Military Review

Tsushima's main culprit

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... only worries, how to crawl forward and not lose the lame and blind.

No matter what happens, there is no greater shame. Disgraced completely
fleetdisgraced by the army, which, in my opinion, has ceased to exist
just as the Port Arthur fleet ceased to exist. Will cease
this stupid second squadron also exists, there will be a small allowance to the shame
... maybe one of these days you will hear at my address - a scoundrel and a scoundrel.
Don't really believe it; tell them that I am neither one nor the other, but just a person
lacking the necessary data to cope with the task
...
If I had even a spark of civil courage, I should have screamed
to the whole world: “Take care of these last fleet resources! Don't send them away
for extermination! " But I didn't have the spark I needed ...

Topic Z.P. Rozhdestvensky is extremely painful in stories our fleet, and this is primarily due to its largest defeat, catastrophe (and Rozhdestvensky's role in it and the general unsuccessful course of the Russo-Japanese War).

Of the latest works on the pages of "Military Review", it is worth noting a series of excellent articles A. Rytika with the introduction into public circulation of a number of new facts and documents on Tsushima. Estimates of the ZPR there are quite objective and harsh.

An opposite example is a large series of articles by A. Kolobov and R. Ivanov. The articles, of course, are interesting, but they are significantly spoiled by the enthusiastic attitude of the authors to Rozhdestvensky and the desire to justify him by any means, up to "Passion for Zinovy".

There was a plan - to slip through in bad weather, while the Japanese are putting the fleet in order, to Vladivostok. The plan was thwarted. There was a proposal: "I cannot defeat the Japanese (and no one could) - change it." Have not changed. As a result - Tsushima, of which, of course, a mediocrity is guilty. Not a system. The blockhead offered to hold a trump card for negotiations in the theater of operations. He was not given. The fool was in a hurry. And geniuses (like Clado and the emperor himself) slowed down. The dumbass shouted - we will lose the battle. Nobody listened to him ... There were definitely geniuses upstairs. Where are the sailors ... There is nothing to be done. There are heroic figures in our history. And there are tragic persons, with which the leaders covered their sins and sins. Zinovy ​​stands out against the general background. It was from him that they made the ideal scapegoat for the bureaucracy and the complete military-political failure of the government.

With the subsequent abundant citation of his correspondence (the shocking of which is more characteristic of a "pregnant schoolgirl" than an admiral leading the squadron to battle) - we will return to it later.

Actually, what to talk about if "on the wave of perestroika and new thinking" in the February 1989 issue of the central press organ of the USSR Navy, the magazine "Morskoy Sbornik", an absolutely shameful (both in terms of level and content) article by V. Chistyakov " A quarter of an hour for Russian cannons ", with a simply enchanting version of how we" almost won (thanks to Rozhestvensky's "genius") Tsushima. " Just in the adoption of this, so to speak, "version" A. Kolobov also admitted.

... for the first time the version of "a trap for H. Togo" was put forward by the respected V. Chistyakov ("A quarter of an hour for Russian cannons"), and, according to the author, he was largely right ...

As they say - "curtain". In general, after this recognition, all the works of A. Kolobov must be treated "appropriately" (as varieties of the "next verb"): there are numbers and (seemingly) facts, but specially selected in order to justify Rozhestvensky by any means ... Calling a spade a spade is called manipulating facts:

... Russian ships demonstrated an unprecedented level of combat training for the Russian Imperial Navy ... Both squadrons, so to speak, started well, but the Japanese managed to suppress the fire potential of our best ships, but we did not, after which, in fact, the battle turned into a beating ...
... if H. Togo continued his movement towards the Russian squadron in order to crush 7 old ships led by "Oslyabey" on the countercourses, he would soon find a wake column approaching him, led by the best battleships of the 2nd Pacific squadron. Such a beginning of the battle became extremely beneficial for the Russian commander, especially since in the Russian Imperial Navy, shooting on the counter-courses was considered one of the most important artillery exercises ... Thus, it can be stated that Z.P. Rozhestvensky was a great success - for a long time maintaining the "two-column" formation and rebuilding so that it was invisible from Japanese ships, he tactically outplayed the Japanese commander, saved his squadron from the "Crossing T", provided his gunners with a 15-minute advantage in the outset of the battle and forced H. Togo to enter the battle is far from the best position possible.
All of the above would make it possible to consider the Russian commander a brilliant naval commander ... if not for a number of mistakes that Zinovy ​​Petrovich made in the implementation of his, in every respect, an outstanding plan.



Absolutely inadequate, neurasthenic control of the Rozhdestvensky squadron in the outset of the battle almost led to a collision of ships and required stopping the course of the Oslyabi. Of course, according to the lawyers, "Zinovy ​​has nothing to do with it."

So in this situation, any sane commander of the "Oslyabi" would smoothly reduce the speed in advance, perhaps - he would have made the coordinate to the right, but would have let the "Eagle" go ahead, would have avoided both a collision and a stop of the battleship. Ber, however, proudly lane forward to the last, and when the collision was already inevitable - arranged an emergency braking and stood up in view of the enemy ... Thus ... Rozhestvensky did not give an order to someone there to slow down.

Briefly: the "coordinate to the right" proposed by the sofa naval commanders to Beru led, with a high probability, either "Eagle" - under the ram of "Oslyabi", or "Oslyabyu" - under the "Eagle" battering ram (in Makarov's "Discourses ..." this question was well described ), simply because to the right of the "Oslyabya" "Oryol" was (and to pass it and complete his maneuver, "Oslyabya" and stopped the course).

The reason for this is obvious - Rozhdestvensky's gross mistake in assigning speed in battle (in the specific case, to the battleships of the first detachment).

The word “sane” sounded from the “creative researcher”. The right word, because just the actions of Zinovy ​​himself (absolutely senseless maneuvering of the squadron) in the outset of the battle were a complete inadequate neurasthenic (and the so-called "explanations" of the ZPR that followed after the battle (that he supposedly expected that Togo would go to him in the front line) was simply are absurd and deceitful).

They cause frank bewilderment attempts by Mr. Kolobov to justify the extremely unfortunate coloring ships of the Second Squadron (in which they repainted by order of the ZPR, including ships that previously had (at the initiative of their commanders) "combat colors"):

There is a lot of evidence that Japanese shells, when hitting the water, gave not only a splash, but also a column of black smoke. This smoke, of course, was clearly visible, but ... But was it so clearly visible against the background of the black sides of our squadron battleships? Still, black on black, in poor visibility conditions, is not so easy to make out. And it is possible that Z.P. Rozhestvensky, planning to protect his ships from night attacks with black and yellow paint, did not make a big mistake and did not make it easier for the Japanese to shoot as it is commonly believed today.

Yellow pipes, according to A. Kolobov, was it also some kind of “clever disguise? Why didn't they paint the whole body yellow?

The exit of the 2nd Pacific Squadron on January 6 was thwarted by the decision of the Hamburg-American Line ... in connection with the "newly announced" rules of neutrality by Great Britain, namely, the ban on the supply of ships going to the theater of war in the colonies of the Indian Ocean, in the Malacca Strait, South -The Chinese Sea and the Far East, the company refuses to supply coal to the Russian squadron other than in neutral waters, and therefore there can be no talk of any overloading of coal in the ocean.

And nothing that the ocean is "neutral waters"?

But back to the letters to Z.P. Rozhdestvensky:

12.12.1904 We have been trudging along in the ranks for two months, but we cannot learn anything; we have forgotten everything that we have learned in Revel, and now only worries, how to crawl forward and not lose the lame and blind. Complete dullness. No matter what happens, there is no greater shame. They are completely disgraced by the fleet, disgraced by the army, which, in my opinion, ceased to exist in the same way as the Port Arthur fleet with Port Arthur itself ceased to exist. This stupid second squadron will also cease to exist, there will be a small increase to the shame, to the people's grief.

17.01.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX Is it really not clear to them that the more numerous the rabble of any bastard, the more impossible it is for them to cope, the more chances are to beat this bastard in parts, where these parts will fall off due to various troubles. Nevertheless, I now have no matter what the strength, people have come to know each other. We may not defeat the Japanese, but they cannot defeat us either.

20.02.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX “The last cablegrams brought here heavy news about new defeats that we suffered on both flanks of Kuropatkin's army, about the movement of the Japanese to Vladivostok, where we have an insignificant number of troops ... we must wait to criticize: maybe one of these days you will hear and at my address - a scoundrel and a scoundrel. Don't really believe it; tell them that I am neither one nor the other, but simply a person who does not have the necessary data to cope with the task.

02.03.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX Tomorrow I am leaving here. There is no more strength to wait. Complete dullness. No matter what happens, there is no greater shame. They are completely disgraced by the fleet, disgraced by the army, which, in my opinion, ceased to exist in the same way as the fleet of Port Arthur and Port Arthur itself ceased to exist. This stupid second squadron will also cease to exist, there will be a small increase to the shame, to the people's grief.

According to the creative supporters of the ZPR, all this "mental slag" belongs to "almost Nelson" (ah, "if not for Faberge").

No, gentlemen! This is a clear handwritten testimony of a responsible person in his weakness, incapacity (for the assigned task) and moral degradation!

The best that has been written about Rozhdestvensky is the book by V.Yu. Gribovsky ("Admiral Rozhdestvensky" and its reprint "The Last Parade of the Admiral"). It was written not only professionally, by a well-known specialist and historian of the fleet, but also by a person who knows the naval organization well from the inside. There is no "black and white" in it, in fact, this is the story of how a young, brave and promising officer turned into his opposite at the top of his career. And he was not the only one ...

Two photos: a brave, well-trained promising young officer ... And the man who led our fleet to the Tsushima disaster.


From the comments to the article about "the passions of Zinovy":

- Rozhestvensky demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of what combat training is (normal combat training).
- You are now making a classic mistake - you judge the people of the past from the height of the available knowledge. Their actions must be judged taking into account the level of development of military art. And in your head - modern forms of combat training, which have stepped forward more than 100 years. It must be understood that the methods of combat training before the First World War were an order of magnitude more perfect than what was at the beginning of the century, and before the Second - an order of magnitude higher than (not all of them) that were before the First World War. He does it. He does what he did before him. And he cannot know what is right and what is wrong. He learns new things by trial and error. And for this, generally speaking, it is worthy of praise. Gribovsky, living "a little" later and knowing in hindsight how to do it all correctly, criticizes the admiral. One must judge without a second thought. You cannot reproach a person for the fact that, while doing something new, he did not immediately do it perfectly.

No, gentlemen lawyers!

First, there was more than enough critical information about the lagging behind and the frankly abnormal situation in our fleet on a number of military issues.

Secondly, we were actively and persistently working abroad on similar problems (and we knew this perfectly well - it was written about this with details in the same "Sea Collection").

Thirdly, quite effective methods of combat training were developed "long before" (one can recall the "Lazarevsky" Black Sea Fleet) and, after a couple of years, the perfectly trained squadron of Tsyvinsky clearly showed what their application to the issues under consideration was.

Fourthly, in those conditions there were those who persistently demanded.

Fifth, the answer to many "bad questions" lies in personal qualities. The same Makarov was far from perfect, he had a number of mistakes. However, he raised the issue of research and study of issues (for example, shooting an old ship for testing, including shells) and, of course, finding himself in real combat conditions, would revise his erroneous pre-war ideas if he had time.

Sixth, on very many sensitive issues of our fleet, it was Rozhdestvensky who was responsible and "the person who made the decision."

Battle, "turn of Togo" and Rozhdestvensky's last chance


Clearly: the same person writes to his wife on 02.03.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX:

This stupid second squadron will also cease to exist, there will be a small increase to the shame, to the people's grief.

And to the bosses:

To the Naval Minister of Adjutant General, Vice-Admiral of Rozhdestvensky Report, July 1905, Sasebo: “And here the squadron, undoubtedly, had to meet a concentrated Japanese fleet, with an outnumbering of cruising and mine detachments, but with almost equal forces of armored squadrons ... Such a ratio of the material part did not seem hopeless at all, and our duty was to look for battles in the calculation, inflicting all possible harm on the enemy, to break through to Vladivostok. "

As a matter of fact, everything is clear ...

But fate gave Rozhdestvensky "the last chance" - to win (or at least not to lose) the battle - "Togo's turn." The ability to immediately turn the battleships of the first detachment (without the Oslyabi) to the enemy and their high-speed "throw" to a sharp reduction in the distance (and increase the effectiveness of artillery fire until reliable penetration of armor and destruction of vulnerable spots of Japanese ships with almost every volley of ours). Powerful longitudinal fire (2x12 inch and 6x6 inch guns of each battleship) and good protection provided this.


Of course, this clear, understandable and logical opportunity to avoid the coming catastrophe (and even to win) is categorically opposed by the “lawyers of Zinovy”. Look, for example, at A. Kolobov:

I believe that the main reason for the defeat in the Battle of Tsushima is the low speed of the Russian squadron in comparison with the Japanese. Having no more than 9-11 knots against 14-16 for the ships of Togo, the line of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons lost the main thing - the initiative in the battle.
... The above is actually a death sentence to the idea of ​​using our five best battleships as a "fast wing", acting separately from the rest of the squadron ... There was a chance to withstand only if the leading Russian battleships managed to "endure" the concentration of Japanese fire, while the ships following them, taking advantage of the fact that they were hardly fired at, could inflict sensitive damage to the Japanese. But for this, the Russian squadron had to act in one formation, without breaking it. This is exactly how Z.P. Rozhdestvenskyand this did not lead him to success.
... Why ZP Didn't Rozhestvensky rush with his 5 fast battleships to the pivot point of the Japanese ships in order to turn the battle into a dump?
Such an action did not have the slightest sense for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it would have been impossible to execute it on time, because taking into account the time taken to set and raise signals and increase the speed to 13-14 knots ... the Russian ships obviously did not have time to get close to the enemy ships ...
Secondly, it was much more profitable to follow the previous course. ... By the time when the end Japanese ships, the weakly protected cruisers of Kh. Kamimura, would have entered the turn, almost the entire squadron could have fired at them with their entire side from a distance, which Z.P. Rozhestvensky assessed as not exceeding 35 cables for the terminal Russian ship.
Thirdly, at the end of the maneuver, the "dump" still could not work out - to fall on the "tail" of the relatively slow-moving 1st combat detachment of the Japanese Z.P. Rozhestvensky, in any case, did not have time, and the cruisers of Kh. Kamimura had a greater stroke and could very quickly break the distance. But after that, the Russian squadron would have been scattered into 2 detachments, and would have been easily defeated.

Now let's move on from shocking and adjectives to facts.

Firstly, the initial distance of the battle to Mikasa was 32 cabs, that is, at a speed of 15 knots of battleships (2,5 cabs per minute), it could be reduced in 8 minutes to 10-12 cabs - that is, the distance direct shot, in which even 6-inch shells confidently pierced the armor of Japanese battleships. Moreover, no "observance of the formation" was needed here, it was necessary to reduce the distance "according to ability" as quickly as possible.

Signals?

The battleship commanders were quite reasonable, confident and morally ready for mortal combat people, and they would react accordingly to the obvious "throw" of the flagship battleship without any signals (not to mention the fact that in that situation the order could be reliably transmitted by a semaphore). But for this it was necessary not even to prepare people (this Rozhestvensky successfully "flunked"), but to simply trust them! And it was with this that there were big problems - even if the ZPR successfully got rid of the second flagship (according to the charter!) Even at the stage of the formation of the squadron.

At the same time, the speed of our battleships could have been higher - I emphasize - in this situation, it was not necessary to maintain a long stroke, but to do a "forced throw" (which was fully ensured without reinforcing the stokers).

Secondly, taking into account the length of the squadron and the enemy's superiority in speed, the “tail” of our squadron “dangled” at distances where the effectiveness of its fire obviously could not be high (that is, the total wake column meant a voluntary refusal of Rozhestvensky from his only and real advantage over the Japanese).

Thirdly, as it was shown above, they were in time, and at a distance, which literally in a few minutes they could simply "perforate" the ships of Togo.

And here is what Rozhdestvensky himself writes:

According to the current opinion, the battle could take a different turn if the battleships of different mobility did not strive to stay united, but were distributed to separately operating detachments. I disagree with this opinion.
Twelve Japanese battleships acted in close formation, concentrating their fire in the first period of the battle, successively on the lead ones, from among our most high-speed battleships, who nevertheless received some support from the followers of the Matels.
If four or five of our battleships, having developed their maximum speed, separated from their weak comrades, the Japanese battleships, having the opportunity to develop a speed greater than our best walkers, would have kept their way and, only in a shorter period of time, would have overcome with concentrated forces the color of our squadron, in order, then, jokingly, to overtake and overcome the abandoned.

Here Rozhestvensky completely ignores the factor of a sharp decrease in the probability of shells hitting a high-speed target (especially with its optimal maneuvering).

But the main thing is different: the main trump card of the Second Squadron - a significant superiority in large-caliber guns - obviously could not be realized in a long wake column (and this was clearly understood even before the war).

Moreover, the presence of both effective ammunition, in fact, only armor-piercing shells rigidly raised the question of the effective range of their use (which further reduced the effectiveness of the "tail" of the column due to the range). For "armor-piercing" a short distance was needed, at which the armor of Japanese ships could reliably penetrate, with the defeat of vital parts of the ships (including vehicles, artillery and cellars).

The same distance resolved the issue with the catastrophic lag of our squadron in matters of artillery fire control, sharply increasing the likelihood of hitting not just enemy ships, but precisely their vulnerable places, even without range finders and with disorganized central fire control.


And then the battleships of the second and third detachments are approaching. In the textbooks of the Marine Corps, large-caliber artillery at effective ranges was assessed as a "lethal argument" in battle, and by the damaged and lost enemy ships, their entry into battle (at an effective) distance became a real "finishing off the wounded."

Yes, Kamimura would have pulled away (whoever had time), although it is obvious that his armored cruisers at sharply reduced distances would have “flown in”, especially the terminal ones (again, before the decrease or loss of speed, and there our battleships of 2 and 3 detachments and just finish off the "wounded").

Yes, our battleships of the first squad would have suffered severely from enemy fire. But not fatal (thanks to the good protection and the problems of the Japanese with armor-piercing shells, which were formally, but they penetrated the armor rather relatively). It is very possible that after a short fight at a short distance they would have looked "almost like Suvorov."


The question is different - the very possibility of a powerful fire strike at a high-speed enemy at an effective distance, with a high probability of real drowning of several (even all) Japanese battleships.

I repeat once again - this required a short distance, better - a direct shot (reliably pierce armor and have a high probability of hits, regardless of rangefinders and zeroing) and the necessary combat stability and survivability of the strike group of ships, and battleships of the Borodino type provided this.

The likely consequences of their "throw on Togo" are the drowning of several Japanese battleships, the withdrawal of the damaged ones under the cover of Kamimura, and the termination of the battle by the Japanese. In fact - the victory of the battle by the Russian side (and with all the "cart" of previous problems with which we came to Tsushima).

However, in this particular case: not that “the history of this does not tolerate the subjunctive mood,” but that Togo, carrying out his, of course, a very risky maneuver, was sure that Rozhestvensky would not dare to do anything like that and would be like a ram in the future. it is stupid to go to the slaughterhouse prepared for him. It's just that Zinovy, as a person, has long been studied, known and perfectly understood ...

And the toughest thing in this situation is that nothing of the kind in front of the same First Squadron ("Port Arthur") Togo simply would not risk carrying out. For he perfectly understood what a catastrophe (for him) it could end.

About sighting, calibers, firing range and "bunch" of fire control methods with maneuver


The opinion of another new "creative researcher" of the subject of the Navy and the Russo-Japanese War (and a "great connoisseur" of "Boyar Zinovy"):

Why do I consider Rozhestvensky one of the best Russian admirals? Actually, this opinion is formed under the impression of his actions as the head of the UAO of the Baltic Fleet. You can read more about this in Gribovsky's "Admiral Ushakov" ... His most impressive achievements are the introduction of the two newest achievements in the field of naval artillery on the entrusted detachment. Firstly, zeroing in with a medium caliber and using its results for shooting with the main caliber. Secondly, at a time when the great Fischer, commanding the Mediterranean fleet of Britain, was conducting experimental firing at 5 yards (000 cables), Rozhestvensky introduced firing at a distance of 25–25 cables into the squad training course.

Him echoes A. Kolobov:

According to the results of the shooting, which took place on January 13, 1905, Z.P. Rozhestvensky issues an order (No. 42 dated January 14, 1905), which establishes the “fork” principle as mandatory.

Allegedly "innovator" Rozhdestvensky (from 25–32 cab) looks somewhat amusing against the background of Klado, who wrote back in 1898 in a textbook for midshipmen of the Marine Corps about effective artillery fire from 53 cab?


It is logical to assume that Klado was not the first here either.

But first about sighting.

First of all, according to its history and, first of all, with us.

In 1870 S.K. Kaminsky proposed a method of sighting with ledges.

In 1874, in the "Guide to shooting from artillery guns" V.N. Shklarevich paid special attention to the need to develop zeroing rules -

no rangefinder can exclude either the need for an eye, or the need for the ability to shoot.

In 1875, the work of V.N. Shklarevich "On the production of an attachment when operating from field guns with a grenade and shrapnel." For the first time, using the theory of probability, the basic rules of zeroing were substantiated by the method, which later received the name NZR (signs of observation of gaps).

In 1877, in the “Brief Guide to the Artillery Service with Field Guns, Model 1877”, the rules for zeroing against stationary and moving (!) Targets were introduced (the essence is, having achieved the capture in the fork, go to its sequential halving). At the same time, it was noted that

evaluating by eye the distance of individual projectiles from the target, one can fall into gross errors, but based on the count of the number of flights and undershoots, one can make accurate conclusions about the distance of the midpoint of the projectile fall from the target.

The first such firing in combat conditions took place during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878.

Of course, the ZPR, which had behind not only the Marine Corps, but also the Mikhailovskaya Artillery Academy, was well aware of all this.

Why was it not immediately implemented in the navy?

The reason is simple - the movement of the shooting ship and the low rate of fire of the guns of that time, due to which each shot was, in fact, an independent event, and zeroing on the basis of previous shots obviously did not provide adequate accuracy for subsequent ones. Accordingly, the range of effective artillery fire at sea until the early 90s of the nineteenth century was estimated up to 20 cab.

A breakthrough was the appearance at the turn of the 90s of rapid-fire medium-caliber guns, the high rate of fire of which, with the correct correction, made it possible to turn the "jet" (a quite used term in the artillery of that time) of shells into a chain of dependent events and sharply increase the accuracy of hitting targets at long distances ( hence the 53rd room in Klado's 1898 textbook). At the same time, the possibility of specifying the actual distance to the target on the basis of fire and zeroing of medium-caliber guns provided a sharp increase in the efficiency and firing range of large caliber.

The obvious subsequent decision: "to shoot large at sharply increased distances, providing them with an average sighting" (providing the required number of (half) volleys in the time interval), and led to the creation of "dreadnoughts".

The main thing was the method of shooting (artillery fire control), and its technical ("dreadnought") and tactical (artillery combat at increased distances) implementation was already a consequence. That is, the statements about allegedly "record distances" at the ZPR, in view of the obvious flaw in the method of obtaining them, have no basis. Yes, the British then fired at a shorter range, but persistently practicing the technique of effective fire in battle - after having worked out which they eventually came to great distances.

In addition, the "devil is in the details", and there were a lot of them here, starting with the problem of the visibility of the flight of the projectile and bursts and ending with the problems of concentrated fire. And it was this that became the subject of forced research, wholesale firing and research exercises in the developed fleets of that time.

O. Parks "Battleships of the British Empire":

Lord Chatfield described the artillery experiments carried out on the Venereble over the course of three months on Prasa Island near Platia Bay in the article The Navy and Defense:Hundreds of volleys were fired and a lot of coal and energy wasted., in order to prove an absolutely obvious fact - it is impossible to conduct effective long-range fire from the powerful batteries of a modern warship according to the old scheme, as anyone pleases. Only scientifically based centralized fire control can meet modern requirements... The adoption of this standard method of firing in the fleets means for the Admiralty and artillery schools the adoption of new projects for the artillery equipment of ships, new training methods, new, better devices - in a word, revolution in artillery ".

Of course, not everything worked out right away, and the same British had many problems (for example, the scandal with unsuccessful optical sights). But they worked actively and moved forward.

The Japanese did the same.


Having started the war in terms of artillery frankly "pale" (for example, the first battle with the Port Arthur squadron and the shelling of Vladivostok), they resolutely and persistently worked to improve the main instrument of the war, and received a sharp leap in efficiency in its course.

However, in our fleet, all this happened only after the "Tsushima pogrom", because, at the very least, having mastered sighting with a medium caliber (including for a large one), our "decision-makers" (including the ZPR), considered this sufficient (despite the fact that, as will be shown later in the articles, there were enough "alarm bells").

So, what do we have in the Rozhdestvensky Training Artillery Unit?

In 1901, in a detachment when firing from a distance of 25–32 cab. zeroing began with 120-mm guns, after which all 254-mm guns, in numerical order, fired one shot, followed by "quick fire".

In June-July 1902, at the "meeting of two emperors" (from the book by V.Yu. Gribovsky, I.I. Chernikov "Battleship" Admiral Ushakov "):

A training artillery detachment demonstrated two-way maneuvering with firing from the wake and front lines at the floating and coastal shields on Carlos Island. The ships ... hit targets from a distance of 15-23 kbt ... Nicholas II noted "an exemplary order ... deigned to pay special attention to the excellent accuracy of firing from guns ...". Wilhelm II was also generous with praise ... ZP. Rozhestvensky in the eyes of Nicholas II grew a whole head, which soon provided him with an enviable promotion. In 1903 ... Rear Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky was appointed acting chief of the Main Naval Staff. He became the third person in the hierarchy of management of the Russian Naval Department.

We have to completely agree with the assessment:

The setting for the prepared maneuvers was as far removed from the possible combat conditions of the time as the organization of the Training Artillery Detachment itself was from justified tactical requirements.
Such important elements of tactics as practicing fire control with appropriate combat maneuvering of ships were not practiced in the detachment. And this despite the fact that back in 1892 the head of the Training and artillery team, Captain 2nd Rank V.Kh. Ienish achieved a revision of training programs in order to bring it closer to the conditions of a real battle. Outstanding artilleryman, author of the "Tactical unit of naval artillery", V.Kh. In training, Jenish strove to achieve a combination of fire and maneuver. This direction of the activity of the Training and Artillery Detachment could turn it into a tactical school for the entire fleet. However, on September 7, 1893, Viktor Khristianovich died along with the entire crew of the battleship "Rusalka", which he commanded on a summer voyage.

Once again, it is not “shooting on a shooting range” that is important, it is the combination of “maneuver and fire” that is important. There are two aspects to this. The first is to ensure high accuracy of your shooting. Reading S.O. Makarova:

114. Influence of the stability of the ship's course on the accuracy of artillery fire. Accuracy and rate of fire are greatly influenced by the maneuvering of the ship. If the shooting ship keeps turning to the right and then to the left relative to the enemy, then aiming the guns will become very difficult, and accuracy will suffer greatly. Turning the ship not only complicates horizontal guidance, but also constrains vertical guidance, because with each change in the position of the rudder, the ship changes its roll, and since the gunner does not know when to put the rudder down, he absolutely cannot foresee these changes, which will spoil its vertical tip. The most advantageous for shooting is to keep the enemy at a known course angle; then the guns will not have to be aimed again, but will only have to correct the old aiming before firing ... If the helmsman does not hold the vessel well at the heading angle, then one cannot count on the accuracy of the shooting. This circumstance is able to halve the number of shells hitting the enemy.
15. Teach the helmsmen to gain ...

Let me emphasize that this applies not only to so many helmsmen, this primarily concerns the "fusion" of the entire squadron, its readiness to actively and skillfully maneuver in a variety of tactical conditions. That is, it is not just stupid to “walk in formation”, but precisely tactically competently maneuver. Including for evading enemy fire.

And here we come to the second, very important component - competent maneuvering at high speeds already at medium distances sharply reduces the enemy's zeroing efficiency and the likelihood of hitting his shells. By the way, this was one of the factors in the emergence of "eggshells armed with hammers" - battlecruisers, at the time of the formation of the idea of ​​which "speed protection" (when fighting at a long distance) was really effective. However, after a few years, the methods of artillery fire control make their own leap in development, after which Jutland happened - "something is wrong with our cats today."

Did our specialists of that time understand this (see the thesis of A. Kolobov that allegedly “they did not know then”)?

Of course, for example, the same Clado's textbook for midshipmen in 1898:

When firing at a destroyer going to the ship at a speed of 12-13 knots, one cannot count on more than 2-3% hits ...


And in the same place:

Currently, the technique has done a lot to increase accuracy ...

But there was nothing even close to tactical maneuvering and shooting methods effective for real combat from Rozhestvensky: both in the Training Artillery Unit, as the Chief of the Naval Staff, and as the commander of the Second Squadron ...

We read "lawyer Zinovy":

... the Russian commander, approaching the end of the Japanese, would substitute the head of his column under the concentrated fire of the entire Japanese line ... There was no mistake in leading the squadron into battle at 9 knots in this situation: the mistake was that Z.P. Rozhestvensky too early reduced the speed of his 9st armored detachment to 1 knots.

That is, Rozhestvensky not just criminally, because of his inadequate and stupid "maneuvering", put Oslyabya under fire, a gross mistake with the choice of the squadron speed also led to a significant increase in the likelihood of enemy shells hitting our ships!

And the low speed of our battleships was one of the reasons for the high efficiency of enemy fire on them!

The war began, and at a time when other countries and our enemy were actively and persistently working on new methods of controlling artillery fire, in 1904, by order of the Main Naval Staff, V. Alekseev's work "Basic principles of organizing control of ship artillery in battle" was published.

Next A. Kolobov's quote:

V. Alekseev's "note" was not his personal opinion on naval artillery issues, but an analysis and a short essay of numerous works by many officers of the navy. What, in fact, is this document valuable ... V. Alekseev makes a truly mind-boggling conclusion: ...“Zeroing is generally possible at large distances, in single combat at a course angle or on parallel courses. In all other cases it is of little use, but in a squadron battle it is completely inapplicable. "... Accordingly, V. Alekseev recommended at distances of 10 cables or less to fire at the eye gauge, and over 10 cables - at the rangefinder, and only "in special cases" - at zeroing. In the yard, I repeat - 1904.

Excuse me, but who was the head of the General Music School? Isn't it "boyar Zinovy"?

Moreover, taking into account the subject matter and significance of the question, he read Alekseev's opus with a probability of "four nines" and authorized its publication!

Against the background of this "cave trash", even the frankly poor method of fire control of the Second Squadron looked like great progress (despite the fact that it was significantly inferior to the enemy):

The shooting rules - "Organization of artillery service on ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron" (Order No. 5 of July 8, 1904) clearly gravitated towards the outdated documents of the Marine Technical Committee of the 90s. XIX century. They envisaged, in particular, zeroing in single shots of the plutong designated for this purpose and indicating the installation of the sight of its first shot with the front matelot, so that the ships following it would use this installation. With the adopted signaling system, all this required precious time, which, as the experience of the war showed, was not enough in the conditions of a squadron battle of large battleships ...

I repeat once again - during this period of time, artillery in terms of methods of firing (and maneuvering at the same time!) Developed by "leaps and bounds", and the result of these literally "several years of work" is especially evident not even in Tsushima, but in the example of the shooting of an English battleship " King Edward VII "in October 1905 ( link и fountainhead).

In October 1905, an artillery exercise was carried out by the British fleet, during which they carried out one interesting idea. The target was made quite healthy - 30x90 feet (9,1x27,4 m) and figured - in the form of a silhouette of the battleship "King Edward VII", which actually fired at it ... from a distance of 6 yards (000 km - 5,5 cables) at a speed of an battleship of 30 knots, 15 shells were fired at it - main, intermediate and medium calibers.
- 11 shots 12 inches (305 mm) - horrible 10;
- 31 shots 9,2 "(234 mm) - horrible 15;
- 71 shots 6 "(152 mm) - horrible 26.


An illustrative example of what optical sights are with small errors in distance (measured or “aimed”) at a stationary target. And now we remember "Oslyabya" ...

Actually, this is the answer to the thesis about the allegedly "high efficiency" of the fire of the Second Squadron (supposedly "perfectly prepared" ZPR): while there was a distance - and optics were and accuracy. Only now it ended very quickly. Accordingly, comparisons (for example, by A. Kolobov) of the effectiveness of the fire of the First and Second Squadrons (on the basis of which a very bold conclusion is drawn about Rozhestvensky's "talents"), to put it mildly, are incorrect, due to the extreme poverty of the First Squadron for optical sights (including the fault of the head of the MGSH personally).

About high-explosive shells


Zinovy's lawyers write:

Thus, the 2nd Pacific squadron was sent into battle with high-explosive shells of the main caliber, which had almost 6 kilos of smokeless powder as an explosive!

As will be shown below, Rozhestvensky himself, as the head of the MGSH, bears responsibility for this personally and personally.

But maybe “he didn’t know”, because his other “lawyer”, V. Semenov, wrote about Tsushima about a different and sharply increased effect of the defeat of Japanese shells, which he had not previously observed?

Again we open the textbook for midshipmen of the Marine Corps in 1898:

... the destruction produced in the unprotected side and light armor is extremely great ... A projectile flying over the armor through the unprotected side will explode above the armored deck, it, thanks to the action of melinite gases, will produce terrible destruction in the armored deck ... the number of fragments flying in all directions at great speed, the effect of such a projectile against personnel is extremely strong ... In addition, an explosion develops an enormous amount of extremely choking gases, so that in an enclosed space those who avoid the fragments will most likely be suffocated by these gases ...
... The destructive effect of high-explosive bombs does not depend on the distance, but only on the amount of explosive contained in them ...



Once again, this is 1898 and a textbook for the Marine Corps midshipmen. Accordingly, when all sorts of "lawyers like V. Semenov" tell us that under Tsushima it was not like under Shatung, the price of such statements is appropriate ...

The death of Oslyabi?

It is worth recalling that heavy high-explosive shells hit its bow near the waterline (and armored deck) (this is to the question that it was better for him not to participate in the "throw" to the turning point of Togo), and once again - a shell that flew over the armor through unprotected side, will explode above the armored deck, it, thanks to the action of melinite gases, will produce terrible destruction in the armored deck.

At the same time, we managed to enter the war, not only lacking full-fledged high-explosive shells, but for the main anti-mine caliber (75 mm) they were not at all, only armor-piercing!
The only admiral who repeatedly raised questions about the need for special tests with the shooting of ships - S.O. Makarov.

And for all this (and the blockage of artillery preparation, and shells, and much more), the ZPR (as the head of the General Medical School) was personally and personally responsible.

But more about this in the next article.

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  1. The comment was deleted.
  2. Astra wild2
    Astra wild2 19 November 2021 05: 59
    +8
    Fate was pleased to appoint Rozhdestvensky: "the scapegoat."
    At first, the highest dignitaries of the empire were closed by Rozhdestvensky, and then it went according to tradition: Rozhdestvensky is to blame for everything. And he is a simple average: not a genius and not
    1. Alex_1973
      Alex_1973 19 November 2021 08: 09
      +16
      Who is to blame for Tsushima ?! Balmont said it best of all:

      Our king is Mukden, our king is Tsushima,
      Our king is a bloody stain
      The stench of gunpowder and smoke
      In which the mind is dark.

      Our king is blind misery
      Prison and whip, trial, execution,
      King of the gallows, twice as low
      What he promised, but did not dare to give.

      He is a coward, he feels with a hesitation,
      But it will be - the hour of reckoning awaits.
      Who began to reign - Khodynka,
      He will end - standing on the scaffold.

      And after him the culprits are countless, but the main culprits are theft, nepotism, mediocrity and spinelessness, well, treachery, where is it without him.
      1. Pilat2009
        Pilat2009 19 November 2021 10: 25
        +13
        Quote: Alex_1973
        Who is to blame for Tsushima ?! Balmont said it best of all:

        Our king is Mukden, our king is Tsushima,
        Our king is a bloody stain
        The stench of gunpowder and smoke
        In which the mind is dark.

        Our king is blind misery
        Prison and whip, trial, execution,
        King of the gallows, twice as low
        What he promised, but did not dare to give.

        He is a coward, he feels with a hesitation,
        But it will be - the hour of reckoning awaits.
        Who began to reign - Khodynka,
        He will end - standing on the scaffold.

        And after him the culprits are countless, but the main culprits are theft, nepotism, mediocrity and spinelessness, well, treachery, where is it without him.

        Excuse me, dear ones. But now there are no problems in the Navy? Judging by the periodically appearing articles, there are more problems than under the tsar.
        1. unknown
          unknown 21 November 2021 06: 45
          -5
          The problem is deeper.
          There is such a philosopher Dmitry Evgenievich Galkovsky.
          The man is still quite young, born in 1960.
          He is the author of the theory of Russia as a UK crypto-colony since 1917.
          The theory is efficient, but there is an even more painful version.
          According to this version, Russia became a UK crypto colony much earlier.
          After losing the so-called Crimean War.
          In the traditional version, Tsar Nicholas I died and was succeeded by his son Alexander II.
          And in the proposed version of the version, the ruler known as Nicholas the First, after losing the war, was eliminated, and a man known as Alexander II was put in his place. Moreover, these rulers were not relatives. The so-called Alexander II was a protégé of Great Britain, and it was from the moment of the beginning of his rule that Russia became a crypto-colony.
    2. Elturisto
      Elturisto 19 November 2021 13: 46
      .
      So it is so, but this cowardly monkey in epaulettes personally crippled the sailors, therefore any excuse for such degenerates is a crime. The author also forgot to mention the "great" Stepan, who Makarov, a supporter of armored ships, is another nugget of royal leaven. Sailors officers raised bayonets in 1917.
      1. Astra wild2
        Astra wild2 19 November 2021 15: 42
        +8
        Actually, Admiral Makarov is considered the last Russian naval commander.
        1. Elturisto
          Elturisto 19 November 2021 17: 25
          -9
          Save Christ from such naval commanders, you are poorly aware of his views, he really suggested building armless cruisers with large artillery instead of battleships. On the Varyag, Russian sailors washed their blood well from such ideas. Read the memoirs of the participants in the defense of Port Arthur ...
          1. Catfish
            Catfish 19 November 2021 18: 51
            +9
            What does Admiral Makarov have to do with the Varyag built in America?
            1. Elturisto
              Elturisto 19 November 2021 19: 33
              .
              The Varangian is a real practical embodiment of Makarov's views on the future of the fleet, which was actually tested in battle. Grandfather Styopa himself may not have had anything to do with the formation of a particular Varyag, which does not negate the fact that this cruiser is closest to Osipych's ideal ...
              1. Catfish
                Catfish 19 November 2021 19: 51
                +13
                You really like to pull the owl over the globe. laughing But in this case it will not work, "Varyag", with its weapons and armor, is a completely typical armored cruiser for any fleet of that time.
                1. Elturisto
                  Elturisto 19 November 2021 21: 33
                  .
                  there is no globe free already ... you seem to have poor reading comprehension, that's about such typical cruisers Makarov wanted to replace the battleships.
              2. 27091965
                27091965 19 November 2021 20: 20
                +7
                Quote: ElTuristo
                Varyag is a real practical embodiment of Makarov's views on the future of the fleet, which was actually tested in battle.

                Varyag had nothing to do with S.O. Makarov's views on what a cruiser should be, pay attention to its armament and compare with what S.O. Makarov proposed.
                1. The comment was deleted.
                  1. The comment was deleted.
                    1. Elturisto
                      Elturisto 19 November 2021 23: 36
                      .
                      Explains that? That armor is not needed? In 1895, there were already powerful high-explosive shells. Development of such shells was carried out simultaneously in several countries. The same applies to rapid-fire medium-caliber artillery. The indicated cruisers were laid down in 1901, no? How could he have something there? to rebuild in 1895? It's good that they didn't listen to Makarov.
                      1. rytik32
                        rytik32 19 November 2021 23: 41
                        +5
                        Quote: ElTuristo
                        In 1895 there were already powerful high-explosive shells

                        And who had such powerful high-explosive shells?
                      2. Elturisto
                        Elturisto 19 November 2021 23: 42
                        .
                        Grandfather is puffing, banned in Google?
                      3. rytik32
                        rytik32 19 November 2021 23: 50
                        +10
                        Why would I go to googol? Read posts there like you?
                        If in 1904 the Japanese had shimosa, and the British and French had liddite and melinitis not in all shells, for example, in 12-dm commons, both of them had black powder laughing
                      4. Elturisto
                        Elturisto 20 November 2021 10: 21
                        -7
                        Black powder was in semi-piercing shells, so that the fragments caused by black powder do not hit personnel without protection, maybe on the contrary heals?
                      5. unknown
                        unknown 21 November 2021 07: 04
                        -2
                        Shimoza from the Japanese?
                        The history of Japan is fake.
                        And Shimose himself is a mythical character.
                        The Japanese did not possess the technology for the production of projectiles with a caliber of more than 6 ".
                        In order to somehow legitimize the version of the Japanese miracle shells, such theories as the acquisition by the Japanese of finished shells of shells and their equipment in Japan with miracle explosives are born. This version, for example, is defended by "Comrade". I tend to trust more the version that is widespread on the vastness of the US Internet, and which was told by another constant participant in our discussions. According to this version, the Japanese had shells filled with liddite, but they were made in Sweden. An experimental batch, so to speak. It is not surprising that the British, as a result of this war, retained armor-piercing shells filled with black powder.
                      6. 27091965
                        27091965 20 November 2021 08: 58
                        +6
                        Quote: ElTuristo
                        Explains that, that no armor is needed?

                        Let's see what S.O. Makarov in his note on the shipbuilding program, November 11, 1902;

                        "My opinion is that it is necessary to build either low-side battleships, clad in heavy armor across the entire surface, or small combat ships, in which deck armor covers the car, boilers and ammunition supplies, and the artillery is on the upper deck, unprotected."

                        As we can see S.O. Makarov does not write that the armor is not needed.

                        Quote: ElTuristo
                        . The specified cruisers were laid down in 1901 - no? How could he rebuild something there in 1895?

                        Having familiarized yourself with his works before 1895, you can understand how his views were before the Sino-Japanese War and how they changed after this war and what reasons influenced this.

                        In 1895, there were already powerful high-explosive shells. Development of such shells was carried out simultaneously in several countries. The same applies to medium-caliber rapid-fire artillery.


                        In 1895, large-caliber artillery ammunition did not include high-explosive shells with a new, "powerful" explosive, since they were at the development stage. For rapid-fire artillery, according to the results of the Sino-Japanese War, in England, it was proposed to develop a "universal" semi-armor-piercing projectile. How it was developed and what kind of explosive was used for them you can read in the works of W. G Armstrong.
                      7. Elturisto
                        Elturisto 20 November 2021 10: 29
                        -9
                        Why all this worthless scribbling. To replenish the squadron of the Pacific Ocean, Makarov proposed to build ten cruisers of 3000 (I can be wrong) tons of armed 8-inch, artillery and deprived of protection. Chemulpo. Yes, someone out there, to save money, even abandoned the shields on the Varyag, but this is exactly what Makarov proposed for a number of years. What else is there to argue with?
                      8. 27091965
                        27091965 20 November 2021 11: 03
                        +5
                        Quote: ElTuristo
                        What is all this worthless scribbling. To replenish the squadron of the Pacific Ocean, Makarov proposed to build ten cruisers of 3000 (I can be wrong) tons, armed with 8-inch, artillery and deprived of protection.

                        Perhaps you have not completely read the document, I will insert a scan from the analysis of this work of his;

                        As we can see S.O. Makarov does not consider himself a "prophet", but offers to discuss this issue and make a decision.
                      9. Elturisto
                        Elturisto 20 November 2021 11: 57
                        .
                        You know how to read, he really pushed his idea of ​​armored courts, obviously criminal and stupid. Everything else does not matter. That's all, the end of the film ...
                      10. Very kind
                        Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 37
                        +1
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        As we can see S.O. Makarov does not consider himself a "prophet", but offers to discuss this issue and make a decision.

                        Moreover, he also raised the issue of special shelling of ships!
                        it is clear that after such, he would immediately forget about his "armless"
                      11. 27091965
                        27091965 22 November 2021 15: 03
                        +1
                        Quote: Very kind
                        Moreover, he also raised the issue of special shelling of ships!
                        it is clear that after such, he would immediately forget about his "armless"

                        Like any person, S.O. Makarov made mistakes that also had an indirect impact on the actions of the fleet in the Russo-Japanese War.
                      12. unknown
                        unknown 21 November 2021 06: 55
                        +1
                        An armored cruiser is not an armored ship.
                        Its part that is under water, primarily cars, boilers and cellars, are protected by an armored deck with bevels, the so-called carapace deck.
                        In the years preceding the Second World War, cruisers with elements of internal armor were built in many countries.
                        For example, British heavy cruisers were protected from internal elements: armored bulkheads of the turbine compartments and cellars.
                        Light English cruisers and almost all American cruisers, both light and heavy, had a similar internal protection of the cellars.
                        Two French heavy cruisers of the Suffren class (out of four) had internal armored bulkheads instead of an outer belt along the waterline.
                        With the protection of artillery, armored cruisers were worse.
                        But there are also exceptions. Bogatyr-class cruisers.
          2. vladcub
            vladcub 19 November 2021 21: 20
            +5
            Rozhdestvensky is bad, I almost agree, but S.O. Makarov is so bad? And who is good then, name the good admirals
            1. Elturisto
              Elturisto 19 November 2021 21: 41
              -5
              Once again, Rozhestvensky personally crippled two sailors, he almost agrees, but when will the full realization come? A good admiral could not appear in a country where beating sailors by cowardly degenerates was commonplace.
              1. vladcub
                vladcub 20 November 2021 09: 01
                0
                In this case: Ushakov, Nakhimov, Greig, Butakov, they are all rubbish.
                There are no good naval commanders from the Soviet admiral either.
                I do not remember a single successful naval operation in the Second World War.
                1. Elturisto
                  Elturisto 20 November 2021 10: 16
                  -7
                  Which of the named fought with the French or English fleet. As for the Soviet admirals, they have nothing to boast about, but they have one advantage - they did not beat the sailors.
            2. unknown
              unknown 21 November 2021 07: 05
              +1
              Makarov stupidly drowned the battleship.
              And he drowned himself.
              1. vladcub
                vladcub 21 November 2021 08: 49
                0
                Did he know that the Yapas had planted mines and wanted to jump over them? So it turns out
              2. Trapperxnumx
                Trapperxnumx 23 November 2021 12: 33
                -3
                Quote: ignoto
                Makarov stupidly drowned the battleship.

                And Togo stupidly drowned TWO battleships. True, he did not drown himself (unfortunately).
        2. RoTTor
          RoTTor 19 November 2021 20: 38
          +2
          S.O. Makarov is a remarkable researcher, innovator, theorist, naval commander, but not a naval commander.
          He simply did not have time, because he died without demonstrating the talents of a naval commander.
          In exactly the same way, the wonderful and indisputably deserved and beloved Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov cannot be considered a FLEET MANAGER, he did not lead the fleet into battle.
          1. Astra wild2
            Astra wild2 19 November 2021 20: 53
            +4
            I apologize for such a wording, but they told me about such expressions in history lesson. And for some reason I am proud that I studied at the SOVIET school. Perhaps Veniamin Markovich loved sonorous epithets, but the Order of the Red Banner of Labor and the "Honored Teacher" are talking about something
            Perhaps it was more appropriate to say: "Makarov could have become an excellent naval leader"
            P
            S
            My future father-in-law and I read Port Arthur and I remember how Makarov was assessed there.
          2. Elturisto
            Elturisto 19 November 2021 21: 45
            -9
            It was already written earlier. Makarov simply, because in the era of the appearance of powerful high-explosive projectiles, he proposed to abandon armor protection altogether. What does the rejection of armor protection lead to - he perfectly showed the battle of the Varyag by the Japanese.
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 19 November 2021 23: 19
              +6
              Quote: ElTuristo
              What does the rejection of armor protection lead to? The battle of the Varyag by the Japanese perfectly showed.

              You do not understand what you are writing about.

              Armored battleships are a ridiculous idea of ​​the Italians (by the way, implemented in the 19th century) and Makarov talked about armored scouts for whom speed and survivability are more important than endurance.

              By the way, none of today's "Destroyers" has armor either. Although this is a different story. laughing
              1. Elturisto
                Elturisto 19 November 2021 23: 43
                .
                Clearly, pass by then, success!
              2. Alexandra
                Alexandra 20 November 2021 01: 27
                +4
                Makarov, S.O. "Battleships or armored ships?" SPb .: Type. Marine Ministry, 1903. [2], 60 p., 7 p. silt (11 pictures)

                "... If the above provision that an armored ship of 9000 tons can break three ships of 3000 tons is true, then the prevailing opinion about the advantage of large ships is correct. behind the first, then the prevailing opinion is wrong ... "

                In 1903 S.O. Makarov strongly doubted that an armored cruiser with a displacement of 9000 tons would be able to defeat a detachment of three 3000 tons of armored cruisers in an artillery battle and tried to argue with the "prevailing opinion" on this issue.

                Yes, according to Makarov, for the above-mentioned 3000 t cruisers, 20 knots were enough.

                "Armorless vessel of 3000 t

                The armored vessel I offer differs from the Esmeralda in its elevated tank and lack of thin cover for 6-inch cannons.

                In order to show what kind of appearance this ship can be given, I drew up its drawings, and the junior assistant to the shipbuilder Baranovsky did the calculations. The drawing shows that the armored carapace deck covers the vehicle, boilers and battle cellars. Above this deck is another, upper one, which also runs the entire length of the ship, and the space between these decks serves for the crew. A raised forecastle is shown in the bow.

                Since in wartime the commander should be as close as possible to the bridge from where the ship is controlled, the commander's cabin is located under the forecastle. Below it are the officers' cabins, and behind these latter are the cabins of the conductors.

                The vessel is divided by 7 main bulkheads, has two bottoms and two sides in the middle. The space between the two sides is used for coal, provisions, etc., so that there are as many water-excluding items as possible above the carapace deck.

                The general dimensions of an armored vessel are as follows:

                Length between perpendiculars is 300 feet.

                Breadth overall - 42 feet 10 inches

                The ratio of width to length is 1 to 7.

                Maximum length 322 feet 10 inches.

                Ratio -1: 7 1/2,

                Penetration is normal at 18 feet.

                There are no deadwoods.

                The center of magnitude is 6,9 feet down from the load waterline. Metacenter from center of magnitude to the top at 8,9 feet.

                Coal holds 600 tons, of which 300 are in normal displacement.

                There are three boiler rooms, of which the middle one is occupied by Belleville boilers for ordinary operation, and the other two are occupied by boilers of higher steam capacity.

                Two 8 "guns and four 6" guns on the sides were placed so that they were just above the main transverse bulkheads. One 6-inch is delivered aft. Small guns are partly on the forecastle and partly on the upper deck. Mine vehicles are also installed on the upper deck. There are supposed to be six boats, of which one is a boat, one is a steam launch.

                The move is assumed to be 20 knots, which requires 10 indicator forces. "

                Do I need to tell what would have done with these armored cruisers S.O. Makarov in an artillery battle, say the cruiser Asama? In the best case for the Makarov cruisers, one would have drowned, and the rest fled.
                1. Elturisto
                  Elturisto 20 November 2021 10: 36
                  -6
                  Thanks to all this kagal of ignoramuses.
                2. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 20 November 2021 20: 43
                  +4
                  Quote: AlexanderA
                  Do I need to tell what would have done with these armored cruisers S.O. Makarov in an artillery battle, say the cruiser Asama?

                  I think it would hurt. If you haven't noticed, we are not talking about armored ships, but about armored decks. Of these, only Svetlana died in battle, and that was no luck. The commander drowned the Varyag himself, Askold calmly broke through Asama, Yakumo and two detachments of dogs. Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug fought for several hours with four detachments of dogs and nothing, they got out of the battle plucked but undefeated.
            2. unknown
              unknown 21 November 2021 07: 07
              0
              The battle of the Varyag only showed that Rudnev was not a combat commander either.
              As for the battle of an armored cruiser against an armored one, there is also an example of "Askold" in the Yellow Sea.
      2. Astra wild2
        Astra wild2 19 November 2021 21: 12
        +4
        "the officers' sailors raised their bayonets" Makarov was loved by the sailors.
        1. Elturisto
          Elturisto 19 November 2021 23: 44
          .
          Did Makarov love sailors?
      3. Seal
        Seal 20 November 2021 11: 51
        +3
        Quote: ElTuristo
        It is no coincidence that all the same sailors officers raised their bayonets in 1917.
        Maybe all the same "the sailor raised the officers with bayonets" in 1917 ??? This is the biggest shame on the Russian Navy and the army in general.
    3. Jura 27
      Jura 27 20 November 2021 03: 54
      0
      Total incompetence and incompetence of the top command personnel, from the ship commander (Rudnev) to the squadron commanders (Makarov, Vitgeft, ZPR).
      ZPR is an excellent deputy for the rear, but no combat commander. Hence, defeat after defeat in the RYAV.
      1. Seal
        Seal 20 November 2021 12: 12
        +1
        Quote: Jura 27
        Total incompetence and incompetence of the top command personnel, from the ship commander (Rudnev) to the squadron commanders (Makarov, Vitgeft, ZPR).
        ZPR is an excellent deputy for the rear, but no combat commander. Hence, defeat after defeat in the RYAV.
        So what ? Is this situation fundamentally different from the situation in the RKKF during the Great Patriotic War?
        1. Jura 27
          Jura 27 20 November 2021 16: 10
          -1
          [/ quote] So what? Is this situation something fundamentally different from the situation in the RKKF during the Great Patriotic War? [Quote]

          It differs fundamentally, in the Second World War the fleet could not have a decisive influence on the course of the war, so its sitting as quiet as a mouse behind a broom on the BM and the World Cup did not particularly affect operations on land. In RYAV, the fleet could decide the outcome of an entire war.
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 19 November 2021 06: 03
    +14
    Two eternal Russian questions: Who is to blame? and what to do? The perpetrators will be identified ... But what to do? Replay Tsushima? smile
    1. Crowe
      Crowe 19 November 2021 06: 38
      +10
      Oh, it would be nice .. It's a pity that "History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood" ...
    2. Very kind
      Very kind 19 November 2021 07: 45
      +8
      parusnik (Alexey Bogomazov) Today, 06:03 and what to do?

      CONCLUSIONS to do
      Especially considering the fact that we are now on the verge of a new war with Japan (will, will not - we'll see, but the fact that its probability is very non-zero is a fact).
      And ZPR he is not "one such", but quite typical for our Navy type
      1. Glory1974
        Glory1974 19 November 2021 10: 31
        +6
        And ZPR he is not "one such", but quite typical for our Navy type

        Unfortunately, not only for the navy, but also for the ground forces.
        The quality of the commanders is poor. Starting with the Minister of Defense Pasha Grachev (Pasha Mercedes), who threatened to take one regiment, and ending with the commanders of formations and units, dozens of them removed from command during the Chechen campaigns.
        For example, during the operation "Desert Storm" with the number of troops about 500 thousand people. removed from command, as not coping, 1 brigade commander of the US forces.
        This is the difference in the quality of the training of commanders.
        It is not difficult to imagine what we will have in case of the start of any hostilities, unfortunately the system does not change.
        1. strannik1985
          strannik1985 19 November 2021 12: 44
          +5
          Starting with the Minister of Defense

          Actually, at the time of the statement, he was right, Grachev is a thief, but not. The militants were consolidated by two unsuccessful assaults by local opposition forces with the support of the FSB.
          1. Glory1974
            Glory1974 22 November 2021 08: 27
            0
            at the time of the statement he was right

            The militants were consolidated by two unsuccessful assaults by local opposition forces with the support of the FSB.

            Don't you think that you are contradicting yourself? The Ministry of Defense was directly involved in the preparation of at least one assault. Equipment and weapons were transferred to the opposition, the operation plan was also developed with the participation of specialists. After nothing worked, Grachev begins another unsuccessful New Year's assault in the first campaign. What should you call it after that? Not that it didn't work the first time, only the third or fourth? Is this normal in your opinion?
        2. unknown
          unknown 21 November 2021 07: 11
          -2
          Before Desert Storm, the Americans bought up all the top leadership of the Iraqi armed forces.
      2. Elturisto
        Elturisto 19 November 2021 13: 48
        -2
        Rather, with China, which the Russian Federation has strenuously armed, supplies resources and helped to destroy our own industry.
    3. vladcub
      vladcub 19 November 2021 08: 51
      +8
      Lyosh, good morning. Of course, it would be ideal for Tsushima Peri to play or even erase her from history.
      But the story has a bad temper. She doesn't let you change anything
      1. unknown
        unknown 21 November 2021 07: 14
        -1
        Wrong.
        Our civilization is a civilization with an unpredictable past.
        The building of traditional history is crumbling before our eyes.
        This entire ancient world, the Tatar-Mongol yoke, even Napoleon with his wars ...
        1. vladcub
          vladcub 21 November 2021 08: 31
          0
          So we can change the past.?
          Tady 1) measure against S. (youthful love)
          2) to slip the fly agarics to the "Belovezhskaya troika" so that they can go there without delay.
    4. Doccor18
      Doccor18 19 November 2021 09: 43
      +11
      Quote: parusnik
      installed ... But what to do? Replay Tsushima?

      At least try to prevent a new one ... From Klimov's articles, at times, her reincarnation is quite clearly drawn ...
    5. Catfish
      Catfish 19 November 2021 18: 54
      +4
      Hi Aleksey! hi

      Tsushima was beaten more than once, though the Americans did it for us. But for Mukden, the Japanese paid off with the Kwantung Army, however, the values ​​are incomparable, Mukden is still not Tsushima.
      1. unknown
        unknown 21 November 2021 07: 30
        0
        Preventing Tsushima was actually very easy.
        It was only necessary to abandon the construction of a series of battleships of the "Borodino" type.
        They just missed the time while waiting for the blueprints.
        While the French project was being converted into a new one.
        So far, they were building ships that were too complex for the domestic shipbuilding.
        It was only necessary to continue the construction of the "Poltava" series.
        Not even modernized.
        Even in the version of "Sevastopol".
        In this case, construction would have been completed much earlier, and the ships arrived at the theater of operations even before the fall of Port Arthur.
        Claims about the low speed of the battleships of the "Poltava" type are just emotions.
        On acceptance trials, the slowest "Sevastopol" went for THREE hours at a speed of 16 knots, and for SEVEN hours at a speed of 15 knots. And "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" kept the speed of 16 knots for TWELVE hours.
        Back in 2004, in the "Marine Collection" application, S. A. Balakin wrote that the battleship "Fuji" ("Fuji") did not have a speed of more than 15 knots during the RYA years.
        And in 2006, in the first issue of the magazine "Marine Campaign", he, in co-authorship with Aleksandrov, wrote that the cruiser "Azuma" during the RYAV years could develop only 16 knots, and then for a very short time. Unfortunately, he tactfully did not indicate the number of minutes.
        The Japanese ships entered Tsushima with a huge fuel overload, which means that their real speed in battle did not exceed 14 knots.
        It turns out that neither we nor the Japanese went to RYAV for more than 15 knots.
        Of course, we are talking about battleships, ours and Japanese, and about the so-called Japanese "armored cruisers".
    6. RoTTor
      RoTTor 19 November 2021 20: 40
      +1
      What to do? - Everything so that this could never happen again.
  4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 November 2021 06: 20
    +7
    In vain :)))
    Okay, Maxim, I warned you
    1. Very kind
      Very kind 19 November 2021 07: 42
      -1
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk (Andrei) Today, 06: 20
      In vain :)))
      Okay, Maxim, I warned you

      "Kindergarten pants with straps".
      Isn't it funny yourself? Or SO got carried away with "Verb over the Baltic"?
      Written, yes, good. Only fantasy and alternatives should not be confused with reality.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 November 2021 09: 05
        +6
        Very funny. Therefore, as I told you in my personal correspondence, you will receive an answer: an article with an analysis of the "facts" which ... No, I cannot :))))
        Maxim, you definitely made my day, thank you. You are not that into facts, you could not be into arithmetic.
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 19 November 2021 23: 28
          -2
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Maxim, you definitely made my day, thank you. You are not that into facts, you could not be into arithmetic

          And this is written by a person in the description of the battle at Chemulpo, who seriously proposed to navigate and determine the distances by the "height of the islands" ... The abundance of lighthouses and navigational signs in the many scattered on the fairways of a large international port, attention is of course zero.

          "whose cow would bellow, and your (Andrey) would rather be silent!" (c) folk wisdom wassat
        2. unknown
          unknown 21 November 2021 07: 35
          -2
          Do you believe in facts and arithmetic?
          The work of S.A. Balakin about Japanese battleships came out back in 2004.
          Reprinted "Eksmo".
          Work on Asama-class cruisers appeared in 2006.
          And nothing has changed.
          What are the 18, 17 and 16 knots of the Japanese fleet?
          By the way, the works of S.A. Balakin have a list of sources used.
          Among them, and sources in Japanese.
        3. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 36
          -4
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Very funny.

          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          You definitely made my day,

          lol
          ... Russian ships demonstrated an unprecedented level of combat training for the Russian Imperial Navy ... Both squadrons, so to speak, started well, but the Japanese managed to suppress the fire potential of our best ships, but we did not, after which, in fact, the battle turned into a beating ... All the above would allow us to consider the Russian commander a brilliant naval commander ... if not for a number of mistakes that Zinovy ​​Petrovich made in the implementation of his, in every respect, an outstanding plan.

          In short - Oh, if not
      2. Charlie
        Charlie 19 November 2021 12: 36
        +1
        It is boringly written. IMHO
        1. RoTTor
          RoTTor 19 November 2021 20: 44
          -2
          Written in detail, reasonably, professionally.
          For the serious and thoughtful reader.
          Well these are not dubious, but brisk tales of BEZ about naval aviation.
    2. strannik1985
      strannik1985 19 November 2021 08: 21
      +2
      Truth is born in controversy!
    3. vladcub
      vladcub 19 November 2021 08: 53
      +6
      Andrey, good morning. Interesting work on the fleet ended without you
      1. Astra wild2
        Astra wild2 19 November 2021 15: 50
        +4
        Andrey from Chelyabinsk, I didn’t know anything about the land and the history of the Fleet and was proud of it, but thanks to you I learned something and there was an interest in learning more
      2. Very kind
        Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 33
        -3
        Quote: vladcub
        Andrey, good morning. Interesting work on the fleet ended without you

        lol
        truly - SECT lol
    4. Wildcat
      Wildcat 19 November 2021 18: 06
      +6
      hi
      Hallelujah!
      It will be SOMETHING.
      hi hi hi
      Maxim versus Andrey!
      fellow fellow fellow
      LADIES AND GENTHELMEN, YEARS READY!
      IIIITS TIME !!!


      We need to stock up on beer, and not only ...
      drinks drinks drinks
  5. 3x3zsave
    3x3zsave 19 November 2021 06: 33
    +14
    It seems to me alone that the style of the article is sustained in the "best" traditions of the forum holivar? In my opinion, not a single author in his publications has stooped to unflattering epithets to his opponents. Note, colleagues, this is an official publication, not "blah blah blah" on the forum. In real life, they beat the face for such words.
    The question remains open to the editors: why was this material not returned for revision?
    1. Very kind
      Very kind 19 November 2021 07: 46
      +1
      Quote: 3x3zsave
      to unflattering epithets addressed to their opponents

      are given data
      with quotes
      1. 3x3zsave
        3x3zsave 19 November 2021 07: 55
        +9
        Phrases: "sofa naval commanders", "creative researcher" ", as well as a mocking reference to the literary activity of Andrei Kolobov, do you consider facts?
        1. timokhin-aa
          19 November 2021 09: 05
          +4
          Maxim has no time, he asked to convey.

          MK:
          1. See the frankly offensive statements of A.K. in relation to Baer. Yes, in the articles.
          2. When the "creative researcher" from the "interference from the right" (and with a battering ram) proposes to "turn" to HER SIDE, the question of the "sofa" logically arises.
          3. Andrey's literary activity, by the way, is very good. The only question is not to transfer "alternatives and fantasy" "Verb ..." to REALITY
          1. 3x3zsave
            3x3zsave 19 November 2021 09: 57
            +4
            Hello, Alexander!
            I have not read that article by Andrey, but I assure you that my reaction to a similar style in an official publication would be exactly the same, despite all my respect for him. You can't stoop to the level of the tabloid press!
            1. Very kind
              Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 31
              -3
              Quote: 3x3zsave
              my reaction to a similar style in the official publication would be exactly the same

              I understand correctly that it will not make it difficult to lead you to this reaction?
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 November 2021 10: 09
            +7
            And you could answer Maxim that it was quite obvious from Oslyabi that the 1st detachment did not have time to reorganize long before the Oryol became a hindrance to the right. At least you could have figured it out? :)
            It was on Suvorov that the Eagle was poorly visible. And from Oslyabi, the dangerous approach and, then, the turning point of the head EBRs to the new course was perfectly visible.
            1. timokhin-aa
              19 November 2021 12: 01
              +5
              He reads and this comment will see
            2. rytik32
              rytik32 19 November 2021 17: 52
              +5
              Andrei, good afternoon!
              Between Oslyabya and Orel there were 6-7 cabins. (see Ovander's memoirs).
              And Oslyabya was rebuilt only because there was an order to enter the wake of the 1st detachment.
              And they say that Pokhvistnev advised Baer to send Rozhestvensky's order further and act on the basis of how it is more profitable to fight.
              1. Nekarmadlen
                Nekarmadlen 20 November 2021 21: 15
                0
                And they say that Pokhvistnev advised Baer to send Rozhestvensky's order further and act on the basis of how it is more profitable to fight.
                Good day ! Could you tell us in more detail what other options Baer had ..?
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 20 November 2021 21: 35
                  +1
                  In order not to go to the alternative, I will post this fragment. Source - memoirs of Bachurikhin (conductor, senior battalion "Oslyabi").
                  Pokhvistnev advised Baer to get closer to the Japanese.
                  1. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 20 November 2021 22: 33
                    +3
                    Dear colleague, I beg your pardon, but who should have given the "full 20 knot stroke"?
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 20 November 2021 23: 00
                      +1
                      Ask Bachurikhin)))
                      Apparently he meant Oslyabyu.
                      1. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 20 November 2021 23: 18
                        +3
                        In other words, the witness, when testifying, was carrying enchanting nonsense request
                      2. rytik32
                        rytik32 20 November 2021 23: 24
                        +1
                        He is not alone. So be calm ...
                        Moreover, he is just a conductor. And you ask him as an officer.
                        Here's another example of an enchanting nonsense about speed performed by a vice admiral:
                        On May 14, the new battleships of the squadron could develop up to 13½ knots, and others from 11½ to 12½. The cruiser "Oleg", with a cylinder damaged in Kronstadt, tightened by a clip, could go 18 knots out of need, with alarm, however, for the intactness of the car. The cruisers "Svetlana", "Aurora", "Ural" and "Almaz" could also have an 18-knot speed, and "Almaz", as always, would risk the integrity of its steam pipes. The cruisers Zhemchug and Izumrud could make short transitions of 20 knots at a huge oil consumption. The cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh had a top speed of 13 knots. The slowest transports "Irtysh" and "Kamchatka" reported their inability to keep the speed of more than 10 knots, but these reports were not justified by the research of the flagship mechanics
                      3. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 20 November 2021 23: 33
                        +3
                        Quote: rytik32
                        So be calm ...

                        I’m just calm :))) And I don’t ask anything from the conductor. Simply, if a witness speaks nonsense about his testimony, then the rest of him should be questioned.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Here is another example

                        And what does not suit you here?
                      4. rytik32
                        rytik32 20 November 2021 23: 53
                        +3
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Simply, if a witness speaks nonsense about his testimony, then the rest of him should be questioned.

                        First, these are memories, not testimonies.
                        Second, the logic is completely wrong. It is necessary to prove that it is a certain part of the testimony that is not true, and not to find any in the slightest inconsistency in the testimony and, on this basis, declare them completely doubtful.

                        And what does not suit you here?

                        1.
                        new battleships of the squadron could develop up to 13½ knots

                        At least 15 knots. Even in circulars it appears.
                        2.
                        and others from 11½ to 12½
                        12 knots - maximum squadron speed 2TOE according to circulars. The order "to develop a full speed" or "have pairs for a full speed" for the squadron meant exactly 12 knots. And similar orders were issued right up to Tsushima.
                        3.
                        The cruisers "Pearl" and "Izumrud" could make short transitions of 20 knots at a huge oil consumption
                        The emerald actually gave 22 knots. Measured by lag.
                        4.
                        The cruisers "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Vladimir Monomakh" had a top speed of 13 knots
                        According to the testimony of Donskoy, he actually developed 13-14 knots.
                        Yes, and Kamimura writes that he could not keep up with the Russian cruisers in the last phase of the battle. And he walked at least 15 knots.
                      5. unknown
                        unknown 21 November 2021 08: 19
                        0
                        Kamimura could not walk 15 knots.
                        Cruisers of the "Asama" type had over-lightened power plants that did not correspond to the class of ships.
                        In real life, the fastest, four English buildings, could go for a long time at 17 knots.
                        "Yakumo", of German construction, with great difficulty kept on 17 knots.
                        Therefore, in the Yellow Sea he acted separately from the "dogs".
                        This means that for a long time - 16 knots.
                        But, everyone surpassed, more precisely, did not spit, "Azuma".
                        The French distinguished themselves. 16 knots, and for a very short time.
                        This means that for a long time -15 knots.
                        A significant overload in fuel, which was taken by all the Japanese ships of the line, increased the displacement, increased the draft, and reduced speed. The real speed of the detachment is 14 knots.
                        The rest is emotion and falsification.
                        Do not believe that such a thing is possible in history. In vain.
                        For example, the biography of the Queen of England is rewritten every year, because, without beating, you have to edit.
                        The Chinese have found pyramids with mummies at their place, but no one is allowed in.
                        Knowledgeable people claim that it is too early, the mummies have not dried up ...
                      6. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 21 November 2021 11: 43
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        First, these are memories, not testimonies.

                        In this case, it makes no difference.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Second, the logic is completely wrong. It is necessary to prove that it is a certain part of the testimony that is not correct

                        You see, if a person, in part of his testimony, speaks in all seriousness about green devils, it is a little strange to look for a grain of truth in his other words :)))
                        Quote: rytik32
                        At least 15 knots.

                        Yeah. Subject to a number of conditions. Good coal, a fresh change of stokers, or even a gun servant sent to their aid.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        12 knots - maximum squadron speed

                        Here I agree. And although I don't think that it would be a panacea, but what the hell is not kidding, maybe the next projectile into the bridge, without even exploding, would have carried Heihachiro Ijuinovich to all the Japanese demons ...
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The emerald actually gave 22 knots. Measured by lag.

                        For a very short time.
                      7. rytik32
                        rytik32 21 November 2021 12: 22
                        +1
                        You see, if a person, in part of his testimony, speaks in all seriousness about green devils, it is a little strange to look for a grain of truth in his other words :)))

                        These are clearly not green devils. The senior battalier could be mistaken in the real maximum speed of the Oslyabi, or simply forget from time to time.
                        I agree here.

                        I looked specifically. The last time in the circular of April 27, 12-knot speed was mentioned for the 1st and 2nd detachments.
                        Yeah. Subject to a number of conditions.

                        Well, obviously they could hold more than 13,5 knots. The old men walked 13-14 knots at night. And nobody's car broke down, the pipes did not burst.
                        Only those who had damage and flooding in the bow (Ushakov, Sisoy, etc.) lagged behind.
                      8. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 21 November 2021 13: 18
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Well, obviously they could hold more than 13,5 knots. The old men walked 13-14 knots at night. And nobody's car broke down, the pipes did not burst.
                        Only those who had damage and flooding in the bow (Ushakov, Sisoy, etc.) lagged behind.

                        It is interesting what the documents from jacar say about this, because reports from the Japanese destroyers should have been.

                        And another question, how did you measure the speed of 14 knots on the Izumrud, which got into the logbook and the telegram?
                      9. rytik32
                        rytik32 21 November 2021 15: 00
                        +1
                        Quote: Maxim G
                        It is interesting what the documents from jacar say about this, because reports from the Japanese destroyers should have been.

                        Do not read
                        And another question, how did you measure the speed of 14 knots on the Izumrud, which got into the logbook and the telegram?

                        It is not written in the high school. Most likely by the speed of the car.
                        In Ozerov's book there is a mention that Nikolai had an order to keep 13 knots, which Sisoy could not fulfill and fell behind.
                      10. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 21 November 2021 15: 59
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The senior battalier could be mistaken in the real maximum speed of the Oslyabi, or simply forget from time to time.

                        Bathaler's position is ... only to teach admirals :)))
                        And you know what else, the conductor of that time most of all corresponds to the modern midshipman. I saw enough of this fraternity on the urgent one, there through one "strategist". No.
                        But let's say you (more precisely Bachurikhin) are right and the testimony of the battalion of truth and irrevocable, and therefore Kosinsky is a bastard, and Lieven is a darling. Ok I agree.
                        What does this episode say if your version of the event is correct? That at the only moment when it was necessary to act and accept responsibility, Baer simply dulled, and therefore the hopes that Vladimir Iosifovich, officially becoming the head of the detachment, could correct the situation are absolutely groundless?
                        Timokhin wrote that Klimov switched to the personality of our mutual friend Andrey from Ch, because he did not speak flatteringly about Baer ...
                        Well, yes, the author of the post poured bile on the wrong person, on the wrong one ... yes
                        Quote: rytik32
                        mentioned 12-node

                        I remember. And, by the way, Kolobov wrote about this, so ...
                      11. rytik32
                        rytik32 21 November 2021 16: 08
                        0
                        That at the only moment when it was necessary to act and accept responsibility, Baer simply dulled, and therefore the hopes that Vladimir Iosifovich, officially becoming the head of the detachment, could correct the situation are absolutely groundless?

                        This is empty talk.
                        To begin with, Bachurikhin himself was not in the wheelhouse and could not hear this conversation. And Osipov could retell it. He is the only survivor who was definitely in the wheelhouse at that moment. There could, of course, still be all sorts of messengers and other sailors ...
                        Baer just blunt

                        Baer followed the order.
                        It’s not for me to explain to you what will become of the fleet or the army if orders are no longer obeyed.
                      12. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 21 November 2021 16: 59
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        To begin with, Bachurikhin himself was not in the wheelhouse and could not hear this conversation. And retell ...

                        Or Bachurikhin invented all this from beginning to end, as another battalier often did (or in good faith conveyed other people's inventions), and Pokhvisnev, in fact, did not offer anything of the kind, since he was a military man and
                        Quote: rytik32
                        carried out the order.

                        How do you like this version?
                        In my opinion, it is in every way more believable than the "Oslyabya", which accelerated to 20 knots (or is it about the whole detachment?)
                      13. rytik32
                        rytik32 21 November 2021 18: 02
                        0
                        I do not know if it was in fact or was invented by Bachurikhin or someone else, but in their memoirs, many write that it was the execution of this order that destroyed the ship.
                        The ship closest to the Japanese became an almost stationary target ...
                        Even a battalion could understand this!
                      14. Very kind
                        Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 27
                        -1
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Baer just blunt

                        Have you ever parted at sea?
                        I'm not talking about dangerous targets
                      15. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 22 November 2021 14: 00
                        +1
                        Maxim (did I understand correctly?) Is a continuation of a long-standing dispute that has very little to do with this topic.
                        Many colleagues, including my esteemed opponent, are firmly convinced that if Baer had officially become the head of the detachment, then it would be ... wheelhouse.
                        So what is the question, so is the answer. This locomotive would not have taken off anyway.
                        Have you ever parted at sea?
                        I'm not talking about dangerous targets

                        No.
                        But from my point of view, there was simply no good solution in this situation. And all this talk
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Pokhvistnev advised Baer to get closer to the Japanese.

                        about nothing.

                        By the way, another colleague, a little lower goes bankrupt, they say, ZPR crippled the sailors to the right and left, although this, as they say, is far from a fact. But Vladimir Iosifovich certainly abused assault and was even convicted of this by a naval court.
                        So, a touch to the portrait.
                      16. Very kind
                        Very kind 22 November 2021 15: 15
                        -2
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        So what is the question, so is the answer. This locomotive would not have taken off anyway.

                        yes damn - these DETAILS do not make much sense - against the background of the SPEED issue
                        stupidly "add gas" solved all the issues
                        ... except for one thing - the need to maneuver by separate units (including high-speed ones)
                        and here it is worth remembering that with direct participation (or rather, with the submission of the ZPR), 2TE had only "one bear in the den"
                      17. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 22 November 2021 15: 45
                        +2
                        Quote: Very kind
                        stupidly "add gas" solved all the issues

                        yes rather than?
                        The fact that the Japanese squadron speed is still higher, as I understand it, is not an argument?
                      18. Very kind
                        Very kind 23 November 2021 11: 19
                        -3
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        yes rather than?
                        The fact that the Japanese squadron speed is still higher, as I understand it, is not an argument?

                        no
                        specifically in the outset of the battle, it only decided how many and which of the Japs would have time to escape
                      19. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 22 November 2021 15: 55
                        +2
                        Quote: Very kind
                        add gas "

                        Or I didn’t understand you, and you mean that the first squad was supposed to "add gas"?
                      20. Very kind
                        Very kind 23 November 2021 11: 18
                        -1
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Or I didn’t understand you, and you mean that the first squad was supposed to "add gas"?

                        Yes
                        well, the rest - to the maximum (transport - definitely not to drag)
                      21. rytik32
                        rytik32 21 November 2021 00: 26
                        +2
                        PS I leafed through the circulars. I just found where it says about the 15-node move.
                        No. 66 of January 21, 1905. Just there about the maneuver of turning the battleships suddenly at 8R to the enemy and attacking him with the front line.
                      22. unknown
                        unknown 21 November 2021 09: 12
                        +2
                        And once again about the speed.
                        Not about ships, but a related topic.
                        About emotions and falsification.
                        Probably, due to your age, you did not have to read the "Wings of the Motherland" magazine of the 70s. But I had to. Reading, I must say, is entertaining, especially in comparison with modern materials.
                        "Wings of the Motherland" 1974-1976. Series "Aircraft of the Second World War".
                        Well, Soviet pilots cannot fight on airplanes, first of all, fighters, which are inferior in speed to the German ones.
                        We work in two directions: we underestimate the speed of German cars, and increase the speed of Soviet ones (moreover, in a very simple way: we pass the speed of the reference cars as the speed of serial ones).
                        Result: the speed of the Me-109G2 is 600 km / h, the speed of the FV-190A4 is 610 km / h.
                        I cite the data without relative flight altitude, that's not the point.
                        You can't do much with Yaks, you can draw the Yak-3 at 660 km / h instead of 640, and the Yak-9U - 700 km / h instead of 668 km / h. Mig-3 to throw a dozen kilometers.
                        But, with the "shopkeepers" we will come off.
                        Result: La-5 - 613 km / h, La-5FN - 648 km / h, La-7 - 680 km / h (in the memoirs of the Three Times Hero of the Soviet Union Kozhedub there is a mention of 700 km / h. maybe proofreading, censorship).
                        Several decades have passed, and in the same "Wings of the Motherland" other information appears, real.
                        Me-109 G2 -650 km / h (German data, we dispersed such a trophy to 666 km / h).
                        ФВ-190А4 - 654 km / h (German data, the British dispersed the trophy to 668 km / h).
                        And the "lavochkin" - swam.
                        La-5 - 580 km / h, La-5F - 600 km / h. La-5FN - from 610 to 634 km / h, La-7 from 630 to 656 km / h. Real speeds of real production cars.
                        Similar information appeared in the "Aviation Collection" application, and Eksmo has published several books on this topic.
                        What changed ?
                        Emotions gave way to facts.
                        Will I wait for this in the Russo-Japanese War?
                        First of all, a real analysis of the technical data of the ships.
                        Or, are we still fighting "accursed tsarism"?
                      23. Jura 27
                        Jura 27 21 November 2021 15: 27
                        -1
                        [/ quote] Will I wait for this in the Russo-Japanese war? [Quote]

                        Everything has been published on Tsushima for a long time. The speed of the first squad is slightly above 14 knots. 15 knots went quite well when it was necessary.
                      24. unknown
                        unknown 28 November 2021 06: 58
                        +1
                        Are you talking about the Japanese first squad?
                        How the Japanese could go 15 knots if the maximum speed of "Fuji" ("Fuji") did not exceed 15 knots. Unfortunately, Balakin did not indicate in what displacement, which is a pity. The Japanese entered the Tsushima battle with a very large fuel overload. Such calculations, for example, in relation to "Mikasa" were made back in 2013. The overload of the Japanese flagship upon leaving the base was approximately 2193 tons. It is clear that Fuji could not accept such an amount, but all ships were overloaded, up to the destroyers. For ships of all countries, the same laws of physics apply: we increase the load - the displacement increases, the displacement increases - the draft increases, the displacement and draft increases - the speed decreases. If the ship went 15 knots before the overload, then, having accepted a very solid overload, it cannot go 15 knots.
                        What the Japanese wrote there, there are two nuances here. Firstly, I would not dismiss the version of falsification, and secondly, the speed was probably correlated with the revolutions, and with different displacement, the same revolutions will give different speeds.
                      25. Jura 27
                        Jura 27 28 November 2021 07: 51
                        0
                        [/ quote] How the Japanese could go 15 knots, if the maximum speed of "Fuji" ("Fuji") did not exceed 15 knots. [quote]

                        So they went 15 knots (1BO). Part of the coal overload was eliminated by throwing it overboard, + coal was spent on the non-economic course from Mozampo to the battlefield.
                      26. Very kind
                        Very kind 24 November 2021 13: 17
                        -3
                        Quote: rytik32
                        PS I leafed through the circulars. I just found where it says about the 15-node move.
                        No. 66 of January 21, 1905. Just there about the maneuver of turning the battleships suddenly at 8R to the enemy and attacking him with the front line.

                        Lay out, pliz.
                        No time to search
                      27. unknown
                        unknown 21 November 2021 08: 09
                        0
                        Eyewitness testimony is emotion.
                        Traditional history, written by the humanities, began to fall apart when techies began to test the events outlined in it.
                        Physics, mathematics against emotions.
                        If during the years of the RJV the battleship "Fuji" ("Fuji") could not develop more than 15 knots, and entered Tsushima with heavily overloaded fuel, then what is the speed of the Japanese first detachment of 16, let alone 17 and 18 knots?
                        And 15 knots are a very big question. Really 14 knots.
                        The squad of "underdogs" of Kamimura had a similar speed.
                        And wherever you look, whatever you read, everywhere about the "flying squadron" and "the world's best armored" cruisers "and" first-class Japanese battleships ".
                        These funny people, humanities ...
                      28. unknown
                        unknown 21 November 2021 08: 00
                        0
                        The Japanese could not go more than 14 knots in Tsushima.
                        Both "Fuji" and "Azuma" could not go for more than 15 knots in RYAF for a long time.
                        Plus a huge fuel overload, about which Andrei Kolobov, better known to us as Andrei from Chelyabinsk, has written repeatedly.
                        Or the laws of physics did not apply to the Japanese ships of the RYAV?
                        Strange, but the ships of all countries of WWII and WWII, even Japanese ones, were operated.

                        Before the battle, Russian ships simply had to be unloaded, from excess supplies that were needed on the campaign, but not in battle. And there were hundreds of tons of them.
                        Even part of the construction overload of battleships of the "Borodino" type, about 135 tons, could be disposed of. Clean the bottom from fouling, especially since it was insignificant, in the area of ​​the waterline. Remove floating craft.
                        Move everything to auxiliary ships and send them around Japan.
                        Objections that they will be intercepted, drowned or captured are not accepted.
                        In the traditional version, they went along with the warships and were intercepted, drowned, captured.

                        Andrew likes to refer to the teachings of the British fleet, which allegedly showed that superiority in two knots gives an indisputable advantage.
                        I, too, have repeatedly cited the example of the Great Maneuvers of the French fleet in 1910.
                        Two squads of battleships.
                        The first, high-speed, of the newest, such as "Patry".
                        The second, slow-moving, from the old types of battleships.
                        The speed of the first squad is -17 knots (which the Japanese did not even dream of in Tsushima).
                        The speed of the second detachment is -13,6 knots (Carnot slowed down).
                        The difference in travel speed was perfectly leveled by maneuvering.
                        Based on the result of the maneuvers, the French came to the conclusion that for a real advantage, a difference of at least SIX knots is needed.
                        PS "Oleg" (with a strapped cylinder) could walk at a speed of 20 bonds for SIX hours.
                        Khromov writes about this in the issue of the "Marine Collection" dedicated to this ship.
            3. unknown
              unknown 21 November 2021 07: 40
              0
              And Rozhestvensky was preparing for battle in general?
              Why then did he flop across the strait in a marching formation?
              Or he wanted to sneak quietly at night, for which the ships had black hulls.
              And only, as Galenin writes, in fact, deliberately sabotage actions of Nebogatov's ships, first of all, "Senyavin" were forced to postpone the passage through the strait for a day?
            4. Very kind
              Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 29
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              And you could answer Maxim that it was quite obvious from Oslyabi that the 1st detachment did not have time to reorganize long before the Oryol became a hindrance to the right. At least you could have figured it out? :)
              It was on Suvorov that the Eagle was poorly visible. And from Oslyabi, the dangerous approach and, then, the turning point of the head EBRs to the new course was perfectly visible.

              I've already written everything. In the text of the article
              SPEED!!!!
              And unlike ... the experience of divergence with targets at sea (including dangerous and in cramped conditions at extremely short distances) I have
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 November 2021 13: 46
                +1
                Half an hour, Maxim. The rebuilding maneuver lasted for half an hour. And all these half an hour Baer had the opportunity to observe his results. Predict the consequences and take action.
                You have brought it all to the end of the maneuver. Moreover, they ignored my proposal to reduce the course without a coordinate. I understand that it's easier for you to oppose, but
                1. Very kind
                  Very kind 22 November 2021 15: 18
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Moreover, they ignored my proposal to reduce the course without a coordinate

                  ahem ... if only it were softer ...
                  hoped that it would not come to stopping the course
                  There was no radar for quick determination of the efficiency factor then
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 November 2021 08: 44
                    +1
                    Maxim, we have an admiral who overlooked that the fourth ship in his ranks will not have a place to stand in front of Oslyabey. And the admiral, in your opinion, is managing the squadron neurasthenically.
                    And there is the commander Oslyabi, whose meeeedleeeenoooooo is being cut - the difference in speed is 2,5 from the strength of the knot, as much as 4,6 km per hour, who can see both Borodino and Oryol much better, because he is closer to them. But he, in your opinion, cannot figure it out without a radar station.
                    Don't you find this approach a bit biased?
                2. rytik32
                  rytik32 22 November 2021 16: 09
                  +1
                  Not half an hour. 10 minutes maximum.
                  Rozhestvensky gave the command to the 1st detachment to suddenly turn 8 points to the left, when Togo turned to the west, i.e. about 13:40.
                  Moreover, "Suvorov" began the turn first, contrary to the rules, so it turned out not a front, but a bearing.
                  And when Togo started the loop, Rozhdestvensky gave the command to the 1st detachment to suddenly turn 8 points to the right, i.e. at about 13:47.
                  Turning, he gave the command to the 2nd detachment to enter the wake ...
                  "Oslyabya" had already started the fight at that moment.

                  And you are now retelling lies from Rozhdestvensky.
                  1. Maxim G
                    Maxim G 22 November 2021 17: 25
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    And you are now retelling lies from Rozhdestvensky.




                    For the thousandth time already. Until the SSI is translated into Russian, this historical Tsushima will continue with walking in a circle.
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 22 November 2021 18: 40
                      +3
                      Quote: Maxim G
                      Until the SSI is translated into Russian, this historical Tsushima will continue with walking in a circle.

                      I assure you, even when they are transferred, the howl "the Japanese are lying!" laughing
                      In the database "Mikasa" it is written that at 14:07 "Oslyabya" - the nearest ship - was the first to start the battle.
                      In the database "Fuji" it is written that at 14:19 "Oslyabya" entered the wake of the 1st detachment.
                      In the database "Sisiksim" at 14:20 there is a record about the formation of a single column by the Russian fleet.
                      All this puts a bold cross on Rozhdestvensky's tales set forth in the testimony and articles.
                      1. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 22 November 2021 19: 50
                        +2
                        Rozhdestvensky's fan club cannot be persuaded, and it is not necessary - they are akin to a pagan cult, but for those who are interested in the Russian-Japanese war, this source is necessary. Alas, as far as I understand from the Japanese scholars, no one writes about the fleet during this war now.

                        And Polutov A.V. will not write anything.
                      2. rytik32
                        rytik32 22 November 2021 20: 00
                        +3
                        We have got one or two Japaneseists.
                        Polutov died.
                        Sidorenko and Pinak are busy with others.
                      3. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 22 November 2021 20: 10
                        +1
                        Yes. They write about aircraft carriers and destroyers of the WWII period.
                        There is also Alexander Zorikhin (LJ PALESTINETS1977), but he does not write about the fleet.

                        And I think that hardly anyone can provide such a serious approach as Polutov had.
                      4. unknown
                        unknown 28 November 2021 07: 04
                        0
                        In the works of Balakin, the list of sources indicates Japanese publications that have not been translated. Balakin, in general, is very fond of writing about the Japanese fleet. For example, in the collection about the cruisers of the Second World War, articles about Japanese cruisers by him.
                        I would not rule out that he speaks Japanese.
                        Or has the ability to use high-quality translation.
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 November 2021 07: 35
                        0
                        Only in your fantasies
                  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 November 2021 07: 34
                    0
                    The official history disagrees with you. She has the audacity to assert that Rozhdestvensky turned 4 rumba to the left immediately at the beginning of the changeover maneuver at 13.20
                    Whose lies are you retelling this time?
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 23 November 2021 08: 58
                      +1
                      Reread the logbooks.
                      You will not find a 4 rumba turn to the left in any of them.
                      But a turn by 8 points is suddenly spelled out in black and white in the Emerald's High Journal. And even the signal itself is recorded.

                      Therefore, to you once again the question: where does the invention of 4 rumba to the left come from?
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 November 2021 09: 32
                        +1
                        A 4 rumba turn is required to be mentioned only in the logbooks of the ships performing it.
                        Naturally, it will not be in the magazines available to you. A turn by 8 points or 90 degrees is geometric delirium, since in the 10 minutes you specified with such a turn, Suvorov would have walked across the second column as much as almost 2 cables. ? wassat Osslyabya during this time at 9 knots 15 cables would have passed, that is, in your opinion, Suvorov overtook him by more than 13.40 miles at 2:XNUMX?
                        In general .... You, as I understand it, finally leaned your elbows on reality.
                      2. rytik32
                        rytik32 23 November 2021 09: 48
                        +1
                        High School of Anadyr.
                        1:40 Our battleships went first to the left to come to the wake of the 2nd and 3rd detachments. Then Suvorov began to turn to the right. The rest began to consistently enter the wake.
                        1:43 1BO opened fire ...

                        ... this is to the question when 1BO performed a turn and whether there was half an hour time at Baer's laughing
                      3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 November 2021 11: 34
                        +1
                        This is the question of your perception of reality. In Anadyr, the 1st detachment rebuilt in less than 3 minutes .... Did you at least understand what you quoted?
                      4. rytik32
                        rytik32 23 November 2021 12: 22
                        +1
                        Understood perfectly!
                        Do not keep the officers of the watch who filled out the VZ for idiots.
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 November 2021 13: 51
                        +1
                        I don’t hold them for anyone or anything. My claims are solely to your interpretations of the residence permit
                        And YES, you don’t understand anything. You are here on a blue eye, with the look of a Connoisseur, treat me that the 1BO rebuilding maneuver began when this was mentioned in the High Journal. And then bring the VZh in which from the beginning of the maneuver to the opening of no fire for 3 minutes :)))
                      6. rytik32
                        rytik32 23 November 2021 10: 00
                        +1
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Naturally, it will not be in the magazines available to you.

                        But there is a turn by 8 points in the Emerald VZ and on numerous schemes.
                        And from the cruisers they saw how 1BO made a co-ordinate, i.e. rebuilding with two consecutive turns suddenly, and recorded in the high school.
                        since in the 10 minutes you specified

                        I actually wrote for 7 minutes.
                        In your opinion, was it 2 miles between the 2 columns?

                        About 17 cab.
                        that is, in your opinion, Suvorov overtook him by more than 13.40 miles at 2:XNUMX

                        Why not overtake it at 11 knots!
                      7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 November 2021 11: 35
                        +1
                        The detachment could describe the recommended coordinates at the end of the maneuver, but it could not start with it :)
        2. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 32
          0
          Quote: 3x3zsave
          a mocking reference to the literary activity of Andrei Kolobov

          fool
          where is the "mocking reference" here?
          "The verb over the Baltic" is very, very good.
          But as an "alternative-fantasy".
          But when they begin to drag him to the place of real history, then wassat
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 22 November 2021 13: 52
            +1
            Glad that you liked the Verb, thank you!
    2. 27091965
      27091965 19 November 2021 08: 34
      +7
      Quote: 3x3zsave
      In my opinion, not a single author in his publications has stooped to unflattering epithets to his opponents.

      Dear Anton. I do not think that the article can be attributed to "insults", the author presented his view on the basis of articles by respected authors A. Kolobov, R. Ivanov, A. Rytik, this is his opinion. I also do not always agree with some of the views of the above authors, although I read what they wrote with great interest. But our opinions are based on the material to which we have access and on this basis we draw our conclusions. I think that this can be attributed to constructive criticism.
      1. 3x3zsave
        3x3zsave 19 November 2021 08: 45
        +1
        Dear Colleague! (Unfortunately the mobile version does not reflect names)
        I have nothing against constructive criticism. I expressed my opinion on the style of the material, which is personally unpleasant to me and runs counter to my understanding of professional journalistic ethics
        1. 27091965
          27091965 19 November 2021 08: 53
          +4
          Quote: 3x3zsave
          I have nothing against constructive criticism. I expressed my opinion on the style of the material, which is personally unpleasant to me and runs counter to my understanding of professional journalistic ethics


          With these I agree with you, but not all are professional journalists, moreover, I hope that the esteemed authors will write their comments to the article.
        2. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 24
          -2
          Quote: 3x3zsave
          I have nothing against constructive criticism.

          noticeably ...
          how the sun blazed - from FACTS
          1. 27091965
            27091965 22 November 2021 15: 09
            +2
            Quote: Very kind
            noticeably ...
            how the sun blazed - from FACTS

            I am not a "fan" of Z. P. Rozhestvensky, in my opinion he bears responsibility for the defeat, but people will always have different views on his activities, negative ones will prevail.
        3. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 25
          -2
          Quote: 3x3zsave
          and runs counter to my understanding of professional journalistic ethics

          apparently the assaults of A.K. (and the illiterate) on the same Baer are not included in it
    3. vladcub
      vladcub 19 November 2021 08: 43
      +2
      "not returned for revision" so for good the whole article needs to be redone, and it takes time.
      1. 3x3zsave
        3x3zsave 19 November 2021 08: 52
        +3
        Hello, Glory!
        That is, do you think that the author has time to write a critical article in a libelous tone, but not to bring it in line with the rules of elementary politeness?
        1. vladcub
          vladcub 19 November 2021 14: 18
          +1
          I agree with you in some ways, but take the position of moderators: the work is, of course, damp, but it will not work out completely "on the knee", and the "hole" must be closed with something ..
          .Would you like to see "raw" works on the site for the first time?
          1. 3x3zsave
            3x3zsave 19 November 2021 14: 46
            +3
            The moderators are responsible for the forum, the editors are responsible for the materials.
            1. vladcub
              vladcub 19 November 2021 15: 15
              +1
              One fig question is not for us
            2. Undecim
              Undecim 19 November 2021 19: 38
              +8
              The moderators are responsible for the forum, the editors are responsible for the materials.

              It is not the responsibility of the site editors to assess authors' compliance with the ethical and legal norms of publications, as recommended by the International Publication Ethics Committee.
        2. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 24
          -1
          Quote: 3x3zsave
          libelous article

          monsieur, libelous tonality is
          So in this situation, any sane commander of the "Oslyabi" would smoothly reduce the speed in advance, perhaps - he would have made the coordinate to the right, but would have let the "Eagle" go ahead, would have avoided both a collision and a stop of the battleship. Rem proudly lane forward to the last

          и
          ... Russian ships demonstrated an unprecedented level of combat training for the Russian Imperial Navy ... Both squadrons, so to speak, started well, but the Japanese managed to suppress the fire potential of our best ships, but we did not, after which, in fact, the battle turned into a beating ... All the above would allow us to consider the Russian commander a brilliant naval commander ... if not for a number of mistakes that Zinovy ​​Petrovich made in the implementation of his, in every respect, an outstanding plan.

          Quote: 3x3zsave
          but bring it in line

          the article was written NORMALLY
          more precisely - SO HOW IT IS NECESSARY
          because the issue of ZPR (taking into account the situation) is of great public importance
          and here in curtsy to "fans of his Faberge" I do not intend to bow
          the assessments will be extremely tough (to the ZPR)
      2. Very kind
        Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 21
        -2
        Quote: vladcub
        "did not return for revision" so for good the whole article needs to be redone

        is burning?
        blazing?
        nothing, like there in the DMB - "we will define you in the landing, there you are ..." lol
    4. Niko
      Niko 19 November 2021 09: 38
      +4
      Quote: 3x3zsave
      It seems to me alone that the style of the article is sustained in the "best" traditions of the forum holivar? In my opinion, not a single author in his publications has stooped to unflattering epithets to his opponents. Note, colleagues, this is an official publication, not "blah blah blah" on the forum. In real life, they beat the face for such words.
      The question remains open to the editors: why was this material not returned for revision?

      I agree in part. Much calmer comments were removed from me. On the other hand, this is the obvious position of the editorial board: "to protect" even "type of authors", and at the same time to encourage publications that cause more "waves"
      1. vladcub
        vladcub 19 November 2021 14: 20
        +3
        V.O. speaks about this frankly. The more "wave" the better
  6. Kote Pan Kokhanka
    Kote Pan Kokhanka 19 November 2021 06: 36
    +5
    Well, it will begin!
    Maxim (Author) will not be forgiven for a classic view of Tsushima!
    Thank you for your work, I liked it, I definitely agree with many things !!!
    1. unknown
      unknown 21 November 2021 09: 36
      -1
      I disagree with the assessment of this article as a classic view of Tsushima.
      Classic view: the Japanese fought on the most modern, and we - on the shit.
      What about facts, not emotions, but facts?
      Of the four Japanese battleships, only one is fully modern. This is Mikasa.
      "Asahi" and "Sikishima" are protected by armor hardened by the Harvey method.
      In the work on the first English battleship protected by armor hardened by the Krupp method, information is given that the British considered the Krupp armor to be thirty percent more resistant.
      The battleship "Fuji" ("Fuji") is generally outdated. But, it is considered modern.
      The belt is not complete, the extremities are protected by a carapace. S.A. Balakin cites the point of view of the British that the volume of the protected citadel is so small that positive buoyancy is not guaranteed if the extremities are damaged (flooded).
      The installations of the main caliber are outdated, to load them you need to bring them to the center plane. Emotions: a fairy tale appeared that eighteen shells were stored in the cap above the barbet (in the cap, not in the barbet) (were there any charges, here Balakin and Belov diverge.
      The cap on this battleship has not yet turned into a turret, its volume is too small to accommodate both shells and loaders in the aft niche.
      Medium-caliber artillery is mostly uncovered by armor.
      Plus additional problems with artillery. In Tsushima, about twenty-seven barrels exploded (if memory serves). They sin on the miracle of explosives and overly sensitive fuses, but ... even before the war, such cases occurred at the exercises of the British fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.
      The inner tube was damaged, parts of which left the barrel following the projectile. The reason is the wire-wound barrel construction.
      The Japanese used cordite, which led to burnout of the barrel, a decrease in accuracy.
      The Japanese, in mass, were inferior to the Europeans by an average of 10-20 kilograms. In real life, a 50-kilogram Japanese loader is forced to operate with a 45-kilogram 6 "caliber projectile. How many minutes of battle will such a loader last?
      The speed of this battleship did not exceed 15 knots during the RYA years. It is a pity that Balakin did not indicate in what displacement. In Tsushima, like all ships of the line, it had a huge fuel overload. The real speed, and hence the speed of the entire first squad, is 14 knots.
    2. unknown
      unknown 21 November 2021 10: 12
      +1
      For the "armored cruisers", the best armored cruisers of the RYAV, the "flying squadron".
      First: "battleships-cruisers", dual-use ships.
      Russia did not have such ships: the Vladivostok ships were raiders, and the Bayan was a scout.
      That is, there is nothing to compare.
      As an acquaintance professor of psychology said, in this case there is no category of choice.
      And the Germans did not have such ships, also scouts, before the Scharnghorst.
      And the British and French, too, did not have (time before the RYAV).
      In addition to "Asam", only "Garibaldians" and American "Pennsylvania" can be attributed to this type.
      We estimate the booking, armament (battleships) and speed (cruisers).
      There is a reservation, a belt along the waterline, the artillery is mostly protected. A plus.
      Armament: four 203 mm guns with a mass of a light "colonial" projectile of 95,3 kg.
      Light ? And we thought that only the Russians had lightweight shells.
      And this is for a battle in the line against battleships with 305mm guns and a projectile mass of 331 kg.
      It will not be enough.
      The British did not build such ships for themselves.
      They built battleships of the second rank. With 254 mm guns with a projectile mass of over 200 kg.
      And then, they believed that it was not enough for a battle with battleships, but it would be suitable against Russian armored raiders.
      The Italians also had second rank battleships. Type "Emanuele Filiberto". And also 254 mm.
      The Americans, having built the Pennsylvania series, became convinced of their weakness, and in the next series, the Tennessee increased the main caliber to 254 mm.
      Of the eight cruisers ("Asams" and "Garibaldians"), only one had one 254 mm gun.
      In terms of medium-caliber artillery, we can say that the enemy's battleships also had it, in the same caliber and quantity. Problems with cordite, burnout of barrels, 50 kg loader and 45 kg projectile are similar to the same problems on Japanese battleships.
      Speed.
      The problem of the Asama project is that, with a limited displacement, it was necessary to use a power plant that did not correspond to the class of the ship. Simply put, re-lightened.
      What did it lead to? It is well known for what: the speed of testing and in real operation are two big differences. In real life, the fastest are the British and Italians (add for comparison), for a long time -17 knots, a German for a long time 16 knots, a Frenchman (thanks to the allies) for a long time 15 knots. In Tsushima, overloaded with fuel -14 knots. Squad speed at the slowest.
      And where is the fast flying squad here?
      Nothing strange, the Italians in WWII have the same problems.
      Condottieri A and B break records in trials, one even walked 42 knots (within eight minutes).
      In real life - 30 knots.
      The Zara-class cruisers are being tested up to 35 knots, and in real life - 29-30 knots.
      Unlike "ases" and "Garibaldians", "Pennsylvania" in real life more than 20 knots for a long time.
      They had to pay for this with a displacement like that of battleships.
      That is, in fact, neither the Aesams nor the Italians matched any of their missions: against battleships they are weak, against cruisers they are slow.
      The reasons for successful action in the war are not in the tactical skill of the Japanese admirals, but in the tactical impotence of the Russian ones.
      1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
        Kote Pan Kokhanka 21 November 2021 15: 28
        0
        Quote: ignoto
        The reasons for successful action in the war are not in the tactical skill of the Japanese admirals, but in the tactical impotence of the Russian ones.

        My thunderous applause and drumming with the tail, were removed from my tongue!
  7. Comrade
    Comrade 19 November 2021 06: 50
    +4
    during this period of time, artillery in terms of methods of firing developed by "leaps and bounds", and the result of these literally "several years of work" is especially striking not even for Tsushima, but for the example of the shooting of the English battleship "King Edward VII" in October 1905 year.
    The target was made quite healthy - 30x90 feet (9,1x27,4 m) and figured - in the form of a silhouette of the battleship "King Edward VII", which actually fired at it ... from a distance of 6 yards (000 km - 5,5 cables) at a speed of an battleship of 30 knots, 15 shells were fired at it - main, intermediate and medium calibers.
    - 11 shots 12 inches (305 mm) - horrible 10;
    - 31 shots 9,2 "(234 mm) - horrible 15;
    - 71 shots 6 "(152 mm) - horrible 26.
    An illustrative example of what optical sights are with small errors in distance (measured or "aimed") at a stationary target.

    The author, let me ask you why you kept silent about the results of the firing of another single battleship, a Japanese one?
    Are you trying to manipulate the minds of your readers?

    Let me remind you that on May 4, 1905, the Shikishima, at anchor, from a distance of 5 yards, fired at much a larger target - an island ranging in size from 24 to 30 meters in length and 10,5-12 meters in width - four 12 '' shell without hitting nor once.

    I dare to assure you that the target was sighted, and the Japanese had everything in order with rangefinders and optical sights.
    1. rytik32
      rytik32 19 November 2021 18: 02
      +5
      Valentine, good afternoon!
      I will allow myself to interfere.
      The shooting data was experimental... They tested new shells. The tests were found unsuccessful precisely because of the low accuracy.
      Those. These results do not in any way relate to testing the skills of the gunners.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 19 November 2021 22: 47
        0
        Quote: rytik32
        Valentine, good afternoon!
        I will allow myself to interfere.
        The shooting data was experimental... They tested new shells. The tests were found unsuccessful precisely because of the low accuracy.
        Those. These results do not in any way relate to testing the skills of the gunners.

        Those. In this case, the gunners, who are crooked, who have failed tests of new shells, are not to blame for anything? The British had a stationary target, and the King Edward VII was on a decent run and hit, while the Japanese and Sikishima were at anchor, and the island was also ... at anchor ... I mean, ideal conditions. But no - the island remained intact, even the sand was not scratched laughing laughing laughing smile hi
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 19 November 2021 23: 08
          0
          Quote: Rurikovich
          Those. curious in this case, gunmen

          What is the basis for the conclusion? Your personal fantasies?
          During the shooting on April 25, 1905, the gunners of the Sikishima showed an accuracy of 75% from the main battery and 66,7% from the main command line on the same island.

          Why do you ignore this information?

          By the way, in the RIF, the shells were also checked for accuracy by firing at a target. But based on the results of these tests, it never entered anyone's head to draw conclusions about the skills of the gunners.

          Or when the professional suitability of Rozhestvensky is called into question all means are good? Any lies are used?

          What about Japanese actual accuracy in the Tsushima battle? I will quote from an article by Captain Anstruther RN (1906) with reference to an unnamed Japanese officer
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 19 November 2021 23: 12
            +2
            Quote: rytik32
            What is the basis for the conclusion? Your personal fantasies?

            Alexey, I beg you! laughing This statement concerned only the shelling of the island on the specified day. wink smile
          2. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 19 November 2021 23: 18
            +1
            Quote: rytik32
            Or when the professional suitability of Rozhestvensky is called into question all means are good?

            We will still deal with Klimov's personal opinion on acquaintance with his material completely. request
            I try to draw conclusions on any problem based only on the maximum amount of data. I take into account in my opinions and Kolobov, and you and other ADEQUATE and SANE-THOUGHTING people. Therefore, do not worry - you will be good drinks hi smile
            Let's talk enough laughing
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 19 November 2021 23: 26
              +5
              Quote: Rurikovich
              I try to draw conclusions on any problem based only on the maximum amount of data. I take into account in my opinions and Kolobov

              This is recycled material.
              Try to work with sources.
              I recently got acquainted in full with the orders and circulars of 2TOE.
              As a result, the opinion about Rozhdestvensky sharply deteriorated.
              For example, the number of circulars on firing from artillery is much lower than the number of circulars on the acceptance of various foodstuffs on board (down to which supplier and at how many centimes per kg to buy meat in Madagascar - several circulars are devoted to this!) And even more so the number of circulars on reception of coal.
              This proves once again that Rozhdestvensky is a person out of place. He should be in charge of the port ... no more. He was an economic manager, not a naval commander.
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 19 November 2021 23: 57
                +3
                Quote: rytik32
                I recently got acquainted in full with the orders and circulars of 2TOE.
                As a result, the opinion about Rozhdestvensky sharply deteriorated.

                Can not argue. But do not forget that the logistics of supplying the Squadron around the world with hemorrhoids is still the same. At that time, Tsushima's results were not yet known. Therefore, if Rozhdestvensky devoted the lion's share of his time to supply and economy, then this is his and only his choice. We will then with you today, with the afterthought, resolve, and then he directly on the bridge (in the cabin, on the deck, etc.) Before judging a person - stand in his place and go through everything that he went through. anyway smile
                Quote: rytik32
                the number of circulars on firing from artillery is much lower than the number of circulars on taking on board various foodstuffs

                Well, the number of real shooting with real shells depends on the number of these. Where did you send the transport with the shells? The stems do not count - they work out the mechanics of actions, and do not teach the senior gunners in practice to make the correct corrections and hit the targets. request
                Quote: rytik32
                He was an economic manager, not a naval commander.

                S.O. Makarov before PA was in exactly the same conditions as Rozhestvensky - without real combat experience in commanding a squadron. And I am more than sure that if they were to be reversed, Makarov would also devote time to supplies, while Rozhestvensky would try to pretend at first P-A deserve respect as a naval commander, and Rozhestvensky walked with a baggage of knowledge and circulars from above. There was not even anyone to send ... He may have understood that what was being imposed on him did not have a positive decision, but he, we do not forget, is a military man. And in the army, orders are not discussed ...
                Now for several days such a srach will be in the comments on Klimov with foam at the mouth - everyone will prove their case. And the point is, neither you nor I were THERE. Especially on the bridge. Moreover, with the knowledge that Rozhdestvensky had. Therefore, judging a person by the fact that he was unable to realize the desires of the System with what the System gave to life is not a gratifying task. Taking all today's knowledge from you and sending it to the Suvorov bridge is not a fact that you would have done better .. Monomakh's hat was heavy. This is on the pages of VO, we are all admirals and strategists ... And to understand WHY a person made such a decision, on the basis of what conclusions, what he expected, why it did not work out the way it was intended, what factors objectively or subjectively influenced this or that decision ? There are always many questions ... Only the answers do not always correspond to our after-messages ...
                I'll sleep, see you tomorrow, best regards hi
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 20 November 2021 00: 11
                  +2
                  But do not forget that the logistics of supplying the Squadron around the world with hemorrhoids is still the same.

                  So the manager does not need admiral's shoulder straps!
                  Well, the number of real shooting with real shells depends on the number of these
                  The stock of combat 6-in. And 120-mm shells was taken supernumerary. The school students even stayed for Tsushima!
                  Where did you send the transport with the shells?

                  Are you talking about "Irtysh"? So they found out that no one asked to send shells on it.
                  S.O. Makarov to PA was in exactly the same conditions as Rozhestvensky - without real combat experience in commanding a squadron

                  Do not replace the question. I'm not talking about combat experience. Where to get it if the last war with Turkey ended long ago?
                  And about the experience of commanding a squadron. He was with Makarov, and not even one squadron.

                  At the same Skrydlov in Port Arthur, the squadron maneuvered at 13 knots and did not fall apart!
                  1. unknown
                    unknown 21 November 2021 10: 47
                    0
                    The problem is a little different.
                    Japan has no real ancient history.
                    Japanese history is the history of medieval England, but in a different setting.
                    Real Japan began with the Meiji Revolution. 1867 year.
                    The French and British created EVERYTHING from scratch.
                    How did they manage it in such a short time?
                    Therefore, the bastion of the Russo-Japanese War is so firmly standing.
                    Unlike the rest of traditional history, which is completely falling apart, from antiquity to the present day.
                    Researchers do not yet have a full understanding of what Japan was at that time, what the Russian-Japanese war was, its time, its localization, and opponents.
                    If there is a desire to come closer to real understanding, then the article "Japan, the history of a country with a painted sun." LJ article CKUNK_69, the journal is frozen, but available. The author is a person with a specialized history education.
                2. unknown
                  unknown 21 November 2021 10: 38
                  +3
                  Rozhestvensky's problem is not that he lost.
                  And the fact that he lost without actually doing what he could and should have done.
                  No emotion, no fantasy.
                  Unload ships, send auxiliary ships around Japan.
                  The speed of the ships will be higher, the Japanese will actually have no advantage in speed, we stand a classic battle in the line, the concentration of fire of several ships one at a time - no, we hold out until dark, cruisers are not tied to the protection of auxiliary ships, together with destroyers they will come in handy in a night battle. Night battle is not the fact that it is a rout.
                  The ships are afloat, most of the artillery is intact, cruisers and destroyers are opposing the enemy. Everything could have turned out like in the Yellow Sea.
                  In the morning - a new meeting with the Japanese. In such a situation, the Japanese will resume the battle?
                  There is such a discipline - psycholinguistics. Studying the interaction of language and brain.
                  The brain is the processor, the language is the operating system. Languages ​​are far from being equal as operating systems. American specialists of this discipline, having studied the events of WWII in the Pacific Ocean, came to the conclusion that many mistakes made by the Japanese are the result of the peculiarities of the Japanese language as an operating system, respectively, thinking within the framework of this operating system. The Japanese are very good at acting according to a previously agreed and worked out plan. But when real actions start to go against the plan, then the finish ... Improvisation was available only to a few of the Japanese commanders. In most cases, sheer confusion, loss of initiative, retreat.
                  By the way, in Spain, Admiral Cervera is not condemned, they believe that in those conditions he did everything he could. He gave this example because there are researchers who see parallels between the Spanish-American and Russian-Japanese wars.
                3. Very kind
                  Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 19
                  -1
                  Quote: Rurikovich
                  Now for several days such a srach will be in the comments on Klimov with foam at the mouth - everyone will prove their case. And the point is, neither you nor I were THERE. Especially on the bridge. Moreover, with the knowledge that Rozhdestvensky had. Therefore, judging a person by the fact that he was unable to realize the desires of the System with what the System gave to life is not a gratifying task. Taking all today's knowledge from you and sending it to the Suvorov bridge is not a fact that you would have done better .. Monomakh's hat was heavy. This is on the pages of VO we are all admirals and strategists ...

                  He did not command the squadron, but 25 thousand tons with two nuclear reactors had to be controlled wink
                  Incl. diverge a couple of hundred meters to the fishermen.
                  However, any normally trained military man (technically, tactically, psychologically) knows what an effective range of weapon use is, and he will do everything in battle to ensure this.
                  Unlike ZPR.
                  Quote: Rurikovich
                  And to understand WHY a person made such a decision, on the basis of what conclusions, what he counted on, why it did not work out the way it was intended

                  yes, everything is clear with him - tyrant and neurasthenic
                  maneuvering before the fight clearly showed this
                  I had to see such bosses - in addition to insane and senseless maneuvers (and so that "steering wheel on board"), they also had a habit of "poking buttons" from their nerves - through the backs of the operators (and not realizing what they were poking and why)
                  1. The comment was deleted.
              2. Senior seaman
                Senior seaman 21 November 2021 17: 10
                0
                Quote: rytik32
                As a result, the opinion about Rozhdestvensky sharply deteriorated.
                For example, the number of circulars on firing from artillery is much lower than the number of circulars on the acceptance of various foodstuffs on board.

                But here it would be good to compare with similar documentation of other commanders in similar conditions. Otherwise, it may turn out that Ushakov or Kunningham paid no less attention to MTO, which is why the bad attitude of modern researchers is nothing more than a consequence of their poor understanding of realities.
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 21 November 2021 18: 11
                  +2
                  Quote: Senior Sailor
                  the bad attitude of modern researchers is nothing more than a consequence of their poor understanding of realities

                  The opinion that Rozhestvensky was a good business executive, but a worthless naval commander, is not new. It was established more than a hundred years ago. Once again, I will cite an excerpt from the work of the historical commission

                  If you want to refute this opinion - go ahead! Compare with Ushakov, even with Kanihem.
                  But so far no one has succeeded in refuting it :)
                  1. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 21 November 2021 18: 43
                    0
                    The fact that staff work, as well as personnel work, in the RIF was set up very badly is not news at all. And even Makarov in Port Arthur, who had much more independence and experience, coupled with authority, completely flunked it.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    If you want to refute this opinion - go ahead!

                    Dear colleague, I am not at that age for a long time to be weak :))) You brought arguments, and you need to prove their worth yes
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 21 November 2021 20: 10
                      +1
                      Quote: Senior Sailor
                      Dear colleague, I am not at that age for a long time to be weak :))) You brought arguments, and you need to prove their worth

                      Why prove something that has been investigated and published a long time ago?
                      I absolutely do not see any reason to post a significant part of the book here.
                      Read:
                      Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 / the work of the historical commission to describe the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Naval General Staff. - Petrograd: [b. and.], 1912-1917. - 26 cm.
                      Book. 7: Tsushima operation. - 1917. - XI, 248 s
                      Available on the Web in electronic form.
                      1. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 21 November 2021 20: 44
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Why prove

                        Then, without such a comparison, an opinion is just an opinion.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 / the work of the historical commission to describe the actions of the fleet in the war of 1904-1905. at the Naval General Staff. - Petrograd: [b. and.], 1912-1917. - 26 cm.

                        Are there the Kanighem circulars? belay
                      2. rytik32
                        rytik32 21 November 2021 21: 50
                        +2
                        Are there the Kanighem circulars?

                        Kanighem attracted you, but for me to compare? No really ...

                        Then, without such a comparison, an opinion is just an opinion.

                        I will cite one of the orders here.

                        Order No. 192.
                        Kamrang Bay, dated April 5, 1905.
                        Combat experience has shown that signal halyards break very easily and usually at the beginning of a battle.
                        The manual semaphore remains the only means of signaling.
                        The semaphore business in the squadron is very bad.
                        Therefore, for evolutionary signals in battle, I suggest immediately bringing on light black boards or iron sheets measuring 5 feet by 4 feet.
                        These boards or sheets have one on the front bridge facing the front material, the other on the back, facing the rear. The boards should have chalk for inscriptions and a sponge for erasing them.
                        The simplest evolutionary signals will be written on the boards like this:
                        (4 R) All of a sudden turn 4R to the right.
                        (L 4) All of a sudden turn 4R to the left.
                        (8 R) All of a sudden turn 8R to the right.
                        (L 8) All of a sudden turn 8R to the left.
                        Accordingly, () or () will mean: turn everyone suddenly by 2; by 3; by 5; 6 points to the right or left.
                        But always the inscriptions will be made so that the letter P stands to the right of the number, and the letter L to the left, so that one cannot be mistaken for another.
                        When the board is lowered or otherwise hidden on the Flagship or lead ship, this will mean the descent of the signal and the moment the maneuver begins.
                        At the same time, all boards on ships of the line must be removed, and between the front and rear boards of the ship, for their simultaneous removal, there must be a strong horn, audible during firing, or other reliable means of communication.
                        Tomorrow, April 6th, it is proposed to test the use of these boards.

                        Rzhaka is that
                        1. It is not realistic to see lines on a chalk board several hundred meters away. Who sat at the last school desk - he will understand)))
                        And drawing numbers and letters all over the board with chalk is not one minute.
                        2. The horn that is heard during the shooting is unscientific fantasy.
                      3. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 21 November 2021 22: 52
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        and should I compare?

                        The problem is that you are not comparing to anyone at all, but simply by default postulating that it is wrong. But do not say how correctly. In all likelihood, because you yourself do not know.
                        Tell me, have you ever managed a team, at least at the level of a shift master?
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Rzhaka is that
                        1. It is not realistic to see lines on a chalk board several hundred meters away. Who sat at the last school desk - he will understand)))

                        I was sitting, but I'm bespectacled, so not the best example :)))
                        But since you started talking about school, you probably remember the story of Valentin Kataev, "The Lone Sail Gleams White", which was included in the school curriculum. Those very times are described there. And there is an excerpt like this:
                        When my grandmother was still alive, she was obligatory twice a year - for Easter
                        and for the rescue - whitewashed shack

                        Oops. It turns out that chalk can be applied to a vertical surface not only with a bar. This is for you and me, living a century later, chalk by default is a block of plaster, but in those days it was not at all necessary. It could well have been a solution applied with a whitewash brush. The fact that such a line will be seen a little better than drawn with a bar, I hope you have no doubts?
                        In fact, I do not know what Rozhestvensky meant when giving this order, but I am inclined to think that a person who did not originally belong to the caste of naval sailors, but despite all the obstacles, who managed to rise to the rank of admiral was not feeble-minded.
                        Anticipating a possible question. Yes, there is not a word about the brush. But there is also nothing about the fact that chalk should be squared.
                      4. rytik32
                        rytik32 21 November 2021 23: 21
                        +1
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        The problem is that you are not comparing with anyone at all, but simply by default postulating that this is wrong.

                        I read the orders of Makarov and Witgeft, there is something to compare with.
                        Oops. It turns out that chalk can be applied on a vertical surface not only with a bar

                        Only this business will take half an hour to wash. And change more than one bucket of water.
                        So the horseradish radish is not sweeter.
                      5. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 22 November 2021 10: 22
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I read the orders of Makarov and Witgeft, there is something to compare with.

                        So they would lead :))) Only when you compare, do not forget that the first squadron was in the base. But with all this, on separate ships ("Poltava", "Novik"), the commanders and inspectors took care of the reserves, while other responsible persons did not even think about it.
                        You can also compare with Chukhnin. Apparently, he did not care at all where and how the auditors buy provisions. How did it end remember?
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Only this business will take half an hour to wash.

                        Nope. Likewise with a sponge. This is not a clay wall of a hut.
                      6. rytik32
                        rytik32 22 November 2021 18: 53
                        +1
                        So they would lead :)))

                        Order of the Temporary ID of the Commander of the Pacific Ocean Squadron, Rear Admiral Witgeft. May 26, 1904 No. 12.

                        I declare the order of the formation of the squadron in different cases of the upcoming voyage:

                        The marching formation of the wake.

                        XNUMXst department. Battleship "Tsarevich", flag of the Squadron Leader.
                        "" Retvizan ".
                        "" Victory "(if in the ranks).
                        II branch. "" Peresvet ", the flag of the Chief of the battleship squadron.
                        "" Sevastopol ".
                        "" Poltava ".

                        The distance between the ships is set to that to which the ships are accustomed during practical navigation, i.e. 2 cables between the actor-post of the front and the fore-post of the rear material.
                        For cruisers of the XNUMXst rank, keep within sight of signals, or, if required, within clear telegraphy; cruiser "Bayan" under the braid pennant of the Chief of a squadron of cruisers on Ost from the squadron, cruiser "Askold" - on S, cruiser "Diana" - on N and cruiser "Pallada" - on W.
                        Cruiser "Novik" to go in five cables in front of the squadron; mine cruisers stay on the leeward traverse of the flagship battleships, at a distance of two cables: "Horseman" at the battleship "Tsesarevich", and "Gaidamak" at the battleship "Peresvet"; the destroyer detachment should be on the leeward traverse of the battleship "Tsesarevich", at a distance of four cables. (Drawing 1).
                        In the event of a transition from a marching wake formation to a combat one, cruisers of the first rank enter the wake of battleships in the following order: "Bayan", "Askold", "Diana" and "Pallada"; For the II rank cruiser "Novik" and mine cruisers, as well as for the destroyer detachment, keep abeam the lead ship of the squadron, from the side opposite to the enemy, increasing the distance to no more than 20 cables. (Drawing 2).

                        In the formation of two wake columns, the 3nd rank cruiser "Novik", as in the first case, go ahead of the squadron, the mine cruiser "Horseman" enter the wake of the XNUMXst battleship squad, the cruiser "Gaidamak" - the second compartment, and the destroyer squads, respectively, on the shells of battleship squadrons , in the distance of two cables. (Drawing XNUMX).

                        In the front line, cruisers of I rank make up the second line, keeping from 3 to 10 cables to the side opposite to the enemy, and firing either in the gaps between ships, or going beyond the flanks. In this case, "Bayan" and "Askold" are on the flank of "Tsarevich", "Diana" and "Pallada" - at "Poltava". (Drawing 4th).

                        If a signal "P" or "L" is sent to the cruisers detachment, with the call signs of the cruiser detachment, then the entire detachment moves over the flank of the battleships, to the right or left, and rebuilds into the most advantageous formation to concentrate fire on the indicated or selected part of the enemy.
                        The same is granted to the Chief of the cruiser squadron if he finds this maneuver beneficial for the success of the battle.
                        At the same time, the destroyer detachment keeps on the opposite side, no further than 20 cables from the battleships, and tries to take such a position in order to clearly see the signals and be able to rush into the attack in time.
                        An attack is allowed to the Head of the destroyer squadron on his own initiative, if an opportunity presents itself during the battle. (Drawing 5).

                        The transition from the wake marching formation to the combat one is carried out according to the general signal "C", with the descent of which the cruisers and mine vessels take their places; even if this signal is not made, the cruisers, having seen the beginning of the battle, must themselves enter the wake of the battleships, having entered under the command of their flagship.
                        In battle, be guided by the instructions for controlling artillery fire, announced in the order of the Fleet Commander of March 4 of this year under No. 21 *).
                        To be able to control the squadron's fire and focus it on the desired ship, I will raise the conditional callsigns 1-I, 2-I, etc. I, according to the two-flag signal book, denotes the number in the formation of the enemy ship, on which the fire should be intensified. These callsigns and, at the same time, the P flag indicate the destroyers to attack the indicated ship.
                        Note: Drawings are only special cases and serve solely to clarify the text.

                        Only when you compare, do not forget that the first squadron was in the base.

                        Only very quickly this base was surrounded.

                        You can also compare with Chukhnin. Apparently, he did not care at all where and how the auditors buy provisions. How did it end remember?

                        Have you forgotten about the riot on Nakhimov due to the lack of fresh bread?
                        And when Rozhestvensky directly writes that it is necessary to buy from a certain supplier, even if it is cheaper from others, it already smells very bad.
                      7. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 22 November 2021 19: 24
                        +1
                        In other words, Witgeft has all the orders only and exclusively on the case, but on the contrary for ZPR?
                        Or is there an unfair sampling?
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Only very quickly this base was surrounded.

                        Exactly. And not a single, sorry, person with weak social responsibility (letter beeches) in large shoulder straps, did not bother to create food supplies, although there was a carriage, leaving everything to the initiative of the ship commanders. Those who hurried in advance, until the end of the siege, provided their subordinates with provisions, and even shared the groundmen, the rest of the sailors sucked their paws.
                        But we deserve your warm approval, because they did not engage in vile deeds :)))
                      8. rytik32
                        rytik32 22 November 2021 19: 55
                        +1
                        In other words, for Witgeft, all orders are only and exclusively on the case, and for the ZPR, on the contrary?

                        My post is not about that. I'm not going to post dozens of orders here. Whoever needs it, they will read it, since they are partly on the Web too.
                        Take a look at the role of cruisers and destroyers in combat. And compare with Tsushima.
                      9. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 22 November 2021 20: 29
                        +2
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Take a look at the role of cruisers and destroyers in combat.

                        Hmm ... In the cruisers' GM they tried to stay away from the enemy, then most of them left. Two reached the neutral ports, none of them came to Vladivostok.
                        In Tsushima, the cruisers fought with superior enemy forces, and when the main forces were defeated, some tried to leave, three of them were interned in a neutral port, and one reached Vladivostok.
                        But you probably put some other meaning into this comparison?
                      10. Very kind
                        Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 13
                        -2
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        who managed to rise to the rank of admiral was not feeble-minded.

                        in the navy such as ZPR has a "special expression"
                        accurate
                        I will not give - i.e. it is obscene
      2. Comrade
        Comrade 20 November 2021 04: 50
        +1
        Hello, Alexey!
        Quote: rytik32
        I will allow myself to interfere.

        Welcome.
        Quote: rytik32
        The shooting data was experimental.

        With your permission, a clarification: this was an experimental long-range shooting

        Quote: rytik32
        They tested new shells.

        If it does not bother you, indicate the source, please, where it says that the tests were carried out there new shells.
        Quote: rytik32
        Those. These results do not in any way relate to testing the skills of the gunners.

        No problem, they don't, they don't.
        However, we have data on the firing of the battleship "Fuji", out of eight 12 "shells hit by only two.

        It turns out 25% versus 90%.

        Now a couple of words to silently "minus" ZPR-fobs.

        First90% of hits for the main battery guns of the battleship were an exceptional achievement for the British fleet. Fifty Royal Navy warships took part in those 1905 firing, and these results are among more the best.
        Second, these fifty ships that took part in the firing practice belonged to six squadrons, and on each the hit of the best ship accounted for, depending on the squadron, from four to twenty-five misses of the worst ships.
        Conclusion.
        Presentation to the public of the results of the shooting of the battleship "King Edward VII"
        literally "several years of work"
        .
        is propagandadesigned to form the desired impression on the gullible reader.

        In conclusion - the results of firing from the main caliber guns of the same battleship in 1911 and 1912.

        Of the thirteen 12 '' shells fired, six and four hit, respectively.
        The last result - 25% - is quite at the level of "Fuji" from the previous screenshot, and even worse.
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 20 November 2021 11: 58
          +1
          If it does not bother you, please indicate the source, which says that new shells were tested there.

          So don't miss the phrase "powder ammunition was used, and the experiment were in some way connect with it".
          In Russian, it reads "Ammunition with gunpowder was used, and the experiment was associated with them."
          As you know, at that time, Japanese combat shells carried shimosa.
          Firstly, 90% of hits for the main battery guns of the battleship were an exceptional achievement for the British fleet. Fifty Royal Navy battleships took part in those 1905 firing, and these results are among some of the best.
          Secondly, these fifty ships that took part in the shooting practice belonged to six squadrons, and for each hit by the best ship, depending on the squadron, there were from four to twenty-five misses of the worst ships.

          So give this data!
          In conclusion - the results of firing from the main caliber guns of the same battleship in 1911 and 1912.

          What is the shooting distance?
          What is the target size?
          How fast is the ship?
          Is the target stationary?
          Without this data, the value of your post is zero.
          And in general, why do we need data from 1911-12?
          Or are you just tinkering with the result you want?

          The data given by the author in the article were published in the Marine Collection No. 4 for 1906. I will post a continuation of that article.

          To cut off accusations that it was only the flagship that fired so accurately.
          As we can see, the Atlantic squadron in firing reached 177 hits, of which 58 with 12-inch shells. Now imagine that the enemy squadron would receive these shells ...
          1. Comrade
            Comrade 21 November 2021 02: 58
            +1
            Hello, Alexey!
            Quote: rytik32
            So don't miss the phrase "powder ammunition was used, and the experiment were in some way connect with it".

            So indicate in this phrase or in the report the word "new". In English it sounds "new".
            You insist that there
            Quote: rytik32
            Tested new shells

            If so, please explain how the "new" shells in this case differed from the "old" ones?

            Quote: rytik32
            So give this data!

            Excuse me
            Here is the ratio of hits between the best gunner of the Atlantic fleet and the worst gunner of the same fleet - 1/10.
            Battleship "King Edward VII" - ten hits of 12 '' shells. (261,4 points)
            Battleship "Majestic" - one hit by a 12 '' projectile. (41 point)

            Quote: rytik32
            why do we need data from 1911-12?

            For clarity.

            Quote: rytik32
            the Atlantic squadron in firing reached 177 hits, of which 58 were 12-inch shells. Now imagine that the enemy squadron would receive these shells.

            I will present you as soon as you present historical facts showing that the accuracy of the squadron's shooting practice was equal to the squadron's shooting accuracy in real combat.
            The nationality of the fleet does not matter.

            Quote: rytik32
            What is the basis for the conclusion? Your personal fantasies?
            During the shooting on April 25, 1905, the gunners of the Sikishima showed an accuracy of 75% from the main battery and 66,7% from the main command line on the same island. Why do you ignore this information?

            Sorry, dear colleague, for interfering, but could not pass by.
            Why do you ignore the following facts:
            a) On April 25, 1905, the fire was fired at a distance of 3 to 000 yards.
            b) May 4, 1905, the fire was fired at a distance of 5 yards.
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 21 November 2021 10: 48
              +1
              Valentine, good afternoon!
              So indicate in this phrase or in the report the word "new". In English it sounds "new".

              Does this somehow affect the purpose of that experiment? There it is written in black and white that the shells were tested during firing.
              Here is the ratio of hits between the best gunner of the Atlantic fleet and the worst gunner of the same fleet - 1/10.
              Battleship King Edward VII - ten hits from 12 '' shells. (261,4 points)
              Battleship "Majestic" - one hit from a 12 "shell. (41 points)

              This perfectly proves that even in the conditions of exercises, the accuracy can differ significantly.
              I will present you as soon as you present historical facts showing that the accuracy of the squadron's shooting practice was equal to the squadron's shooting accuracy in real combat.

              Take the Japanese. According to a plate from Polutov's book, for 6-inch guns, the standard accuracy (the results are just compiled on the basis of shooting practice data) is
              7000 m - 6,5%
              6000 m - 7,5%

              In fact, "Sikishima" in Tsushima hit "Oslyabya" with the third single sighting shot. This is confirmed by Russian sources. Those. the actual accuracy was 33% and greatly exceeded the standard accuracy.
              Further in the Siksisma database for the record at 2:10 there is the following text: "the battle became more and more fierce, our shells were steadily hitting the target"
              And by the way, compare this with what you previously wrote about the shooting of the Sikisisma.
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 22 November 2021 05: 47
                0
                Hello, Alexey!
                Quote: rytik32
                Does this somehow affect the purpose of that experiment?

                Excuse me, no one was tempted to assert that "tested new shells".
                And when I asked a clarifying question, I thought that you will now show information from Sidorenko or another expert who knows what Captain Jackson did not know.
                And you, in response, with a smart look, began to poke your nose into a sentence, the text of which I have known very well for a long time.

                Quote: rytik32
                There it is written in black and white that the shells were tested during firing.

                There was a target, they fired at it from a distance of 5 yards, 800 '' guns did not hit even once.
                It doesn't matter what shells were there.

                Quote: rytik32
                This perfectly proves that even in the conditions of exercises, the accuracy can differ significantly.

                Am I with by that argue?
                The point is that the author of the text under discussion, for propaganda purposes, presented the brilliantly firing battleship as typical shooter of the English fleet. And upon closer examination, it turns out that this is not so (however, the schoolchildren were eating).
                A glass of tar is attached to a spoonful of honey.

                Quote: rytik32
                Take the Japanese. According to a plate from Polutov's book, for 6-inch guns

                I suggested that you present historical facts showing that the accuracy of target shooting squadrons was equal to shooting accuracy squadrons in real battle.
                And in response you posted fragmentary data on medium-caliber firing single battleship, and then extrapolated this data to the entire Tsushima battle.

                Quote: rytik32
                Further in the Siksisma database for the record at 2:10 there is the following text: "the battle became more and more fierce, our shells were steadily hitting the target"

                This is just a colorful and emotional description, they are not facts.
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 22 November 2021 19: 50
                  +2
                  Quote: Comrade
                  Excuse me, no one was tempted to say that "they tested new shells."
                  And when I asked a clarifying question, I thought that you will now show information from Sidorenko or another expert who knows what Captain Jackson did not know.

                  Understood, the path will be your way: the Japanese tested old shells, stuffing them with gunpowder and, because of the accuracy of their shooting, they became unsatisfactory laughing

                  It doesn't matter what shells were there.

                  There were shells that did not meet the requirements for firing accuracy.

                  The point is that the author of the text under discussion, for propaganda purposes, presented the brilliantly firing battleship as a typical shooter of the British fleet.

                  I will give the average% of hits with large and medium caliber guns in the firing of the British fleet:
                  1907 - 42,7%
                  1908 - 53,6% (Good Hope has 81%)
                  1909 - 54,1%

                  The battleship cited by the author - 45,1%
                  Here is such a "brilliantly shot battleship"

                  I suggested that you present historical facts showing that the accuracy of the squadron's shooting practice was equal to the accuracy of the squadron's shooting in a real battle.
                  And in response, you posted fragmentary data on medium-caliber firing of a single battleship, and then extrapolated this data to the entire Tsushima battle


                  I will not offer you such data, because:
                  1. It is pointless to compare shooting in different conditions, especially in combat and training conditions.
                  2. Actual accuracy is unlimited. The hit percentage can be anything from 0 to 100%.
                  3. The firing accuracy of one ship from the accuracy of another can differ significantly. And not necessarily within the squadron, these differences are leveled.
                  1. Very kind
                    Very kind 23 November 2021 11: 15
                    -1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    It is pointless to compare shooting in different conditions, especially in combat and training conditions.

                    exactly!
                  2. Comrade
                    Comrade 23 November 2021 16: 43
                    -1
                    Hello, Alexey!
                    Quote: rytik32
                    the path will be your way: the Japanese tested old shells, stuffing them with gunpowder and, because of the accuracy of their shooting, they became unsatisfactory

                    Do you want to say that "Shikisima" did not hit even once, because instead of shimosa, there was gunpowder in the shells?
                    Quote: rytik32
                    I will give the average% of hits with large and medium-caliber guns in the firing of the British fleet: 1907; 1908; 1909.

                    What for ? With the same success, your humble servant can lay out not even faceless averaged indicators, but a detailed layout of who and how from the "British" fired in 1911 and 1912.
                    We are discussing artillery exercises with you 1905 years, the results of which were glorified by domestic enthusiastic Anglophiles on the example of the results of the shooting of the battleship "King Edward VII", presented by them to ignorant and gullible readers as typical for the entire English fleet.

                    Quote: rytik32
                    I will not offer you such data, because:
                    It is pointless to compare shooting in different conditions, especially in combat and training conditions.

                    So why did you write the following, if you understand it?
                    Quote: rytik32
                    the Atlantic squadron in firing reached 177 hits, of which 58 were 12-inch shells. Now imagine that the enemy squadron would receive these shells.
    2. Astra wild2
      Astra wild2 19 November 2021 20: 26
      +1
      Did they drink an extra portion for the glory of the emperor?
  8. Per se.
    Per se. 19 November 2021 07: 02
    +11
    But fate gave Rozhdestvensky "the last chance" - to win (or at least not to lose) the battle - "Togo's turn." The ability to immediately turn the battleships of the first detachment (without "Oslyabi") to the enemy and their high-speed "throw" to a sharp reduction in the distance


    There was such John Clerk, who became famous after the publication of his book "An inquiry into naval tactics" ("To the question of naval tactics"). The main theme in his reasoning was the tactics of cutting through the enemy line. One day, the Clerk's brochure fell into the hands of Captain Douglas, who had just been appointed flag captain to Admiral George Rodney. The Clerk's tactics were first deliberately used at the Battle of All Saints Isles in 1782, when Douglas convinced Admiral Rodney to maneuver by cutting through the enemy line, as recommended in a pamphlet by John Clerk. After the victory at the Isles of All Saints, the Clerk's tactics were long established in the English fleet.

    This is by the way, but it seems that for Rozhestvensky, too, "cutting the line" when attacking the front line of the newest battleships, during the "turn of Togo", would end for the Japanese fleet, if not a pogrom, then worse than what happened for us in Tsusumu, as if did not have.
    As for the main culprit in the death of the 2nd Pacific squadron, Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky, this is a consequence, and the reason is Nicholas II himself, the incompetent emperor, plus the Russian tsarism itself, which has come to a standstill and dependence on the West.
    1. Very kind
      Very kind 19 November 2021 07: 40
      +9
      This is by the way, but I think that for Rozhdestvensky "cutting the line"

      No "cutting" the line!
      Incl. taking into account the factor of Japanese torpedoes! To keep the optimal distance of the arte - about 10-15 cables, i.e. with the approach, the lapel was optimal in the entry into battle, incl. aft towers
      1. Per se.
        Per se. 19 November 2021 08: 16
        +5
        Quote: Very kind
        taking into account the factor of Japanese torpedoes!
        There were no Japanese destroyers at that moment, but the bow torpedo tubes of the Russian battleships could also be used, and more purposefully than the Japanese could do in a wake formation, especially double because of the loop. Finally, even an archaic ram could sink the enemy. However, your presentation with a lapel is also an option, although now all these are just assumptions and regrets. What happened was that "according to the program" it was written, by the revolution of 1905 and by 1917, then, the superpower of the USSR, with the nuclear fleet, and with the Japanese got even in 1945.
        1. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 11
          -1
          Quote: Per se.
          There were no Japanese destroyers at that moment, but the bow torpedo tubes of the Russian battleships could also be used,

          1. The Japanese have better torpedoes
          2. The effectiveness of 12 inch "perforators" with armor-piercing was definitely higher than the risk of going into the dump and under the torpedoes of the Japs
      2. Doctor
        Doctor 19 November 2021 10: 03
        +2
        No "cutting" the line!
        Incl. taking into account the factor of Japanese torpedoes! To keep the optimal distance of the arte - about 10-15 cables, i.e. with the approach, the lapel was optimal in the entry into battle, incl. aft towers

        Of course! The battle is lost for lack of maneuver. While Rozhdestvensky stupidly lane forward, Togo maneuvered as he wanted. First he worked with one side on the head, then the other.
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 19 November 2021 22: 29
          +2
          Quote: Arzt
          Togo maneuvered as he wanted

          Travel speed advantage - why not maneuver. For the Russians, any maneuver is a deviation to the side. Conclusion - Togo, thanks to his speed, chose the tactical pattern of his actions. request And he was in knocking out modern Russian ships. By the evening of "painstaking" work, out of 5 new EBRs, only one "Eagle" remained ...
          1. rytik32
            rytik32 19 November 2021 23: 59
            +3
            Quote: Rurikovich
            Travel speed advantage

            In the logbook of Izumrud it is written in black and white "at night we walked with a 14-knot speed."
            And these are Nebogatov's samotopes!
            So Rozhestvensky gave the Japanese the advantage of speed.
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 20 November 2021 00: 11
              +3
              Quote: rytik32
              So Rozhestvensky gave the Japanese the advantage of speed.

              They presented transports, which Rozhestvensky took with him, proceeding from the fact that he expected to endure on the basis of the battle at Shantung and go to Vladivostok.
              Vitgeft deliberately went to the breakthrough, because even the high-speed "Mongolia" was not a burden. Rozhestvensky went to "take possession of the sea," therefore he carried everything he needed with him. request
              Understand that he was not imbecile either and understood, even from the experience of Shantung, that speed was a decisive factor, that an opponent's advantage of a couple of knots was not so critical than an advantage of 6 knots. So, you just need to understand WHAT made him not let go of the transports and break through already at 14 nodes, but pull the ballast with him, which ultimately killed him. That's all smile
              1. Very kind
                Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 09
                -2
                Quote: Rurikovich
                proceeding from what he expected on the basis of the battle at Shantung to endure and go to Vladivostok.

                And the textbook by Klado 1898. for midshipmen of the Marine Corps ZPR did not read - what is 12 inches at an effective distance?
                Quote: Rurikovich
                So, you just need to understand WHAT

                personal qualities"
                more precisely, their complete degradation
                up to the loss of adequacy
    2. Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
      Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich 19 November 2021 17: 37
      +3
      a couple of weeks ago I reread Semenov's "The Tragedy of Tsushima", and so, there Semenov writes that in Japanese captivity the surviving officers of the squadron "lost" all possible unrealized battle scenarios, the result is the same - the defeat of the Russian squadron.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 19 November 2021 23: 40
        0
        Quote: Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
        a couple of weeks ago I reread Semenov's "The Tragedy of Tsushima",

        Semyonov is a liar and a traitor who with difficulty got away from being shot at the trial, for the surrender of the destroyer and the admiral, along with the entire headquarters. To give his justifications as objective facts is, to put it mildly, overly optimistic.
        1. Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
          Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich 20 November 2021 09: 24
          +1
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Semyonov is a liar and a traitor who with difficulty got away from being shot at the trial, for the surrender of the destroyer and the admiral, along with the entire headquarters. To give his justifications as objective facts is, to put it mildly, overly optimistic.




          The last order of Semyonov to the destroyer commander was - full speed in order to break away from the Japanese. However, the destroyer commander did not comply with this order. Semyonov was seriously wounded, could not really stand not to walk, lost consciousness ...
          However, in some ways you are right - both Semyonov and the admiral and the entire destroyer crew could shoot themselves and, thereby, preserve their honor ...
          Do I understand correctly, your logic: the soldiers and officers of the Red Army who were surrounded, and later taken prisoner, are also cowardly traitors? ...
          1. rytik32
            rytik32 20 November 2021 12: 02
            +2
            Semenov's last order to the destroyer commander was

            To begin with, Semenov had no right to give orders to the destroyer commander at all.
            both Semyonov and the admiral and the entire destroyer crew could shoot themselves and, thus, preserve their honor

            Or they could transfer to another battleship and continue the battle ... but they didn't want to fight something)))
            But the white sheet was immediately found.
            1. Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
              Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich 20 November 2021 18: 50
              +1
              Quote: rytik32
              To begin with, Semenov had no right to give orders to the destroyer commander at all.


              Wonderful! Delightful! But if Semenov "did not have the right to order the destroyer commander at all"then how can he be accused of surrendering that destroyer to the Japanese, since Semenov is in that situation, excuse me, a pig's tail ???
              As far as they could transfer to another battleship, Semenov was seriously wounded, this time, and the second - as far as I remember, that destroyer was surrendered after the end of the battle (or was I mistaken?).
              And third: what about the Red Army soldiers who were surrounded and then captured? Are they also cowards, bastards and traitors to the Motherland?
              1. rytik32
                rytik32 20 November 2021 19: 55
                +4
                Quote: Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
                Wonderful! Delightful! But if Semyonov "did not have the right to order the destroyer commander at all," then how can he be accused of surrendering that destroyer to the Japanese, since Semyonov, excuse me, is a pig's tail in that situation ???

                For the very fact of talking about surrender, the destroyer commander had every right to this Semyonov ...
                As far as they could transfer to another battleship, Semenov was seriously wounded, this time, and the second - as far as I remember, that destroyer was surrendered after the end of the battle (or was I mistaken?).

                Yeah, deliberately stood and waited for the Japanese to sail
                And third: what about the Red Army soldiers who were surrounded and then captured? Are they also cowards, bastards and traitors to the Motherland?

                Those who are looking for a white sheet when there is still no enemy on the horizon - yes, cowards, bastards and traitors.
                1. Very kind
                  Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 06
                  0
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Those who are looking for a white sheet when there is still no enemy on the horizon - yes, cowards, bastards and traitors.

                  Here it is by the way
          2. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 20 November 2021 21: 17
            +3
            Quote: Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
            Semyonov was seriously wounded, could not really stand not to walk, lost consciousness ...

            Just a blatant lie. And at the trial, Semenov told how he kind of crawled on all fours onto the bridge of the destroyer and crawled back with a couple of groans. None of the sailors confirmed this in court. On the contrary, they showed that it was Semenov who hurried the sailors to raise the Japanese flag ..

            Well, that's why our Bulkokhrusta are so fond of citing the most obvious and obvious cowards and traitors as an example !? Why do I know dozens of Russian officers who fought with honor to the end even in a hopeless battle, but you only have scoundrels and cowards as the main idols?
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 20 November 2021 23: 11
              +3
              By the way, according to the Naval Regulations, if the admiral is severely wounded, the command passes to his flag-captain, i.e. Clapier de Colongou.
              And, it turns out, formally, it was not Nebogatov who was supposed to lead the squadron, but Clapier-de-Colong. But for some reason he did not want to take command ...
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 21 November 2021 20: 41
                +1
                Quote: rytik32
                And, it turns out, formally, it was not Nebogatov who was supposed to lead the squadron, but Clapier-de-Colong.

                Here, in general, a muddy story, again, returns us to Rozhdestvensky. In theory, if you torment yourself and carefully dig deeper into the numerous orders of Rozhdestvensky, it turns out that Suvorov, as a flagship, had to graze two destroyers and Pearls. However, in reality, for some reason, no one paid the slightest attention to Suvorov's failure. Violent came to Suvorovets only a few hours later, and then almost by accident.

                There is a serious suspicion that in reality none of the commanders understood from Rozhestvensky's orders exactly what he should do in battle in the first place. Therefore, such a strange picture, when Emerald rehearses Nebogatov's signals and Zhemchug suddenly went to guard the transports. And both commanders are sure that they are carrying out some order of the ZPR in turn.

                The claims to Kolong are justified, he delayed and confused the situation with the transfer of command, but a fair share of the blame for this chaos lies with Rozhdestvensky.
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 21 November 2021 23: 36
                  +2
                  I read the 2TOE orders and circulars and I can safely say that they were extremely incomprehensible and contradictory. New documents were invented, but the old ones were not canceled. As a result - an incomprehensible vinaigrette!
              2. Maxim G
                Maxim G 26 November 2021 19: 14
                +1
                Clapier-de-Colong - was the flag captain, not the chief of staff, respectively, the command really should have been transferred by a CONDITIONAL SIGNAL to Nebogatov.


          3. Very kind
            Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 06
            -1
            Quote: Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
            The last order of Semyonov to the destroyer commander was - full speed in order to break away from the Japanese. However, the destroyer commander did not comply with this order. Semyonov was seriously wounded, could not really stand not to walk, lost consciousness ...

            taking into account the fact that it all began with Kolomiytsev
            and ZPR knew everything, but de facto agreed, Semenov's "revelations", to put it mildly, smell bad
      2. Very kind
        Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 07
        -1
        Quote: Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
        a couple of weeks ago I reread Semenov's "The Tragedy of Tsushima", and so, there Semenov writes that in Japanese captivity the surviving officers of the squadron "lost" all possible unrealized battle scenarios, the result is the same - the defeat of the Russian squadron.

        Semenov - brehlo
        on this character will be separately in the second part
        1. Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
          Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich 22 November 2021 15: 30
          0
          Quote: Very kind
          Semenov - brehlo


          Excuse me, but who, then, would you order to read, really Novikov-Priboi ???
          1. Very kind
            Very kind 23 November 2021 11: 14
            -2
            Quote: Abrosimov Sergey Olegovich
            order to read, is it really Novikov-Surf ???

            yes, N-P I ADVISE to read
            although this is far from the ultimate truth
    3. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 19 November 2021 22: 40
      +3
      Quote: Per se.
      As for the main culprit in the death of the 2nd Pacific squadron, Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky, this is a consequence, and the reason is Nicholas II himself, the incompetent emperor, plus the Russian tsarism itself, which has come to a standstill and dependence on the West.

      . what .... I would call the bureaucracy and embezzlement rather the main culprit. And as a consequence of this - longer (than in the West) terms for the construction of ships, throwing in preferences (as a consequence of the absence of a clear line of development of the fleet, and as a consequence, the diversity of types even in each individual class) and when the rooster is about to bite into the little crown and something starts to work out (development of prototypes and execution of the Program "For the needs of the Far East" in 1895), then, alas, it turns out to be too late ...
      so here I agree with you, Sergei, in principle. ZPR with Tsushima is only a consequence of the structural defects of tsarist Russia hi
    4. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 19 November 2021 22: 41
      +2
      Quote: Per se.
      Clerk's tactics were long established in the English navy.

      Exactly until the guns began to shoot further wink repeat smile
    5. unknown
      unknown 21 November 2021 10: 51
      +1
      Battleships of the "Borodino" type had the "Tsesarevich" as a prototype.
      Battleship of the French type.
      The so-called "dump" type.
      That is, a ship designed not only for combat in the classic line, but also for active maneuvering, cutting through the enemy's column. Hence the turrets for medium artillery, with angles of fire greater than those of casemate guns. For combat when the enemy is "from all sides".
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 21 November 2021 21: 28
        +1
        Quote: ignoto
        That is, a ship designed not only for combat in the classical line, but also for active maneuvering, cutting through the enemy's column.

        Yes exactly. Borodinians are designed for tough close combat.
  9. Very kind
    Very kind 19 November 2021 07: 38
    +4
    Comrade: I dare to assure you that the target was sighted, and the Japanese had everything in order with rangefinders and optical sights.

    Sorry, you state this with such confidence then that were personally present by the controller?
    Can you see the act of this shooting with your signature? lol
    Or are you just?
    Are you trying to manipulate the minds of your readers?

    Your article, by the way, is quite good, contains important and new information, but there are serious errors (about them a little below)
  10. vladcub
    vladcub 19 November 2021 09: 02
    +1
    The author, don't you think that it is now easy to blame Rozhestvensky for everything?
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 19 November 2021 23: 43
      +1
      Quote: vladcub
      The author, don't you think that it is now easy to blame Rozhestvensky for everything?

      It was even easier to do this right after Tsushima. And it was! "badly maneuvering, bad shooting, bad management." Only the prosecutor saved from the execution of Rozhdestvensky. very clearly behind him the figure of Nicholas II was shining.
      1. Maxim G
        Maxim G 20 November 2021 15: 59
        +1
        Vogak was the prosecutor there, as was the trial of Nebogatov, who was not even a professional sailor.
        Yes, and they were judged in different ways and they behaved differently at the trial.
        The trial of the ZPR is a farce, and Nebogatov was ordered to be shot, replaced by 10 years in prison.
    2. rytik32
      rytik32 20 November 2021 00: 21
      +3
      Read the findings of the historical commission
      1. Kayuk
        Kayuk 20 November 2021 02: 46
        +2
        Alex, I welcome you!
        These conclusions in the Conclusion of the Commission were written by Lieutenant, then Captain 2nd Rank Gustav Konstantinovich von Schultz, attached to them (Not to be confused with the commander of the cruiser "Novik"). Apparently he tried hard. And the chairman of the commission and members are from admirals who fought with the Japanese exclusively in the Baltic. Considered this battle, where all the "material evidence" in the form of large ships - for the most part - on the seabed or the Japanese, and the ship's logs are not available. The only irrefutable fact was the obvious defeat or murder of the fleet. To the question: how could this have happened - the official "Investigative Commission to clarify the circumstances of the Tsushima battle" tried to answer in monosyllables - the victims of the murder are mainly to blame: they overloaded the ships, painted them black, fired past, maneuvered badly, etc. In general, "woe to the vanquished." The last part of the Opinion, called the “Opinion of the Commission,” generally reads like a song. "Tsushima" by Novikov's battalion after her is childish babble. There, even the commander of the "Emerald" Captain 2nd Rank Baron Fersen got it. That they say he got away from surrender and captivity - this seems to be not subject to condemnation, but why did he put the ship on a stone? It is necessary to exact a strict penalty for this! Or maybe, exact for the fact that he did not give up? The Commission does not say a bad word about the captain of the 1st rank Ozerov, who nevertheless raised the Japanese flag over his sinking battleship Sisoy the Great. He exhausted, they say, the opportunity for resistance, the crew saved, why cling to a person ...
        Throughout the multi-page Opinion there is not a single (!) Bad word addressed to the former Rear Admiral Nebogatov, and his surrender is mentioned only in connection with the departure of the Izumrud! Just a saint! And his lie that the gunners on the ships of his detachment were either new untrained, or called up from the reserve and all who had forgotten were turned on, although his squadron had an old cadre. But "about the shells (Japanese), one of the main reasons for the defeat of the squadron, said only in passing." In general, there are a lot of lies there.
        And the main thing is that not all members of the commission signed these conclusions. And this Conclusion was published - a month before October 1917. Therefore, referring to it is such an occupation ...
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 20 November 2021 12: 12
          +3
          Andrei, good afternoon!
          although his squadron had an old cadre

          Where did you get this data?
          But "about the shells (Japanese), one of the main reasons for the defeat of the squadron, said only in passing."

          The topic of shells has already been chewed up.
          The shells were very different.
          The Japanese have an advantage at long distances: the high-explosive action does not depend on the distance and the gaps are clearly visible.
          Ours - on the neighbors. Better flatness of the trajectory, they can penetrate armor and explode behind it.
          Whether to take advantage of their shells or give the advantage to the Japanese is the art of the naval commander.
          And this Conclusion was published - a month before October 1917.

          But it was written earlier and not for the general public, but for the naval officers. As instruction based on past experience. Therefore, this is not empty fiction.
          1. Maxim G
            Maxim G 20 November 2021 13: 21
            +2
            Quote: rytik32
            Where did you get this data?

            The Russians at the Investigative Commission said that the non-rich fired well (when the end battleships were able to drive off the Japanese cruisers before the start of the general battle), this is confirmed by Japanese documents.
            Everything agrees - Nebogatov was lying, it was the staff that was so good, and not his training of teams, which, although insufficient (as he himself said), was.
          2. Kayuk
            Kayuk 20 November 2021 20: 04
            +1
            Where did you get this data?

            1. Notes of the Naval Minister Admiral A. A. Birilyov on the original text of the "Conclusions of the Investigative Commission" to page 66.
            2. V.Yu. Gribovsky: “The detachment turned out to be fully equipped with conductors (non-commissioned officers), on each ship from 8 to 9 people (50 in total). Of the 2 lower ranks, about half were non-commissioned officers and sailors of regular crews, up to 435% were sailors from other Baltic ships, and about 20% were recruits from the 20 draft and about 1904% were called up from the reserve. "
            The topic of shells has already been chewed up.

            Alexey, perhaps chewed up, but there are many BUT ...
            for naval officers. As instruction based on past experience.

            1. Then why is this so-called instruction not signed by all members of that commission (Birilev, Heiden).
            2. It appeared just for naval officers in the September 1917 issue of "Marine Collection".
            3. Nicholas II, it was not approved ... Therefore, it was published after the February Revolution.
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 20 November 2021 21: 28
              +1
              2. V.Yu. Gribovsky

              and so you yourself wrote that only half were staff members.
              1. Then why is this so-called instruction not signed by all members of that commission (Birilev, Heiden).

              Neither Birilyov nor Heiden were included in the commission.
              2. It appeared just for naval officers in the September 1917 issue of "Marine Collection".

              And the conclusion was ready back in 1906, but not everyone had access to it.
              1. Kayuk
                Kayuk 20 November 2021 22: 08
                +1
                and so you yourself wrote that only half were staff members.

                So Nebogatov assured that the gunmen on the ships of his detachment were either new, untrained, or called up from the reserve and forgot everything. Those. there was no staff at all.
                To which Birilev wrote: "This is not true: they had the old cadre."
                Neither Birilyov nor Heiden were included in the commission.

                So I wrote that the commission was composed of admirals participating in the war with the Japanese in the Baltic. They all just gave a wave. A.F. Heiden was a member of the Investigative Commission. Therefore, "CONCLUSION ... ON CLARIFICATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TSUSIMA BATTLE" still cannot be used as a full-fledged official document, since there is no reason to consider the work completed due to the absence of the signature of Admiral A. F. Geiden, who does not agree with some parts of the text.
                And A. A. Birilev's remarks make it possible to consider some of the issues uncovered or biasedly considered. Something like this....
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 20 November 2021 22: 52
                  +1
                  Quote: Kayuk
                  A.F. Heiden was a member of the Commission of Inquiry

                  Yes, I was wrong. Was
                  Therefore, "CONCLUSION ... ON CLARIFICATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TSUSIMA BATTLE" still cannot be used as a full-fledged official document, since there is no reason to consider the work completed due to the absence of the signature of Admiral A. F. Geiden

                  Nevertheless, there is a solution and it was published as official.
                  1. Kayuk
                    Kayuk 21 November 2021 00: 32
                    0
                    Aleksey, a decision cannot be official if it is not signed by everyone .... Therefore, it lay under the cloth until 1917.
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 21 November 2021 00: 58
                      +1
                      This decision lay under the carpet exactly until the abdication of Nicholas 2. So Heyden's signature - nothing more than a formality Nicholas II covered up Rozhdestvensky - is no secret to anyone.
                      1. Kayuk
                        Kayuk 21 November 2021 01: 18
                        0
                        Anything is possible, Alexey! We will no longer know the truth. But there are just a lot of cover-ups ... My opinion about the admiral - he did everything in his power, and as a military man followed orders... But the fact that he, being honest, did not shout everywhere like Nebogatov, who set him up with these ordersprobably for this he was covered from newspapermen and various liberal riffraffs. Nevertheless, the sailors believed him even after the battle, the soldiers, upon his return to Russia, treated him with respect. Yes, he did something and somewhere wrong, we are all human, but in that battle, in my opinion, there was something that, even if Nelson were in his place, neither victory nor breakthrough happened would. By the way, Togo also made a lot of mistakes in that battle. But "the winners are not judged."
                      2. Very kind
                        Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 02
                        -1
                        Quote: Kayuk
                        he did everything in his power

                        fool
                        Quote: Kayuk
                        as a military man carried out the corresponding orders

                        he did not "fulfill", but criminally sabotaged
                      3. Kayuk
                        Kayuk 22 November 2021 21: 47
                        0
                        he did not "execute", but criminally sabotaged

                        Be so kind as to provide facts of criminal non-performance.
                      4. Very kind
                        Very kind 23 November 2021 11: 11
                        -2
                        Quote: Kayuk
                        Be so kind as to provide facts of criminal non-performance.

                        first thing to hand


                        there was no special department for him then
                        on "performance" in the position of N 2TE - further

                      5. Very kind
                        Very kind 23 November 2021 11: 13
                        -2
                        first thing to hand
                      6. Kayuk
                        Kayuk 23 November 2021 21: 24
                        0
                        there was no special department for him then

                        These are your emotions ... Facts, be so kind wink
                      7. Very kind
                        Very kind 24 November 2021 13: 18
                        -3
                        Quote: Kayuk
                        Facts, be so kind

                        photos didn't cling yesterday
                      8. Kayuk
                        Kayuk 26 November 2021 13: 35
                        0
                        So there the Minister of the Navy was involved ... He was then not an unknown Admiral F.K. Avelan. And the head of the naval scientific department - Admiral A.A. Virenius ....
                        Actually, I meant the orders under the command of 2 TOE. So I'm waiting for the facts.
                      9. Kayuk
                        Kayuk 27 November 2021 19: 27
                        0
                        first thing to hand

                        As I understand it, you can no longer count to two? hi
          3. unknown
            unknown 21 November 2021 10: 55
            +1
            In the live journal naval-manual, THIRTEEN ARTICLES are devoted to the shell issue.
            Everything is disassembled in great detail, from all sides.
            Conclusions are brief: Japanese shells worked better on non-armored parts of ships, ours - on armored ones.
        2. ban
          ban 21 November 2021 15: 09
          0
          overloaded ships, painted them black, fired past, maneuvered badly


          Wasn't it so, I'm ashamed to ask?
        3. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 03
          -2
          Quote: Kayuk
          These findings

          I agree.
          On this issue will be in the second part. Briefly but to the point
      2. Very kind
        Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 03
        -1
        Quote: rytik32
        Read the findings of the historical commission

        Crafty conclusions ...
  11. ban
    ban 19 November 2021 09: 18
    +6
    Everything is written correctly.
    Well, which of the Christmas artilleryman? The very distribution of ships into detachments shows that there could be no question of any centralized fire control, except for the first detachment, even theoretically. The training of artillerymen and artillery materiel is simply near-zero. Tactics need not be mentioned. Having an overwhelming advantage in heavy artillery, it's so stupid to ... fight a battle ?!
    Have the 2nd TOE at least half of the preparation of the Tsyvinsky detachment, the question of Togo's loop did not even arise - the Japanese had to be defeated by the fire of heavy guns from a long distance.
    Let us recall the fate of the British armored cruisers at Jutland ...
    Something like that.
    PS To rush to the noose of Togo with the formation of the front - for this you need to be a brilliant naval commander - Nelson or Cunningham. Alas...
    1. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 19 November 2021 13: 31
      +2
      Quote: ban
      Everything is written correctly.
      Well, which of the Christmas artilleryman? The very distribution of ships into detachments shows that there could be no question of any centralized fire control, except for the first detachment, even theoretically. The training of artillerymen and artillery materiel is simply near-zero. Tactics need not be mentioned. Having an overwhelming advantage in heavy artillery, it's so stupid to ... fight a battle ?!
      Have the 2nd TOE at least half of the preparation of the Tsyvinsky detachment, the question of Togo's loop did not even arise - the Japanese had to be defeated by the fire of heavy guns from a long distance.
      Let us recall the fate of the British armored cruisers at Jutland ...
      Something like that.
      PS To rush to the noose of Togo with the formation of the front - for this you need to be a brilliant naval commander - Nelson or Cunningham. Alas...

      To do this, you need to be a battalion. In addition to jokes, we all condemn that tank corps and armies were thrown into the prepared defense of the Germans into the Great Patriotic War, losing a huge number of people and equipment, so this is called adventurism. You tell Scheer in the Battle of Jutland on the Grand Fleet shove, maybe it will turn out torpedoes to release or store up
      1. ban
        ban 19 November 2021 13: 33
        +4
        Have you read the entire article?

        You will also tell Scheer in the Battle of Jutland on the Grand Fleet to shove


        And what did he do TWO times ???
        Gee ...
        1. Pilat2009
          Pilat2009 19 November 2021 13: 37
          +2
          Quote: ban
          Have you read the entire article?

          You will also tell Scheer in the Battle of Jutland on the Grand Fleet to shove


          And what did he do TWO times ???
          Gee ...

          In fact, he did not see the enemy, and then suddenly turned everything away
          1. ban
            ban 19 November 2021 13: 40
            +3
            And then? Take an interest
            1. Pilat2009
              Pilat2009 19 November 2021 13: 54
              +1
              Quote: ban
              And then? Take an interest

              Then he went home. He had no idea to ram
              1. ban
                ban 19 November 2021 14: 28
                +3
                What order did Scheer give to the battlecruisers after the SECOND lapel from the Grand Fleet?
                Aha laughing
                Not really funny.
                1. Pilat2009
                  Pilat2009 20 November 2021 14: 50
                  0
                  Quote: ban
                  What order did Scheer give to the battlecruisers after the SECOND lapel from the Grand Fleet?

                  Ram?
                  1. ban
                    ban 20 November 2021 15: 05
                    0
                    Ram the enemy.
                    And in general, Scheer TWO times lane on the column of the Grand Fleet, on a stick above the T, in fact. The "Kaisers" turned out to be very tenacious ...
                    They say under the influence of two bottles of schnapps drinks
                    1. Pilat2009
                      Pilat2009 20 November 2021 15: 25
                      0
                      Quote: ban
                      And in general, Scheer TWO times lane on the column of the Grand Fleet, on a stick over T

                      See above. He did not see any British ships.
                      "The British battleships opened heavy fire, causing significant damage to German ships at short range. The British were not visible from the German ships. The Germans only watched the flashes of guns on the dark side of the horizon, unable to respond. Scheer realized that he was again trapped. and decided to complete the third "combat turn"
                      1. The comment was deleted.
                      2. ban
                        ban 20 November 2021 23: 26
                        0
                        The moderators deleted my previous comment ... I will not repeat myself, read about Jutland, there is a lot of good literature now ...
                    2. unknown
                      unknown 21 November 2021 10: 56
                      0
                      And high-speed ones. During the battle, up to 24 knots were squeezed out.
                      1. ban
                        ban 21 November 2021 15: 05
                        0
                        In my opinion, "Kaiser" is an ideal PMV battleship.
    2. vladcub
      vladcub 19 November 2021 14: 37
      +1
      Honestly, I do not know well his track record, and in Vika, it’s not a hunt to look. Going out then re-entering a lot of trouble. I remember that he commanded the Vesta artillery against the Fethi Bulen and successfully
      1. ban
        ban 19 November 2021 21: 32
        +2
        In Vick, something to look for is so-so ...
        In fact, Leit-t Rozhestvensky in 1877 was the head of artillery on ships and floating batteries of the Black Sea Fleet. "Vesta" was equipped with a Davydov apparatus for the production of automatic salvo fire. It was controlled by an officer of the Artillery Department of the MTK sub-k Chernov. Something like this.
        Details - V.Yu. Gribovsky "Vice-Admiral Rozhdestvensky".
        Apparently, Rozhdestvensky remained in those times as an artilleryman ...
        Sorry to answer late, I was at work.
        1. vladcub
          vladcub 20 November 2021 08: 36
          0
          Better late than never
      2. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 20 November 2021 00: 32
        0
        Quote: vladcub
        I remember that he commanded the Vesta artillery against the Fethi Bulen and successfully

        I remember that he, after waiting for the award, exposed this "feat" of Vesta. Calling it just a shameful escape without a single successful shot laughing

        What became famous for the second time. Evil tongues from contemporaries wrote that Rozhdestvensky simply could not restrain his ardent desire to settle accounts with the commander. For all the good things, of course. They write that both were "two boots of a pair" - of an extremely vile and absurd character, as they had not bitten each other with the commander on Vesta - a big mystery. However, due to the difference in rank, Rozhdestvensky apparently suffered more. Which prompted the ZPR to do nasty things to Captain Baranov. laughing

        However, they say that Baranov, even after his resignation for lying, did not suffer much, being immediately attached to the main capital police chief. That's where he came off! laughing
        1. ban
          ban 20 November 2021 16: 22
          +1
          Well, no need to tell jokes))
          Rozhestvensky himself asked for a campaign, he did not obey Baranov in any way - he was the flagart of the Black Sea Fleet.
          I have an extremely negative attitude towards Rozhdestvensky, but the truth is more expensive
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 20 November 2021 21: 41
            +1
            Quote: ban
            Well, no need to tell jokes))

            Well, if this anecdote is already historical. Rozhdestvensky's exposure is a fact. Baranov's resignation is also a fact. Why contemporaries commented on it in this way is difficult to say, however, the disgusting character of Rozhdestvensky and the same disgusting character of Baranov are also not a secret for history.
            1. ban
              ban 20 November 2021 22: 41
              0
              Fact - Baranov was not the boss of Rozhdestvensky, well, not like that. And then - well, Russia ...
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 21 November 2021 20: 25
                0
                Quote: ban
                Fact - Baranov was not the boss of Rozhdestvensky, well, not like that. And then - well, Russia ...

                However, there was. Rozhestvensky was not part of Vesta's crew, i.e. really was not completely subordinate to Baranov. But on the other hand, Baranov was placed at the disposal of him as a senior in rank and position. This is the essence of the then conflict, apparently.
                1. ban
                  ban 21 November 2021 20: 46
                  0
                  Well xs, maybe so. The commander on the ship is a king and a god
        2. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 20 November 2021 22: 48
          0
          Quote: Saxahorse
          They say that Baranov, even after his resignation for lying, did not suffer much, being immediately attached by the chief police chief of the capital.

          You always confuse everything. Not right away, and not the chief of police.
          At the very beginning of 1881, he was the acting governor of Coven.
          March - August 1881 - Petersburg mayor.
          1882-1897 - Governor of Nizhny Novgorod.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 21 November 2021 20: 31
            0
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            Not right away, and not the chief of police.

            I am glad that you have a good command of this issue, you should have told all this a little earlier. I happened to read about this funny story of Baranov in passing in some blog. I am so generally indifferent to the fate of Baranov, unlike Rozhdestvensky, with his bad character, he still did not become the cause of the historical catastrophe.
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 21 November 2021 20: 49
              0
              Quote: Saxahorse
              You should have told all this a little earlier.

              I talked about in a post by a colleague of Caliber, dedicated to Drzewiecki.
              Quote: Saxahorse
              he, with his bad character, did not become the cause of the historical catastrophe.

              On the contrary, the man was in his place and served very productively. Everything is according to the classics.
              Each person necessarily benefits from being used in his place.

              And bad temper is not about him.
        3. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 13: 00
          -2
          Quote: Saxahorse
          I remember that he, after waiting for the award, exposed this "feat" of Vesta. Calling it just a shameful escape without a single successful shot
          What became famous for the second time. Evil tongues from contemporaries wrote that Rozhdestvensky simply could not restrain his ardent desire to settle accounts with the commander

          Other. Completely different.
          But more on that in the second part (too)
    3. rytik32
      rytik32 19 November 2021 18: 21
      +6
      Yes, and there was no takik from Rozhdestvensky.
      Why be surprised? He did not command a single large squadron until 2TOE, with the exception of perhaps a training and artillery detachment (but there is its own specificity).
      Therefore, the question is why Rozhdestvensky was put at the head of 2TOE, and not Skrydlov, Dubasov or Chukhnin, who had such an experience?
      1. A_Mazkov
        A_Mazkov 19 November 2021 20: 38
        +4
        Perhaps for the same reasons why 3TOE was headed by Nebogatov. It's just that no one else volunteered. In addition to Togo and Kamimura, the Japanese had junior flagships in every detachment, and after the death of Felkersam, Beru had to lead the 2nd detachment into battle.
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 19 November 2021 21: 40
          +6
          Skrydlov was definitely called, but Nikolai 2 refused him.
        2. Maxim G
          Maxim G 20 November 2021 07: 41
          +1
          Nebogatov initially only prepared 3 TOEs for the campaign. Danilevsky was supposed to host it, but he refused.
      2. ban
        ban 19 November 2021 21: 47
        +1
        I agree completely.
        For the sake of justice, in 1877 it was actually the flag of the Black Sea Fleet.
        In 1895 he commanded the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. The Mediterranean and Pacific squadrons were concentrated on the Chifu raid. Preparing for battle with the Japanese fleet. Commander - Tyrtov, Jr. flagships Makarov and Alekseev. Makarov's closest assistants in the development of military action plans were Rozhdestvensky and the flag officer Prince Dolgorukov.
        As you can see, Rozhdestvensky had some kind of experience, but by 1905 he had forgotten everything ... Completely.
      3. Kayuk
        Kayuk 20 November 2021 02: 55
        +1
        It was such a system .... Cens floated - leave me alone. Makarov drove these people out of the battleships with such difficulty ... Even he was not allowed to remove the commander from the ship. And for half a year there is no commander in the Pacific Ocean (January to May 1905)! This is fine. The squadron is going to Vladivostok, there is a battle ahead, the admirals may die, and you will not push anyone out of St. Petersburg to the Pacific Fleet !!! Why die, let others ... I'd rather instruct from the office ...
    4. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 19 November 2021 23: 47
      0
      Quote: ban
      PS To rush to the noose of Togo with the formation of the front - for this you need to be a brilliant naval commander - Nelson or Cunningham. Alas...

      You didn't have to be a genius to make that decision. The first was Nelson, and since then this version has been included in textbooks starting almost from the junior cadet courses. Novikov told the reality in Tsushima! Literally in all wheelhouses, officers started talking that the admiral would now order a front strike. Everyone was waiting for this! But "figvam" all .. ZPR stupidly merged.
      1. ban
        ban 19 November 2021 23: 54
        +1
        Of course, we know better from the sofa now. And Nelson was not the first, if that.
        There is a competent commentary on this issue above.
  12. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 19 November 2021 09: 20
    +2
    "But the main thing is different: the main trump card of the Second Squadron - a significant superiority in large-caliber guns - obviously could not be realized in a long wake column (and this was clearly understood even before the war)." it is absolutely true and obvious, they do not go into battle in a column either on land or at sea, You can discuss as much as you like which land mines or armor-piercing are better, but if the criminal is a coward and a traitor Zinovy ​​did not begin to line up the ships (by the front), giving them to the Japanese according to to one ... this is an obvious betrayal comparable to the betrayal of the scoundrel Ruzsky in 1917, and the goal of Rosesvensky was the destruction of the empire. death of sailors and slander on the king.
    1. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 19 November 2021 13: 34
      +3
      Quote: vladimir1155
      "But the main thing is different: the main trump card of the Second Squadron - a significant superiority in large-caliber guns - obviously could not be realized in a long wake column (and this was clearly understood even before the war)." it is absolutely true and obvious, they do not go into battle in a column either on land or at sea, You can discuss as much as you like which land mines or armor-piercing are better, but if the criminal is a coward and a traitor Zinovy ​​did not begin to line up the ships (by the front), giving them to the Japanese according to to one ... this is an obvious betrayal comparable to the betrayal of the scoundrel Ruzsky in 1917, and the goal of Rosesvensky was the destruction of the empire. death of sailors and slander on the king.

      Don't they walk in columns? Jellicoe doesn't agree with you
      1. demiurg
        demiurg 19 November 2021 19: 51
        +2
        Quote: Pilat2009

        Don't they walk in columns? Jellicoe doesn't agree with you


        Why not then? As soon as the columns became more than a dozen pennants each, the firefights ended due to smoke and hairstyle techniques. Neither the Germans nor the British even tried to attack with a front / bearing.
        1. Pilat2009
          Pilat2009 20 November 2021 14: 56
          +1
          Quote: demiurg
          Why not?

          I mean to you that after the ROE the main battle formation remained - the wake column. And not a single admiral was perverted to walk in the front. Were they all idiots?
      2. unknown
        unknown 21 November 2021 11: 03
        +1
        The problem is not in the columns, but in the wrong tactical setting.
        The Japanese had no real speed advantage (technically).
        More precisely, it was insignificant.
        And the French in their Great Maneuvers proved (the first squad is 17 knots, the second enemy squad is 13,6 knots) that such a slight advantage can be easily leveled by a maneuver.
        Such an advantage was given to them by Rozhdestvensky.
        As a result, they were able to concentrate fire and knock out our ships one by one.
    2. vladcub
      vladcub 19 November 2021 14: 31
      +2
      "the death of the sailors and slander against the tsar" so Zinovy ​​did this on purpose to frame the tsar ?!
      The henpecked Nikolasha did not have the will of his father and grandfather, and the weak-willed ruler of the state is a complete trindee!
    3. Kayuk
      Kayuk 20 November 2021 02: 59
      0
      and the goal of Rosesvensky was the destruction of the empire. death of sailors and slander on the king.

      You yourself understood what you wrote ...
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 20 November 2021 10: 46
        +1
        Quote: Kayuk
        you understood yourself

        at the beginning of the 20th century, among the intelligentsia and "enlightened" classes who read the bells, a hysterical and schizophrenic general desire was ripening to "crush the reptile" that is, the Russian empire .... by the way, it is very similar to the general insanity of the late USSR, who scolded the authorities and dreamed of living like in the West .. ...

        FI Tyutchev.
        "Waste labor - no, you can't bring them to their senses ..."
        Vain labor - no, you cannot expose them, -
        The more liberal, the more vulgar,
        Civilization is a fetish for them,
        But their idea is not available to them.

        As you bow down before her, gentlemen,
        You do not get recognition from Europe:
        In her eyes, you will always
        They are not servants of enlightenment, but servants.

        May 1867
  13. Ryaruav
    Ryaruav 19 November 2021 09: 25
    +7
    Everything is correct in the article it says, better bitter truth than pseudo-patriotic attempts to rewrite history
  14. EvilLion
    EvilLion 19 November 2021 09: 28
    +6
    Who is guilty? The Romanov dynasty and the state. build. And not such ships, not such admirals, etc., this is only a consequence. For there to be others, the country also had to be different.
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 19 November 2021 23: 53
      +1
      Quote: EvilLion
      For there to be others, the country also had to be different.

      It wasn't that bad. Normal people offered normal solutions. Correctly responded to Japan's frustrations after the confiscation of Liaodong. We began to prepare the fleet and army for war. We prepared a quite sensible program and began to work it out. Alas .. The fish rots from the head, this history teaches us over and over again over the head .. Literally a couple of timely decisions or instructions, for example, about the acceleration of the construction of Borodintsy, and there was simply no RYAV or WWI .. The monarchists clicked, and on a matter of months if not weeks.
      1. EvilLion
        EvilLion 24 November 2021 08: 17
        +1
        Living in the world and trying to claim at least something in it, it is impossible to avoid participation in a world war. And normal decisions will not be promoted if the state. the system does not contribute to this. The same serfdom was abolished in such a way as to offend the landowner as little as possible, and not in the way it was necessary. Although, it seems to be a sensible decision, which was even brought to implementation, because it was overripe.

        On land in the Russo-Japanese war, not a single battle was won either. Did this prevent Kuropatkin from holding positions at PMA? Yes, not at all.
  15. Victor Leningradets
    Victor Leningradets 19 November 2021 10: 41
    +8
    Thank you so much, Maxim!
    Although the theme of Tsushima and the role of Z.P. Rozhestvensky is hackneyed to the extreme, but due to the monstrous stream of apologetics addressed to the latter, it is simply necessary to write the truth about this.
    The trouble is that an impartial analysis of those events of a century ago has not yet been made, but instead there is a bunch of OPINIONS, subjective by human nature itself. Despite all the shades, they can be divided into four groups:
    1. The heirs of three revolutions and the immortal "Tsushima" A.S. Novikov-Priboy, who a priori consider the Russian Empire a prison of nations, the tsar a bloody mediocrity, Rozhestvensky a crazy despot, and the Second Pacific Squadron a bunch of floating targets for the Mikado fleet.
    2. The critics, corrupted by the era of "stagnation - perestroika - 90s", believe that the place of Russia is in the dustbin of history, and that Japan in 1904 - 1905. contributed to the destruction of this goliath, begun back in the war of 1953 - 1955.
    3. Nostalgic for Russia, the second we have lost the descendants of the peasants of that time, seeing themselves in the role of admirals and politicians of that time, who, armed with an afterthought, would not allow Tsushima's shame.
    4. Technicians and historians (all amateurs) who study the cause-and-effect relationships of defeat solely on the basis of correlating the technical parameters of military equipment and the tactics of its use.
    Of course, this list is the same fruit of the biased analysis of the author of these lines.
    Naturally, a biased analysis of any of these groups is guilty of the task of obtaining a result pleasing to the soul, which automatically throws out from consideration everything that does not fit into the Procrustean bed of the researcher.
    As a result, upcoming work on Tsushima, claiming objectivity, MUST take into account the available material submitted by all four groups (despite the disgusting writings of group 2).
    Nevertheless, all four groups are forced to rely on indisputable facts:
    1. The squadron was assembled in the shortest possible time and under the leadership of ZP Rozhestvensky made an unprecedented voyage across three oceans without losing a single ship and without having serious damage during the voyage.
    2. In the daytime battle on May 14, 1905, the Second Pacific Squadron was completely defeated, and during the night from May 14 to May 15, 1905, it was finished off by torpedo attacks. Some of the ships fled, and some - shamefully surrendered on the afternoon of May 15.
    3. Control of the squadron by Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky was lost 40 minutes after the opening of fire.
    This is, in short, everything that all researchers admit, despite one or another bias.
    As for the genre of alternative history, in which they often try to change the events that actually took place, it must be borne in mind that any alternative action is parried by an alternative reaction, unless a priori the enemy is considered a complete idiot, so that under the given boundary conditions, the result, if not a foregone conclusion, then has little variation ...
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 20 November 2021 00: 02
      -1
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      Despite all the shades, they can be divided into four groups:

      Alas, a mistake. You missed item number "0"! All the most important conclusions were drawn already a hundred years ago, right after the battle. And the heat of public passions was much more serious than today's sluggish dispute .. The conclusions of the court are known - "they fired badly, badly maneuvered, bad management!" Today's rehash of the eternal-yesterday's Bulkokhrusta is just another attempt to rewrite history.

      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      Nevertheless, all four groups are forced to rely on indisputable facts:

      All three facts cited by you are also more than controversial. For example, point 1 - the terms set by the emperor - Rozhdestvensky were disrupted, instead of July 1, the squadron left only on October 1. P.2 it is generally not clear what was there. A.3 - initially there was no control. None of the commanders knew what he was going to do in battle. They walked stupidly behind the matelot or even dodged around in circles around ..
    2. unknown
      unknown 21 November 2021 11: 11
      -3
      The problem is deeper and more tragic.
      Now there are new data on the revolutions of 1917, and the Soviet period.
      Victory in the RYAV was unnecessary.
      Preparations for the bankruptcy of the country began in 1896.
      And a victory in RYAV would have confused all the cards.
      By 1907, most of the large enterprises were corporatized.
      The shares are sold on foreign markets.
      The funds received, through the extremely timely introduced gold ruble, were withdrawn abroad.
      Add to this the gold taken out of the country to support the Fed's operations.
      In 1917, the country was bankrupt, the new owners of the enterprises were thrown, the debts were hung on the population.
      Refusal to pay debts is a fiction. In fact, they began to pay off the debts with the help of concessions.
      Many researchers believe that Nicholas II did not die, but quietly left for Great Britain, where he ruled until 1936 under the name of George the Fifth.
      It is clear that not all were traitors, but the "fifth column" was grandiose.
  16. Trilobite Master
    Trilobite Master 19 November 2021 11: 29
    +8
    I don’t know, colleagues, tell me, please, is this the beginning of the holivar or is it a continuation? smile
    The style of the article is clearly sharply polemical, with a practically formalized transition to personalities and criticism of the opponent directly, and not of his constructions.
    Ink shots start to smell like feces. From the content of the article, it follows with a greater degree of evidence not that someone Rozhdestvensky is mediocrity, but that someone Kolobov is a swindler and manipulator.
    Stop, gentlemen! Our life is not a marzipan anyway, and VO is less and less like a club of intellectuals, let's not aggravate this unfortunate situation.
    I suggest leaving arguments like "he was the first to start" for kindergarten. smile
    1. 3x3zsave
      3x3zsave 19 November 2021 11: 43
      +1
      a certain Kolobov
      This is "Andrey from Chelyabinsk"
      Michael! hi
      1. Trilobite Master
        Trilobite Master 19 November 2021 12: 48
        0
        I understood that, Anton. smile
        I just didn’t elaborate. It's not about the personalities of Andrey or Maxim. The point is not to switch to these personalities. Who started it first is not the point. The main thing is to stop and preferably immediately. smile
        However, the topic does not really interest me, although I try to read Andrei's articles, so if the guys want to dissolve the srach already at the level of articles, and not comments, please, especially since I cannot interfere with this process in any way. I'll just stop reading and that's it. request
    2. Elturisto
      Elturisto 19 November 2021 13: 54
      +6
      This is when this VO was a club of intellectuals :)?
      1. Trilobite Master
        Trilobite Master 19 November 2021 14: 47
        +4
        And I didn’t say that I was. You read something wrong.
        VO sometimes resembled a club of intellectuals with some articles and discussions. For example, people who are quite adequate, knowledgeable and not stupid usually gathered under Andrey's articles - although the topics of his research are not close to me, and I am familiar with them superficially, it was interesting to read both articles and discussions. Respect for the opponent, argumentation of positions, links to sources ...
        Now, if Andrey answers in the same style, but I'm afraid that he will:
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Okay, Maxim, I warned you

        the branch will turn into a srach, in which there will again be a place for the Anglo-Saxons, and for Stalin and Putin, and, finally, for Ukraine and the superethnos, since the citizens "responsible" for these topics on the website will immediately find a breeding ground for themselves in the polemics.
        1. 27091965
          27091965 19 November 2021 15: 00
          +5
          Quote: Trilobite Master
          Now, if Andrey answers in the same style, but I'm afraid that he will:
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Okay, Maxim, I warned you

          the branch will turn into a srach,


          Let's hope this doesn't happen.
          1. Very kind
            Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 54
            -1
            Quote: 27091965i
            Let's hope this doesn't happen.

            there is no point
            stupidly there is no subject of discussion
            there are "fans of Faberge Zinovy"
            and there are facts
            see - despite a bunch of posts by "fans of Faberge" - there is not a single real objection in them, despite the fact that A. Kolobov himself above about "Oslyabya" again began to talk nonsense, "not noticing" (or not understanding) anything on the issue speed (and maneuver and as a factor in reducing the effectiveness of enemy fire)
        2. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 56
          -1
          Quote: Trilobite Master
          VO sometimes resembled a club of intellectuals with some articles and discussions. For example, people who are quite adequate, knowledgeable and not stupid usually gathered under Andrey's articles - although the topics of his research are not close to me, and I am familiar with them superficially, it was interesting to read both articles and discussions. Respect for the opponent, argumentation of positions, links to sources ...

          fool
          Are you talking about this? -
          ... Russian ships demonstrated a level of combat training unprecedented for the Russian Imperial Navy ...
          All of the above would make it possible to consider the Russian commander a brilliant naval commander ... if not for a number of mistakes that Zinovy ​​Petrovich made in the implementation of his, in every respect, an outstanding plan.

          wassat
          or about this -
          So in this situation, any sane commander of the "Oslyabi" would smoothly reduce the speed in advance, perhaps - he would make the coordinate to the right, but would let the "Eagle" pass forward,

          fool
    3. vladcub
      vladcub 19 November 2021 15: 27
      +3
      Mish, Anton hands and feet for !.
      "do not aggravate" here I am with 2 hands for. To swear not figs to go to the site. Enough in the queue and you will hear everything about: yourself, close relatives, power and the weather
    4. Very kind
      Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 58
      -1
      Quote: Trilobite Master
      Ink shots start to smell like feces.

      a long time ago
      for example:
      So in this situation, anyone sane the commander of "Oslyabi" would smoothly reduce the speed in advance, perhaps - would make a coordinate to the right, but would have let the "Eagle" go ahead, would have avoided a collision and stopping the battleship. Rem proudly lane forward to the last

      and performed by "fan of Faberge Zinovy" A. Kolobov
  17. Victor Leningradets
    Victor Leningradets 19 November 2021 13: 51
    +6
    Disgraced completely by the fleet, disgraced by the army, which, in my opinion, ceased to exist in the same way as the Port Arthur fleet ceased to exist with Port Arthur itself. This stupid second squadron will also cease to exist, there will be a small increase to the shame, to the people's grief.

    We must pay tribute to Z.P. Rozhestvensky - he assessed the situation correctly.
    Many note the similarity of the strategic layouts of the 1953-1955 wars. and 1904-1905 The fact is that the Russian Empire in these wars alone resisted the alliance of the most powerful powers with cannon fodder. In the first case, Great Britain, France and Turkey, in the second - Great Britain, the USA and Japan. It's just that in the first case, due to the initial successes of the Russian Army and Navy, a large predator had to intervene without warning, then in the second it cost little (Japanese) blood and British equipment. It would not work - we would have had a defeat from the heirs of Rodney and Nelson!
    Like half a century before, the main guarantee of victory was logistics and the possession of the sea - a lesson that was not learned by tsarism. The stake on "the heroism and prowess of the Russian soldier (sailor)" turned out to be beaten by strategic planning, advanced technology and combat training.
    I wonder how, realizing all this, Rozhdestvensky continued to seek battles with the Japanese fleet? Has the careerist in him so overpowered the sane military leader?
    Obviously yes:
    “And here the squadron, undoubtedly, was to be met by a concentrated Japanese fleet, with an outnumbering of cruising and mine detachments, but with almost equal forces of armored squadrons ... the enemy can do whatever harm is done, break through to Vladivostok. "

    This Rozhdestvensky one is genuine, and letters to his wife and public speeches about a spark of civic courage are all straws! The adventurer sent the squadron into battle deliberately, knowing about all the shortcomings of the materiel and combat training, not looking for ways to get to Vladivostok even with the most valuable part of the squadron. And transports and illuminated hospital "Eagle" took with him just to attract the enemy, a kind of "I'm coming to you!"
    Of course, the experience of the battle at Shantung on July 28.07.1904, XNUMX was a weak hope for success. But this position characterizes him as a mediocre naval commander. To withstand the beating for many hours by giving up the initiative to the enemy means giving the latter the opportunity to freely maneuver and consistently destroy their own ships.
    Twelve Japanese battleships acted in close formation, concentrating their fire in the first period of the battle, successively on the lead ones, from among our most high-speed battleships, who nevertheless received some support from the followers of the Matels.

    That is, in fact, Rozhdestvensky himself admits that he allowed, giving the initiative to the enemy, to destroy an equal number of combat convoy in parts. At the same time, references to the fact that without ballast of old ships
    then the Japanese battleships, being able to develop a speed greater than our best walkers, would have kept their course of action and, only in a shorter period of time, would have overcome the color of our squadron with concentrated forces, in order, then, jokingly, to catch up and overcome the abandoned
    It is clear that 15-16 knots of Japanese battleships and 18 knots of Japanese armored cruisers against 13-14 knots (and possibly more!) Of the first detachment do not give the same freedom of maneuver as against 9-10 knots of the connected line. You still need to run after them! So it was the move of 9 knots and the inflexible line that ensured the Japanese destruction of the "squadron color" and finishing off the "abandoned" ones.
    Particularly unpleasant is the fact that the command is not secure in case of failure of the flagship. After all, it was this experience of the battle of July 28.07.1904, XNUMX that should have been taken into account in the first place! No! All subordinates for him are rams, incapable of making independent decisions. The decision made characterizes Vice-Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky as an unimportant military leader, relying only on his own infallibility and perhaps Russian. So he was able to drag the squadron "across the three seas", never to defeat Admiral H. Togo.
    Thus, the answers to the main questions:
    1. Could the Russian Empire have won in the war of 1904-1905? - No.
    2. Could the Second Pacific Squadron, at least partially, break through to Vladivostok - it will become clear from the command-staff games.
    3. Could the Second Pacific Squadron under the leadership of Vice-Admiral Rozhdestvensky defeat the Mikado fleet under the leadership of Admiral Togo in a general battle?
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 20 November 2021 00: 08
      0
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      Thus, the answers to the main questions:

      Well, what a pessimist you are ..
      P.1 - Yes, of course! RI was many times superior to the enemy, a small peripheral half-power. There was a 95% chance of winning in any case.
      P2. - Of course I could, and it was not too difficult.
      P.3 - under the leadership of Rozhdestvensky, you can only commit suicide and more agonizing .. Here you are right.
      1. Maxim G
        Maxim G 20 November 2021 15: 34
        +2
        People are fighting, and the command staff in the navy was poorly trained, and often openly cowardly. So there was nothing good for Russia in that war.
        And when you write about the strike by the front line, one must understand that no one prepared the crews for this.

      2. Victor Leningradets
        Victor Leningradets 21 November 2021 19: 18
        -1
        I'm realist!
        And I remember the lessons of history very well.
        Russian "power" was not visible against the background of the British Empire and the North American United States.
        If your scenario was realized with the breakthrough of the Second Pacific Squadron to Vladivostok and the accumulation of a critical mass of Russian troops in Manchuria, the "Red Race" (as it was called in the domestic press) would send troops to Primorye to block the Trans-Siberian Railway and occupy Vladivostok.
        The second Pacific would have been destroyed by the British fleet, including 12-14 battleships of the Duncan and Formideble class. The half-million Russian army, having devoured all the horses, would have been forced to get out of Manchuria, the name on the tail of a completely combat-ready enemy.
        I think that the Americans would also take part in the division of the booty and would chop off Chukotka from the Russian Empire, and at the same time Kamchatka. And then, in general, it is possible to form a certain version of a "democratic republic of Russia" (an analogue of the Far Eastern Republic) stuffed with emigre and local scum under the auspices of the great powers. Do not forget about the rampant revolutionary actions within the Russian Empire.
        I do not think that the value of Russia as an ally against Germany would overpower the desire to once and for all discourage Russia's desire to encroach on the sphere of influence of the Anglo-Saxons. Moreover, after the demonstrative flogging, the Tsar would undoubtedly become more accommodating.
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 21 November 2021 21: 13
          -1
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          The Second Pacific would have been destroyed by the British Fleet, including 12-14

          We heard such nonsense even in the testimony of the commanders of both Pacific squadrons. Especially the commander of Oleg Dobrotvorsky shone as a pomnitsa, as if he assured that the Russian squadron was defeated by British battleships. wassat

          The British did not shine with love for the Russian Empire, of course, but they were the ones who hastily agreed to a truce and search for compromises when the Republic of Ingushetia began to advance in Afghanistan and Turkestan. The British already knew for sure that they had nothing to protect India and Persia from a blow from the north.

          Well, in general, the assessment of the alignments for 1905 is completely inadequate. RI was considered the strongest power on the continent and none of its major players was ready to openly attack it. Only the ridiculous defeat of the Republic of Ingushetia in the RYAV served as a trigger to all dreams of a redivision of the world.
          1. Victor Leningradets
            Victor Leningradets 22 November 2021 11: 31
            0
            If we recall history, the American-Japanese intervention in our Far East, and also the Anglo-American intervention in the North, is not such a long history.
            As soon as 1878 Great Britain turned to Russia, and she set her tail between her legs in the Balkans. The most powerful on the continent? Well, excluding Germany, maybe, but not in every part of Europe and Asia.
            Here you have a typical expression of overland thinking. Do you think that if you have more army than the enemy, then victory is in your pocket? No! You need to have an overwhelming lead in the right place at the right time. Countries such as Great Britain, the United States and Japan understood this very well. Quickly transfer troops by sea, take key positions, and an even more numerous enemy will be defeated.
            In addition, ownership of the sea provides ownership of the initiative. You will not be able to reliably block all threatening directions, ensure a quick maneuver of forces in the Russian expanses, and most importantly, really threaten the enemy.
            Now about China. Great Britain had been preparing Japan for a long time as a "torpedo" for the Far Eastern aspirations of the Russian Empire. This ensured both the colonial interests of Great Britain and the reorientation of Russia to the war with Germany, which was necessary in the near future. The United States also joined the pie section, which provided co-financing for this project. So they would not have allowed Japan to fail and Russia to gain strength. I think that the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was also a consequence of the pressure of the Anglo-Saxons on Russia. Otherwise, really - why end the war without a land victory?
    2. Seal
      Seal 20 November 2021 11: 45
      -1
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      1. Could the Russian Empire have won in the war of 1904-1905? - No.
      2. Could the Second Pacific Squadron, at least partially, break through to Vladivostok - it will become clear from the command-staff games.
      3. Could the Second Pacific Squadron under the leadership of Vice-Admiral Rozhdestvensky defeat the Mikado fleet under the leadership of Admiral Togo in a general battle?
      While one can still agree with the answers to the second and third questions, one cannot agree with the answer to the first question. The Russian Empire could well have won the Russo-Japanese War. Yes, that's a paradox. Despite all the defeats, the military-strategic state of the Russian Empire was better than that of the Japanese Empire. The number of Russian troops in Manchuria continued to increase, reinforcements arrived. By the time of the conclusion of peace, the Russian armies in Manchuria occupied positions near the village of Sypingai and numbered about 500 thousand fighters; the troops were located not in a line, as before, but echeloned in depth; the army has significantly strengthened technically - we have howitzer batteries, machine guns, the number of which has increased from 36 to 374; communication with Russia was no longer maintained by 3 pairs of trains, as at the beginning of the war, but by 12 pairs. The spirit of our Manchu armies was not broken.
      The Japanese, who had suffered huge losses, were not active. Since the Japanese army, which stood against the Russian, numbered only about 300 thousand fighters. The former upsurge in it was no longer observed. Japan was economically exhausted.
      But Kuropatkin's tactics were aimed at depleting Japan. In principle, this is how it happened. If Kuropatkin had not waited until another two or three divisions arrived at his front (and they arrived constantly, with a frequency of 1 division every two weeks), but had struck with the available forces, then the Japanese army would have rolled back at the speed of a steam locomotive ...
      But alas, the Japanese have started a dastardly game, rocking Russia from within, financing our revolutionaries and supplying them with weapons.
      1. ban
        ban 21 November 2021 15: 03
        +2
        At the time of the conclusion of peace, the Russian armies in Manchuria were occupying positions near the village of Sypingai

        And our army bosses were much more afraid of their own offensive than of the Japanese.
        Paradox!
    3. unknown
      unknown 21 November 2021 11: 21
      0
      Above in the comments, I have already noted that the real speed of the Japanese in Tsushima is not more than 14 knots.
      The obsolete "Fuji" ("Fuji") did not run more than 15 knots in the RYA. Plus a huge fuel overload on all Japanese ships of the line.
      Japanese armored cruisers (that "asams", that "Garibaldians") are extremely unsuccessful ships that did not match the battle in the line against battleships due to weak weapons, and were not suitable as a "fast detachment" because of their real slow speed (for a long time 15 to 17 knots).
      Answering your questions:
      1. The country has been preparing for bankruptcy since 1896. There is no need to win a war.
      2. The wrong tactical attitude was chosen by Rozhestvensky, which largely determined the result.
      3. Incorrect shipbuilding policy: the search for a new type of battleship for serial construction, instead of building a second series of battleships of the "Poltava" type, did not allow concentrating additional ships in this theater of operations until the fall of Port Arthur.
      Possible reason - see point one.
      1. ban
        ban 21 November 2021 14: 59
        -1
        extremely unsuccessful ships that did not match the battle in the line against battleships due to weak weapons

        And also cardboard for our 10 "and 12" guns.

        Incorrect shipbuilding policy: the search for a new type of battleship for serial construction, instead of building a second series of battleships of the "Poltava" type, did not allow concentrating additional ships in this theater of operations

        It is still inexplicable for me - to send Sisoy and Navarin to the Baltic before the war - what state of mind should you be in ?!
        What would be superfluous?
        But it was possible to leave this low-speed five in Arthur, and concentrate the high-speed ships in Vladivostok - then Togo would have insoluble problems
    4. ban
      ban 21 November 2021 14: 38
      0
      Unfortunately, history does not know the subjunctive mood.
      Could the Russian Empire have won the war of 1904-1905?

      I just had to!

      Could the Second Pacific Squadron, under the leadership of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, defeat the Mikado fleet in a general battle?

      Here I agree - definitely not under the leadership of Rozhdestvensky.
      Under the guidance of a normal admiral and with good training, I could!
  18. Elturisto
    Elturisto 19 November 2021 13: 59
    -8
    Respect to the author, I hit the "Severe Chelyabinsk" crust-baked dreadnought with the whole board, in my opinion, serious damage below the waterline and the tower jammed.
    1. Catfish
      Catfish 19 November 2021 19: 26
      +5
      ... the branch will turn into a srach, in which there will again be a place for the Anglo-Saxons, and for Stalin and Putin, and, finally, for Ukraine and the superethnos, since the citizens "responsible" on the site for these topics will immediately find nourishing controversy in the controversy Wednesday.


      Judging by your commentary, Mikhail predicted everything quite accurately, and you are a clear confirmation of this, Mr. "Crisp-baked Dreadnought".
      1. Elturisto
        Elturisto 19 November 2021 19: 38
        -2
        Something in my commentary I do not find mentions or even hints of these politicians, countries or ethnic groups.
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          1. The comment was deleted.
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  19. LisKat2
    LisKat2 19 November 2021 14: 53
    +6
    by no means seemed hopeless "toadying.
    I read that in his youth he boldly criticized the technical backwardness of the fleet. And he has matured and says that the bosses are pleased.
    I can’t defend him: I don’t have so much knowledge, but they frighten him even without me. It seems to me that he correctly said about himself: "Just a person who did not have the necessary data to cope with the task."
  20. LisKat2
    LisKat2 19 November 2021 15: 07
    +3
    Please tell me how to change the nickname and avatar to install?
    I had a profile on that phone, but not here
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 19 November 2021 22: 07
      0
      We go to the main page, at the top right there is a square with an avatar, click, then click on "Profile", then on what has appeared, we look for the settings pencil at the top right, click and edit the avatar in the window that appears smile
  21. Elturisto
    Elturisto 19 November 2021 17: 38
    0
    Quote: Trilobite Master
    And I didn’t say that I was. You read something wrong.
    VO sometimes resembled a club of intellectuals with some articles and discussions. For example, people who are quite adequate, knowledgeable and not stupid usually gathered under Andrey's articles - although the topics of his research are not close to me, and I am familiar with them superficially, it was interesting to read both articles and discussions. Respect for the opponent, argumentation of positions, links to sources ...
    Now, if Andrey answers in the same style, but I'm afraid that he will:
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Okay, Maxim, I warned you

    the branch will turn into a srach, in which there will again be a place for the Anglo-Saxons, and for Stalin and Putin, and, finally, for Ukraine and the superethnos, since the citizens "responsible" for these topics on the website will immediately find a breeding ground for themselves in the polemics.

    Actually, Admiral Rozhestvensky mutilated at least two sailors, his brothers in arms. This is not going into his professional "achievements" - therefore, an attempt to justify this monkey in uniform cannot be a sign of intelligence, but rather a sign of the moral degradation of this justifier himself. The beating of sailors was staged in the Russian Imperial Navy on a large scale and was massive. The Russian man was a second-class man in his country, and the sailors themselves felt it well. And the sailors are the most educated layer of the military. And all this led to Potemkin, Ochakov, Sveaborg, then to the execution of an officer in 1917. But history, as you know, teaches nothing.
  22. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 19 November 2021 19: 52
    +6
    Damn .... In the morning I read the material, due to lack of time and the fact that during the day it is not comme il faut to write my opinion on the mobile (the boy is not small, large, the fingers are also not female, because typing on the smart keyboard looks comical, especially large texts ...)))) decided to leave until the evening. In the evening, when we came home from work, and even after Friday evening, I read the material again, then all the comments ... Then the material AGAIN have a complete understanding of the author's opinion .. request
    The topic of RYAV, especially Tsushima, is very interesting, opinions on this topic are always read by me, I often express my opinion without getting personal.
    M. Klimov brought confusion, but this is his right and his opinion. Personally, I would like the truth not to evaporate while the passions are boiling !!! For then there will be no point in these "battles" ....
    According to the article, I had a couple of questions for the author, but I will repeat - I will wait for all the material smile For not everything is so unambiguous with the author. With all due respect to him (based on previous materials on the state of the fleet), we are talking here and now, and the ZPR was on the bridge then. What has happened has happened - this cannot be changed and it is a thankless task to look for the guilty. The same A. Kolobov, A. Rytik. Mr. R. Ivanov only express their views on the past and, again, it does not do honor to smash them to smithereens. You can express your opinion, and consider them the lawyers of the ZPR - No. ... We are operating this day with our message and believe that wow, I would have given Togo down the drain ... WOULD NOT! If only because Rozhdestvensky acted on the basis of an order to seize the sea. Therefore, he proceeded from HIS knowledge of previous collisions (under PA ) with the Japanese. And he believed that he must first go to Vladivostok, and then act on the basis of the situation. Therefore, having an order in your hands, you will no longer brandish a saber and rush at the enemy. Therefore, personally, I consider the option of throwing the front line at the enemy as a variant of afterthought, and not common sense. I will repeat myself - I consider this given by the author only the opinion of the author, and not the only correct option ...
    I have my own opinion on this, thank gods, the brains to analyze something and draw conclusions for myself have been preserved. Albeit with laziness repeat
    So I’d better wait for everything, and then I’ll speak out. Without transitions to personalities ...
    The article is a plus, since the topic is interesting and a fresh opinion (albeit with excesses) is interesting hi
    All with a holiday of rocket and gunners (and yourself) drinks smile
    1. Astra wild2
      Astra wild2 19 November 2021 20: 36
      0
      Colleague, Rurikovich, I remember your remarks under Andrey's works. Therefore, I will wait for your work to evaluate the arguments.
    2. Very kind
      Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 51
      -2
      Quote: Rurikovich
      If only because Rozhdestvensky acted on the basis of order to seize the sea

      fool
      he scored on him
      BOLT
      more in the next
  23. The comment was deleted.
  24. Constanty
    Constanty 19 November 2021 22: 20
    0
    Defeat in battle is born in the head.
    I believe that, despite many objective reasons, such an attitude, the idea of ​​battle (or its lack) is a heavy pressure on the commander.
    With his attitude, he accepted the role of front man and became the scapegoat - or maybe he never had any advantages or courage - after all, his greatest feat and springboard of his career was actually Vesta's escape to battleship ". Fethi Bulend "

    In addition to the ability to shine at court, Makarov lacked professional talent, courage (including civil) and determination.

    And yes, Makarov was wrong and died, ignoring the threats, but died with honor and respect.
    Cowardice, procrastination and fatalism of Rozhdestvensky led to a defeat incomparable even with Trafalgar (from the point of view of France and Spain).
    1. unknown
      unknown 21 November 2021 11: 26
      +1
      About the defeat in the head.
      The topic has been very well studied by Western military psychologists.
      The optimal minimum age for a soldier is 35 years.
      Management age starts at 42 years old.
      Psychophysiologically, only two percent of the population is prepared for war.
      But, if there are people in the unit belonging to these two percent, then the unit's survival rate on the battlefield rises sharply.
  25. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 20 November 2021 00: 21
    +2
    A good article with carefully and correctly selected arguments and materials. The article is made in the form of criticism of previous materials on this topic, but this is just good, the continuity of events, facts and arguments is understandable. Thanks to the author!

    The reaction of Andrey's fans from Chelyabinsk is interesting. Not having time (or failing) to give a single argument on the essence of the article, they immediately demanded to delete it for insufficient "respect for the author" of previous opuses on this topic. The reaction is peculiar and once again devilishly resembles the reactions of the admirers of Academician Fomenko with his insane "new chronology". Exactly the same abundance of scientific reasoning and complete unwillingness to speak in the language of real facts and documents.

    Sorry guys .. Rozhdestvensky was convicted of mediocrity and complete inability a hundred years ago, as a result of the analysis of Tsushima with still living witnesses. Today's attempts to rewrite history once again, using the death of eyewitnesses, do not arouse the slightest respect for the initiators of this "exhumation"!
    1. Kayuk
      Kayuk 20 November 2021 03: 36
      0
      Rozhestvensky was convicted of mediocrity and complete inability a hundred years ago, as a result of the analysis of Tsushima with still living witnesses.

      1. Above, I have already written about these so-called conclusions or Conclusions, in which there are a lot of lies.
      2. Rozhestvensky was banally framed or made a switchman, having written off all the flaws of that system on him.
      3. Confirmation of this - did not touch Nebogatov. He was told to speak only against Rozhestvensky, because if they started to put pressure on him as well as on the commander of the 2nd TOE, he, as a dishonest person, would begin to say what many did not like. And so - everything is sewn-covered. The abscess was camouflaged. The truth was enough for 12 years.
      4. I am writing here, not trying in any way to whitewash Rozhdestvensky, he is a man of that system, we can no longer understand this. I just want to know why it happened at Tsushima that way, in 40 minutes the squadron was gone. A counterbalance to this battle is the Battle of the Yellow Sea and the Battle of the Korea Strait. Three fights and such different results.
      5. I read the article - just such a rejection from her, you can see bile and an attempt to humiliate everyone who here expresses protection to the Admiral. In the comments went srach and mutual insults ... No, guys, thanks to such "authors" we will never know the truth ...
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 20 November 2021 21: 10
        0
        Quote: Kayuk
        I just want to know why it happened at Tsushima that way, in 40 minutes the squadron was gone. The counterbalance to this battle is the Battle of the Yellow Sea and the Battle of the Korea Strait.

        The first and obvious reason is the overloading of ships, the stupid order of Rozhestvensky about full loading with coal and water before the battle turned the battleships into half-submerged unarmored troughs. Bring the ZPR ships to a normal state, the Japanese would not be able to sink anyone. And especially Borodino, who showed amazing vitality and resilience. And immediately the second reason, the complete lack of control in battle. ZPR failed to clearly issue instructions to its flagships. I didn't even try, the story of Oslyabya, who was left without an admiral even before the battle, especially hurts.

        Quote: Kayuk
        I read the article - just such a rejection from her, you can see bile and an attempt to humiliate everyone who here expresses protection to the Admiral.

        It is impossible to convince you by definition. You evaluate any word in a binary system. Anything that casts doubt on the wisdom of Rozhdestvensky is a deliberate lie for you. Meanwhile, for more than a hundred years it has been obvious to the majority that the cause of the catastrophe in the RYAV was precisely the STUFF of Admiral Rozhdestvensky. sad
        1. Kayuk
          Kayuk 20 November 2021 21: 49
          +1
          complete lack of control in battle. ZPR failed to clearly issue instructions to its flagships

          So why don't you hate Vitgeft then? It was worse there .... The squadron just crumbled in an instant.
          Anything that casts doubt on the wisdom of Rozhdestvensky is a deliberate lie for you.

          Where did I write this? The point of my message is that you shouldn't dwell on it. He is a victim of those circumstances, as well as his squadron. His guilt is also undeniable as a commander. But to crush the squadron in 40 minutes - there are other reasons that have not yet been clarified.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 20 November 2021 22: 11
            +1
            Quote: Kayuk
            Where did I write this? The point of my message is that you shouldn't dwell on it.

            Necessary! It is necessary to focus on the main causes of the catastrophe, and it is Rozhdestvensky that is its main cause! It is not necessary to reduce everything to abstract, universal issues. Rozhdestvensky is the third after the tsar in matters of the fleet! He is what they call the subject of history! Its influence on the entire history of the RYAV is enormous; it is truly a fatal figure for the Russian Empire ..
            1. Kayuk
              Kayuk 20 November 2021 22: 13
              +1
              Well then, there is no place for you, since you have decided everything for yourself who is the reason for the defeat ... yes
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 20 November 2021 22: 17
                +2
                Quote: Kayuk
                since you have decided everything for yourself who is the reason for the defeat ...

                Well, I'm not convincing myself. And for the hundredth and thousandth time I remind the reality of history to numerous liars and similar "exhumators" of long-buried villains and mediocrity.
                1. Kayuk
                  Kayuk 21 November 2021 00: 30
                  0
                  numerous liars and similar "exhumators" of long-buried villains and mediocrity

                  I don't recognize you in the mask ...
                  Meanwhile, there were such enthusiastic liberals in Russia who, upon receiving news of the death of the squadron at Tsushima, without flinching, composed a telegram of greetings to the Japanese emperor, congratulating him on his victory ... over the Russian autocracy.
                  1. Saxahorse
                    Saxahorse 21 November 2021 20: 53
                    -1
                    Quote: Kayuk
                    without flinching, composed a greeting telegram to the Japanese emperor,

                    There are many of those in Russia today. People who sincerely hate both their own people and their country are not at all difficult to find among the allegedly new Russian "elite".
          2. Very kind
            Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 45
            -1
            Quote: Kayuk
            a victim of those circumstances

            nichrome to myself "sacrifice" ...
            not just No. 3 in the naval hierarchy, but with the right of personal report H2
            1. Kayuk
              Kayuk 22 November 2021 21: 43
              +1
              Go yourself to report to H2 from Madagascar. What do you think he did there for more than 2 months? Probably # 1 and # 2 in your hierarchy made him sunbathe there ... sad
              1. Very kind
                Very kind 23 November 2021 11: 05
                -2
                Quote: Kayuk
                Go yourself to report to H2 from Madagascar.

                ZPR himself drove himself into this Opu
                before that, he had the opportunity to report to H2 - and he did it VERY DOSED (well, he kept his tail in the wind)
                1. Kayuk
                  Kayuk 23 November 2021 21: 20
                  +1
                  ZPR himself drove himself into this Opu

                  Read the docs
                  1. Very kind
                    Very kind 24 November 2021 13: 21
                    -4
                    Quote: Kayuk
                    Read the docs

                    aha
                    GUIDANCE
                    and not false excuses ZPR
                    - there is no time to disassemble in detail what he wove on the case, but already the report to Virenius (according to Shcheglov) just ... at the pole, the sirloin part twisted and was twisted (ZPR) - how to get rid of it
                    1. Kayuk
                      Kayuk 26 November 2021 13: 47
                      0
                      Shcheglov - this is already 1906 and there the case is vague (the subordinate spreads his superior superiors in a report, and this boss personally gives a course to this case. And at that the issue is resolved very quickly. less is a fact). And now we are talking about 1904. So I would like the facts of those years. And so it turns out a set of unproven lies, selected metered out from the rumors and tales of Silych.
          3. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 08: 09
            0
            About Vitgeft.
            There is such a funny discipline - astrology.
            Perhaps funny, but, for example, Grigory Kvasha, a physicist by training, created the so-called structural horoscope. Moreover, he does not consider himself an astrologer, he claims that everything is according to science.
            So, any competent astrologer will say that people born in the year of the Goat, for all their merits (and they are, for example, Steve Jobs, Geitz should not be offered - he is a functional autist) have significant drawbacks: they cannot engage in politics, politics, commerce and the military business. Fail.
        2. ban
          ban 21 November 2021 14: 44
          0
          And especially the Borodino people, who showed amazing vitality and resilience

          That is why after the RYAV they (Slava and Tsesarevich) were not modernized, unlike the Black Sea five, and by the beginning of WWII they were ships of the 2nd line.
          Let's remember the battle of Slava in Moonsund - it turned out to be made of cardboard. The Japanese simply did not have normal armor-piercing shells ... Something like this
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 21 November 2021 21: 00
            0
            Quote: ban
            Let's remember the battle of Slava in Moonsund - it turned out to be made of cardboard.

            Glory in Moonsund is like a mammoth in a swamp, where you do not turn immediately stuck. For the Baltic, and specifically for the protection of mine positions, the BBO was built. Battleships of 15000 tons or more in the Baltic could pass through very few fairways. On which Slava ran into, after the first hole, having lost the ability to move. It's just that ships of this class have too much draft.

            However, this did not stop the fans of cutting from the imperial elite, the Baltic battleships are an example of this. One single access to long-range cover during the entire First World War, and at the same time six serious navigational accidents with many months of repairs at the docks.
            1. ban
              ban 21 November 2021 21: 29
              +1
              You are wrong here in any way. And the Kaiser with Koenig at Moonsund?
              Although Regensburg they lost on the stones wink In Finland.
              Baltic !!
              Although Tirpitz felt good in the Baltic, the rest of the great Germans.
              And the last parade in Kronstadt?
              They also overtook the elephants, be healthy!
              And navigational accidents in WWI - so did the skerries, who does not risk, he does not drink champagne!
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 21 November 2021 21: 40
                0
                Quote: ban
                And navigational accidents in WWI - so they walked in skerries

                We walked in a few, narrow fairways. Step to the right, step to the left - a hole in the belly. You can also remember Rurik 2, which Byakhirev almost ditched in his first campaign as an admiral. As usual, we turned, all three Bayans slipped through and Rurik 2, which was the last one, immediately collected 50 tons of Baltic pebbles with his belly. I barely crawled to Kronstadt.

                There is nothing to do in the Baltic for ships with such a displacement. Every turn is risky.
                1. ban
                  ban 21 November 2021 21: 43
                  0
                  Bakhirev, if that.
                  all three Bayans slipped through and Rurik 2, which was the last one, immediately collected 50 tons of Baltic pebbles with his belly

                  Duck and what sediment does he have?
                  Bayan next to Rurik that puppy wink

                  We walked in a few, narrow fairways

                  You forgot to add - in SHKHERAH !!!
                  So what kind of container ships, tankers and liners go to the Baltic, and? Understand, it's one thing to walk in the middle of the Gulf of Finland, and another (completely different) to walk along the edge of the skerries.
                  1. Saxahorse
                    Saxahorse 21 November 2021 21: 49
                    -1
                    Quote: ban
                    Bayan next to Rurik that puppy

                    Well Duc! And Admiral Byakhirev's head is exactly a felt boot! What did you think about when you suddenly turn around in shallow water? And after all, he himself recently commanded the same Rurik, you can’t say that he didn’t remember the draft of his ships .. However, the admiral's shoulder straps seem to have a bad effect on the brains ..
                    1. ban
                      ban 21 November 2021 21: 55
                      +1
                      You shouldn't be talking about Bakhirev, in the 17th it was he who commanded the propagandized rabble in Moonsund, and, nevertheless, managed to discourage the Fritzes from continuing their operations in the direction of St.
                      1. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 21 November 2021 21: 59
                        -1
                        Quote: ban
                        You shouldn't be talking about Bakhirev

                        After the shame at Gotland, it is better not to remember Byakhirev's name. It was in the history of the German fleet that he was remembered, in the story of how his squadron fled in panic from one single German cruiser ..

                        However, our mutual friend Andrey is from Chelyabinsk and he didn’t forget to include this little guy among the heroes .. How did our long quarrel with Andrey begin. laughing
                      2. ban
                        ban 21 November 2021 22: 05
                        0
                        After the disgrace at Gotland

                        What's the shame?
                        After all, the duty of the commander is not to be a coat hanger in the wheelhouse, and not to expose his ship to enemy fire, including. The Germans skillfully maneuvered, unlike the same Rozhdestvensky
                      3. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 22 November 2021 22: 57
                        +1
                        Quote: ban
                        After all, the duty of the commander is not to be a coat hanger in the wheelhouse

                        That's it!
            2. ban
              ban 21 November 2021 21: 39
              +2
              What Slava ran into, after the first hole, losing the ability to move

              Ask how many Fritzes threw Slava!
              The opportunity to move, by the way, was not lost - Slava could not pass the shallow fairway to the Baltic.
              But here we must take into account the complete collapse of discipline - I think the ship could have been unloaded, put on plasters, pumped out floods. But the propagandized sailors scrambled in panic, instead of fighting for survivability ... And the Bolsheviks later came up with beautiful legends. Something like that
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 21 November 2021 21: 45
                0
                Quote: ban
                Slava was unable to pass the shallow fairway to the Baltic.

                This is exactly what I am writing to you about. No need to drive the elephant into a puddle.

                Well, what about the "propagandized" is how to say .. Baron von Lieven in 1904, who promoted? Why did he suddenly interned his Diana in Saigon?
                1. ban
                  ban 21 November 2021 21: 50
                  +1
                  Think about it. Break through to Vladik and 100% repeat the fate of Novik ... Or return to Arthur. And so at least the cruiser kept
                  1. Saxahorse
                    Saxahorse 21 November 2021 21: 55
                    +1
                    Quote: ban
                    And so at least the cruiser kept

                    Who did he keep it to? And did the German faith interfere with going further, towards the 2nd TOE? They all strove to jump out of the war, closing their eyes to conscience and duty. This is the sad truth of the surrendered and internees.
                    1. ban
                      ban 21 November 2021 22: 01
                      +2
                      And where were 2 TOEs at that time?
                      And was she?
                      Too lazy to watch, I prevent coronovirus with an antiseptic laughing
                      1. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 21 November 2021 22: 02
                        +1
                        Quote: ban
                        I prevent coronovirus with an antiseptic

                        Approve! laughing
                      2. ban
                        ban 21 November 2021 22: 07
                        +2
                        Thank you!
                        On this I propose to end an interesting discussion, otherwise the wife swears am
          2. Pilat2009
            Pilat2009 22 November 2021 10: 00
            0
            Quote: ban
            And especially the Borodino people, who showed amazing vitality and resilience

            That is why after the RYAV they (Slava and Tsesarevich) were not modernized, unlike the Black Sea five, and by the beginning of WWII they were ships of the 2nd line.
            Let's remember the battle of Slava in Moonsund - it turned out to be made of cardboard. The Japanese simply did not have normal armor-piercing shells ... Something like this

            Either way, the 5th squadron of British battleships received more penetrations than Slava. Or so
            1. ban
              ban 22 November 2021 23: 55
              0
              Barham 6, Worspite 13, Malaya 8, Valiant got off with a slight fright. Worspeight was heavily damaged (withdrew from the battle), in Malaya most of the killed and wounded (explosion in the 6 "battery).
              Glory - 7.
              "Having lost half of the heavy artillery, the battleship, with almost 2500 tons of water inside, was at the limit of the depletion of its combat effectiveness and with a draft increased to 10 with its nose, it had no chance of going north by the Moonsund Canal. the disastrous situation. The death of Glory, slowly advancing to the north, was only a matter of time. "
              Something like that.
              But I meant a little differently - in the new Sevastopol, the main belt is 5,1 m high and 225 mm thick - and, as everyone knows, it was very, very small.
              But the 1,98 m belt 194 mm thick is a super reliable booking!
              1. Pilat2009
                Pilat2009 23 November 2021 10: 28
                0
                Quote: ban
                Barham 6, Worspite 13, Malaya 8, Valiant got off with a slight fright. Worspeight was heavily damaged (withdrew from the battle), in Malaya most of the killed and wounded (explosion in the 6 "battery).
                Glory - 7.
                "Having lost half of the heavy artillery, the battleship, with almost 2500 tons of water inside, was at the limit of the depletion of its combat effectiveness and with a draft increased to 10 with its nose, it had no chance of going north by the Moonsund Canal. the disastrous situation. The death of Glory, slowly advancing to the north, was only a matter of time. "
                Something like that.
                But I meant a little differently - in the new Sevastopol, the main belt is 5,1 m high and 225 mm thick - and, as everyone knows, it was very, very small.
                But the 1,98 m belt 194 mm thick is a super reliable booking!

                I understood your idea. But practice has shown that German 305 mm shells pierced 200 mm or 300 mm. And then, it is not necessary to pierce the belt, you can pierce both the tower and the deck, and the casemate 150 mm with ignition and detonation
            2. unknown
              unknown 28 November 2021 08: 13
              0
              You will remember the operation in the Dardanelles.
              How many British battleships sank there.
        3. Very kind
          Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 47
          -2
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Bring the ZPR ships to normal, the Japanese would not be able to sink anyone

          You could.
          See the same 1898 Klado textbook. - clearly and directly it was written that 12 inches at an effective distance (!) it is a murderous remedy (including for "capital thorn")
          1. rytik32
            rytik32 22 November 2021 21: 40
            +2
            In 1904, only the RIF was armed with projectiles equipped with high-blasting explosives, capable of penetrating more than half of its caliber armor and exploding behind it. Moreover, the fuse delay was just calculated for the explosion in the CMU.
            The rest have either black powder, or, like the Japanese, an explosion until the moment of penetration.
            1. Very kind
              Very kind 23 November 2021 11: 03
              -3
              Quote: rytik32
              In 1904, only at the RIF

              there is still an interesting nuance - after throwing the (alleged) 4 EBR of the KRKR Kamimura, it remains to blame or rake, but the blame would have to be brought to the sharp aft control unit, from which our armor-piercing would sew them longitudinally (and then even a solid blank would go in)
          2. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 22 November 2021 23: 49
            +1
            Quote: Very kind
            See the same 1898 Klado textbook. - it was clearly and directly written that 12 inches at an effective distance (!) is a killer means (including for a "capital thorn")

            And it is right. The armor of that time did not hold an armor-piercing 12 "projectile, especially at a direct shot distance. But the Japanese actually did not have armor-piercing shells, the shimosa detonated when hitting the armor. Therefore, there is an abundance of hits, but there is practically no pierced armor. Only cracks that have fallen off or shifted In this sense, the Japanese did not gain anything from decreasing the distance.
        4. ban
          ban 22 November 2021 23: 58
          0
          Meanwhile, for more than a hundred years it has been obvious to the majority that the cause of the catastrophe in the RYAV was precisely the STUFF of Admiral Rozhdestvensky.

          good
      2. Very kind
        Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 49
        -2
        Quote: Kayuk
        I read the article - just such a rejection from her, you can see bile and an attempt to humiliate everyone who here expresses protection to the Admiral

        Did you write "admiral" with a capital letter on purpose?
        "Protection" is that - "search for the Faberge boyar Zinovy"?
        SO DO NOT FIND
        this article is so "sighting" (but with "cover")
        but the next one is just "to defeat"
    2. unknown
      unknown 21 November 2021 11: 29
      -1
      There is no real rewriting yet.
      There is simply no real understanding of when it was, where, who the opponents are.
      Therefore, in the official history everything collapses except for this topic.
      New data appears, but they try not to introduce them into circulation.
      But, the mass is accumulating.
  26. ban
    ban 20 November 2021 02: 50
    -1
    Respect to the author again!
    There is time - I will not deny myself the pleasure of savoring some especially tasty moments:

    Allegedly "innovator" Rozhdestvensky (from 25–32 cab) looks somewhat amusing against the background of Klado, who wrote back in 1898 in a textbook for midshipmen of the Marine Corps about effective artillery fire from 53 cab

    Indeed, having new guns with a firing range of 74 kabs (and, as it turned out later, all 110), to consider the real range of combat 25-32 kabs - how's that ?! Well, just no words! Approximately how to train from the AK-47 at the PPSh firing range, no, TT!
    And no matter what Rozhdestvensky's lawyers would prove to us about the alleged shooting practice at 60-70 cabs in Libau and Madagascar - I DO NOT BELIEVE !!! During the investigation, you will lie anything - from your own experience smile
    And why didn't he open fire on the Japanese with 70 cabs, huh?

    The obvious subsequent decision: "to shoot large at sharply increased distances, providing them with an average sighting" (ensuring the required number of (half) volleys in the time interval), and led to the creation of "dreadnoughts"

    In 1903, Cuniberty wrote the article "The Ideal Battleship for the Royal Navy" - take an interest. When did Michigan start designing mattress toppers, and when were they approved for construction? If they were quicker, they would not be dreadnoughts, but Michigan laughing

    Moreover, taking into account the subject matter and significance of the question, he read Alekseev's opus with a probability of "four nines" and authorized its publication!
    Against the background of this "cave trash", even the frankly wretched method of fire control of the Second Squadron looked like great progress

    Here, neither add nor subtract.
    Tsushima's results confirm this 100500%.
    1. rytik32
      rytik32 20 November 2021 12: 17
      +5
      Quote: ban
      And no matter what Rozhdestvensky's lawyers would prove to us about the alleged shooting practice at 60-70 cabs in Libau and Madagascar - I DO NOT BELIEVE !!! During the investigation, you will lie anything - from your own experience

      Yes, there was no 60 cab. and close, whatever the local lawyers of Rozhdestvensky wrote.
      I read a circular on the organization of that shooting and the distance in it are clearly spelled out: 15-25 cab.
      And the commission wrote in its conclusion that no more than 30 cab.
      1. ban
        ban 20 November 2021 13: 12
        -1
        But this is the pure truth.
        And for me and Novikov-Surf it is enough that they wouldn’t say what, they say, battalier ...
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 20 November 2021 13: 48
          +1
          The value of Novikov-Priboy's work is also in the fact that he collected the memories of the surviving veterans of Tsushima: both sailors and officers. By the way, these materials are in the archive. The work was constantly refined and supplemented. In fact, it turned out to be a huge collective work, and not purely his private opinion.
          1. ban
            ban 20 November 2021 14: 27
            0
            Of course!
            And from an educational point of view, the work is generally priceless - how many guys, having read the book, got sick with the fleet!
          2. Kayuk
            Kayuk 20 November 2021 21: 32
            +3
            The value of Novikov-Priboy's work is also in the fact that he collected the memories of the surviving veterans of Tsushima: both sailors and officers

            Collect, then collect. But what did he do with the material!
            Finally, there is a detailed account of the Tsushima battle made by the former underground revolutionary and sailor Novikov-Priboy, who participated in the battle as a medical orderly [6] and was in the interior of the battleship Orel. The battle itself took place outside of his field of vision, but the Soviet government gave him the opportunity to get acquainted with archival materials and personally interview many participants in the battle who lived in the USSR. Several experienced naval officers were called to help him with their advice.
            Novikov collected a wealth of material, but what did he do with it? In the first edition of his book, there were almost no positive reviews of his officers. Even Soviet critics were horrified, and in the newspaper "Red Fleet" the novel was subjected to severe criticism, which demanded that the book be revised and introduced into it, in addition to favorable reviews about the sailors, also positive characteristics of naval officers who participated in the battle. In the second edition, this deficiency was partially eliminated, but by party order, all the dirt collected and invented by Novikov in relation to Admiral Rozhestvensky, whose moral image was supposed to serve to discredit the old regime in the eyes of Soviet readers, was retained. For some reason, the heroic deeds of some other worthy officers are ridiculed. Probably, these shortcomings will be partially corrected in subsequent editions. But it is impossible to correct the spirit of the book, filled with defeatism in relation to his homeland, when it was ruled by the historical Russian power, the psychology of philistine cowardice and the physiological hatred of a semi-intellectual for everything that reminds him of his mental inferiority..

            This is in Tsushima by Aleksandrovsky. Although for me "Tsushima" by Novikov - Priboy is a good presentation of the historical facts of that period, the memoirs of eyewitnesses. For this he is greatly respected.
            1. ban
              ban 20 November 2021 22: 52
              -1

              Collect, then collect. But what did he do with the material!

              You are wrong, in my opinion, excuse me
              1. Kayuk
                Kayuk 21 November 2021 00: 38
                +1
                This is not only my opinion. Therefore, you are sorry. And read the above again. One-sided judgment will not lead to truth. Therefore, we will continue to search for this truth. But such articles will not lead to anything good, except srach, here.
                1. ban
                  ban 21 November 2021 10: 41
                  0
                  Truth can and should be sought.
                  But there is no need to pull the owl onto the globe, protecting Rozhdestvensky.
            2. Very kind
              Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 41
              +1
              Quote: Kayuk
              But it is impossible to correct the spirit of the book, filled with defeatism in relation to his homeland, when it was ruled by the historical Russian power, the psychology of philistine cowardice and the physiological hatred of a semi-intellectual for everything that reminds him of his mental inferiority.
              This is in "Tsushima" by Aleksandrovsky

              don't bullshit hurt her
              1. Alexandrovsky G.B. Tsushima battle. 1905–1955, Rossiya Publishing House, New York, 1956
              2. there is no "defeatism" in NP, and, in principle, the book was written very well for its time
          3. Very kind
            Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 43
            0
            Quote: rytik32
            The value of Novikov-Priboy's work is also in the fact that he collected the memories of the surviving veterans of Tsushima: both sailors and officers. By the way, these materials are in the archive. The work was constantly refined and supplemented. In fact, it turned out to be a huge collective work, and not purely his private opinion.

            Certainly!
            Well, and a very important point - a POSITIVE attitude - "remember! And do not allow it again!"
        2. RoTTor
          RoTTor 20 November 2021 21: 53
          +1
          The ancient Romans had a wise saying: "Shoemaker, do not judge higher than the boot!"
          If it is enough for you, then ... To each - his own.
          Novikov-Priboy did not further increase his naval and strategic training. The battalier's notes are also interesting in terms of his personal leadership and competence.
          In the 5th grade I read "Tsushima" excitedly, becoming an officer, gave someone the entire five-volume Novikov-Priboy.
          The strategic views of the battalier = captain, well, just a treasure trove.
          Better read his co-sailor-officer, the wonderful Soviet shipbuilder Kostenko, about whom he writes in his novel - "On the Eagle in Tsushima"
          1. ban
            ban 20 November 2021 23: 04
            -1
            Well?
            You can read a lot, and Semyonov, and Klado, etc.
            What did you want to say?
            PS And what about strategic views - you turned it down abruptly - they are not even close in "Tsushima", something like that ...
            And a five-volume edition -? !!
            In general, your comment smiled laughing
            1. Vagabung
              Vagabung 25 November 2021 20: 18
              0
              Novikov-Priboy A.S. - Collected works in 5 volumes
              Год издания: 1963
  27. Seal
    Seal 20 November 2021 11: 26
    +1
    Quote: Astra wild2
    Actually, Admiral Makarov is considered the last Russian naval commander.
    We have the right to call a naval commander such an admiral who independently won at least one major naval battle, the victory in which influenced the overall outcome of the war. Hence, perhaps the last of our naval commanders can be considered perhaps that of FF Ushakov.
    1. ban
      ban 20 November 2021 13: 14
      -1
      But Nimitz, for example, can be considered a naval commander?
      Or Vitgeft? And this, whatever one may say, is our admiral, who inflicted the greatest losses on the enemy in the entire history of the steam fleet.
      1. Pilat2009
        Pilat2009 20 November 2021 20: 40
        0
        Quote: ban
        Or Vitgeft

        In general, Vitgeft himself admitted that he was not a naval commander but a staff officer
        1. ban
          ban 20 November 2021 20: 55
          0
          Yes, who can argue, but nevertheless, to sink 2 battleships, who else could?
          1. Pilat2009
            Pilat2009 20 November 2021 21: 57
            +1
            Quote: ban
            what else could you?

            Ivanov
            1. ban
              ban 20 November 2021 22: 54
              0
              Fleet commander? On a personal initiative? Oh well
    2. RoTTor
      RoTTor 20 November 2021 21: 45
      -1
      ... and P.S. Nakhimov, under whose command the Black Sea Fleet destroyed the Turkish fleet
    3. Kayuk
      Kayuk 21 November 2021 00: 42
      0
      Our last naval commander can probably be considered unless FF Ushakov.

      Probably after all it was Rear Admiral L.P. Heyden.
  28. RoTTor
    RoTTor 20 November 2021 21: 44
    -1
    Reasonably and logically explains the direct, though not obvious, reason for the disastrous delay of our squadron.
    I recommend listening carefully:

    The Gull incident and, as a result, the defeat of the Russian squadron in the Tsushima battle. A. Krushelnitsky


    https://video.search.yahoo.com/search/video?ei=UTF-8&p=%22%D0%93%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9+%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%22#id=1&vid=925016b4654899012ce29a70f2234aee&action=click
  29. Usher
    Usher 20 November 2021 22: 10
    +1
    Quote: Captain General
    Quote: ElTuristo
    Varyag is a real practical embodiment of Makarov's views on the future of the fleet, which was actually tested in battle.

    I didn't want to argue with you.
    But you are confidently walking the path of Kolobov, who absolutely does not understand how the fleet was arranged in those days.
    No, no, I do not argue that Makarov's extravagant ideas about the fleet were a kind of unprofessionalism. So yes, his idea of ​​"ideal armored cruisers" says a lot about him as a sailor.
    But Varyag had nothing to do with these ideas.
    Varyag was the development of Admiral Chikhachev's ideas about cruising war. And when it was handed over to Russian operators, it was a wonderful ship.
    But quickly enough it was turned into a trash heap.
    This was a feature of the Russian fleet, and quickly turn everything into a trash heap.
    And the idea to send the Varyag to Chemulpo was idiocy in its purest form.
    There should have been (based on the tasks facing the stationers) a ship for impacting on land (a gunboat or, if you really wanted to push, a coastal defense battleship; a floating artillery platform, in other words).
    But for some reason the "trade fighter" Varyag was sent there. Which there was simply "do not sew a mare's tail."

    What the hell is this? What does the garbage have to do with it? Do you know the design of Varyag boilers? On it stood the unreliable but highly publicized boilers of Nikloss, if memory serves. Which were promoted, but they showed good results only in greenhouse conditions. With these boilers, the French navy suffered a lot. All problems are due to thin tubes that have burned out.
  30. A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 21 November 2021 00: 30
    0
    Personally, I really liked the article, even in spite of its peculiar syllable!
    As for the strike on Togo's noose by the "Borodinites" in the front line, this is unlikely. No matter how much more mess it turned out.
    But it is difficult to argue with the author about the methods of using artillery in general and the figure of Rozhdestvensky in particular. After all, Rozhdestvensky has really always been characterized as an expert in these matters, and in the battle he behaved very strangely.
    Let's say there is no speed for a dash and approaching the enemy for profitable 10 - 12 cabs. But his idea is to crawl at 9 knots on the NO23 course, hoping to endure enemy fire, well, nonsense!
    1. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 21 November 2021 07: 07
      +1
      Quote: A_Mazkov
      hoping to endure enemy fire, well, nonsense!

      Vitgeft endured.
      1. unknown
        unknown 21 November 2021 11: 32
        0
        Vitgeft did it at a different speed.
        The difference in speed was less.
        Theoretically, Vitgeft could go at a higher speed, but apparently, a clinical underestimation of the speed of the ships of the line was characteristic of all Russian admirals of that time.
        1. ban
          ban 21 November 2021 14: 52
          +1
          Theoretically, Vitgeft could walk at a higher speed.

          Poltava and Sevastopol - alas!
          And how long have the ships already fought without normal maintenance?
          1. unknown
            unknown 28 November 2021 08: 17
            0
            The Poltava was faster than the Sevastopol.
            He was the slowest of the three.
            As for the service, Vitgeft, like Rozhdestvensky, could better prepare the ships for battle.
            1. ban
              ban 28 November 2021 10: 54
              0
              I wonder how, in your opinion?
      2. A_Mazkov
        A_Mazkov 21 November 2021 12: 12
        +3
        And Witgeft maneuvered, because of which Togo could not take a favorable position for himself in relation to ITOE. Even in the last phase (before the death of Vitgeft) Togo fought on the "dogon", and Mikasa could get it from all Russian ships. Yes, our sailors fired worse than the Japanese, but there are no questions about Witgeft's tactics.
        1. Pilat2009
          Pilat2009 21 November 2021 13: 08
          0
          Quote: A_Mazkov
          there are no questions about Witgeft's tactics

          So Togo made a loop so as not to catch up later. This is not a question for Witgeft, but for Togo's mistakes.
          1. Kayuk
            Kayuk 28 November 2021 14: 58
            0
            There are many questions about the "name of Togo" loop. Why did it have to be done at all? 2 TOE walked along the strait, to the right and to the left you cannot maneuver much in the narrowness. Togo crossed her course from above and went to the classic "Crossing the T". But then it turns sharply by almost 180 degrees, crosses the course of our squadron for the second time and, turning to the left, goes to the column of the 2nd and 3rd detachments, supposedly to destroy them ??? !!! The question is why? After all, it was possible to disassemble the Suvorov and Oslyabya, then the next ones, beautifully from above with their entire column of 12 ships. If they began to unfold, or fail from damage, it would have turned out to be a herd in a corral. But Togo turned ...
      3. Very kind
        Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 37
        0
        Quote: Pilat2009
        Vitgeft endured.

        due to the maneuver and the fact that it was shooting back very well
        those. Togo understood that if he went to reduce the distance, he would get a lot, and this kept him
    2. Very kind
      Very kind 22 November 2021 12: 38
      0
      Quote: A_Mazkov
      Let's say there is no speed for a dash and approaching the enemy for profitable 10 - 12 cabs.

      was, and taking into account the "Togo loop" - it was real in 6-7 minutes
      1. A_Mazkov
        A_Mazkov 22 November 2021 16: 34
        +1
        I'm talking about something else.
        Rozhestvensky decided to keep the speed of the squadron at 9 knots.
        Okay, so be it.
        At the same time, he himself later said that: "It was clear that, due to the comparative speed of the Japanese battleships, the initiative in choosing the relative location of the main forces, both for the start of the battle and for its various stages, as well as in the choice of distances , will belong to the enemy ... ".
        What Togo was going to do was not a secret for Rozhdestvensky, he would try to put a "stick over T" and fire all his ships in turn to knock out the 2TOE ships.
        But I still did not understand from the testimony and reports of Rozhdestvensky, but how did he even intend to fend off Togo's actions?
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 22 November 2021 20: 12
          +3
          Quote: A_Mazkov
          But I still did not understand from the testimony and reports of Rozhdestvensky, but how did he even intend to fend off Togo's actions?

          The Christmas plan of battle was not announced to anyone, and moreover, he said that it was not there)))
          The front line attack was practiced during the exercises ...
          And the final version, apparently, was to keep a tight formation and respond with well-aimed fire, and like the Japanese would not dare come close.
          1. A_Mazkov
            A_Mazkov 22 November 2021 21: 07
            0
            Alexey, and close, how many, from 10 to 15 cab.?
            So such a distance is contraindicated in Togo, it has only 4 EBRs, the rest is cruisers. At such a distance, the Russians will switch to armor-piercing and will definitely "perforate" everything they hit.
            I wonder what distance Rozhestvensky himself was counting on, from 20 to 30 cab.?
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 22 November 2021 21: 27
              +3
              Quote: A_Mazkov
              Alexey, and close, how many, from 10 to 15 cab.?

              No, obviously more.
              he has only 4 EBRs, the rest are cruisers.

              By the way, Togo ordered Kamimura to stay a little further in the first phase of the battle. I was afraid for them.
              I wonder what distance Rozhestvensky himself counted on, from 20 to 30 cab.?

              If you read the