbook for the fifth grade.

    fool
    Andrey, do you understand the difference between the STRAIGHT (which you are now talking about) and the PLANE?
    Again -
    Moreover, no "observance of the formation" was needed here, it was necessary to reduce the distance "according to ability" as quickly as possible.
    But at whom - to look according to the situation.
    In my opinion, Kamimura's end EBRs and RBKRs were a much more interesting target than Mikasa.
    1. Astra wild2
      Astra wild2 24 November 2021 11: 37
      +6
      Colleague, "very kind" poking is not the most compelling argument. It is rather a manifestation of rudeness.
      I put cons for: wild stupidity and rudeness.
      My request, but ..
      1. Very kind
        Very kind 24 November 2021 12: 44
        -2
        Quote: Astra wild2
        Colleague, "very kind" poke

        I poked YOU somewhere? No.
        and we are familiar with Andrey and we communicate
        1. Astra wild2
          Astra wild2 24 November 2021 16: 33
          +4
          In that case, I'm sorry. I did not know.
          It's just that my mother taught me that a well-mannered person should not be rude
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 18: 58
      +4
      Quote: Very kind
      Andrey, do you understand the difference between the STRAIGHT (which you are now talking about) and the PLANE?
      Again -
      Moreover, no "observance of the formation" was needed here, it was necessary to reduce the distance "according to ability" as quickly as possible.

      So everything is on the diagram, Maxim. What's wrong? :)))))) 0
      Quote: Very kind
      Moreover, no "observance of the formation" was needed here, it was necessary to reduce the distance "according to ability" as quickly as possible.

      I didn't give a damn about the formation at all - I count the distance from Suvorov alone.
      Quote: Very kind
      In my opinion, Kamimura's end EBRs and RBKRs were a much more interesting target than Mikasa.

      Only now Kamimura did not turn where Togo was (see above, I gave a diagram there)
      1. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 28
        -2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        So everything is on the diagram, Maxim. What's wrong?

        "Shortest" decrease the distance "according to ability".
        do you see the difference?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I didn't give a damn about tuning at all

        noticeably
        "scoring" on the entire column of yaps

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Only now Kamimura did not turn where Togo was (see above, I gave a diagram there)

        yes do not care - the question was in the need to reduce the distance - in the outset of the battle !!!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 18: 12
          +4
          Quote: Very kind
          "Shortest" decrease the distance "according to ability".
          do you see the difference?

          A simple calculation shows that we will approach the battleships with cables up to 22-27. With end Nissin - up to 15. While Kamimura will cross or leave
          Quote: Very kind
          noticeably
          "scoring" on the entire column of yaps

          Maxim, your calculation would be correct if all 12 Japanese ships turned around through one point. But that was not the case. Calculation is wrong
          Quote: Very kind
          yes do not care - the question was in the need to reduce the distance - in the outset of the battle !!!

          Well, the cables would have approached him by 20 at best, however, by that time only firebrands would have remained from Suvorov and Alexander
          1. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 10: 29
            0
            If Kammimura leaves, how will he then catch up with his 14 knot detachment speed, if we unload the ships before the battle and have 14 knots in the first squad, like the first Japanese squad, and the rest of our ships -13 knots.
  13. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 10: 57
    +1
    The innovation of Z.P. Rozhestvensky is not that he used zeroing, it was used on all formations of ships that fought in the Russo-Japanese (including those armed with old guns, for which M. Klimov for some reason considers zeroing impossible), but that he personally introduced the "fork" method as required.

    belay
    YES - "shoving her into the splash salad from ALL" (I'm talking about the realities of the battle on non-"parade ground" with instructions and the so-called "combat" training)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 18: 59
      +3
      Quote: Very kind
      USU - "putting it in the" salad "splashes from ALL"

      And this has already been answered. And he wrote in flocks. And he quoted the order of the ZPR. Rozhdestvensky did not force everyone to hammer on one goal. "According to ability" and nothing more.
      1. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 23
        -3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Rozhdestvensky did not force everyone to hammer on one goal. "By ability"

        yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy
        actually it was possible
        2-3 EBR
        when ORGANIZING this fire
        for example, by "dial" ("hours") - "mine - not mine"
        but for the ORGANIZATION of squadron fire - for the real conditions of BATTLE ZPR, NOTHING was done!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 18: 14
          +4
          Quote: Very kind
          yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy
          actually it was possible
          2-3 EBR
          when ORGANIZING this fire
          for example, by "dial" ("hours") - "mine - not mine"

          You can't, Maxim. That is why they avoided concentrating fire on one target even on the 68-bis cruisers.
          And yes, that is why almost all fleets after the RYAV were hammered into the centralization of fire.
  14. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 10: 58
    -2
    In 1903-1904. The GMSh consisted of a naval accounting department and a personnel department. Everything! Other structures were engaged in armament .... In view of the above, how M. Klimov blames ZP for the absence of high-explosive shells in our country. Rozhdestvensky is a mystery to me.

    FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF NGMS
    in detail - in the second
  15. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 11: 01
    -1
    For my part, I can only ask my respected opponent in the future, assessing the activities of Z.P. Rozhestvensky as head of the General Music School still take into account what the General Music School was in reality in the period 1903-1904.

    About was
    incl. because ZPR of the head of VMUO Virenius "successfully dismissed"
  16. Astra wild2
    Astra wild2 24 November 2021 11: 15
    0
    "I didn't see anything like that" Andrey, it would be better if you cited excerpts from Japanese documents ..
    The photographs did not convince me much. You yourself noticed that the photographs are black and white.
    1. Very kind
      Very kind 24 November 2021 11: 19
      +2
      Quote: Astra wild2
      The photographs did not convince me much. You yourself noticed that the photographs are black and white.

      especially considering that this "creative" was not appreciated, to put it mildly - and it was NEVER painted SO again
  17. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 11: 25
    +1
    A. N. Krylov:
    Back in 1885, a very thin-walled, durable projectile with a large explosive charge that meets the requirements was developed. Unfortunately, it turned out to be very expensive, as a result of which it was not accepted.
  18. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 11: 27
    -1
    Vladimir Iosifovich immediately responded to the needs of the army in the field, designing the first 76-mm high-explosive grenade and organizing its production in such a way - that already in 1905 it began to enter the Far East. This circumstance is all the more remarkable because the issues of equipping high-explosive grenades with powerful explosives were not sufficiently studied in Russia at that time, and the gross production of such projectiles during this period was in its infancy.

    https://topwar.ru/134619-otec-fugasnogo-snaryada.html
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 18: 59
      +4
      What are we talking about. Maxim, do you not realize that the quoted passage confirms my point of view, not yours?
      1. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 21
        -2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        the quoted passage confirms my point of view, not yours?

        fool
        immediately responded to the needs of the active army, designing the first 76-mm high-explosive grenade and organizing its production in such a way - that already in 1905 g.

        once again - in the navy was not, not because "they could not" but because "so wanted"!
        when the question arose - "for some reason" they did it!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 18: 36
          +4
          Quote: Very kind
          again - the fleet was not, not because "they could not" but because "they wanted it so"!

          It's clear:))))
          Quote: Very kind
          immediately responded to the needs of the active army, designing the first 76-mm high-explosive grenade and organizing its production in such a way - that already in 1905

          Maxim, let's start simple. We are not talking about complex and expensive 152-254-305-mm shells, but about 76-mm "consumer goods". But even their army received only in 1905. In order for them to have time for 2TOE, they should have been “born” a little like this a year earlier - in 1904. This seems to be a self-evident fact.
          What is no less funny - you are quoting here
          Vladimir Iosifovich immediately responded to the needs of the army in the field, designing the first 76-mm high-explosive grenade and organizing its production in such a way - that already in 1905 it began to enter the Far East.

          Only now Vladimir Iosifovich himself is not aware of this success. In his "Historical Sketch" he wrote
          The absence of a high-explosive shell for field and mountain guns during the entire war, which made it possible for the Japanese to easily adapt adobe walls for the defense of villages and remain behind them in complete safety from our shrapnel.

          и
          Already during the war, in the summer of 1904, at the request of the troops, GAU began to develop a melinite grenade for 76-mm cannons. However, this work was carried out slowly, so that the grenades did not hit the active army until the end of the war.
  19. Victor Leningradets
    Victor Leningradets 24 November 2021 12: 04
    +8
    Good day, Andrey!
    I am glad for your next contribution to the analysis of the Tsushima battle.
    It seems that the events of more than a century ago have been sufficiently studied and analyzed. In fact, this fatal line, behind which the agony of the Russian Empire began, is not understood by us either from a scientific, historical or military point of view.
    Tsushima is just a small, but extremely bright episode, and thanks to the visualization of the mediocre death of an entire fleet, it is decisive for the millions of Russians who have lost faith in the Tsar and the Fatherland.
    I already wrote that Great Britain was the main director of the successive collapse of the Russian Empire. If you look at how consistently, starting from the XNUMXth century, Russia was cut off from the oceans and open seas, and who was the beneficiary of Russia's landing in the confined space of the Baltic Pool and Danube Settlement Basin, it becomes clear who was Russia's strategic adversary.
    Rossi's exit to the Baltic was supposed to end with the conquest of Sweden and the annexation of Norway. This would give Russia an outlet to the Atlantic. All this took about 40-50 years. It did not happen due to the useless waste of forces in the continental war in Europe.
    Access to the Black Sea and the subsequent defeat of Turkey (and not regional victories) was supposed to ensure Russia's access to the Indian Ocean. It also took 40-50 years. However, the British brilliantly pitted the continental powers against each other in the Napoleonic Wars, and the vector of acquiring a geostrategic advantage was lost, and with the defeat of Russia in the Crimea in 1953-1955, it was completely crossed out. In addition, through short-sightedness or betrayal, control over the Bering Strait, the northern gateway to the Pacific Ocean, was lost.
    The last attempt - a breakthrough to the east - the division of the Chinese heritage in the late 1904th - early 1905th centuries for a free exit to the Pacific Ocean, the colonization of Manchuria (this is where the Stolypin reform could have worked!) Was suppressed by the Russo-Japanese War of XNUMX-XNUMX.
    It must be understood that in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia fought not with Japan as such, but with Japanese human material (trained by Europeans) and advanced English technology. The desire of the United States to join the club of great powers, and not shedding blood, but making financial investments in the militarization of Japan, came in handy.
    So the "Crimean trap" was repeated in the Pacific Ocean after half a century.
    Now a few words about the First and Second Pacific Squadrons:
    On the eve of the formidable tests, Russia built a lot of ships (battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc.) but did not build a fleet and did not prepare for its combat use. We really did not have any reasonable basing, no worthy logistical support, no strategy and tactics of war at sea, no naval commanders capable of commanding squadrons of modern ships. The only thing that was more or less worked out was a cruising war on communications, however, without providing this war with an appropriate fleet of ships. But the actions of Jessen's squad are, perhaps, a small spoonful of honey in a common barrel (which is up to the readers to decide).
    Unfortunately, Russia will come to an understanding of the need for the fleet as a single organism and a locomotive for the development of the state too late - in 1912.
    Thus, neither the First nor the Second Pacific Squadron could win this war at sea. Even if a miracle happened and the Mikado Fleet lost a significant part of its power, the overseas puppeteers would insure it, both by the ship's personnel and, possibly, by direct intervention in hostilities.
    Thus, strategically, the victory of the Russian fleet in the war of 1904-1905 is even theoretically impossible.
    But operational art and tactics remain.
    1. Vagabung
      Vagabung 25 November 2021 22: 42
      +2
      and with the defeat of Russia in the Crimea in 1953-1955.

      And from whom did Russia suffer defeat in the Crimea during these years (this is already under the USSR), do not specify?
      1. unknown
        unknown 28 November 2021 10: 38
        -1
        Apparently, the author of the comment was mistaken with the dating.
        There is a version that Russia actually lost the Crimean War.
        The ruler known as Nicholas I was removed and replaced by the ruler known as Alexander II (not a relative, but an English henchman).
        According to this version, since that time Russia has become a crypto colony of Great Britain. According to the theory of the philosopher Galkovsky, this happened later, in 1917.
    2. unknown
      unknown 28 November 2021 10: 35
      -2
      The agony is understandable.
      Russia has been prepared for bankruptcy since 1896.
      By 1907, the main enterprises were corporatized, the shares were sold abroad.
      The funds received were converted into gold using the gold ruble and exported abroad. In 1917, the country was bankrupt, the debts were hung on the population.
      Officially, the new foreign owners of enterprises were thrown, but in real life they began to give them away with the help of concessions. The victory in the RYAV only got in the way.
      Everything has long been decayed and chewed up, only Soviet historical education interferes with us.
      Do you want more details in A. Stepanenko's live journal.
  20. Very kind
    Very kind 24 November 2021 12: 15
    -3
    Why is the post-war shooting data used as an illustration of the success of the pre-war training of the British fleet?

    because it is "refined technical expertise"
    There is no TACTICS in it, pure technique and mathematics - what is the exact distance and optical sights
    for a SIMPLE (standing) target
    an analogue from my practice, still a cadet of the VVMU - an example at a lecture when 1123, during practical firing with a well-adjusted firing system (+ exposed "weather") at a distance, EMNIP 14 km received a DIRECT hit with a single 82 missile on a submarine target
    Yes, this is a unique example - this is an example of TECHNICAL capabilities, and the fact that even with real (in real combat conditions) shooting errors, the target acc. conditions is covered by a "covering ellipse" (or Rabn)
    1. Very kind
      Very kind 24 November 2021 13: 02
      -2
      explanation -
      Quote: Very kind
      14 km received a DIRECT hit by a single 82 missile on a submarine target

      82r is an UNCONTROLLED missile
      and at 14 km it flew right into the target because
      - there were exact KPDTS and depth (!) of the goal
      - the "weather" is exactly set (and there was no strong wind)
      well, everything else is a well-adjusted PLO control system (electromechanical)
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 19: 00
      +2
      Maxim, "refined technical experience" in this interpretation is generally not from that opera.
      Let's start with a simple one - accuracy in exercises and accuracy in combat are two huge differences. Already in the future, many British dreadnoughts showed 60% of hits and higher in exercises - in a real battle EMNIP once got something about 5%.
      Further. The fact that one British battleship knocked out about 100% with its main caliber during exercises does not in any way indicate the poor quality of the 2TOE training. This is the same as comparing the accuracy of the 2TOE in Tsushima and my black shoes. It is necessary to compare like with like. Even the shooting practice of 2 fleets must be checked for the conditions in which they were carried out. And yes, as I already said, according to indirect data (Vyrubov's letter), it turns out that the best shooters of the 2TOE could also show an excellent percentage for peaceful conditions.
      But all this has almost nothing to do with accuracy in battle.
      1. Very kind
        Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 20
        -4
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        does not in any way indicate the poor quality of 2TOE preparation

        "and around the corner the guys are drinking beer"
        Do you have all the argumentation of "this" level?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        as I already said, according to indirect data (Vyrubov's letter), it turns out that the best 2TOE arrows could also show

        Andrey you can imagine the difference between TIR and BATTLE?
        and the main complaint against "BP" (in quotes) Zinovia is in FULL disregard of the conditions and realities of the BATTLE

        I'll tell you more than that - BREDA in the "current" BP documents - before Opa
        just AHINEA - "ah they have mastered new tactics !!!", "Scimitar" shoot!
        moreover, these ... KIs are not even able to google that "the conditions have changed" and now the same "scimitar" the entire salvo is simply given "to be devoured" by the enemy
        etc.
        those. not "ah, he's a new tactical technique" - but a complete PE with an understanding of the REAL CONDITIONS OF BATTLE
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 November 2021 18: 37
          +4
          Quote: Very kind
          Andrey you can imagine the difference between TIR and BATTLE?

          Of course. It would never have crossed my mind to draw parallels between British exercise precision and 2TOE live-fire.
  21. Astra wild2
    Astra wild2 24 November 2021 12: 25
    +3
    "from 10-12 cables", probably, the Japanese also took this into account and I doubt they would allow it to reach such a distance
    1. geniy
      geniy 24 November 2021 14: 36
      -2
      Dear ... in order to prevent the Japanese from reaching a distance of 10-12 cabs, they should not just take into account, but make some specific counteraction to this - that is, simply RUN from the Russian squadron.
      1. Astra wild2
        Astra wild2 24 November 2021 17: 04
        0
        I thought: strong barrage fire. As an example, how they fight against "jihadmobiles": strive to strike at a long distance .. About the battles for Palmyra, there is a militant: Fedorets "Under the White Sun of the Desert." Our AHC, a former Afghan, is the most brutal. Fascinated by the Syrian Marathon Series
        1. geniy
          geniy 24 November 2021 17: 31
          -1
          Madam, you apparently do not understand well how the battleship differs from the jihadmobile. Entot jihadmobile is most likely made of thin iron 1 mm thick and any bullet will easily kill either the driver or break the engine and the jihadmobile will immediately stop. But the battleship has armor with a thickness of 200 mm and it is not easy to stop it. You probably don't know that the battleship Suvorov was out of action and involuntarily approached the Japanese squadron at a distance of 10 cables and all 12 Japanese armored ships fired at it point-blank - but HE DIDN'T STOP!
          And if 12 Russian battleships launch a frontal attack on 12 Japanese ships of which 8 are armored cruisers, then the Japanese ships will also be hit, and the only way for them to increase their distance is to RUN!
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 25 November 2021 07: 23
            -3
            Quote: geniy
            And if 12 Russian battleships launch a frontal attack on 12 Japanese ships of which 8 are armored cruisers, then the Japanese ships will also be hit, and the only way for them to increase their distance is to RUN!

            that's all right, if our men marched at the front, they would have won
        2. Oleg Zorin
          Oleg Zorin 25 November 2021 21: 51
          +1
          Don't listen to him about "escape". The cruising squad of Kamimura in a pinch would have performed the all-of-a-sudden turn maneuver and broke the distance, having an advantage in speed. The fight would not end there in any case. But most likely it would have turned out to be the same version that Academy of Sciences has already analyzed more than once - both in this article and in previous ones.
          1. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 10: 40
            -2
            The real speed of the Kammimura squad is -14 knots.
            With proper preparation for battle (cardinal unloading of ships), the Russians would have such a speed in the first detachment, in the rest of the squadron -13 knots.
  22. LisKat2
    LisKat2 24 November 2021 13: 22
    -1
    I wish you all a good day.
    I had no particular desire to comment
    It seems to me that the essence of the disagreements in the politicization of society: because of not wise economic reforms, the people react painfully to positive assessments of events before 1917
    The justification of Rozhdestvensky, some will perceive as an attempt to justify the king.
    If Kolobov's article had been accepted in 1969 more calmly.
    My stepfather, a convinced member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, trusts publications before 1975 or reprints from foreign languages. Always voted for the communists, and in the spring they voted with Mama for United Russia. They called him that the elders of the clan decided so? (He is from Kabardin-Balkaria
    1. Astra wild2
      Astra wild2 24 November 2021 16: 42
      0
      Pig is also very cautious: "not wise", I do not like foul language, my mother brought up that way, but about the reforms, only obscenely.
      About the decision of the elders, I have already been told about this
  23. geniy
    geniy 24 November 2021 14: 06
    -4
    I don’t have time to discuss (now I’m writing proposals to the government about the Northern Sea Route), but I could not endure the falsity of Andrey's statement from Chelyabinsk:
    Suppose Z.P. Rozhestvensky had a magic wand, which made it possible to instantly increase the speed from 11 knots to 15 knots. Suppose that "Suvorov" rushed at 15 knots to the location of this very "Mikasa".
    That is, AiCh believes that the Russian squadron could not move at a speed of 15 knots. But in fact it was Rozhdestvensky who made her go at a speed of 9 knots. And he could well have given the order to separate the pairs so that each Russian ship could go at maximum speed even before the start of the battle. Let me remind you that in a couple of months the entire Russian squadron, with the help of special scrapers, cleaned its sides of shells. But the Japanese ships were not cleared. Therefore, the newest Russian ships could go at an equal speed with the Japanese battleships.
    BUT, the competition in the speed of the two opponents could be only under one most important condition: that the Japanese squadron took flight from the Russians, and Andrei carefully hides this.
    1. Astra wild2
      Astra wild2 24 November 2021 17: 26
      +1
      As I understood Andrey: if the Japanese were standing, then we can talk about constant rapprochement, but the Japanese were constantly moving.
      I heard somewhere what Socrates called: “the speed of a hare and turtles?
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        24 November 2021 19: 01
        +3
        Quote: Astra wild2
        As I understood Andrey: if the Japanese were standing, then we can talk about constant rapprochement, but the Japanese were constantly moving.

        You understood everything completely right :))))) hi
      2. geniy
        geniy 24 November 2021 20: 43
        -6
        [quote] [quote] As I understood Andrey: if the Japanese stood, then we can talk about constant rapprochement, [/ quote] [/ quote
        Mademoiselle - you have absolutely no idea how Andrei is deceiving all of you. He presents the entire Japanese squadron as if it were a material point from a single ship - Mikaza - which seemed to easily escape from under the blow. In reality, the Japanese squadron is a KILVATER line of 12 ships. And now the Russian squadron rushing with the front on the Japanese would have approached the Kilvaternaya line and the SECOND squadron of Japanese ships would have come under attack. Of course, they could easily have avoided rapprochement - but this is only on condition that all the Japanese would turn FOOD to the Russians. That is, the Japanese immediately had to take flight, and this is where Andrey is trying to deceive you.
        1. mmaxx
          mmaxx 26 November 2021 07: 38
          0
          Several times different Yap detachments did "all of a sudden" from ours. That is, they showed the feed. And it doesn't sound like running away. In the taiga, you can scare a bear. Will make a bunch and run away. But what will he do when he returns?
          1. geniy
            geniy 26 November 2021 10: 25
            -2
            Several times different Yap detachments did "all of a sudden" from ours. That is, they showed the feed. And it doesn't sound like running away. In the taiga, you can scare a bear. Will make a bunch and run away. But what will he do when he returns?



            You have a wrong analogy - supposedly the bear will return to an unarmed person. But in reality, the bear returned to the khotnik of the morning large-caliber rye. Because the Russian squadron had 43 large-caliber guns (10 inches), while the Japanese had only 17 large-caliber guns.
            And you write incorrectly as if the Japanese fleet turned stern to the Russians - no! The Japanese just made a turn all of a sudden and made two parallel columns perpendicular to the course of the Russian squadron - that is, the Japanese actually created a double stick over the "T" - that is, a huge advantage over the Russians. As a result of the fact that the Russians marched in a wake column, then under the ongem of 12 Japanese ships there were 2-3 head Russian battleships and instead of making a front formation in advance, the Russian fleet in the wake column turned away. If all 12 Russian ships were moving in the front line, they would inevitably crush the Japanese flo and shoot it from a dagger distance. Do you remember that during this one Russian shell hit the fuji tower and almost caused an explosion in the cellars. And if all 12 Russian ships fired at the Japanese point-blank, then the Japanese would have had dozens of penetrations of the armor of the towers and casemates.
            You are right that the Japanese made a turn "all of a sudden" several times, but they never once became "stern" to the Russian fleet. But if the Russian fleet went to them at these moments to approach the front line, then the Japanese would either be shot at close range or flee. And the fact that the Russians never used this opportunity is the fault of the fool Rozhestvensky, who did not create any battle plan and did not foresee anything except the course of the wake column.
    2. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 24 November 2021 19: 19
      +8
      Quote: geniy
      That is, AiCh believes that the Russian squadron could not move at a speed of 15 knots

      No. AiCh writes that the Russian squadron could not increase the speed from 11.5 knots to 15 immediately... That's all. By the way, it's true.
      1. geniy
        geniy 24 November 2021 21: 18
        -4
        No. AiCh writes that the Russian squadron could not increase the speed from 11.5 knots to 15 instantly. That's all.

        You are also trying to cheat. Because it was necessary to increase the speed of the course even BEFORE THE BATTLE STARTED. And the whole squadron should go through the strait not at 9 knots, but at 14 knots. At the same time, the Russian squadron had every chance to pass the Korean Strait WITHOUT A Fight AT ALL, because the Japanese would have had to catch up with the Russians for a very long time and the meeting had to take place in the evening twilight. And if the hospital Eagle had gone without navigation lights, the Japanese cruiser would not even have found the Russian squadron and the Japanese destroyers would have seen it only in the middle of the strait.
        So it was very easy to IMMEDIATELY increase the speed from 14 knots to 15 knots.
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 24 November 2021 21: 27
          +7
          Quote: geniy
          You are also trying to cheat.

          No.
          Quote: geniy
          Because it was necessary to increase the speed of the course even BEFORE THE BATTLE STARTED.

          Old battleships could not go more than 12 knots in principle. So you are the one who is busy with the artistic whistle.
          Quote: geniy
          WITHOUT FIGHT AT ALL

          Do you seriously think that capslooking makes delusional statements more convincing?
          Quote: geniy
          So it was very easy to IMMEDIATELY increase the speed from 14 knots to 15 knots.

          Even with 14 immediately will not work. It's just that these are steam engines, they don't increase their speed so quickly. It seems that "Varyag" with a serviceable car accelerated one knot in two minutes (I can be wrong and I don't remember the source), and these are battleships.
          1. geniy
            geniy 24 November 2021 23: 04
            -3
            Old battleships could not go more than 12 knots in principle. So you are the one who is busy with the artistic whistle.

            That even old Russian ships could go at a speed of more than 12 knots, here is my opinion:
            and began more and more copying of Western trends in shipbuilding, in which the bulbous shape of the bow end became more and more widespread. It is believed that it is she who provides any vessel with the lowest value of hydrodynamic resistance. However, this is not at all the case. In fact, this is a complete deception! Scientists simply cannot offer shipbuilders a single really effective way to reduce hydrodynamic resistance, but for some reason they came across a bulbous tip, which does not give any useful effect, but with the help of numerous deceptions, hydrodynamic scientists managed to fool the heads of all shipbuilders and shipbuilders about the supposedly miraculous effect and the remarkable usefulness of the bulb tip.
            Here all readers will probably be indignant: how can smart and honest scientists deceive all of humanity?
            Yes, easily - and they have no conscience! And moreover, this deception began not at all yesterday or even ten years ago - but a hundred and thirty years ago! This is how it was. Quote from the book by L. S. Shapiro "The Fastest Ships" page 47: "In 1882, Russian shipbuilders raised the question of the need, in parallel with the research of ships under the full-scale test program, to test models in an experimental pool. However, the Naval Ministry for several years, using various pretexts, delayed the construction of the pool It is not known when it would have been built at all, if not for ... the English battleship that overtook the Russian battleship with the Grand Duke General-Admiral Alexei Alexandrovich on board in 1888. The angry Grand Duke stamped his feet and reviled the sailors until he was reported that what happened is natural, since domestic-built battleships develop no more than 15-16 knots, while English ones - about 18 knots, and this is largely due to the fact that they are designed taking into account the tests of models in the experimental pool. "
            But in fact - all this is an explanation of shameless deception, or lack of knowledge. Because, in reality, testing models of ships in the experimental pool does not give absolutely any positive result, and overtaking the English battleship is explained by completely different reasons. The fact is that all ships in the world belong to the category of well-streamlined bodies. And improving the form of one of them in comparison with any other gives an insignificant result. But in addition to form resistance, any ship has other types of resistance - and most importantly, the largest of them is the resistance of water friction against the ship's skin. So: there is a laminar - that is, a smooth flow, and there is a turbulent - vortex, the resistance from which is three times greater. But besides the turbulent form, the frictional resistance depends very much on the roughness coefficient of the skin. The greater this coefficient, the greater the frictional resistance. And this even with the absolutely smooth skin of a newly built and launched ship. And if a ship or vessel has served for several years, then its entire skin is overgrown with shells and algae. And the size of these shells is about 20-40 mm - and they all have a bluff shape. I do not have detailed data on friction drag coefficients, but for comparison and understanding, here is the data on the thickness of the skin roughness of modern icebreakers: "... And our icebreakers were not covered by Inertoy until this moment. Severe corrosion-erosion corrosion of the hull with a roughness depth of up to 2 mm led to a significant increase in the coefficient of friction of ice against the hull skin. Thanks to the resulting "grater", the increase in the ice resistance of nuclear icebreakers turned out to be equivalent to a 2-fold loss of power. At the Lenin nuclear-powered icebreaker, also corroded, the icebreaking capacity from the design 1,6 m decreased to 1-1,2 m. " Everyone can clearly see that even an increase in the roughness of the skin up to 2 mm greatly increases friction. And now the Angians more than a hundred years ago issued a law that all warships must be docked at least twice a year - that is, six months later, in order to clean the shells from their hull. But the law is law, and it was very difficult to comply with it, because the delivery of a ship to the dock in those days cost a lot of work and a lot of money. So - although the original quote did not mention which particular Russian battleship shamefully lost in speed to the English, but most likely it was the battleship "Peter the Great" (there were simply no other Russian battleships in the Baltic at that time) built in 1872, which means that In 1888, he served for 16 years - and probably during the entire period the Russians never cleaned the casing. Therefore, it was not at all bad contours that were the cause of its low speed - but the uncleaned skin and high frictional resistance. And this proves that all warships immediately after construction lost speed very quickly. So if on tests the battleships showed 18 knots, then soon after the construction and fouling of their skin, the real speed became 2-3 knots less. But there is a mystery here. During the Russian-Japanese war, just before the Tsushima battle, during anchorage, Russian sailors managed to clear the bottoms and underwater parts of the sides of shells and algae without any docking at a completely unequipped coast. Russian sailors made steel scrapers and tied them to ropes, which they passed under the bottoms of the ships, and dragging these ropes back and forth - they very well cleaned the underwater skin of all their ships from fouling. Therefore, the real speed of Russian ships could be much higher than everyone is used to. But profane historians do not understand the meaning of cleaning the underwater skin and therefore do not pay any attention to this fact. And the author has an assumption that the speed of Russian ships in the Battle of Tsushima could have been much higher. And the Japanese most likely did not dock all their ships and did not clean their skin, so the speed of the Japanese battleships and armored ships was much lower than the passport speed.
            1. mmaxx
              mmaxx 25 November 2021 04: 46
              +4
              None of the ships of that time had bulb formations. They were the TARANS. If anyone had a decrease in wave resistance, it was only by chance. On the contrary, in the literature there are constantly phrases of shipbuilders about the senselessness of these spies from the point of view of speed.
              Bulba was founded by Yurkevich after WWI. And now these bulbs live and thrive. These are SPECIAL hull formations to reduce wave formation by the ship's hull. They are especially effective if the ship is traveling at constant speeds. This is even despite the fact that, for example, a supertanker travels 9-10 knots and 90% of the resistance in such a course is friction, not wave formation.
            2. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 25 November 2021 11: 21
              +5
              built in 1872 year, which means that by 1888 it served as much as 16 years - and probably for the entire period the Russians never cleaned the casing.

              Marsh learn materiel!
              1. geniy
                geniy 25 November 2021 15: 55
                -4
                Do you, Ivan, disagree with something? The battleship Peter the Great began construction in 1869, launched in 1872, unsuccessfully completed in 1877 - the speed was only 12,5 knots, in 1881 it was sent to England to rework machines - the speed became 14 knots, and by 1888 it was for sure got a strong fouling.
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 25 November 2021 17: 06
                  +4
                  Quote: geniy
                  launched in 1872

                  Yeah. In August to the Neva. (The bottom does not overgrow in fresh water.) In the fall, he was transferred to Kronstadt and the first thing they did was dock. And they took him out of there in September 1874. The company lasted 12 days, after which the battleship was returned to the dock, where it stayed until the end of July 1875. On August 7, they were again taken to the dock, and you can be sure the bottom was cleared.
                  He spent the winter at the dock again.
                  Then there were tests, replacement of screws, which, of course, was carried out at the dock. This is August 1875. After that, wintering again at the dock.
                  Quote: geniy
                  in 1881 he was sent to England for the alteration of cars

                  Not for alteration, but for replacement. And it also took place at the dock. not to mention that Elder's plant is located on the Clyde River. And in fresh water, as I wrote, the bottom does not overgrow, but on the contrary, seaweed dies off. There is even such a method of cleaning, when the ship is bluntly introduced into the river bed, and after a while it is taken out clean.
                  Then the battleship goes to Mediterranean, from where it returns in 1882 and does what? Right.
                  Quote: geniy
                  by 1888 it must have gotten heavily fouled.

                  I don't know how incompetent you need to be to seriously think that a warship has been in 16 years
                  the Russians never cleaned the trim.
                  1. mmaxx
                    mmaxx 26 November 2021 07: 44
                    0
                    It grows on the bottom in fresh water. Not shells, but another joy. And the mixture of fresh and salt water further promotes fouling.
                    1. Senior seaman
                      Senior seaman 26 November 2021 12: 20
                      +1
                      Quote: mmaxx
                      It grows on the bottom in fresh water. Not shells, but another joy.

                      Perhaps. But it will die out anyway in salty.
                      1. mmaxx
                        mmaxx 26 November 2021 15: 30
                        +1
                        Maybe it will die out. But it won't fall off by itself.
          2. geniy
            geniy 25 November 2021 16: 03
            -2
            WITHOUT FIGHT AT ALL
            Do you seriously think that capslooking makes delusional statements more convincing?
            Do you disagree with something?
            Maybe you just don't know how to count? Or you don’t know something? So I will remind you.
            In Tsushima, at 2 a.m., an auxiliary cruiser - actually an armed transport ship Shinano-Maru - discovered the running lights of the hospital ship Eagle. BUT if Rozhestvensky would have forbidden this ship to carry navigation lights - like all other ships, then the Japanese simply would not have seen him. At 04:02 Shinano-Maru approached the Eagle to inspect it, as the Japanese mistook it for another ship, and at that moment, at a distance of 8 cables in the haze, they saw 10 other ships of the squadron. The Russian squadron was discovered. At 04:28 the captain of the 1st rank Narukawa transmitted a report on the radio: "Enemy in square 203" If the Rozhdestvensky order to the Eagle went 20 miles away from the squadron, then Shinano-Maru simply would not have guessed about the presence of the Russian squadron.
            But even if after another 2 hours - that is, at 6 o'clock in the morning, the Japanese would have seen the Russian squadron and Rozhestvensky would have ordered the radiotelegraph operators to drown the Japanese transmission with his spark, then Admiral Togo would not have learned anything about the Russians.
            And then the Japanese patrol ships would have to go to their port at a distance of 150 km = 90 miles at a speed of, say, 15 knots - 6 hours, which means that at 12 noon Admiral Togo would only know about the presence of Rozhdestvensky's squadron. BUT he could not leave immediately - for 2 hours the Japanese squadron divorced the couples, therefore they would leave the port at 14 o'clock in the afternoon. To the Russian squadron in the middle of the strait they have to go about 100 miles by 15 junction battleships - this is a loss of time 6 hours. Add to 14 o'clock the moment of exit and if you know how to count, then you get the meeting time of the Russian and Japanese squadrons at 20 o'clock in the evening - then it is already completely night time, since the Tsushima battle ended at 19.10. Thus, if Rozhestvensky was not a complete fool, then the Tsushima battle, in principle, could not begin on this day.
            And then it was 12 o'clock in the night - and during this time the Russian squadron went another 150 miles (plus 150 on the previous day), which means 300 miles closer to Vladivostok.
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 25 November 2021 17: 12
              +3
              Quote: geniy
              So I will remind you.
              In Tsushima, at 2 a.m., an auxiliary cruiser - actually an armed transport ship Shinano-Maru - discovered the running lights of the hospital ship Eagle.

              Grow a reminder to yourself first :))
              The Shinano-maru was actually the third to spot the Russian squadron. Before him there were fishermen and a VNOS post on one of the islands. And then there were three lines of auxiliary cruisers like the "Shinono-maru".
              So "going unnoticed" is unscientific fantasy.
              1. geniy
                geniy 26 November 2021 10: 15
                0
                And then there were three lines of auxiliary cruisers like the "Shinono-maru". So "going unnoticed" is unscientific fantasy.

                It doesn't matter who and when was the first Japanese to see the Russian squadron, and most importantly - who was the first to report. And it was Shinano Maru who did it first. But if Rozhestvensky had guessed to give the order to jam all Japanese radio broadcasts, then Shinano Maru would not have been able to warn Admiral Togo.
                Of course, three lines of Japanese patrol ships (through one of them the Rozhdestvensky squadron passed unnoticed) and in the middle of the Korean Strait opposite the Tsushima Islands, Russians would still be found, only Ivan Ochenkov forgets that from the middle of the Korean Strait to the base of the Japanese fleet is 90 miles, and when the speed of the slowest battleship Fuji is 15 knots - however, as I already wrote, due to fouling of the underwater skin, absolutely all ships in operation have a stroke of 2-3 knots less than on acceptance tests with a smooth skin. Therefore, the speed figure of 18 knots for Japanese battleships is a purely fictitious value, which in reality they did not have (as well as the Russians), and in fact the battleships could develop about 15 knots. Therefore, dividing 90 miles by 15 knots, we get 6 hours of travel - but this is provided if the Russian squadron stopped motionless and waited for the Japanese squadron. And yes, here it is also necessary to remember that the Japanese would have needed 2 hours to warm up the boilers and to shoot from anchor and to call the sailors from the shore. Ivan ochenkov is trying to deceive everyone - they say to spin up steam engines and even steam turbines - this is a long business, but in fact it takes a lot of time to warm up boilers from a cold state. So - 2 hours must be added to the Japanese squadron for the loss of time. And since the Russian squadron would not move motionlessly to wait for them in the Korea Strait, during this time it would have advanced a lot and instead of 90 miles the Japanese would have to go all 150 miles (divide this by the speed of 15 knots) and get a Japanese time delay of 2 hours + 10 h = 12 h. Thus, only after 12 hours the Japanese, with their entire fleet with battleships, could arrive at the supposed location of the Russian squadron, a square with sides of about 100 miles by 100 miles. And this arrival shortly before nightfall - that is, the Russian squadron would be found at 6 a.m. + 12 hours for the Japanese exit = the arrival of the Japanese in the area at 18 p.m. and another + 2-3 hours in search of the Russian squadron, because if Rozhestvensky would not have been a fool, he would have ordered all ships to jam all radio broadcasts of the Japanese and the Japanese admiral would have been deaf and blind. And in general, all Japanese ships would be deaf without radio communication if Rozhestvensky was not a fool.
                And at 19.10 the battle of Tsushima ended because night came and at night the Japanese were afraid to fight - because they would have to shoot at a pistol distance of about 3 cables, on which they would have been destroyed by Russian armor-piercing shells. So the Japanese would have to lose another 12 hours of night. And after that, at the onset of morning, the Japanese would again have to look for a Russian squadron that was moving at an unknown speed for them and an unknown course - therefore, the Japanese could only find Russians near Vladivostok - where, as you know, I help the walls - because there was a Japanese minefield about which was already known to the Russians. And in Vladik there were Russian destroyers and submarines, not to mention the cruiser Russia, but the Japanese destroyers would have used up all the coal and would not have been able to reach Vladivostok and return back to Japan. So all the advantage in this situation, if Rozhestvensky was not a fool, would be with the Russians.
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 26 November 2021 12: 25
                  +1
                  Quote: geniy
                  as I already wrote because of fouling of the underwater skin

                  You have written a lot of nonsense and I fully admit that I sincerely believe that the Japanese did not have docks for such a simple operation as cleaning the bottom. The only problem is that it has nothing to do with reality.
                  I will not even comment on the rest of the nonsense.
          3. geniy
            geniy 25 November 2021 16: 14
            -3
            Even with 14 it will not work instantly. It's just that these are steam engines, they don't increase their speed so quickly. It seems that the "Varyag" with a working machine accelerated one knot in two minutes (I can be wrong and I don't remember the source), and these are battleships.

            You probably just don't know how a steam engine works.
            The fact is that before increasing the power, first the stokers must throw a lot of coal into the furnaces of the boilers. Then this coal should ignite and boil tons of water, and only after that the power of the steam engine will increase. And it was precisely this process of preparation that was meant in relation to the Varyag.
            And what I meant was that the Rozhdestvensky squadron had given an order for maximum speed in advance and there was a lot of coal in the furnaces of the boilers - all you had to do was put steam into the machines and they would almost instantly increase the power. And then the entire Russian squadron will rush to the Japanese fleet and approach it at a distance of dagger fire.
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 25 November 2021 17: 14
              +4
              Quote: geniy
              And it was precisely this process of preparation that was meant in relation to the Varyag.

              Stupidity.
              Quote: geniy
              all you need to do is put steam into the cars and they will increase power almost instantly.

              Only in your fantasies. Even turbine ships could not instantly raise their speed. This can only be done by the internal combustion engine.
              Quote: geniy
              You probably just don't know how a steam engine works.

              Alas. Unlike you, I know. yes
          4. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 11: 18
            0
            The old battleships increased their speed to 13-14 knots at night.
            All those who believe that the speed of the Japanese squadron was 15 knots are carried away by the artistic whistle. And some, they increase it to 16.
            Back in 2004, that is, seventeen years ago S.A. Balakin wrote that already in July 1904 the battleship "Fuji" could not go more than 15 knots.
            And in 2006, Balakin, in co-authorship with Aleksandrov, wrote that already in September 1904 Azuma could not produce more than 16 knots, and then for a very short time.
            All Japanese ships entered the battle of Tsushima with a huge overload.
            In 2013, an article appeared in which Mikasa's overload was calculated approximately, but very reliably. The total overload of the flagship, construction and operational, according to these calculations was 2975 tons (to the design normal displacement). The main belt went under the waterline by thirty centimeters (its upper edge).
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 28 November 2021 20: 00
              +1
              Quote: ignoto
              And in 2006, Balakin, in collaboration with Aleksandrov, wrote that already in September 1904 Azuma could not produce more than 16 knots,

              Moreover, they referred to the memoirs of British observers. But here's the problem, our colleague Valentin Maltsev, aka Comrade, (aka Countryman with AI) found these memories and they do not contain a word about the problems of the Asamoids with speed.
      2. rytik32
        rytik32 24 November 2021 23: 57
        +4
        the Russian squadron could not increase the speed from 11.5 knots to 15 instantly. That's all. By the way, it's true.

        Good afternoon, Ivan!
        And the Japanese, getting out of the loop, how quickly could they increase the speed to 15 knots?
        Or do you think that when turning 15 points, speed is not lost?
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 25 November 2021 11: 25
          +2
          Quote: rytik32
          Good afternoon, Ivan!

          hi Welcome.
          Quote: rytik32
          And the Japanese, getting out of the loop, how quickly could they increase the speed to 15 knots?

          Of course, they slowed down a bit when turning.
          How long could it take to dial again? It's hard to say, but at least it took them no longer than the Russian battleships. But rather less. Simply by virtue of the fact that their ships were in better technical shape, the machine crews were more experienced, and so on. But this, of course, IMHO :)))
          1. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 11: 24
            0
            The Japanese could not have a speed of more than 14 knots.
            They were all overwhelmed.
            "Mikasa" had an operational overload, relative to the design normal displacement, in 2191 tons.
            More experienced machine commands.
            Maybe they were more experienced, but lighter (the average weight is about 50 kg, Europeans are 10-20 kg more).
            This is the same as with the Japanese loaders, weighing 50 kg., Which had to operate with shells weighing 45 kg.
        2. geniy
          geniy 25 November 2021 15: 58
          -4
          Right, right. When turning to the opposite course - about 180 degrees, both ships and even airplanes experience a loss of speed by about 2 times. That is, the Japanese squadron, instead of 15 knots, would initially reduce the speed to 8 knots in the first minutes after the turn - that is, less than a Russian squadron could have with 15 catch.
          1. mmaxx
            mmaxx 26 November 2021 07: 48
            +1
            But this is a decrease in speed from a maneuver. And the boilers work and give 15 knots of steam. That is, the Japanese only had to overcome their own inertia of the ships.
            1. geniy
              geniy 26 November 2021 13: 00
              +1
              That is, the Japanese only had to overcome their own inertia of the ships.

              Yes, you are absolutely right. Moreover, this process of gaining speed is probably quite fast - no longer than one minute - it would seem a mere trifle. And this is true.
              But the essence is in the principle of combat maneuvering. If all the Russian ships turned their noses at the Japanese, an inevitable rapprochement would begin. And the only way for the Japanese to avoid this fatal rapprochement for them is to turn stern to the Russians and start fleeing from them. And then mutual longitudinal shelling will begin - the most deadly form of artillery fire.
              But the difference is that the downed overtaking ships - the Russians immediately lag behind and go back from under the shelling. But the escaping wounded Japanese ships stop and get surrounded and under fire from the entire Russian squadron. And under hundreds of point-blank shots and torpedoes, the knocked out Japanese quickly perish.
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 26 November 2021 15: 34
                +2
                Are you sure the Japanese would run? They all won so far. And I do not remember from the history of the Japanese cowardice before the enemy.
                For a samurai, the most important thing is to die in battle. What are you going to scare them with? Togo staged a battle with a decisive result. And he won. Himself the whole war did not leave the open bridge. Taking into account the higher technical rate of fire and an order of magnitude better training of the gunners, the battle would have ended 2 times faster.
              2. mmaxx
                mmaxx 26 November 2021 15: 38
                0
                All this reminds of a hungry Ostap Bender in Vasyuki. I love his optimism in life.
              3. mmaxx
                mmaxx 26 November 2021 15: 41
                0
                One more time.
                But I propose this situation for the Japanese. The mad Russians rushed at me (Togo). There is no need to fuss. While the signals are being picked up, transmitted and it's time to run, I'll wait a minute. In a minute or two, NOTHING will happen. I will appreciate the situation and just move on. In the best case, the Russians will run over Nissin and Kasuga in this way. And to hell with them. And the battleships themselves, with the help of the Russian maneuver, put a wand over the t "Suvorov". Moreover, a maximum of "Alexander 3" can fire at the terminal battleships. At such a distance, the Russian flagship will be getting shy with even greater speed than it actually happened. Moreover, the flights will go to "Alexander". During this time, the Russians will rush forward and, possibly, finish off or cause serious damage to the end cruisers. But the Japanese are incomparably better at maneuvering. And then you can start to dismantle the formation of the Russians from the stern, or you can do "Alexander" through "all of a sudden". Russians in the front line. The outer ship is not a fighter against the line. The speed difference is 1,5 times. With the "skill" to maneuver the Russians, it takes more time to restore the formation and at a lower speed the maneuverability is worse.
                And yes, more. Throughout the war, the Japanese fired better than the Russians. They had combat experience and knew how to maneuver. The ships are not overloaded with wood and are generally simpler than ours, made based on French motives. Fires are not so bad. And the same "Suvorov" in reality just burned down. As in Warship.
            2. unknown
              unknown 28 November 2021 11: 27
              0
              The boilers may produce 15 knots of steam.
              More "Fuji" did not go since July 1904.
              What about the huge operational overload?
              The displacement is greater, the draft is greater, for example, the Mikasa has increased by about 88 cm relative to the design normal displacement.
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 28 November 2021 12: 16
                0
                It's true. But they have a loss of speed from maneuvering. This means that there is steam and power in the machines. And ours still need to get this steam. ZPR increased speed on lane change. And then dropped to 9 knots. And you have to dial again. Time is still needed. And with such risky maneuvers, one must either know exactly the timing (that is, prepare in advance) or have a good instinct. But with this, it seems, ZPR had problems. He failed to rebuild in one column. And one stupid thing - a decrease in speed.
    3. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 25 November 2021 07: 25
      -2
      Quote: geniy
      BUT, competition in the speed of movement of both opponents could be only under one main condition: that the Japanese squadron took flight from the Russians,

      it is true, if they went to the front in battle, then they would have defeated the Japanese, and if the traitor led everyone in a marching column one by one ... then the result is obvious
  24. Victor Leningradets
    Victor Leningradets 24 November 2021 14: 09
    +1
    You should start with the operational environment.
    In the Yellow, East China and Sea of ​​Japan, the Japanese fleet dominates. The fleet is very specific, designed to operate in a confined space around the Japanese Islands and has limited anchorages suitable for large ships, not to mention naval bases.
    The question arises, in connection with what it was decided that the Second Pacific Squadron should break through the Korea Strait in the immediate vicinity of Sasebo, the base of the Mikado fleet? Another cunning plan?
    It is unlikely that Rozhestvensky hoped to slip past Tsushima unnoticed, and then crawl undetected to Vladivostok. Rather, on his part, it was a deliberate challenge to Admiral Togo, in the confidence that in an artillery battle it would be possible to realize the theoretical advantage in heavy artillery. Here we need to make a digression:
    Russian sailors, receiving high-explosive shells from Japanese battleships and armored cruisers, mistakenly mistook the action of eight-inch shells for twelve-inch shells, and six-inch shells for eight-inch shells. Let us recall the statement that the Japanese did not have semi-armor-piercing eight-inch shells, and twelve-inch shells were, both purely high-explosive and semi-armor-piercing. The six-inch ones were mentioned in passing, which makes it possible to evaluate them as high-explosive with a low content of explosives. In reality, the combat damage received by the "Eagle" from twelve-inch semi-armor-piercing shells and from high-explosive eight-inch - credited as from twelve-inch, and as from high-explosive six-inch - as from eight-inch. That is, the fire system of the Japanese squadron looked like this: after zeroing at a distance of battle, a well-armored enemy is thrown with high-explosive six and eight-inch shells causing fires and fragmentation damage, and the rarer, but more accurate shooting with twelve-inch semi-armor-piercing shells damages the inner belt and towers. Thus, the Japanese squadron, controlling the distance of the battle, has a multiple advantage in heavy artillery, if we consider the high-explosive effect of shells.
    Hence, Rozhdestvensky's main mistake was to look for an artillery duel with the ships of Togo and Kamimura. It was necessary to carry out the most valuable part of the Second Squadron - four battleships of the "Borodino" class without exposing them to the fire of twelve Japanese ships. To do this, it was necessary to divide the squadron into a breakthrough detachment and a distraction detachment, thereby ensuring the absence or short duration of fire contact of the first detachment with enemy ships.
    In this regard, the most controversial is the movement of the marching column through the Korea Strait. Here it should be noted that the most expedient was the squadron, in addition to the breakthrough detachment and transports, around the Japanese islands to the La Perouse Strait, where to give a distracting battle. At the same time, the movement should have been carried out in detachments with a rendezvous in pre-agreed areas, to make it difficult to determine the composition of the squadron. If the bait worked, then the ships of Togo and Kamimura would rush to intercept, first to the Sangar Strait, and then to the La Perouse Strait, spending their very limited supply of fuel. For this reason, the Japanese would not have a sufficient number of destroyers at the point of battle, so that the distraction detachment would have a good chance of surviving by evading a decisive battle.
    The breakthrough detachment, meanwhile, was supposed to cross the Korean Strait using the dark time of day and weather conditions and, leaning towards the Korean coast, reach Vladivostok. With a belated detection of a breakthrough detachment, the Japanese would not have been able to intercept at maximum speed due to lack of fuel, and if this had been preceded by a battle in the La Perouse Strait, they would have had to go to intercept with damage, with incomplete ammunition and with guns shot in battle. As an experienced naval commander, Admiral Togo, most likely would have sent Kamimura to demonstrate the interception, hoping to finish off the breakthrough detachment in the future.
    If the Japanese did not succumb to the provocation and saw through the bait, they would either have been forced to divide their forces into two straits, or block the Korean Strait with the main forces, hoping to cope with the distraction detachment that had broken through to Vladivostok in the future.
    At the same time, Rozhestvensky had a good chance, having met the forces of Togo and Kamimura, to fight on the withdrawal to a neutral port, where to disarm.
    Thus, from an operational point of view, the path chosen by Rozhdestvensky was the worst possible one, which led to the battle on conditions ideal for the enemy.
    1. Jura 27
      Jura 27 24 November 2021 15: 50
      +3
      [/ quote] Rather, on his part, it was a deliberate challenge to Admiral Togo, [quote]

      The ZPR had a psychological quirk that he was going to support the honor of the fleet and Russia, defiled by previous defeats, hence the neglect of combat training and slow-moving transports in the battle of squadrons and other miracles. When the "psychology of a suicide" (VKAM, EMNIP) is in my head, there is no time for the nuances of tactics and combat training.
    2. Victor Leningradets
      Victor Leningradets 24 November 2021 17: 26
      -2
      I forgot to add about the Vladivostok cruising squadron, which, by the way, could seriously affect the balance of power. I did not make a reservation, it was the Vladivostok squadron (in fact - the first rank cruiser Russia), reinforced in advance by Oslyabey, Aurora and auxiliary cruisers. What reason was there for them to wait for the Third Pacific Squadron to approach and engage in "the last and decisive battle?"
      And so - they would raid the communications of Japan, you see - they pulled off Kamimura's detachment.
      1. mmaxx
        mmaxx 25 November 2021 04: 49
        +3
        To Tsushima the Vladivostok detachment was practically incapable of combat. They would have met Vladik, but no more.
        1. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 25 November 2021 09: 29
          -2
          The Vladivostok detachment - until the arrival of the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron - is a rank I cruiser "Russia" (one).
          After the arrival of the Oslyabya, Aurora, Rion, Terek, Dnepr, Kuban, and Ural detachments, eight ships, and five of them may not enter Vladivostok, acting independently to east of the Sangar Strait and the La Perouse Strait.
          1. mmaxx
            mmaxx 25 November 2021 10: 06
            +2
            Understood nothing. Write it more simply: what ships could at least meet the 2nd squadron? At least in the Golden Horn.
            I don't even ask about the fight.
            1. Victor Leningradets
              Victor Leningradets 25 November 2021 13: 13
              -1
              Among these ships there are no intended for decisive combat. And there is no need for them to meddle under the guns of Togo and Kamimura. But, having departed from Madagascar, they, without waiting for Nebogatov, must independently go around Japan to Vladivostok. Some of them (Oslyabya, Aurora and Russia) should operate from Vladivostok in the spirit of Jessen's detachment, and the auxiliary cruisers Terek, Rion, Kuban, Dnepr and Ural - from the eastern sides of Japan. Moreover, the dispatch of light cruisers Deva or Uriu to counter raiders is well parried by a detachment of cruisers "Oslyabya", "Russia" and "Aurora". So to neutralize the Vladivostok squadron, at least four armored cruisers will have to be dispatched.
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 25 November 2021 13: 35
                +2
                Such plans are fantastic for our admirals. I think that now too.
                1. Victor Leningradets
                  Victor Leningradets 25 November 2021 15: 12
                  -2
                  And what is the fantasy?
                  To get around Japan, and if necessary, around Sakhalin is a difficult, but quite feasible task for two ships (Oslyabya and Aurora).
                  "Rion", "Terek", "Kuban" and "Dnepr" - and they acted, but did not have support from the Vladivostok detachment.
                  1. mmaxx
                    mmaxx 25 November 2021 17: 12
                    0
                    During the entire war, neither admirals nor generals did anything reasonable. And here are the suggestions.
                    A! No! They blew up two Japanese battleships.
                    We are still arguing here: whether Ivanov violated the order or Vitgeft gave it in such a veiled way.
                  2. mmaxx
                    mmaxx 25 November 2021 17: 15
                    0
                    And the cruising operations of our fleet were simply miserable. Also, only in one episode they really helped the war - they sank a transport with howitzers. Otherwise .... Complete lack of results. Some little thing.
              2. unknown
                unknown 28 November 2021 11: 32
                0
                The Kamimura detachment in the battle with the Vladivostok cruisers did not have enough fire performance. Four against three, and then, and two.
                And the speed was not enough.
                You shouldn't have taken the Azuma. Since September 1904, it has been more than 16 knots, and then for a very short time did not give out.
                You should have taken the Yakumo. It is at least one knot faster.
    3. Ol willy
      Ol willy 24 November 2021 18: 00
      0
      If the task was to set "retreat to a neutral port, where to disarm," then it was easier to leave for Qingdao without any fight
      1. Victor Leningradets
        Victor Leningradets 24 November 2021 18: 11
        0
        The goal is to get to Vladivostok with the most combat-ready part of the squadron. In case of unfavorable development of events - departure to the neutral port (Qingdao). By the way, Rozhestvensky, in his orders for the upcoming battle, did not exclude this possibility.
    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 November 2021 19: 07
      +3
      Victor, all the questions raised have long been answered.
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      Here it should be noted that the most expedient was the squadron, in addition to the breakthrough detachment and transports, around the Japanese islands to the La Perouse Strait, where to give a distracting battle. At the same time, the movement should have been carried out in detachments with a rendezvous in pre-agreed areas, to make it difficult to determine the composition of the squadron. If the decoy worked, then the ships of Togo and Kamimura would rush to intercept, first to the Sangar Strait, and then to the La Perouse Strait, spending their very limited supply of fuel.

      Honestly, I don't even want to answer such a fantasy. If the Russians had gone around Japan, Togo would have moved closer to La Perouse, as he had intended. The Japanese did not have a limited supply of fuel - they had a lot of ports, and their ships were much more economical than ours. The "distracting" battle would turn into the destruction of the forces that gave it - the advantage in speed, so that we did not have to break away. The destroyers went along with the ships of Togo.
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      The breakthrough detachment, meanwhile, was supposed to cross the Korean Strait using the dark time of day and weather conditions and, leaning towards the Korean coast, reach Vladivostok.

      It would also have been found in the Korea Strait and destroyed before the passage to Vladivostok - it was not difficult to intercept it either from Sasebo or from La Perouse
      1. Victor Leningradets
        Victor Leningradets 24 November 2021 20: 49
        -1
        Battleships entering the port to resupply = falling into time trouble. Besides. you need not just a port for fishermen and traders, but either a base or an international port equipped to service large-tonnage workers. There are not many of them on the west coast of Japan. And the armadillos mikado (of English manufacture) are extremely voracious at high speeds: 1000 miles at a speed of 16 knots! So throwing from Sasebo to the La Perouse Strait and towards the breakthrough detachment (correct 1500 miles) + the subsequent battle (second in a row!) Is an overwhelming task. In addition, the breakout squad must be met, and not missed. In general, the further from Sasebo, the better for the Russian squadron.
        1. unknown
          unknown 28 November 2021 11: 41
          0
          Alternative History site
          15.02.2013 years
          The article "On the overloading of battleships in the Russo-Japanese War". Mikasa.
          The fuel was loaded prohibitively.
          Read carefully.
          Calculations without emotion.
          Andrey read the article.
          Participated in the comments.
          PS The most voracious of the Japanese is "Asahi". from 27 to 30 - 447 tons.
      2. unknown
        unknown 28 November 2021 11: 37
        0
        Andrey, what is the limited amount of fuel the Japanese have?
        You read the article of the Compatriot "On the issue of overloading battleships in the Russo-Japanese War." Mikasa, 15.02.2013/XNUMX/XNUMX. water level.
        But the auxiliary vessels should have been launched around Japan.
        They all died in real life, were captured.
        I would like to keep them, intern.
  25. sevtrash
    sevtrash 24 November 2021 18: 26
    +1
    The author correctly noted that professionals have a more objective assessment of the situation or personality in their area of ​​interest. In this regard, he is very subjective, moreover, he reacts rather aggressively and nervously to criticism in his relation.
    So about the assessment of professionals - who else but them, and even more so the professionals of that time, can speak about the work of Rozhestvensky.
    From the conclusions of the commission to investigate the circumstances of the defeat at Tsushima -
    “It was an unfortunate choice of the squadron chief, who assumed command without faith in the possibility of combat success, did not pay the necessary attention to the combat training of the squadron, did not tolerate the independent cooperation of his subordinates and did not have the courage to admit that the task undertaken was beyond his strength, when he was convinced of this. The tactical mistakes made by the squadron commander further worsened the situation. Hopeless from the beginning, based not on conscientious calculation, but on a blind hope for good luck, the breakthrough operation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron to Vladivostok should have ended in disaster. "
  26. Victor Leningradets
    Victor Leningradets 24 November 2021 20: 26
    -1
    As I wrote in my first commentary on the article, in case of a failure in strategy and operational art, tactics remain, that is, the ability to skillfully maneuver and use weapons to compensate for the enemy's advantage.
    Here the largest number of copies was broken without any visible progress in clarifying the truth and the possibilities of "unlocking potential" and "self-realization" of the Second Pacific Squadron.
    The first thing that all researchers stumble on and then follow the wrong course is the famous "Togo loop." Everyone gasps or even echoes about "how the Japanese commander set up. Meanwhile, Togo (and he is really a great naval commander) did not make any mistake. On the contrary, quickly understanding the situation and finding a detachment of the most powerful Russian battleships, he undertook a maneuver to ensure he quickly intercepted and consistently destroyed this part of the Second Pacific Squadron.
    The main theses of alternatives are the following:
    - "Togo's Loop" led to the creation of the first and second Japanese armored detachments, as a result, the second detachment could not fire in the outset of the battle, and the ships of the first detachment entered the battle in turn;
    - The need to continue the initiated maneuver provided the first armored detachment of the Second Pacific Squadron with the opportunity to get as close as possible to the enemy, rushing at him at full speed (about 15 knots) with the front formation, which would allow firing at rapprochement up to direct fire. The formation of the Japanese squadron huddles together, and in the general dump the Russians inevitably win (the Russian spirit is higher than the spirit of Yamato);
    - The Japanese admiral "gave" Rozhdestvensky 15 minutes of "overwhelming" fire superiority, and only "defective" shells allowed Togo to avoid complete defeat.
    The slightest impartial analysis knocks the ground out of all these arguments:
    - The second Japanese armored detachment was not going to open fire at an ultra-long distance, and by the time it entered the battle, it took its due position in front / abeam of its main target - "Oslyabi";
    - Andrei himself gave excellent explanations about the front line attack in this article, there is nothing to add here, suicide in the style of "Alexander III";
    - The Russian squadron did not have an overwhelming superiority in the Battle of Tsushima, especially in its swift tie-up. And it's not about defective shells at all. I remember some time ago I suggested that Andrey conditionally replace the hits in the first phase of the battle of 1895-inch shells of the 1911 model of the year with the shells of the XNUMX model. The question was: will this lead to the sinking of the Mikasa? Andrei himself resolutely answered no. Yes, perhaps the damage would have been more serious, but this would not have led to the loss of combat effectiveness or the sinking of the Japanese flagship.
    Rozhestvensky's main tactical miscalculation is an inflexible low-speed column with a denial of the role of junior flagships. So our battleships went, aligning with the slowest, allowing the enemy to knock out the best ships one by one. Truly - chained by one chain!
    Could it have been done differently? - maybe yes. In this situation, it was really necessary to look for close combat with the enemy. At the same time, the first armored detachment of the Russian squadron, increasing the speed to maximum, should have turned "all of a sudden" eight points to the left, and five minutes later - again eight points all suddenly to the left, dispersed with the first Japanese detachment on the right sides. At the same time, the second and third armored detachments of the Russian squadron should, simultaneously with the first turn of the first armored detachment, sequentially turn eight points to the left and rapidly approach the Japanese squadron, keeping its turning point under fire. This would put the Japanese on fire, which could have some effect. Most likely, this maneuver would also have been parried by the Japanese, but with a high degree of probability this phase of the battle would have ended very similarly to the counter-galls divergence of the squadrons at 14:50. The Japanese would have had to play catch-up with the squadron moving at 13-14 knots, which would have brought the battle to the situation on July 28.07.1904, 15.05.1905, when the Japanese had to catch up with the Witgeft ships. In addition, transferring the battle to long distances would turn off the six-inch artillery from it, which would significantly reduce the fragmentation and incendiary effect of Japanese artillery on Russian ships. So, indeed, it was possible to endure until nightfall, but this did not exclude the danger of night mine attacks and a new battle on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    1. unknown
      unknown 28 November 2021 11: 43
      +1
      In Tsushima, the Japanese would not have been able to catch up with the Russian ships leaving at a speed of 13-14 knots.
      Due to the enormous overload, they could not go more than 14 knots in detachments.
  27. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 24 November 2021 23: 08
    +2
    Judging by the abundance of water, the article by Maxim Klimov of our mutual friend from Chelyabinsk really hurt. I will try to quickly go over his theses, which seemed the most amusing.

    : H.'s loop. Togo seems to be a forced decision that the Japanese naval commander had to make when he realized that the four Borodino-class battleships still manage to take their place in the ranks, and not the weak left column, but the entire Russian squadron will have to attack on the countercourse

    Very funny! Reproaching Klimov for the lack of substantiation of his theses, as an example, Andrei immediately throws in his own speculations taken straight from the ceiling! Well, why did our friend Andrei come up with the idea that Togo seemed to be dreaming of attacking the left column? Why bite his tail? Togo has a direct task not to let the Russians into Vladivostok, and the fight on the counter-courses clearly contradicts this. Moreover, Togo already had an example of unsuccessful maneuvering on counter courses in the Yellow Sea, after which it had to catch up with the Russian squadron for several hours.

    the Japanese flagship, and - immediately developed 15 knots, then, after about 4 minutes, there would be a fourth “Asahi” in it (or near it), and the distance between “Suvorov” and “Asahi” would be 22-27 cables and further - would no longer be reduced

    How lovely! This is Zeno's old anecdote about the swift-footed Achilles unable to catch up with the turtle! Tellingly, Togo had a turtle, even a suitable name - Fuji. laughing

    "I am not at all inclined to accuse M. Klimov of deliberate falsification of facts."

    Can you remind Andrew that the so-called "aporias" (for example Zeno) were invented by the ancient Greeks to fool their opponents? Is it worth reproaching Klimov for "manipulation" in order to immediately throw in an ancient example of such manipulation of facts himself? wink

    "Does the yellow stand out strongly against the gray sky?"

    Strongly. It can even be recalled that the fog lights of cars are often made exactly yellow. It is believed to be most visible in haze and dusk.

    "The company refuses to supply coal to the Russian squadron otherwise than in neutral waters, and therefore there can be no talk of any overloading of coal in the ocean."

    Andrew apparently "does not notice" a nuance in the above passage. Great Britain talks about its colonies and territorial waters. The 2nd TOE rested and loaded in French and German waters.

    Yes, this is a later book (1927), but this is a plus - it contains the experience of not only the Russian-Japanese, but also the First World War

    Let me remind you again that it is incorrect to use the techniques invented and described in the days of dreadnoughts for battleships. Completely different devices, completely different guns.

    And yes, M. Klimov is absolutely right that both the sighting and the "fork" were known long before the described events, but the fact is that before Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the "fork" principle was not introduced as mandatory on any connection of Russian ships

    And rightly so that was not. Fork in the army and in the navy are two big differences! On land, the cannon has a zero point at which it was fixed, in the sea everything moves and sways. We need either devices that created a virtual zero point, or statistics (for example, firing volleys) that circumvent the problem of zero point drift. And for short distances, a fork is not needed at all. Rozhestvensky's order for a fork is a gross mistake.

    Oddly enough, ours worked too - as a result, in Tsushima, the Russian squadron demonstrated a much higher shooting class than the 1st Pacific

    It's just nonsense. Comparing shooting at 70-90 kb and 15 minutes of shooting at 20 kb is completely incorrect. Andrey was pointed out, but as usual he "did not notice" it.

    Yes, it may seem strange, but in 1903, the General Medical School wasn’t just weapons, he couldn’t even deal with the strategy and tactics of battle.

    At the same time, Rozhestvensky, even before the General Music School, ran the Baltic Artillery School, i.e. the leading artillery facility of the empire. He was obliged to study and raise all these questions long before his appointment as the chief of the General Music School.

    The need for high-explosive projectiles with a high content of explosives was realized already in 1889. The problem was that the domestic industry simply could not then produce thin-walled projectiles, which was necessary to ensure a high content of explosives.

    Yours is not true. There were such shells and they were offered for purchase. They refused mainly because they wanted to place orders with the NECESSARY factories. Instead of pulling up technology, they pretended that it was not very necessary. Tellingly, in 1907, after the scandalous showdown in Tsushima, such opportunities were instantly found.

    Uff .. It turned out a bit long, but at least I touched on the main blunders of Andrey's article. I'm not sure the truth is that it will help him. Andrey does not like real facts. lol
    1. mmaxx
      mmaxx 26 November 2021 07: 58
      +1
      Soberly.
      drinks

      We'll have to put a bukoff in order for the stone to pass
    2. unknown
      unknown 28 November 2021 11: 46
      0
      The Japanese could not go more than 14 knots because of the enormous operational overload and the presence in their units of outright slow-moving vehicles - "Fuji" and "Azuma".
  28. rytik32
    rytik32 24 November 2021 23: 31
    +4
    Good afternoon!
    Always glad to have a good occasion to talk about Tsushima.

    So, let's begin
    Alas, the respected M. Klimov does not give any explanation why this article deserved the term "shameful", and it would be very interesting to know his argumentation.

    This article was criticized a long time ago, for example http://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_18/page_19/Page_32/shuvalov-tsushima/

    Kh. Togo's loop seems to be a forced decision that the Japanese naval commander had to make when he realized that the four Borodino-class battleships still manage to take their place in the ranks, and not the weak left column, but the entire Russian squadron, would have to attack on the countercourse.

    Absolutely not true.

    We read Japanese instructions written before the war.
    (a) 1st Detachment will target the enemy's most easily attacked wing and take position T in relation to it (as shown below); all maneuvers will be subordinated to the idea of ​​"pressing" on the leading enemy ship.
    And where is the attack on the counter courses here?

    Option II was in Tsushima
    (a) The lead ship must always keep a course for the enemy's lead ship, or for his nearest wing; at a distance of about 8000m, turn right or left depending on the situation.

    What actually happened in Tsushima. Those. the Japanese maneuvers at the start of the battle are strict adherence to instructions.

    Attempts to present Togo's maneuvers as forced are the unfortunate fantasies of those unfamiliar with Japanese combat instructions.

    the maneuver of rebuilding the 1st combat detachment in the head of the left Russian column lasted 29 minutes. That is, V.I. Baer watched for almost half an hour as the 1st Armored Detachment entered the head of his battleship.


    Yes, this maneuver did not last 29 minutes. The rebuilding was carried out at the last moment, no more than 10 minutes before the start of the battle. Both VZ Izumrud and Krzhizhanovsky's diary clearly state that the rebuilding began after the Japanese turned to the left (west), which happened 13:37 (rus).

    And in continuation of the topic of whether there was a threat of a collision between "Oslyabi" and "Eagle"

    Here is a diagram from Durnovo's report. It was compiled immediately upon arrival in Vladivostok - in hot pursuit.
    And this is a diagram from the Mikasa database, also drawn up immediately after the battle:

    But from the Fuji database

    Pay attention to the position of "Oslyabi" in relation to 1BO.

    Interesting, right? Could there be a threat of collision? No way! The detachments just walked in parallel columns!

    According to the letter of the junior mine officer of the ship, Lieutenant P.A. Vyrubova 1st, during the third practice shooting in Madagascar, which took place on January 19, 1905, out of six training shells fired by the bow turret of the main caliber, five (83%) hit the shield.


    Writing is a very dubious source from a critic's point of view.
    Let's better read what Rozhdestvensky wrote in circular No. 42 dated January 14.01.1905, XNUMX
    On the Suvorov, for example, no connection was established not only between guns of different calibers, but also between 6-inch guns of the same side. Even the guns of one tower did not peer, but one after another they threw shells with the same and very large errors
    in order No. 50 of 20.01.1905
    from the "Suvorov" ... a shot was fired at the shield that appeared under the stern of the "Donskoy" at a distance of 6 cab. behind the "Donskoy" ... The shell did not reach the "Donskoy" by half a cable and therefore did not reach the 6,5 cab shield and lay very to the left of the shield, so it ricocheted over the "Donskoy".
    And here we see a completely different picture!
    1. mmaxx
      mmaxx 25 November 2021 04: 55
      +2
      In general, the British confirm that Togo from the very beginning wanted to deal with the head one. According to the precepts of Nelson. No secrets. It's just that Rozhestvensky's complete underdevelopment in general issues of studying tactics and general erudition (which, in general, is characteristic of the military) led to such a "plan" of battle on his part.
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 25 November 2021 07: 32
        0
        Quote: mmaxx
        It's just that Rozhestvensky's complete underdevelopment in general issues of studying tactics and general erudition (which, in general, is characteristic of the military) led to such a "plan" of battle on his part.

        it is the complete inadequacy to go into battle in a column one by one
    2. mmaxx
      mmaxx 25 November 2021 05: 09
      +2
      So everyone writes that "Oslyabya" took a place in the ranks. That is why that situation arose. And it would not have arisen if Rozhestvensky had not considered that the maneuver with rebuilding was completed and reduced the speed to 9 knots. And if he hadn't lowered it, then "Eagle" would have passed (cut off) "Oslyabya". At a higher speed, there would be no problems.
      And at the same time, the Japanese walked along the formation longer and would have been under fire for this first phase of the battle longer. When they could not fire all the battleships.
      That is, the ZPR did not have any eye gauge. Therefore, 9 knots and a herd. This was the only way he could manage.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 November 2021 19: 08
      +4
      Quote: rytik32
      This article was criticized a long time ago, for example http://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_18/page_19/Page_32/shuvalov-tsushima/

      Alexey, you probably did not notice, but in general I am discussing with Klimov. And within the framework of this discussion, I am ready to challenge the arguments of Maxim. If Maxim chooses for himself the arguments from tsushima.ru, I'm ready to oppose these arguments, no question. But in order to oppose Klimov, he needs to voice his theses. I did not undertake to oppose the entire Internet at once.
      Quote: rytik32
      Absolutely not true.

      Alexey, aplomb does not suit you.
      Aleksey, it's not bad that you are pulling Japanese documents to your point of view by the ears. The bad news is that you are sincerely convinced that you are right in doing so. You have generally ceased to assess the materials that you present to any extent, and as a result, you proudly demonstrate the most complete absurdity.
      Firstly, I will not even ask whether the pre-war Japanese instructions you quoted were in effect at the time of the Tsushima battle. I strongly doubt it, but let's even say that they did. What do they indicate?
      Quote: rytik32
      The lead ship must always keep a course for the enemy's lead ship, or for his nearest wing

      So, let me remind you that the main forces discovered each other when the closest column was the 1st armored one, consisting of 4 EDRs of the "Borodino" type, located to the right and in front of the Japanese. It was on them (according to the instructions) that X was supposed to keep the course. It was them that should have been attacked, all according to the same instructions. Did H. Togo do it? No. The instruction is violated. Further. Togo goes over to the other side in order to attack the weak left Russian column. How was he supposed to attack her as instructed? In it, everything is said in Russian in white:
      Quote: rytik32
      will take position T in relation to it (as shown below)

      Crossing T! That is, according to the instructions, you should go to the nearest column, and as you get closer, you should set “crossing the T” to it. Did Togo put the cross on the Russian squadron? He did not set it, he turned, though on a converging, but almost parallel course. The instruction was violated again.
      That is, Togo, in the tie-up of the Tsushima battle, maneuvered as he liked, but not in accordance with the instructions you quoted. Moreover, if he wanted to put up the crossing, he, in theory, should have welcomed the rebuilding of the Russians in one column, since there was an opportunity to “roll out” the most powerful Russian head units.
      We do not see any of this. Accordingly, the instruction you are citing has nothing to do with Togo's maneuvering in the outset of the battle.
      Quote: rytik32
      Attempts to present Togo's maneuvers as forced are the unfortunate fantasies of those unfamiliar with Japanese combat instructions.

      As you can see, only your fantasies about Japanese instructions are unsuccessful here.
      Quote: rytik32
      Yes, this maneuver did not last 29 minutes. The rebuilding was carried out at the last moment, no more than 10 minutes before the start of the battle. Both VZ Izumrud and Krzhizhanovsky's diary clearly state that the rebuilding began after the Japanese turned to the left (west), which happened 13:37 (rus).

      For the reasons I described in another topic, the rebuilding of the 2nd column physically could not occur within 10 minutes. To you, as I see, arithmetic is not a decree.
      Do you believe VZ "Izumruda"? Fine. Then quote him in full - that Rozhestvensky made the rebuilding by turning 8 points to the left. That is, for your recommended 10 minutes "Suvorov", having turned 90 degrees, would have passed 18,75 cables - in your opinion, the distance between the columns was under 18 cables? Well, let's say that eyewitnesses have ratings for 20 cables - they jump from 7 to 20 cables. But "Oslyabya" in the same 10 minutes would have covered 9 cables at 15 nodes. That is, in order to complete the maneuver indicated by the "Izumrud", it was possible if the "Suvorov" was almost 2,5 miles from the "Oslyab"?
      Seriously? :) Well, okay, let's say. But what about the VZh Anadyri, which you also quoted to me? And who points out that the rebuilding of Rozhdestvensky took as much as 3 minutes? How do these 2 VJs fit together? :)))
      Do you know, Alexey, what is the saddest thing? I will tell you about these contradictions, which directly, openly say that the HL of cruisers and transports is incomplete and contradictory in terms of describing the movement of the EBR, in the previous discussion I showed. Even with numbers. A new topic - and again for the fish money ...
      To conclude the topic - even 10 minutes - is more than enough for risk analysis and decision-making, with which you can avoid emergency braking.
      Quote: rytik32
      Pay attention to the position of "Oslyabi" in relation to 1BO.

      Interesting, right? Could there be a threat of collision? No way! The detachments just walked in parallel columns!

      But worst of all are your schemes. Looking at them, the non-commissioned officer's widow weeps with burning tears.
      Firstly, according to the schemes, there was no emergency stop for the Oslyabi, he did not try to rebuild for the Eagle, and in general everything was fine with him. And he fought, probably, until the very end of the battle, and then surrendered to the Japanese. Congratulations on your historic discovery!
      Secondly, in previous articles you have proven to me out of the way that my calculations in some way contradict Shcherbachov 4. You demanded to believe them blindly, like a native. When it was beneficial to you. Now it is unprofitable for you, and you deigned to forget about his testimony, completely contradicting all the schemes.
      Thirdly, and this is the funniest thing, this is the heading angle on the Japanese waste paper that you posted here.
      The most "unsharp" angle to "Mikasa at the moment of the beginning of the fire was indicated by ZP. Rozhestvensky - it showed that it was the point in front of the left traverse. The Japanese argued that this angle was much sharper. Our official history seems to have taken something in between, and reported that the turning point was 4 points from the left traverse of "Suvorov".
      And according to the data of the commander of "Fuji", the turning point was not that beyond the traverse of Suvorov, behind the traverse "SLEEP"! That is, according to the drawing of the commander of "Fuji", it turns out that the Japanese squadron nevertheless began to diverge from ours in the contour, then suddenly changed its mind and began to turn somewhere abeam "Sisoya" or "Navarin" (on the diagram, the point was almost abeam " Nakhimov ")
      That is, on the diagram of the commander "Fuji" - an impossible nonsense. He could not even reflect the relative position of the squadrons relative to each other correctly. And you measure the position of "Oslyaby" by it ...
      Whatever nonsense is written in a foreign piece of paper - we take it on faith, believe it thoughtlessly, without even straining our brains for a second, yes, Alexey? At least it contradicted other foreign pieces of paper ...
      You are not even embarrassed by the fact that such maneuvering completely refutes the very pre-war instructions to which you refer above. It was necessary to "press on the head" along it, and according to the drawing of the commander of "Fuji" H. Togo passed on the counter courses until the middle of the Russian system (!) And only after that he began to turn, lagging behind "Suvorov" (!!!)

      Quote: rytik32
      Writing is a very dubious source from a critic's point of view.
      Let's better read what Rozhdestvensky wrote in circular No. 42 dated January 14.01.1905, XNUMX

      Doubtful here, Alexey, are only yours, if I may say so, calculations. Vyrubov wrote about the THIRD shooting, which took place, noting that the first went badly. You disagree with him and refute him on the grounds that Rozhdestvensky spoke badly about the FIRST shooting in order No. 42 of January 14.01.1905, XNUMX. Generally speaking, the passage you cited from Rozhdestvensky seems to confirm Vyrubov's letter, and does not refute it. Quoting an erroneous shot when zeroing in generally hardly creeps into at least some gate - the fact that one gunner screwed up somehow does not mean that the whole EBR should screw up
      Quote: rytik32
      And here we see a completely different picture!

      I state with regret, Alexey, that you have long seen exclusively your own fantasies about the Battle of Tsushima. Not even noticing the obvious and obvious internal contradictions of your vision.
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 25 November 2021 21: 40
        -1
        So, let me remind you that the main forces discovered each other when the closest column was the 1st armored one, consisting of 4 EDRs of the "Borodino" type, located to the right and in front of the Japanese. It was on them (according to the instructions) that X was supposed to keep the course. It was them that should have been attacked, all according to the same instructions. Did H. Togo do it?

        After Togo raised the signal for battle, he maneuvered just that.
        So everything is according to the instructions.
        Did Togo put the cross on the Russian squadron? He did not set it, he turned, though on a converging, but almost parallel course.

        Yeah, parallel, especially when Mikasa turned onto SO79 lol
        For the reasons I described in another topic, the rebuilding of the 2nd column physically could not occur within 10 minutes. To you, as I see, arithmetic is not a decree.

        In arithmetic, you have 3 errors:
        1: 13-47: 13 = 40 minutes, not 7
        2. You did not take into account that the ships are turning in a circle.
        3. You did not take into account that the speed decreases when cornering.
        For pp. 2 and 3, I will tell you that by turning the rudder by 15 degrees, the Borodinians turn around a radius of 1,9 cabs (the length of 1/4 of the circle is 3 cabs) with an average speed of about 8 knots (this is at an initial 11 knots). Accordingly, the speed gain then is also not instantaneous.
        Will you recalculate according to the updated data? Or will it do well? laughing
        Then quote him in full - that Rozhestvensky made the rebuilding by turning 8 points to the left.

        Please.
        The admiral made a signal for the 1st armored detachment to turn everyone suddenly to the left by 8 points
        and the signal itself is recorded (8B) (R) (8)
        8B is the callsign of the 1st squad
        I - suddenly turn to the left
        8 - the number of points
        But what about the VZh Anadyri, which you also quoted to me? And who points out that the rebuilding of Rozhdestvensky took as much as 3 minutes? How do these 2 VJs fit together? :)))

        They go well together. Read more logbooks.
        Maxim ask for help drinks
        At the same time, clarify what you need to believe, the records in the logbook or the testimony given a year later?
        Firstly, according to the schemes, there was no emergency stop "Oslyabi", he did not try to rebuild for the "Eagle", and in general everything was fine with him

        Andrey, why are you making this up again? You can't do it any other way?
        From the Fuji database it is perfectly clear how the Oslyabya was rebuilt - the diagram is attached. Another one. Earlier, I even indicated the time of completion of the rebuilding on the Fuji database.
        And according to the commander of "Fuji" the turning point was not that beyond the traverse of Suvorov

        And "Suvorov" stood still all the time while the Japanese were turning? wassat
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 November 2021 18: 33
          +2
          Quote: rytik32
          After Togo raised the signal for battle, he maneuvered just that.

          Yes, really? :))) Again, the Japanese official is lying in our eyes

          Quote: rytik32
          In arithmetic, you have 3 errors:

          Only one - I based it on your data.
          Quote: rytik32
          1: 13-47: 13 = 40 minutes, not 7

          You would have already decided on the testimony somehow. Then you write to me that the maneuver took 10 minutes according to the Emerald High School.
          Quote: rytik32
          The rebuilding was carried out at the last moment, no more than 10 minutes before the start of the battle.

          Immediately cite a quote from which it follows that it took 12-13 minutes
          Quote: rytik32
          Both the VZ Izumrud and Krzhizhanovsky's diary clearly state that the rebuilding began after the Japanese turned to the left (west), which happened 13:37 (rus).

          So the fire is open at 13.49-13.50 And now say that it took 7 minutes :)
          Quote: rytik32
          2. You did not take into account that the ships are turning in a circle.
          3. You did not take into account that the speed decreases when cornering.
          For pp. 2 and 3, I will tell you that by turning the rudder by 15 degrees, the Borodinians turn around a radius of 1,9 cabs (the length of 1/4 of the circle is 3 cabs) with an average speed of about 8 knots (this is at an initial 11 knots). Accordingly, the speed gain then is also not instantaneous.
          Will you recalculate according to the updated data? Or will it do well?

          Alexey! Stop !! I beg!!! You didn’t even realize that ignoring the time to make a maneuver and dropping the speed of the EDR “Borodino” was a curtsey to YOUR side. I simplified FOR YOUR benefit. But, since you insist so - if you please.
          So, to rebuild "Suvorov" needs to turn to the left by 90 degrees - according to your calculation, it will pass 3 cables with an average speed of 8 knots - it will take him 2,25 minutes. When "Suvorov" reaches the turning point, it will have to turn around again - again go through 3 cables with an average of 8 knots - for another 2,25 minutes. As we know, the Alexander and Borodino also managed to turn behind the Suvorov - we will not see in any description that the 1BO entered the battle with the front line turned perpendicular to the 2BO course. That is, before the opening of fire on a new course, that is, that is, 3-4 cables "Suvorov" nevertheless passed through - considering its speed within 9 even knots, it turns out that these 3-4 cables were covered in 2-2,7 minutes.
          In total, it turns out that in 7 minutes you recommended "Suvorov"
          Turn left 90 degrees. - 2,25 minutes
          Immediately upon completion of the turn, turn right 90 degrees - 2,25 minutes (and 4,5 minutes from the beginning of the maneuver)
          Walk along a straight line 3,5 cables. - another 2,5 minutes (7 minutes from the beginning of the maneuver)
          Accordingly, the distance between the columns at the moment of the beginning of the maneuver is two turning radii, that is, 3,8 cables ...
          Quote: rytik32
          Please.
          The admiral made a signal for the 1st armored detachment to turn everyone suddenly to the left by 8 points
          and the signal itself is recorded (8B) (R) (8)

          Maybe so. But bad luck, two other ships indicate that the signal was slightly different.

          Well, on the "Pearl" he was not noticed at all. Let Alexey, I will take your methodology and declare that your Emerald imagined a signal, because Zhemchug does not mention it. Well, after all, this is not khukhry-muhry - this is (aspirated) VE-ZhE! He, in your opinion, cannot be wrong! tongue
          Quote: rytik32
          Andrey, why are you making this up again? You can't do it any other way?

          That is, when I quote your remark, I am making it up. Alexey, have you confused anything? You joyfully announced this to the world
          Quote: rytik32
          Interesting, right? Could there be a threat of collision? No way! The detachments just walked in parallel columns!

          And the diagrams led, which is typical :)))
          Quote: rytik32
          And "Suvorov" stood still all the time while the Japanese were turning?

          Alexey, Rozhestvensky showed "near the rumba in front of the left traverse" to Mikasa AFTER the turn, the last, at the moment of opening fire. So we have a completely logical decrease in the heading angle by 3 points during the turn. And then the heading angle could no longer fall, since Suvorov walked at 9 knots (and even if he was at 11) and Mikasa accelerated to 15.
          I repeat, you can now continue to prove that the Fuji scheme is correct (this is geometric nonsense, but your business). I won't argue anymore - I'd rather spend my time on an article with the calculation of the positions of ships in the outset of Tsushima. But you finally understand one thing: this your thesis contradicts your own statement that H.Togo did everything according to instructions and "populated" on the head of the Russian column. Well, it is impossible to "sit" on it being abeam of the "Oslyabi" AT THE very BEGINNING of the turn, when only the third ship passed through the turning point.
          1. rytik32
            rytik32 26 November 2021 22: 29
            0
            Again, the Japanese official is lying in our eyes

            And you read this fragment in Meiji's English translation - be surprised!
            Then you write to me that the maneuver took 10 minutes according to the Emerald High School.

            I did not write this.
            I wrote that no more than 10 minutes before the battle began, this maneuver began.
            Immediately cite a quote from which it follows that it took 12-13 minutes

            You draw the wrong conclusions.
            But bad luck, two other ships indicate that the signal was slightly different.

            So in the High Journal of Emerald 4 signals refer to the recording 13:30))) I gave only one.
            Well, on the "Pearl" he was not noticed at all.

            These are questions for Pearl.
            Let Alexey, I will take your methodology and declare that your Emerald imagined a signal, because Zhemchug does not mention it

            This is purely your manual: if it is not mentioned, then it was not. I fundamentally disagree with this approach. If not mentioned, it only means that it is not mentioned.
            So we have a completely logical decrease in the heading angle by 3 points during the turn.

            I didn't get the logic.
            You can now continue to prove that the Fuji scheme is correct.

            Fuji is very schematic. It would never have occurred to me to measure the angles on it. I took the directions to the enemy from the records, where he was clearly indicated.
            Well, it is impossible to "sit" on it being abeam of the "Oslyabi" AT THE very BEGINNING of the turn, when only the third ship passed through the turning point

            Then why the Shcherbachev tower could not shoot at the Japanese if they were abeam? wassat And Suvorov, after the first sighting shot, opened fire from nasal 12-inch tower.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              27 November 2021 11: 38
              +2
              Quote: rytik32
              This is purely your manual: if it is not mentioned, then it was not.

              Really? That is, I wrote that Rozhdestvensky did not start the maneuver at 13.20 and did not turn 4 rumba to the left at 13.20 because this is not in the ships' VZ
              Quote: rytik32
              I wrote that no more than 10 minutes before the battle began, this maneuver began.

              What's the difference? Are you saying that Emerald 1BO completed the maneuver 3 minutes before the start of the battle, or what?
              Quote: rytik32
              These are questions for Pearl.

              Ah, well, right. We will ignore everything that does not fit into your theory.
              Quote: rytik32
              Then why the Shcherbachev tower could not shoot at the Japanese if they were abeam?

              You ask yourself this question, since you are looking at the position of the Russian ships according to the Fuji scheme
              1. rytik32
                rytik32 27 November 2021 17: 27
                +1
                That is, I wrote that Rozhdestvensky did not start the maneuver at 13.20 and did not turn 4 rumba to the left at 13.20 because this is not in the ships' VZ

                Because in the VZh, turning to the left is described in a different way and at a different time. And two turns to the left, first at 4R in succession, and then at 8R suddenly - could not be.
                What's the difference? Are you saying that Emerald 1BO completed the maneuver 3 minutes before the start of the battle, or what?

                You will first figure out how entries are made in the VJ, you will understand how to read them. It is very good if you familiarize yourself with the rules for maintaining a residence permit. There will be questions about the content of one of the residence permit ...
                Ah, well, right. We will ignore everything that does not fit into your theory.

                The record "Suvorov and I armored detachment increased the course went to the line of II and III armored detachments" in the High Journal of Pearls is. Only it is not written how the turn was performed: sequentially or suddenly.
                You ask yourself this question, since you are looking at the position of the Russian ships according to the Fuji scheme

                I understand perfectly well that from Fuji it was impossible to see where the Japanese were in relation to Oslyabi. That's where Oslyabya was in relation to the Japanese - you can.
      2. A_Mazkov
        A_Mazkov 25 November 2021 23: 39
        +1
        I will intervene a little in your dispute with Alexey.
        To quote Rozhestvensky: “Meanwhile, the enemy battleships, having run a considerable distance in a long way to the west, that is, to the left of the squadron, changed course towards ours, and when they found themselves in 4 points ahead of the left traverse of the Suvorov, they began to consistently turn to 16 points to the left At this time, at 1:49 pm, our first detachment had already entered its place in one wake column of battleships, reduced its speed to 9 knots, and the Suvorov fired the first shot at the head Mikaz , which one managed to lay on a new course parallel to ours, while of the following matelots, part turned, and part, not even reaching the turning point, had a head-on course and aligned with the leading ones. Shikishima "," Fuji "," Asahi "," Kassuga "," Nissin "," Izuma "," Yakuma "," Asama "," Azuma "," Tokiwa "and" Iwate "; after the battleships went to the south, outside shots, a detachment of 6 cruisers. The first shot of "Suvorov" was fired from a distance of 32 kabeltov, when “Mikaza” was less than one rumba, ahead of the left traverse of “Suvorov” ", then the official history did not take anything in between, but is based precisely on the one indicated by Rozhdestvensky.
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 26 November 2021 00: 04
          +2

          Such a scheme would have turned out if the Russian fleet was on the NO14 course until 07:23
          1. A_Mazkov
            A_Mazkov 26 November 2021 13: 11
            0
            Good afternoon, Alexey!
            Did you compose it according to Japanese data?
            Actually, it turns out very strange ...
            Very much after Mikasa left the loop, the courses of the squadrons sharply converge. On the Russian side, no one noted this, either they talked about parallel, or about slightly converging.
            And it turns out that at 14.07, except for the "Nissin" from the Togo detachment, no one can fire at the rest of the "Borodinites".
            In addition, before Nissin, you have somewhere about 14 cab. it turns out, but for BrK this is a dangerous distance.
            And it seems like less than 16 cab. there was no distance in Tsushima?
            And Rozhestvensky in such a situation could try to pick up speed and turn to the left to hit the junction of two Japanese detachments.
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 26 November 2021 16: 30
              0
              Anton, good afternoon!
              This is an alternative scheme, drawn up to prove that the Russian fleet turned to the right much earlier than at 14:07.
              I wrote earlier that the turn was around 14:00, and it was smooth. This is mentioned both in reliable Russian (VZh Izumrud) and in Japanese sources.
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 November 2021 18: 17
              0
              Colleague writes
              Quote: rytik32
              This is an alternative scheme drawn up.

              I would add - very alternative methods lol
  29. Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 24 November 2021 23: 43
    0
    The opinion of my land couch: Rozhdestvensky and a certain Nikolai Romanov, who considered himself a tsar, are to blame.
  30. Comrade
    Comrade 25 November 2021 04: 57
    0
    This raises several questions to M. Klimov.

    Why is the post-war shooting data used as an illustration of the success of the pre-war training of the British fleet?
    Why is the best result of the exercise taken as an illustration?

    Because Klimov is not a researcher, but propagandist... His task is not to get to the bottom of the truth, or at least get closer to it, but to form the desired impression among gullible and ignorant readers in this matter.
    Dear Andrey, your article came out very good, everything is chewed and laid out on the shelves. Bravo!
    I'm afraid only not to feed the horse.
    Klimov the truth to one place. If his theses contradict the facts, so much the worse for the facts.
    Along the way, you are right. The technique of English practice shooting, which Klimov trumped, was adopted after the Russo-Japanese war.
    1. Very kind
      Very kind 25 November 2021 10: 11
      -2
      Quote: Comrade
      Because Klimov is not a researcher, but a propagandist.

      Monsieur, the verbiage is YOU.
      And I have not only maritime experience, but also experience in analyzing test results (including on "related topics").
      The sect "Faberge Zinovy", on the other hand, has tricky numbers that they are unable to summarize into any acceptable arguments.
      Quote: Comrade
      Klimov the truth to one place. If his theses contradict the facts, so much the worse for the facts.

      Monsieur, this is for YOU (and YOUR sect).
      Just two examples of this "answer" A.K .:
      - complete ignorance of the speed factor (yes, including as a factor in reducing the likelihood of hitting enemy shells)
      - and why did he decide that Togo would "fall from the oak" to attack the 2nd and 3rd squadrons on the COURSES?!?!?
      it's just tactical delusion!
      Quote: Comrade
      The technique of English practice shooting, which Klimov trumped, was adopted after the Russo-Japanese war.

      Monsieur, according to the indicated shooting, there is simply no METHODS (squadron battle), de facto it is a TIR.
      But this is a demonstration of the maximum TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES (including what the Japs had)
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 25 November 2021 10: 40
        0
        Quote: Very kind
        The sect "Faberge Zinovia", on the other hand, has tricky numbers, which they are unable to bring down into any acceptable arguments.

        Moreover, there are often blatant falsifications of historical sources.
        For example, statements that "Sikishima" could not be targeted at "Oslyaba" and information from the "Fuji" database with an invented time and / or place of hitting "Oslyabya".
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 November 2021 19: 11
      +4
      Thank you, dear colleague! hi drinks
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 26 November 2021 06: 04
        +2
        Dear Andrew,

        I fully support your idea that it is impossible to mechanically extrapolate the results of the best gunner in the squadron to the entire squadron. This is nothing more than a propaganda trick.
        Otherwise, in order to avoid double standards, we must declare, referring not to the accuracy of the shooting practice of "Prince Suvorov", that his accuracy is the accuracy of the entire 2nd Pacific squadron, or even the entire Russian fleet.
        And here is the training shield that "King Edward VII" fired at. The dimensions are indicated there in red for clarity.


        This is what came to my mind, but would "King Edward VII" have achieved its excellent results if it had fired not at this shield, but at the Russian shield?
        I do not have the sizes of Russian shields at hand, and if you have the opportunity, lay them out, please. Perhaps, there was no uniform size in the Russian fleet, so it can be plus / minus. It seems that Melnikov's dimensions were flashing in the "Cruiser" Varyag ".
        It will even be possible to superimpose the projection of the Russian shield onto the English shield. Let's see how many hits in this case will fall on the Russian shield.
        I got the feeling. that these shootings were a PR campaign. Show a potential enemy and your inhabitant at the same time what the British are capable of. It was just before these firing sessions that the training shields were brought to this size.
        So the percentage of hits is higher.
        lol
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          26 November 2021 19: 05
          +2
          Good time ducks, dear Valentine!
          Quote: Comrade
          It seems that Melnikov's dimensions were flashing in the "Cruiser" Varyag ".

          I looked, I could not find it. Either the eye is blurred, or they are not there.
          But dear Igor, who writes here under the pseudonym 27091965i, indicates that the standard British exercise shield was much smaller
          In 1904, the area of ​​the shield was 600 square meters. feet, in 1905 the size was reduced to 300 square meters. feet

          Here is the area of ​​the shield - under 2,7 thousand square meters. feet hi
        2. rytik32
          rytik32 26 November 2021 23: 05
          +1
          Quote: Comrade
          we must declare, referring not to the accuracy of the shooting practice of "Prince Suvorov", that his accuracy is the accuracy of the entire 2nd Pacific squadron, or even the entire Russian fleet

          Only Rozhestvensky declared this shooting "useless disposal of ammunition supplies."
          if you have the opportunity, post them, please

          I don't have sizes either.
    3. rytik32
      rytik32 25 November 2021 22: 12
      +1
      Quote: Comrade
      Because Klimov is not a researcher, but a propagandist. His task is not to get to the bottom of the truth, or at least get closer to it, but to form the desired impression among gullible and ignorant readers in this matter.

      Valentine, good afternoon!
      I found the results of the firing of the British Navy in 1905.
      King Edward VII is really far from being the leader:

      So your accusations are groundless
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 26 November 2021 03: 55
        0
        Hello, Alexey!
        ,
        Quote: rytik32
        I found the results of the firing of the British Navy in 1905.
        King Edward VII is really far from being the leader:

        I appreciate your efforts to find information, alas, it is useless in the context of our small discussion.
        The point is that points were awarded according to a number of criteria, not just accuracy. I have a complete list of participants in that shooting practice, there are four nominations, in each of which "points" were awarded. Then you add them up and get the result from your table ..
        This is the case with Barr & Stroud. You found the total amount for which the company sold the goods, and you told me that rangefinders were sold for this amount. But it turned out that the company was selling not only rangefinders, but other products as well. It turns out that this is the average temperature in the hospital.

        Quote: rytik32
        So your accusations are groundless

        You will be able to assert this only when you find not the rating of the participants in the shooting practice, calculated in "points", but the number of shells fired / hit by each of the ships.

        Your humble servant checked the libraries of Canada, the results of that shooting are not in the libraries of the country in any form.
        I have a chat with an English admiralty employee next week.
        I hope they already have such a reference in their library. If so, and they will not become too expensive to break the price, I will order a copy. In principle, there is such a service in the RN Admiralty, they make copies from sources for money.
        Yes, the searches for the reports of the British attachés, about which we talked a few months ago, have not been crowned with success. We do not have them in any library in the country, they checked in the library of the US Congress - also dull. Not in digital form, and not in the general catalog either.
    4. unknown
      unknown 28 November 2021 12: 13
      0
      I have two questions for you.
      First.
      Do you have any information about the construction overload of the battleship "Asahi"?
      I could not find such information, whether it was, and if there was, then exactly how much.
      Second.
      Do you have any information about redesigning shell lifters on Japanese ships?
      If we assume that thin-walled projectiles with an outrageous amount of explosive were used, then the bulk mass will be less than that of the standard one, and the length, respectively, will be greater.
      Lifting mechanisms need to be altered for a long projectile length.
      Such information is available, for example, about the Black Sea battleships after the adoption of the shells of the 1907 model.
      If there was an alteration, then at what time, before what battle?
      If not, then the version about new shells is not confirmed.
      Then they used either standard English with liddit, or experimental Swedish, but in English dimensions.
  31. mmaxx
    mmaxx 25 November 2021 05: 01
    0
    As for the painting of the Russian squadron.
    Some, we will not point a finger, believe that everything is fine, and that black + yellow in that case did not affect anything. But according to the feedback from the participants, it follows that they did influence.
    Well, in the end. No one ever after Tsushima even tried to fight in a ceremonial color. Ball or camouflage. Everything. And in peacetime, you can swim with little whites.
    1. Maxim G
      Maxim G 25 November 2021 11: 12
      +2
      It is enough to look at the "Aurora" on the Neva - you will not immediately notice it.
  32. Che why
    Che why 25 November 2021 05: 04
    +1
    I am not at all an expert on Tsushima, and my knowledge is at the level of an ordinary person, but it seems to me that you cannot study events in the style of a lawyer or prosecutor and even an arbitrator! because position neutrality is also a position. you have to be not above the fight, but generally outside the fight.
    Rozhestvensky's role cannot be judged from any side. it is not an objective judgment. all the more, in my opinion, the great influence on the minds of researchers was influenced by Novikov's novel "Tsushima", where the admiral is presented as some kind of psychopath-idiot. I would generally "forbid" this novel as fiction or nonsense, well, something like "Icebreaker" by rezun.
    we must not forget that the "officers' school" is strong in its traditions, when the officers themselves, as a caste, will not allow fools in their ranks! this is a blow to the prestige of the officer class.
    Did Rozhdestvensky make mistakes, or someone else? naturally! erare humanum est (err is human). but these are not mistakes due to stupidity, but because this is a person, not a robot, a computer !!!
    and if there were such mistakes, and they certainly were, then we must look not for excuses or accusations, but for the reason !!! Why did the person, in this case the admiral, make exactly such decisions? where is the logic in his action?
    it seems to me everything is much deeper, or as KozmaPrutkov said; "dig deeper, see the root!"
    did the admiral know how the Japanese would act? naturally! after all, he must have spent many hours contemplating the battle in the Yellow Sea. he probably studied this fight to the smallest detail !!! and what conclusions did he draw from this battle?
    did the admiral know about the state of his squadron? naturally!
    did he know that he was going to "Golgotha" and there was no way back?
    So knowing the approximate tactics of the enemy, knowing the condition of the ships, and that this is the path to disaster, what plan should the admiral choose for the battle? how can he get out of this situation with minimal losses, and so that after the battle the squadron does not scatter like a Pacific Ocean.
    what should the ships do in case of loss of the flagship? or which course to take? rendezvous point what ???
    the so-called "couch experts" could naturally defeat the Japanese! they have everything smooth on paper !!! and a calculator in hand !!!
    but reality is not on paper !!! "it was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines." in reality, such "experts" are waiting for a bunch of ravines !!!
    PySy
    I personally believe that the main reason for the Tsushima disaster was not at all in the admiral or the fleet as a whole, but in the army !!!
    if our army had not waged such a passive war, would have released Port Arthur, and in general would not have allowed the Japanese to blockade it, then the Pacific would have been intact. and this is a completely different alignment at sea, if you combine both squadrons.
    but then the problem is even deeper, but how could our army wage an active war with such a weak supply? the throughput of the railway road what ???
    it was like the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war, but then Stalin quickly drew the right conclusions and in a hurry they began to build railway lines to the borders with Finland.
    unfortunately Nicholas II was not like Stalin.
    generally dig here, do not dig. it is necessary to consider the whole range of problems, including economic ones.
    And to draw arrows on the map is the children who paint the contour maps and win everyone in the virtual war.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 25 November 2021 07: 39
      0
      Quote: Che For Than
      Novikov's novel "Tsushima", where the admiral is presented by some kind of psychopath-half-wit

      the fact is that Novikov saw the admiral not from the sofa, but from the deck of the ship, I trust him more than you, ... the actions of the traitor and coward Rozhdestvensky fully confirm the opinion of the sailor Novikov, which you voiced, to go into battle in a wake marching column one by one having turned around the front, this is how you write the psychopathy of an idiot, but I think it was a treacherous plan of Judas, he was not a sailor to be so delusional about tactics
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 25 November 2021 14: 38
        +4
        Quote: vladimir1155
        the fact is that Novikov saw the admiral not from the sofa, but from the deck of the ship

        What a keen battalier - I saw the admiral on the "Prince Suvorov" from the deck of the "Eagle". smile
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 25 November 2021 15: 20
          -1
          Quote: Alexey RA
          What a keen battalier - I saw the admiral on the "Prince Suvorov" from the deck of the "Eagle".

          yes yes Novikov-Priboy saw from the deck of a neighboring ship, was keen-sighted and smart wrote many books got on the tablets of history, not like you and me after 120 years observing from fragmentary information
        2. Comrade
          Comrade 26 November 2021 03: 42
          0
          Quote: Alexey RA

          What a keen battalier - I saw the admiral on the "Prince Suvorov" from the deck of the "Eagle"

          Sorry, dear colleague, but it turns out that Novikov did not contemplate Rozhdestvensky from the deck of the Eagle, but through deck.
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 26 November 2021 07: 43
            0
            Quote: Comrade
            and through the deck.

            this deck was much thinner than those 120 years after which
            you see
      2. Comrade
        Comrade 25 November 2021 20: 45
        0
        Quote: vladimir1155
        the fact is that Novikov saw the admiral not from the sofa, but from the deck of the ship, I trust him more than you

        To no avail.
        Novikov, together with Kostenko, spent the entire battle in the infirmary, so he could not see any admirals from there. (see Novikov-Surf "Tsushima" vol. 2)
      3. Victor Leningradets
        Victor Leningradets 26 November 2021 07: 33
        +1
        Oh, we like to criticize Novikov's battalion, not realizing that they are criticizing the ARTISTIC work "Tsushima" by WRITER AS Novikov-Surf.
        Bataler Novikov honestly fulfilled his duties in the Tsushima battle, and the writer A.S. Novikov-Priboy created a novel in the spirit of parts, where he relied on historical material and eyewitness accounts.
        The value of his book is a fairly objective and artistically vivid description of the life and life of sailors and officers during the campaign, and the tragedy of the death of the squadron in battles on May 14-15.05.1905, XNUMX. And most importantly, those moods that reigned in the sailor environment. A good fleet going to war, in which Potemkin and Ochakovs are potentially maturing!
        And about the admiral told from the words of the messenger (apparently even beloved by the admiral) and from the words of the officers who knew him.
      4. Che why
        Che why 28 November 2021 14: 37
        0
        what can a sailor know about battle control tactics? and Novikov did not see the admiral, neither from the sofa nor from the deck. it’s as if you began to argue "how to land on the moon", citing the fact that you once launched a paper airplane! you are now a great specialist in aerodynamics of other crap !!! and has the right to tell people from the MCC at Baikonur how and what to do. schizophrenia.
        the novel "Tsushima" was written in 20-30 when it was fashionable to scold the tsarist regime, and making the officers look like fools is quite normal! the very structure of the novel is set out in such a way that the officers are stupid people and beat the sailors' faces, the admiral is the main stupid person and a psychopath, but in order to at least somehow look believable, they "dragged" a couple of adequate officers into the novel.
        I’m not defending the admiral, I said right away, he is a man and of course, he must have made a number of mistakes!
        what formation and where to go, it is again easy to argue from the couch by drawing arrows on the map. and you take a certain abstract squadron where everyone will follow your clear order! like in a computer game, you ordered the units to run there and they all ran in unison and synchronously. in reality, this does not happen. there will always be a factor of human error and this factor must be taken into account.
        put yourself in the shoes of an admiral, you have studied combat in the Yellow Sea, you know how the Japanese will act. you know the condition of your ships and how the crew is assembled on them. Are you going to win with this gypsy camp? this is unrealistic!
        and you cannot retreat !!! you are forcibly driven there for slaughter !!! you're in zugzwang.
        then what is your task? minimize losses! and if you take into account the battle in the Yellow Sea, how the Japanese pressed on the flagship, and how then the first squadron crumbled, you give a clear order: "everyone should go to Nord-Ost even if the flagship is lost, etc." while there is always someone who will do everything through the ass! any team is so arranged.
        the goal is to break through and not win !!!
        you are drawing a plan for victory. that's funny.
        PySy
        it would be nice to send the destroyers forward into the attack! they would have overwhelmed everyone with torpedoes and VICTORY !!! Some kind of World of Warships.
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 28 November 2021 21: 23
          0
          Quote: Che For Than
          in reality, this does not happen. there will always be a factor of human error and this factor must be taken into account.
          put yourself in the shoes of an admiral, you have studied combat in the Yellow Sea, you know how the Japanese will act. you know the condition of your ships and how the crew is assembled on them. Are you going to win with this gypsy camp? this is unrealistic!

          you have decided to cancel two military sciences at once, tactics and strategy! duty admiral to provide for everything that you have listed, otherwise it will be correct to write a written statement "the admiral is represented by some kind of psychopath-idiot, therefore I ask for resignation and transfer command to the deputy" in tactics and strategy (this is science) there is a set of standard axioms and theorems, techniques and concepts, to one and they include the principle of concentration of forces, the creation of a fist, the second related concept is the greatest use of your advantages, and the third is with linking the enemy's actions and ensuring freedom of action for yourself (you need to make sure that the enemy acts according to your patterns and not you according to him), you can still continue but the conclusion from all this is such a technique as lining up before battle from a marching column to the front of the offensive ... this is used in chess and in battles on the ground and at sea and even in the air, this is the basics known to the ancient Romans and Indians of South America and references to the Japanese that they were in a more advantageous position are not accepted, who prevented you from taking a winning position not knowingly a losing position?
      5. mmaxx
        mmaxx 29 November 2021 08: 15
        0
        To smear Novikov's battalion, I will cite an outside opinion of contemporaries:


        I wrote about this book. A. Volkov. Plunging into darkness. It takes a long time to explain about the personality. Easier to read the book.
  33. Per se.
    Per se. 25 November 2021 07: 32
    +6
    We are discussing the Battle of Tsushima, more precisely, the command role of Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky. I have already noted that this is not the main problem. The whole point of sending the 2nd Pacific squadron was to reinforce the 1st Pacific squadron, which ended up in the besieged Port Arthur, and after its surrender ceased to exist. The war had already been lost, Rozhdestvensky would not have been able to radically change anything at sea, even if he had broken through with part of his forces to Vladivostok.

    Here, it would be wiser to stop Rozhdestvensky's squadron, and start peace negotiations with Japan, on honorable terms. Or, continue the war, but not according to the original plan of joining with the 1st Pacific squadron, strengthening the second squadron, waging a cruising war.

    This is the main thing, otherwise the ships of Rozhdestvensky were doomed, and in vain he expected new commands from Nicholas II, and without waiting, he moved his ships towards death, literally, - "Ave, Caesar, morituri te salutant" (Glory, Caesar, going greet you to death).
    Therefore, we can only now discuss how much more expensive it was possible to sell their lives, how much more dignified and competent fight, but talking about the possibility of victory is hardly reasonable.
    1. Victor Leningradets
      Victor Leningradets 25 November 2021 21: 00
      +1
      What you write is only indirectly related to Rozhdestvensky. Yes, he was among the initiators of the sending of the Second Pacific Squadron in the winter of 1904. He showed remarkable organizational skills in organizing the squadron and its campaign, but was late.
      The fate of the squadron and the war as a whole was in the hands of one person - Nicholas II. He was deciding whether to follow the squadron further or go back. Obviously, it was decided (with impermissible delay) to move on, and Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, having received an order from Colonel Romanov, HAD to carry it out. Any alternative to this is treason and sabotage.
      The method of execution was entirely in the hands of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky.
      What did he have in terms of material resources, personnel and experience of battles with the Japanese fleet?
      - 4 battleships of the "Borodino" type - strong enough ships capable of forming the core of the future Pacific Fleet of the Russian Empire;
      - battleship-cruiser "Oslyabya" - a valuable ship for supporting cruising operations;
      - an invalid shelter (the battleship Sisoy the Great) - another miscarriage of the notorious "tonnage economy", however, equipped with fairly modern weapons, the cars are worn out;
      - torpedoes (battleship "Navarin") - an absolutely outdated and worn-out battleship of the monitor type;
      - Prince Myshkin (Armored cruiser "Nakhimov") - a rarity with sailing armament;
      - cruiser "Oleg" - unsuitable for squadron combat, but useful as a squadron reconnaissance;
      - the cruiser "Aurora" - a ship outdated from birth, but useful as a raider;
      - cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" - another rare ship, suitable only for heroic death;
      - "Svetlana" (object of worship of witnesses SO Makarov) - a yacht unsuitable for military service;
      - "Diamond" - the same thing in miniature, but the ship is RUNNING!
      - the newest cruisers of the second rank "Pearls" and "Emerald" - ideal advice notes.
      - auxiliary cruisers "Rion", "Terek", "Kuban", "Dnepr", "Ural" - raiders of that era;
      - 9 destroyers of the latest construction;
      - transports, floating workshops.
      It is clear that the Second Pacific Squadron consists of a valuable core, a limitedly valuable cruising squadron, an auxiliary fleet and outright junk. The third squadron adds five more units to the "trash" category.
      As for the personnel, judging by the testimony of Semyonov and Kostenko during the voyage, the personnel got used to their management. The quality of the ship commanders can be considered quite acceptable, but the flagships really did not fit anywhere as combat commanders. Around the world - please, fight - sorry, not trained!
      What was Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky supposed to do when he received the order to break through to Vladivostok? (We will not talk about "mastering the sea" - this is some kind of KVN) - Right! - Perform it on the most valuable part, sacrificing all the trash and using the cruising connection profitably.
      For this it was necessary:
      - Develop an operation plan to break through the most valuable core of the fleet to Vladivostok;
      - Divide the squadron into units in accordance with the task (breakthrough, cruising, heroic death);
      - Change all flagships to active commanders who are able to carry out the order, while showing reasonable initiative;
      - Prepare ships for battle in accordance with the assigned task, while redistributing ammunition.
      What was made of this?
      - Sending four auxiliary cruisers on a raid to the shores of Japan, AND EVERYTHING.
      Thus, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not fulfill the task assigned to him, without taking the necessary measures to implement it.
      I deliberately do not analyze the Tsushima battle on 14.05.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX, anything can happen in battle, but the fact that Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky deliberately brought the squadron entrusted to him to Golgotha ​​is an irrefutable fact. And given the position he took at the trial and his public appearances after returning from captivity, it is likely to suspect Dolus Malus (malicious intent) of his actions.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 25 November 2021 23: 48
        -1
        Quote: Victor Leningradets
        What you write is only indirectly related to Rozhdestvensky. Yes, he was among the initiators of the sending of the Second Pacific Squadron in the winter of 1904. He showed remarkable organizational skills in organizing the squadron and its campaign, but was late.

        Rozhdestvensky was ordered to take command and go on a campaign on July 1, 1904. He came out in the end on October 1. Are you sure you can call this "outstanding organizational ability"?
        1. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 26 November 2021 07: 17
          0
          Here I am guided by the reviews of contemporaries, in particular A.N. Krylov. In those conditions, this is the result! Under his (ZP Rozhestvensky) constant control and prodding, the Admiralty Plant kicked out both "Borodino" and "Oryol" in the spring of 1904, which would not have happened in a normal situation. The commissioning of the Suvorov in the summer of 1904 would also be problematic.
          It’s just that July 1, that October 1 is too late, one could have foreseen.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            26 November 2021 12: 16
            0
            Never mind, saxahorse is in your repertoire. The delay there was generally not related to Rozhdestvensky.
          2. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 27 November 2021 22: 35
            +2
            Quote: Victor Leningradets
            Here I am guided by the reviews of contemporaries, in particular A.N. Krylov. In those conditions, this is the result! With his (Z.P. Rozhestvensky) constant control and prodding

            Yeah yeah .. And you can also recall the letter from Makarov in the fall of 1903 with a request to extend the company for a week for the completely ready Alexander 3 in order to transfer him to Libau and send him to Port Arthur. What is the indifferent order of Rozhdestvensky - to mothball and leave in Kronstadt ..

            ZPR sample of the chief of a wooden waist-deep!
            1. Victor Leningradets
              Victor Leningradets 28 November 2021 11: 22
              0
              Well, and a very wise order!
              There is no point in sending an unprepared ship (obviously in company with the Oslyabya) directly into the clutches of the Japanese. This is the best way to feed them the fleet piece by piece.
              Here's what should have been done - to send there Vice-Admiral S.O. Makarov himself with the requirement to prepare the first Pacific squadron for a decisive battle. The entire course of negotiations with Japan spoke of the impending war. But alas!
        2. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 26 November 2021 13: 37
          0
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Rozhdestvensky was ordered to take command and go on a campaign on July 1, 1904. He came out in the end on October 1.

          Gribovsky, who can hardly be called a fan of the ZPR, says exactly the opposite. Rozhestvensky demanded to leave in late March and early April with combat-ready ships, but he was detained.
          Quote: Saxahorse
          July 1 1904 year.

          "Prince Suvorov" and "Borodino" and "Eagle" finished tests at the end of August.
          On August 1, 1904, the flag of the commander of the 2nd squadron, Rear Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, was raised on the battleship "Prince Suvorov" that had left the day before on the raid. In fact, of the battleships of the new series, only "Emperor Alexander III" was quite ready. On "Suvorov" acceptance tests continued for three more weeks,

          Borodino finished testing only on August 27 - two days before the squadron left for Revel. At the "Orel", which remained in the Kronstadt harbor, which was delayed by the consequences of the accident in March, work and acceptance were in full swing.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 27 November 2021 22: 52
            +1
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            Rozhestvensky demanded to leave in late March and early April with combat-ready ships, but he was detained.

            I do not know what Rozhdestvensky demanded in his dreams .. The order of Avelan clearly states the 1st of July. Which he personally confirmed during the investigation. Rozhestvensky himself indicated the reasons for the hang-up in his letter - delays and delays in the supply of supplies and the replenishment of crews with personnel. Those. questions for which Rozhestvensky himself, as the head of the General Music School, is personally responsible .. About technical problems, not half a word. Although Eagle was then almost drowned right in Kronstadt during the supply and completion. But ZPR type again has nothing to do with it.
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 28 November 2021 19: 45
              0
              Quote: Saxahorse
              Do not know

              This is quite obvious, but easy to fix. Just read it.
      2. Per se.
        Per se. 26 November 2021 12: 29
        +1
        Quote: Victor Leningradets
        about what you write - has only an indirect relation to Rozhdestvensky.
        I note that Rozhestvensky is being discussed, but in this situation he could only choose more or less damage for the Russian fleet, with a breakthrough to Vladivostok.
        I remember your statement about the options for a breakthrough to Vladivostok, including with a distracting detachment. In my humble opinion, it was necessary to immediately establish the main base of the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok, and not spend money on Port Arthur and Dalny (even to the detriment of Port Arthur). With the fall of Port Arthur, Rozhdestvensky's campaign lost its meaning.
        And given the position he took at the trial and his public appearances after returning from captivity, it is likely to suspect Dolus Malus (malicious intent) of his actions.


        We then lost the war to the Japanese, first of all on the hills of Manchuria, and only because of this, and then at sea. Alas, there are no advocates for Kuropatkin now, and supporters of the fact that we are a "land power" do not exclaim too much about this.
        Every cloud has a silver lining, although it is a shame for the state (Tsushima), but this hastened the fall of the rotten tsarist regime, one way or another became the forerunner of the creation of the USSR.
        1. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 28 November 2021 11: 08
          0
          Thank you, Sergey!
          Finally, there is a sane point of view on the events of 1905.
          From a strategic point of view, yes, in order to draw the game, the most important thing is to defeat the Japanese on land. Then, having returned Port Arthur, it would have been possible to sign a peace without annexations and indemnities.
          There are two points:
          1. To do this, it is necessary to defeat the Japanese utterly in the style of a blitzkrieg so that they cannot roll back to new positions, dragging out the war (partners will give money and weapons for it, do not even hesitate). Taking into account the logistics, this is extremely difficult.
          2. I continue to fear the direct intervention of Great Britain in the event of the imminent defeat of Japan. There is nothing to fend off the landing of colonial troops in Primorye, and this is a war on two fronts. By occupying the Transsib, the enemy can bring our victorious army to its knees, which once again underlines the importance of the fleet.
        2. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 28 November 2021 21: 37
          +4
          Quote: Per se.
          My humble opinion, it was necessary to immediately establish the main base of the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok, and not spend money on Port Arthur and Dalny

          The fleet was needed in the Far East to protect Liaodong and the Chinese Eastern Railway. It is useless in Vladivostok.
      3. Falcon5555
        Falcon5555 26 November 2021 15: 28
        +3
        Quote: Victor Leningradets
        breakthrough, cruising, heroic doom

        Cruise? How does this relate to the breakout? Make fun of them in different straits? But if the result remained the same, Rozhestvensky would later be accused of crushing our forces.
        Heroic death? Doesn't sound good. Maybe send the ballast back? But it may have been enough not to turn on the lights on hospital ships. lol , or send them back too.
        But, on the good, it was necessary to start from afar. For example, these endless discussions about shells, gunpowders, and shooting techniques - all this had to be solved then, not now. Nicholas, who for some reason bears the surname "Romanov", had not to shoot the crows in the palace parks, but to poster his battleships from the cannons. At that time he had no more important business.
        It is possible and even in advance - muddy scams in Korea, a crooked (in terms of diplomacy) organization of the base in Port Arthur. As a result, a war was provoked "out of the blue." sad
        1. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 26 November 2021 20: 48
          0
          1. The cruising of the Vladivostok detachment in 1904 made it necessary to concentrate Kamimura's detachment against it. The presence of "Oslyaby" ensured the passage of the raiders through the curtain of light forces.
          2. Ballast in battle - it is transports (if you do not use them as fire ships). Warships of no combat value are a distraction group. We managed to divert the main forces onto ourselves - great, the task is completed. Failed - went to Vladivostok, weak, but consolation.
          Here are the interesting questions:
          - in which squad to include the cruiser "Oleg";
          - tactical designation of nine destroyers;
          - mine warfare in the territorial waters of Japan.
          And you shouldn't worry about the result against the background of the actual one!
          1. Falcon5555
            Falcon5555 26 November 2021 23: 59
            0
            1. So what? Are you suggesting that they go hunting for civilian ships? Well, the civilians would hide, they would intercept and sink someone, and the Japanese dispatched some light force to pursue these cruisers. It would not have affected the battle of the battleships in any way. And in terms of fuel, the midnight raid east of Japan was probably impossible. Even from Vladivostok, the cruisers could only slightly crawl out of the straits. (And they could pass them, oddly enough, in both directions!) But the real range turned out to be less than the calculated one.
            2. Some warships may not be of value, but our people are of value! We have no kamikaze! So it’s impossible - to send deliberately to a heroic death, as you write, when it is not inevitable - for example, everyone could return at all. Probably something could be thought of to try to break through not so straightforward and unsuccessfully. To scoff in different straits, as usual it is intelligence and will not necessarily go through tsushima. Anything else.
            1. Victor Leningradets
              Victor Leningradets 27 November 2021 22: 02
              0
              In the Russian Empire, only the grand-prince's offspring were of value, and the secular princes were of limited value. The rest are consumables. It was the one who "saved" them in the Tsushima Strait.
              The military are all suicide bombers. He put on his uniform, took the oath - that's all, be ready to give your life in the name of Russia. To return to everyone - violation of the order given by the Tsar himself! In the ground forces, victims are still an ordinary event ("Battalions are asking for fire").
              1. Falcon5555
                Falcon5555 27 November 2021 23: 56
                0
                The military are all suicide bombers.
                This is something new. Where did you find out? Kamikaze are suicide bombers. Because they themselves, and their command - all there were fooled by the "code" of the samurai, who, samurai, then bish, and themselves could rip their stomachs like they shouldn't do. Here is your commander will order you: "but rip up your belly, brother," and you will go and spread it, or twist your finger at your temple and report to your superior commander that yours is probably crazy? In no country in the world, in any other army, people were not treated like that. Yes, and in Japan, this manifested itself only in the Second World War. In "Battalions are asking for fire" artillery support was planned, as the name says, but the train with ammunition was bombed by aircraft - such is the plot there. And the film leaves open the question of whether there was a flaw in the command, the end is about that. In my opinion, operations should be planned in such a way that the opportunity to survive, not die, is implied and planned. Whoever dies is out of luck, or the enemy turned out to be more cunning than planned, but to write down in the PLAN: "to die heroically" is something wrong. sad
                1. Victor Leningradets
                  Victor Leningradets 28 November 2021 10: 54
                  +2
                  Nothing new!
                  The army stands on the fact that orders are given on the basis of general expediency. Rip open your stomach - will not order - abuse of power. But "two grenades - and the end of the reptile! (And this is forty meters to crawl on the open)" - he will order - and crawl ("Hot Snow") - otherwise a well-deserved bullet. He himself was both a soldier and an officer. Sometimes it is necessary to give such orders, even erroneous ones. Only always in an even calm voice so that everyone can see your confidence and firmness. This is much better than the intellectual mental rushes and disasters from non-decision making.
                  1. Falcon5555
                    Falcon5555 28 November 2021 11: 59
                    0
                    I don’t remember this episode with two grenades, but yes, the novel “Hot Snow” is a strong (and tragic) thing. Yes, and this is an important episode in the history of the war. But even your quote is not about suicide, but about two grenades and something (about a tank?) That must be destroyed. Lucky, so maybe the soldier will survive. In general, this is an important topic.
                    1. Victor Leningradets
                      Victor Leningradets 28 November 2021 14: 53
                      0
                      The self-propelled gun hit our positions.
                      There was no chance there, but the order - and the soldier went to carry out and died without destroying this self-propelled gun.
                      Understand that they are fighting not in order to survive, but for the victory to be ours. Otherwise, the enemy will decide what to do with you who survived (and at the same time with all your family and friends).
                      1. Falcon5555
                        Falcon5555 28 November 2021 20: 38
                        0
                        Otherwise, the enemy will decide what to do with you who survived (and at the same time with all your family and friends).

                        If with the Mongolotatars, then yes. With the Nazis - too. In many past European wars, it seems that everything was not so important. It was just that some duchy or region passed from one king to another, some alliances were renegotiated, and that's it. And with Japan in 905 it was about the same. A piece of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands have changed the owner, so what? .. Nothing!
                      2. Victor Leningradets
                        Victor Leningradets 29 November 2021 10: 13
                        0
                        From a military point of view, your thinking is treason. This way, you can get to the point that it is not necessary to carry out orders that are contrary to your inner convictions. You can always come to an agreement with your conscience - your own tea!
                        This is how the Russian army fled in 1917. There is no discipline - the khan.
                      3. Falcon5555
                        Falcon5555 29 November 2021 10: 25
                        0
                        Reflection - treason? "Thoughtcrime", huh? repeat To recall and remind the well-known facts of history - and now treason ... belay And now it is no longer necessary to carry out the orders, supposedly ... Did I write that?
                        Not a desire to quarrel ... I liked your first post by the methodology of the approach, except for the details that I disputed. But then your thought went completely in the wrong direction. So it became uninteresting. Fizkult-hello.
            2. Victor Leningradets
              Victor Leningradets 27 November 2021 22: 12
              -1
              The Japanese dispatched some light force to pursue these cruisers.

              The dispatch of light cruisers Deva or Uriu to counter raiders is well parried by a squad of cruisers "Oslyabya", "Russia" and "Aurora".
              And in terms of fuel, the midnight raid east of Japan was probably impossible.

              And how were Terek, Kuban, Rion and Dnepr raided there? So, relying on the support of warships, auxiliary cruisers could pretty much draw on the combat and reconnaissance forces of the Japanese fleet.
              Some of them (Oslyabya, Aurora and Russia) should operate from Vladivostok in the spirit of Jessen's detachment, and the auxiliary cruisers Terek, Rion, Kuban, Dnepr and Ural - from the eastern sides of Japan. Moreover, the dispatch of light cruisers Deva or Uriu to counter the raiders is well parried by a detachment of cruisers "Oslyabya", "Russia" and "Aurora". So to neutralize the Vladivostok squadron, at least four armored cruisers will have to be dispatched.
              1. Falcon5555
                Falcon5555 28 November 2021 00: 03
                0
                [Some of them ("Oslyabya", "Aurora" and "Russia") should operate from Vladivostok
                But they must first get to Vladivostok! Even if they did, how long would it take them, and how would they help? Well, they will sail there for months, interfere with merchant shipping, and in the future they will cause some damage to the economy. Pull back four armored cruisers? If pulled .. Nothing will change to ensure the breakthrough of the battleships.
                1. Victor Leningradets
                  Victor Leningradets 29 November 2021 10: 25
                  0
                  Alternatively, I try to reduce the situation as much as possible to the battle of 28.07.1904/XNUMX/XNUMX, only without the ballast of the slow-moving ships.
                  Therefore:
                  1. Raiders will hurricane in the straits, and "Oslyabya", "Russia" and "Aurora" support them from Vladivostok, driving / destroying Japanese light cruisers. This should force at least four Kamimura armored cruisers to be dispatched to support the Japanese light forces. This leaves him with four battleships and four armored cruisers in the line.
                  2. A squadron of low-value battleship ships follows in order to the La Perouse Strait. where he either accepts the battle, or freely passes to Vladivostok. Armored cruisers Kamimura are not able to stop them, only the united fleet.
                  3. Breakthrough squad: "Prince Suvorov", "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino", "Eagle", "Oleg", "Pearl" - trying to secretly break through the Korean Strait. If a battle starts with the united main forces of the Japanese fleet, they retreat to a neutral port.
                  It is not clear where it is better to use the destroyers: in the La Perouse Strait for active operations or to cover the breakout squad.
      4. Maxim G
        Maxim G 27 November 2021 07: 19
        +2
        Quote: Victor Leningradets
        - "Svetlana" (object of worship of witnesses SO Makarov) - a yacht unsuitable for military service;

        "Svetlana" is a full-fledged rank 2 cruiser and did not differ from the French cruisers of that time, on the model of which it was built in France.
        It is incorrect to compare it with the "messenger ship for the Pacific Ocean" which the "Almaz" was, it was not a rank 2 cruiser, of course.

        "Svetlana"


        "Friant"
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 27 November 2021 20: 45
          0
          Quote: Maxim G
          "Svetlana" is a full-fledged rank 2 cruiser

          Strictly speaking, the first. because the armored deck was chalked.
        2. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 27 November 2021 22: 13
          0
          Two wimps
      5. unknown
        unknown 28 November 2021 12: 27
        0
        A lot of funny things have been written about Sisoy.
        For example, that the inspector fell through the deck.
        Failed due to rotted deck planks.
        And the fact that the plank flooring is just a flooring on a metal base?
        Or is it rotten too, to the point of forming a hole?
        The battleship "Fuji", which for some reason is always referred to as the newest, is actually an outdated ship.
        The belt is incomplete. And also short. The booked volume, limited by the belt, traverses and deck, was so small that in case of damage to the extremities, that is, their flooding, positive buoyancy was not guaranteed.
        S.A. Balakin back in August 2004.
        Installations of the main caliber are outdated. The legend about the placement of 18 shells in the stern of the armored cap does not stand up to criticism. Tower cuts, both side and top, are available. There is no place there.
        Medium caliber mostly unprotected.
        Speed, real, already from July 1904 no more than 15 knots.
        And why, "Sisoy" is worse?
        The fact that in the side salvo there are less than 6 "guns for two pieces?
        Or speed?
        So, in Tsushima, the Japanese were overloaded with fuel at the most.
        The speed dropped.
        Article "On the issue of overloading battleships in the Russian-Japanese war." Mikasa.
        The site "Alternative history". 15.02.2013/XNUMX/XNUMX.
        Andrey read the article, participated in the commenting.
  34. Oleg Zorin
    Oleg Zorin 25 November 2021 21: 08
    -2
    Brilliantly! Timokhin's absence of any plan for the article was correctly noted. Emphasis on the confusion of claims not supported by any factual material. Destructive analysis of Timokhin's mathematical errors. Clear and logical justification of their position on controversial issues. And, finally, an exquisitely polite style of addressing the opponent (the exact opposite of Timokhin's sometimes boorish attacks). Brilliant article, bravo, Andrei Nikolaevich!
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 4 December 2021 14: 01
      0
      Timokhin's absence of any plan for the article was correctly noted.


      What article?

      1. Oleg Zorin
        Oleg Zorin 5 December 2021 17: 18
        0
        What article? This one).
        https://topwar.ru/189108-glavnyj-vinovnik-cusimy.html[quote=timokhin-a-a] У Вас провалы в памяти? Тогда Вам ко мне, окажу помощь. И вообще, перестаньте себя вести как обиженная гимназистка.
        1. timokhin-aa
          timokhin-aa Yesterday, 01: 42
          +2
          Dude, you don't see the signature under the article? Ay.
  35. Vale2000
    Vale2000 25 November 2021 21: 47
    +1
    Maxim Klimov is a naval officer who gave a considerable part of his life to the navy.
    How much is this?
  36. 76SSSR
    76SSSR 26 November 2021 00: 33
    +1
    Klimov

    Klimov is not the one with the K-150 case?)
    1. Oleg Zorin
      Oleg Zorin 26 November 2021 21: 00
      -1
      this is Timokhin A.A.
      1. timokhin-aa
        timokhin-aa 4 December 2021 14: 01
        0
        Klimov and Timokhin are different people, come to your senses.
  37. Serge-667
    Serge-667 30 November 2021 21: 36
    0
    On the road, this maneuver is dangerous, because it leaves the driver a few seconds (or even fractions of a second) to react, and V.I. Baer had much more time ...

    I beg of you! There is no need to compare the road with motorists and the sea.
    Try to assess the situation at least in the Yal-6 boat and "brake adequately in front of the pier. You will immediately understand what the difference is.
  38. Andrey Tameev
    Andrey Tameev 2 December 2021 06: 28
    +2
    Thank you, Andrey, very well-reasoned!